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PETER OF AUVERGNE'S QUESTIONS
ON
BOOKS I AND II OF THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA:
A STUDY AND CRITICAL EDITION*

Anthony J. Celano

INTRODUCTION

The efforts of modern scholars, such as R.-A. Gauthier,1 M. Grabmann2 and O. Lottin,3 have contributed greatly to our understanding of the moral philosophy of the thirteenth century. Despite their numerous investigations, the

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The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes and in the apparatus fontium:

Comm. = The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. H. P. F. Mercken (Leiden, 1973) (references are to page and line numbers)

D = Sententia libri De anima, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia 45.1; Rome-Paris, 1984)

EN = Ethica Nicomachea

H = Les auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiévale. Étude historique et édition critique, ed. J. Hamesse (Philosophes médiévaux 17; Louvain-Paris, 1974) (references are to page and item numbers)

Lect. = Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones libri quinque priores (Alberti Magni ... Opera omnia 14.1/1; Münster in W., 1968) (references are to page and line numbers)

M = Metaphysica. Translatio anonymi, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Aristoteles Latinus 25.2; Leiden, 1976)


Sent. = Sententia libri Ethicorum, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia 47.1-2; Rome, 1969) (references are to page and line numbers)

ST = Sancti Thomae de Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum Summa theologiae, 5 vols. (Ottawa, 1941-55), especially vol. 2 which contains ST 1-2.

1 'Trois commentaires “averroi’stes” sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 16 (1947-48) 187-336; Magnanimité, l’idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne (Bibliothèque théomiste 28; Paris, 1951); ‘Arnoul de Provence et la doctrine de la fronesis, vertu mystique suprême’, Revue du moyen âge latin 19 (1963) 135-70; and the introduction to Sent., pp. 1*-268*. These and

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historian of medieval ethics is hampered by a general scarcity of printed texts. Although the commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea* (hereafter *EN*) have been published, little is known about the teachings of many less famous masters of the medieval universities; almost all of their questions on the *EN* remain unedited and some commentaries of importance have been almost totally ignored. To view the immense erudition and the deep understanding which Albert and Thomas brought to their study of Aristotle as isolated phenomena, the products of particular genius, gives an incomplete, if not incorrect, picture of thirteenth-century moral philosophy. In order to expand our knowledge of moral speculation in the thirteenth century the sixty-six questions of Peter of Auvergne on the first two books of the *EN* are edited in their entirety below.

Peter’s questions represent the first phase in the development of moral philosophy after the death of Thomas Aquinas. Peter’s commentary is particularly important for our understanding of those condemned propositions of 1277, which concern the nature of human happiness and man’s ability to attain his *sumnum bonum*. In the discussion of the contents, which precedes this edition of the questions, particular attention will be given to the problems which arose from the meeting of the Christian *beatitudo* and the pagan *εὐδαιμονία*. The way in which Peter resolves the conflict between Greek philosophy and Christian theology determines the direction which future medieval commentators would follow.

Two manuscripts contain the questions on the *EN* by Peter of Auvergne. The more complete is Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1386 (= L). It is the product of several hands, the most important of which is a German hand of the early fourteenth century. After a detailed table of contents an assortment of works by numerous other works of Gauthier are indispensable for the student of Aristotle’s *Ethics* in the Middle Ages.

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4. *Lect.* and *Sent.*

5. The commentary of John of Tytynsale (Teasdale), which is contained in three manuscripts (Durham, Cathedral Library C.IV.20 [= D], Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 611/341, and Oxford, Oriel College 33 [books 1-5]), has evoked little interest from historians of medieval philosophy. See C. H. Lohr, ‘Medieval Latin Aristotelian Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi-Myngodus’, *Traditio* 27 (1971) 289.

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thirteenth-century authors follows. Peter of Auvergne’s questions are the last work in the manuscript: a prologue, 47 questions on book I and 19 questions on book II of the EN occupy fols. 115ra-126va. For unknown reasons the questions end abruptly with a discussion on virtue as a mean, whose source is book II, chapter 8 of the EN. Gauthier has observed that the manuscript is not mutilated in any way and that the bottom of the column of fol. 126va and all of fol. 126vb are left blank. We do not know whether the exemplar was incomplete or the author or scribe simply discontinued the work here.

The second manuscript which contains the questions is Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16110 (= P), which was bequeathed to the Sorbonne by James of Padua. P, a fourteenth-century manuscript written by several hands, ends with a prologue and eight questions on the EN (fols. 276v-277v) which correspond to the prologue and book I, questions 1, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 22 and 28 of L. Book I, question 12 of L is transcribed at the bottom of fol. 237r of P as an apparent addition to a set of anonymous questions on the EN. The anonymous questions of P, to which Peter’s work has been appended, were certainly composed in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The unnamed author of this first set of questions was greatly influenced by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas and offers conclusions which are similar to those of Peter of Auvergne. The similarity in thought between the master of P and Peter of Auvergne may explain the addition of Peter’s questions to the anonymous commentary.

No indication as to the identity of the author of our questions appears in P, but the rubricator of L names Peter of Auvergne as the author. At the top of fol. 115r he has written in large capital letters: INCIPIUNT QUESTIONES MAGISTRI P. DE AVERNIA SUPRA LIBRUM ETHICORUM. Neither the explicit nor the table of contents of L mentions the author of the commentary. We must ask ourselves whether the questions are indeed the work of Peter or, as is so often the case, if a scribe merely attached a well-known name to an unascribed text. Gauthier has argued that Peter of Auvergne’s reputation was not so great in the fourteenth century as to prompt false attributions.

A more detailed description of the manuscript is found in H. V. Shooner, ed., Codices manuscripti operum Thomae de Aquino 2 (Rome, 1973), pp. 194-95; also Gauthier, ibid., 236-41. Grabmann mentions the attribution of the questions to Peter of Auvergne by the rubricator of L in Die Aristoteleskommentare des Heinrich von Brüssel, p. 47. Until the appearance of Gauthier’s article, the commentary was not listed among Peter’s works.

Gauthier, ibid., 240-41.

9 ibid., 241. See the description in G. Lacombe, ed., Aristoteles Latinus. Codices 1 (Rome, 1939), no. 671 (on pp. 561-63); but see also Gauthier, ibid., 241 n. 15, because the editors of Aristoteles Latinus have confused Peter’s questions with the Sententia libri Politicorum of Thomas Aquinas.

10 Gauthier, ibid., 241-43.

11 ibid., 240. Because the rubricator refers to Thomas Aquinas as sanctus, the manuscript must have been copied sometime after 1323. The reputation of Peter of Auvergne seems to have
Although the ascription of the rubricator cannot be accepted without hesitation, no compelling reasons exist for rejecting it. A comparison between the questions on the \textit{EN} and certain quodlibetal questions known to be the products of Peter's magisterial activity in the Parisian theology faculty has shown some similarities in doctrine.\textsuperscript{12} The similarity between our questions and a known work of Peter, the general tenor of moderate 'Aristotelianism',\textsuperscript{13} together with the attribution of the rubricator afford solid reasons for listing the commentary among the authentic \textit{opera} of Peter of Auvergne.

To date with precision a commentary on the \textit{EN} from the last quarter of the thirteenth century is not without difficulty: many of the commentaries of this period are anonymous and almost all of them give no direct indication of their date of composition. The scarcity of information concerning the life of Peter compounds the difficulty in determining the date of composition of one of his works.\textsuperscript{14} The year in which he entered the theology faculty at Paris, 1296,\textsuperscript{15} been somewhat greater at the time than Gauthier believes. See J.-P. Muller, 'Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la bêtitude formelle', \textit{Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale} 15 (1948) 152-70. Gauthier realizes himself that this argument alone is hardly convincing.

\textsuperscript{12} A. J. Celano, \textit{Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on the Nicomachean Ethics} (Licentiate thesis, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 5-8. Peter’s \textit{Quodlibet} I.6, ‘Whether God can make a creature see the true divine essence and < make the creature > not blessed?’, contains conclusions on the twofold nature of the end and the primacy of the intellect similar to those found in the questions on the \textit{EN}. Cf. questions 7, 11, 25 and 31 of book I below with Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 269, fol. 138rb and Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 932, fol. 105va. See also Muller, ibid., 154-55 and n. 31 below.

\textsuperscript{13} Gauthier, ‘Les \textit{Questions}’, 243.

\textsuperscript{14} The information on the life and works of Peter of Auvergne is examined by E. Hocedez in five articles:

1. ‘La vie et les œuvres de Pierre d’Auvergne’, \textit{Gregorianum} 14 (1933) 3-36
2. ‘La théologie de Pierre d’Auvergne’, \textit{Gregorianum} 11 (1930) 526-55
3. ‘La philosophie des Quodlibets de Pierre d’Auvergne’ in \textit{Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schütern gewidmet}, ed. A. Long et al. (BGPTM Suppl. 3.2; Münster i. W., 1935), pp. 779-91
4. ‘Une question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation’, \textit{Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie} 36 (1934) 335-86
5. ‘Les \textit{Questiones} in \textit{Metaphysicum} de Pierre d’Auvergne’, \textit{Archives de philosophie} 9.3 (1932) 179-234.

For a more recent bibliography, see G. M. Grech, ‘Recent Bibliography on Peter of Auvergne’, \textit{Angelicum} 41 (1964) 446-49 and also Gauthier, ‘Les \textit{Questions}’, 233-36. Gauthier’s assertion that the rector of the University of Paris in 1275 and the bishop of Clermont in 1302-1304 are the same man is not beyond question. Lohr makes a tentative identification of the two in his ‘Medieval Latin Aristotelian Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus-Ricardus’, \textit{Traditio} 28 (1972) 334. We can say with certainty only that the master who completed the works of Thomas Aquinas, left the arts faculty in 1296, and became bishop of Clermont is the same man. This Peter of Auvergne is probably the author of our questions. The source of the biographical data is Ptolomy of Lucca, \textit{Historia ecclesiastica} 23.11, ed. A. Dondaine, ‘Les \textit{Opuscula fratris Thomae chez Ptolémée de Lucques’, \textit{Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum} 31 (1961) 152.

\textsuperscript{15} Hocedez, ‘La vie et les œuvres’, 5.
provides a definite *terminus ante quem* for his questions, since they are undoubtedly the work of an arts master. Because the questions do not contain some late innovations in thirteenth-century thought, Gauthier favored a date well before 1291.\(^\text{16}\) If the author of the questions is the Magister Petrus de Alvernia who became rector of the University of Paris in 1275, as Gauthier believed, then the questions must have been composed between 1275 and 1291 or earlier, since the appointment as rector supposes membership in the arts faculty. Even if Gauthier’s assertion is incorrect, the questions must have been written at Paris during these years, as I shall attempt to demonstrate below.

An analysis of one censured article from the condemnations of 1277 may help to determine a more exact *terminus post quem*.\(^\text{17}\) The most important censured proposition for our purposes concerns the possibility of earthly happiness: ‘Quod felicitas habetur in ista vita, et non in alia’.\(^\text{18}\) The addition of the modifying phrase ‘in ista vita’ must have surprised the arts masters at Paris during this period. From 1248 to 1277 the unqualified term ‘felicitas’ is used in the arts faculty to denote the earthly happiness which Aristotle discusses in the *EN*. When Albert, Thomas and Boethius of Dacia use ‘felicitas’, they have in mind the concept called τελειωμοσία by Aristotle.\(^\text{19}\)

In all the known commentaries on the *EN* composed after 1277 ‘felicitas’ is described in a way not found prior to the condemnations. In the commentaries of the last quarter of the thirteenth century ‘felicitas’ comes to be qualified by such expressions as ‘in futura vita’, ‘in patria’, ‘in alia vita’ and ‘in terra’ in order to contrast the Christian ideal of beatitude with Aristotelian happiness.\(^\text{20}\) Those

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\(^\text{16}\) Gauthier, ‘Les *Questiones*’, 245.

\(^\text{17}\) The difficulties of such a method are noted by R. Hissette, ‘La date de quelques commentaires à l’*Ethique*’, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 18 (1976) 79-83. I am convinced, however, that the condemnations concerning moral philosophy can be useful in dating commentaries on the *EN*.


\(^\text{19}\) ‘Dicendum, quod felicitas non est quaedam generalis beatitudo et ordinatio totius animae secundum omnes potentias, sicut quidam dicunt...’ (Lect., pp. 75-76.71-04); ‘Ex quo patet quod felicitas de qua Philosophus loquitur non consistit in illa continuatione ad intelligentiam separatam per quam homo intelligat omnia, ut quidam posuerunt’ (Sent., p. 51.90-94); ‘Non dico summum bonum absolute, sed summum sibi, bona enim possibilia homini... Quid autem sit hoc summum bonum, quod est homini possibile, per rationem investigemus’ (De *summo bono*, ed. N. G. Green-Pedersen, *Boethii Daci Opera. Topica. Opuscula* [Corpus philosophorum dancorum medi ae avi 6.2; Copenhagen, 1976], p. 369.3-7).

\(^\text{20}\) Some striking examples of the new terminology are found in the following:

- John of Tytynsale: ‘... quia mortui sunt ex *tra* > vitam presentem cuius felicitatem quierimus’ (D 212rb [my corrected foliation used here and below])
- Giles of Orléans (?): ‘... illa felicitas que est in patria est per se intransmutabilis, et de illa non loquimur, immo solum de felicitate que est homini possibilib in hac vita...’ (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16089 [= G], fol. 200va).

For similar definitions of happiness, cf. Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek der Stadt
cumbersome designations of Aristotle’s notion of happiness as ‘felicitas in hac vita’ or ‘felicitas in terra’ would scarcely have been used if some extraordinary event had not made them necessary. Such an abrupt change in terminology may well have been occasioned by the condemned article concerning happiness. This new terminology would then have originated in the desire of the arts masters to avoid ecclesiastical censure. Peter of Auvergne’s use of these new terms may thus indicate that he composed his questions sometime after 1277.21

The questions of John of Tytynsale afford a useful criterion for dating late thirteenth-century commentaries on the _EN_. His little studied work has a dated explicit, the only one at present known in a commentary on the _EN_ of the late thirteenth century: ‘Expliciunt questiones XII librorum metaphysice et similiter III librorum ethicorum disputate a magistro Johanne a Ditensale, anno domini MCC octogesimo tercio’.22 John’s familiarity with Peter’s application of the twofold end to the Aristotelian concept of happiness and his subsequent refinement of Peter’s position suggest that John’s commentary is of a later date.23 We can therefore conclude that in all probability Peter of Auvergne’s questions on the _EN_ were written between 1277 and 1283.

**Analysis of the Contents of the Questions**

**The Prologue**

In the prologue, which is dependent to a large extent upon the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne determines in a general fashion the aim

Amplon. F 13, fol. 90rb and Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 213, fol. 52va. The commentator who most carefully distinguishes between earthly and heavenly happiness is the anonymous author of Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 2172 (= V), fol. 7rb:

Et est intelligendum quod ista speculacio vel coniunctio per cognitionem ... secundum quod est possible in hac vita est ... possesso....

After a long discussion of the difference between happiness and beatitude, which the commentator of V calls _felicitas intrinseca_ and _felicitas extrinseca_ respectively, he makes clear his notion of _felicitas in hac vita_. Note also his careful distinction between the philosopher’s happiness and the Christian’s beatitude in his response to the question whether a man can be called happy during his lifetime:

... est intelligendum quod quidam philosophy, sicut Averrois et multi alii philosophy <non> posuerunt aliam felicitatem nisi illam que est in hac vita. Sed Avicenna et Algazal, qui fuerunt iudei, bene posuerunt aliam felicitatem in alia vita; nec etiam Philosophus videtur expresse negare eam (V 12va).

Cf. ‘Sed dico quod in hac vita aliquis homo potest esse felix, ... etiam secundum quod est possible in hac vita’ (ibid.). K. Giocarnis’ assertion that the commentator of V does not mention otherworldly happiness is obviously incorrect (‘An Unpublished Late Thirteenth-Century Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle’, *Traditio* 15 [1959] 306).

21 See book I, questions 39 and 40 (below, pp. 80-82).

22 D 258v.

23 See the discussion on the end on pp. 11-13 below.
and the subject matter of the science of ethics. After a short definition of art Peter asserts that all human art arises from cognition. As ethics is the art of living, Peter concentrates on those human habits which are in the mind (anima) (prol., par. 3, II. 18-25). Peter divides human understanding into two kinds: (1) that which understands those things which are done by man (practical understanding); (2) that which understands natural things (speculative understanding). Peter ignores speculative understanding in the rest of the prologue and concentrates on the subject matter of the art of living, the habitus practicus (prol., par. 3.25-28).

As Peter seeks to narrow his definition of ethics, he quickly eliminates certain human activities as irrelevant to his study. Activities which are common to animals and vegetation are not considered because they are not subject to the will. Peter is now ready to give his first and most general definition of ethics: 'moral philosophy considers those things which are subject to reason and the will' (prol., par. 3.32-33). The mental processes of understanding (intelligere) and choosing (eligere) are offered as examples of what a moral philosopher studies. Peter has done much more than describe certain moral actions; he has given us an important key to understanding his moral philosophy. He has described his belief in the primacy of the intellect over the will. A moral decision is reached first by man understanding and then by making a choice. Peter himself realizes that his understanding of moral action is not Aristotelian, but is derived from the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (prol., par. 3.38-52).

The remainder of the prologue considers man as a member of the polis and is derivative in nature. Peter, like most of his contemporaries, divides moral science into three branches: monastics, economics and politics. The questions on the EN treat monastics because its subject matter concerns individual human actions which are ordered to an end (prol., par. 8).

Book I

Questions 1-5

In questions 1 through 5 Peter considers in more detail the subjects discussed in his prologue. The general theme of the first five questions is ethics as a science. Peter begins with a general consideration of moral science. For Peter moral science is a more inclusive term than ethics because it considers man not only as an individual moral agent but as a member of a household and of society as well (question 2, par. 4). Peter claims that Aristotle handed down moral science because man is so easily swayed from the true path. Moral

24 Lect. 2.51-53; Sent. 4.99-106.
25 Cf. ibid.
science is first and foremost an aid to correct living and governs all actions in the moral, domestic and political spheres (1, par. 3-4).

In questions 3 through 5 Peter turns his attention specifically to the science of ethics. Peter defends ethics as a valid and unified science because it has one subject, human actions and passions. Although actions and passions taken separately provide no basis for those universal statements which are required by science, they can be considered as part of the totality of human endeavors, and then they may be described scientifically (3, par. 3-4 and 4, par. 7). 26

Peter realizes that we cannot speak of the science of ethics in the same way as we speak of mathematical sciences. Whereas a triangle always has three sides, human actions admit a certain variety. Still we can make conclusions which hold true for the most part and therein lies the scientific character of ethics (4, par. 7.20-27). 27

After the discussion of the subject matter of ethics, Peter considers the aim of moral philosophy. He distinguishes between theoretical and practical science by concentrating upon the aim or purpose of the science. He says that every science proceeds by distinction, definition and demonstration. Speculative sciences are for the sake of contemplation alone: they do not necessarily lead to action though they give rise to knowledge. Practical sciences, on the other hand, have a purpose beyond the acquisition of knowledge, for they have a certain utility. In the case of moral philosophy, man discerns a goal beyond the dissipation of ignorance about morals: the study of ethics makes men good by teaching them the right way to act. This science then must be practical (5, par. 4). Peter's arguments reflect the Aristotelian division of sciences into contemplative and practical, a distinction generally adopted in the Middle Ages. 28

Questions 6-8

Questions 6 through 8 consider man as a moral agent and the faculties by which he makes moral choices: the appetite, the will and the intellect. In question 6 Peter examines a basic Platonic and Aristotelian premise that 'all things seek the good'. Peter asks whether the appetite can possibly pursue evil.

26 Cf. Lect. 2.2-5 and 28-33. Questions 3 and 4 of Peter's commentary correspond to the first two questions of Albert's prologue.

27 Cf. Lect. 2.2-5; EN 1.3 (1094b11-23).

28 Lect. 4.16-19. Peter does not use here Thomas' method of distinguishing the sciences, which is based upon the relationship between human reason and the science itself (Sent. 4.25-43); see also questions 5 and 6 of the commentary of Thomas on the De trinitate of Boethius and the bibliography in A. Maurer, trans., St. Thomas Aquinas. The Division and the Method of the Sciences. Questions V and VI of His Commentary on the De trinitate of Boethius, 3rd rev. edition (Toronto, 1963).
Following Thomas Aquinas, Peter concludes that no one desires evil except under the guise of goodness; everything which the appetite pursues must have a 'racio boni' (6, par. 6.20-23). Man can pursue evil only if it appears to him as good. Thus, evil is never desired per se, but only per accidens (6, par. 6.23-31). Even suicide, the greatest of evils, appears to the one who takes his own life as a good action, which can release him from his misfortunes (6, par. 11).

Gauthier has shown how greatly the work of Thomas Aquinas influenced Peter's conclusions concerning the principles of human action. All human moral activities proceed from the will and the intellect according to Thomas and Peter. Peter affirms with Thomas the supremacy of the intellect in question 7, because intellectual cognition of the desired object must simply and naturally precede the act of volition (7, par. 6).

Question 8 asks whether man is sufficient of himself for the operations of life. Peter responds that no being other than God is self-sufficient with respect to existence. Peter, however, is not concerned with self-sufficient existence, because man needs certain external goods in all his activities, if only food and shelter, to keep him alive (8, par. 4). In this question Peter suggests his answer to a much more difficult problem, the role of external goods in human happiness. In words reminiscent of Thomas' commentary on the EN, Peter claims that worldly goods 'embellish' (decorant) human life and make virtuous actions easier to perform (8, par. 5). The final resolution to the vexing problem of the effect of fortune on human happiness comes later in the questions.

Questions 9-10

Questions 9 and 10 begin the analysis of the text of Aristotle, and concentrate upon the concept of the good as described in the opening lines of the EN. According to Peter, Aristotle's first conclusion means that all things have a natural inclination towards their own perfection. Because the perfection of

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29 Cf. Sent. 5.158-64.
30 Gauthier, 'Les Questiones', 244-47; cf. Sent. 5.128-48.
31 Compare the conclusions in our questions with those of Peter's later work, Quodlibet I.6:

Actus autem omnis voluntatis rationem habet ex actu intellectus, siquidem objectum voluntatis primum est bonum apprehensum vel intellectum, ut alias declaratum fiuit. Ergo omnis actus reflexus in natura intellectuali rationem habet immediate vel per medium ex actu intellectus primo (ed. Muller, 'Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort', 154).

Could 'alias' refer to the questions on the EN?

32 Cf. Sent. 58-59.116-21: 'Si bona <fortunae>, conferent ad hoc quod vita hominis sit beator, quia, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas indiget exterioribus bonis vel ad decorum vel in quantum sunt instrumenta operationis secundum virtutem; et quantum ad primum dicit quod nata sunt simul decorare vitam felicis.'

33 See book I, question 35 (below, pp. 76-77).
anything is its own good (suum bonum), each thing necessarily seeks the good (9, par. 4-5). For Peter, as for other thirteenth-century commentators on the EN, the end and the good can be considered as synonyms; when the good, therefore, is said to be sought by each thing its end is also so desired (10, par. 5 and cf. 14, par. 4). The conclusion that each thing seeks its ultimate perfection leads Peter to a consideration of the end itself. In the response to the question whether all things desire one good, Peter makes a distinction which will reappear throughout the remainder of his work. He distinguishes between two aspects of the end. An end, he says, can be understood in two ways: (1) finis quo which is the perfection of anything whereby it is perfected; (2) finis cuius which is the end by participation in which something is perfected (10, par. 6.15-18).

The immediate source for Peter’s twofold distinction within the end is the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas says that an end can be viewed in two ways: as finis cuius and as finis quo. Considered in the first way the end is the object in which the nature of goodness is found. Taken in the second way the end is the use of the aforesaid object. Thomas offers the example of the final human end, which as the finis cuius can only be God; as the finis quo the end for man can be considered to be the pursuit of this finis cuius or the activity by which God is known and loved.

34 For the doctrine of the good as end in Albert and his predecessors, see J. Schneider, Das Gute und die Liebe nach der Lehre Alberts des Grossen (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie N.F. 3; Munich-Paderborn-Vienna, 1967), especially pp. 79-85. For Thomas, see Sent. 31.30-41 and ST 1-2, 4 ad 1. For the source of Peter’s response to the objection that inanimate objects do not seek the good (9.1), see Eustratius’ commentary on the first book of the EN (Comm., pp. 12-13). Cf. Alberti Magni De bono, tr. 1, q. 1 (Alberti Magni Opera omnia 28; Münster in W., 1951), p. 2.49-53 and also Lect. 7.9-17; cf. Thomas, Sent. 5.156-83, and the commentator of V, fol. 2va-b.

35 Much of the discussion which follows is derived from Eustratius’ response to the same question (Comm., p. 13). The answers of Albert and Thomas are found in Lect. 7.25-54 and Sent. 5.175-82 respectively.

36 The notion of a specific end or goal participating in the universal end is common in the thirteenth century: see Comm., p. 13, where Eustratius distinguishes between the good simpliciter and bonum quoddam. Albert distinguishes between a finis extra, to which all created goods are related, and particular ends (De bono 10.28-33); cf. Albert’s Ethicorum libri X (Paraphrasis), lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 4 in B. Alberti Magni ... Opera omnia, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1891), p. 22a, and Lect. 6.52-55. Thomas Aquinas argues that all goods must be similar to, and participate in, the simply highest good. By means of participation, the highest good or the absolutely final end is said to be that which all things seek (Sent. 5.175-82).

37 ST 1-2, 1, 8; cf. ibid. 1-2, 2, 7. See also W. Kluxen, Philosophisches Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin (Mainz, 1964), pp. 120-21. The distinction is not Thomas’ own; its source is Aristotle’s De anima 2.4 (415b20-21 and 415b2-3). It acquired its Latin form from the commentary on the De anima by Averroes (Commentarium magnnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, ed. F. S. Crawford [Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelic 6.1; Cambridge, Mass., 1953], pp. 183-84). Compare the text of the translation of Aristotle there with that found in Averroēs commentarius Aristotelis De anima (Venice, 1574), fol. 67v and t. c. 35, fol. 68r. The first application of the
Eustratius also knew and used the twofold distinction within the end, but he, like Thomas, did not apply it to the first book of Aristotle's EN. The reason why Eustratius considers such a concept as not pertinent to his commentary lies in his expressed interest to explain only the words of the Philosopher. Thomas' reluctance to use the notion of the finis cuius when discussing the passages where Aristotle treats the final end for man stems from similar reasons. Thomas has no desire to discuss the final end simpliciter (finis cuius) in his commentary on the EN, because he intends to examine only the highest of all goods operable by man (summum omnium operatorum). Human efforts alone (finis quo) are the subject of moral science. The consideration of the finis cuius, in Thomas' opinion, lies outside the scope of the EN and is properly reserved for theological investigations.

Thomas Aquinas' successors felt no such reluctance to include a discussion of the finis cuius in their commentaries on the EN. The innovation of Peter of Auvergne lies not in the distinction itself but in its application to Aristotle's concept of the human good. For the first time a medieval commentator on the EN considers the end not only as human activity but also as the final object of the activity.

Peter of Auvergne applies the distinction in the end directly to the human good when he says that the finis cuius is the finis hominis because man is made both good and happy through participation in the first being. As a result, Peter concludes that further distinctions are appropriate to the human end. If the finis cuius of man is the absolute first being, then it must be a universal extrinsic end. If, on the other hand, the finis quo is the human operation, then it must be a distinct individual intrinsic end (10, par. 6.18-26).

It is not difficult to see why the distinction within the end was applied to Aristotle's teachings by Peter of Auvergne. Albert and Thomas rightly dismissed the question of the first cause as irrelevant to Aristotle's work, but they left some important questions unanswered in the minds of their successors. For example, if each person contemplates the highest being, is the end not, in some way, the same for everyone? or if the good is one, how can perfection be diverse in different people? Peter of Auvergne provided the new direction

distinction to the concept of Christian beatitude seems to be William of Auxerre's Summa aurea; see R. Guindon, Béatitude et théologie morale chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (Ottawa, 1956), p. 54.
38 Eustratius 6.2 in Eton, Eton College Library MS. 122, fol. 104vb.
39 Comm., p. 5.
41 Sent. 9.193-201.
42 Later commentators, such as James of Douai (?) (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14698 [= J], fols. 133va-134vb) and John of Tytynsale (D 200vb-206ra, passim), reject Peter's assertion that the finis extrinsecus and the finis cuius are identical. I plan to examine their innovations in a future article.
which was required to resolve such questions when he introduced the concept of the twofold nature of the end into a commentary on the *EN*.

**Questions 11-17**

After his discussion of the relationship between the good and the end, Peter concentrates specifically upon the end and its role in ethics. The end, he says, directs and orders all human actions. Insofar as man is man, all his operations must have a purpose or a goal. Thus, all human activities can be reduced ultimately to some primary cause (11, par. 4). For example, if a person desires knowledge, the goal of the acquisition of knowledge will direct all his subsequent choices concerning education: he may prefer a university degree in philosophy to a technical degree. If, on the other hand, the acquisition of money is his primary concern, his choice of courses will certainly differ (11, par. 5). The end gives meaning to subsequent actions and human operations derive their nature and worth from the object of volition. Such an object is both the beginning (*principium*) and the end (*terminus*) of all human actions (12, par. 5-6).

The preceding discussion of the end does not specify any particular end which man pursues. In questions 13 to 16 Peter considers the relevance of the ultimate end to moral philosophy. He argues that, if everything in a genus derives its nature from the end, the end must exist for anything else in the genus to exist (13, par. 5). In the case of human actions the will must have an end or purpose to direct its actions (13, par. 6). Like Aristotle, Peter distinguishes between an essential order which does not permit an infinite regression and an accidental order which may be infinite (13, par. 7). When we direct our moral choices to achieve some goal there can be no infinite regression; an end must direct all our actions (14, par. 4).

Not only must a person have a final end, he must direct all his moral choices to attain his end. Order arises from a conscious effort to attain a goal. One must know the end and arrange one’s activities accordingly. For example, a doctor does not operate until he has made a diagnosis. Only after the doctor has discovered what he needs to do (the end), can he then proceed to prescribe the best medicine. Although the medical efforts precede the restoration of the healthy body in execution, they depend upon the physician’s concept of health. Peter concludes, therefore, that in all actions knowledge of the end is necessary (15, par. 4).

In the final question concerning the nature of the end Peter considers the way in which knowledge of the end pertains specifically to moral philosophy. He reiterates his notion of the end as either intrinsic or extrinsic. The ultimate intrinsic end is the substance and perfection of man. The intrinsic end, however, is ordered to the extrinsic end which consists in the understanding of
the separate substances. Peter now claims that each of these ends can be further subdivided: either according to its substance or according to its role in human affairs. We can easily see how this new division is applied to the external end. In the human act of contemplating the separate substances man attains his true good. The end of intelligere, the separate substances, can be regarded in themselves or insofar as they are the final object of human desire. In the first instance, the separate substances are not the concern of the moral philosopher, who seeks to know the separate substances only as the end of human activities (16, par. 4).

Peter never answers the question how the double characteristic of the end can be applied to the intrinsic human end. We must ask ourselves how the internal perfection of a person can be considered according to its substance alone and not as an end of human operations. Perhaps we could argue that the soul wherein the understanding of the separate substances occurs can be understood as the intrinsic end according to its substance, but Peter never expresses such an opinion and restricts all further references of the dual nature of the human end to the external end. The twofold distinction within the intrinsic end is abandoned by Peter's successors and Peter himself seems to realize the inapplicability of such a division to the internal human end.

What remains in Peter's doctrine of the end can be summarized as follows: the extrinsic end or the finis cuius, which can be understood in se or in its relationship to human actions, is the separate substances; the intrinsic end or the finis quo is the human operation itself.

**Questions 18-19**

Questions 18 and 19 concern Aristotle's discussion of the proper student of ethics. Aristotle himself realized that the discussion of the suitable age and temperament for a student of moral philosophy is peripheral to the topic of the first book of the EN. Peter adds nothing to Aristotle's belief that experience and self-control make a person receptive to moral teachings (18, par. 4 and cf. 19, par. 4).

**Questions 20-23**

In questions 20 to 23 Peter considers common opinions about happiness. Everyone agrees that happiness is the human good, but there is a diversity of opinion concerning the constitution of happiness. Many people consider pleasure to be the highest human good and the main element of happiness because all people seek the pleasurable (20, par. 1). Before Peter can discuss

43. EN 1.3 (1095a11-14); Lect. 13-14.39-14 and Sent. 11-12.70-160.
44. Note that Peter does not distinguish between voluptas and delectacio (20.7.33-34).
pleasure as the ultimate human good, he must first define it. He says that
pleasure is 'that by which something is primarily brought by the appetite to the
good.' The desire for pleasure, therefore, spurs the will to seek an object. Once
the object is attained, then pleasure results (20, par. 4).

Both the senses and the intellect can be satisfied by the acquisition of the
good. When the sensitive appetite is united to its object both satisfaction and
pleasure result (20, par. 5-6.19-22). Peter dismisses sensual pleasure as an
adequate account of happiness because sensual pleasures remain in the lower
part of man, but the sumnum bonum hominis must occur in the highest human
faculty, the intellect (20, par. 6.22-28). Peter does not discuss intellectual
pleasure here, probably because he reserved this topic for the tenth book of the
EN, where Aristotle speaks of pleasure as a concomitant feature of happiness.
Peter merely states that the highest human good does not consist in pleasure,
but in the union of the appetite with the good. Pleasure then results as the
accidens felicitatis (20, par. 7).

Peter follows very closely the teachings of Aristotle, when he dismisses both
honor and riches as possible definitions of happiness. Both honor and riches are
sought propter aliud and, as such, cannot constitute happiness which is the
bonum propter se (20, par. 8 and cf. 21, par. 4).45

Questions 24-26

Peter returns to a consideration of the finis hominis when he examines Aris¬
totle’s response to the Platonic doctrine of the separate good. Despite Aristotle’s
criticisms of the notion of the universal good, Peter, as a Christian, cannot
simply abandon the Platonic idea. In his response to the question concerning
the existence of the separate good (q. 24), Peter draws three conclusions which
hardly differ from those of other thirteenth-century commentators: (1) there
must necessarily be some separate good in nature; (2) the separate good does
not have the same nature as lesser goods; (3) all other things are good by
participation in the separate good (24, par. 5).46

His conclusion concerning the necessary existence of a separate good
naturally gives rise to the question whether human happiness does not in some
way consist in such a good. Peter first presents the view that as the final end is
the ultimate good for man, then it is reasonable to assume that felicitas consists
in the separate good, which is the final end (25, par. 1). If, on the other hand,
happiness is proper to each person, how can a separate good, which is common
to all, be that in which the human good consists (25, par. 2)?

45 Cf. EN 1.4 (1095b22-1096a9); Lect. 21-23.26-64; Sent. 19-20.83-216.
46 De bono 10.28-33; Sent. 27.198-210 and 29.26-34. Cf. Comm., pp. 8-9 and V 3va: ‘... ideo
dico quod bonum est multiplexatum sui.... Sed sequitur quod propter istum finem sint multa alia
bona particularia ordinata ad ipsum ... et ista bona particularia multiplicabunt se in eadem
specie.’
Peter argues in the determination of question 25 that happiness is indeed human perfection, but he quickly shifts the focus of his arguments from individual human fulfilment to the now familiar distinction between the *finis cuius* and the *finis quo*. The end, he says, is twofold: either the operation or perfection which is ordered to an end; or the object of the operation. The end considered in the second manner is better than the end viewed in the first way because the goodness of the operation is derived from that of the object. Peter applies the distinction directly to the concept of happiness when he concludes that the object of intellectual activity is more of a good than the activity itself. Without the object of speculation all human intellectual activity would be futile. If one should call happiness a human operation, then the separate subsistent good is not happiness; only if happiness refers to the object of speculation is it that good (25, par. 4-5.12-23).

Peter, like Albert and Thomas, realizes that Aristotle treated the *finis hominis* as a human operation alone. According to Peter, Aristotle in the *EN* had no interest in the end understood as the object of contemplation. The concern of the Philosopher is, in Peter’s terms, the *finis quo*, or human activity alone. Aristotle distinguished between the *finis cuius* and the *finis quo* in the *De anima* so that confusion concerning the nature of the end might be avoided (25, par. 5.23-25).

We have reached a crucial point in the questions of Peter of Auvergne and indeed in the history of medieval moral philosophy. No longer do the commentators on the *EN* dismiss the separate good, God, as irrelevant to ethics. Spurred by the condemnations of 1277 they seek to define the way in which God is the same end for all mankind and how happiness remains an individual operation. The originality of Peter’s questions lies in his application of the distinction of the end to Aristotle’s notion of happiness. Peter’s response to the problem of the role of the subsistent good in happiness is echoed by most of the commentators of the last two decades of the thirteenth century. Despite

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47 Albert says that he wishes to discover the ‘ultimum vel optimum inter operata bona ... scilicet felicitas’ (*Lect.* 31.32-33). The *bonum simpliciter*, which Albert says is one, is not sought in ethics (*Lect.* 32.74-81). Thomas says that he will consider only the *summum omnium operatorum* (*Sent.* 14.14-21).

48 James of Douai (?) refuses to consider the object of contemplation in his commentary, claiming that happiness is one by definition and not by its object:

> Concedo quod unus sit finis ultimus omnium hominum, unus in racione.... Iste etiam finis ultimus est unus secundum nomen quia omnes appellerunt eum fel <ict>atem.... Secundo modo tunc dico quod non est idem finis ultimus apud diversos ... quidam racionem finis querunt ... in honoribus ... diuiciis (J 134vb).

More representative of the period is Giles of Orléans’ (?) response:

> Finis extrinsecus hominis est deus, bonum separatum cui coniungitur <homo> per contemplacionem ... finis etiam intrinsecus eius ultimus non, sed magis consistit in operacione propria contemplativa... (G 198vb).
their appreciation of Aristotle's reluctance to discuss the object of human contemplation in a treatise on practical philosophy, the arts masters consider the finis cius to be a proper concern of moral philosophy. They never ignore, however, Aristotle's dictum to refrain from seeking more precision than the subject requires. The late thirteenth-century commentators on the EN are content to examine the nature of the end only insofar as it pertains to their understanding of felicitas. The concept of the separate good as the end of human desire belongs to their science, but not a discussion of the nature of the first good.

Questions 27-29

After his description of the good and its relationship to human happiness, Peter turns his attention to a more specific definition of happiness itself. The first condition which the characterization of the human end must meet is that it describes a perfect good. By 'perfect' Peter means that which lacks nothing which can possibly belong to it. Happiness fulfills the requirement because it includes, orders and gives reason to all human goods. Peter qualifies the description by stating that happiness includes all the goods of man insofar as he is man (27, par. 4). Peter adds the qualification in order to avoid the problem of including within his definition of happiness all possible external goods, such as...
Wealth, power, healthy children and the like. Happiness includes all the essential goods of man and it is the goal to which all his actions are directed (27, par. 5). We see in Peter’s description of happiness the close connection between the concepts of happiness and the good. Just as all human activities derive their meaning from their contribution to the attainment of happiness, so too do all goods derive their nature of goodness from the first good. We can observe the careful and orderly progression from the discussion of more general topics, such as the nature of the good and the end, to the more specific treatment of the final human good, happiness.

In question 28 Peter considers an aspect of happiness which featured in the condemned propositions of 1277. Peter asks whether happiness is a caused good. Rather than resolving here the specific problem, and the immediate source of the censured thesis, of the role of divine causality in the production of happiness, Peter is content to answer the question in a general fashion. In his determination Peter once more appeals to the Philosopher’s distinction between the finis cuius and the finis quo. If happiness, which consists in the operation of understanding (intelligere), is considered as the finis cuius, then happiness is uncaused. The object of the intellect is the first cause, the uncaused good (28, par. 5). If, however, we speak of happiness as a human operation or the finis quo, it must proceed from the form of the intellect and, as such, is a caused good (28, par. 6).

Peter explains the distinction of the end by an example borrowed from the Summa theologiae. If we compare happiness to the spending of money we can see clearly the distinction between the finis cuius and the finis quo. The money itself is the same for all and can be compared to the separate uncaused good which all men desire (finis cuius). The use of the money will differ according to individual desires and is analogous to the operation of understanding which differs for all men (28, par. 4).

Happiness as a finis quo is called an operation because it is the perfection of man according to his form. Neither the form nor the habits which produce moral actions constitute happiness because they are both ordered to something else. Only the operation to which all other actions are ordered satisfies the conditions of the good for man; happiness, therefore, consists in an operation (29, par. 6-7).

49 Cf. Lect. 34.23-54; Sent. 32-33.99-180.
50 Cf. question 12 (below, pp. 48-49).
51 Later in the commentary Peter resolves the question of divine causality (question 38).
52 Cf. ST 1-2, 3, 1 and 1-2, 2, 7.
53 Cf. Lect. 37-38.65-50; Sent. 35.29-45.
The preliminary discussion of the nature of happiness is now finished. Peter has explained that happiness is the perfect good which lacks nothing in itself; it is caused insofar as it is the operation of man; it is neither a form nor a habitus, but that to which both are directed, an operation.

Questions 30-37

In questions 30 to 37 Peter turns to a consideration of the specific operation from which happiness results. Felicitas cannot be an operation of the sensitive soul, because it consists in an operation whereby man secundum quam homo is united to the object of his desires, the summum bonum. Because such a union cannot occur in the senses alone, happiness cannot be an activity of the sensitive soul (30, par. 4).

The qualification ‘secundum quam homo’ assures the reader of Peter’s reluctance to consider otherworldly happiness in his questions. He makes his position clear when he says that happiness does not occur without the operation of the senses. In order to speculate we need the phantasms, which result from sense experience (30, par. 6). If Peter were considering the beatific vision, he would have to mention the possibility of a direct knowledge of God without the mediation of the senses; but the way in which man is joined to the highest good on earth is the sole concern of a treatise on ethics.

Because Peter has already considered the primacy of the intellect over the will, he concludes that happiness, which is the highest human operation, must occur in the intellect (31, par. 5-6). The will is brought towards the good, is satisfied and derives pleasure from its attainment, but happiness does not consist in pleasure or the satisfaction of the will; happiness, therefore, must occur in the intellect (31, par. 8).

Peter argues that if happiness is an operation of the intellect it must be either speculative or practical, since these are the two ways in which man reasons. The virtues which perfect the practical intellect are prudence and temperance; the perfections of the speculative intellect are understanding, wisdom, science, art and the like. Peter concludes that happiness itself must be twofold because felicitas consists in the perfections of the intellect. Peter goes so far as to say that there are two happinesses (due felicitates), political and speculative (32, par. 5.19-27).

Peter’s interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of happiness shows the direct influence of Albert the Great. Both Peter and Albert have extended Aristotle’s account of happiness as human perfection in speaking of two perfections of the rational parts of the soul. They define moral virtue as a second and lesser type

54 Cf. Sent. 36.97-107.
55 See question 7 (below, pp. 42-43); cf. Lect. 39.88-91.
of happiness and claim that speculative operations constitute the primary type of *felicitas* (32, par. 5-6). Peter then defines the highest kind of happiness as the union of man with the highest good (33, par. 4).

It is important to realize that, when Peter speaks of the union of man with the first cause, he does not have in mind the beatific vision whereby man has intuitive knowledge of the separate good. The union of which Peter speaks is the harmony between the object contemplated and the one who contemplates. Peter defines true earthly happiness as the exclusively intellectual activity of contemplation of the separate substances (32, par. 9).

Practical happiness is relegated to a means by which man attains the right frame of mind for contemplation by subduing his passions. Morally virtuous actions are no longer a constituent element of the highest good; they are transformed into an instrument for achieving the final end (32, par. 7).

56 ‘Et sic secundum duos ordines duo sunt summe bona hominis, quorum tamen unum ordinatur ad alterum, scilicet civilis ad contemplativam...’ (Lect. 32-33.88-13). Thomas Aquinas understands Aristotle to mean that happiness consists more principally in the contemplative life than in the active life. He never claims in the *Sent.* that there are two happinesses (Sent. 36.114-21). Thomas seems to attack directly the position of his former master when he denies that happiness can be defined as prudence, the virtue by which the practical intellect is perfected. Thomas understands Aristotle to mean that happiness consists in *both* intellectual and moral virtue (Sent. 43.124-33 and 165-69). Albert’s interpretation of two distinct happinesses gained almost universal acceptance in the late thirteenth century:

James of Douai (?): ‘Ista igitur duo optima inveniuntur in homine, sed unum ad aliud ordinatur. Felicitas enim civilis ordinatur ad felicitatem contemplativam’ (J 137va)
Giles of Orléans (?): ‘Due etiam felicitates sunt hominis... scilicet felicitas contemplativa et felicitas politica’ (G 198vb)
John of Tytynsale: ‘Dicendum quod duplex est felicitas: una civilis et alia contemplativa’ (D 208va)
the commentator of V: ‘Duplex est felicitas; contemplativa.... Alia est felicitas practica’ (V 6vb).

57 Again Albert is the source of Peter’s response:...

Peter’s contemporaries also agree with Albert:

James of Douai (?): ‘Felicitas civilis removet impedimenta < ad > speculacionem’ (J 137va)
Giles of Orléans (?): ‘... quod prudencia est procuratrix sapiencie, parans ei vacacionem, passiones temperans’ (G 198vb)
John of Tytynsale: ‘Felicitas civilis ordinatur ad contemplativam ... ut quedam expurgatrix eorum que impediunti contemplacionem’ (D 208va)
the commentator of V: ‘Virtutes habent precedere scientias, quia oportet scientem prius esse sedatum a passionibus; modo non potest esse sedatus ab ipsis, nisi habeat virtutes Morales’ (V 10ra).

Only Thomas Aquinas avoids the position of two separate happinesses:

Ille enim qui habet habitum perfectum semper potest operari secundum illum habitum vel maxime continue inter omnes; sed felix habet perfectam virtutem... ergo ipse semper vel maxime poterit operari in vita activa quae sunt secundum virtutem et speculati in vita contemplativa (Sent. 58.84-90).
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goess so far as to say that happiness does not consist in practical activity (32, par. 6.33-34).

Pleasure, Peter insists, always results from happiness because the union of man with the separate good completely satisfies the human appetite. Peter has already defined pleasure as the fulfilment of the desires of the appetite, and his definition leads him to conclude that pleasure is necessarily joined to the attainment of the human good. Thus, the good, and not the pursuit of pleasure, leads a person to good actions (34, par. 4).

The final questions concerning happiness consider a very important topic in Aristotelian ethics: the role of external goods in the production of happiness. Questions 35 to 37, in which Peter discusses the effect of external goods such as health, riches and friendship on happiness, are related to the broader and more important questions concerning the cause and duration of happiness. If the goods of fortune are necessary to human perfection, then man's ultimate achievement will rely to some extent on factors outside his control. If, on the other hand, the external goods are not important, then a moral philosopher would be forced to admit that a man on the rack could be as happy as the most contented citizen of Paris.

Peter resolves the question of the role of external goods in the production of happiness by turning again to the responses of Albert and Thomas. In language very similar to his two Dominican predecessors, Peter distinguishes between two kinds of external goods: (1) those which are absolutely indispensable to human existence, such as food, drink and the like (35, par. 4 and cf. 36, par. 4.13-15); (2) those which are useful for the maintenance of the good life, such as money, a fine home, etc. (36, par. 4.18-20). Peter concludes that only the first type of external good is necessary for virtuous activity. Without them there can be no human operation and thus no human happiness (35, par. 5 and cf. 36, par. 4.15-16).

External goods of the second kind, although not necessary for happiness, do permit a person to achieve his aim more easily. Friends and money are particularly helpful in the pursuit of civil happiness because man can

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58 See p. 14 above.

59 Paraphrasis (cited above, n. 36), lib. 1, tr. 7, c. 7 (p. 118a-b); cf. Lect. 54.60-68 and Paraphrasis, lib. 1, tr. 7, c. 11 (p. 123b). See also Sent. 47-48.144-76 and 57.8-17.

60 Albert is the first medieval commentator to distinguish felicitas secundum esse from felicitas secundum posse. Felicitas secundum esse consists in the exercise of reason. Felicitas secundum posse is happiness considered as virtuous actions together with all possible external goods (Lect. 60.78-84, 22.37-45, 51.22-34, 69.68-72; Paraphrasis, lib. 1, tr. 7, c. 14 [p. 127b]). Thomas distinguishes between felicitas secundum optimum quod esse posse and felicitas essentialiter. The distinctive factor between the two types of happiness is the enjoyment of external goods (Sent. 57.8-10 and 59-60.203-209). See my 'The Notion of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas', forthcoming in the Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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perform his civic duties more easily as a wealthy member of a society (36, par. 4.20-25 and 37, par. 6).  

Questions 38-42

The entire discussion of the role of external goods in the human good is directed towards the more important questions on the cause and duration of happiness. Peter of Auvergne seriously considers two of the three possible causes, which are discussed by Aristotle in the first book of the EN: God and man. If God or chance is the cause of happiness, then man's ultimate good is subject to forces outside his control and the usefulness of ethics could be seriously questioned.

Peter’s questions add very little to the debate on the cause of happiness in the thirteenth century. Peter states that happiness is caused by God acting in us as well as by our own actions. Felicitas, he says, must originate in God because everything proceeds from the first cause. Since all ends are ultimately reduced to the final end, happiness as the finis hominis must be reduced to the primum agens (38, par. 4).

Peter has already sketched a preliminary response to the problem of the cause of happiness in question 28. He has said that as the finis cuius happiness is uncaused separate good; as the finis quo happiness is indeed something which must have a cause. In question 38 Peter is concerned solely with the finis quo, which is the operation whereby man achieves his own happiness.

According to Peter, God cannot cause happiness in man, unless man himself has some part in its production. He argues that an extrinsic cause, such as God, cannot produce an accident, such as happiness, in man, unless there is a mediating substantial form; a universal cause in most cases needs an instrumental agent for what it gives. Because happiness is the proper accident of man, God needs the mediating substantial form of man. Thus, virtue is the immediate cause of happiness, which man himself acquires through habit, training and experience (38, par. 5).

61 Albert speaks of external goods as cooperating in the production of civil happiness (Lect. 54.65-68).

62 EN 1.9 (1099b8-10). Peter ignores the possibility of chance as the cause of happiness in this question. For an examination of the cause of happiness in Aristotle and his medieval commentators, see Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires’ (cited in n. 1 above), 245-53 and 269-78. Peter’s response differs only slightly from those of his contemporaries.

63 See p. 17 above.

64 Albert calls human operations the 'propinqua causa felicitatis’ and God the ‘causa prima’ of all (Lect. 55.44-49; cf. Gauthier, ‘Trois commentaires’, 247). Eustratius calls virtue the proximate cause of happiness and God must be favorably disposed to, and a co-worker in, its production (Comm., p. 148). For Thomas, happiness comes from God ‘principaliter’ with man cooperating in its production (Sent. 50.59-62). John of Tytynsale asserts that happiness proceeds principally from a divine cause and immediately from a human one: ‘Principaliter < felicitas > procedit a
In previous questions Peter has already dismissed the products of good fortune as the possible cause of happiness. Material goods do not constitute an essential part of happiness, but are only embellishments or adornments of the highest human good (35, par. 5). Even when Peter discusses Boethius' definition of happiness as the *aggregatio omnium bonorum*, he restricts himself to the definition of happiness as the activity of virtue (27, par. 6; 39, par. 3 and par. 10). Peter ignores the concept of earthly beatitude, which is found in the works of Eustratius, Albert and Thomas, and steadfastly maintains that *felicitas* includes in itself, or orders to itself, every possible human achievement. The goods, which are ordered to happiness, are none other than the external goods of fortune. If the misfortune which results from the loss of external goods is ordered by reason, man can remain happy despite his setbacks. Man with the help of the first cause, who preserves all beings, remains responsible for the achievement of his own happiness (39, par. 8).

After his resolution of the difficult problem of the cause of happiness, Peter considers the question whether happiness can be obtained during one's lifetime. Such a question, which was first resolved by Aristotle, takes on added significance after the condemnations of 1277. Peter, like his contemporaries, exercises great care in his responses to the problem of earthly happiness. A preliminary answer can be found in question 29 of Peter's commentary. There Peter has distinguished between *felicitas* as it consists in use (*finis quo*) and as it consists in the object (*finis cuius*). The *finis quo* is the perfection of man according to his very form (29, par. 6). By emphasizing the *felicitas*, which consists in use, Peter implies a contrast between happiness as the *finis quo* and supernatural beatitude, which is the ultimate end of human existence. Peter causa divina; immediate tamen a causa humana, cum sit operacio hominis voluntaria' (D 210vb).

For the positions of Peter's other contemporaries see Gauthier, 'Trois commentaires', 269-78.

65 The concepts of 'beatus in politicis' (Comm., p. 163), 'felicitas secundum posse' (Paraphrasis, lib. 1, tr. 7, c. 14 [p. 127b]) and 'beatus sicut homines' (Sent. 60.215-22) arise from the consideration of the role of material goods in the production of happiness. Drawing upon Boethius' definition of the human good, the notion of earthly beatitude found in the writings of Eustratius, Albert and Thomas reflects their interpretation of Aristotle's difficult passage in which he calls men 'blessed' (maktaios o av6pdmou$) (EN 1.10 [1101 a20]). There can be no question here of a transformation of Aristotelian ethics into Christian moral theology, as Mercken has stated. Aristotle's medieval commentators are merely exploring the ways in which bodily misfortunes detract from the full enjoyment of life. Happiness (*felicitas*) itself can only be lost by a cessation of virtuous activities, although grave disasters may tarnish earthly beatitude. See Sent. 47.159-62: 'et quantum ad hoc subdit quod denudari quibusdam exteriorum bonorum cunoquvat beatitudinem, in quantum scilect reddit hominem aliqualiter contemptibilem in oculis allorum' (emphasis mine). For a far different interpretation of Thomas on this question, see H. P. F. Mercken, 'The Transformation of the Ethics of Aristotle in the Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas' in Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario. Atti del Congresso internazionale 5 (Rome-Naples, 1974), pp. 151-56. See my article, 'Aristotle on Beatitude', forthcoming in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985).
makes the contrast more explicit later in the same question when he says: happiness consists in an operation; although the operation is ordered to the object, we do not seek the object in the argument (29, par. 7).

In his determination of the question devoted specifically to the possibility of earthly happiness, Peter asserts that man can indeed be happy on earth through a happiness which is his perfection (39, par. 6.24-25). The activity by which man perfects himself consists in a union with the first object of knowledge: thus, the highest earthly human achievement is contemplative knowledge of God, but it is not intuitive knowledge of the divine (39, par. 6.26-29). The union of which Peter speaks is the highest achievement of man according to reason. Peter’s claim that ‘felicitas est summe bonum secundum racionem rectam’ corresponds directly to Albert’s description of felicitas as the ‘summum bonum operatorum’ (39, par. 8.46-48).

The remainder of questions 39 and 40 considers the way in which happiness, once attained, can be lost. Disease, Peter says, can deprive a man of right judgment, and through irrational base actions a happy man can become wretched (40, par. 6-7). Peter is correct in identifying the essential nature of happiness with the proper exercise of reason. In an implicit, but obvious, reference to the condemned proposition ‘man can be happy only in this life’, Peter declares that happiness can be lost through death. However, Peter is careful to define precisely what he means by happiness: happiness, which is the perfection of man, is lost at death; this is why Aristotle says that death is the ‘ultimum terribilium’ (40, par. 5). There is no question here of a denial of supernatural beatitude. Peter expresses his opinion on the subject quite clearly: happiness, as the worldly contemplative activity of man, ceases at death, as do all his other human activities. Not even the theologians can deny that.

Peter, without doubt still troubled by the possibility of a misunderstanding concerning his position on earthly happiness, asserts once and for all the difference between the philosopher’s felicitas and the theologian’s beatitudo in question 42. Peter says that we can speak of happiness in two ways: either the perfection of man during his life or another happiness which comes after death. The second kind of happiness is not his concern, because the state of the separate soul is not a proper subject of moral philosophy. Aristotle himself did not discuss happiness after death and Peter is content to do likewise (42, par. 4).


67 Peter’s contemporaries are just as careful as he is in maintaining the distinction between Aristotle’s intention in the EN and the theologian’s beatitude:

James of Douai (?): ‘Si loquitur de felicitate post hanc vitam, nihil ad propositum, quia Philosophus non intendit hic de tali felicitate’ (J 138va)
The caution with which Peter and his contemporaries approach the question of earthly happiness results from the intellectual turmoil of the preceding years. The arts masters of the last quarter of the thirteenth century want no one to misinterpret their conclusions on Aristotle's *EN*. By emphasizing the aim of the Philosopher they do not deny supernatural beatitude, but maintain the distinction between what man accomplishes through his own efforts and what is achieved through grace. Only a reader with malevolent intentions could find fault with the conclusions of Peter of Auvergne on the nature and cause of felicitas.

Peter's contributions to medieval moral philosophy end with his discussion on the two types of happiness. His main contribution to the study of Aristotle in the thirteenth century is his application of the distinction between the *finis cuius* and the *finis quo* to the problem of God's role in human happiness. The remainder of his commentary does not stray far from Aristotle's text and its interpretation by Albert and Thomas. Hence the rest of our survey of the contents of the questions will mention very briefly the topics covered by Peter and their source in Aristotle's *EN*.

**Questions 43-44**

Peter treats both questions as a single problem: is praise due to a happy man? He defines both honor and praise as an exhibition of reverence in testimony of virtue. Praise differs from honor merely because it is the vocal expression of reverence (44, par. 4). Following Aristotle, Peter concludes that praise results from its relation to the good, and honor belongs to that which is absolutely good in itself. Because virtue is ordered to something else, happiness, honor and praise belong to the happy man accidentally and not *per se* (44, par. 5-6).

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Giles of Orléans (?): 'Dico quod aut Boethius loquitur de felicitate post hanc vitam, aut in hac vita. Si primo modo, non ad present' (G 199rb)

John of Tytynsale: '... quia mortui sunt ex <tra> vitam presentem, cuius felicitatem querimus' (D 212rb)

the commentator of V: 'Tamen simpliciter perfecta felicitas non potest homini inesse in hac vita, sed magis post mortem' (V 12va).


Note Albert's and Thomas' lack of patience with those who mistakenly interpret Aristotle's notion of happiness (*Lect.* 75-76.71-04; *Sent.* 51.74-76). The 'quidam' mentioned by both Albert and Thomas may very well be members of the theology faculty.

*EN* 1.12 (1101b15). Aristotle's position differs slightly from Peter's because he argues that praise belongs to virtue, which is good *in se*, and to the *ευδαιμων* accidentally.

Questions 45-47

Peter examines the source of virtue in questions 45 to 47. In a question which has no parallel in the Aristotelian text, he concludes that virtue must have its source in the intellect because reason orders all human motion. Although reason works in conjunction with the will, reason is the superior faculty because the object must be apprehended by the intellect before the will can move man (45, par. 4).  

Returning to the text of Aristotle, Peter investigates the way in which reason regulates human appetites. Like Aristotle, he dismisses the possibility that beasts order their affairs rationally. Because they lack the essential element of rational behavior, the capacity for ordering, brutes cannot be called virtuous (46, par. 4).

In the question whether the act of the sensitive appetite is ruled by reason, Peter focuses upon the primary constituent of moral virtue. Peter agrees with Aristotle in saying that the sensitive appetite is ruled by reason in a certain way, but not simpliciter (47, par. 6.14-15). Peter argues that for an action to be ruled by reason it must be subject to the will; a moral philosopher, therefore, must consider how the appetite obeys the will. He first views the appetite in two ways: first, insofar as it is part of the mind; second, with respect to the faculty (organum) itself. As part of the human mind the sensitive appetite is subject to the higher faculty of reason. The appetite considered in itself cannot be said to follow reason, except per accidens, insofar as temperament may be changed by a moderate diet and lifestyle. Peter concludes that the two ways in which the appetite is considered led Aristotle to call this part of the soul both rational and irrational (47, par. 6-7).

Book II

Questions 1-2

After his consideration of the way in which virtue originates in the moral agent, Peter discusses the nature and the definition of virtue itself. He says that virtue is distinguished according to the differences among its principles, objects and ends. The first principle of moral virtues is rational only by participation.

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71 See p. 9 above. For a discussion of the development of the thirteenth-century doctrine of the superiority of the intellect, see Lottin, Psychologie et morale 1.405-24; also Gauthier, ‘Le cours sur l’Ethica nova’, 83-92. For the immediate source of Peter’s response, see ST 1-2, 17, 1.
72 Cf. EN 1.12 (1102b13-30) and 6.13 (1144b7-15).
73 Aristotle says that the appetitive part of the soul shares in reason ‘somehow’ (παρά) (EN 1.13 [1102b29-30]).
74 EN 1.13 (1102b28-31); cf. Sent. 73.171-83.
On the other hand, the first principle of intellectual virtues is rational in substance. The principles thus distinguish moral virtues from intellectual (II, 1, par. 4).\(^{75}\)

In distinguishing virtues according to their ends, Peter recalls some earlier conclusions in the commentary. Practical happiness, to which moral virtue is directed, is a different end from speculative happiness, to which intellectual virtue leads. Because the end orders all actions to itself, as we have seen,\(^{76}\) the virtues which are ordered to the end must also differ (II, 1, par. 5).

Intellectual and moral virtues may differ according to their ends, but they are not of diverse natures. The ordering of the moral virtues to the intellectual assures us of a similarity in nature. Peter concludes that virtues are not of one nature \textit{simpliciter}, but of one nature \textit{secundum attribucionem}, which is an analogical unity (II, 2, par. 5 and 2, par. 6.37-39).

Prudence is for Peter, as for Aristotle, the one intellectual virtue to which all moral virtues are directed, and from which all moral virtues descend. As such, prudence is the \textit{principium} of all moral virtue (II, 2, par. 5 and 2, par. 7-8).\(^{77}\) Peter has returned to his notion of the end which conveys meaning (\textit{ració}) to everything which is ordered to it. With his distinction between practical and speculative happiness, both of which are human ends, comes the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. Peter is aware, however, of the supremacy of intellectual happiness. As a result, he realizes the importance of the intellectual virtue of prudence, which directs all human moral actions.

\textit{Questions 3-5}

Peter considers the cause of virtue in these three questions. In his response to the question whether virtues are innate, Peter argues that the act and the perfection of virtue are not in us by nature; they cannot, therefore, exist until the intellect acts. Citing Aristotle's \textit{De anima}, Peter asserts that the intellect is nothing before it is actualized through learning. It is then clear that intellectual virtues are not innate (II, 3, par. 6).\(^{78}\)

After dismissing the possibility of innate moral virtues, Peter concludes that virtues must be generated by human operations. He defines moral virtues as perfections of the sensitive appetite, which has an inclination to right reason. Because the sensitive appetite can turn away from the directives of right reason, it must be trained and led toward correct actions by learning and pleasure. In operations ordered by right reason moral virtues arise (II, 4, par. 4).\(^{79}\)

\(^{75}\) Cf. \textit{EN} 6.1 (1138b34-1139a15). Peter is obviously familiar with the sixth book of the \textit{EN}.

\(^{76}\) See p. 12 above.

\(^{77}\) Cf. \textit{EN} 6.4 (1140a24-30) and 6.7-13 (1141a9-1145a11).

\(^{78}\) Cf. \textit{EN} 1.13 (1103a19-b2) and 6.13 (1141b1-12); cf. \textit{Lect.} 93.57-67 and \textit{Sent.} 77.71-114.

\(^{79}\) Cf. \textit{EN} 2.1 (1103a26-b2); \textit{Lect.} 93.30-38; \textit{Sent.} 78.115-31.
One moral operation is not sufficient to produce virtue. Peter argues that the more remote the passive is from the active, the more power it needs to be actualized: for example, what is cold requires more power to be heated than what is tepid. The sensitive appetite is that in which moral virtue is generated and is like (*sicut*) a passive principle. Before the acquisition of virtue the sensitive appetite is ruled by what is contrary to reason, so the effect of one operation is insufficient to produce virtue. Many operations are necessary to move the appetite to virtue (II, 5, par. 5).

Peter argues, like Aristotle, that intellectual virtue may be acquired faster than moral virtue. Because intellectual virtue arises in the intellect, which is independent of the body, a *habitus* to intellectual virtue may be generated from one intellectual experience; because of its dependence on the disposition of the body, the sensitive appetite is more inclined to wrong so that moral virtue cannot arise from one operation (II, 5, par. 6).  

*Questions 6–9*

The relationship between virtue and passion and the role of pleasure in directing the passions form the subject matter of questions 6 through 9. Aristotle displayed great interest in these topics because they form the basis for his conclusions on moral virtue. Peter is content to repeat, for the most part, the conclusions of Aristotle. Peter follows the commentator in defining passion as the motion of the appetitive part of the soul under the appearance of good and evil. Virtue then is a modification of the passions according to reason (II, 6, par. 3-4).

Virtues themselves are not the passions because virtue is the ruler of passions and modifies them through reason. For the same reason virtues are not merely *inpassibilitates*, as the Stoics claim. Peter concludes with Aristotle that virtues are not *inpassibilitates simpliciter*, but *inpassibilitates respectu excellenciarum passionum* (II, 7, par. 4-5). Reason allows man to stand unrelentingly against the onslaught of passionate desire. Reason, not impassivity or insensitivity, is the element which produces human excellence.

The means by which the operation is measured and judged to be virtuous are pleasure and pain. Pleasure plays an important role throughout the *EN* of Aristotle. It is the method by which a novice in ethics can be taught proper habits; it is the infallible sign of correct actions. If an activity is truly good, Aristotle claims that real pleasure must always follow. Peter agrees with Aristotle that pleasure and pain are the measure of moral activities. If an operation is in

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80 *EN* 2.2 (1104b1-5).
81 *EN* 2.3 (1104b9-18) and 2.2 (1104a10-27); cf. *Sent*. 84.48-67.
82 *EN* 2.3 (1104b18-34); cf. *Lect*. 100.13-57; *Sent*. 84-85.110-31.
accordance with the inclination or habit of the agent, pleasure results; if not, pain. In both intellectual and sensual pursuits man seeks pleasure, either as an effect of intellectual achievement or as the *principium* of sensual activity. In either case, pleasure is the rule by which the action can be measured (II, 8, par. 7).\(^{83}\)

**Questions 10-14**

In these questions Peter examines the three possible classifications of virtue as passion, potency or habit. In the preliminary treatment of the question Peter supports Aristotle’s assertion that the *habitus* of virtue must exist in the mind before one can perform truly virtuous acts (II, 10, par. 4).\(^{84}\) If, for example, a student were to perform just actions under the strict guidance of a harsh, but just, teacher, he would not be called virtuous. Only after repetition of just acts under the threat of punishment would the *habitus iusticie* be formed. The teacher would no longer be necessary and the student could flourish on his own.

Peter, like Albert and Thomas, defends Aristotle against the charge of an insufficient treatment of the qualifications of the soul. Peter argues that Aristotle omits an extensive discussion of the operations of the soul in the *EN* because he is concerned only with the principles of action (II, 11, par. 3).\(^{85}\) What produces human activities are habit, passion and potency. Aristotle has mentioned all three in the second book of the *EN*.

Peter distinguishes the principles which direct moral activities as follows: potency is something inherent in the mind; habit is produced by external factors, custom and experience; passion is the product of what is pleasurable or painful (II, 11, par. 5). Moral virtue must be identified with one of these principles.

The passions themselves pertain only to the sensitive appetite wherein desires originate. They are not merely mental characteristics but belong also to the body. The whole composite, man, both body and soul, is moved by the passions to pursue good and avoid evil (II, 12, par. 6).\(^{86}\)

Virtue perfects the potencies which are in the human mind. The potency to be perfected by moral virtue is either the appetite or man according to his appetite. In either case, there is a certain potency to irascibility, concupiscence and the like. The *habitus* of moral virtues perfect the potencies of the human appetite by ordering them to virtuous operations. The virtues perfect potencies

\(^{83}\) *EN* 2.3 (1105a3-5); cf. *Lect.* 102.43-80; *Sent.* 84-85 passim.

\(^{84}\) *EN* 2.4 (1105b11-12) and 2.4 (1105a17-b18); cf. *Lect.* 104-106 passim; *Sent.* 87-88 passim.

\(^{85}\) *EN* 2.5 (1105b21); cf. *Lect.* 112-113.74-84; *Sent.* 90.31-36.

\(^{86}\) *EN* 2.5 (1106a4-6); cf. *Lect.* 113-114.85-86; *Sent.* 90-91.37-112.
in the mind and, as a result, mental potencies cannot be the virtues themselves (II, 13, par. 4).  

After dismissing potency and passion as possible explanations of virtue, Peter is left with only one mental capacity: he concludes with Aristotle, Albert and Thomas that virtue is indeed a *habitus* of the mind (II, 14, par. 4-5).

**Questions 15-19**

The final questions of Peter’s commentary add nothing to the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mean. Peter correctly realizes that virtue is not an exact midpoint between two opposing vices (II, 18, par. 5 and 19, par. 6) and that not all actions admit a mean (II, 17, par. 4). Peter also observes rightly that virtue has the nature of an extreme with respect to good and evil. What is ordered by right reason will always produce human excellence (II, 16, par. 8).

**The Sources of the Questions**

The Latin text of the *EN* which Peter used in composing his questions is beyond doubt that translation designated by Gauthier as *R*, the *recensio recognita* of the Grosseteste translation, which was completed by an unknown scholar between 1260 and 1270. We cannot determine exactly which version of this text Peter had before him, for his references to the *EN* are almost all paraphrases or summaries of the words of Aristotle. Even the lemmata provide no clue as to the exact recension of *R* on which Peter based his questions because they have numerous omissions, inversions and variants which do not appear in any of the known versions of the Latin *EN*. The reader will find in the *apparatus fontium* to the edition below, after all the citations to the *EN*, the corresponding page numbers of the edition of the *textus recognitus* of the *Aristoteles Latinus*.

Almost all of the other references to the works of Aristotle in the questions can be found in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, a *florilegium* of Aristotelian and

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87 *EN* 2.5 (1106a6-10); cf. *Lect.* 114-115.86-53; *Sent.* 92.186-97.
88 *EN* 2.6 (1106a11-18); cf. *Lect.* 115.53-91; *Sent.* 92.205-11.
89 Cf. *EN* 2.8 (1108b26-30) and 2.8 (1109a15-19).
90 *EN* 2.6 (1107a8).
91 *EN* 2.6 (1107a6-8).
pseudo-Aristotelian texts, as well as other works, which was compiled in the thirteenth century and used extensively in the university milieu. Because so many of Peter’s references to Aristotle’s works can be found in this compendium, it is likely that he used just such a compilation in composing his questions. Therefore the reader will also find in the apparatus fontium, after references to works of Aristotle other than the EN, references to the Auctoritates Aristotelis and to the Latin translation of Aristotle’s work, where available.

The remaining sources for Peter’s questions, as has been shown above in the analysis of the contents of the questions, are the Greek commentary on the EN translated by Robert Grosseteste and the commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In addition to these works Peter draws inspiration from the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas: at times Peter abandons the text of the EN and follows very closely the plan and arguments of the Summa theologiae. As a result, many passages of the EN which Albert and Thomas commented on in their questions are ignored by Peter, and several questions which do not arise from the text of Aristotle are discussed by Peter. We must not conclude, however, that Peter merely extracted theological arguments from the Summa and applied them to Aristotle’s teachings on ethics. Peter recognized the unsuitability of many of Thomas’ teachings, especially those on perfect beatitude, for questions on the EN; he often alters Thomas’ theological arguments in order to remain true to the spirit of Aristotle’s moral teachings.

These loca parallela to the Summa theologiae as well as to the commentaries mentioned above are given in the apparatus fontium where a new question begins.

\[94\] H.

[95] In fact, Peter, unlike Albert and Thomas, has not written a true commentary on the EN, but has selected certain questions which had arisen from his reading of Aristotle’s text and the works of his two Dominican predecessors. Examples of Peter’s great debt to Thomas’ ST are easily found, the most striking being book I, questions 28-32, which correspond directly to ST 1-2, 3, 1-5. Most of Peter’s arguments pro and contra in these questions, as well as his responses, are taken directly from Thomas’ work. Note the first three arguments non of question 29, which are found in ST 1-2, 3, 2 as the fourth, sixth and second arguments of Thomas; also the first argument sic of Peter is the same as that of Thomas. In question 30, Peter’s first two arguments sic correspond directly to those of ST 1-2, 3, 3.

[96] Compare Peter’s question 28 of book I with ST 1-2, 3, 1 and 2, 7, where Peter substitutes earthly happiness as his topic for Thomas’ heavenly beatitude. Compare also question 30 of book I with ST 1-2, 3, 3; whereas Thomas distinguishes between imperfect and perfect beatitude, Peter is content to discuss only earthly happiness. Peter never cites any of Thomas’ arguments which are taken from the Bible or the Church Fathers and realizes that the questions on the cause of earthly happiness (I, 38-40) have a purpose different from those of Thomas on the cause of heavenly beatitude (ST 1-2, 5, 1-7).
The Edition

The text which follows is taken mainly from the more complete manuscript, Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1386 (= L). Where necessary, I have used the readings of Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16110 (= P) to aid in interpreting a faulty or difficult passage in L. I have refrained as much as possible from emendation, as I prefer to allow the witnesses to the text of Peter to stand unchanged rather than risk an incorrect interpretation. I have followed the orthography of L with one major exception: I have distinguished between u and v although the manuscript does not. In expanding the common abbreviations for sed and etiam, I have preferred the normalized spellings (sed, etiam) to the artificially imposed medieval set and etiam. Variants in spelling within the same manuscript, such as wilt and vult in L, have not been noted, and purely orthographic scribal corrections of a minor character have not been recorded.

Square brackets indicate an editorial deletion, angle brackets an editorial addition. The siglum L² in the apparatus criticus indicates a correction or an addition made by a second hand. The symbol *** indicates a lacuna which I have inferred.

That portion of the text contained in both L and P comprises the prologue and questions 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 22 and 28 of book I. The change of folio in L is noted as it occurs throughout the text; for P, the number of the folio containing a question is given at the beginning of that question and any subsequent change in folio is indicated. Sections of the text which Gauthier has edited in ‘Les Questiones’ (above, n. 6) are left as they appeared, except for some minor changes.
1. Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo Physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. Et racio huius duplex est. Una est quoniam principans sic se habet ad principatum sicut principium ad principatum; intellectus humanus est quoddam principium humane operacionis artis, intellectus divinus operationum naturalium; sed intellectus humanus est aliquid nature; principium ergo ipsius est intellectus divinus; ergo simpliciter principium rerum artificialium erunt res naturales.

5 Iterum, ars cognicio quedam est et habitus intellectus; cognicio autem intellectus habet ortum a sensibus, et ideo secundum ordinem in sensibilius est ordo in virtute intellectiva; ideo priora que sunt particularia priora sunt hoc modo universalibus. Ideo que sunt secundum cognitionem intellectivam imitantur ea que sunt secundum naturam.

10 Iterum, ea que sunt secundum artem imitantur, aliquo modo ea que sunt secundum naturam; unde dicitur secundo Physicorum, si natura faceret domum, faceret eam sicut ars facit.

15 2. Iterum, ea que sunt secundum artem imitantur, aliquo modo ea que sunt secundum naturam; unde in anima sunt duo habitus. Unus quo intellectus habet cognitionem eorum que sunt operabilia ab homine. Iterum, natura subministrat rebus artificialibus, tamen non complet ea que sunt secundum artem nec iudicat. Unde unus est intellectus qui intelligit ea que sunt secundum naturam. Alius, ut dictum est, intelligent ea que sunt secundum artem. Et unus practicus, et alius speculativus. Finis autem in speculativa est veritas. Rerum artificialium intellectus cognoscitivus et factivus est in talibus in quibus consideratur veritas propter operacionem, et talis est practica. Et ideo in intellectu sunt habitus speculativus et habitus practicus. Et quia practica speculatur ea que sunt operabilia, ideo nesse est quod consideret ea que sunt ab homine operabilia. Quedam autem sunt que sunt communia homini et omnibus animatis, ut que sunt secundum animam vegetativam ut nutri; et
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33

tales operaciones non subiacent voluntati. Et quia moralis considerat ea que
subiacent racioni et voluntati, ideo illa non considerat. Quedam autem sunt
operaciones hominis in quantum sentit, et tales dicuntur racionales in quantum
obedient racioni, secundum se autem irrationales; iste autem sunt sicut audire
et videre. Et de talibus non considerat iste philosophus; secundum tamen quod
necesse est ipsa obedire racioni in respectu finis sunt de consideracione huius
moralis philosophi. Quedam autem sunt operationes hominis in quantum est
homo, ut intelligere, eligere, et ista sunt moralis consideracionis. Et quia homo
in quantum homo est dominus et principium intelligendi, ideo intelligere sub
hac racione pertinet ad moralem. Velle etiam et eligere secundum quod
subiacent voluntati humane, consideracio istorum pertinet ad moralem. Voluntas
autem movet secundum quod ordinatur a racione, et ideo operationes que
sunt hominis in quantum homo, que sunt ordinabiles racione, sunt sicut
subjectum moralis sciencie; et istud non probat philosophus, sed quomodo
contingat huiusmodi operationes ordinari in finem, et de habitibus talibus
opportet considerare. Operaciones vero hominis in quantum sunt ordinables ad
finem sunt subjectum huius sciencie. Aliter dicitur quod homo in quantum
ordinatur ad operandum secundum rationem est subjectum huius; prima
tamen via melior esse videtur. Quia autem sciencie dividuntur secundum
divisionem objectorum vel subjectorum, ideo divisio philosophie moralis est
secundum divisionem operationum hominis secundum quod homo.

4. Intelligendum quod homo in principio sue generacionis imperfectus est;
statim enim indiget nutrimento et indumento quantum ad corpus. Et quia
unumquodque natura naturam est perfici et ad illud habet ordinem, perficitur
autem homo per communicacionem et societatem; ideo dicit Philosophus quod
homo est animal communicabile et sociabile / vel civile natura, et ita perficitur
per societatem. Est autem intelligendum quod cum homo sit imperfectus, natura
eius est perfecta per ea sine quibus natura humana salvari non potest, sicut
indiget nutrimento et veste sine quibus non potest vita transsiri. In talibus
etiam iuvatur familia. Unde unus arat, alius fodit, sine quibus vita transsiri non potest.

5. Iterum, homo imperfectus est de se, quia caret eo quod indiget ad hoc quod

32 subiacent[ subjunt P 33 non] racio praem. et exp. L 34 hominis[ anime praem. et
40 quantum] ipsum P et] est P 41 etiam] autem P eligere cont. cum Gauthier]
intelligere LP 50 Quia] oportet P 51 est s.s. L2: om. P 56 communicacionem
concommunicacionem P: raciocinacionem L 57 communicabile] racionalis praem. et exp. L
60 enim] etiam L 61 iuvatur cont. cum Gauthier] imitatur L: invitatur P fodit[ rodit P
62 quia] quidem L quo] quod P hoc] hec L

56 Pol. 1.1 (1253a2-3); cf. Sententia libri Politicorum, edd. H.-F. Dondaine et L.-J. Bataillon
(Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia 48; Rome, 1971), p. A 77; H 252 (3); cf. EN 1.7
(1097b11) et R 382.
sufficienter vivat. Et hic iuvatur multitudine civili secundum quod unus in
civitate factit calciamentum, alius autem alia, et sic fiunt communicaciones in
civitate.

6. Iterum, ad ea que pertinent ad doctrinam sunt aliqui qui instruunt alios.
Iterum, principes sunt in civitate ut corrigeantur qui paterna castigacione
castigari non possunt.

7. Iterum, in talibus que sunt unum secundum ordinem quidlibet habet
aliquid sibi proprium, et ideo, cum homo sit pars talium multitudinum, habet
operationem sibi propriam. Et ideo contingit considerare hominem quantum
ad operaciones proprias, et secundum quod / est pars civitatis, et secundum
quod est pars domus.

8. Et sic dividitur sciencia moralis in tria: in <monasticam et> yconom-
cam, id est dispensativam, et politacam. Prima pars considerat operationes
hominis secundum se magis et etiam habitus et disposiciones secundum quas
contingit ordinali operationes et passiones hominis ad finem. Et quia omnes
operationes ordinantur ad felicitatem, ideo preordinat primo felicitatem;
secundo declarat ex quibus contingit generari habitus et corrumpi; deinde de
virtutibus, ut de temperancia et fortitudine, et electione et consilio; quarto
autem de liberalitate; quinto de justicia distinguendo eam; sexto de virtutibus
intellectualibus, ut de sapiencia et prudencia; deinde de his que habent
similitudinem cum hac, scilicet primo de continencia, <secundo de> amicicia;
ultimo autem determinat de felicitate complens tractatum suum de ipsa.

9. Sciencia dispensativa considerat que exiguntur ad constitucionem domus,
in qua primo est vir, mulier et asinus et talia.

10. Ulterius autem politica que civilis dicitur considerat ex quibus primo
componitur civitas et que sunt partes civitatis et quomodo se debeant habere ad
invicem, et etiam posterius ad erudicionem puerorum. Sic igitur patet quod hic
oporet determinare de operationibus hominis secundum quod homo.

LIBER I

Questio 1

Circa istum librum querantur aliqua in generali. Et primo, utrum ista sciencia sit necessaria ad regimen vite humane?
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 1-2) 35

5 1. Et videtur quod non, quia multa animalia bruta reguntur memoria et
ymaginacione, ut dicitur primo Methaphysice; hominum autem genus excedit
bruta animalia secundum experimentum et racionem; ergo sicut bruta reguntur
ymaginacione, ita homines experimento absque arte et sciencia.
2. Oppositum vult Philosophus primo Methaphysice. Dicit enim quod vita
hominis regitur racione et arte. Ad regimen igitur vite necessaria est sciencia
moralis.
3. Dicendum quod ad perfectum regimen vite humane necessaria est
sciencia moralis sive ars. Cuius racio est quia intellectus cares sciencia et arte
ex multis aliis decipitur. Propter quod ad perfectum regimen vite necessaria est
sciencia moralis.
4. Unde videns Aristotiles quod multi homines erraverunt in via morum,
illis succurrat tradendo scienciam moralem. Sicut enim ad faciendum aliquid
artificiale non sufficit intellectus, sed oportet artem vel scienciam quam invenit
vel adidicit, ita etiam ad perfectum regimen vite humane non sufficit intellectus
vel racione, sed oportet scienciam moralem habere aut per invencionem aut per
doctrinam.
5. Unde animalia bruta habent memoriam; et non solum ista reguntur
memoria et ymaginacione, sed etiam assuefactione. Et sicut assuefactio se habet
ad memoriam et ymaginacionem in bruti, ita sciencia moralis in hominibus ad
intelectum et racionem. Et ideo dicit Aristotiles primo Methaphysice, hominum
genus arte et racionibus vivit.
6. Ad racione tum dicendum quod non solum bruta vivunt memoria et
ymaginacione, sed etiam quadam assuefactione illi adiuncta. Et propter hoc
oporet quod homo habeat artem et scienciam moralem. Si etiam homo velit
regere se/ipsum, si etiam velit multitudinem domesticam vel civilem regere, audiat
scienciam moralum et operetur secundum illam.

Questio 2

Consequenter queritur utrum tota moralis sciencia sit una?
1. Et videtur quod sic, quia de toto et parte est sciencia una, sicut de aere et
de parte aeris; homo autem pars est multitudinis domestice et multitudinis
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civilis; quare, ipsorum erit scienza una et de illis est tota scienza moralis; quare, tota scienza moralis erit una.

2. Preterea, illa scienza est una que est unius generis subiecti; sed in tota scienza morali est unum subiectum, scilicet operacio humana ordinata in finem; ergo, etc.

3. Oppositum patet per Aristotilem, qui diversas scienecias morales nobis tradit.

4. Dicendum quod tota scienza moralis est una in genere, sicut scienza naturalis una in genere est. Sicut enim naturalis versatur circa naturalia enicia, ita moralis versatur circa operaciones humanas ordinatas in finem; et sic est una et distincta in diversas partes, sicut scienza naturalis. Diversa enim sunt enicia naturalia et eorum sunt diverse consideraciones et propter hoc eorum sunt diverse scienecias speciales; sic etiam et in scienza morali, quia operationum humanarum diverse sunt consideraciones. Una enim consideracio est operationis humane secundum se. Alia vero consideracio est ipsius hominis secundum quod est pars multitudinis domestice. Tercia autem secundum quod est pars multitudinis civilis. Et propter hoc in scienza morali sunt diverse scienecias speciales.

5. Est autem intelligendum propter racionem quod aliquod est totum quod est unum ordine, sicut mundus et exercitus et multitudo domestica et etiam civilis; que omnia dicuntur esse aliquod unum totum in comparacione ad unum primum principium principans, a quo reguntur. Invenitur etiam aliquid quoddam totum secundum colligationem parcium vel composicionem, sicut domus. Est nichilominus tercio totum quod unum continuitate, sicut lignum vel lapis. Modo dico quod in toto quod est unum ordinacione partes habent operationem que non est operationis tocius. Miles enim bene habet operationem que non est operationis tocius exercitus. In toto autem quod est unum composicione vel continuitate, pars non habet operationem que non sit tocius principaliter ex istis.

6. Dissolvitur prima racio: dico enim quod nullum est de toto continuo et parte eius; et racio visa est prius. De toto autem quod est unum ordinacione non oportet quod sit una scienza partis et tocius. Per idem enim apparet ad secundam racionem, quoniam bene probat quod scienza moralis sit una in genere; et hoc concessum est. Sed quod sit una specie, hoc non concludit et racio visa est, quia scienza moralis est de operationibus humanis. Diverse autem sunt operationes humane in specie; quare, et diverse consideraciones speciales et per consequens scienecia.

38 hoc L
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 3-4)

Questio 3

Consequenter queritur circa istam partem scienecie moralis que dicitur ethyca. Et primo, utrum sit scienecia una?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia in ista scienecia determinatur de virtute intellectuali et morali; et iste non sunt virtutes unius racionis; ergo, ista scienecia que dicitur ethyca una non est.

2. Oppositum apparat per Aristotilem, qui tradit nobis unus scieneciam.

3. Dicendum quod scienecia est habitus. Habitus autem potencia est respectu actualis consideracionis, ut patet ex secundo De anima. Unitas autem potencie attenditur ex unitate obiecti. Illa igitur scienecia est una que habet unum objectum, et hoc dicit Aristotiles in Posterioribus quod illa est scienecia que est unus generis subjecti. Modo dico quod cum ista scienecia habet unum subjectum quia illa que considerantur in scienecia sunt a nobis agibilia, sive operationes humane; et ideo scienecia una est. Et additur quod ad unitatem scienecie non exigitur quod illud unum circa quod considerat scienecie univoco, immo sufficit quod sic per attribucionem sive per analogiam dictum. De ente enim secundum quod ens est scienecia una, / sicut divina; et tamen ens secundum quod ens est analogum.

4. Ad raciones in contrarium est dicendum quod virtus moralis est habitus a quo progrediuntur operationes humane que sunt subjecte racioni et voluntati simpliciter. Virtus intellectualis est habitus a quo procedunt operationes intellectuales ut speculacio, que est subjecta voluntati et racioni. Unde dico quod tam operationes morales quam intellectuales sunt a nobis agibiles et in hoc conveniunt; et ideo de operationibus moralibus et virtualibus est una scienecia, quia in illo uno conveniunt.

Questio 4

Consequenter queritur utrum de moribus sive operationibus humanis sit scienecia?

1. Et videtur quod non, quoniam omnis scienecia est de universal; operationes humane sunt particulares; omnis enim operacio circa singularia est, ut habetur secundo huius; ergo etc.

Questio 3 6 una] dicitur praem. et exp. L
Questio 4 4 Et[ una praem. et exp. L 5 singularia] tercius praem. et exp. L

Questio 4 1 Cf. Lect. 1-2.56-33; Sent. 4.25-30. 6 EN 2.1 (1103a26-b2) et R 396.
2. Preterea, omnis sciencia est ex necessariis; mores autem non sunt necessarii, quia mores sunt ex voluntate; quod autem est ex voluntate non est necessarium, quia voluntas se habet ad opposita; quare, etc.

3. Preterea, sciencia est de eo quod est idem apud omnes, quia est de necessario et intransmutabili et universali, quod est idem apud omnes; sed mores non sunt idem apud omnes quia quod est bonum in una regione erit malum in alia; quare, etc.

4. Oppositum arguitur: quia circa mores et operaciones contingit recte agere et peccare, ergo de ipsis est sciencia.

5. Preterea, de eo quod est bonum et difficile est sciencia; sed mores et operaciones humane sunt boni et difficiles; ergo, de ipsis est sciencia.

6. Iterum, de eo de quo contingit assignare raciones diffinitas et aliquid demonstrare potest esse sciencia; mores sunt huiusmodi; ergo, etc.

7. Dicendum quod de moribus est sciencia. Contingit enim assignare raciones diffinitas de aliquid demonstrare de moribus. Et ideo intelligendum quod alique sunt sciencie que sunt de hiis que sunt vera sicut semper et non possunt aliter se habere aliquo modo, sicut sciencie mathematicae, ut omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis; alie vero sunt sciencie que considerant illa que sunt vera, ut in pluribus, non sicut semper, sicut sciencia moralis. Quod enim virtutes generentur ex hoc quod homines operentur secundum virtutem, ut in pluribus, istud est verum. Et ideo dicit Aristotiles in Posterioribus quod de illis que sunt in pluribus bene est sciencia inquantum illa sunt ut in pluribus. Semper enim ita est quod illa que proveniunt in naturalibus sunt ut in pluribus, et tamen de naturalibus est sciencia; ergo, similiter erit in moralibus quod, licet ut in pluribus eveniant, bene erit de illis sciencia.

8. Ad raciones, dico ad primam quod operacionum duplex est consideracio: una que est in particulari et sub forma propria et isto modo operaciones corruptibiles sunt; et ideo, ut sic, de hiis non est sciencia, cum sciencia sit de incorruptibilibus; alia autem est consideracio operacionum inquantum omnes partiales in racione universalis operacionum uniuntur, et quia illa ratio universalis incorruptibilis est, ideo et operaciones; quare, de hiis, ut sic, potest esse sciencia.

9. Ad aliu dico quod mores secundum quod dependent a voluntate huius vel illius sic non sunt necessarii, et sic bene arguis: secundum tamen quod accipiuntur simpliciter et in universalis, sic sunt necessarii et permanentes; sicut
enim homo in communi est permanens et incorruptibilis, sic mores in communi, non autem secundum quod dependent a voluntate huius vel illius. 10. Ad tercium est intelligendum quod si de aliquo sit scientia, non oportet quod illud in esse invenitur apud omnes. De aliquo enim animali est scientia et tamen non invenitur apud omnes; necesse est tamen quod eius racio vere accepta sit eadem apud omnes. Verumptamen circa positions al eiusmod multocies errant homines et propter hoc quod de moribus est scientia et racio morum. Si vere accipiatur, est eadem apud omnes / quia omnes homines sunt idem in specie. Et ideo raciones morum debent esse apud illos in specie eadem vel decipiantur. Et ideo quantum ad raciones de moribus est scientia.

Questio 5

Consequenter queritur utrum ista scientia sit practica vel speculativa?

1. Arguit Albertus: modus est theoricus sive speculativus et etiam doctrinalis quando proceditur in scientia, aliquid distinguendo et demonstrando. Talis autem est ista scientia, aliquid distinguendo et demonstrando. Talis autem est ista scientia; distinguuntur enim aliqua hic et demonstrantur; ergo, ista scientia est speculativa.

2. Preterea, scientia speculativa est propter scire; hec autem scientia est propter scire, scilicet ut sciantur que demonstrantur in hac scientia, ut fugiatur ignorancia circa mores; quare, etc.

3. Oppositum arguitur: quia ista scientia non est contemplacionis gracia, sed ut boni fiamus, ut dicetur inferius; scientia autem speculativa est solum gracia contemplacionis; ergo, etc.

4. Dicendum quod scientia speculativa est tantum propter scire et non refertur ad opus, sicut ad aliquam utilitatem aliam; neque debet aliquis querere in scientia speculativa aliquam utilitatem. Scientia autem practica refertur ad aliquid opus; unde est propter aliquid opus et aliquam utilitatem. Ista autem scientia moralis non est tantum propter scire, immo refertur ad opus et ideo, per consequens, ad utilitatem. Docet enim modum operandi secundum omnes virtutes, et ex hoc apparat quod refertur ad aliquid opus. Et ex operatione ista
provenient utilitas ut homo efficiatur bonus; et ex hoc manifestum est quod ista
scienza non est speculativa, sed practica.

5. Intelligendum tamen quod duplex est operacio: quedam que non transit in
matieram exteriorem, ut intelligere, considerare et alia. Et talis operacio proprie
dicitur actio. Alia dicitur operacio que transit in materiam exteriorem, ut
edificare et talia. Et talis dicitur factio. Secundum diversitatem tamen istorum
operacionum oportet quod sciencia practice differant: propter quod quedam
sunt sciencia active, ut yconomica et politica; quedam autem factive, ut artes
mechanice. Est /igitur istor scientia activa et, per consequens, practica.

6. Ad racionem dico quod si aliqua scientia procedit diffinendo et demons-
trando, et hoc propter scire tantum, illa est speculativa. Si autem procedat
diffinendo et demonstrando, non propter scire tantum, sed gracia alicuius
alterius, non est speculativa, sed practica. Quia autem istor scientia, ut ostensum
est, huiusmodi est, ideo istor scientia practica est et non speculativa.

7. Ad secundam racionem dico quod illa scientia que est propter scire
tantum est speculativa. Ad minorem dico quod istor scientia non solum est
propter scire, sed ut boni fiamus, sicut dictum est in littera. Unde non solum est
ut fugiatur ignorancia circa moralia, sed ut homines operentur secundum
virtutem et fiant boni.

Questio 6

Conseuenter dicit littera quod omnia bonum appetunt; et ideo queritur
utrum aliquis possit appetere malum?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia aliquis sciens fornicari esse malum appetet
fornicari et prosequitur; ergo, sciens malum appetit malum; quare, aliquis
appetit malum.

2. Preterea, bonum non potest fieri, nisi concomitatur aliquod malum. Si
enim fiat vel generetur aliquod bonum, oportet quod aliiud corruptur, et hoc
est malum. Si ergo appetat bonum, appetit malum illud quod comitatur illud
bonum. Unde si aliquis sciret quod ex cursu oportet sudare, si appetit currire,
necessario appetit sudare; si ergo aliquis <appetit> bonum, et malum quod
sequitur illud bonum; quare, aliquis malum appetit.
3. Preterea, quidam est appetitus qui sequitur cognitionem; modo potest contingere quod illud quod est malum videbitur alicui bonum; si ergo aliquid appetat illud quod videtur sibi bonum et illud videtur alicui malum, tunc appetit malum.

4. Preterea, aliquis appetit non esse et prosequitur se interficiendo; hoc autem est malum; quare, aliquid appetit malum.

5. Opposatum patet in littera.

6. Dicendum quod illud quod per se appetibile sic prosequatur ipsum bonum est. Non enim potest aliquid movere appetitum, nisi illud sit delectabile; et ex eo quod movet appetitum eo ipso est bonum et racionem boni habet. Hoc enim est racio boni quod movet appetitum. Propter hoc dico malum non potest per se ab alicui appetitu apprehendi. Unde si malum est secundum veritatem, sumendum secundum veritatem, si vero secundum existimacionem, sumendum secundum existimacionem. Intelligendum quod aliquid est malum secundum existimacionem, et hoc potest aliquid appetere. Videtur uno modo quod aliquid appetit quod videtur bonum et illud aliquando est malum; ipsum igitur malum appetitur, sed non inquantum malum, sed inquantum racionem boni habet. Et propter hoc malum non appetitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum est bonum.

7. Alio modo appetitur malum per accidens quia aliquando bonum appetitur et illud concomitatur malum multocies. Et ideo cum illud bonum non possit haberi, nisi concomitetur malum, illud malum appetitur non propter se, sed propter bonum quod concomitatur ipsum.

8. Tercio modo appetitur quod, quia aliquis existens in magnis infortuniiis et videtur sibi melius non esse quam esse, minus malum videtur sibi non esse quam esse sub talibus infortuniiis. Modo illud quod est minus malum respectu minoris mali est aliquod bonum. Unde homines cum fugiunt maius malum prosecuntur minus. Et propter hoc, hec est causa quare aliqui appetunt non esse. Iste igitur qui appetunt non esse appetunt malum non per se, sed per accidens, inquantum racionem boni habet; et pluribus modis non contingit malum appetere et semper sub racione boni appetitur. Quicquid igitur appetitur bonum est; malum ergo non appetitur; omnia ergo bonum appetunt.

9. Ad racionem dico quod sentencia Philosophi est quod si aliquis appetat fornicari et prosequatur in hora qua appetit, videtur sibi bonum illa hora secundum sensum. Unde omnis malus ignorans, sed talis ignorancia non excusat peccatum, ut apparebit in tercio huius; talis enim aliquid modo est

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24 appetitu] modo praem. et exp. L
42 non suppl. in marg. L
48 EN 3.5 (1114b1-16) et R 420.
voluntaria. Dico igitur quod licet fornicari sit malum, in illa tamen hora videtur sibi bonum; et ideo illud appetit, inquantum bonum apparat.

10. Etiam ad secundam, quoniam bene probat quod malum non appetitur propter se, sed per accidens. Sed hoc non probat quod per accidens appetatur, ut ostensum est. Per idem autem ad tercium apparat.

11. Ad quartum dicendum quod si aliquis appetat non esse et interficiat se, minus videtur sibi malum quod moriatur quam quod subiciat se tot angustiis; et hoc videtur sibi bonum; et ideo ipsum appetit. Nichil igitur appetitur, nisi bonum vel sub racione boni.

Questio 7

Postea queritur, quia dictum est quod operacio intelligendi subiacet voluntati, ideo queritur, cum duo sunt partes intellectus, velle et intelligere, quod istorum sit primum vel prius secundum naturam?

1. Et quod velle, probacio: quia omnes operaciones hominis subiacent voluntati; ad operationes autem hominis homo est dominus — dicitur enim homo dominus suarum operationum quia cum velit operari potest — sed operationis volendi est dominus. Si tu dicas quod homo non est dominus, tunc sequitur quod homo operationum suarum omnium non esset dominus.

2. Iterum, operacio talis que est in nobis cum volumus videtur sequi velle; sed intelligere est in nobis cum volumus, sicut dicitur secundo De anima; quare, sequitur velle.

3. Iterum, operacio se habet ad operationem sicut objectum ad objectum; igitur objectum intellectus quod est ens sicut se habet ad bonum quod est objectum voluntatis, sic se habet voluntas ad intellectum; sed bonum secundum Platonem prius est ente, quia sequitur secundum ipsum: omne ens est bonum, non tamen convertitur; quare, etc.

4. Ad oppositum arguitur: agens naturaliter prius est passo et motivum mobili; sed intellectus movet voluntatem; quare, intellectus prior est voluntate, quia nichil movet voluntatem / nisi bonum intellectus.

5. Dicendum quod operacio intelligendi simpliciter et naturaliter precedit velle, velle autem accidentaliter precedit intelligere.

6. Primum apparat ex duobus. Primo quia voluntas est virtus passiva quedam et est aliquid in potencia ad velle hoc et non velle. Potencia autem


53 V. sup. q. 6, par. 7.
Questio 7 1 Cf. ST 1-2, 9, 1. 11 De an. 3.3 (427b17-18) et D 187; H 195 (268).
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 7)

25 passiva non vadit ad actum nisi determinetur; hoc autem quod determinat ipsum est bonum, et non secundum quod est in rebus, sed movet ipsum secundum quod cognitum et secundum quod intellectum: et sic bonum secundum quod comprehensum ab intellectu movet ipsum voluntatem. Quare, intelligere est prius ipso velle.

30 7. Iterum, per alium illud apparat, quia necesse est quod ordo sit in operacione intellectus et voluntatis secundum ordinem objectorum et ideo sicut se habent objecta, sic et operationes. Objectum autem intellectus est ens, objectum autem voluntatis est bonum, et ens precedit bonum naturaliter, quia dicitur aliquid ens secundum entitatem suam absolute, dicitur autem aliquid bonum inquantum determinatur eius esse per bonitatem. Unde racioni entis addit racio boni, sicut enti absolute dicit accidens quod determinatur per alium. Et ideo operacio intelligendi natura precedit operacionem voluntatis.


40 9. Ad racionem primam dico quod maior vera est. Ad minorem dico quod vera est secundum accidens, sed non secundum naturam. Et necesse est quod sit in nobis aliqua operacio que sit non quia volumus, ut visum est, nec homo illius habet dominium.

45 10. Ad secundum dico quod maior vera est ut sic. Et cum dicitur: intelligere fit in nobis cum volumus, verum est, aliquod. Sed est aliquod quod causatur in nobis non quia volumus, sicut aliquid videmus quod tamen vellemus non videre.


56 Cf. ST 1-2, 5, 2.
11. Ad tercium dico quod cum assumitur, bonum est prius ente secundum Platonem, dico quod falsum est et erraverunt. Dicit enim Plato quod aliquid est bonum quod non est ens sicut materia, et dicit eam bonam quia appetit bonum ut formam. Et manifestum est quod, cum locavit eam sub privacione et non ente, dicit falsum: immo materia est ens, et dicitur materia ens in potencia. Unde quamvis omne ens sit bonum, racio tamen entis est alia a racione boni.

**Questio 8**

P 277ra-b

Consequenter queritur utrum homo sit per se sufficiens ad operaciones / vite?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud quod habet sufficiencia principia operacion- num vite videtur sibi sufficere in operationibus vite; sed homo habet principia sufficiencia vite operationem, ut formam que anima est; quare, etc.


3. Oppositum enim apparat, quia homo statim post nativitatem indiget nutrimento et tegumento, que coaugent et coadiuvant ipsum / ad operandum; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod nullum aliud ens a principio primo sufficiens est sibi in esse; ideo nec est sibi sufficiens quantum ad operationem. Sed de sufficiencia alciuius quantum ad esse non querit questio, sed utrum homo sit sufficientes ad operationem vite ita quod sibi ministrat necessaria vite vel indigeat sibi simil ad sibi ministrandum. Et secundum hoc dicendum est ad questionem quod homo secundum nullam operationem sibi sufficit. In operationibus enim vegetativis sibi non sufficit, quia indiget nutrimento et alimento et perfectione quantitatis. Istud autem non potest operari ab homine ipso, et ideo alio indiget.

5. Iterum, etiam in operationibus sciendi non est sufficientiens, quia sciencia ex istis predictis, videlicet ex nutrimento et alimento, dependet. Alie autem operaciones intelligendi secundum intellectum speculativum maxime perficiunt sapientem; et in istis adhuc operationibus melius est quod homo habeat societatem, ut dicitur decimo huius. Sapiens etiam indiget necessariis ad vitam,

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60 eam bonam] eam esse bonum L 63 Unde om. L

**Questio 8** 2 operaciones] operacionem P 5 videtur] add. quod P 12 operandum]

operacionem P 15 quantum suppl. in marg. L 17 vite] ad vitam P

QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 8-9)

quibus habitis potest sapiens sibi sufficere. Inveniuntur nichilominus alie operaciones, ut dare, recipere, et ad talia indiget homo aliiis, scilicet quibus possit dare et a quibus possit recipere, etiam fortune vel bonis fortune que tunc decorant ipsum, ut opera virtuosa omnia opere valeat prosequi. Ideo, nullus homo in operacione aliqua sibi sufficit.

6. Ad racionem in oppositum dico quod minor falsa est. Et cum dicitur ‘habet animam’, dico quod operaciones non tantum requirunt animam sed obiectum in quod operentur, et quod ille varientur secundum diversitatem objectorum, sicut vegetativa a sensitiva distinguuntur; indigent enim iste due potencie organis determinatis; quare, etc.

7. Ad aliam racionem dico quod quanto aliquid est perfectius tanto magis sibi sufficit secundum quod perfectius; et quia homo est animal secundum naturam perfectius, ideo nobiliorem actum habet, et quantum ad hoc sufficiens est magis quantum ad talem naturam. Quantum autem ad operacionem potencie vegetative minus perfectus est homo, quia cum generatur minus potest sibi sufficere. Quod autem natura dedit aliis animalibus, quibusdam arma, ut cornua, et quibusdam dentes, ut canibus, causa defensionis, quibusdam autem pilos, ut coopieriantur a frigore, homini autem non; hoc est propter nobilitatem nature humane. Unde dedit homini intellectum et naturam quibus potest omnia genera armorum sibi preparare.

Questio 9

Omnis doctrina et omnis ars etc. (1094al-3). Queritur circa primam conclusionem, de eo quod Aristotiles assumit ad probandum conclusionem quod omnia bonum appetunt, primo utrum omnia bonum appetunt?

1. Et quod non videtur, quia appetitus supponit cognicionem; qui ergo cognicionem non habet non appetit bonum; sed multa sunt que operantur malum sine cognitione; ergo, etc. Quia que cadunt sub operacione cadunt sub appetitu; quare, non omnia bonum appetunt.

2. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

3. Iterum, unumquodque appetit esse et esse bonum eius est; quare, omnia bonum appetunt.

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Questio 9 1 Cf. Comm. 12-13.3-18; Lect. 7.9-17; Sent. 31.30-41; ST 1-2, 8, 1 et 1-2, 1, 4 ad 1.
4. Dicendum quod omnia bonum appetunt quia omnia encia secundum naturam habent inclinacionem ad suam perfectionem; perfectio autem uniuscuiusque est suum bonum, et imperfectio malum; quare, omnia bonum appetunt.

5. Iterum, illud dicitur bonum in quod terminatur appetitus, et hec est racio boni; et ideo, quicquid terminat appetitum bonum est. Et ita omnia bonum appetunt, cum omnia aliquid appetere videantur. Sed est intelligendum quod aliquid est bonum secundum veritatem; aliquid autem secundum apparenciam, quia omne ens, quantumcumque malum, habet aliquid bonum, sive simpliciter sive quod videtur esse bonum, et quod est bonum apparend, ut dicit Aristotiles, secundo Physicorum; quare, etc.

6. Iterum, appetitus nichil est, nisi inclinacio ad perfectionem. Aliquando illa inclinacio est ex natura, sicut dicitus quod grave habet inclinacionem ad deorsum ex natura illa. Aliquando est inclinacio secundum bonum cognitum et apprehensum; et per cognitionem causatur ista inclinacio. Et sic ex forma cognita causatur inclinacio. Talis autem inclinacio dicitur appetitus vel voluntas que per se feruntur in bonum. Quare, omnia bonum appetunt.

7. Ad racionem dico quod cum dicitur, omnis appetitus est per cognitionem, dico quod est ut sic; et est ut non. Quidam enim appetitus est animalis et ille supponit cognitionem; appetitus autem naturalis, non. Et unde sequitur quod multa sunt que non appetunt appetitu animali, sed omnia appetunt vel appetitu naturali vel animali.

8. Ad racionem dico quod non sequitur: omnia non operantur bonum, ergo non appetunt < bonum > , quia ad hoc quod aliquid terminet appetitum, sufficit quod sit bonum secundum veritatem vel secundum operationem. Unde credens aliquando operari bene, operatur malum aliquando; et ideo non oportet quod si aliquis operetur malum quod credat hoc, nisi per accidens.

9. Iterum, contingit quod id quod ordinatur in finem malum est secundum se, habet tamen racionem boni respectu finis. Et ideo non appetit illud secundum se, sed respectu talis finis, ut apparex ex projectione aliquarum diviciarum in mare ne submergatur navis: licet proicere talia secundum se sit malum, respectu tamen talis finis est bonum.

Questio 10

Consequenter queritur utrum omnia appetant unum bonum?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia quod appetit unumquodque est suum esse; sed non omnium est idem esse; quare, etc.
Questions on the Ethica Nicomachea (I, 10-11)

2. Iterum, quod appetitur est perfectio rei; sed diversorum sunt diverse perfectiones; quare, non omnia idem appetunt.

3. Iterum, secundum Aristotilem multis existentibus doctrinis finis appetitur; sed fines sunt diversi; quare, etc.

4. In oppositum arguitur: omnis multitudo descendit ab aliquo uno et causatur ab uno in quolibet genere secundum Proclum. Si ergo sunt multa bona in que encia diversa ordinantur, oportet ponere primum bonum quod erit bonum quod maxime appetitur ab omnibus.

5. Iterum, finis et bonum idem; quare, cum unus sit finis omnium, unum erit bonum omnium appetendum.


7. Iterum, propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis; sed omnia habent racionem appetibilis et boni a primo; quare istud erit quod omnia maxime appetent, tamquam bonum primum et unum: omnia igitur unum bonum appetunt. Apparet ad raciones; procedunt enim sui viis. Raciones primo adducite bene probant quod est unum bonum quod est finis omnium quod est extrinsecum, ut dictum est.

Questio 11

Circa conclusionem principalem queritur utrum omnes operaciones humane ordinentur in finem?

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8 fines] finis L

Questio 11 2 conclusionem] capitulum praem. et exp. L

7 EN 1.1 (1094a6-8) et R 375. 10 The Elements of Theology, ed. E. Dodds (Oxford, 1963), prop. 21, p. 24; cf. ‘Procli Elementatio Theologica translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke (Textus ineditus)’, ed. C. Vansteenkiste, Tijdschrift voor philosophie 13 (1951) 273-74. 24 V. sup. q. 10.7.

Questio 11 1 Cf. Comm. 18.50-60; Sent. 5.128-147, 6.219-225; ST 1-2, art. 1 et 2.
1. Et quod non, probacio: quia illud propter quod est aliquid est aliqua causa eius; sed finis non est aliqua causa; quare, propter finem non erit aliquid. Minor probatur, / quia causa prior est causato; sed finis, posterior; quare, si sit ultima perfectio hominis operacio, tunc ultima perfectio hominis erit propter aliquem finem, quo est inconveniens; quare, tunc non esset ultimus finis hominis, quod est falsum.

2. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

3. Item, omne quod procedit a principio determinato et per medium determinatum tendit in finem determinatum; sed tales sunt operaciones hominis; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod omnes operaciones hominis secundum quod homo sunt propter aliquem finem, secundum quod dicit Aristotiles: ‘omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter electio et proheresis, alcuuis videtur esse operatrix.’ Omnia enim que sunt in aliqua genere sunt propter principium aliquod quod est in illo; sed finis est principium omnium operabilium; quare, omnia reducta sunt ad ipsum.

5. Iterum, operaciones hominis secundum quod homo sunt operaciones quorum homo est dominus; procedentes ab aliqua virtute racionem habent ab objecto; et ideo omnes procedentes sunt secundum racionem objecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum; et ideo omnes sumunt racionem a bono, sicut a fine; igitur propter bonum ordinatur; quare, omnia propter finem operata sunt, quoniam finis est causa causarum, sicut in secundo Physicorum dicitur.

6. Ad raciones, dicendum ad primam quod finis potest dupliciter considerari: vel secundum intencionem et sic prius est et movet agentem ad transmutandum materiam, et sic racio concludit; vel potest finis considerari secundum esse et, ut sic, est effectus causarum. Cum igitur effectus sit posterior causa, sequetur quod, ut sic, finis sit posterior aliis principiis, et isto modo non procedit. Quod autem postea dicitur: dico quod ultima perfectio hominis est propter finem, scilicet propter finem extrinsecum et non propter finem intrinsecum hominis; unde finis intrinsecus hominis est propter finem extrinsecum hominis a quo etiam racionem habet.

Questio 12

Consequenter queritur utrum omnes operaciones hominis racionem et spe- ciem sumant ex fine ad quem ordinatur?

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P 237r (in marg. inf.)
1. Et quod non, probacio: quia illud a quo aliquid sumit speciem debet esse intrinsecum; sed finis non est intrinsecus rei, ut ipsis operacionibus eius; quare, etc.

2. Iterum, <illud> a quo aliquid sumit speciem debet esse prius; sed finis non est prius hiis que sunt ad finem; quare, etc.

3. Item, si operatio sumit racionem a fine, cum eadem operatio ordinetur in diversos fines, eadem operatio continebitur sub diversis speciebus; hoc autem est inconveniens; quare, etc.

4. Ad oppositum arguitur: operaciones hominis recipiunt speciem a quo recipiunt bonum vel malum; sed operaciones habent racionem boni vel mali, ex hoc quod in bonum finem vel malum ordinantur; quare, etc.; quare, ex fine habent speciem.

5. Dicendum quod operaciones hominis sorciuntur speciem ex fine vel ex generante – nec refert, quia operaciones hominis procedunt a voluntate secundum racionem objecti voluntatis, ita quod objectum voluntatis habet racionem efficientis respectu operacionum – et ideo finis est qui dat speciem; quia finis et obiectum idem, idem ipsa racio finis.

6. Iterum, ipsa racio finis movens voluntatem agit operaciones, et iterum iste operaciones procedunt in finem; et ideo, finis primum est et terminus operacionum; sic igitur a fine et efficiente operaciones recipiunt speciem. Tunc patet quid dicendum sit, in calefactione et in omnibus talibus actionibus, quia racionem sorciuntur a fine, a termino suo et a suo agente, cum sint operaciones.

7. Ad racionem, concedo maiorem. Ad minorem dico quod finis non est extrinsecus simpliciter, sicut nec motus ad illud ad quod vadit. Unde a fine immediate non sumunt speciem, ita quod finis sit species; immo, ad quod convenit cum fine, cum dicitur quod effectus recipit speciem ab efficiente, quia dat sibi perfectionem.

8. Ad secundum dico quod finis prius est secundum intencionem, non autem secundum esse.

9. Ad tercium dicendum quod eadem operacio nature potest habere diversas species secundum quod est ordinata in diversos fines Morales; secundum enim quod ordinantur in finem bonum, sunt sub specie boni / et continentur; secundum autem quod ordinantur in finem malum, sunt sub specie mali. 

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Questio 13

Consequenter queritur utrum in operacionibus hominis sit ponere ultimum finem?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia bonum et finis idem; sed in bonis est procedere in infinitum, quia hoc bonum generat illud, et illud aliud, et sic in infinitum; quare, in operacionibus humanis non contingit ponere ultimum finem.

2. Preterea, finis est objectum voluntatis; sed in objectis est procedere in infinitum, quia voluntas vult bonum et vult se velle et iterum vult se velle velle bonum, et sic in infinitum; in infinitis autem non est ultimum; quare, non contingit ponere ultimum finem in operacionibus humanis.

3. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles.

4. Item, finis movet efficientem et sunt sibi invicem cause; ideo, secundum ordinem et processum in causis finalibus est ordo in causis efficientibus. Siigitur in causis finalibus contingit procedere in infinitum, tunc in causis efficientibus contingit procedere in infinitum; quod est inconveniens, quia est ponere primum agens, in cuius virtute agunt omnia agencia; quare, ad finem ultimum necesse est devenire qui appetitur non propter aliud sed solum propter se.

5. Dicendum quod in operacionibus humanis est devenire ad ultimum finem, qui non appetitur propter aliud, quia in unoquaque genere, remoto primo, removetur omne posterius quia primum in unoquaque genere est causa omnium illorum que sunt in illo genere. In infinitis autem non est primum; et ideo, qui ponit infinitum removet primum, et per consequens omnia alia que ad illud primum sunt ordinata; et sic nec sunt alie cause, nec causa finalis; et ideo, nichil erit ordinatum in finem. Quia tamen hoc sit impossibile, necessarium est ponere causam finalem in actionibus et operacionibus humanis.

6. Item, hoc apparebat ex alio, quia, remota causa finali, removetur simpliciter bonum quia universaliter omne bonum racionem finis habet vel racionem boni sumit ex fine. Si igitur removetur finis remotavitur bonum; sed qui procedit in infinitum in causa finita non ponit finem; quare nec bonum.

7. Item, in secundo Metaphysice probat Aristotiles quod est status in omni genere cause. Hoc etiam dicit Aristotiles quod omnes homines inclinantes in finem. Si igitur tollatur finis totum desiderium frustra erit, quod est falsum et inconveniens. Propter quod dico quod in causis finalibus non contingit procedere in infinitum — essencialiter, dico, ordinatis — ubi una racionem super

25 Quia quod L

1 Cf. Comm. 22.52-76; Lect. 10.5-31; Sent. 7-8.1-52; ST 1-2, 1, 4. 11 EN 1.2 (1094a19-22) et R 375. 31 Meta. 3.2 (996a19-28) et M 43-44; cf. H 118 (43).
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 13-14) 51

alterum habet et ordinatur ad alium, ita quod unum racionem sumit ex alio. In accidentaliter tamen ordinatis contingit in infinitum procedere, ubi unum racionem non habet ex altera, sicut est in causis efficientibus accidentaliter ordinatis, ut quod iste generet istum, et iste illum, et sic in infinitum; < quod > non < essencialiter > est, quia unum non habet causalitatem super alterum essencialem.


9. Ad alii dico quod in objecto voluntatis est duplex ordo essencialis. Ubi unum / racionem boni habet ex alio et illud ex alio, in talibus in infinitum procedere non contingit; et ideo, nec in finibus ordinatis secundum se. Est nichilminus in voluntate ordo accidentaliter, ut voluntas vult bonum et vult se velle et vult se velle, et sic in infinitum; et in talibus sic ordinatis in infinitum procedere non est inconstiens.

Questio 14

Utrum omnes operaciones hominis querantur propter finem ultimum?

1. Et quod non, probacio: quia que queruntur propter se non queruntur propter alius; sed quaedam operacio hominis queritur propter se, sicut speculacio et sicut ludus aliquando; quare, etc.

2. Item, omnis operans propter alius ex intenzione simul cogitat de illo fine; sed homo operans aliquam operacionem non cogit at ultimum fine, ut felicitatem; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum dicit Philosophus quod ultimus finis est qui queritur propter se et omnia alia propter ipsum.

4. Dicendum quod omnes operaciones hominis queruntur propter aliquid bonum, sicut patet ex prima conclusione huius libri; bonum ultimum et finis idem, vel racionem habet a fine; quare, omnes operaciones hominis sunt propter finem ultimum.

Questio 14 1 Cf. Comm. 23.38-05; Lect. 10.41-62; ST 1-2, 1, 6. 9 EN 1.2 (1094a19-22) et R 375; cf. EN 1.4 (1095a24-35) et R 376. 12 EN 1.1 (1094a1-2) et R 375.
5. Item, ordo est in causis efficientibus secundum ordinem in finibus ita quod prior efficiens prioris est finis et posterior posterioris; sed in efficientibus est ita quod omnes efficientes cause reducuntur ad unum efficiens, et substanciam et perfectionem ab ipso recipiunt; quare, sic erit in causis finalibus quod actiones hominis omnes queruntur propter ultimum finem, sicut dicit Aristotiles.

6. Ad racionem dico quod maior non est vera. Sunt enim aliqua que aliquando queruntur propter alius et aliquando propter alia. Unde dicit Aristotiles quod honores querimus etsi non esset aliud, et tamen ordinatur in aliud. Et tamen dicitur quod speculacionem querimus propter se, <quod est> verum; sed etiam speculacio ordinatur aliquando in aliud. Similiter aliquando aliquid ludit non propter alius sed propter se; tamen ille ludus aliquando ordinatur ad aliquid [ordinatur]. Item, ludere propter ludi graciam non est operacio hominis secundum quod homo, sed secundum quod communis cum aliis animalibus. Questio autem de operazione hominis secundum quod homo.

7. Ad aliud dico quod maior falsa est, immo dico naturam agere propter aliquid, non quia agit deliberando. Secundum enim quod vult Aristotiles, primo Physicorum, non est necessarium ad virtutem; sed secundum Philosophum inferius, cognicio ultimi finis non est necessaria ad virtutem, ut dicit, quia nichil confert ad virtutem; quare, etc.

17 efficiens] ai praem. et exp. L

Questio 15 3 vite] si praem. et exp. L

20 EN 1.2 (1094a20-22) et R 375. 22 EN 1.7 (1097b1-3) et R 382; EN 1.6 (1096b18-20) et R 380. 31-32 Phys. 2.8 (199b27-28); cf. H 147 (89).

Questio 15 1 Cf. Comm. 25.34-44; Lect. 10-11.62-17; Sent. 8.52-93; ST 1-2, 12, 2.

7 EN 1.9 (1098b30-1099a3) et R 386; EN 1.4 (1095a6) et R 377. 11 V. sup. q. 15.7.
3. Ad oppositum arguitur: quando aliquid operatur aliquid diiudicando ipsum in aliud, cognicio illius alterius necessaria est ad operacionem, sicut cognicio signi multum facit ad sagittantem; sed sic est de cognicione finis respectu operative vel operacionum; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod cognicio finalis necessaria est ad operacionem hominis secundum quod homo ordinatur ad finem. Ordinare / autem non potest aliquis operationes, nisi cognicionem habeat operabilium, quia racionis est ordinare. Racionem autem eorum que sunt ad finem non habet aliquis, nisi ex fine; ideo, debentem recte operari in moralibus necesse est habere racionem finis. Sed est intelligendum quod in operacione practica intellectus duplex est processus: quidam raciocinacionis; quidam autem est execucionis. Primo modo, debens aliquid operari secundum intellectum practicum oportet quod raciocinetur, et racio incipit a fine, sicut operans sanitatem raciocinatur secundum que sunt ad finem et ultimo ex sanitate que est in anima; est sanitas extra quod est primum in intencione, ultimo autem in execucione. In moralibus autem, cum sit duplex processus, intenditur finis secundum racionem ultimi et non secundum quod prius est secundum cognicionem, licet tamen finaliter non introducatur finis realiter sine aliquali precedente cognicione. Est igitur necessaria cognicio finis operanti secundum racionem.

5. Ad racionem primam dicendum quod maior vera est. Et cum dicitur quod nichil facit ad virtutem, nichil facit ad operacionem, concedatur; sed dico quod cognicio finis aliquid facit ad virtutem, quia ad operacionem virtutis exigitur scire, velle et inpermutabiliter operari secundum Aristotilem inferius.

6. Item, virtus est habitus electivus in medietate consistens, recta racione determinatus. Racionis autem est ordinare, quod non contingit sine cognicione; quod, cum dicit Philosophus quod cognicio operacionum confert ad virtutem, verum est secundum se et absolute; sed oportet quod cum cognicione sit appetitus ordinatus et velle et operacio ad hoc quod cognicio conferat ad virtutem. Vel dicendum quod quamvis aliquis habeat habitum virtutis, ad hoc tamen quod recte operetur oportet quod habeat cognicionem finis.

7. Ad aliud dicendum quod maior falsa est. Non enim finis necessarius est, sed ea que sunt ad finem, et si est finis, necesse est ea que sunt ad finem esse, et non e converso, ut dicitur secundo Physicorum. Unde, si est conclusio, sunt premisse et non e converso. Unde in operacionibus vite est processus in raciocinando qui incipit a racione, et est processus qui terminatur ad finem vite.
Questio 16

Conseguenter queritur utrum consideracio ultimi boni pertineat ad civilem doctrinam?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia Aristotiles, decimo huius, considerat de ultimo fine; ibi autem considerat ea que pertinent ad monasticam; non ergo ad civilem pertinet consideracio ultimi finis.
2. Item, consideracio cause prime non pertinet ad civilem doctrinam; ultimus autem finis est primum et causa omnium; ergo, etc.
3. Oppositum per Aristotilem.
4. Dicendum quod ultimus finis duplex est et uterque potest dupliciter considerari: quidam enim est intrinsecus, qui est substancia et perfectio hominis; et quidam est extrinsecus, ad quem ordinatur finis intrinsecus. In intelligere enim substancias separatas consistit ultimus finis hominis extrinsecus. Uterque autem istorum finium potest dupliciter considerari: ut secundum substantiam eius, et sic cognitione ultimi finis non pertinet ad civilem doctrinam vel monasticam sed ad metaphysicam et ad librum De anima; si autem isti considerentur ut fines operationum humanarum, tunc ad civilem doctrinam pertinet, quia racio operationum. Ipse autem considerat operaciones, quare et fines sic consideratos. Voco autem civilem doctrinam que est de operationibus hominis, sive sit monastica sive politica sive civilis, magis tamen ea que considerantur in civili doctrina, sicut vult Aristotiles.
5. Ad raciones, apparret solucio ad primam: cum dicitur, finis omnium est prima causa, verum est. Et quando dicitur quod prima causa non est de consideracione civilis sciencie, dicendum quod hoc verum est secundum substantiam suam. Nichil tamen prohibet ipsum esse de consideracione civilis doctrine inquantum operationes / considerate a civili ordinantur ad ipsam.

Questio 17

Conseguntur quia dicit Philosophus quod civilis ordinat quicquid aliquis addiscere debet et usque ad quod tempus, ideo queritur utrum expediens sit...
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I, 17)

1. Et quod sic videtur, quia omne bonum alicuius expediens est illi; sed omnis sciencia bonum et perfectio intellectus est; quare, expedit homini perfici secundum intellectum et in quolibet tempore et in quolibet loco.

2. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles.

3. Item, non est expediens hominem laborare in illa sciencia ad quam non est natus; sed non est quilibet natus ad quamilbet scienciam: quidam enim sunt nati ad medicinam, quidam ad naturalia, quidam ad mathematica; quare, etc.

4. Intelligendum ad hoc quod cum intellectus sit sicut tabula nuda ante addiscere et sic inperfectus et sic in potencia ad scienciam que est actus intellectus, omnis sciencia est perfectio intellectus, et sic sit cognicio et sciencia de malo.

5. Secundo est intelligendum quod quamvis intellectus separatus sit et inmixtus et secundum se non egeat corpore, in operacione tamen communicat corpori; necesse est, cum intelligit, fantasmata speculatur. Ideo cum in operacione indigent corporte, necessarium est ipsum diversificari secundum diversificationem corporum. Unde Aristotiles in libro De anima dicit quod molles carne aptos mente dicimus. Unde super hoc fundat Aristotiles philosophiam suam.

6. Tercio est intelligendum quod non consideratur hic illud quod bonum est secundum se, sed quod est bonum secundum quod ordinatur in finem. Aliquid enim est malum secundum se et tamen bonum respectu finem. Ut interfacere hominum est malum et tamen est bonum propter pacem civitatis.

7. Item, aliquid est falsum secundum se, verum tamen respectu finem. Dico autem quod bonum est quemlibet quamilbet scienciam in civitate et quocumque tempore addiscere. Bene dico absolute, quia sciencia queque est perfectio intellectus et bonum etiam intellectus; ideo in quilibet tempore et quilibet loco in quo ignorat est bonum addiscere, non tamen expediens, quia expediens nominat bonum respectu finem. Quia quidam sunt nati ad unum, quidam ad aliud, ex consuetudine et tempore nativitatis sue, et ideo, cum homo bene non possit proficere in illo ad quod non natus est, ideo non expedat addiscere nisi illam ad quam natus est, sicut vidimus quosdam proficere in mathematicis et non in moralibus, quosdam autem e converso. Sic enim narrat Aristotiles de


21 De an. 2.9 (421a25-26) et D 147; H 182 (99). 36-37 EN 6.7 (1141b4-5) et R 484.
Anaxagore quod ipse erat bonus in spiritualibus, malus autem in operabilibus. Ideo vidit Plato disposicionem et nativitatem puerrorum, ut ex hoc experiretur ad quam scienciam puer sit utilis.

8. Iterum, nec etiam in qualibet tempore est expediens addiscere, quia quidam ad quodam magis in uno tempore et melius sunt dispositi quam in alio. 9. Iterum, nec etiam in qualibet civitate, ut si sit aliqua sciencia que docet homines a recta racione deviare in aliqua civitate, illa sciencia in tali civitate addiscenda non est; ut si aliqua esset civitas in qua doceretur quod sacrificandum est, illa sciencia que docet quod Iupiter sit deus expellenda est a civitate. Sic igitur apparat qualiter quedam sciencie addiscende, et quedam non; et in quo loco et in quo non; et in quo etiam tempore et in quo non. Et per hoc apparat ad raciones, quoniam procedunt viis suis.

Questio 18

Consequenter queritur utrum puer sit conveniens auditor huius sciencie.

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia ille qui potest proficere in hac doctrina est conveniens auditor; sed puer est potens proficere; et magis quam senex propter habundanciam caliditatis et propter disposicionem spirituum; quare, etc.

2. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles in littera.

3. Iterum, ille non est conveniens auditor qui non potest attingere ad finem huius doctrine; talis est puer. Probacio: quia finis huius doctrine est recta operacio secundum racionem rectam; addiscam autem quod non attingit puer propter defectum racionis et experiencie; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod puer dupliciter est: est enim puer etate, quia deficit a tempore; est autem puer moribus, quia deficit a moribus, nec est exercitatus in hiis propter inordinatum appetitum et habitum. Puer, primo modo, non est conveniens auditor huius doctrine, quia auditor huius doctrine debet iudicare finem et ea que sunt ad finem secundum rectam racionem, quia finis huius est principium huius sciencie. Debentem autem habere rectum iudicium oportet habere cognitionem. Puer autem cum sit inexcercitus in operationibus talibus propter defectum etatis non erit conveniens auditor; sed cum fuerit exercitatus in operationibus morum ita quod habet cognitionem principiorum in moribus,


38 EN 7.15 (1154a32-33) et R 518. Questio 18 1 Cf. Comm. 42.86-98; Lect. 13.56-74; Sent. 11-12.70-107. 7 EN 1.3 (1095a3) et R 377.
tunc erit conveniens auditor. Propter hoc post audicionem naturalium et mathematicarum debet hec scientia audiri. Est nichilominus puer in moribus non conveniens auditor huius scientiae propter appetitum inordinatum, quia hec scientia est operationis gracia, ut dicitur in secundo libro; et ille non potest recte operari propter passiones et propter inordinatum appetitum. Verumptamen proficiunt quemlibet audire istam doctrinam, quia si non depravatus, omnino poterit reduci ad bonos mores, sicut dicit commentator.

5. Ad racionem dico quod minor falsa est, quia doctrina non est nisi ex principiis doctrine que non potest puer habere, quia non est exercitatu in hiis.

Si tamen habeat aliquam experienciam et cognitionem principiorum, conveniens auditor est.

**Questio 19**

Utrum insecutor passionum possit quantum ad cognitionem proficere in doctrina ista?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia qui non habet experienciam eorum ex quibus sumitur doctrina vel qui non potest habere rectum iudicium eorum que cadunt in doctrina non potest proficere in doctrina ista; insecutor autem passionum est talis; quare, etc.

2. Item, qui errat circa principia in doctrina non habet rectam cognicionem eorum que sunt in doctrina; sed talis est insecutor passionum, quia

10 operacionibus est principium doctrine, sicut dignitas in demonstrativis; sed propter appetitum et habitum inordinatum inclinant ad malum finem, et ita errat in principiis; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Dicendum quod insecutor in actu non habet rectum iudicium in actu de operacionibus. Insecutor autem habitu potest habere. Contingit enim aliquid scire in actu et in habitu. Scire autem in actu est considerare aliquid secundum actum. Scire autem in habitu est habere habitum qui est principium considerandri sine actuali consideracione. Dico igitur quod insecutor non habet rectum iudicium in actu, quia rectum iudicium non est sine cognitione principiorum primorum in actu in sciencia; sed existens in passione non habet cognitionem principiorum actu in sciencia, quia post cognitionem omnia ordinat ad malum

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**Footnotes:**

24 EN 2.1 (1103b18-26) et R 397. 27 Comm. 45-46.81-87 (ad 1095a8-13).

et habet cognitionem de eo ad quod inclinat habitus. Cum igitur actu rectum
iudicium non habeat de principiis, nec per consequens de principiis actualiter,
et, ut sic, non potest proficere in ista scienza. Nichilominus tamen dico quod
talis passionum insecutor rectum iudicium de principiis in habitu habere potest
et per consequens de principiis < in actu >, quia sedata passione in eo rectum
iudicium et actuale de principiis habet; hoc autem non esset nisi habitualem
principiorum cognitionem habuisset; quare, etc. Et appareat ad raciones, quia
procedent sui viis.

Questio 20

Nos autem dicamus etc. (1095b14). Utrum felicitas consistat in voluptatibus?
1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud quod appetitur propter se et non propter
aliud videtur / esse summum bonum; talis autem est voluptas, quia dicit
Aristotiles in decimo huius quod aliquis appetit delectari propter delectari;
quare, etc.

2. Item, quod omnia appetunt videtur esse summum bonum; sed tale est
voluptas, sicut dicit Eudoxus in decimo huius; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles in littera.

4. Intelligendum quid intelligimus nomine delectacionis, per quod nichil
intelligitur nisi illud quo primo fertur aliquid per appetitum in bonum. Quo
tamen privatum est, tunc est volens; deinde autem unitur tali modo vel
secundum appetitum vel secundum intellectum. Deinde unito bono desiderat cum
ipso desiderante sequitur delectacio, et ita iam in bono habitu quiesscit
aliquis. Ista autem quietacio in isto bono dicitur delectacio. Unde delectacio
nichil est aliud nisi quietacio quedam in bono desiderato.

5. Iterum, in homine est duplex virtus secundum quam fertur in bonum,
sensus scilicet et intellectus; et utrumque fertur in bonum; et utrumque
quietatur in suo bono. Unde appetitus sensitivus fertur in bonum et unitur ei;
ulterius quietatur in illo.

6. Ista autem quietacio in sensilibus dicitur ipsius sensus sensualis delecta-
cio. Dico igitur quod in voluptatibus sensibilibus dicit disponi somnum bonum
hominis, quia somnum bonum debet esse secundum illud quod est somnum
in homine. Istud autem non est sensus, sed intellectus; et ideo in delectacionibus

25 talis] scienza praem. et exp. L

Questio 20 2 nos ... etc. cont. cum Gauthier] quod autem universale melius etc.
(1096a11) L

5 EN 10.2 (1172b19-24) et R 565. 8 EN 10.2 (1172b9-10) et R 565. 9 EN 1.3 (1095b14-
24) et R 378.
sensibilibus non consistit summum bonum hominis. Quoniam tamen sensus sit communis animalibus, brutis et hominibus, felicitas autem est operatio propria hominis et secundum proprium virtutem, manifestum est quod felicitas hominis non consistit in voluptatibus sensus.

7. Item, nec in delectacione secundum quod huuiusmodi consistit summum bonum hominis, quia felicitas consistit in unione desiderati cum desiderante; sed delectacio non est unio talis, sed aliquid quod sequitur ad talem unionem, sicut appareat. Est enim quietacio appetitus in bono, cum iam unitum est, et ita sequitur felicitatem, et ita delectacio est accidens felicitatis; quare, in delectacione sive voluptate, quae idem est, non consistit felicitas.

8. Ad racionem primam est dicendum quod illud est summum bonum hominis quod maxime appetitur ab homine secundum quod homo; et istud est maximum bonum uniusciusque quod maxime appetit unusquisque. Et debemus dicere quod illud est bonum hominis quod convenit homini et appetit homo secundum quod homo. Et hoc est secundum intellectum, quia sic differt ab alis. Et dico quod homo secundum quod homo non appetit delectacionem sensualem. Unde plures appetunt plura non secundum quod homines. Unde istam delectacionem secundum intellectum appetit intellectus secundum quod est conveniens ad illud quod maxime appetit.

9. Ad aliud dicendum quod illud quod omnes homines appetunt est ultimum bonum, si appetant secundum quod homines. Talis autem non est delectacio sensualis, quia illa convenit pariter brutis; et ideo non est propria homini; quare, in tali non consistet hominis felicitas.

Questio 21

Consequenter queritur utrum felicitas consistat in honoribus?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud quod est premium virtutis est felicitas; unde dicit Aristotiles felicitatem esse principium virtutis – secundum Philosophum quarto huuius; quare, etc.

2. Item, in illo debet consistere felicitas hominis quod attribuitur deo et subiectis nobilioribus; honorem autem maxime attribuimus deo; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum: felicitas debet esse bonum proprium; sed honor non est proprium bonum eius qui honoratur, sed honorantis; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod inpossible est felicitatem consistere in honoribus. Et
huius racio est quia honor universaliter queritur propter aliquid aliud, quod patet sic: est enim honor exhibicio reverencie in testimonium virtutis et aliciuus alterius ut excellencie, et ideo honor queritur secundum quod est testimonium aliciuus excellencie. Et ideo dicit Aristotiles quod homines / querunt magis honorari a sapientibus et prudentibus, quia tales melius possunt iudicare. Felicitas autem consistit in bono absoluto, quod est bonum propter se et non ad aliud ordinatum; quare, etc. Cum igitur honor ordinetur ad aliud, manifestum est quod in honore non consistet felicitas.

5. Ad racionem primam dico quod felicitas est essenciale premium virtutis, quia omnis virtus est propter felicitatem. Nullus enim felix nisi virtuosus; sed honor est premium accidentale; consequitur enim ipsam virtutem.

6. Ad aliam racionem dico quod maior falsa est; immo felicitas sicut probatur decimo huius, in speculatione virtutis intellective et respectu objecti primi et optimi consistit. Talis autem non est honor; quare, in honore non consistit hominis felicitas.

Questio 22

Utrum honor sit in honorante vel in honorato?

1. Et quod in honorato, probacio: quia quod confertur alicui videtur esse in illo ut aliquid possessum vel accidens eius; honor autem attribuitur honorato; quare, est in honorato et non in honorante.

2. Item, actio est in ipso mobili vel paciente; sed honoracio est actio, et ille qui est honoratus patitur; quare, honor est in honorato et non honorante.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles in littera.

4. Dicendum quod honor non est in honorato, sicut in subiecto, sed in ipso honorante. Est enim duplex operacio: una, scilicet, que manet in agente; alia autem que transit in materiam exteriorem. Manens enim operacio in agente est intelligere < et > velle. In materiam autem exteriorum transeuntes sunt, sicut fabricare, secare, urere. Unde operacio que est intelligere dicitur manere in intelligente, quia causatur ab intelligibili, et intellectus passivus refert istam passionem in ipsum quod agebat in ipsum; ideo dicitur manere in agente.
Similiter velle causatur a bono apprehenso, et intellectus istam actionem refert in bonum apprehensum. Talis autem operacio est honor; est enim quedam operacio manens in operante. Est enim causata a bono eius qui honoratur. Bonum autem existens in eo qui honoratur est illud quod movet ipsum generantem ad actionem generandi. Et ista actio non manet in ipso absolute, sed per illum ad ipsum in quo erat illud bonum. Unde honor est exhibicio / reverenciae in testimonium virtutis et excellencie illius qui honoratur sic, quod bonum quod est in honorato, a quo incipit actio ista, est illud ad quod terminatur ipsa honoracio, sicut dicitur de intelligere. Si autem propter aliquid aliud et non propter bonum in ipso existens exhibeat reverenciam, tunc est adulacio; vel si hoc faciat propter habere pecuniam suam, tunc est cupidus. Quales enim sunt fines, tales debent denominari habitus. Apparet igitur quod honor est in honorante, sicut in passo, et non in honorato.

5. Per hoc apparat ad raciones: est enim dicendum quod ille qui honoratur non habet racionem passi, sed bonum existens in ipso est in racione agentis et moventis.

Questio 23

Consequentem queritur utrum felicitas consistat in diviciis?

1. Et quod sic videtur, quia circa illud circa quod maxime afficiuntur homines videtur consistere felicitas hominis; sed circa pecunias maxime afficiuntur homines, ut ad sensum patet; quare, etc.

2. Item, cuius appetitus indeterminatus est videtur habere racionem ultimi finis; talis est appetitus diviciarum, sicut vult Aristotiles in Rethorica sua; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: ultimum bonum non compatitur secum malum; sed per divicias parantur mala; quare, in diviciis non consistit felicitas.

4. Dicendum quod in diviciis non consistit felicitas; sed est intelligendum quod quaedam sunt divicie naturales que sunt / ad supplendos defectus naturales, sicut potus, cibus, vestimentum et similia. Divicie artificiales sunt ille que sunt invente propter faciles communicaciones diviciarum naturalium, sicut aurum et arguentum. Denarius enim est quasi fideiussor ad habendum quicquid
homo voluerit. Et manifestum quod dividie naturales non sunt felicitates, quia omnia talia queruntur propter alium. Si igitur felicitas non queritur propter alium, manifestum quod in diviciis naturalibus non consistit felicitas.

5. Iterum, multo minus in diviciis artificialibus consistet felicitas, quia illa non queruntur nisi inquantum sunt mensura diviciarum naturalium et ad divicias naturales ordinantur. Si igitur in diviciis non consistit ultimum bonum hominis, et felicitas [non] est ultimum bonum hominis, sequitur quod in diviciis non consistet felicitas.

6. Ad racionem primam est dicendum quod in illo in quo maxime afficiuntur < homines > secundum quod homines in illo consistet felicitas; sic autem non maxime afficitur homo circa divicias, sed solum afficitur circa eas ut ordinet eas secundum racionem rectam. Et talis affectio est bona. Sed verum est quod quidam sunt homines non recte ordinati, qui maxime afficientur circa eas, et quamvis circa eas maxime afficiantur non est ponendum quod in eis consistit felicitas, quia afficientes se circa eas inordinati sunt.

7. Ad aliud dicendum quod illius cuius est appetitus infinitus secundum rectam racionem regulatus, illud circa quod afficitur, in eo dicitur consistere felicitas. Sed dico quod appetitus diviciarum non est regulatus recta racione.

8. Iterum, appetitus diviciarum naturalium non est infinitus, quia parvum est quod natura appetit. Appetitus tamen diviciarum artificialium potest esse infinitus: alter autem est appetitus summi boni et alter diviciarum. Quanto autem aliquis cognoscit summum bonum, tanto magis appetit ipsum; quanto autem aliquis plus cognoscit divicias et congregat, tanto minus appetit eas, si fuerit regulatus racione recta. Et ideo quamvis, ut sic, appetitus sit inordinatus et cum sit infinitus, non oportet quod in eo consistat felicitas hominis.

Quod autem universale melius (1096all). Circa opinionem Platonis, qui posuit felicitatem consistere in quodam bono separato, et Aristotiles ostendit contra ipsum quod non sit aliquod bonum separatum quod sit unius racionis; ideo, queritur utrum hoc sit verum?

1. Quod autem sit bonum separatum eiusdem racionis in omnibus, probacio: quia in unoquoque genere est ponere aliquod primum quod est mensura et principium omnium que sunt post; quare, in genere bonorum erit hoc ponere, et tale erit bonum separatum; quare, etc.

35 artificialium] naturalium L

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2. Item, quod sit eiusdem racionis cum aliis bonis, probacio: quia omne quod generatur ab aliquo generatur, et a sibi simili, ut habetur in septimo *<Methaphysice>.* Cum igitur omnia bona temporalia sint mutabilia, generatur ab alio et simili specie vel racione, quia illud bonum, a quo sunt omnia bona, erit eiusdem racionis cum aliis; quare, etc. Et hec fuit racio Platonis.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur per raciones Aristotilis: quia in hiis que se habent secundum prius et posterius non inventitur una ydea unius racionis secundum opinionem Platonis, ideo in numeris non posuit Plato unam ydeam; sed hoc est in bonis reperi re prius et posterius; quare, non est aliq uid bonum separatum unius racionis cum aliis.

4. Iterum, bonum et ens convertuntur quia omne ens bonum et e converso; et sic et ens reperi re in diversis generibus, sic et bonum. Cum ergo non sit ens separatum unius racionis cum aliis, quare neque bonum.

5. Intelligendum primo quod necesse est esse aliquod bonum separatum in natura; secundo intelligendum quod non est eiusdem racionis cum inferioribus; tercio, quod omnia sunt bona per participacionem illius.

6. Primum probatur sic per racionem, quoniam omne bonum per participationem est bonum causatum quod causatur ab alio. Et semper causa melior causato. Si tunc sit bonum causatum a bono, illud bonum causans aut causatur ab alio aut non, et sic erit processus in infinitum, quod est impossibile; aut illud bonum est incausatum, et tunc habetur propositum, quod sit reperi re bonum <in> causatum, et nichil aliud quam bonum: quia aliter non esset bonum per essenciam, quia illud dicitur aliquid per essenciam in quo nichil est quod non sit sua essencia. Si igitur illud habeat aliquid quod non sit bonum, tunc non erit bonum per essenciam, quod est falsum; quia contingit devenire ad unum bonum simplicissimum quod est sua essencia.

7. Item, habetur duodecimo *Methaphysice,* bonum est duplex: bonum ordinacionis, sicut in universo, et bonum separatum; sicut apparat in exercitu est bonum ordinis et bonum separatum, sicut bonum ducis. Sic igitur manifestum est ex intencione Philosophi quod est reperi re bonum separatum proporcionaliter duci in exercitu, ut ipsam causam primam.

8. Secundo est intelligendum quod illud bonum non est unius racionis cum aliis bonis quia non predicatur de aliis, quia unum subsistens de alio subsistente non predicatur quia sunt diversa numero; et que predicantur, predicatum et subjectum, sunt unum numero; quare, etc.

9. Item, secundum Philosophum, decimo *Methaphysice,* sempiternum et non sempiternum non sunt unius generis, sicut nec corruptibile et incorrupt-

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tibile; sed primum bonum est sempiternum, alia bona causata sunt non sempi-

terna; quare, etc.

10. Item, illud quod est causa prima non potest esse unius generis cum ipsis

causatis, nec unius nature cum illis, quia universaliter quecumque causata in

hoc conveniunt quod sunt causata, et in natura eorum universaliter nature esse

eorum ex alio dependent. Si igitur primum esset eiusdem nature cum illis, tunc

derenderet ab alio in esse; [ab alio] quod est inconveniens. Primum enim

principium calidorum non dependet ab alio quod sit formalius eo calidum;

quare, etc. Unde manifestum est quod non est alius bonum separatum quod sit

unius racionis cum aliis. Et in hoc reprobatis Aristotiles Platonem.

11. Tercio est intelligendum quod omnia sunt bona per participacionem istius

boni separati, quia omnia que causantur et procedunt vel ordinantur ad unum

attribucionem habent ad ipsum. Sed omnia bona causantur a primo bono, quia

omnia bona attribuuntur ei quod racionem finis habet. Unde dicuntur omnia

bona quia sunt ab hoc bono et ad illud ordinantur et ad illud acquirendum

coadiuvant. Manifestum est quod est ponere primum bonum separatum a quo

omnia causata dependent. Quod tamen bonum separatum non est unius

< racionis > cum ipsis bonis causatis.

12. Primam racionem concedo, quoniam oportet ponere bonum separatum.

Sed illud non est unius racionis, ut dictum est.

13. Ad secundum dicendum: quando dicitur, simile generatur a suo simili,
dicendum quod ista proposicio intelligenda est in generacione substantiarum,

non autem in generacione accidencium, quia durum generatur a non duro; nec

adhuc est ipsa proposicio universaliter intelligenda in generacione substanci¬
rum, sed de generacione particulari proxima. Et dicendum quod quamvis

omnia bona sit generata a primo, non oportet quod sint eiusdem racionis cum

illo.

Questio 25

Consequenter queritur utrum, posito bono separato, sit ponere felicitatem in

ipso?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia ultimus finis est ultimum bonum et felicitas

hominis; sed istud est ultimus finis quod est separatum bonum; quare, etc.

2. Ad oppositum arguitur: felicitas est proprium bonum hominis; sed istud

bonum / separatum non est proprium homini, sed commune omnibus; quare,

etc.

Questio 25

7 separatum] hominis praeem. et exp. L

Questio 25

1 Cf. Comm. 94-95.22-43; Lect. 31.31-33, 32-33.18-53; Sent. 22-23.18-54.
QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICA NICOMACHEA (I. 25-26)

3. Item, bonum hominis debet esse hominis perfectio; sed istud bonum separatum non est hominis perfectio, quia separatum non est perfectio separati, sicut Philosophus vult septimo <Methaphysice>; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod felicitas est perfectio hominis, sed finis duplex: uno modo, ipsa operacio eius vel perfectio quod est ad finem; alio modo dicitur objectum illius operacionis. Unde finis illius qui medicatur est sanitas; objectum autem ipsius est corpus sanatum.

5. Item, simpliciter finis hominis potest dici operacio hominis ut forte intelligere vel aliquid tale; alio modo, objectum illius operacionis non intelligere, cum intelligere sit operacio finis. Iste est magis bonum, quia bonitas operacionis est a bonitate objecti. Si tu voces felicitatem hominis operacionem hominis, tunc bonum separatum non est felicitas hominis. Sed de tali bono dicit Aristotiles quod felicitas hominis est operacio hominis. Si autem tu voces felicitatem hominis objectum operacionis, tunc illud separatum est felicitas hominis. Sed de hac non intelliget Aristotiles, sed ponet hanc distinctionem, scilicet ‘finis quo’ et ‘finis cuius’, ut apparret secundo De anima. Raciones enim procedunt suis viis.

Questio 26

Consequenter dicit Aristotiles quod amicis existentibus et veritate consenziendum est veritati.

1. Et videtur quod non sit verum, quia magis bono magis est consenziendum; sed amici sunt magis bonum quam veritas. Dicit enim Philosophus: sine amicis nullus eligit vivere, habens omnia reliqua bona.

2. Item, videtur quod amici sunt magis bonum omnibus aliis et per consequens veritate; quare, etc.

3. Item, illi quod est causa magis boni magis est consenziendum; sed huiusmodi sunt amici, ut dicitur decimo huius; quare, etc.

4. In oppositum est Aristotiles et commentator.

5. Item, ei quod est magis amicis magis est consenziendum; sed veritas magis est amico, quia amicus non est amicus nisi propter veritatem.

22 felicitatem] bonitatem praem. et exp. L

11 Meta. 7.16 (1040b25-30) et M 153. 21 EN 1.7 (1098a17-18) et R 384. 24 De an. 2.4 (415b2. 20) et D 95; cf. Phys. 2.2 (194a35-37); H 181 (82).
Questio 26 1 Cf. Comm. 72.74-79; Lect. 24.2-32; Sent. 22.41-75. 2, 5, 11 EN 1.6 (1096a14-16) et R 379. 10 EN 9.12 (1171b29-33) et R 562. 11 Comm. 72.74-79 (ad 1096a10-14).
6. Dicendum quod simpliciter melius est consentire veritati quam amicis. Et huic rationi est quia homo propter felicitatem est. Propter amicos autem non est homo finaliter, quia amici sunt bonum hominis per accidens; quare, cum per se bonum sit magis bonum, magis consenciendum est veritati quam amicis.

7. Utrum tamen magis eligendum sit <verum quam falsum> quando expedit dicere falsum propter amicum quam verum, dicendum <quod> expediens dicitur bonum per comparacionem ad finem, sicut aliquando expedit mercos proicere in mare. Ideo ad hoc considerandum est de fine. Finis autem hominis duplex est: unus qui est felicitas practica que consistit in operacionibus hominis et in operabilibus a nobis; alius est finis qui consistit solum in speculacione veritatis. Dico igitur quod non est expediens defendere amicum et dimittere veritatem per comparacionem ad finem, qui est speculacio, quia finis speculationis est veritas primi intelligibilis in quo consistit hominis felicitas. Si autem loquamur de expedimento per comparacionem ad finem qui est vita politica que consistit in virtutibus moralibus, dicendum quod aliquando magis valet defensio amici quam ipsa veritas; et tunc expedit facere detrimentum veritatis. Simpliciter tamen dico quod melius est consentire veritati in detrimentum amicorum et per comparacionem ad finem que est cognitione veritatis. Ideo dicit forte Philosophus quod expedit hominibus honorare veritatem et ipsam amicis preferre, et maxime philosopho, quia philosophus est qui ordinatur in cognitionem veritatis. Et ideo aliter convenit hoc / philosopho quam politico. Unde philosophi est amator sapiencie, nisi cum preferat veritati amicos mentitum nomen eius.

8. Ad raciones, est dicendum ad primam quod dicit Aristotiles quod sine amicis nullus eligit vivere. Dicendum quod hoc est verum vivendo civiliter; tamen sine amicis eligi aliquis vivere vita contemplativa. Et ideo racio concedatur quantum ad hoc quod concluere potest; per idem apparet ad secundum argumentum.

Questio 27

RURSUS REVERTENDUM (1097a14-15). Ibi enim primo dicit Aristotiles quod felicitas est bonum perfectissimum.

1. Et videtur quod non, quia perfectum est cuius nichil est extra; sed extra
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5 felicitatem est aliquod bonum quod adiunctum felicitati reddit ipsum felicitatem eligibiliorem; quare, etc.

2. Item, perfectum est quod attingit proprium finem; talis autem non est felicitas, non attingit ad finem quia ipsa in se finis est; quare, etc.

3. Oppositum dicit Boethius in De consolacione quod felicitas est bonum perfectissimum et aggregatio omnium bonorum; quare, etc.

4. Et dicendum quod felicitas est aliquod bonum perfectum, quia perfectum est illud cuius nulla pars est extra que nate sunt in eo. Felicitas autem talis est quia includit in se omnia bona hominis secundum quod homo, et omnia bona hominis attributionem habent ad ipsam ita quod felicitas est illud ad quod omnia alia ordinantur sicut ad finem, et a quo sumunt racionem omnia alia.

5. Item, bonum racionem boni habet per hoc quod appetitur. Quedam autem sunt bona que eliguntur propter aliud, sicut divicie solum propter aliud, numquam autem propter se. Quoddam autem est bonum quod eligitur propter se et propter aliud, ut sciencia. Est nichilominus tercium bonum quod eligitur propter se tantum. Secundum autem bonum magis est bonum quam primum, et tercium quam secundum; et ita quod est hoc bonum est perfectissimum. Talis autem est felicitas, et ex hoc sequitur quod felicitas sit bonum perfectissimum.

6. Ad racionem: quod extra felicitatem non est aliquod quod non contingatur ab ipsa secundum aliquam attributionem. Felix enim etsi habeat ultra amicos vel divicias vel aliqua alia, ipsa tamen magis attribuuntur ad felicitatem.

7. Ad secundum dicendum quod hec racio perfecti, que est quod perfectum est quod attingit proprio fini, est verum de illo quod habet finem; de racione autem felicitatis non est quod attingat finem, quia ipsamet finis est omnium et per consequens sui ipsius; quare, etc.

Questio 28

Consequenter queritur utrum felicitas hominis sit aliquod bonum causatum?

1. Et videtur quod non, secundum Boethium in libro De consolacione, qui dicit, felicitatem perfectam deum confiteri neceesse est; deus autem est aliiquid incausatum; quare, in causato non consistet hominis felicitas.

2. Iterum, felicitas est summum bonum; summum autem bonum est bonum incausatum; quare, in bono incauso consistet felicitas, non ergo in bono causato.

9 Boethius] philosophus praem. et exp. L

Questio 28 3 qui quia L 6 bonum3 om. P

9 De cons. phil. 3, pr. 2 (CCL 94.38); H 289 (34).

Questio 28 1 Cf. ST 1-2, 3, 1 et 2, 7. 3 De cons. phil. 3, pr. 10 (CCL 94.53).
3. In oppositum arguitur: felicitas est finis hominis; finis autem causatur ab his que sunt ad finem; quare, felicitas in bono causato consistet.

4. Dicendum quod duplex est finis: uno modo operacio, alio modo ipsum objectum operacionis, sicut usus pecunie et esse pecunie.

5. Unde dicit Philosophus quod finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet 'finis quo' et 'finis cuius'. Unde si vocemus felicitatem objectum operacionis huius quod est intelligere, cum objectum sit inmateriale et incausatum, manifestum est quod, ut sic, felicitas hominis consistet in bono incausato. Illud enim objectum intellectus, ut sic, est prima causa omnium a quod omnia in esse suo dependent et in esse suo conservatur.

6. Si autem loquamur de felicitate / que consistit in operacione hominis secundum intelligere, cum talis operacio procedat a forma intellectus, erit aliquod causatum. Et ideo, ut sic, in aliquo causato consistet felicitas hominis. Et apparat ad raciones, quia procedunt suis viis.

Questio 29

Consequenter queritur utrum felicitas sit operacio?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia felicitas debet esse aliquod bonum manens; talis autem non est operacio, quia operacio semper est in fieri; quare, felicitas non est operacio.

2. Item, felicitas debet esse bonum non interruptum; quelibet enim operacio hominis est interrupta; quare, etc.

3. Item, secundum Boethium felicitas est status omnium bonorum aggregacione perfectus; talis autem non est operacio, sed quies operacionis; quare, etc.

4. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles.

5. Item, bonum uniuscuiusque consistit in operacione, sed bonum hominis est felicitas hominis; quare, felicitas hominis consistet in operacione.

6. Et dicendum quod felicitas secundum quod consistit in usu et non in objecto consistit in operacione, quia est perfectio hominis secundum formam eius. Et est intelligendum quod est perfectio triplex hominis: una est ipsius forma; secunda autem est que est ipsius habitus qui est principium operacionis;
tercia autem perfectio est operacio. Ultima autem perfectio non consistit in
forma, quia ipsa forma est in potentia ad habitum.

7. Item, nec ultima perfectio consistit in habitibus, quia non consistit in eo
quod ordinatur ad aliud; sed habitus sunt principia operacionum et ordinantur
ad operationem; quare, sequetur quod felicitas in operatione ultima <est>,
quia omnia alia ordinantur ad ipsam, et ipsa ad nichil aliud. Nam tale est
felicitas, et ideo in operatione consistit felicitas. Et licet operacio ordinetur ad
objectum, de tali ordinacione non loquimur in proposito; quare, etc.

8. Ad racionem dicendum quod quedam est operacio que non manet in
agente, que est magis perfectio rei facte quam agentis. Et in istis non consistit
felicitas. Alia autem est operacio que manet in substancia agentis, sicut
intelligere. Et in tali operacione consistit felicitas.

9. Ad aliud dicendum quod bonum hominis debet esse tale non interruptum;
sed debet <non> esse tale bonum quod semper meliori modo se habeat ad
felicitatem quo potest. Nunc autem non potest aliqua esse operacio hominis,
nisi sit interrupta. Et nichil prohibet quin in operatione consistat felicitas.

10. Ad aliud dico quod felicitas aggregat omnia bona, quia ad ipsum omnia
alia ordinantur, et ideo dicitur status pro privacione motus. Quia enim ipsa est
finis; finis autem terminat motus; ideo terminat motum. Nichilominus operacio
in qua consistit non est motus, nisi equivoce, quia intelligere non est movere,
sicut dicitur primo De anima contra Platonem.

Questio 30

Consequenter queritur utrum felicitas consistit in operacione anime sensitive?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia aut consistit in operacione anime sensitive aut
intellactive; non intellactive, quia non consistit in operacione que dependet ex
alia operacione; sed operacio intelligendi ex operacione sentiendi; quare, in
operacione intelligendi non consistit felicitas. Consistit ergo in operacione
sentiendi.

2. Item, quod non sit felicitas sine operacionibus sensus dicitur, quia felicitas
est bonum perfectum; sed operacio sentiendi est bonum hominis; secundum
etiam quod vult Boethius, felicitas est status omnium bonorum aggregatione
perfectus; quare, sine operacione sentiendi non erit felicitas.
3. In oppositum arguitur: operacio sentiendi communis est hominibus et brutis; quare, si felicitas consistet in operationibus sensus, / tunc bruta felicitarentur; hoc autem est falsum; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum primo quod felicitas non consistit in operatione sensus; secundo, quod non consistit in operatione sensus in presenti vita. Probacio primi est: felicitas consistit in operatione illa hominis secundum quam homoconiungitur objecto suo, scilicet ipsi summo bono; sed secundum operationem sensus non coniungitur homo illi bono, quia talis operacio non excellit sensibilia; quare, in operatione sensus non consistet hominis felicitas.

5. Item, felicitas consistit in operatione illius quod principale est in homine, cum sit bonum perfectissimum hominis; talis autem est intellectus; quare, consistit in intellectu, et si sic, non ergo in sensu.

6. Secundo est intelligendum quod felicitas non est sine operatione sensus. Consistit enim, ut dictum est, in operatione intellectus. Talis autem operacio non est sine operacione sentiendi; vult enim Aristotiles, tercio De anima, intellectum, cum intelligit, necesse est fantasmata speculari. Quare, etc.

7. Item, felicitas hominis non est sine esse hominis; esse autem non est sine potencia sensitiva; quare, nec felicitas sine potencia sensitiva. Apparet igitur quod felicitas non consistit in operatione virtutis sensitive; sine tamen ipsa non est illa operacio; quare, etc.

8. Ad racionem dico quod felicitas hominis consistit in illo quod non ordinatur ad aliud; nec tamen est contra racionem eius quod dependeat ex alio tamquam ex causa, sicut ex operatione sentiendi, quia finis de necessitate dependet ex hiis que sunt ad finem; quare, etc.

9. Alie raciones bene probant quod non est felicitas sine operacione sentiendi, et ideo concedantur quantum ad hoc quod concludunt.

Questio 31

Deinde queritur utrum felicitas consistat in operatione voluntatis vel intellectus?

1. Et quod in operacione voluntatis, probacio: quia ultimus finis in opera-
cione respondet primo moventi; sed primum movens in homine est voluntas et ultimus finis eius est felicitas; quare, etc. Voluntas enim movet intellectum ad raciocinandum.

16 primo] quod praem. et exp. L 30 felicitas] potencia praem. et exp. L
Questio 31 4 voluntatis] intellectus praem. et exp. L

27 De an. 3.7 (431a14-17) et D 229; H 188 (167).
Questio 31 1 Cf. Lect. 39.70-94; ST 1-2, 3, 4.
2. Item, delectatio est aliquid ipsius voluntatis, quia est quietacio desiderii; sed felicitas est delectacio, cum delectacio sit ultimum bonum quod in unione convenientis cum conveniente sequitur delectacio; quare, etc.

3. Item, felicitas est ultimum bonum; ultimum autem bonum est objectum voluntatis; quare, felicitas consistet in operacione voluntatis.

4. Ad oppositum: felicitas hominis, sicut vult Aristotiles in hoc primo, consistit in eo quod est principalius in homine habente rationem; sed hoc est intellectus, sicut probatur decimo huius; quare, etc.

5. Ad dissolucionem autem questionis considerandum primo quod, cum in homine sit reperire primo intellectum et voluntatem, considerandum quod istorum sit principalius. Et videtur quod intellectus, quia omne quod per se <est> activum alicuius et motivum videtur principalius esse eo quod movet; sed intellectus est motivus voluntatis, non enim movetur voluntas nisi a bono comprehenso ab intellectu.

6. Item, sicut se habet objectum voluntatis ad objectum intellectus, ita voluntas ad intellectum; sed objectum voluntatis est bonum, objectum autem intellectus est ens; prius autem est ens <quam> bonum, quia, sicut dicit Algazel, ens est quod primo occurrit intellectui nostro; quare, etc.

7. Secundum enim Philosophum in decimo huius: felicitas <consistit> in operacione illius quod est optimum et in virtute optima. Cum igitur intellectus sit nobilior ipsa voluntate, manifestum est quod felicitas consistet in operacione intellectus, non autem voluntatis.

8. Unde intelligendum <est> quod voluntas fertur in bonum desideratum; voluntas quietatur / in bono habito et delectatur in illo. Felicitas autem non consistit in ista prima operacione, quia motus ad felicitatem non est felicitas. Iterum, nec in secunda predicta operacione, quia felicitas consistit in unione hominis cum bono perfectissimo, et ad hanc unionem consequitur delectacio. Cum igitur delectacio non sit talis union que quidem est felicitas, quare felicitas non consistit in operacione voluntatis.

9. Sed est intelligendum quod in felicitate sunt duo: est ibi unio, et est considerare id quod pertinet ad eius essenciam, scilicet unionem; item, est considerare delectacionem, que est quasi accidens proprium consequens ipsam.

Primum istorum pertinet ad intellectum, secundum autem ad voluntatem. Primo enim intellectus dicit hoc esse summum bonum, et tunc homo per
voluntatem unitur illi, et tunc sequitur delectacio que est ultima operacio voluntatis.

10. Ad racionem primam est dicendum: cum dicitur, voluntas est primum, falsum est; immo intellectus. Universaliter enim volumus quia intelligimus, et non convertitur.

11. Ad secundam racionem est dicendum quod major vera est et minor falsa est. Cum dicitur, delectacio est finis ultimus secundum quod ultimum bonum est felicitas, et cum dicitur, tale ultimum est delectacio, falsum est; immo ipsa unio hominis ad summum bonum est felicitas; ad istam autem sequitur delectacio, sicut quedam eius proprietas; quare, etc.

12. Ad tercium dicendum quod ultimum bonum hominis est bonum voluntatis sicut objectum. Et cum dicitur, ultimum bonum est felicitas hominis, dico quod verum est, sicut objectum; sed istud bonum quod est operacio voluntatis est bonum, et istud bonum racionem habet ex racione objecti. Unde videre non potest esse objectum primum < visus, sed > visibile; verum operacio aliciuius virtutis non est, < sed > objectum illius virtutis. Unde operacio voluntatis non est objectum eius. Quare in operacione voluntatis non consistet felicitas, immo magis in operacione intellectus que est principalis in homine.

Questio 32

Consequenter queritur utrum felicitas consistat in operacione intellectus practici vel speculativi, quia Aristotiles videtur dicere quod consistit in operacione illius quod est principale in homine?

1. Quod autem consistit in operacione intellectus practici videtur, quia felicitas consistit in istis operacionibus in quibus homo magis assimilatur substanciis separatis, secundum Aristotilem in decimo huius; sed in operacionibus intellectus practici assimilantur illis, quia substantiae separate sunt cause aliorum; sed et homo per intellectum practicum est causa aliarum in alios regulando per virtutem prudentis.

2. Item, felicitas est bonum hominis; illud autem in quod fertur intellectus speculativus non est bonum hominis, sed secundum intellectum practicum dicimur boni et non secundum operacionem intellectus speculativi; quare, in operacione intellectus practici consistet felicitas.

47 quod] quia L 56 primum < visus sed > visibile coni. cum Gauthier] primi visibilis L

Questio 32 5 consistit corr. ex consistat L 9 aliarum aliorum L alias alios L

Questio 32 1 Cf. Comm. 194.17-21; Lect. 32-33.89-15; Sent. 36.114-152, 58.84-90; ST 1-2, 3, 5. 3 EN 1.8 (1098b14-16) et R 385. 7 EN 10.7 (1178b24-31) et R 580-581.
3. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles in decimo huius.

4. Item, in operacione illa que est diuturnior consistet felicitas; sed operacione speculativa diuturnior est quam sit practica; quare, in operacione speculativa consistet felicitas, non autem in practica.

5. Intelligendum quod felicitas est operacio hominis secundum intellectum vel virtutem intellectus. In intellectu autem duo est considerare, practicum et speculativum. Virtutes practice sunt prudencia et temperancia; speculativa autem ut intellectus, sapiencia, sciencia et ars, etc. Siigitur felicitas est operacio intellectus, et in intellectu sunt duo, ut dictum est, duplex erit felicitas: una que est perfectio hominis secundum virtutem moralem; et alia secundum virtutem speculativam, secundum quod commentator dicit quod felicitas intellectus speculativi consistit in sapiencia. Secundum hoc sunt due felicitates, politica et speculativa; tamen speculativa magis habet racionem felicitatis, quia optimum hominis debet consistere in operacione optima respectu optimi objecti. Sed optima virtus est intellectus speculativus et objectum eius optimum intelligibile.

6. Item, illud magis habet racionem boni simpliciter quod non ordinatur in alium; sed felicitas contemplativa non ordinatur in alium sed practica, ut operari secundum prudenciam ordinatur ad contemplacionem; quare, in practica operacione non consistet felicitas; consistet ergo in speculativa.

7. Item, posterior est operacio que est secundum intellectum speculativum quam practicum, quia operaciones virtutis practice sunt ad sedandum concupiscencias. Et hoc dicit Aristotiles, septimo Physicorum, quod in sedando et quiescendo fit anima prudens et sciens; prius autem ordinatur ad posterius; quare, practicum ordinatur ad speculativum. Et si sic, quare in operacione speculativae consistet felicitas.

8. Item, etiam illud per quod maxime assimilamur substanciis separatis, que sunt perfectissime, in illo maxime consistet nostra felicitas; sed illud est speculacio et contemplacio, sicut dicit Aristotiles decimo huius; quare, etc.

9. Ad racionem dicendum est quod maior vera est. Et cum dicitur quod magis assimilamur substantiis separatis secundum intellectum practicum, cum simus principia operationum secundum intellectum practicum sicut ipsa sunt principia ipsorum, verum est in hac operacione assimilamur ipsis. Sed alia est quedam operacio, magis principalis, que est intelligere primum intelligibile, et in hac operacione assimilamur ipsis secundum operationem intellectus specula-
tivi. Et ideo in eo in quo magis assimilatur, in isto est magis felicitas; hec autem speculativa; quare, in speculativa magis consistet felicitas quam in practica.

10. Ad alium dicendum quod homo dicitur bonus et verus ex operacione intellectus. Verum tamen est quod non dicitur bonus bonitate morali secundum intellectum speculativum, sed simpliciter boni dimirum secundum intellectum illum.

Questio 33

Scrutandum autem (1098b8). Utrum felicitas indigeat delectacione?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia bonum per se sufficiens non indiget <t> exterioribus, tunc enim non esset sufficiens; sed felicitas est bonum sufficiens; delectatio autem est extra felicitatem; quare, etc.

2. Item, felicitas non indiget illo quod inpedit operacionem secundum virtutem; sed delectatio inpedit operacionem secundum virtutem, secundum Philosophum in decimo huius; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum arguitur: omne subjectum in esse suo indiget passione propria; sed delectatio prorsum accidens est ipsius felicitatis; quare, etc.

4. Intelligendum quod felicitas habet delectacionem sibi adiunctam. Et ratio huius est quia felicitas consistit in unione hominis cum bono separato; in illa autem unione quietatur homo; in illa autem quietazione desiderii est delectatio; quare, felicitati coniuncta est delectacio.

5. Item, felicitatem consequitur maxima delectacio quia voluntas operacionis est ex voluntate objecti. Cum igitur istud objectum hominis vel intellectus sit nobilissimum, tunc operacio consequens erit optima, et per consequens delectacio maxima; hec autem operatio est felicitas; quare, felicitatem maxima consequitur delectacio. Nichilominus cum delectacio dicitur delectacione secundum sensum, et talis est extra felicitatem, et ideo dicit Aristotiles quod felicitas non indiget delectacionem tamquam aliquo extrinseco. Est etiam alia delectacio intellectualis, et talis consequitur felicitatem, quia est secundum virtutem secundum quam est felicitas.

6. Est enim intelligendum quod aliquid preexigitur ad alium aut ut aliquid preambulans, et sic sensus exteriores exiguntur ad felicitatem; exigitur secundo modo aliquid sicut coadiuvans, et hoc modo ad felicitatem exiguntur amici;

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54 speculativum] practicum praem. et exp. L
Questio 33 4 exterioribus] exteriorum L 7 operacionem] virtutem praem. et exp. L
21 extrinseco corr. ex intrinseco L

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Questio 33 1 Cf. Comm. 132.59-67; Lect. 46.81-87; Sent. 46.1-63; ST 1-2, 4, 1. 8 EN 10.5 (1171b1-23) et R 572-573. 20 V. sup. q. 33.2.
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exigitur etiam tercio modo aliquid sicut illud quod de racione eius est, sicut tota racio felicitatis exigitur ad felicitatem; exigitur nichilominus aliquid quarto modo tamquam necessarium consequens ipsum, et sic propria passio exigitur 30 ad substantiam et delectacium ad felicitatem.

7. Ad racionem primam, dico quod non indiget felicitas delectacione nisi ut de necessitate ipsum consequens est. Et cum dicitur quod delectacio est extrinseca, dico quod non exigitur ut aliquid pertinens ad essenciam felicitatis, ut dictum est, cum voluptas vel delectacio secundum sensum est totaliter 35 extrinseca. Et ideo talis delectacio non exigitur, sed ea que dicta est, ad felicitatem.

8. Ad aliud dicendum quod aliqua delectacio coauget operacionem, sicut in operacione, sicut delectacio cytharizandi coauget operacionem; et talis non corrumpit operacionem. Delectacio tamen que est in operacione contraria 40 corrumpit. Unde si aliquis fuerit in operacione cytharizandi per delectacionem que consistit in fielando, poterit impediri. Dico igitur quod delectacio que consistit in felicitate coauget felicitatem et non corrumpit eam; quare, etc.

Questio 34

Consequenter queritur: cum in felicitate sit cognicio veri et etiam delectacio consequens felicitatem, queritur quid istorum sit melius?

1. Quod autem delectacio melior sic videtur: quia perfectio melior est quam perfectibile secundum quod huiusmodi; sed delectacio est perfectio cognicionis, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus decimo huius, delectacio perficit felicitatem, sicut superveniens finis; quare, etc.

2. Item, illud propter quod aliquid appetitur melius est illo quod appetitur; sed propter delectacionem appetitur totum quod appetitur - unde adiuncte erunt delectaciones turpibus operacionibus propter generationem; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum arguitur: cognicio productiva est delectacionis; sed productum nobilius est producto; quare, cognicio melior est delectacione.

4. Intelligendum quod unio intellectus cum bono separatum maius est bonum quam delectacio, quia bonum operacionis sumitur ex bono objecti, quia racio operacionis ex racione objecti sumitur. Dictum est enim prius quod felicitas que consistit in cogniscione veri racionem habet ex objecto; ita etiam dicendum est quod nobilitatem habet operacion ex objecto. Ista autem unio cum bono separatum est quod causat delectacionem; nam ex ista unione sequitur quietacio. Talis autem quietacio est delectacio; quare, bonum in ista delectacione erit propter

Questio 34: 1 Cf. Sent. 46-47.65-120; ST 1-2, 4, 2. 6 EN 10.7 (1177a22-29) et R 570. 15-17 V. sup. q. 30.16-21.
tale bonum, et unumquodque propter quod tale et illud magis. Quare, non querimus cognicionem veri propter delectacionem, sed delectacionem propter veri cognicionem.

5. Ad racionem est dicendum quod duplex est perfectio: quedam est essencialis, et talis melior est ipso perfectibili quod est in potencia ad illud; alia est perfectio accidentalis, et de tali non procedit obiecto. Et dico quod Aristotiles intendit quod delectacio perficit felicitatem accidentaliter, ut decor iuventutem accidentaliter. Si dicas, ‘Felicitas est accidens. Quare non erit magis bonum homine?’, dico quod verum est absolute accipiendo illa. Homo tamen cum felicitate assumptus magis bonum est quam ipse per se, sic felicitas cum delectacione.

6. Ad aliud dicendum quod sunt quedam delectaciones circa concupiscencias consistentes, et tales sunt minime delectaciones. Alie autem sunt delectaciones in operationibus intellectus. Et quia sensus non comprehendid nisi singulare, non attingit racionem boni simpliciter, et ideo in agentibus accidit quod queritur operation propter delectacionem. In intellectu autem est e converso, quia ibi queritur delectacio propter operationem. Unde dicendum quod sequentes iudicium sensus querunt operationem propter delectacionem; in intellectu autem est e converso; ideo, etc.

Consequenter queritur utrum bonum corporis exigatur ad felicitatem?

1. Et quod non videtur, / quia quanto aliquid magis abstrahitur a sensibus, tanto magis potest speculari secundum racionem, secundum commentatorem primo huius; sed felicitas consistit in speculacione; quare, videtur quod bona corporis exteriora et sensibilia non valent ad felicitatem, sed quanto < magis > abstrahitur homo ab hiis, tanto videtur magis felix; quare, etc.

2. Item, ad bonum intransmutabile non exigitur bonum transmutabile; sed felicitas est bonum intransmutabile; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: illud sine quo non contingit recte operari non est felicitas, quia felicitas est operacio secundum racionem rectam; sed talia sunt bona corporis; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod felicitas est operacio secundum racionem, et ideo quecumque exiguntur secundum racionem ad operationem, exiguntur et ad

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**Questio 34**

29 ipse] ipsum L

25 EN 10.4 (1174b31-32) et R 570.

Questio 35 1 Cf. Lect. 51.22-45; Sent. 47-48.144-185; ST 1-2, 4, 6; Alberti Magni Ethicorum libri X, ed. A. Borgnet, lib. I, tr. 7, c. 7 (Opera omnia 7; Paris, 1891), p. 118a-b.

4 Cf. Comm. 130-131.4-26 (ad 1098b12-20).
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15 felicitatem. Ad operationem autem secundum racionem exigitur esse et vita; quare, ista exiguntur ad felicitatem; sed ista sunt bona corporis; quare, bona corporis exiguntur ad felicitatem.

5. Item, non potest aliquis operari sine sanitate corporis; et sanitas est bonum corporis; quare, bonum corporis exigitur ad felicitatem; unde ista, esse [unde] et sanum esse, exiguntur. Sunt autem quedam sine quibus potest esse recta operacio, et talia non impedient operationem, nec expeditiunt; decorant tamen felicitatem et, ut sic, ad ipsam exiguntur: et talia videntur esse multa bona corporali. Quare, ad felicitatem exiguntur bona corporalia.

6. Ad racionem dicendum quod maior est falsa, quia ad speculacionem exigitur corpus et sensus, et ideo non quanto magis abstrahitur a sensibus, tanto melius speculatur. Unde dicendum quod [intellectus] quanto aliquid magis abstrahitur a passionibus corporis et concupiscenciis regulando eas secundum racionem rectam, tanto magis potest speculari, et non mortificando eas simpliciter.

7. Ad secundum dicendum: cum dicitur, felicitas est bonum incorporale, dicendum quod falsum est; sed dicitur bonum intransmutabile, quia est bonum permanens in vita humana respectu aliorum bonorum humanorum.

Questio 36

Consequenter queritur utrum bona exteriora, ut divicie, exigantur ad felicitatem?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illa sine quibus inimpossible est recte agere necessaria sunt ad felicitatem; sed sine bonis exterioribus non contingit aliquem recte operari, quia sine illis non potest aliquis operari, nec etiam unum; quare, etc.

2. Item, dicit Boethius in De consolatione quod felicitas est status omnium bonorum aggregacione perfectus. Igitur divicie sunt necessaria ad felicitatem.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: bonum perfectum et perfectissimum non indigest bonis fortune que sunt bona exteriora; sed felicitas est bonum perfectissimum; quare, etc.

4. Intelligendum quod sunt quedam divicie naturales quibus sustentatur homines, ut cibus et potus. Sunt etiam alie divicie artificiales quibus fit venialis commutacio aliorum. Dico igitur quod divicie naturales sunt necessarie ad felicitatem, quia sine illis non potest aliquis operari. Et hoc est quod dicitur

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19 corporis\[ex praem. et exp. L

Questio 36 6 operari\[esse L

Questio 36 1 Cf. Comm. 141.1-10; Lect. 51-52.49-53; Sent. 59-60.203-209; ST 1-2, 7, 4.

8 V. sup. q. 27.9.
decimo huius, quod sapiens et iustus et fortis indigent hiis que sunt necessaria ad vitam. Superfluitas autem talium non est necessaria. Alie autem divicie sunt utiles propter commutacionem diviciarum naturalium. Et ideo iste non exiguuntur nisi per accident. Quamvis enim felicitas indiget hiis, tamen felicitas practica magis indiget hiis quam speculativa. Sapiens enim potest magis speculandi per se, ut dicitur in decimo huius: hiis largitis sufficienter ad vitam, magis sufficit sibi sapiens. Hoc etiam dicit Aristotiles quod inpossible est indigentem bene operari. Apparet igitur que divicie necessarie sunt ad felicitatem, et que non, et qualiter.

5. Ad racionem dico quod bonum perfectum non indiget aliquo bono quod non includit in eo vel quod ad ipsum non ordinatur. Et dico quod felicitas est bonum perfectum, quia omnia alia ad ipsum ordinantur et diriguntur; quare, etc.

Questio 37

Consequenter queritur utrum felix indigeat amicis?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illo indiget felix sine quo non eligeret vivere reliqua habens omnia bona; sed dicit Aristotiles in octavo huius quod nullus eligit vivere sine amicus reliqua habens omnia bona; quare, etc.

2. Item, nullius boni iocunda est possessio sine consorcio amicorum; sed felicitas est iocunda; quare, etc.

3. Oppositum videtur dicere Aristotiles decimo huius.

4. Item, felicitas est bonum sufficientissimum; quare, non indiget aliquo alio, nec per consequens amicis.

5. Intelligendum quod secundum Aristotilem in decimo huius felix in felicitate speculativa et practica indiget amicis non propter operacionem, quia, ex quo felix est, recte operatur.

6. Item, non propter delectacionem absolute sibi admixtam maximam, sed indiget amicis ut melius operetur et melius delectetur: ut melius videlicet operetur, quia ut faciat eis bona, quod est opus virtutis; ut etiam magis delectetur, quia in bene faciendo eis et propter eorum consorcinum magis delectatur. Et ideo amici ipsi felici amici necessarii. Per hoc appareat ad raciones; procedunt enim viis suis et, ut sic, concludunt.
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Questio 38

UNDE ET QUERITUR (1099b9). Circa istud capitulum querit Aristotiles de causa felicitatis et queritur utrum felicitas sit bonum a deo causatum?

1. Et videtur quod sic. Probacio: quia bonum divinum est bonum a deo causatum et datum; sed felicitas est bonum divinum; quare, etc.

2. Item, bonum non causatur nisi a causa, et melioris boni oportet assignare meliorem causam, et optimi boni optimam causam; sed felicitas est bonum hominis optimum; melior autem causa, immo optima, est deus; quare, felicitas est a deo causatum et per consequens a deo datum.

3. In oppositum arguitur: illud quod causatur et inest nobis per voluntatem et desiderium et electionem est causatum a nobis—sumus enim domini nostrarum electionum—sed causatur felicitas in nobis per voluntatem et electionem; causatur enim a virtute et virtus est habitus electivus in medietate consistens, determinatus recta racione; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod felicitas est bonum causatum a deo in nobis et a nobis. Quod apparat quia omnia encia a prima causa procedunt, et felicitas est aliquid et ita causatur a prima causa, quia primum universaliter est causa omnium posteriorum, et preterea quilibet finis, et per consequens finis ultimus, in primum agens reductur; cum igitur felicitas sit ultimus finis hominis, reducetur in primum agens quod est prima causa omnium; quare, etc.


25 substantiali bis exh. L.

1 Cf. Comm. 143-145.71-10; Lect. 55-56.1-4; Sent. 50-51.40-143; ST 1-2, 5, 6-7.
27 Comm. 145.5-6 (ad 1099b9-18).
Questio 39

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquis possit esse felix in vita ista? Et circa hoc duo: primo, utrum aliquis possit esse felix in vita? secundo, utrum aliquis possit amittere felicitatem in hac vita?

1. De primo videtur quod non, quia felicitas non compatitur secum aliquod malum, quia est summe bonum et tale non compatitur secum aliquod malum; sed homo in hac vita semper habet aliquod malum, quia multos defectus habet vel potenciam ad malum, et illa potencia est malum; quare, etc.

2. Item, felicitas consistit in cognitione substantiarum separatarum; sed in hac vita non potest aliquis cognoscere substantias separatas, quia, sicut dicitur secundo Methaphysice, sic se habet intellectus ad illas, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis; quare, etc.

3. Item, secundum Boethium summum bonum est quo adepto nichil amplius desiderari potest; sed habito quocumque bono in vita adhuc queritur alius bonum, quia habita cognicione primi in vita ista, adhuc queritur maior cognicicio. Et est desiderium ad ulteriorcognicionem, quia primum est quesitum desiderabile respectu intellectus nostri, sicut dicit commentator. Quare, etc.

4. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles, quod felicitas inest homini in hac vita.

5. Item, quicumque habet habitum qui est principium operacionis in vita potest habere illum operationem; sed homo in hac vita habet principium et habitum operacionis, quare et operacionem, et in tali consistit felicitas; quare, aliquis potest esse felix in hac vita.

6. Dicendum quod homo potest esse felix in hac vita felicitate que est perfectio hominis. Et huius racio est quia natura nichil facit frustra, nec deficit in necessariis. Appetitus autem naturaliter inest homini, et maxime appetitus est respectu primi scibilis. Et ideo non potest ille appetitus esse frustra, quia frustra dicitur illud quod naturum est finem includere et non includit. Igitur in unioné respectu primi scibilis cum consistat felicitas, manifestum est quod possiblè est hominem felicitari in hac vita.

7. Item, in illis que sunt ordinatora ad finem [sed] non potest esse finis; non potest esse illud quod est ad finem, quia racio eorum que est ad finem sumitur ex fine. Sed habitus virtutum sunt ordinati ad felicitatem. Quare, si non est
felicitas, non est talis habitus. Cum igitur videamus in multis esse habitus virtutum, habitus autem virtutum sunt principia movencia huiusmodi operacionem que est felicitas, quare erit homo felix in hac vita.

8. Ad racionem primam dico quod felicitas non compatitur secum malum hominis. Et cum dicitur quod homo in presenti vita habet aliquam miseriambis sibi adiunctam, dicet aliquis quod hoc non est necessse; immo dicet quod felix qui recte operatur non habet aliquod malum, quia semper operatur secundum rectam racionem. Et cum dicis quod habet defectum amicorum vel bonorum exteriorum, dico quod huiusmodi defectus ordinat ista secundum racionem rectam; ideo habent racionem boni. Et cum dicitur, in ista est possibilitas amissione boni, dico quod istam amissionem ordinat secundum racionem rectam, et ita non est malum in eo; vel dicendum quod felicitas bene compatitur secum malum. Et cum dicitur, est summe bonum, dico quod falsum est; sed hoc est primum principium. Et ideo felicitas est summe bonum secundum racionem rectam.

9. Ad secundum argumentum dicendum quod homo potest habere cognitionem substanciarum separatarum. Et quando dicitur quod intellectus noster se habet ad eas sicut oculus vespertilionis etc., dico secundum Commentatorem super istam eandem proposicionem quod Aristotiles non dicit hoc quia intendat quod inpossibile sit comprehendere substancias separatas, sed intendit difficultatem esse ad hoc. Unde l licet oculus vespertilionis non comprehendat lucem solis visus clartate, tamen visus esse potest, et similiter dico esse de intellectu respectu substanciarum separatarum.

10. Ad tercium argumentum est dicendum quod maior vera est; est enim felicitas illud ultimum, quo adepto, nichil amplius desiderari potest. Et tamen assumitur in minorem quod, cognitis substanciis separatis, adhuc remanet desiderium. Dico quod non remanet cum racione; racio enim non dicit illud esse desiderandum quod inpossibile est haberi, licet appetitus possit hoc appetere.

Questio 40
Consequenter queritur utrum felix in vita possit amittere felicitatem?
1. Et videtur quod sic, quia homo incipit esse felix, quare desinit esse felix; omne enim generatum de necessitate corrumpitur, licet non omne generabile generabitur; quare, etc.
2. Item, perfectio corruptibilis est corruptibilis; sed felicitas est perfectio hominis corruptibilis; quare, felicitas est corruptibilis; sed quod est corruptibile corrumpetur; quare, felicitas corrumpetur.

3. Item, bonum voluntarium est bonum quod amitti potest, cum voluntas sit ad opposita; sed tale bonum est felicitas; quare, etc.

4. Ad oppositum: felicitas terminat appetitum humanum; sed non potest terminare appetitum universalis, quod est ubique et semper, nisi sit permanens; quare, etc.

5. Et dicendum quod homo potest amittere felicitatem que est in vita ista, et amittitur in morte quia ex quo est perfectio hominis et omne hominis amittiur in morte; quare, et felicitas. Et ideo dicit Aristotiles quod mors est ultimum terribilium.

6. Item, cum felicitas sit operacio recta, cum igitur possit homo amittere rectam racionem per infirmitatem et litargiam vel ab huiusmodi, quia per tales infirmitates convertitur iudicium racionis, ideo felicitas per huiusmodi potest amitti. Unde de talibus iudicandum est, sicut de mortuis.

7. Item, per exercitacionem pravarum operationum potest homo amittere felicitatem. Sed non de facili potest felix inclinari ad operationes que sunt secundum habitus malos. Unde delectacio cauget operationem propriam et minuit contrariam. Et ideo contingit quod aliquis operans operationem in qua est delectacio non transfert se ad operationem in qua non est delectacio, nisi per violenciam. Sed felix habet maximam delectacionem in sua operatione, et ideo non de facili transfertur in miseriam, sicut dicit Aristotiles; quare, dico, qui est simpliciter felix. Si autem non sit simpliciter felix, potest sibi occurrere aliqua operacio in qua videtur sibi maior delectacio quam sit in operando secundam racionem. Patet ergo quod felix potest amittere felicitatem: primo, in morte; secundo, in infirmitate; tercio, per exercitium pravarum operationum, sed hoc tamen erit ex difficili, ut dictum est.

**Questio 41**

**PRONEPOTUM AUTEM (1101a21-22).** Circa istam partem queritur utrum bona amicorum redundunt in amicos vivos ut reddant ipsos felices?

1. Et quod non, probacio: quia bona amicorum vivorum non magis expediunt homini ad felicitatem quam ipse amicus; sed amicus non expedit

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**Notes:**

- **Pronepote autem** (1101a21-22). Circa istam partem queritur utrum bona amicorum redundunt in amicos vivos ut reddant ipsos felices?

- **Questio 40**

- **Questio 41**

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homini ad felicitatem, nec est necessarius, nec quantum ad delectacionem, nec quantum ad operacionem; quare, etc.

2. Item, si redundaret in amicos vivos, aut hoc esset propter operacionem, aut propter delectacionem: non propter operacionem, quia felix [unde felix] recte operatur; nec etiam propter delectacionem, quia felicitas habet delectacionem sibi admixtam; quare, bona amicorum mortuorum non redundant in amicos vivos.

3. Dicendum breviter quod amici non sunt necessarii felici propter operacionem, ut patet, nec propter delectacionem, cum delectacio sit felicitati adiuncta; sed propter bonum operari et propter magis maiorem / delectacionem indiget <eis >. Indiget enim amicus ut eis bene faciat, et ut eis bene faciendo magis delectetur, et ut sic rectius operetur.

4. Consimiliter dicendum est de eufortuniis et infortuniis amicorum: manifestum enim est quod minus indiget amicus bonis amicorum quam ipso amico; ex quo tunc amicus non est necessarius simpliciter felici, nec bona illius inpediti nec expediti ad felicitatem. Sed cum bona amici sint quasi bona propria, quia amicus est alter ipse, sic utitur aliquis bonis amicorum. Et sic secundum accidens bona amicorum iuvant ad felicitatem, quia ex bonis amicorum vel melius operatur vel magis delectatur. Apparet ad raciones; procedunt enim suis viis.

Questio 42

Utrum bona amicorum vivorum redundent in mortuos?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud quod dicitur ab omnibus non potest esse omnino falsum, secundum commentatorem primo libro, nam illud sumitur <ex> experiencia quadam; sed omnes dicunt quod bona amicorum vivorum redundant in amicos mortuos; quare, etc.

2. Ad oppositum, amicorum est idem habere et non habere, cum amicus sit ut alter ipse, ut habetur in octavo huius; si ergo bona amicorum vivorum redundant in amicos mortuos, tunc sequitur quod mortui bona in vivum redundabunt, quod est inconveniens; quare, etc.

3. Item, in illud quod non est non potest aliquid pertingere; sed mortui non sunt, cum sint extra vitam presentem positi; quare, bona amicorum remanencium ad ipsos non pertingunt.

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Questio 41 6 ad delectacionem] ad felicitatem praem. et exp. L 20 felici] amico L
Questio 42 7 Ad oppositum] Item L 11 Item] ad oppositum L

Questio 42 1 Cf. Comm. 169.12-41; Lect. 71-72.73-75; Sent. 62-63.98-153. 4 Comm. 129-130.77-90 (ad 1098b8-12). 8 EN 9.4 (1166a30-31) et R 549.
4. Dicendum quod felicitatem dicimus duplicem: unam que est ultima perfectio hominis in vita; aliam que est post mortem. Que <utrum> ipsius anime separate ponamus vel aggregati non est multum curandum. De felicitate autem que est in vita facit Philosophus mencionem, de alia autem non, et ideo similiter faciamus. Supposito hoc, dicendum quod mortui extra presentem vitam positi sunt, et non simpliciter <felices>, quia, cum felicitas est perfectio alicuius in presenta vita, manifestum est quod mortui nec felices nec miseri sunt; ideo nec bona amicorum vel infortunia pertingunt ad eos, quia non nati sunt esse miseri vel felices. Amici tamen mortui manent in mente, sive in memoria, et ita felicitas eorum manet in memoria, et sua felicitas et fama sic manet, et bona amicorum aliquid pertingunt ad ipsos, inquantum eorum <fama> magis redditur celebris vel minus. Ideo dicit Philosophus quod eius omne in opinione est esse secundum quid; ideo bona amicorum presencium est aliquid quod valde parum expedit ad felicitatem eorum. Et patet tunc quod bona amicorum vivorum redundant in amicos mortuos, inquantum fama eorum redditur magis celebris vel minus. Raciones procedunt suis viis. Unde philosophi dicunt quod secundum quod manet felicitas mortuorum sibi bona amicorum vivorum redundat in ipsos.

Questio 43

Determinatis autem (1101b10). Consequeuter queritur circa istam partem utrum virtus sit bonum honorabile?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia virtuti debetur honor tamquam premium, sicut dicitur decimo huius; quare, virtus est bonum honorabile.

2. Item, illud quod est eligibile secundum se est honorabile; sed virtus secundum se est eligibilis; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Item, honor debetur ei quod non ordinatur in alium bonum; sed tale non est virtus; quare, virtuti non debetur honor.

Questio 44

Utrum felici debeatur laus?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud debetur felici quod debetur bono divino,
quia felicitas est bonum divinum; sed deum laudamus; quare, felicem laudare debemus.

2. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles.

3. Item, laus debetur bono quod ordinatur in aliud; sed tale non est felicitas; quare, etc.

4. Intelligendum quid est laus et quid honor quoniam ista duo conveniunt, quia utrumque est exhibicio reverencie in testimonium virtutis quocumque modo sicut cum sermone vel sine sermonem. Laus tamen existit in exhibicione reverencie per testimonium exhibite per sermonem. Unde laus est sermo illucidans magnitudinem alicuius virtutis. Est autem honor illius quod non ordinatur in aliud vel ad aliud; ideo, si non est in eo quod laudatur, non est laus sed magis adulacio. Dico igitur quod honor est exhibicio reverencie in testimonium boni absolute. Virtus autem ordinatur ad aliud et ideo debetur virtuti honor <non> per se, sed per accidens.

5. Ad raciones, est dicendum ad primam quod honor non est premium essenciale sed actuale, et ideo per accidens ei competit; sed ab accidente non inducitur res; ideo, etc.

6. Ad secundam questionem est dicendum quod cum laus sit exhibicio reverencie in testimonium boni ordinati ad aliud, felicitas autem non est bonum ordinatum in aliud, ideo felici non debetur laus inquantum laus est pars honoris; inquantum tamen laus competit virtuti que inducit felicitatem, debetur felici laus per accidens.

7. Ad rationem dicendum quod minor falsa est que dicit quod deo debetur laus. Et quando dicitur 'laudamus', dico quod illa laus pars est boni honoris; et sic per accidens potest esse laus attributa felici. Sed hec non est illa laus de qua intendimus, sed est totaliter equivoca de hac et de illa.

Questio 45

Si autem illa felicitas (1102a5). Circa istud capitulum queritur utrum imperare vel ordinare motum sit actus racionis vel voluntatis?

1. Et quod sit voluntatis, probacio: quia imperare move re est, ergo illud imperat in homine cuius est movere; sed voluntatis est movere, sicut dicetur in decimo huius, quare, etc.
2. Item, cuius est imperare in homine, illud est magis liberum; cuius est autem imperari, illud est magis servum; sed voluntas est magis libera; quare, eius est imperare, et per consequens movere.

3. In oppositum arguitur: eius est movere cuius est ordinare; sed ipsius rationis est ordinare; quare, et movere.

4. Intelligendum quod ipsius rationis est imperare motum in aliquibus; tamen non imperat nisi cum voluntate. Ad huius declaracionem oportet videre quod istorum sit principalius in homine. Quia enim uterque super alterum reftetur, ideo dubium est quod istorum sit principalius. Sed dictis primum appareat quod racio sit principalius, quia objectum voluntatis est bonum apprehensum, objectum autem rationis est ens, et bonum additur supra ens. Si igitur virtutes se habeant ut objecta, quia racio illorum sumitur ex posicione objectorum, voluntas erit aliquid posterius securum naturam ipsa racione.

5. Item, quod movetur ab aliquo universaliter posterior est illo; sed voluntas non movetur nisi a bono comprehenso a racione; et ideo ipsam voluntatem rationis est precedere. Racio autem vel intellectus essencialiter non movetur a voluntate, quia non movetur nisi a suo objecto. Suum autem objectum non est aliquid volitum; movet tamen ipsam voluntas accidentaliter. Sic igitur patet quod racio est aliquid principalius: si igitur eius quod est principale est movere vel imperare, patet quod racionis est imperare. Voluntas autem cum sit movens secundarium, et in movente primo virtute maneat movens secundarium, patet quod voluntas movere in virtute racionis vel intellectus.

6. Imperare autem non est aliud nisi aliquid ordinare cum intimacione motus vel prosecucione. Ista autem intimacio aliquando fit absolute per indicativum modum, aliquando per imperativum, quia cum racio non determinatur aliquibus nisi a voluntate, ideo racio non movet in istis, nisi cum voluntate. Quantum autem ad actum illum, in quo racio non dependeret a voluntate, potest movere sine voluntate; et ideo dicendum quod, cum racio aliquando possit moveri sine voluntate, voluntas autem non sine racione quia non sine bono apprehenso a racione, ideo racio principalior est et per consequens movet principalius.

7. Ad racionem est dicendum quod cuius est movere principalsiter, eius est imperare. Et cum dicitur, voluntas movet omnia, dico quod verum est secundum quod mota est a virtute racionis; unde non movet racionem per se et essencialiter, sed accidentaliter.

8. Ad aliud dicendum est quod libera est voluntas, sicut subjectum. Ista tamen que judicantur a voluntate et imperantur primo causantur a racione; et ideo dico quod eius est imperare quod primo est liberum. Hoc autem non est
voluntas, sed racio quia racio principalior est ipsa voluntate, ut visum est; ideo, etc.

**Questio 46**

Utrum in brutis inveniatur imperare motum?

1. Et videtur quod sic per Avicennam sexto decimo *Animalium*: virtus mota est virtus que imperat motum; virtus exequens motum est virtus existens membris vel musculis; cum igitur in brutis inveniatur iste motus vel virtus motiva, invenitur virtus imperans istum motum; quare, etc.

2. Item, in quibuscumque invenitur principans et subjectum invenitur illud cui principatur; sed in brutis invenitur principans et subjectum, ut vult Aristotiles in *Rethorica* sua; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: in brutis non invenitur racio; quare, nec in hiis invenitur motus ad imperandum.

4. Dicendum quod hoc est verum quod imperare non est nisi ordinare aliquid ad alium cum intimacione. Ad oppositum, ordinare autem est racionis, et ideo cum in brutis non sit racio, non erit in eis imperium. Et ideo non est ibi virtus que precipiat motum. Unde non est ibi motus talis quia non est imperans, non quia non sit ibi imperatum.

5. Ad Avicennam dico quod virtus motiva in habentibus racionem est imperans motum; in aliis non, nisi extendamus virtutem motivam universaliter ad imperandum.

6. Ad aliud dico quod maior falsa est: quia in omnibus aliquid necessce est reperire principalius et subjectum; et tamen in eis non est reperire imperans et cui imperatur. Sed hec maior est intelligenda in habentibus racionem; et minor est vera quod in brutis est reperire principans et subjectum, sed tamen sine racione.

**Questio 47**

Consequenter queritur utrum actus appetitus sensitivi imperetur a racione?

1. Et quod non, videtur: quia omne quod suadetur a racione natum est obedire racioni; sed appetitus sensitivus non est natus obedire racioni, cum sit contrarius, quia unum contrarium non est natum obedire alteri; quare, etc.
2. Iterum, illa que non subduntur racioni non obedijunt racioni; sed appetitus sensitivus non subditur racioni, quia est virtus materialis et sequitur disposicionem organi; et tale non subiacet voluntati sive racioni que organum non habet.

3. Item, appetitus sensitivus fertur in sensum; et nos non sumus domini simpliciter fantasie vel virtutis sensitive; quare, etc.

4. Oppositum vult Aristotiles in littera.

5. Et arguitur racione: omne quod natum est obedire racioni imperatur a racione; sed virtus sensitiva nata est obedire racioni; quare, etc.

6. Intelligendum quod appetitus sensitivus in homine imperatur a racione et subditur racioni aliquo modo non simpliciter. Hoc patet: manifestum est enim quod nullus actus ordinatur a racione qui non subiacet voluntati. Et ideo / videndum est quomodo subiacet voluntati. Est enim reperire virtutem sine organo, sicut intellectum, et etiam reperire appetitum sensitivum qui est virtus materialis. Et talis sequitur disposicionem et complexionem organi. Potest igitur appetitus sensitivus considerari vel ex parte ipsius organi vel inquantum est virtus ipsius anime. Si autem nos consideremus ipsum ut est virtus anime, tunc natum est ordinari a racione, quia illud quod principalius est, natum est ordinare illud quod minus principale est; et appetitus sensitivus minus principale est et racionem subjiciet habet. Et similiter dicendum est de actu ipsius appetitus.

7. Si autem consideremus istum appetitum quantum ad organum, tunc non sequitur ipsum organum. Et quantum ad hoc est irrationabilis 1st appetitus nec subicitur racioni nisi per accidens, inquantum ipsam complexionem contingit alterari per racionem, inquantum subtrahitur alimentum quod facit ipsam magis declinare a malo. Unde hec pars anime dicitur racionalis et irrationalis ab Aristotile. Unde Philosophus in Politicis suis: racio principatur appetitui sensitivo, non principatu regali sed principatu disposito.

8. Ad racionem primam est dicendum quod illud quod imperatur a racione natum est obedire racione. Verum est, ut sic, et dico quod unum oppositorum, ut est oppositum, non est natum alii obedire. Et ideo dico quod iste appetitus sensitivus, ut oppositum habetur a racionem, non subditur racioni et hoc est secundum quod sequitur complexionem organi. Sed alio modo subditur, quo dictum est in substancia solucionis questionis.

9. Ad aliud dicendum quod actio potencie sensitive subiacet voluntati nostre secundum quod est potencia anime absolute, sed non secundum quod sequitur disposicionem organi, ut supra habitum est, quia, ut sic, habent repugnanciam.
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Liber II

Questio 1

Duplci autem existente virtute etc. (1103a14). Circa istum secundum librum primo queritur utrum omnis virtus sit moralis?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia omnis virtus que generatur in nobis ex consuetudine est moralis; sed omnis virtus generatur in nobis ex consuetudine, quia sicut virtus moralis est <ex> consuetudine operandi, ita virtus intellectualis ex consuetudine; quare, omnis virtus est moralis.

2. Item, virtus est habitus electivus, in medietate consistens quemadmodum sapiens determinat; sed omnis virtus est talis, scilicet intellectualis et moralis; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles qui distinguui virtutem in moralem et intellectualem.


5. Item, virtutes distinctuunter penes fines. Finis autem virtutis intellectualis est felicitas speculativa; finis vero moralis est felicitas practica. Cum igitur unius non sit finis alterius, nec una virtus erit alia.

6. Ad racionem in oppositum dicendum: concedo maiorem; ad minorem dico quod virtus intellectualis non generatur in nobis ex consuetudine. Similiter dico ad aliud quod non generatur ex operacione que est in consuetudine; immo generatio istarum est experiencia et doctrina que differt a consuetudine secundum commentatorem. Unde si ex consuetudine accepimus habitum directum in particularia, experiencia hec est; ex operacionibus enim que apparent in sensibus accipit aliquis habitum in universali et non in particulari. Et ille habitus est directivus in universalia. Unde consideracio vel operacio in consuetudine non generat habitum, quamvis iuvet ad illius generacionem.

7. Ad aliud dicendum quod si diffinitum non est unius racionis, nec etiam diffinio. Sic autem est in proposito. Si enim hec diffinio conveniat morali, tunc est habitus qui est racionalis secundum participacionem. Si autem conveniat virtutti intellectuali, tunc / aliter est intelligendum, quia tunc non est.

20 finis suppl. in marg.] virtus praem. et exp. L

2 Cf. Comm. 198.8-32; Lect. 89.59-63; ST 1-2, 58, 1. 12 EN 2.1 (1103a14) et R 396.
26 Comm. 198.8-32 (ad 1103a26-b6).
35 medietas duarum maliciarum, nec etiam determinata recta racione, ut prudencia, neque idem principium habet; et ideo, ut sic, sunt diversa; quare, etc.

Questio 2

Consequenter queritur utrum virtus secundum unam racionem dicatur de morali et intellectuali?

1. Et quod non, probacio: quia quorumcumque principia sunt diversa, ipsa sunt diversa; sed generativum virtutis moralis est consuetudo, intellectualis autem disciplina vel experiencia vel regula; ergo < etc. >

2. Item, diversitas habituum causatur ex diversitate finis; sed huius et illius non est idem finis – unius enim felicitas practica, alterius autem speculativa, et isti fines sunt diversi; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: quorum est una passio, illorum est una racio et unum subjectum; sed utraque virtus habet unam passionem, quia utraque laudabilis est; quare, etc.

4. Item, utriusque una racio est appetibilis, ut utraque aliqualiter appetitur propter se et non propter alium; quare, erit eorum una racio; quare, etc.

5. Dicendum quod virtus non est diversarum racionum penitus in virtute morali et intellectuali, quia si sic, unum istorum non ordinaretur ad alium, nec per alium regularetur; sic autem non se habent iste virtutes. Sed virtus intellectualis una, ut prudencia, principio est virtutum moralium. Quare, non sunt penitus equivocae virtutes.

6. Item, non est racio una penitus in hac et in illa, quia diversitas eorum sumitur secundum diversitatem virtutis que dirigit in finem et etiam ex fine sumitur; sed finis moralis et intellectualis non est unius racionis, sicut speculatio et operacio que non sunt omnino diversa. Si igitur unius non sunt virtutis penitus neque diversarum, tunc aliquo modo erunt unius racionis inquantum una racio accipitur in comparacione ad aliam, et diversarum inquantum diversus est finis eorum. Et sic virtus dicitur de hiis secundum attributionem. Et prius est virtus intellectualis quam moralis, quia raciones eorum, que sunt ad finem, accipiuntur ex fine. Sed istorum sunt felicitas practica et speculativa; et felicitas practica ordinatur ad speculacionem. Ideo racio virtutis prius invenitur in virtute intellectuali, secundo in morali. Ideo sumit racionem ex prudencia. Prudencia autem est virtus intellectualis secundum significacionem, cum est e converso, quia non est illud primum simpliciter quod significatur per nomen, ut patet per nomen nature. Quod enim primo est

\[\text{Questio } 2\]

\[6 \text{ veP ... ergo suppl. s.s. } L^2\]

\[23 \text{ operacio} \] \text{oracio praem. et exp. } L\]

\[\text{Questio } 2\]

\[1 \text{ Cf. Comm. 202.34-46; Lect. 89-90.76-62; ST } 1\text{-}2, 58, 2.\]
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natura est forma. Quod autem primo significatur per nomen nature est
generacio nascencium, quia imponimus nomen secundum quod res primo nate
sunt. Et sic, cum virtutes morales sint prius nobis nate quia pauci veniunt ad
intellectuales, ideo prius imponitur eis nomen. Raciones prime probant quod
non inveniatur unius racionis simpliciter. Et hoc est verum; sed sunt unius
racionis secundum attribucionem.

7. Ad rationes in oppositum, est dicendum quod si aliquorum passio est una
simpliciter, ipsa sunt unum simpliciter et eorum est racio una simpliciter. Et
cum dicitur utriusque est una passio ut laudabile, verum est sed non primo.
Sicut enim virtus moralis descendit ab intellectualibus, sic et laus que est in
moralibus descendit a virtutibus intellectualibus ad morales.

8. Similiter ad alium est dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales, si habeant
racionem appetibilis, hoc non est nisi secundum quod iste appetitus descendit a
virtute intellectuali, ut a prudencia.

9. Item, omnes morales virtutes ad intellectuales ordinantur; ideo, non sunt
unius racionis appetitus.

Questio 3

Consequenter queritur circa racionem virtutis utrum virtutes insunt nobis a
natura?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia illud cuius principia sunt nobis innata innatum
est; sed principia virtutum, sicut / anima et partes anime, sunt nobis innate
simpliciter, que sunt principia in operabilibus et intellectualibus; quare, etc.

2. Item, virtutes aut sunt nobis innate aut sunt in nobis facte. Si facte, hoc est
ex alio priori et tunc vel erit procedere in infinitum vel erit devenire ad aliquas
virtutes nobis innatas; sed procedere in infinitum est impossible; quare, etc.

3. Item, habitus se habent ad animam, sicut forma ad materiam; sed forma
est innata materie; quare, et virtutes anime.

4. Ad oppositum arguitur: ex innatis nobis non dicimur boni vel mali; sed ex
habitibus virtutum dicimur boni vel mali et laudamus et vituperamus; quare,
etc.

5. Item, arguitur racione Aristotelis: que insunt nobis a natura prius
habemus potencias quam actus, ut prius habemus visum antequam videre insit
nobis; sed in habitibus prius insunt nobis operaciones. Unde in hoc quod

34 forma] sic praem. et exp. L  
35 res] in praem. et exp. L

Questio 3 7 aut suppl. in marg. L  
8] sed L

Questio 3 1 Cf. Comm. 194-200, passim; Lect. 93.57-67; Sent. 77.1-114; ST 1-2, 63, 1.
15 EN 2.1 (1103a27-32) et R 396.
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operamur opera castitatis fimus casti, sicut est in operacionibus artificialibus quod prius facimus opera fabri antequam fabri simus.

6. Et dicendum quod actus et perfectio virtutis non inest nobis a natura ita quod sint connata ipsi intellectui. Hoc apparat ex virtutibus intellectualibus que sunt perfectiones intellectus. Intellectus autem secundum Aristotilem, tercio De anima, nichil est eorum que sunt ante addiscere vel invenire. Et ita patet quod virtus intellectualis non inest nobis a natura. Et quia virtutes morales causantur ab intellectualibus, ideo nec ille sunt innate. Intellectus tamen potencialis est, in potencia ad omnes, sicut materia ad omnes formas. Et sicut materia recipit formas universales primo, secundo minus universales, sic intellectus apprehendit universalia magis et mediantibus illis occurrit sibi alia que distinguuntur a primis. Et etiam est in intellectu practico, quia primo occurrit sibi prima principia in operabilia, ut forme universales, et mediantibus istis occurrit sibi alia que diriguntur a primis. Quia tunc intellectus est nobis innatus qui est in potencia ad virtutes, ideo dicendum quod aptitudo ad virtutes est nobis innata.

7. Item, aptitudo posteriorum conclusionum est nobis aliqualiter innata inquantum sunt nobis aliquo modo Innata sua principia; propterea, similiter in appetitu sensitivo qui est secundum virtutem moralem que est racionalis per participacionem, iste appetitus natus est ad virtutes; ideo potencia vel aptitudo nobis innata est.

8. Ad racionem est dicendum quod cuius cause sunt nobis innate in actu, illud est nobis innatum, quia hoc principio posito ponitur effectus; sed illud cuius principium in potencia est nobis innatum, non oportet quod illud sit nobis innatum, quia hoc posito non ponitur effectus. Et dico quod principia virtutis sunt nobis innata in potencia; ideo, etc.

9. Et ad aliud dico quod non contingit procedere in infinitum, sed contingit stare ad aliqua in operacionibus et speculacionibus. Et cum dicis, illi habitus generantur in nobis, dico quod verum est; non tamen ex aliquibus habitibus prioribus, sed illa sunt in nobis ex presencia sensibilis. Et cum dicis, omnia doctrina fit in nobis ex preexistenti cognitione, dicendum quod hoc verum est de cognitione intellectiva raciocinativa, et hec est doctrina cognitionis; non autem est intelligendum de cognitione sensitiva que habet \(<\text{se}\>\) ad presencia sensibilis.

10. Ad tercium est dicendum quod simile est in hoc quod sicut forma est perfectio materie, sic virtutes sunt perfectiones anime; sed difficile est, quia forma est perfectio substancialis, virtus autem accidentalis. Vel potest concedit

31 innatus] in nob natus L

22-23 De an. 3.4 (429a18-22) et D 201; H 185 (138).
maior, et potest dici ad minorem quod forma non est in/nata materie, sed materia est in potencia ad omnes.

Questio 4

Consequerter queritur utrum omnes virtutes generentur in nobis ex operacionibus?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia omne generativum alterius debet esse perfectius illo quod generatur; sed tales non sunt operaciones respectu virtutum; quare, etc.

2. Item, omne quod generatur generatur a sibi simili, conveniente nomine et specie, sicut scribitur in septimo <Metaphysice>; sed sic non est in generatione virtutis per operacionem; quare, etc.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles. Etiam arguitur: sicut est in artibus, sic et in virtutibus moralibus; sed in cytharizando fimus cythariste; quare, in operando opera virtuosa fimus virtuosi. Operacio igitur est generativa virtutum.

4. Intelligendum quod virtutes morales generantur in nobis ex operacionibus. Virtutes enim morales sunt perfectiones appetitus sensitivi qui habet inclinacionem ad rationem rectam inquantum natus est ordinari ab illa. Nichilominus tamen habet inclinacionem in oppositum propter complexionem organi vel dispositionem, ita quod a principio appetitus sensitivus habet inclinacionem ad oppositum illius quod est secundum rationem rectam. Et ideo illud quod disponit ipsum ad rationem rectum est cognicio racionis recte, quia cum aliquis operatur bene et alias idem bene operatur, quamvis primo tristetur, postea minus tristabitur, tercio adhuc minus, et tandem cum delectacione operabitur. Delectacio autem coauget operationem et sic appetitus sensitivus disponitur ad rationem rectam.

5. Item, operation et motus de racione eius est ad quem est motus, et ideo operacio que ordinatur ad bonum bona est. Addiscens enim aliquid habet ab eo quod addiscit aliquid in eo et ita cum simile generat sibi simile, ita operacio aliqua appetiti dat speciem sed non completam; sed exigitur quod in virtute alterius det speciem appetiti, et hoc est mediante recta racione. Unde operaciones inclinant ad rationem rectum, cum sint regulate a racione recta.

Ulterior autem est dans speciem ipsi appetiti ita quod primum dans speciem est recta racio, secundum est operacio. Unde aliquando contingit per racionem rectam que est in se ipso quod aliquis bene operatur, aliquando autem per

55 quod| quia L
Questio 4 27 aliqua aliquo L 27, 28, 30 appetitus appetui L

Questio 4 1 Cf. Comm. 200.67-74; Lect. 93.1-56; Sent. 78.115-131; ST 1-2, 63, 1.
8 Meta. 7.8 (1033b29-33) et M 136-137; H 130 (178). 10 EN 2.1 (1103a34-b2) et R 396.
rationem que est in alio, ita quod racio recta accipitur propter quacumque rationem, sive sit intrinseca sive extrinseca.

6. Ad racionem dico quod illud quod principaliter est generativum alicuius est perfectius eo; non tamen illud quod instrumentaliter generat, sicut calidum et frigidum generat formam substanciali, et est minus perfecta illis. Et dico quod operationes sunt generative in virtute alterius, et ita instrumentaliter.

7. Ad aliud dico quod ille sermo habet veritatem in generacione substantiarum quod simile a simili generatur; in generacione autem accidencium non. Vel concedatur in proposito maior. Et dico quod operationes conveniunt in nomine et specie cum virtute; et operacio est de genere illius ad quod vadit. Illud etiam quod est activum et principium operacionis est recta racio; et id ad quod est operacio est ejus regula, ut racio recta, et etiam virtus quam inducit.

Aliqua operacio consistit in racione recta. Quare, etc.

Questio 5

Consequenter queritur utrum virtus moralis generetur ex una operacione?

1. Et videtur quod sic, quia sicut se habet virtus moralis ad operacionem, sic virtus intellectualis ad experienciam; sed per experienciam in uno singulari accipimus virtutem intellectuallem, ut patet ex coniunctione superiorum corporum ubi solum habemus experienciam in uno singulari ut in una commutacione, et tamen accipimus universale; ita et ex hoc genere accipimus scieniam et virtutem.

2. Item, ex eodem generatur virtus ex quo / augmentatur; sed ex una operacione augetur virtus; quare, et generatur.

3. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles primo huius ubi dicit quod una yrundo non inducit ver, sed multe; et ita una operacio non inducit virtutem, sed etiam multe.

4. Item, in artibus ex una operacione non generatur ars; sed ex sepe cytharizar generatur cytharista; quare, etc.

5. Dicendum quod virtus moralis perfecta non generatur ex una operacione. Et hoc patet, quia quanto passivum magis remotum est ab activo, tanto magis indiget maiori virtute. Maiori enim virtute indiget frigidum ad hoc quod calefacit quam tepidum. Sed appetitus sensitivus est illud in quo generatur virtus sicut in principio passivo. Et ideo quanto remocius est a virtute, tanto

45 Aliqua] alia L

Questio 5 16 Dicendum] ad L

Questio 5 1 Cf. Comm. 198-199.8-38; Sent. 78.132-176; ST 1-2, 51, 3. 11 EN 1.7 (1098a18-19) et R 384.
indiget maiori virtute ad hoc ut in eo virtus generetur. Sed appetitus sensitivus ante generationem virtutis semper sub contrario est propter dispositionem organi, et illud quod inclinat una operacio valde parvum est. Et ideo non ex una sed ex pluribus generatur virtus, cum sub esse incompleto potest virtus generari ex una operacione ita quod illa aliquid addit, et alia operacio plus valet ad complementum virtutis. Si autem aliquis daret quod aliquis haberet appetitum qui simpliciter inclinaret ad bonum, <sed> traheretur ad malum per racionem organi, tunc ex presencia boni et racionis recte fieret bonus; et secundum quod aliquis habet magis inclinacionem ad virtutem, secundum hoc ex paucis operacionibus generatur virtus in eo. Et si unus non habet magnam inclinacionem ad bonum, tunc ex pluribus generatur <virtus>.

6. Ad racionem est dicendum quod non totaliter est simile de virtute intellectuali per experienciam in singularibus et de morali in operacionibus, quia secundum virtutem intellectuallem est intellectus qui est separatus; ideo propter magnam dilectionem intellectus ad virtutem intellectuallem statim ex una experientia habitus generatur. Appetitus autem sensitivus magis inclinatur ad malum propter dispositionem et complexionem corporis; ideo non potest virtus in eo <ex> una operacione generari. Vel aliter dicendum quod subjectum intellectualis virtutis est racionale secundum substantiam. Subjectum autem moralis est racionale per participacionem et illud subjectum est virtutis moralis et non intellectualis; ideo non est simile.

7. Ad aliud dicendum quod ex quo augmentatur aliquid, generatur ex illo sed non complete. Unde sicut contingit de cavacione lapidis quod multe gutte cavant et disponunt ad cavacionem, ultima autem cavat, similiter contingit de operacionibus multis disponentibus ad virtutem et tunc ex una operacione generatur virtus.

Questio 6

Si igitur aut virtus (1104b13?). Circa istam partem queritur utrum virtus sit cum passione?

1. Et videtur quod non: nullus habitus virtutis esse potest cum aliqua passione; sed virtus est habitus; quare, <etc.>

2. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles, qui dicit omnem virtutem consistere circa actiones et passiones.

3. Et dicendum quod virtus potest esse cum passione, quia passio nichil

42 augmentatur] generatur praem. et exp. L
Questio 6 8 cum suppl. in marg. L passionem] quia praem. et exp. L

Questio 6 1 Cf. Lect. 98-99.35-16; ST 1-2, 59, 2. 2 fortasse 1104b3. 6 EN 2.3 (1104b14) et R 399.
aliud est nisi motus appetitive partis sub fantasia boni vel mali secundum commentatorem. Motus autem talis non est <aliud> quam inclinacio <quam> dicimus appetitum. Aliquando propter hoc passio non est aliud quam prosecucio boni vel mali; virtus autem non est aliud nisi modificacio istius passionis. Si igitur recta racio et modificacio istius passionis potest esse cum passione, tunc virtus potest esse cum passione.

4. Item, virtus in appetitu sensitivo se habet sicut sanitas in corpore; sanitas autem non est aliud nisi / proporcio humorum in corpore; sic virtus nichil aliud est nisi proporcio quedam debita circumstanciarum que sunt in corpore cum passione. Si igitur sanitas stat cum calido et frigido, sicut cum suo subiecto, tunc virtus stabit cum istis circumstanciis et cum subiecto istorum; tale autem subjectum est passio; quare, etc.

5. Ad racionem est dicendum: quando dicitur, virtus non stat cum eo quod inclinatur ad malum contrarium, dico quod sic. Idem enim existit actu sub uno contrariorum, et in potencia est ad aliud, et etiam inclinacionem habet ad aliud. Similiter etiam potest dici per interpretationem minoris, quia passio non inclinat ad operacionem nisi secundum quod determinatum est debitis circumstanciis.

Questio 7

Consequenter queritur utrum virtutes sint passiones?

1. Et videtur quod non: quantum enim aliquid movetur habet aliquid de contrarietate, quia habet aliquid de termino a quo et aliquid de termino ad quod; sed passio est motus; quare, si debeamus dicere quod aliquis sit simpliciter virtuosus, necesse est quod sit simpliciter in quiete et non in motu et passione, quia quamdui est in passione habet aliquid de contrario virtutis.

2. Item, virtus est illud, vel saltem cum illo, cum quo generator virtus; sed virtus generator in intellectu in sedacione et quiete, ut dicitur septimo 10 Physicorum; quare, erit inpassibilitas vel inpassibilitates quedam.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Intelligendum quod virtutum moralium quedam existunt circa operacionem, ut iusticia que consistit in distribucionibus et communicacionibus, ut in empcione et vendicione. Quedam autem existunt in passionibus, ut temperancia

\[10\text{ inclinacio]}\text{ inclinacionem}\ \underline{L}

\[\text{Questio 7} \quad 3\text{ non]}\text{ sic}\ \underline{L} \quad 5\text{ aliquis corr. ex aliquid}\ \underline{L}\]
et huiusmodi. Et de huiusmodi dicebant quidam quod virtutes sunt 'inpassibilitates', considerantes quod passio trahit ad malum et virtus non patitur secum malum; ideo dixerunt virtutes inpassibilitates. Et istud dixit Plato quod non appareat falsum omnino, quia dicit Aristotiles quod Plato dicit quod statim in principio sunt parum assuefaciendi ad delectaciones quas oportet, quando oportet et quomodo oportet.

5. Dicendum tamen quod virtutes simpliciter inpassibilitates non sunt, quia virtus est regula passionis, et ideo non potest esse sine aliqua passione; propter quod cum passione est sed cum modica; modificata tamen per ipsam racionem ita quod mansuetudo non videtur aliud nisi regulacio ire cum circumstanciis acceptis quando oportet et quomodo oportet. Nichilominus tamen virtuosi non patiuntur excellenciam passionis: unde temperatus non habet magnam concupiscenciam ad venerea. Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod male dixerunt qui dixerunt quod virtutes sunt inpassibilitates simpliciter, sed sunt inpassibilitates respectu excellenciarum passionum.

6. Ad racionem in contrarium est dicendum: quando dicitur, quamdiu aliquid existit in passione habet aliquid contrarium virtuti, verum est quod virtuosus quamdiu est in passione habet aliquid de eo a quo est motus et de illo ad quod est motus; sed non habet aliquid de contrario virtutis, quia virtus non est modificacio illius per idem.

7. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima fit sciens et prudens in sedendo et quiescendo a passionibus simpliciter ab excellenciis passionum.

**Questio 8**

Consequenter queritur de quodam dicto in alia racione ubi dicit Aristotiles quod operaciones et passiones mensurantur delectacione; ideo queritur utrum delectacio mensuret operacionem?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia illud quod est mensura alicuius principium eius est, ut habetur decimo *Methaphysice*: sed delectacio non est principium operacionis; quare, etc.

2. Item, quod mensuratur mensuratur aliquo sui generis; sed delectacio non est de genere operacionis; quare, etc. Delectacio enim est quoddam accidens operacioni.

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15 non suppl. in marg. L. Post 8 6 delectacio] non praem. et exp. L.

16 non suppl. in marg. L. Post 8 1 Cf. Comm. 207.62-72; Lect. 102.25-80; Sent. 84-85.100-204. 2 EN 2.3 (1105a3-4) et R 400. 6 Meta. 10.1 (1052b32-33) et M 186; H 135 (239).
3. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles.
4. Item, illud secundum cuius mensuram vel quantitatem diversitas quantitatis attenditur secundum prius et minus est mensura illius; sed secundum quantitatem delectacionis est quantitas operationis; si delectatio est magna et operatio est magna, et si parva est delectatio et parva erit operatio; quare, etc.
5. Dicendum quod in omni operatione consistit delectatio vel tristitia: quia operatio vel est secundum inclinacionem operantis vel secundum habitum vel secundum inclinationem naturalem vel secundum consuetudinem, et tunc est delectatio; si autem operatio non fuerit secundum inclinationem vel ex habitu vel natura, tristicia consistit in illa.
6. Secundo intelligendum est quod diversimode se habent operatio et delectatio in operatione intellectus et sensus: quia intellectus apprehendit racionem boni universalis, ideo homo querit propter operationem delectacionem; sensus autem e converso, querit enim operationem propter delectacionem.
7. Tercio est intelligendum quod illud quod per se mensurat aliquid est principium eius ita quod principium in aliquo genere est principium et mensura aliorum. Per accidens autem contingit ut effectus mensuret causam. Dico igitur ad questionem quod loquendo de operatione secundum intellectum, tunc operatio est principium delectacionis et principium ita quod secundum quantitatem operationis est quantitas delectacionis, quia cum effectus per accidens est mensura cause, ideo potest dici quod delectatio est mensura operationis. Si autem loquamur de delectacione che est in sensu, tunc dicendum quod, cum queritur operacio propter delectacionem, ideo ibi delectacio magis est causa per se operationis. Et ideo, ut sic, potest dici quod delectatio consequens operationem sensibilem sit principium et mensura ipsius operationis secundum sensum; non tamen operacio delectacionis principium.
Raciones procedunt viis suis.
8. Ad racionem dicendum: quod per se mensurat aliquid est principium eius per se; sed non oportet quod mensuret unum per accidens quod sit principium per se sed per accidens.

Questio 9

Consequenter queritur utrum difficilius est expellere voluntatem quam iram?
1. Et quod non videtur, quia difficilius est expellere duo quam unum; sed
5 qui pugnat iram pugnat contra duo, scilicet contra legem et contra passionem, ut dicitur decimo huius – iratus enim pugnat contra legem et contra se ipsum; sed qui pugnat contra voluntatem pugnat contra non audientem legem – quare, etc.

2. Item difficilior est pugnare contra voluntatem et contra aliud quam voluntatem tantum; sed pugnans contra iram, cum sint ibi duo, passio et voluntas, pugnat contra duo, quia sicut dicit commentator, ira dulcius est melle stillante supra hominem; sed in voluntate tantum unum est; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Item, difficilior est expellere illud ab aliquo quod forcius inheret; sed concupiscencia est forcius inherens, sicut dicit Philosophus; quare, etc.

5. Intelligendum secundum Aristotilem in Rethorica sua, ira est appetitus cum tristicia apparentis punicionis propter apparentem promptitudinem sui aut aliquius suorum, ita quod in racione eius cadit tristicia vel appetitus tristicie que causatur ex tristante propter parvipensionem; et etiam ponitur appetitus, ut apparat. Ex quo manifestum quod iratus delectacionem habet et tristiciam. Appetitus autem punicionis non est sine spe punicionis. Spes autem delectat, quia consistit delectatio in spe presentis sensus et memoria preteriti et in spe futuri. Ideo tamdiu delectatur quamdiu habet speram de punicione. Et [quia] ira cum tristicia est; homo autem per se fugit tristiciam; ideo non posset semper manarem in ista tristicia. Quare, in ira sunt duo, scilicet delectacio et tristicia. Illius autem delectacio ymaginata non / stat diu; sed est sicut delectacio in somnno; ideo non diu stat ira. Ira etiam movet cum impetu et ista duo sunt que faciliter transeunt, scilicet mutus cum impetu et delectacione ymaginata; et ideo ira faciliter transit.

6. Voluntas autem vel appetitus delectacionis inest nobis a natura; ideo contemporanea est nobis. Dico ergo ad questionem quod simpliciter voluntatem repellere difficilior est que contemporanea est nobis. Ira autem de facili transit, ut apparat; tamen pro tempore aliquo difficilior est sedare iram quia ira motus impetuosus est et magis impetuosus quam voluntas. Et ideo pro illo tempore pro quo est impetuositas difficilior est iram sedare et repellere. Raciones procedunt suis viis.

7. Ad primam potest dici quod difficilius est pugnare contra duo quam contra unum quod non est equale illis duobus. Et cum dicitur quod in ira sunt
dixi, dico, etsi in ira sint duo, ista tamen minus adherent quam voluntas; ideo, etc.

8. Ad aliud dicendum quod difficilius est repellere iram et voluntatem quam voluntatem solum; sed facilius est repellere iram et aliam voluntatem quae est in ira, ut illam quae ex sola ymagine causatur quae est in ira. Illa autem quae est in voluntate causatur ex presenti sensibili et in actu est; ideo de difficili magis sedatur. Racio in oppositum procedit via sua.

Questio 10

QUERET AUTEM UTIQUE ALIQUIS (1105a17). Queritur utrum aliquis non habens habitum virtutis possit operari opera virtutis?

1. Et quod sic videtur, quia sicut omne quod movetur secundum locum reductur ad movens inmobile penitus, ita omne alterans alteratum reductur ad alterans inalterabile simpliciter, secundum Commentatorem in libro De subs-tancia orbis; cum igitur operans secundum virtutem sit, alterans alteratum potest reduci ad alterans non alterabile quod non habet opera virtutis; quare, etc.

2. Item, si opus virtuosum causatur, est aut a forma virtutis quae sit eadem cum operacione aut ab alia non habente formam virtutis. Si ab eadem, queram de illa utrum sit generata vel non. Constat quod sic, et tunc erit processus in infinitum, quod est inconveniens; vel erit devenire ad aliquid operans virtutem, non habens opera vel habitum virtutis.

3. Ad oppositum arguitur: forma non est in effectu nisi a causa efficiente. Tunc arguitur: cum forma sit in operacione virtutis, necesse est quod illa forma sit in generante virtutem; quare, aliquis operans opera virtutis habet opera virtutis et habitum.

4. Dicendum quod aliquis habens habitum virtutis formaliter potest operari opera virtutis. Probacio huius est: quia si quelibet opera iusta procedunt a virtute iusticie, cum iusticia causatur a consimilibus virtutibus, tunc sequitur quod ante istas operaciones est habitus iusticie. Et cum illi habitus generentur ex operationibus, tunc contingit procedere in infinitum aut stare ad aliquid quod non habet habitum virtutis. Verum est quod operaciones iuste causam habent, sed illud est racio vel intellectus secundum virtutem, cuius formam
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virtutis habet, ita quod habens racionem vel intellectum habet habitum virtutis intrinsecum vel accipit ab extrinseco. Sicut contingit quod aliquando aliquis habens cognicionem primorum operabilium operatur opera virtutis; aliquando, cum non habeat illa, habet hec ab extrinseco, et per consuetudinem operacionem bonarum sequitur habitus sive operetur ab aliquo intra vel extra. "Quod" contingit in artibus: aliquis enim non loquitur grammaticam nisi habens habitum gramatice, nisi hoc sit a casu. Sed non est simile, quia ars generatur in intellectu speculativo, virtus autem in practico. Et illud quod est in practico generetur ex aliquo existente in speculativo; non tamen sic oportet in / speculativo quia non est ibi prius in alio, sed est ponere aliquid prius in se ipso.

5. Ad racionem est dicendum, cum dicitur, forma in effectu est ex forma existente in efficiente, verum est vel formaliter vel virtute. Et hoc sufficit: generatur enim calidum a non calido, sed non a non calido quod non sit calidum virtute. Similiter dicendum est in proposito.

Questio 11

Post hæc autem scrutandum (1105b 19). Circa istam partem Aristotiles tangit ea in existencia anime, scilicet habitum, passionem et potenciam.

1. Et videtur quod Aristotiles insufficienter tangit ea que sunt in anima, quia operaciones sunt in anima et non sunt habitus neque passiones neque potencie; quare, etc.

2. Item, felicitas et virtus est in anima et tamen nullum istorum est *** quia secundum unum istorum est aliquis bonus et felix.

3. Dicendum quod Aristotiles solum tangit illa que sunt principia operationis illius anime, cuius principia hic intendit investigare. Principium autem operationis in anima est vel habitus vel passio vel potencia; et ideo non tangit operationem quia operacio non est principium operationis.

4. Item, nec tangit substanciam ipsius anime, que non est in anima sed est ipsa anima.

5. Item, sufficienter sic accipitur illud quod est in anima: aut sumitur quantum ad id quod est in anima, et sic sunt potencie; aut per distinctionem exterioris ab anima, et tunc aut causatur ex consuetudine et experiencia, et tunc est habitus; aut causatur ab aliquo delectabili vel tristabili, et sic est passio. Apparet ex istis ad raciones.

33, 34 speculativo] speculacio L 35 in?] alio praem. et exp. L

Questio 11 3 potenciam] -cia L 5 potencie] passiones praem. et exp. L 11-12 et ... operacionis bis exh. L 15 sufficienter] -ciencia L

Questio 11 1 Cf. Lect. 112-113.74-84; Sent. 90.13-36.
Questio 12

Utrum passiones sint in anima?

1. Et quod non videtur, quia passio est motus appetitive potencie sive fantasie boni vel mali; sed anima non movetur, immo est illud quo aliud est <motum>; quare, in ipsa non est passio.

2. Item, illud in quo ipsa anima compatitur ipsi corpori non est in anima, sed in toto aggregato; sed in istis passionibus, ut est <in> ira et aliis, anima compatitur corpori; quare, etc. Nullo enim existente de sensibili, aliquid teneretur propter complexionem corporis, sicut habetur libro De anima; quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum: perfectio est in suo perfectibili primo; sed passiones sunt perfectiones anime; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum quod non accipitur hic passio quocumque modo, sed ut est motus appetitive virtutis sub fantasie boni vel mali. Primo enim movetur appetitus ab aliquo sensibili exteriorum; secundo movetur fantasia que iudicat illud esse bonum vel malum. Et sic movetur a iudicio boni vel mali, quia tunc ad ipsum motum factum in fantasie requiritur motus appetitive virtutis ad se ipsum. Illud a quo primo sumitur motus vel <ad sequendum vel> ad fugiendum illud ita quod motus anime incipit quasi a circulo, primo a sensibilibus exterioribus; secundo est motus in interioribus; et tunc motus talis transit motum in exterioribus.

5. Item, passio non debetur anime nutritive, quia in ea non est iudicium vel cognicio boni vel mali.

6. Item, passio videtur dicere inclinationem anime in aliquod exterius; actiones autem anime consistunt in apprehensione aliquorum intrinsicis; et ideo passiones <non> pertine <n> t ad potenciam nutritivam nec ad racionem, sed solum ad appetitum sensitivum. Et quia iste non movetur nisi secundum iudicium de bono vel de malo quod fit aliquando a fantasie boni vel mali, ideo hoc subiungitur in diffinicione, scilicet fantasie boni vel mali. Dico tunc quod iste passiones sunt tocius coniuncti. Quod enim non est ens secundum se, eius non est passio sicut subjecti; sed appetitus sensitivus non est ens secundum se, et ideo tocius coniuncti sunt passiones / per animam. Tamen simpliciter [intelligendum] de habitibus saltem moralibus, quicquid sit de intellectualibus et de potencis, idem intelligendum.
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7. Prime raciones probant quia non sint passiones anime absolute. Et concedendum est quod hec sunt tocius coniuncti per animam. Unde quedam passiones sequuntur coniunctum: quedam racione materie, quedam racione forme, sicut patet de se.

8. Ad racionem est dicendum in oppositum quod iste passiones sunt perfectiones tocius aggregati, et non anime per se sicut innuitur.

Questio 13

Consequenter queritur utrum potencie perficiantur per virtutes, sicut innuit Aristotiles?

1. Et quod non videtur, quia unius potencie una est perfectio; sed potenciarum anime sunt alie perfectiones quam virtus, sicut potencie concupiscibilis perfectio est delectacio, et irascibilis ira; ideo, etc.

2. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles.

3. Item, illud quod disponit aliquam potenciam ad operacionem est aliqua perfectio eius, si sit disposicio intrinseca; sed virtutes disponunt potencias ad operacionem irascitivam et concupiscitivam; quare, etc.


5. Ad racionem est dicendum quod unius potencie, unius est actus respectu unius; nichil tamen prohibet respectu diversorum esse plures perfectiones. Ad minorem dico quod concupiscencie potencie et appetitive actus absolutus est concupiscencia. Actus tamen secundum racionem rectam est ipsa concupiscencia recta racione determinata. Ad unum autem actum determinatur et ordinatur per virtutem ad concupiscendum, quando oportet et que oportet, etc.; ita concupiscencia ordinatur ad virtutem et mediante virtute ordinatur ulterius ad operaciones que sunt secundum virtutem.
Questio 14

Consequenter queritur utrum virtus sit habitus?
1. Et videtur quod non, quia illud quod habet rationem habitus non est ultimum in genere suo, quia habitus ad alius ordinatur; sed virtus est ultimum de potentia; quare, etc.
2. Item, omnis habitus semper est sub operacione, nisi alius prohibeat; virtus autem non est semper sub operacione: potest enim aliquid non operari virtutem semper nullo exteriorum prohibente; quare, etc.
3. Oppositum dicit Aristotiles.
4. Item, in anima non sunt nisi tria, potencia, passio et habitus. Virtus autem est aliquid istorum: non autem potencia, quia secundum potenciam non dicimur boni vel mali, secundum autem virtutem dicimur; similiter autem nec [in potentia] est passio propter eandem rationem; quare, est habitus.
5. Intelligendum quod habitus ex ratione sua videtur aliquid dicere ordinatum ad operacionem secundum scientiam secundum se acceptam, <quod> habitum dicimus.
6. Item, habitus est illud quod derelinquitur ex motu, sicut dicitur quinto Methaphysice; et istorum quidam sunt habitus corporis, sicut pulcritudo, sanitas; alii sunt habitus anime secundum quos anima operatur, sicut scientia et virtutes et sic querimus in proposito. Unde de tali habitu dicit Commentator super tercium De anima quod est illud quo aliquid operari potest cum voluerit.
7. Item, virtus est que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit; perficit autem animam; / quare, est habitus scientiae.
8. Ad rationem dico quod habitus non est simpliciter ultimum, sed est in genere potentie ultimum quia ordinatur ad alius.
9. Ad alius concedo maiorem quod habitus semper est sub operacione nisi aliquid prohibeat. Ad minorem dico quod voluntas et appetitus est eorum que sunt secundum rationem. Et ideo habens virtutem non operatur quod non vult.

Questio 15

Queritur utrum in passionibus sit invenire medium?
1. Et videtur quod non, quia in indivisibili non contingit invenire medium; sed operationes indivisibiles sunt, cum sint qualitates vel actiones quae sunt secundum se indivisibiles; quare, etc.
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2. Item, illud quod habet se perfectum in quolibet indivisibili temporis non est divisibile divisibilitate temporis vel motus; sed delectacio vel passio reperiuntur in quolibet indivisibili temporis vel sunt sub esse perfecto, ut vult Aristotiles in decimo huius, ubi dicit quod delectacio est consequens operacionem vel passionem; quare, etc. Quod autem delectacio non sit in corpore patet, quia dicit quod delectacio est sub esse perfecto in quolibet < indivisibili > temporis.

3. In oppositum arguitur: in omni motu est reperiire medium et extrema; sed passio et operacio motus sunt; quare, etc.

4. Intelligendum quod operaciones et passiones circa quas consistit virtus moralis possunt considerari < uno modo> quantum ad naturas proprias et alio modo quantum ad circumstancias. Sed primo modo in ipsis non est reperiire medium nec extrema, quia ipsa sunt vel de genere actionis vel qualitatis, et illa sunt indivisibilia secundum se. Si autem consideremus motum secundum rationem suam, sic non est divisibilis secundum se sicut nec terminus ad quem est motus, et ideo multo minus actio que nominat aliquod existens sub motu. Si autem consideremus ista secundum circumstancias, ut quantum ad qualitatem motus consequentem operacionem et alias circumstancias, tunc, cum passio considerata sub mixtione sub contrario, potest esse secundum plus et minus, ut contingit minus irasci et magis. Si etiam consideretur secundum tempus, contingit invenire medium. Et apparat ad raciones: apparat solucio, quia bene probant quod in passionibus secundum se non est invenire medium.

Questio 16

Consequenter queritur utrum virtus sit medium?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia illud quod habet racionem extremi medium non est; sed virtus habet racionem extremi, cum virtus sit bonum et bonum racionem extremi habet respectu mali; quare, etc.

2. Item, si sit medium, aut per abnegacionem, et hoc non contingit: tunc enim lapis diceretur tale medium quod non est unum extremum nec aliud. Iterum, nec medium per compositionem, quia tunc oporteret quod esset composition ex extremis ex extremis; hoc autem est falsum. Quare, etc.

3. Ad oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Item, effectus debet proporcionari cause; sed virtus generatur ex operaciones autem ille ex quibus generatur sunt operaciones ad medium adducte; quare, virtus debet esse medium.

9 EN 10.4 (1174b31-32) et R 570.
10 EN 2.7 (1106b36-1107a8) et R 404.
5. Dicendum quod virtus est medium quoddam secundum racionem suam et propriam speciem, quod patet sic: racio potencie vel habitus secundum quod huiusmodi sumuntur ex racione objecti, quia objectum racionem finis habet respectu illorum. Virtus autem per racionem suam habitus est, ut ostensum est; et ideo ex objecto suo debet sumere racionem suam. Objectum autem virtutis est ipsum medium in operacionibus, quia racio virtutis ex racione medii. Unde virtus est medium in operacionibus et passionibus, medium scilicet duarum maliciarum, quia ita se debet habere medium quod est virtus ad extrema, que sunt due malicie, sicut operaciones se habent; quia sic est habitus, sicut in objectis. Sed sic est in objectis quod objectum virtutis est medium inter superhabundanciam et defectum. Quare, sic erit in virtute.

6. Et dico medium secundum operacionem, quia / in isto medio aliquos remerant extrema, non tamen sub propriis formis, quia liberalis in dando convenit cum prodigo, et in hoc quod recipit cum avaro; sed manent ista sub racionibus propriis, sicut in tepido remanet calidum et frigidum.

7. Item, operaciones generant virtutem et non nisi secundum quod terminata sunt sub racione recta; et sic oportet tunc esse in effectu quod virtus sit medium secundum racionem rectam. Est igitur virtus medium, et est medium duarum maliciarum, et est medium secundum racionem rectam.

8. Ad racionem dico quod idem potest esse medium et extremum respectu diversorum. Et dico quod virtus racionem medii habet. Et cum dicis, virtus boni racionem habet quod est extremum respectu mali, intelligendum quod bonitas virtutis consistit in eo quod est agere secundum racionem rectam; malum autem secundum quod malum est declinabile a recta racione. Et quia utraque malicia convenit in hoc, ideo ambe unum extremum sunt respectu boni. Sed malus per se non contingit declinare a racione recta, sed intendit aliquo delectabile cui conjunctum est declinacio a racione recta, et ita per accidentis hoc intendit. Nichil autem constituitur in esse specie per accidentes, et ideo malicia non constituitur in specie quia declinare a malicia. Ideo racio malicie sumitur ex racione objecti; et similiter racio virtutis consistit in racione medii. Malicie enim causantur ex passionibus diversis oppositis medio, et ideo ab illis sumunt racionem per se.

9. Ad secundum est dicendum quod virtus est medium per composicionem. Et cum dicitur quod sequitur quod virtus sit composita ex extremis, verum est quod est habitus compositus ex extremis, sed non secundum quod extrema manent sub racionibus propriis, sicut si aliquid argueret tepidum esse medium inter calidum et frigidum quia est compositum ex illis. Non valent saltim

40 delectabile] declina praem. et exp. L
50 inter] sicut L
secundum quod ista manent sub racionibus propriis. Similiter dicendum est in proposito.

**Questio 17**

**Non suscipit autem omnis operacio** (1107a8). Consequenter circa partem istam: ibi enim dicit quod furturn, adulterium, homicidium sunt mala.

1. Et videtur quod non, quia omnes operationes speciem sorciuntur ex fine operacionis; igitur que ordinantur in bonum finem bone sunt; sed furturn, homicidium, adulterium possunt ordinari in finem bonum, ut propter sustentacionem vite; quare, etc.

2. Item, quod contingit fieri ut oportet et quando oportet, tale racionem boni habet. Tale est adulterium, ut dicit commentator quinto huius: dicit quod contingit adulterari ut oportet, ut si aliquis adulteretur cum uxore tiranni ut expediatur civitas in magno bono. Similier dicit quod furari est bonum secundum quod oportet. Quare, etc.

3. In oppositum est Aristotiles.

4. Item, quod habet racionem extremi non potest habere racionem medii; sed adulterium, furturn et alia extrema sunt, quia non contingit in eis racionem boni invenire; quare, etc., quia bonum existit in medio.

5. Item, illud quod medium est et racionem boni habet non potest habere racionem mali; ergo, illud quod secundum racionem suam malum est non potest habere racionem medii vel boni. Talia autem sunt adulterium, furturn et alia. Quare, etc.

6. Dicendum quod actus morales considerati secundum quod sunt aliquid secundum naturam boni sunt, sed nec boni vel mali sunt relati ad nos. Actiones autem morales sunt bona natura eo quod terminant aliquid. Bonum autem est bonitate moris, quia bonum vel malum moris non dicitur aliquid nisi ut relatum ad finem vel operacionem cum rectis circumstanciis determinatam. Operaciones autem secundum se accepte neque bone neque male absolute, dico, et ideo interficere sic non est bonum neque malum simpliciter, nec / accipere rem alienam, quia si non esse esse t mala secundum se, quocumque modo essent mala. Et ideoiste operaciones debent accipi secundum quod referuntur ad bonum, ita quod illa operacio que regulata est racione bona erit, que necnon...
non bene accipere quando oportet et a quo oportet. Unde bonum est simpliciter interficere hominem quando oportet et a quo et propter quid illud habet racionem boni. Quando autem huiusmodi raciones non determinantur a racione recta, tunc sunt male, ut interficere quando non oportet et a quo non oportet et ubi non oportet, etc.: hec habet racionem mali. Hoc autem sonas homicidium secundum quod aliquis interficit cum defectu aliquius conditionis existentis ad rectam racionem. Similiter adulterium malum nominat et hoc maxime cum muliere committere quando non oportet et ubi non oportet. Similiter etiam dicendum de furto: accipere rem alienam quando non oportet et ubi non et cum non indiget malum est. Ideo dicit Aristotiles quod omnia ista cum malo convolvuntur.

7. Ad racionem est dicendum quod maior vera est. Et cum dicitur, istas operaciones contingit ordinare in bonum finem ut interficere quando oportet, dico quod statim tu accipis illud quod non est homicidium; sed si deficiat aliqua circumstancia, tunc est homicidium. Similiter de furto: cum dicitur quod contingit accipere rem alienam, statim assumitur illud quod deficit a circumstancia aliqua. Verumptamen est quod aliquando contingit accipere, ut cum aliquis sit in ultima necessitate constitutus; et talis rem alienam non accipit, nec est hoc furtum.

8. Ad secundum dicendum quod maior vera est. Et cum dicitur, ista, adulterium, furto, etc., possunt fieri secundum quod oportet, ut dicit commentator, dico quod commentator postea subdit quod illud dictum erroneum est; unde dicit quod commiscere cum uxore alicuius non est licitum propter aliud bonum.

**Questio 18**

TRIBUS AUTEM DISPO <SICIO> NIBUS (1108b11). Utrum virtus contrariatur duabus maliciis?

1. Et videtur quod non, quia quod opponitur privative aliquibus non est contrarium illis; sed virtus opponitur duabus maliciis privative, nam virtus cum sit bonum est privacio mali; quare, etc.

2. Item, tantum unum uni contrariatur; quare, cum virtus sit bonum unum tantum, contrariabitur ei unum; non ergo due malicie.
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3. Ad oppositum arguitur: equali contrariatur magis et minus; sed virtus est equalis, quia est in medio; extrema autem sunt ut plus et minus; quare, etc.

4. Dicendum secundum Philosophum decimo *Metaphysice*, contraria sunt sub propria racione que sunt maxime distancia sub aliquo uno genere. Et secundum ipsum, illa que simpliciter participant racionem istam simpliciter contraria sunt. Que autem imperfecte participant, imperfecte contraria sunt.

Media autem inter duo extrema non distant ab extremis maxime, sed <medium> habet aliquid de uno, et in hoc contrariatur alteri, et e converso. Simpliciter non distat medium, quia medium habet aliquid de utrisque. Virtus autem medium est inter duas malicias, ut dictum est. Et ideo distat ab extremis, et tamen non simpliciter distat. Et ideo non maxime contrariatur duobus extremis, sed aliquo modo contrariatur.

5. Item, sicut tepidum non contrariatur simpliciter calido et frigido, similiter in proposito: virtus inquantum habet aliquid de extremo quod est defectus contrariatur habundancie et inquantum habet aliquid de extremo <quod> se habet per superhabundanciam contrariatur defectui. Apparet igitur qualiter virtus contrariatur duabus maliciis.

6. Ad racionem est dicendum quod nichil prohibet illa que secundum unam racionem privative opponuntur, secundum aliam racionem esse contraria; sicut album et nigrum sunt privative opposita, quia nigrum secundum quod nigrum / dicit privacionem albi, vel secundum quod nigrum deficit ab albo. Similiter in proposito est dicendum.

7. Ad minorem dico quod habitus malus est qui deficit a racione recta. Ex hoc autem in alis est quod deficit ab objecto. Verumptamen malum secundum quod est de genere qualitatis non solum est privacio boni sed malum aliquod positive dictum, et sic contrariatur bono, quia utrumque contrariorum dicit aliquid positive. Secundum ergo quod malicie dicunt privacionem virtutis, sic sunt privative opposita; sub racionibus tamen propriis contrariantur virtuti.

8. Ad aliud est dicendum: oportet tantum unum uni contrariatur perfecte. Imperfecte autem nichil prohibet plura opponi uni secundum diversas raciones.

**Questio 19**

Queritur circa hoc quod dicit Aristotiles quod virtus magis opponitur uni malicie quam alter.

**Questio 18**

33 malum] bonum L


1. Et videtur quod non, quia illud quod opponitur duobus et per unam racionem reconvenit in illis eodem modo opponitur illis et equaliter; sed virtus contrariatur duabus maliciis per unam racionem, ut quia mala sunt, et virtus bonum; quare, etc.

2. In oppositum dicit Aristotiles.

3. Item, malicia que difficillior est virtuti magis opponitur virtuti; sed virtus magis est difficilis uni quam alteri, sicut in fortitudine difficillior est timiditas quam audacia.

4. Dicendum quod virtus magis opponitur uni maliciarum, aliando illi malicie que est secundum superhabundanciam, aliando illi que est secundum defectum. Racio primi est quia virtus racio medii est et est medium etiam quod nos; et compositum aliquo modo ex extremis, ut apparent ex precedentibus.

5. Item, sicut patet decimo Methaphysice, compositum ex pluribus est ex altero magis et altero minus, et tunc virtus, cum simul accipitur de uno, magis similis est illi, et ei de quo minus accipit, minus similis, sicut patet de mediis coloribus, quorum quidam plus accipiantur de albo, quidam minus.

6. Item, secundum quod patet: quia virtus, cum sit medium inter duas malicias, declinat ab illo ad quod magis <est > secundum inclinacionem naturalem, naturaliter homo inclinat ad delectacionem et fugit tristiciam; et ideo in illis in quibus est maior delectacio magis consistit virtus in illo extremo quod recedit a delectacione, sicut apparent de temperancia que est media inter intemperanciam et insensibilitatem; magis enim opponitur intemperancia, quia ad illud magis inclinatur. Similiter autem fortitudo consistit in agrediendo quedam tristia, et tristia fugimus naturaliter; ideo, iste virtuosus intendit declinare timiditati, et ideo magis accedit ad audaciam; et per consequens magis opponitur timiditati quam audacie.

7. Ad racionem in oppositum est dicendum quod maior vera est. Ad minorem cum dicitur quod virtus opponitur duabus maliciis per unam racionem, falsum est. Cum enim aliquid includat de utroque extremorum, per hoc quod includit aliquid de uno opponitur alteri et e converso. Unde avaricie opponitur largitas inquantum dat, et prodigalitati inquantum recepit. Et dico quod virtus non opponitur istis secundum quod bonum, sed secundum quod iste malicie habent sibi annexam superhabundanciam et defectum. Et in hoc terminatur secundus liber ethicorum.

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INTRODUCTION

IN the Confessio fidei 'Universis'\textsuperscript{1} Abelard replies to each of seventeen of the capitula under which his heresies had been listed in the Capitula haeresum xix attached to St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistola 190 ad Innocentium papam, with a brief statement of the orthodoxy of his belief.\textsuperscript{2} A much more detailed and scholarly reply to the same capitula (in addition to the two which have been omitted in the Confessio fidei 'Universis') appears to have been the subject of Abelard's Apologia, of which we have only the opening section and

\textsuperscript{1} This title has become conventional, but is not given in the earliest and best manuscripts (see below, p. 131). Lest there should be any confusion between this work and the Confessio fidei ad Heloissam (PL 178.375-78), the latter work will always be referred to by its full title; the word Confessio on its own, therefore, will refer only to the Confessio fidei 'Universis'.


fragments preserved in Thomas of Morigny's answer to that work.\(^3\) The verbal similarities between the two works suggest that they were composed in the same circumstances.\(^4\) In both works Abelard refutes the allegation in the *Capitula haeresum* xix that the propositions listed are to be found in his *Theologia*, his *Scito te ipsum* (Ethica) and his *Sententiae* (a work whose composition he denies). In both works also he brings together the same authorities to show that he has a right and a duty to defend himself. However, there are important differences.

In the first place the *Apologia* is addressed directly to St. Bernard. At the head of the work Abelard draws up the list of the nineteen capitula, which he squarely attributes to Bernard himself. He gives the impression that the whole purpose of the work is to sort out the differences and lack of understanding between Bernard and himself; the *Apologia* is a confrontation of the ways of thinking of two minds, and no third party is involved.\(^5\) Abelard's tone is not without arrogance. He accuses Bernard of woolly thinking and lack of understanding of dialectic,\(^6\) but he takes his opponent seriously enough to underpin his own defense with all the scholarly tools at his disposal.

The *Confessio fidei* 'Universis', on the other hand, while referring obliquely to Bernard in perhaps an ironic tone as amicus noster,\(^7\) is addressed to the church at large, against which Abelard has no particular grudge. He spares his audience scholarly logical and theological arguments and two recondite capitula,\(^8\) and expatiates only on the two capitula whose doctrines he wishes to defend.\(^9\) Abelard adopts a more submissive attitude, he admits his fallibility (especially in regard to his conduct\(^10\)) and he calls for charity from his brother Christians.

However, the significance of the *Confessio fidei* 'Universis' does not lie merely in the fact that it is addressed to all Christians, and not to one man alone. Over and above this, it gives the impression of being a formal and public statement disclaiming heresy. At the beginning of the text Abelard recalls the

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\(^3\) Ed. Buytaert, 1.341-68.

\(^4\) For the parallels see the first section of the apparatus beneath the text, edited below.

\(^5\) Note the repeated use of *tu*, *te* and *tuus* and second person singular verbs throughout the *Apologia*.

\(^6\) Cf. *Apologia* 8 (Buytaert 1.363): 'Erras plane, frater, tamquam uim uerborum nequaquam intelligens, et illius expers disciplinae quae disserendi magistra est, nec solum uerba intelligere docet, uerum disserere intellexta ualeat.'

\(^7\) *Confessio*, ep. 1 (p. 138 below).

\(^8\) *Capitulum* 3 (the identification of the Holy Spirit with the World-Soul) and *capitulum* 16 (the opinion that the Devil might influence minds through the use of stones and plants).

\(^9\) *Capitulum* 11 (*Confessio* xi), that in Christ there was no spirit of the fear of the Lord, and *capitulum* 13 (*Confessio* xiii), that a man does not win additional merit by his deeds.

\(^10\) Ed. below, pr. 4: '... quamvis impar ceteris sim morum qualitate.'
arguments which he had already brought forward in his *Theologia 'scholarium'*, to be considered when heresy is suspected, applying them to his own case. He shows, for example, that he should not be convicted of heresy simply for holding an erroneous belief since heresy lies in perversely persisting in that belief after its error has been exposed, and he insists that he has always been willing to correct or abandon such beliefs. Throughout the *Confessio* Abelard states rather than argues for his orthodoxy, and one is left wondering whether the *Confessio* might indeed be a document demanded, or required by convention, from Abelard in the course of the proceedings of an inquisition against heresy.

Those accused of heresy were required to confess the faith of the Catholic Church. The particular form of the confession made by Valdés (before 1184), the eponymous instigator of the Waldensian heresy, has been recorded. However, the closest similarities are those between Abelard’s *Confessio* and the proceedings at the trial of Gilbert, bishop of Poitiers, at the Council of Reims in 1148, as witnessed by John of Salisbury.

In both cases it is St. Bernard who initiates the proceedings. Both the accused disclaim heresy and state that they do not wish to persist obstinately in an error which has been shown to be contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Both emphasize that they have taught nothing in secret. In both cases, too, some of the disputed doctrines have been taken from books which the accused claim they have not written. John of Salisbury records Gilbert’s indignation at being confronted with a statement in a work he had no hand in composing, and, just as Abelard vehemently condemns the man who upholds the doctrine of the first capitulum, so Gilbert pronounces anathema against the heresies and

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11 At the beginning of *Theologia 'scholarium'* Abelard is trying to forestall charges of heresy (*tsch* 7-9 = *TSch* Prolog. 7-9; see Buytaert 2.402-404). It is significant that he should return to the words he uses here (including the quotation from Proverbs 10:19 about speaking too much) when his back is to the wall, as it were, in the *Confessio*.


13 Edited by A. Dondaine, ‘Aux origines du Valdéisme: une profession de foi de Valdés’, *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 16 (1946) 191-235 (see 231-32). The confession of Valdés is addressed to ‘all the faithful’ (*Pateat omnibus fidelibus*), is comparable in length to that of Abelard, and states the orthodox belief with one sentence for each item, as does the *Confessio fidei Universis*; the heretical beliefs are not mentioned except by implication.


15 ‘[Gilbertus] dicebat se nec esse hereticum nec futurum, qui paratus erat et semper fuerat acquisere ueritati et apostolicam sequi doctrinam; hereticum namque facit non ignorantia ueri, sed mentis elatio contumatiam pariens’ (*Historia pontificalis* 10, ed. Chibnall, pp. 21-22); cf. *Confessio*, pr. 1-2.

the author of the book he is alleged to have written. Concerning the works he admits to writing, Gilbert, like Abelard, promises to erase any statements that should be found to be erroneous. The actual profession of faith demanded from Gilbert was formulated not by Gilbert himself but by Geoffroy of Auxerre, St. Bernard’s secretary and biographer, who appears to have been the official clerk at the local synod. The profession of faith was formulated in such a way as to bring four of the doctrines which were, as agreed by both sides, held by Gilbert, into line with orthodox faith. Three of the articles begin with the word credimus; in the fourth, the verbs fatemur and profitemur express the profession of faith.

The parallels between the formulae used by Abelard, especially in the prologue and epilogue of his Confessio fidei ‘Universis’, and the statements that Gilbert is recorded as having made during the course of the proceedings against him suggest that Abelard is deliberately using standard terminology in rebutting charges of heresy. Also, as in Gilbert’s case, the affirmation of orthodox belief is attached to each of the articles which contain the disputed doctrine. However, there is no evidence that any part of the Confessio fidei ‘Universis’ was drawn up by another party for Abelard to countersign. For the style and doctrine of the Confessio matches that of other works of Abelard, as the apparatus to the text will show. Our accounts of the Council of Sens do not permit us to say whether Abelard presented this Confessio, or parts of it, during the proceedings of his case. It is more reasonable to consider the Confessio as a document, deliberately drafted as a confession of faith, which was sent to interested parties during the period before the Council, when several documents scrutinizing Abelard’s doctrine were being circulated.

The Apologia and Confessio fidei ‘Universis’ would both have been written soon after the publication of the Capitula haeresum xix. One would expect to find the Apologia at the abbey of Clairvaux, where a copy of the reply to his work, the Disputatio catholicorum patrum contra dogmata Petri Abaelardi of

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17 (direct speech) ‘Ego libellum istum cum auctore suo et omnes hereses que in eo scripte sunt anathematizo uobiscum’ (Historia pontificalis 10, ed. Chibnall, p. 22); cf. Confessio 1: ‘... ego verba ... detestor, et ea cum auctore suo pariter damno.’

18 (direct speech) ‘Iustum enim est, si ego peccavi scribendo, idem puniar in radendo...’ (Historia pontificalis 11, ed. Chibnall, p. 23); cf. Confessio, pr. 2.

19 This profession of faith is recorded in Historia pontificalis 11 (ed. Chibnall, p. 24); see also N. M. Häring, ‘Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis des Reimser Konsistoriums von 1148’, Scholastik 40 (1965) 55-90.

Thomas of Morigny, was deposited. However, the origin of the one manuscript which contains the Apologia itself (unfortunately incomplete through the loss of several folios) has not been securely ascertained. The reference by Otto of Freising to an ‘Apologeticum’ written by Peter Abelard against the ‘capitula of Bernard’, with the incipit of our Apologia, and the fact that Hugh, archbishop of Rouen, asked Thomas of Morigny to write his Disputatio, presumably when the latter was at Saint-Martin-des-Champs in Paris, where he lived between 1140 and 1144, give some idea of the audience of the Apologia. Historical evidence for the reception of the Confessio, however, is not forthcoming, and one is obliged to rely on the testimony of the manuscripts themselves to gauge how the work was published and what readership it reached.

The number of manuscripts – which at twenty (including five lost manuscripts) is relatively high for a work of Abelard – is itself deceptive. For six of the manuscripts (of which two are lost) are closely related copies of the small collection of materials made up of Berengar of Poitiers’ letters and Abelard’s Soliloquium, which was copied widely in the late thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth century (tradition β below). Another four manuscripts (including the manuscript from which Duchesne took his text) represent a late (s. xv-xvii) tradition of manuscripts of the personal correspondence, to which a dossier of works concerning the Council of Sens had been added (tradition ε).

In some manuscripts the Confessio is associated with letters by St. Bernard concerning Abelard. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 2545 (belonging to the late tradition ε) includes St. Bernard’s Epistolae 188 and 191 and the Capitula haeresum xix. London, British Library Cotton Otho C.xiv and its copy, Dublin, Trinity College 780 (D.3.10), include Epistolae 189 and 188; these seem to have been copied out alongside Abelard’s work as further items in a large collection of letters illustrating ecclesiastical controversies, especially those concerning


\[\text{22 For the manuscript (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 28363) see P. Ruf and M. Grabmann, ‘Ein neuau gefundenes Bruchstück der Apologia Abelard’s, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosoph.-hist. Abt., 5 (Munich, 1930), pp. 3-9; summarized in Buytaert 1.343-45.}\]

\[\text{23 Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici (G. Waitz and B. von Simson, eds., Ottois et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I imperatoris [MGH Script. rerum germ. in usum schol. 46; Hanover-Leipzig, 1912], p. 74).}\]

\[\text{24 Luscombe, p. 50.}\]

\[\text{25 For further descriptions of the manuscripts, see below, pp. 120-29.}\]
English sees, in the twelfth century. A fourth manuscript, now Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 998, but apparently written in the Benedictine abbey of Göttweig, is curious. It is the only early manuscript in which the *Capitula haeresum xix* are also found. The *Capitula*, however, are detached from Bernard's *Epistola 189* and Pope Innocent II's reply to Bernard's letters condemning Abelard. Moreover, the *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* has been added by a different scribe who has divided the text between two odd spaces left blank in the manuscript, and has added a paragraph from the *Sententiae Petri Abaelardi* (which he calls the 'Theologia' of Peter Abelard) on a fly-leaf at the end of the manuscript.\(^{26}\) It is apparent, then, that he added Abelard's works to a manuscript already containing letters of Bernard and Pope Innocent II.

These three isolated testimonies do not, therefore, suggest that there was a separate tradition in which Abelard's *Confessio* travelled with those works of St. Bernard in which Abelard's teaching is condemned. There is no evidence that the *Confessio* was ever at Clairvaux, and not one of the fifteen surviving manuscripts can be shown to have come from a Cistercian abbey.

One manuscript, however, in which two letters of St. Bernard are included, directly preceding the *Confessio*, points to another tradition: that of the early 'Northeast French' group of manuscripts, which is designated by the siglum \(\delta\). All three manuscripts of this tradition are of the twelfth century, and miss out the last phrase of *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* xiii. Of these Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 532 (D) is a collection of devotional texts which, Leclercq has claimed, was made by the Cistercian Galland of Rigny, who corresponded with St. Bernard. Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Phillipps 1732 (R) was in Reims in the fifteenth century, and included *Epistola 330* and part of *Epistola 189* of St. Bernard, both concerning Abelard. This manuscript passed through Clermont College in Paris, and is annotated by Jacques Sirmond (1559-1651), confessor to King Louis xiii and a prolific collector of manuscripts. Sirmond writes in the margin, opposite the beginning of Abelard's *Confessio*, 'Petri Abailardi Apologia'—a title which is also in D, and which Duchesne may have used at Sirmond's suggestion. The third manuscript in tradition \(\delta\), Cambrai, Bibliothèque Municipale 27 (G), includes some sermons of St. Bernard. The association of Bernardine material with the *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* in these manuscripts need not suggest a Clairvaux origin for tradition \(\delta\). For it is noticeable that abbeys in northern France and Belgium provide a very fine early tradition for the correspondence of St. Bernard, and that the very abbey from

\(^{26}\) Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 998, fol. 177r: ‘Petrus abaelardus in theologia sua. Predestinatio ut diximus de bonis tantum est ... per quod salvaretur’ = *Sententiae Petri Abaelardi (Epitome theologiae christianae)* [PL 178.1729n-c)]. I owe this identification to Dr. Constant Mews.
which D originates (the Benedictine abbey of Anchin) also owned the earliest complete collection of St. Bernard’s works. The text that Tissier used for his 1662 edition of the *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* shares with this tradition the omission of the last clause of section xiii.

The manuscript which, textually, turns out to be the closest to the hypothetical ancestor of all fifteen manuscripts directs our attention firmly away from St. Bernard, and towards another, more benign, critic of Abelard.

In Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14193, written well within the confines of the twelfth century, a scribe has copied out Abelard’s work, and his work alone, into a little booklet of the correspondence of Walter of Mortagne. The *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* immediately follows the only manuscript copy we have of Walter’s *Epistola ad Abaelardum*. In this letter Walter seeks from Abelard positive confirmation or denial of certain approaches to theology and certain doctrines which are said by pupils of Abelard to be those of their master, and which appear to be confirmed in Abelard’s *Liber theologiae*, a copy of the first part of which has come into Walter’s hands. In general Walter objects that Abelard should presume to put forward his own opinion rather than truth (opinionis nostrae sensus rather than veritas) and that he should have the arrogance or foolishness to pretend to know such impenetrable truths as the nature of the Trinity or the mode by which Christ was generated from, and the Holy Spirit proceeded from, the Father. The opinions which Walter picks out concern the local position of God, angels and souls, and, in particular, that (1) the Son should have less power than the Father, (2) Christ won no merit by his preaching, his conduct or even his death, and (3) no one ought to be rewarded or punished because of his good or evil deeds, but only because of his will (voluntas). Walter ends his letter by asking Abelard to preach openly (literally ‘from the roof-tops’), and to avoid enticing people with ‘hidden bread and the sweetness of unseen water’; and he urges Abelard to write back briefly telling him the truth about his beliefs. The *Confessio fidei 'Universis'* has been appended to this letter in ms. lat. 14193 as though the compiler of the little booklet considered it to be the response to Walter’s plea. Is there any internal evidence that Abelard himself intended it to be such?

Some resemblances between Walter’s letter and Abelard’s *Confessio* can be found. Abelard begins his *Confessio* by saying that ‘nothing is so well said that it cannot be twisted’, implying, one may presume, that pupils of his, such as those

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27 For the manuscripts of Walter’s correspondence see L. Ott, *Untersuchungen zur theologischer Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik* (BGPTM 34; Münster, 1937), pp. 142 ff.
with whom Walter had come into contact, might well have distorted his arguments. He objects to accusations of arrogance and denies categorically that he has used subterfuge in his teaching, quoting the very verse from Proverbs concerning hidden bread and secret water with which Walter ended his letter. Abelard admits that he has not been able to avoid reprehensio (which Walter warns him not to fall into) but he has spoken openly, and in many places. Moreover, he is confident that veritas (and thus, implicitly, not the opinio expressed in his teaching) frees him from guilt. As for the specific doctrines raised by Walter, that concerning the attribution of power especially (or properly) to the Father is mentioned in the Confessio, and it is accepted by modern scholars that Abelard made a revision to his Theologia 'scholarium' on the basis of Walter's criticism. Abelard's categorical denial in the Confessio that he believes that the Father is a full power, the Son is a certain power and the Holy Spirit is no power shows no particular influence of Walter's letter, but is a direct response to the condemned capitulum which heads almost all the lists of capitula held against Abelard in the period leading up to the Council of Sens. The other doctrines attributed by Walter to Abelard, however, have hardly been mentioned in recent scholarship. These are, as we have seen, that Christ won no merit by his deeds and conduct, and that, in general, rewards and punishments correspond not to deeds, but rather to the will. The second of these, although it is not couched in the same words as capitulum xiii of Capitula haeresum xix ('Quod propter opera nec melior nec peior efficiatur homo'), is reminiscent of certain arguments adduced in support of this capitulum (e.g., Capitula haeresum xiv has Abelard saying: 'Nec propter opera peior uel melior efficitur homo, nisi, dum operator, fortassis in aliquo eius uoluntas augmentetur'). The application of this doctrine to Christ, however, does not seem to have been brought up by any of Abelard's opponents except Walter. Moreover, it is precisely this application to Christ (alongside the more general

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29 St. Bernard, however, uses the same phrase in his accusations against Abelard in his Epistola 190 (see below, p. 132). Whether this suggests a connection between Walter's and St. Bernard's letters, or simply indicates that the phrase was well-known and the natural one to use in the context, needs to be investigated further.


31 Ostlender compares this with the statement in the Sententiae florianaenses (belonging to the 'school' of Abelard) that Christ could not be made better (melior) by God the Father, but that he could be made more blessed (beatior) (Sententiae florianaenses 39, ed. Ostlender, p. 19); however, no mention is made here of Christ's will or his deeds.

application) that is brought into Abelard’s defence in *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* xiii: ‘For not even when the soul of Christ puts its will into effect, ought it to be thought better as a result.’

The *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’*, therefore, appears to take up some specific points raised in Walter of Mortagne’s *Epistola ad Abaelardum*. It remains, of course, primarily a response to the *Capitula haeresum xix*. But one can perhaps see Abelard, who had earlier on taken Walter’s gentle criticisms seriously enough to introduce alterations to his *Theologia*, still remembering Walter’s words when he came to write his *Confessio*, and even, perhaps, sending Walter a personal copy of the *Confessio* which was subsequently included in the collection of Walter’s correspondence.

The reconstructed archetype for the whole manuscript tradition, which the manuscript including Walter’s letters resembles most closely, is marred by two conspicuous corruptions which suggest that no copyist had access to a properly finished text of the *Confessio*.

First, the order of the replies to the condemned capitula has been confused. What appears as the second paragraph of the reply to the capitulum in *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* vi should rather be added to the reply in section ix. Abelard is replying to the charge that he believed that sins committed in ignorance were free from blame. In its present position this reply interrupts two paragraphs concerning the power of God (to do other than He has done, and to prevent evil), whereas, appended to section ix it would complete the reply to capitulum x of *Capitula haeresum xix* which includes both the statement that those who crucified Christ in ignorance did not sin, and that nothing which is done in ignorance should be blameworthy. It is possible that the misplaced paragraph had been written in the margin of the ancestor of the archetype of the extant manuscripts and had been inserted erroneously into section vi because the words ‘multa ... facta ... sunt’ at the beginning of the marginal addition and the phrase *multa facere* in the reply in section vi suggested to the scribe a sequence of thought.

Another disturbance of order has occurred in *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* xiii. For the natural flow of the argument, the words ‘Non enim angelus ... melior inde reputari debuit’ should be removed from the position where they are found at present. In this way the application of the argument remains general (for all men) throughout; the change of subject from plural to singular is adequately

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33 The proposed order is supported by the order of capitula in *Capitula haeresum xix*: note the following correspondences: cap. 7 ‘Quod ea solummodo possit Deus facere ... non alio’ (=*Confessio* vi.1); cap. 8 ‘Quod Deus nec debeat nec possit mala impedire’ (=*Confessio* vii); cap. 9 ‘Quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, sed poenam tantum’ (=*Confessio* viii); cap. 10 ‘Quod non peccaverunt qui Christum ignorantes cruciferunt et quod non sit culpae describendum quidquid fit per ignorantiam’ (=*Confessio* ix + vii.2).
C. S. F. BURNETT

managed by the use of *quilibet*. The reference to angels and the soul of Christ not adding merit by their deeds cannot be accommodated where it is found at present, not only for reasons of syntax (what would the subject of *permanet* be?), but also for logical reasons; for in no way can angels or the soul of Christ be equally good as other men. The awkwardness of this passage as it stands appears to have led the scribe of the ancestor of tradition 8 and the scribe of O to juggle with the text in an attempt to make it lie better. It is reasonable to suppose that the clause ‘Non enim angelus ... melior inde reputari debuit’ was written in the margin, like the second half of section vi, and was inserted in the wrong place by the scribe of the archetype. The omission of the last phrase in the section in tradition 8 might be a further indication of the garbled state of a previous version of this section.

The picture that seems to be emerging is that Abelard wrote a *Confessio fidei* addressed to the church at large, to counter the list of nineteen capitula which were being circulated in order to discredit him before the Council of Sens. We do not have a ‘finished’ text of this work. What we have is a document which was perhaps written in haste, or, at least, not revised or corrected by its author after copying. Furthermore, the correspondences between the *Confessio fidei Universis* as we have it and the *Epistola ad Abaelardum* of Walter of Mortagne suggest that Abelard may have deliberately altered his text in order to cope with Walter’s letter as well as with the *Capitula haeresum xix*. For the most striking correspondence with Walter (the reference to Christ adding merits by his deeds) appears to have been a marginal addition.


The *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* is found in the following manuscripts.34

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<th>Manuscript</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 2923, s. xiii med./ex. (perhaps from the south of France), fols. 48v-49v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 1896, s. xiv (unknown provenance), fols. 192r-193r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale nouv. acq. lat. 1873, s. xv ex. (unknown provenance; Lord Guildford, then Phillipps 6217), fols. 215v-217r.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 532, s. xii (abbey of Anchin [O.S.B.], dioc. Arras), fols. 181r-183r.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 For fuller description of these manuscripts including the evidence for their dates and provenance, see D. E. Luscombe, J. Barrow and C. S. F. Burnett, ‘A Checklist of the Manuscripts Containing the Writings of Peter Abelard and Heloise and Other Works Closely Associated with Abelard and His School’, *Revue d’histoire des textes* 16 (1984-86) (forthcoming).
E = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 2545, s. xv/xvi (possibly the Nantes
codex owned by F. d'Amboise), fols. 56v-57v.

F = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 13057, s. xvi/xvii (abbey of Saint-

G = Cambrai, Bibliothèque Municipale 27, s. xii ex. (Cambrai Cathedral), fols.
187v-189r.

L = London, British Library Cotton Otho C.xiv, s. xiii (Westminster Abbey),
fols. 183v-185r.

I = Dublin, Trinity College 780 (D.3.10), s. xvii in. (Archbishop Ussher’s
notebook), fols. 13r-14r.

O = Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon. Pat. Lat. 171, s. xii (in Italy in the
Middle Ages), fols. 200v-201v (198v-199v old foliation).

P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14511, s. xii ex. (fols. 1-17) (at abbey of
St. Victor [regular canons], Paris, probably only after s. xvi in.), fol. 2r (end
only).

Q = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14193, s. xii (abbey of Saint-Germain-
des-Prés [O.S.B.], Paris), fols. 6v-7v.

R = Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Phillipps 1732, s. xii (at St. Denis,
Reims, in s. xv), fols. 144v-146v.

W = Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 998, s. xii ex. (abbey of
Göttingen [O.S.B., dioc. Passau], fols. 151r-v, 176v.

Y = Oxford, Bodleian Library Add. C. 271, s. xiv (at Cambrai in late s. xv),
fols. 84v-85v.

Three further Latin manuscripts are lost, but are the basis of the following
witnesses to the text:

fr = a French translation, copied in the hand of Gontier Col (c. 1350 - c. 1418),
but of uncertain authorship, is found in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale fr.
920, pp. 218-222.35

Du = the edition made by André Duchesne in D. Petri Abaelardi ... Opera (Paris,
1616), pp. 330-33 (d’Amboise reprints this edition on fol. *r-*ii* of his
publication).

T = the edition made independently by Bernard Tissier in Bibliotheca patrum
cisterciensium 4 (Bonnefontaine, 1662), pp. 259-61, from an unidentified
manuscript.

The Confessio fidei 'Universis' was also once in two manuscripts belonging to
the house of the regular Augustinian canons of St. Victor, which are given the

35 See C. Bozzolo, ‘L’humaniste Gontier Col et la traduction française des lettres d’Abélard et
together with the other Abelardian works in the same manuscript has been edited by F. Beggiato,
Le lettere di Abaelardo ed Eloisa nella traduzione di Jean de Meun, 2 vols. (Modena, 1977); ‘la
Confession d’Abaelart general et especial contre aucune articlez contre lui imposez’ is in 1.241-
46.
shelf marks p 13 and GGG 17 in the early sixteenth-century catalogue of the library of St. Victor by Claude de Grandrue. In the list of contents of ms. p 13 is included *Confessio petri abaelardi de eodem non completa* on fol. 57r. De Grandrue copied the same list of contents into ms. p 13 itself, and it can still be read on fol. 78r (fol. 90r in the old foliation) of Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14669, which bears the St. Victor class-mark p 13. Unfortunately, fols. 49-60 (old foliation), which would have included the *Confessio*, are now missing from the manuscript. In the case of ms. GGG 17 in de Grandrue’s catalogue, the manuscript has not been traced. The *Confessio* began on fol. 54r of the manuscript, and is described as *Epistola petri abaelardi contra calumnias quorundam capitulatorum sib* (sic) *obectorum*.


Amongst these witnesses to the text of the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* three traditions are clearly discernible on the evidence of the variant readings.

First, ABY belong together. They share the following divergent readings:

pr. 2 *fortassis, dolendis; v necnon; vii.2 est; viii contraxisse nos; xiv potest una personarum; xvii quo, tam* om. They are alone of the extant manuscripts in giving the work the title *Confessio Petri Abaelardi*. Most conspicuous is the fact that all three manuscripts give in the margin the text of the *capitula* to which Abelard is replying. This text corresponds closely to that of the most widespread tradition of the *Capitula haeresum xix*, and, since it is included in no other manuscript except (in a very different form) Q, one can presume that the scribe of the common exemplar from which ABY derive added these *capitula* himself. The *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* in ABY always follows the *Soliloquium* of Peter Abelard, which in turn is tagged onto the three letters of Berengar of Poitiers which include the *Apologia* for Abelard. Hence this tradition may be called the ‘Berengarian tradition’. Agreement of all three manuscripts in this tradition is indicated by the siglum β.

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37 *Confessio petri abaelardi (sic) de eodem hic non completa*.

38 A gives no title. The significance of Duchesne’s knowledge of the title *Confessio*, which he gives as an alternative to *Petri Abaelardi Apologia*, is discussed below.


To this tradition would appear to belong the French translation of the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’*. For this immediately follows a translation of the *Confessio fidei ad Heloissam*. It would appear that the translator took his text of this from Berengar’s *Apologia* since this is the only context in which the *Confessio fidei ad Heloissam* has survived in Latin. Moreover, textual evidence supports the assignment of the French version to this tradition: e.g., the title is *La confession*; in vi.2 the French *est* agrees with β’s divergent reading *erat* in place of *erat*; and in ep. 2 the French *venen* corresponds with the reading *veneno* in BY. To this Berengar tradition would also have belonged the text in the lost part of ms. p 13 of the abbey of St. Victor, which, according to the catalogue of Claude de Grandrue, was entitled *Confessio Petri Abelardi*, and followed at least two, if not all three of Berengar’s letters, including the *Apologia*. Finally, a manuscript belonging to this tradition was the source of a few alternative readings recorded in Duchesne’s edition, e.g.: the title *Petri Abaelardi Apologia seu fidei Confessio*; pr. 2 *forte, al. fortassis*; ep. 2 *nemo al. veneno*. This manuscript would most probably have been B, which is the manuscript used by Duchesne for his edition of Berengar’s letters and Abelard’s *Soliloquium*.

Within this tradition A gives the best readings. This manuscript is important because it was acquired by Petrarch who made extensive annotations in it. For the *Confessio*, however, Petrarch merely noted Abelard’s citations of Augustine and Cicero, near the beginning of the work. B and Y are closer to each other than to A. The Oxford manuscript was in Cambrai by 1471, but it bears no relationship to the twelfth-century Cambrai manuscript which is described below. In pr. 4 BY write *inquam* for *umquam*; in ii they omit *id*; in vi.2 they add *er* before *ille*; and in ep. 2 they write *veneno* for *nevo*. Occasionally a second hand in Y has tried to correct obvious mistakes in the text (thus eliding *non* in *necon* [vi.2] and deleting *tam* in xvii), without, it seems, having recourse to another exemplar.

The manuscripts of the β tradition attest to a humanist interest in the life of Abelard, which was also responsible for a proliferation of manuscripts of the personal correspondence between Abelard and Heloise. In the case of AY and the French translation, the Berengarian corpus has been wedded to the corpus of the personal correspondence itself. The unreliability of the readings in this tradition suggest that it is late, and all the manuscripts within this tradition could derive from one poor manuscript which included the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* dating from as late as the second half of the thirteenth century.

The second recognizable tradition is that of mss. CEF. Here the title (omitted in F)

\[\text{This manuscript gives the first words of the text as the title.}\]
capitulorum responsio. In all three manuscripts we find the same omissions, which occur frequently (e.g., of the words *quod*, *est*, *dico*, ep. 1 *cetera* and *vel*), the same transpositions of words (e.g., in vi, vii, x, xii and xiv), and common divergent readings (e.g., *consoiat*, *faciet*, vii *divertant*, xi *quippe*, xiii *meriti*, xvii *que moveant*, and ep. 2 *pietatem*, *nemo*, *ducis*). The principal manuscript which Duchesne used for his edition belongs to this tradition. His manuscript was very similar to F, which may well have been a copy prepared for Duchesne’s or d’Amboise’s use.\(^42\) Readings common to CEF and Duchesne are indicated by the siglum ε.

In all the manuscripts of this tradition the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* is included in a dossier of documents tagged onto a copy of the personal correspondence between Abelard and Heloise. All three manuscripts include Fulk of Deuil’s letter to Abelard, and CE also include a selection of documents concerning the Council of Sens and Abelard’s condemnation. The scribe of F seems to have been interested in Abelard’s relations with St. Bernard, for he includes Abelard’s letter to Bernard concerning the Lord’s Prayer (*Epistola 10*). However, the manuscripts of this tradition are all late (s. xv ex. - xvii in.) and the particular selection of documents they contain cannot be shown to derive from earlier collections. The text of the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* that they give is poor, as is that of the personal letters, and they all compound their common mistakes by adding errors of their own.\(^43\) It is regrettable that Duchesne chose a manuscript of this tradition for his edition, and included only a minimum of alternative readings from the slightly better β tradition.\(^44\)

Another manuscript which would have belonged to this tradition is the lost St. Victor GGG 17 which included the personal letters, the letter of Fulk of Deuil and some of St. Bernard’s letters condemning the teachings of Abelard.

Before we turn to the third group of closely related manuscripts it is appropriate to mention three manuscripts and a printed edition which each represent separate traditions.

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42 Note that a reader of the seventeenth century has indicated on fol. A’ that ‘Epistolae omnes hujusce codicis evulgata fuerunt ab Andrea Duchesne’ (Monfrin, p. 28).

43 For example, on five occasions C misses out entire lines.

44 The inadequacies of Duchesne’s edition were pointed out by J. Leclercq in his ‘Notes abélardiennes’, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 8-9 (1966-67) 59-62; see p. 60.

45 This would appear to be the Westminster Abbey manuscript mentioned in the catalogue of 1672 (J. A. Robinson and M. R. James, *The Manuscripts of Westminster Abbey* [Cambridge, 1909], p. 38).
century, so the lacunae in L can be supplied from ms. 1.\textsuperscript{46} The scribe of L occasionally omits words (pr. 2 per errorem and 3 meum est, 1 ego, 11 malitie, 14 quoque and assero, 13 tempus, ep. 2 Nolite iudicare ... condemnpabimini) or misinterprets an abbreviation (xiv Deinde for Deum). Other changes preserve the syntax and sense, and on the whole the scribe has produced an intelligent copy.

The text of Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 998 is written in the schrägoval style typical of Southeast Germany from the beginning of the eleventh until the end of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{47} This manuscript contains the only copy of the Confessio fidei 'Universis' definitely known to come from a Germanic milieu, and one is not surprised to find that its text is not close to that of any other manuscript of the Confessio. However, as has been pointed out above, the same scribe who inserted the Confessio into empty spaces in the manuscript also copied out a paragraph which corresponds to a passage from the Sententiae Petri Abaelardi, of which nine out of the twelve extant or lost manuscripts have a Germanic provenance. In one of these manuscripts (Cologne, Historisches Archiv der Stadt W137), the Sententiae appear, moreover, to be called Theologia Petri Baylard.\textsuperscript{48} This title corresponds to the title of the fragment in W (Petrus Abaelardus in theologia sua), while Abelard is called Baiolardus in the title of the Confessio in W.

Tissier's edition of the Confessio fidei 'Universis' is based on an unidentified manuscript. It is marred by so many obvious errors that little reliance can be placed on it. Since Buytaert has claimed that there are some 250 differences between the text of Tissier's edition of Thomas of Morigny's Disputatio and the Clairvaux manuscript of the work,\textsuperscript{49} it is quite probable that many of the errors in the Confessio fidei 'Universis' are due to Tissier rather than his exemplar.

Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon. Pat. Lat. 171 may represent a unique O Italian copy of the work. However, in spite of the fact that there is an

\textsuperscript{46} For information on ms. 1, I am much indebted to Bernard Meehan of the Department of Manuscripts, Trinity College Library, and to the unpublished catalogue of the Trinity College manuscripts by Marvin L. Colker.

\textsuperscript{47} See B. Bischoff, Paläographie des römischen Altertums und des abendländischen Mittelalters (Berlin, 1979), pp. 153-54, 170.

\textsuperscript{48} The hesitation here is due to the fact that the work referred to as Theologia Petri Baylard in the list of contents of the manuscript on fol. 1 has been excised from the manuscript and only a few words can be recovered from the remaining opening page of the text, which has itself been erased (fol. 179v). From a list of contents, however, on fol. 117v, and the evidence of the few words that can be read, it seems more likely (as Dr. Constant Mews has shown in correspondence) that the work is the Sententiae Petri Abaelardi rather than the Theologia 'scholarium' which has a similar incipit.

\textsuperscript{49} E. M. Buytaert, 'Thomas of Morigny and the Theologia 'scholarium' of Abelard',
inscription in Italian of the thirteenth or fourteenth century on fol. 1r, the manuscript may be an import, since the hand in which the entire manuscript has been written shows symptoms of the schrägoval style mentioned above. Also, as in W, of which O is roughly a contemporary, the Confessio fidei ‘Universis’ gives the impression of being added as an afterthought: in this case to fill up the last quire of the manuscript. For it bears no relationship to the contents of the rest of the manuscript, and is written in a different-coloured ink, apparently by the same scribe as the rest of the manuscript employing a different pen. O has a few mistakes peculiar to itself (e.g., pr. 1 ne and 2 exciata, xiii non before prepediatur [so contradicting the sense], ep. 2 delinquatur), and some possible readings which are not shared with any other manuscript (e.g., pr. 2 usquam for uspiam and 4 fratrum for fraterna, vi.1 fecit for facit and 2 addition of nostre after culpe).

We now come to the manuscripts which are most relevant for establishing the text of the Confessio fidei ‘Universis’: DRG, P and Q.

Of these, DRG form a group which might be called the ‘Northeast French’ group, from their known provenances, and agreement of all three manuscripts is indicated by the siglum δ. The readings distinctive of these manuscripts are as follows: pr. 4 integra; n sicut et patrem; iv trinam; v facilitas; x dicimus; xiii si added and nec in eo quod non operatur remaneat omitted (with T); ep. 1 theologie omitted (with CE);51 ep. 1 repperitur. Among the three manuscripts GR share the greatest number of variants. The oldest of these is Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Phillipps 1732 (= R), which was at the abbey of St. Denis, Reims, by the fifteenth century. The Douai manuscript comes from the Benedictine abbey of Anchin in the diocese of Arras, which has also preserved copies of Abelard’s Theologia ‘scholarium’ and Sic et non. Douai, Bibliothèque Municipale 532 (= D) consists of a selection of pastoral texts from a wide range of authorities including sermons of St. Bernard, compiled according to Leclercq by Galland of Rigny. The Confessio follows excerpts from Hildebert, Isidore, Gregory the Great and John Chrysostom, and is followed by an unidentified letter from ‘a certain brother to his friend’52 and a letter from Peter, prior of St. Jean, Sens, to Hatto, bishop of Troyes. Sermons of St. Bernard are also found in G, a slightly later manuscript from Cambrai, which was certainly at the Cathedral at an early date, but may not have originated there.53 This manuscript

50 Entirely works of St. Augustine and Pope Leo the Great.
51 The omission of theologie in CE seems to be an error occurring independently from the δ tradition.
53 For a full description of the contents of this manuscript see now E. R. Smits, ‘An Unedited
consists of a calendar, collects for the whole year, and, besides the sermons of Bernard, a miscellaneous collection of letters, amongst which the Confessio is to be found. Three of the letters are by Hildebert of Lavardin, and the fourth is a letter of a certain P. to Geoffrey of Lèves, bishop of Chartres, about the reform movement in the church. Almost all the texts in this manuscript are given only in fragments; the manuscript is a miscellaneous collection of assorted devotional literature probably selected at different times by the scribe himself.

In spite of the early dates of these three manuscripts, and the fact helpful for the editor, that they all belong to the same tradition, not one of them, nor their reconstructed archetype, can be thought to represent the original text of the Confessio. There are errors in the text. For example, in section ii, perhaps as a result of a two-stage corruption, *sic ex patre* has become *sicut et patrem*. In ep. 1 the title of Abelard's book has been omitted. Section xiii presents problems peculiar to itself which have been referred to above. But DRG show the same tampering with the intrusive middle clauses, and they all omit the final clause either because of homoeoteleuton, since two clauses end in *-neat*, or because a marginal addition to the text has been ignored. Nevertheless, in view of their early date it has seemed right to draw attention to the variant readings of these manuscripts in the first *apparatus criticus* which records *lectiones potiores*.

It is a pity that we have only the last few sentences of the Confessio fidei *Universis* in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14511 (= P), since the first seventeen folios of this manuscript are the remnant of what would have been, in all probability, a highly important early collection of Abelard's works. All that is left of this manuscript is a column of the Confessio, Abelard's *Sermo 14* (concerning the Lord's Prayer), and his commentaries on the Apostles' Creed and the Athanasian Creed. P would appear, from its script, to be an early manuscript of the Confessio. Where it was written before it came into the possession of the Canons of St. Victor, Paris, is unknown. Since it is not mentioned in Claude de Grandrue's early sixteenth-century catalogue, it was probably bound with the much later copy of Abelard's *Problemata Heloissae* and *Epistola 9* after that date. P does not clearly belong with any other manuscript of the Confessio, and has a curious reading of its own, which, while

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44 See pp. 119-20.

55 De Grandrue describes only the second half of this manuscript (fols. 18-50, s. xv in.) under the shelf mark GGG 19; see Ouy and Gerz-von Büren, *Le catalogue*, p. 347. Hence it is not possible to discover the contents of the lost portion of P as it is, say, for St. Victor p 13. The letter of St. Benedict and the list of works of St. Augustine given in a later hand on the fly-leaf of P do not appear to belong to the fragment containing Abelard's works.
making sense, appears to employ the word *caritas* once too often: ep. 2
*frater nam vestram caritatem exoro ne innocentiam meam ... infamie ne vo
respergendo in caritate delinquatis.*

Without doubt the manuscript which gives the best complete text is Paris,
Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14193 (= Q). This text stands closest to the
hypothetical archetype reconstructed from all the extant manuscripts of the
*Confessio fidei ‘Universis’*. Q, however, must be a copy of an earlier manuscript.
For, on occasion, the scribe has made a spelling mistake (e.g., pr. 2 *edicationem*
for *edificationem*, *satisfactionem*, ix *crucifixiores*, ep. 1 *concesserit* for *concluse-
rii*). The error in section x (quia tam for qui tamen) is more serious, and on the
few occasions when Q gives a different order of words from the main
manuscript traditions (in pr. 2 and 4, i, ii and iii) or omits a word (in pr. 2 and
ep. 2), one is inclined to believe that Q diverges from the archetype.

Q is a codex from the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Prés. It
consists of at least thirteen small manuscripts of different dates and contents. It
is as if a librarian of the abbey has gathered up miscellaneous leaflets and
fragments of manuscripts and bound them together to keep them tidy. The
manuscript which concerns us is the first in the codex, and consists of a mere
nine folios. The central folios (fols. 2r-7v) contain six doctrinal letters of Walter
of Mortagne and the *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’*, added to the last of these, all
written in the same hand. Surrounding these letters is a collection of poems,
including two longer poems by Petrus Pictor, written in three different hands,
which apparently have been added to the fly-leaves of this gathering of letters
after the letters themselves had been copied.\(^56\) The *Confessio fidei ‘Universis’* has
been copied immediately after Walter’s *Epistola ad Abaelardum*, and is written
out as a letter: i.e., without a title, and beginning with the *salutatio*. A much
later hand has added the words ‘Petri Abelardi’ in the margin opposite the
beginning of the letter. The scribe of the letters has inserted, after writing the
*Confessio*, the relevant *capitula* to which Abelard is replying. It seems that he
did not find these in his exemplar, but took them from elsewhere, presumably
from a copy of the *Capitula haeresum xix*, for he has squeezed them into the
text wherever he can, sometimes before Abelard’s reply, sometimes after, and,
while considerably abbreviating some of the *capitula*, he has left out the final
one altogether.\(^57\) In adding the *capitula* he has also numbered them in the

\(^{56}\) The most careful description of this manuscript (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14193,
fols. 1-9) is given by L. Van Acker in his *Petri Pictoris Carmina* (CCCM 25; Turnhout, 1972), pp.
xcvii-xcviii, cxii and 48. Van Acker shows that the original order of the folios was 1, 8, 2-7, 9,
and that a tenth folio has been torn out.

\(^{57}\) e.g., i ‘Contra primum capitulum quod tale est: quod filius sit quedam potentia, spiritus
sanctus nulla’ (abbreviated); ii ‘Contra quod filius solus sit ex substantia patris’ (corresponds with
tradition \(\beta\) against *Capitula haeresum xix* 2); iv ‘Contra quod Christus non sit tertia persona in
margin. That he did not, in all probability, find the capitula in his exemplar is supported by the fact that they are not included in any of the other manuscripts of the Confessio except those of the β tradition in which the Capitula haeresum xix have been copied more fully and carefully and independently from Q. Moreover, the scribe, whoever he was, appears to have taken upon himself the role of an editor; for the clarification of the doctrinal controversies exemplified in the Confessio by the addition of the capitula themselves shows the same tendency as the omission of the personal details in the address and valediction in the letters of Walter of Mortagne in this particular manuscript. The evidence that the arrangement of this manuscript gives for connecting the Confessio fidei Universis with Walter's circle has been discussed above.58

The archetype which can be reconstructed from the texts of the fifteen extant manuscripts of the Confessio fidei Universis was itself a flawed manuscript. In two places, as we have seen, it seems to have contained clumsily inserted marginalia. In another two places it evidently gave wrong readings. In pr. 3, within a quotation from Gregory the Great, an est appears to have been wrongly added; the resultant syntactical difficulties lead different scribes to adopt different solutions, and it was only with Duchesne (and the closely related ms. F) that the correct text of Gregory was restored. In viii a nos appears to have been omitted; for the infinitive contraxisse in direct statement demands an accusative subject, and the fact that nos was added in later traditions, but in different positions, suggests that it was lacking in the early tradition of the text.

Aside from correcting these two errors in the text, the edition which follows presents the hypothetical archetype of the extant manuscripts (see ψ in the stemma on p. 130 below). The edition is therefore based largely on the agreement of the best manuscripts, Q and DRG, and P as far as it goes. Wherever these manuscripts differ, their readings, together with those of the other manuscripts, are given in the first apparatus criticus and before the readings of other manuscripts. Often the cause of these differences is self-evident, being due to an obvious error of copying in one manuscript or another. However, where Q, DGR and P offer equally viable readings, those of Q have in principle been adopted, not only for the sake of consistency, but also because, taken as a whole, Q gives the most reliable text. Q has been examined in situ. Its orthography has been retained, but the punctuation is the editor’s own, and is meant primarily to make the syntax of the sentences clear. The capitula

58 See above, pp. 117-19.

trinitate’ (abbreviated); ix ‘Contra quod per ignorantiam non peccatum’ (first half of capitulum x omitted); xiv ‘Contra quod sapientia aut benignitas ad patrem non pertineat’; xvi ‘Contra quod anima Christi per se non descendit ad inferos’ (abbreviated); xv omitted. See Mews, ‘The Lists of Heresies’, 87-88, 108-10 for a full list of the variants in the capitula in Q.
P is not included because the portion of the text which it gives does not include the criteria which have been used in setting up this stemma.
included in Q have not been reproduced, since they do not appear to come from the archetype, as has been indicated.

The title presents a particular problem, since none is given in Q. D gives Apologia Petri Abailardi, which is the title added by Jacques Sirmond in R. This accurately describes the nature of the letter, but is liable to lead to confusion with the longer Apologia addressed by Abelard to St. Bernard. The titles Excusatio and Confessio also occur. Most manuscripts, however, give Responsio (or Epistola) Petri Abaelardi contra calumnias obiectorum capitula-rum, or some variant of this. As a letter the Confessio would not have been given a title by its author, and different scribes have described the nature of the letter in different ways. I have, therefore, followed Q in not giving a title in the edition itself, and followed convention in referring to the work as the Confessio fidei 'Universis' elsewhere.

The apparatus fontium gives parallels in other works of Peter Abelard and sources and parallels from works other than those of Abelard. In the first instance it is not our intention to draw up passages from the works of Abelard which would support or deny the propositions in the capitula; this has been done elsewhere,59 and the reader can also find concordances for the enunciation of the capitula themselves in other publications.60

The variants in the first apparatus criticus are more useful for illustrating the history of the text rather than for establishing the text of the archetype. The variant readings in all the manuscripts except Dublin, Trinity College 780 (D.3.10) in that it is a direct copy of London, British Library Cotton Otho C.xiv are given in full. The minor errors in Q and DRG are given in the second apparatus criticus. The variant readings are given in roughly the chronological order of the manuscripts, while manuscripts belonging to the same tradition are grouped together.

It remains to thank very warmly the librarians who have provided microfilms of the manuscripts containing the Confessio fidei 'Universis' and the hospitality afforded by the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, the British Library, and the Bodleian Library, where I was able to consult the manuscripts in situ. Finally I would like to express my debt to David Luscombe, the late Neil Ker, Julia Barrow, Bob Moore, Edmé Smits and Constant Mews for their unfailing help and encouragement. This research has been made possible by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.

59 See Luscombe, pp. 102-42.
60 Comparisons between the different sets of capitula have been set out by W. Meyer in 'Die Anklagesätze des hl. Bernard gegen Abälard', Nachrichten der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philol.-hist. Klasse 4 (1898) 379-468, by C. Ottaviano, 'Appunti abelardiani', Rivista di cultura 16 (1930) 343-55 and by Buytaert 2.458-60, 468-69. For a revised account see Mews, 'The Lists of Heresies'.
UNIVERSIS ECCLESIE SANCTE FILIIS
PETRUS EX EIS UNUS SED IN EIS MINIMUS

Praefatio 1 Notum proverbium est, nichil tam bene dictum quin possit depravari, et, ut beatus meminit Ieronimus, ‘qui multos scribit libros, multos sumit iudices’. Ego quoque cum scripserim pauca, vel. ad comparationem aliorum, nulla, reprehensionis notam effugere non potui; cum tamen in his de quibus graviter accusor, nullam, sciat deus, meam recognoscam culpam, nec si qua fuerit, procaciter defendam. 2 Scripsi fortassis aliqua per errorem que non oportuit, sed deum testem et iudicem in animam meam invoco quia in his de quibus accusor, nichil per superbiam aut per malitiam presumpsui. Multa in scolis multis locutus sum, nec umquam aquas furtivas vel panem absconditum

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habuit mea doctrina. Palam locutus sum ad edificationem fidei sive morum, quod michi salubre visum fuit, et quicumque scripsi libenter omnibus exposui, ut eos iudices non discipulos haberem. Quod si uspiam per multiloquium excessi—ut scriptum est: in multiloquio non effugies peccatum—numquam importuna defensio me effecit hereticum, paratum semper ad satisfactionem de maledictis meis corrigendis sive delendis. In quo certe proposito usque in finem perseverabo. 3 Sed, sicut meum est maledicta mea si qua sunt velle corrigere, sic crimina non recte michi objecta propulsare me convenit. Cum enim beatus dicit Augustinus 'crudelis est qui famam suam negligit', ac, iuxta Tullium, 20 'taciturnitas imitatur confessionem', conscriptis contra me capitulis equum duxi respondere, ea videlicet ratione servata qua contra derogantium linguas beatus Gregorius fideles his instruit verbis: 'Sciendum est quia linguas detrahentium sicut nostro studio non debemus excitare, ne ipsi pereant, ita per suam malitiam excitatas debemus equanimiter tolerare, ut nobis meritum crescat; aliquando autem etiam compescere, ne, dum de nobis mala disseminant, eorum qui audire nos ad bona poterant, corda innocentium corrumpant'. 4 Agnoscat igitur

fraterna caritas me, qualemcumque filium ecclesie, cum ipsa integre cuncta
recipere que recipit, cuncta respuere que respuit, nec me unquam unita/tem
fidei scidisse, quamvis impar ceteris sim morum qualitate.

I Quod igitur michi vel per malitiam vel per errorem impositum est, quod
de deo scripserim quia pater est plena potentia, filius quedam potentia, spiritus
sanctus nulla potentia, hec ego verba non tam humana quam diabolica, sicut
justissimum est, abhorreo, detestor, et ea cum auctore suo pariter damno. Que
si quis in meis repperiat scriptis, non solum me hereticum, verum etiam
heresiarchem profiteor.

II Tam filium quam spiritum sanctum sic ex patre profiteor esse ut eiusdem
sint cum patre substantie, eiusdem penitut voluntatis atque potentie, quia
quorum est / eadem omnino substantia vel essentia, nulla potest esse vel
voluntatis diversitas vel potentie inequalitas. Quisquis autem me scripsisse
asserit quod de substantia patris spiritus etiam sanctus non sit, malitie id vel
ignorantie maxime fuit.

I 4-6 Que si ... heresiarchem profiteor: cf. Abael., Apologia 5 (ed. Buytaert, 1.362): 'Profer
scriptum si potes, et me convinces haereticum....'

II 1-4 Tam filium ... inequalitas: cf. Abael., Apologia 16 (ed. Buytaert, 1.366): 'Cui primum
respondeo me plane asserere in eodem libro (cf. isch 26-27 [ed. Buytaert, 2.411-12]), ubi te
reputas hoc reperire, Patrem, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum eiusdem penitut
esse substantiae vel essentiae, siue eamdem omnino substantiam esse vel
essentiam, et tam Filium quam Spiritum Sanctum de Patre esse....'

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28 integra δ 29-30 fidei unitatem DQ 30 ceteris sim] sim ceteris ΔT: ceteris ε
28 5 per errorem vel per malitiam Q: per malitiam ε 2 est om. DG ε 4 Quel Quod
bc μ 5 scriptis] libris QW 6 heresiarchem sic Q: -cham cett. codd.
29 1 sic ex patre] sicut et patrem δ: sicut ex patre L: ex patre T ε profiteor DG
3 vel] om. Ω 5 me scripsisse] scripsisse me Q 5 etiam sanctus] sanctus etiam ΔO: sanctus
WB
III Solum filium dei incarnatum profiteor ut nos a servitute peccati et a iugo diaboli liberaret et superne aditum vite morte sua nobis reseraret.

IV Iesum Christum sicut verum et unicum dei filium, ex substantia patris ante secula genitum, ita tertiam in trinitate personam, spiritum quoque sanctum tam ab ipso filio quam a patre procedentem, et credens assero et asserens credo.

V Gratiam dei ita omnibus necessariam dico ut nec nature facultas nec arbitrii libertas sine illa sufficere possit ad salutem. Ipsa quippe gratia nos prevenit ut velimus, ipsa subsequitur ut possimus, ipsa nos conservat ut perseveremus.

VI 1 Deum ea solummodo facere posse credo que ipsum facere convenit, et quod multa facere posset que numquam facit. 2 Multa quoque per ignorantiam facta culpe sunt adscribenda, maxime cum per negligentiam nostram contingit nos ignorare quod nobis necessarium erat prenoss. Qualis ille fuit de quo psalmista dicit: noluit intelligere ut bene ageret.

VII Mala deum frequenter impedire fato, quia non solum effectum malignantium prevenit ne quod volunt possint, verum etiam voluntates eorum immutat ut a male quod cogitaverant / penitus desistant.
VIII Ex Adam in quo omnes peccavimus tam culpam quam penam nos contraxisse assero, quia illius peccatum nostrorum quoque peccatorum omnium origo extitit atque causa.

IX Crucifixiores Christi in ipsa eius crucifixione gravissimum peccatum fatoer commississe.

X Multa de Christo dicuntur que non tam secundum ipsum caput quam secundum corpus ipsius quod est ecclesia sunt accipienda, ut ille spiritus timoris qui est initium sapientie, quem videlicet timorem perfecta caritas foras mittit. Huius ergo timoris spiritum in anima Christi que perfectissimam habuit caritatem numquam fuisse credendum est, qui tamen inferioribus eius membris non deest. Tante quiippe perfectionis et tante securitatis anima illa extitit per ipsam verbi unionem ut sciret nichil omnino se posse committere unde penas incurreret vel deum ofenderet.

XI Castum vero timorem in seculum seculi permanentem qui proprie reverentia caritatis dicitur, tam ipsi anime Christi quam electis angelis et hominibus semper inesse recognosco. Unde et de ipsis supernis / spiritibus scriptum est: ‘adorant dominationes, tremunt potestates’.

VIII 1 Ex Adam in quo omnes peccavimus: cf. Rom 5:12.
X 2 corpus ... quod est ecclesia: Col 1:24. 2-3 timoris ... initium sapientie: Eccli 1:16.
3 timorem ... mittit 1 Jo 4:18.

VIII 1 nos] post contraxisse β: om. QBDOL
5 qui] quia Q tamen] tam QBY 7 penam δOWL

VIII 2 post quia add. et L illa Y peccatum] peccatorum E quoque om. LT 2-3 omnium peccatorum T 3 causa] eam B
IX capitulum deest in W 1 Crucifixiores Q ipsa om. T eius om. ε eius ... X 1 dicuntur om. C
XII Potestatem ligandi et solvendi successoribus omnibus apostolorum eque ut ipsis apostolis concessam esse profiteor, et tam indignis quam dignis episcopis, quambdi eos ecclesia susceperit.

XIII Omnes in dilectione dei et proximi equales equaliter bonos esse confiteor et meritis pares, nec quicquam meriti apud deum deperire si bone voluntatis affectus in suo preponderati effectu. Non enim angelus cum a deo missus id quod facere vult impleverit, aut / anima Christi sue voluntati effectum addiderit, melior inde reputari debuit, sed eque quilibet bonus 5 permanet, sive operandi tempus habeat sive non, dummodo equalem bene operandi voluntatem teneat, nec in eo quod non operatur remaneat.

XIV Deum patrem eque sapientem ut filium, eque benignum ut spiritum sanctum profiteor, quia in nulla boni plenitudine, in nulla dignitatis gloria, differre una personarum potest ab alia.

XV Adventum filii in finem seculi posse attribui patri, numquam, sciat deus, in mentem meam venit, nec se verbis meis inseruit.

XVI Sic et animam Christi non per se ad inferos descendisse sed per potentiam, omnino a verbis meis et sensu remotum est.

XIII 4-5 anima Christi... debuit: cf. Gualterium de Mauritania, Epistola ad Abaelardum (ed. Ostlender, p. 40): 'Praeterea apud nos ventilatum est vestram afiirmare sapientiam, quod Christus praedicando, laborando, ad extremum moriendo nihil meriterit, et quod nemo propter opera sua bona vel mala nisi pro sola voluntate remunerari debeat vel puniri.'
Novissimum quoque capitulum, quod scripsisse criminor quod neque opus neque voluntas neque concupiscencia neque delectatio que movet eam, peccatum sit, nec debemus eam velle extingui, non minus a meis tam dictis quam scriptis alienum est.

Epilogus 1 Quod autem capitula contra me scripta tali fine amicus noster concluserit ut diceret: hec autem capitula partim in libro theologie magistri Petri, partim in libro sententiarum eiusdem, partim in libro cuius titulus est Scito te ipsum reperta sunt, non sine admiratione maxima suscepi, cum nusquam liber aliquis qui sententiarum dicatur a me scriptus repperiatur. Sed sicut cetera contra me capitula...ita et hoc quoque vel per malitiam vel per ignorantiam prolatum est. 2 Si qua igitur consolatio in Christo Iesu, si qua visceram pietatis, fraternam caritatem vestram exoro ne innocentiam meam, quam a culpa veritas liberat, infamie nevo respergendo delinquat. Caritatis quippe est obprobrium non accipere adversus proximum, et que dubia sunt in meliorem partem interpretari, et illam semper dominice pietatis sententiam attendere: Nolite iudicare et non iudicabimini, nolite condemnpnare et non condempnabimini.

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THE text here edited, namely, the 'Translatio s. Mildrethe uirginis cum miraculorum attestatione', has been used as a source by medieval and

* I am grateful to the Keeper of Manuscripts in the British Library, London, for permission to publish this text and to Mr. Richard Emms for his help in commenting on an earlier draft of my edition. Dr. Michael Lapidge has greatly improved, and substantially contributed to, the section on style, as has Professor P. D. A. Harvey to the description of the manuscripts; I am grateful to both of them.

The following abbreviations have been used throughout the article:


BHL = Bibliotheca hagiographica latina antiquae et mediae aetatis, ed. Société des Bollandistes, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1898-1901)


GR = Ordnance Survey, National Grid Reference


HSAC = Thomas of Elmham, Historia monasterii s. Augustini cantuariensis, ed. C. Hardwick (RS 8; London, 1858)


Sawyer = P. H. Sawyer, Anglo-Saxon Charters: An Annotated List and Bibliography (London, 1968) (numbers cited refer to numbers assigned to charters in this work)

modern writers but it has never been published.\textsuperscript{1} It is important in a variety of ways to students of eleventh-century history, hagiography and Latinity. First, it is a firmly attributed work of the Flemish hagiographer Goscelin, who appears to have been a prolific writer of accounts of English saints, including a \textit{uita} of Mildrith (whose translation and miracles are described in the present text) and a polemical tract concerning the whereabouts of her relics, the ‘Libellus contra inanes s. virginis Mildrethe usurpatores’ (\textit{BHL} 5962).\textsuperscript{2} Secondly, it contains information not otherwise available about the important early Kentish abbey of Minster-in-Thanet and about the city of Canterbury and in particular the extramural abbey of St. Augustine. Thirdly, it provides material for studying the cult of Mildrith, an eighth-century abbess of Minster, at a period when English saints’ cults were being affected by the changes in the English Church associated with an influx of ecclesiastics trained in Normandy and elsewhere on the Continent.

I

GOSCELIN OF CANTERBURY

Evidence for attributing the present text to Goscelin is indirect but firm. A contemporary note in the eleventh- or twelfth-century manuscript, Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 312, attributes the ‘Liber amplior (historia maior) de adventu beatissimi Anglorum apostoli Augustini sociorumque eius in Britannia’ (\textit{BHL} 777) to Goscelin. At the finish of this work, Goscelin stated that he intended to supplement the ‘Liber amplior’ with a collection of posthumous miracles. This was evidently done for the collection appears to be extant under the title ‘Historia maior de miraculis s. Augustini’ (\textit{BHL} 779). In this composition Goscelin referred to the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’ as his own work.\textsuperscript{3} He must have written the latter in the period 1087-91 since he made no allusion to the translation of Mildrith’s relics in 1091 to the chapel of the Holy Innocents in the then newly constructed abbey-church of St. Augustine, yet he referred to Abbot Scotland’s death which occurred in 1087.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} It was used extensively by William Thorne and Thomas of Elmham. See \textit{Scriptores}, cols. 1908-10, and \textit{HSAC}, pp. 220-22 and 224-25. In the modern period, it has been referred to in, for example, \textit{ASE}, p. 426 and n. 2, and F. Barlow, ‘Two Notes: Cnut’s Second Pilgrimage and Queen Emma’s Disgrace in 1043’, \textit{English Historical Review} 73 (1958) 649-56.

\textsuperscript{2} See below. The \textit{uita} is printed in \textit{ML}, pp. 105-43, the ‘Contra usurpatores’ in \textit{HP}, pp. 68-96.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{ML}, pp. 20-21; and, for the texts, \textit{Acta sanctorum Mai.} 6.395 and \textit{Acta sanctorum Ordinis Sancti Benedicti}, ed. J. Mabillon, 9 vols. (Venice, 1733), 1.525. This argument is based on T. J. Hamilton, \textit{Goscelin of Canterbury: A Critical Study of His Life, Works and Accomplishments} (Diss. University of Virginia, 1973). My debt to this work is great and I wish to express my thanks to the author for his permission to use it.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{ML}, p. 20 and below, p. 207.
Goscelin's literary output is important for two reasons. First, he seems to have been among the most prolific writers of eleventh-century England, producing chiefly hagiographies but also the polemical 'Contra usurpatores' referred to above and the devotional text known as the 'Liber confortatorius'. The full extent of his œuvre is disputed but he certainly wrote uitaes for the abbeys of Wilton, Sherborne, Barking, Ely and Ramsey before settling at St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury. Secondly, his literary abilities represent an aspect of the influence of Continental scholarship on later Anglo-Saxon England for, originally a monk of Saint-Bertin in Flanders, he came to England in the early 1060s to become a member of the household of the Lotharingian bishop, Herman of Ramsbury. His skills were highly prized in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries as shown not only by the demand for his services but also by the comments of other writers. Reginald of Canterbury described him as a 'rhetor and grammarian, a dear friend of the muses'; and William of Malmesbury extolled his 'distinguished skill in letters and in singing' and rated him second only to Bede as a hagiographer of English saints.

Goscelin's style therefore merits attention in any study of the development of Latin writing in England. Its most notable feature is its extensive use of figurative writing. Goscelin sometimes uses whole phrases in this way. For example, he refers to the nuns of Minster-in-Thanet in the face of Viking attack standing as 'Christiane Amazones contra demonum castra' (i); to the fluctuating fortunes of Minster-in-Thanet as the waxing and waning of the moon (iv); to the abbey as the 'uinea Domini' and to the Lord as the vintager (ii); to Cnut as the Good Samaritan and his accession as a 'serenitatis aura' (vi); and to Ælfstan, the abbot who translated Mildrith's relics, as acting 'ut auarus auri ac gemmarum' (xiv). In many cases, however, the imagery is inherent in Goscelin's vocabulary itself and the reader is given no clue that an image is being invoked. Thus Goscelin uses the word plantationes to mean the


7 In what follows, I rely heavily on Hamilton, Goscelin, pp. 375-414. For the section on Goscelin's vocabulary, I am entirely dependent on the generous assistance of Dr. Michael Lapidge. Errors are, of course, my own. The Roman numerals in parentheses refer to chapters of the text edited below on pp. 156-210.
community of Minster (ii), tentoria (presumably with Biblical overtones) to refer to the property of the Church (vi), consulares to signify the saints of St. Augustine's Abbey (xvi), lampades to signify Mildrith's virtues and so on (xiii). Certain of these usages have military overtones, perhaps derived from a reading of classical authors. Into this category come the use of contubernium to refer to a monastic community (xxxvi), classicum to refer to a peal of bells (xx) and the verb librare (usually used of spears) to describe the hoisting of sails (xi). Others are more domestic, such as references to the Church as beehives (aluearia) and its members as swarms of bees (apum examina [xxx]). Some figurative usages in Goscelin's work were common to many other medieval writers: tripudium to mean 'joy', for example (xix), and pignus to mean 'relics' (although Goscelin also uses it in the present text to mean 'child' [i, xiii, xvi]). The sheer profusion of imagery in Goscelin's work, however, does seem to set it apart.

Goscelin's writing was further enriched by the use of classical and, more often, Biblical quotations, sometimes presented as such but usually adapted and absorbed into Goscelin's own sentences. Mildrith's shrine, for example, is said to have been borne 'euangelice quaterno humero', an allusion to the story of the paralytic carried to Christ by four men (xiv). In a similar fashion, Goscelin's description of Cnut's peril in a storm at sea is heavy with adapted usages from Virgil's Aeneid (xi).

As we could surmise from his easy and fluent use of classical allusion, Goscelin was evidently a man of extensive and thorough Latin training. He has an exceptionally wide vocabulary. In common with many Anglo-Latin authors of the tenth and eleventh centuries, Goscelin made extensive use of recondite and often obscure words and unusual usages, although it must be stressed that his inclination to such words was not as pronounced as in an author like Frithegod or Byrhtferth. In the present text one might note Goscelin's use of masculine agentive nouns in -tor: castigator (xxi), conspector (xxi), contemplator (xxi), dilapidator (xviii), dissuasor (xxi), excitator (xxv), expugnator (xxiii), orationator (xxi), somniator (viii, xxii), and uiolator (xxiii). Corresponding to these masculine nouns is a series of unusual feminine agentive nouns in -trix (used for the most part to describe Mildrith herself): castigatrix (xxxvii), certatrix (xxxvii), coadiutrix (xi), curatrix (xxiv, xxxi), ductrix (xxxii), fautiatrix (xxx), insidiatrix (xviii), liberatrix (xxiii), miseratrix (xxv), meritrix (xxvi), protectrix (xxvi) and sanatrix (xvii, xxix, xxx, xxxvi). Grecisms, which are common in tenth-century Anglo-Latin writing, are not frequent in Goscelin, but he does employ the following: apoteca (xiv, xxxv), basileus (x), extasis (xxi),

fantasma (xxi), ierarcha (xxi), ierarchia (xxii), monarchia (vi, xi), mysteriar
ches (xxi), symmista (xxxv), thimiamata (xiv) and tyrannis (xxv, xxxvii). Alongside these grecisms Goscelin also uses several words which might be described as grecizing formations: agonizare (xxviii), chorizare (xxxvi) and somnista (xxix). Goscelin also resorted, not infrequently, to neologism.\footnote{Examples include: orationator, ‘one who prays’ (xxi); chorizare, ‘to sing in choir’ (xxxvi); somnista, ‘sleeper’ (xxix); and calualura, ‘baldness’ (xxi).} Compound adjectives are widely used and give Goscelin’s prose an especially ornate character (his use of such words, common in poetry, enhances the figurative aspect of his prose mentioned above). Examples include: almifluus (xxvii), aurotextus (xvi), Deiferus (xxxvii), dulcifluus (xvi), dulcimodus (xxvi), largifluus (xxxiii), laudisonus (xvi), lucifluus (xxx), magnidicus (vii), mellifluus (xxx), nardifluus (xiv), opiferus (xxviii), regificus (xxi), saluificus (xxxvii), saluiferus (xxxvii) and soliferus (v). Compound nouns include psalmidicus (v) and uatidicus (xxx).

Words which are peculiar to medieval Latin writing do occur but they are not used on a large scale and are often employed in specialised ways. Examples include: argenteus, ‘silver coin’ (xxii); birrus, ‘cloak’ (xix); cambutta, ‘crutch’ (xxiv); conducticius, ‘hired’ (xxiii); fasciamentum, ‘cloth’ (xxii); ierarcha, ‘ecclesiastic’ (xxi); indutiatus, ‘legally delayed’ (ix); manica, ‘sleeve’ (xxii); resolido, ‘rebuild’ (ix); tegna, ‘tricks’ (ix); theatrum, ‘spectacle’ (xix); and theoricus, ‘contemplative’ (xxi).\footnote{Cf. RMLWL s.v.} Spellings such as extimplo for extemplo (xi) and nauim for nauem (v) also reflect medieval usage.

Goscelin’s syntax is generally sound and his sentences, although often composed of numerous clauses, are fundamentally simple in construction, avoiding, for example, the potential difficulty of indirect speech. Many passages in the present text, however, have been made markedly rhetorical by the use of such devices as alliteration, rhymed prose and climactic use of synonymous phrases and clauses. A good example is the passage describing the degradation of Emma, Cnut’s widow (xviii):


The effect is to heighten further the involved and ornamented character of the prose and, perhaps, to make it more impressive to the Continental churchmen who came to dominate the English Church in the second half of the eleventh century.
II

St. Mildrith and Minster-in-Thanet

According to a tradition which may well be authentic and which Goscelin himself relayed in his ‘Vita Mildrethe’, Minster-in-Thanet was founded when Egbert, king of Kent (664-673), granted land on the Isle of Thanet to the Kentish princess Domne Eafe, who became the first abbess.\(^{11}\) She was succeeded by her daughter Mildrith, who was in turn succeeded by Eadburg, who translated Mildrith’s relics to a newly constructed second church at Minster. For the subsequent history of the abbey, the present text is the earliest source, although a series of probably authentic charters also provides some information.\(^{12}\)

Minster seems to have been an important abbey in the independent kingdom of Kent and its estates were certainly highly prized by the community of St. Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury, which obtained them and the relics of St. Mildrith in the early eleventh century, as the present text describes. Minster became a grange of that abbey and was clearly a valuable source of income.\(^{13}\)

The precise reasons for Mildrith’s veneration as a saint are obscure, as is so often the case with saints created before the advent of papal canonisation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. She is said to have survived an attempt to incinerate her, to have calmed a storm at sea and to have enjoyed various visions; her body is said to have been undecayed when translated by Eadburg.\(^{14}\) But it is difficult to see what lies behind these accounts or why such beliefs should have been current about Mildrith rather than about her mother or her successors.

III

The Cult of St. Mildrith in the Eleventh Century

The present text has three components: chapters 1-5 are chiefly a history of Minster-in-Thanet; chapters 6-17 are a *translatio* describing the involved circumstances of Mildrith’s translation in 1035 from Minster to St. Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury; and chapters 18-37 are a collection of *miracula* which allegedly occurred in the course of the eleventh century through Mildrith’s intercession. These *miracula* do not represent an ongoing register of miracles;

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\(^{11}\) The history of Minster-in-Thanet and the legends surrounding it are discussed fully in *ML*.

\(^{12}\) For the charters, see below, text-note 65.


\(^{14}\) *ML*, pp. 11-13. The chief source for these accounts is the ‘Vita Mildrethe’, printed in *ML*, pp. 105-43.
rather they have been assembled by Goscelin from various sources and have been arranged in a literary fashion to give maximum effect.

The light cast on St. Mildrith’s cult in eleventh-century Canterbury (and on Goscelin’s attitude to it) is considerable. Among the important points arising from the present text are the following. First, it is striking that the miracula enable us to reconstruct the fortunes of the cult through the period of the Norman Conquest. It appears to have been flourishing in the pre-Conquest period and to have won enthusiastic acceptance from the new Norman abbots of St. Augustine’s, Scotland and his successor Wido.15 The present text is thus evidence relating to the influences of purely English practices and traditions on the Anglo-Norman Church, a process observable also, for example, in the evolving attitudes of Lanfranc and Anselm to the Anglo-Saxon heritage.16

Secondly, Goscelin’s work makes it very clear that he envisaged a close link between Mildrith’s relics and the liturgy of St. Augustine’s Abbey. He describes how Abbot Ælfstan and his party were unable to open Mildrith’s tomb at Minster-in-Thanet until they had promised that exceptional devotions should be paid to the saint at their abbey, and Goscelin goes out of his way to emphasise that this promise was kept.17

Thirdly, the link between the cult of Mildrith and the possession of her erstwhile lands was also strong. The present text describes how Wulfric, abbot of St. Augustine’s Abbey, habitually celebrated Mildrith’s feast at Minster. No doubt it was appropriate for the abbot of the monastery which possessed Mildrith’s relics to honour the site associated with her in this way, but we may suspect that Wulfric’s practice was also intended as a symbolic representation of the bonds between St. Augustine’s Abbey’s tenants on Thanet and their monastic overlord. The alternation of miracles between Thanet and Canterbury was presumably also intended to emphasise links which were territorial as well as spiritual.18

Finally, the present text is an example of the narrowness of the divide between historiography and hagiography.19 By careful reconstruction of the early history of Minster and by references to ancient charters and other sources, Goscelin was in effect using historical methods to establish the credentials of the

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15 The miracles described in chapters 18, 19 and 30 clearly belong to the pre-Conquest period. Scotland’s attitude emerges from chapter 36, Wido’s from the fact that he translated Mildrith’s relics (see above, p. 140).


17 ML, p. 66, and chapters 13, 17 and 20 below.

18 ML, pp. 66-67, and chapters 19-37 below.

relics possessed by St. Augustine’s Abbey. That this was necessary was shown by the bitter and long-lived dispute which broke out when the canons of St. Gregory’s Priory, Canterbury, began to claim publicly that they possessed the true relics of St. Mildrith, a claim which led Goscelin to write his ‘Contra usurpatores’. This text sought to refute the claim partly by historical argument and partly by descriptions of pertinent miracles. One of the latter is found in two manuscripts of the present text and may have been taken over from the ‘Contra usurpatores’.

IV

Manuscripts

The ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’ is preserved in the following manuscripts. All of them have been consulted and the sigla here assigned to them correspond to those used in the notes to the text.


N. R. Ker has analysed this manuscript palaeographically and shown that it was written in three kinds of script: ‘a purely English hand like that of the missal written at St. Augustine’s in the last decade of the eleventh century’; a script of the type developed at Christ Church, Canterbury, at the end of the eleventh century and used until the mid-twelfth century; and a ‘mixed’ script combining features of these two. The palaeographical evidence shows that the book was written at Canterbury or Rochester and, although precise dating is impossible, it points to a date in the late eleventh or early twelfth century. Study of the illuminated initials of the manuscript has provided evidence in favour of a Canterbury provenance. C. R. Dodwell has regarded them as representative of the ‘Canterbury School’ and suggested a date between 1100 and 1130. An ex libris inscription on fol. 1r shows that the book belonged to St. Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury, and its contents make it virtually certain that it was also produced there. The contents are as follows:

20 ML, pp. 62-64, and HP.
21 See below, chapter 35 and notes.
22 N. R. Ker, English Manuscripts in the Century after the Norman Conquest (Oxford, 1960), pp. 27, 29, 30 and pl. 11. Fol. 166r, the first page of the present text, is reproduced in E. M. Thompson et al., eds., The New Palaeographical Society. Facsimiles of Ancient Manuscripts, etc., First Series, 2 (London, 1903-12), pl. 85, where it is incorrectly described as the first page of the ‘Vita Mildrethe’. The editors regarded its script as typical of St. Augustine’s Abbey in the period 1100-25.
23 The Canterbury School of Illumination, 1066-1200 (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 28 and 123.
24 It does not, however, appear in the medieval catalogue of the abbey’s books. On this and the ex libris inscription, see M. R. James, The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover (Cambridge, 1903), pp. 519 and 531.
(1) fol. 2r-v: ‘Bulla plumbea’ of St. Augustine (CS 7; Sawyer 1244)²⁵
(2) fols. 3r-18v: ‘Historia minor de vita s. Augustini’ (BHL 778)
(3) fols. 18v-23v: ‘Historia minor de miraculis s. Augustini’ (BHL 780)
(4) fols. 26r-60r: ‘Liber amplior (Historia maior) de aduentu beatissimi Anglorum apostoli Augustini sociorumque eius in Britannia’ (BHL 777)
(5) fols. 61r-85v: ‘Historia maior de miraculis s. Augustini’ (BHL 779)
(6) fols. 86r-93v: ‘Sermo in festiuitate s. Augustini’
(7) fols. 93v-141v: ‘Historia translationis s. Augustini’ (BHL 781)
(8) fols. 143r-166r: ‘Vita s. Mildrethe virginis’ (BHL 5960)
(9) fols. 166r-196v: the text here edited (BHL 5961/4)
(10) fols. 197r-248v: hagiographical works concerning the archbishops Laurence (fols. 197r-203r, BHL 4741), Mellitus (fols. 203v-212r, BHL 5896), Justus (fols. 214r-217r, BHL 4601), Honorius (fols. 217r-220r),²⁶ Deusdedit (fols. 220r-221v, BHL 2153), Theodore (fols. 222r-231r, BHL 8083) and Abbot Adrian (fols. 233r-248v, BHL 3740 and 3742)
(11) fols. 251v-259v: the ‘Libellus responsionum’ of Gregory the Great and the epitaph of Augustine
(12) fols. 260r-276r: ‘Libellus contra inanes s. urginis Mildrethe usurpatores’ (BHL 5962)
(13) fols. 276r-279r: charters allegedly granted to St. Augustine’s Abbey by Edward the Confessor (fol. 276r-v, Sawyer 1248) and Æthelberht (fols. 277r-279r, CS 5 and 6, Sawyer 3 and 4)²⁷
(14) fols. 279r-284v: privileges allegedly granted to St. Augustine’s Abbey by Popes Boniface, Adeodatus, Agatho, John and (a fragment) Calixtus²⁸
(15) fols. 285r-286v: an additional miracle of St. Augustine in a later hand (compare item 4 of ms. B).

Item 9, the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’, is written on four gatherings (fols. 166r-196v). The ‘Vita Mildrethe’ impinges on the first gathering (fol. 166r). The single hand of the latter text also wrote the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’ down to the end of fol. 173v. The remainder of the text was written by two further hands, both of which seem to have written sections before the ‘Vita Mildrethe’ and after the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’; the chapter numbered ‘XXXV’ in the two other complete manuscripts (B and C) is lacking. These observations make it likely that the manuscript took shape in its present form at or soon after the time of writing. The only items unlikely to have been part of it at the outset are items 1, 13, 14 and 15; a contents-list of c. 1300 on fol. 1v lists only items 2-12, which suggests that the remaining items were not part of the

²⁷ These charters were, like CS 7, almost certainly forged at St. Augustine’s Abbey in the eleventh century. See Levison, England and the Continent, pp. 223-25 and 346.
²⁸ ibid., pp. 181-82 and 199 ff.
manuscript at that date. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that items 13-15 have a complete gathering to themselves and item 1 occupies a folio which has been added to the beginning of a gathering.

B = London, British Library Harley 105, fols. 158r-188r.

This manuscript was owned in the seventeenth century by Sir Simonds d’Ewes, who obtained it by an exchange with Sir Robert Cotton. Sir Simonds had it bound and added various notes, an elaborate title-page and chapter and folio numbers.29 His foliation, however, which is in ink, has been disregarded here in favour of the official pencil foliation added, as noted on fol. 250v, at the then British Museum in 1875.30

M. R. James regarded the script of the codex as like that of Christ Church, Canterbury, in the twelfth century and C. R. Dodwell has regarded the illuminated initials as further products of the ‘Canterbury School’.31 According to the latter, however, the style of illumination indicates that the manuscript was written somewhat later than A, namely, in the period 1140-60. B has no ex libris inscription and does not appear in any medieval catalogue, but its contents, which are close to those of A, suggest that it too was owned and probably written by the community of St. Augustine’s Abbey. The contents comprise:

(1) fols. 3r-37v: ‘Liber amplior (Historia maior) de aduentu beatissimi Anglorum apostoli Augustini sociorumque eius in Britannia’ (*BHL 777*) (the dedication is lacking, probably because of the loss of leaves)

(2) fols. 37v-38v: an ‘interjectio’ on the status of monks

(3) fols. 38v-65v: ‘Historia maior de miraculis s. Augustini’ (*BHL 779*)

(4) fols. 65v-67r: a further miracle of St. Augustine in a later hand (compare item 15 of ms. A)

(5) fols. 68r-74v: ‘Libellus responsionum’ of Gregory the Great

(6) fols. 75r-135v: ‘Historia translationis s. Augustini’ (*BHL 781*)

(7) fol. 136v: epitaph for St. Mildrith32

(8) fols. 137r-156r: ‘Vita s. Mildrethe uirginis’ (*BHL 5960*)

(9) fols. 156r-158r: lections for St. Mildrith

(10) fols. 158r-188r: the text here edited (*BHL 5961/4*)

(11) fols. 198r-204r: ‘Libellus contra inanes s. uirginis Mildrethe usurpatores’ (*BHL 5962*)


30 Sir Simonds’ ink foliation was erroneously used in *ML*, pp. 105-106.


THE TRANSLATION AND MIRACLES OF ST. MILDRITH

(fols. 244r-246v, BHL 4601), Honorius (fols. 246v-249r, BHL 3986) and Deusdedit (fols. 249r-250v, BHL 2153).

This manuscript is very tightly bound so that it is impossible to distinguish all the gatherings. It is notable, however, that the 'Vita Mildrethe' seems to begin on a new gathering (fol. 137r) and that the three preceding leaves are blank apart from the epitaph on fol. 136v. Item 11, the 'Contra usurpatores', also begins on a new gathering (fol. 190r) but its contents-list (fol. 189r-v) is written on the last leaf of the previous gathering. Moreover, the note at the end of this list giving the title is in the same hand as the text itself, so that the two gatherings must have been placed together at or very soon after the time of writing. Items 8, 9 and 10 are all in the same hand so they are likely to have been together from the outset. Since item 12 seems to begin on a new gathering (fol. 205r) it is possible that it was once separate. It should be emphasized, however, that the manuscript seems very consistent in script and layout, which suggests that all its constituent elements were bound together at an early date, perhaps at the time of writing.

C = London, British Library Harley 3908, fols. 51r-100r.

Fols. 1-100 of this codex are written in the 'Christ Church Script' which was used, according to N. R. Ker, from the late eleventh to the mid-twelfth century. Fols. 101-117 are in a much later hand and contain verses by John of Bridlington (fols. 101r-117r) and a fragment of a history by Ælmer, monk of St. Augustine's Abbey. There is no illumination in the manuscript. The script of fols. 1-100 suggests that this section was written in Canterbury (or Rochester). There is no ex libris inscription but the contents, which are entirely devoted to St. Mildrith, make it likely that the book was owned by and written at St. Augustine's Abbey. They comprise:

1. fols. 1r-35r: 'Vita s. Mildrethe virginis' (BHL 5960)
2. fols. 35r-39v: lections for St. Mildrith
3. fols. 40r-41v: lections and homilies
4. fol. 42r-v: 'Missa de s. Mildretha'
5. fols. 43r-50v: 'Historia de s. Mildretha' with musical notes
6. fols. 51r-100r: the text here edited (BHL 5961/4).

Item 6 contains a full version of the present text but the chapter numbered 'XXXV' in B here forms the last chapter, i.e., it follows the chapter numbered 'XXXVII' in B. In C, chapter numbers have been added in a sixteenth-century antiquarian hand, and these conform to those given in B despite the difference in the arrangement of the chapters. C's version of the text is carelessly written and there are numerous corrections and erasures.

The manuscript, which was rebound on guards in 1977, is composed mostly of gatherings of eight folios. The final gathering comprises fols. 100-117 and thus contains the end of the 'Textus translationis Mildrethe' and the material in a later hand. Of the

33 *English Manuscripts*, pp. 26 and 30.
other items all overlap onto the gatherings of the adjacent texts with the exception of item 5 which is restricted to one gathering occupied by this item alone. Since item 5 seems to follow logically from item 4, however, it is unlikely that it is a subsequent interpolation into the manuscript.

**D = London, British Library Cotton Otho A.vii, fol. 6.**

Before its almost complete destruction by fire in 1731, this manuscript contained the following texts:

1. 'Vita s. Praxedis uirginis'
2. 'Vita s. Mildrethe uirginis' (*BHL* 5960)
3. the text here edited (*BHL* 5961/4)
4. 'De obitu Bede' by Cuthbert
5. a life of St. Machutus in Old English
6. homilies relating to St. Machutus
7. verses on the twelve apostles
8. various prayers
9. a chronological table up to 1550
10. the privileges of St. Augustine's Abbey.

A few leaves of the book remain but in a very damaged condition. Of these, fol. 6 preserves fragments from chapters 30-32 of the 'Textus translationis Mildrethe'; and fragments of the 'Vita Mildrethe' are also to be found on fols. 1-5. David Yerkes has suggested that these folios may be in a late eleventh-century script probably earlier in date than the script of A, B and C. It is therefore much to be regretted that this copy of the text has been almost completely lost. The inclusion of items 2, 3 and 10 suggests that, like A, B and C, D may have been produced at and for St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, but the book's damaged state makes firm conclusions impossible.

**V

MANUSCRIPT RELATIONSHIPS AND EDITORIAL PRACTICE**

As we have noted, D may be the oldest manuscript on palaeographical grounds but the charred and fragmentary condition of its few surviving folios makes it of no value for reconstructing either the text or the interrelationship of the manuscripts. We must therefore concentrate on A, B and C. As noted above, A is probably the oldest of these since it seems to represent a book.

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35 D. Yerkes, 'Earliest Fragments of Goscelin's Writings on St. Mildred', *Revue bénédictine* 93 (1983) 128-31. I am very grateful to Professor Yerkes for drawing my attention to this manuscript and for giving me access to his paper before publication.
36 See above.
transitional between the English script of the eleventh century and the ‘Christ Church Script’ developed at the end of that century. Although Dodwell dates its illumination not earlier than 1100, it does seem possible that A is older than that and that it was written very near in time to the composition of the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’.

There are two grounds for this assertion. First, A’s chapter-list originally lacked entries for chapters 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37 although the chapters themselves are found in the text. (Later hands have added a summary and a full version of the entry for chapter 32 as found in B.) These deficiencies in A’s chapter-list suggest the possibility that the chapters in question were added to the text after the list’s composition. Secondly, A lacks chapter 35 which relates directly to the dispute between St. Augustine’s Abbey and St. Gregory’s Priory over Mildrith’s relics. This dispute presumably postdates the original composition of the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’ since it is not otherwise referred to in that text. Moreover the chapter in question also appears in the ‘Contra usurpatores’, a text which itself postdates the present one (to which it refers). All this suggests that chapter 35 is a later addition to the ‘Textus translationis Mildrethe’ and that its absence in A is testimony to A’s greater antiquity.

B, as we have noted, was probably written a generation later than A and its chapter-list, although not complete, extends to chapter 34. Moreover B incorporates chapter 35. The relationship between A and B cannot be direct since sometimes one and sometimes the other seems to have the better text. Both must therefore descend from an earlier version. That version cannot be represented by C which, where it diverges from B, is generally (especially in its uncorrected form) in agreement with A.

C’s history is rendered more complex by two facts. First, its text has in several places been corrected to make it conform with B’s where it previously

37 See above, p. 146.
38 See below, text-note 3.
39 See below, text-note 252.
40 HP, p. 63.
41 See below, text-notes 94, 99, 138, 156, 184, 187, 208, 212, 226 and 240 (where A seems to have erroneous readings) and 79, 101, 110, 218, 239, 241, 244, 261 and 262 (where B seems to have omissions and erroneous readings).
42 See below, text-notes 5, 60, 153, 160, 208 and 214.
43 See below, text-notes 162, 175, 182 and 256 (where C differs from A and B) and 100, 213, 222, 226-228, 235-238 (where C has been corrected, usually by insertion of words, to bring it into line with A and B). These corrections seem usually to be in the hand of the original scribe although in some cases, notably n. 227, another corrector may be involved.
resembled A's. The script of these corrections is difficult to assess, being rather rough and cramped, but it appears to differ from that of the original scribe. It therefore seems that a corrector with access to a text resembling B's has revised C's version. Secondly, a hand slightly different from that of the rest of the text has added B's chapter 35 apparently as a postscript to C's version; this further suggests that a B-type text has been used to revise C. It is, however, unlikely that the reviser used B itself since C's text of chapter 35 often diverges from B, resembling rather the text in the 'Contra usurpatores'.

If the text underlying A and B is designated X and the text used by C's reviser designated Y, we can tentatively propose the following stemma:

\[ \text{X} \rightarrow \text{B} \]
\[ \text{A} \rightarrow \text{Y} \]
\[ \text{C} \]

The relationship between B and Y must remain in doubt although Y was clearly closer to B than to A or the unrevised C.

These conclusions must be regarded as very provisional until the interrelationships of all the texts contained in A, B and C have been more closely studied. The signs are that these books were produced and used in close relationship to each other and that their contents, barring fols. 101-117 of C, were regarded as closely interconnected. It would be of the greatest interest to examine them as entities and to relate them to other apparently parallel manuscripts, notably Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 312 and Oxford, St. John's College 96. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the apparent relationship of A, B and C seems to indicate that no one manuscript can be presumed to have the best text and that variants must therefore be treated on their merits. Whichever reading seemed closest to the author's sense has accordingly been retained and others relegated to footnotes. Minor corrections and errors clearly arising from scribal carelessness have generally not been noted.

Variations in the spelling of proper names have been noted except in the case of 'Mildretha', which is spelt quite inconsistently 'Myldretha' and, less frequently in this text, 'Mildritha'. Other orthographical variants have been

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44 See below, text-notes 134, 156, 179, 184, 187, 212, 226 and 240.
45 See below, text-note 252.
disregarded. Since A seems to be the oldest manuscript preserving a complete

text, its orthographical practice has generally been preferred although

inconsistencies within it have been eliminated in favour of the forms most

frequently found. Spelling in B and C differs to a certain extent and is also

inconsistent within each manuscript. Variants include the addition of an initial

$h$ to $abundantia$ in B; the spelling $archa$ for $arca$ (C); the omission of $p$ in

dampnum and (in A and C) of $h$ in $hactenus$; the inconsistent rendering in all

manuscripts of $quatinus$ as $quatenus$ and inconsistent variations in the spelling

of $solennitas$ and its compounds in the forms $solempn$- and $solemn$-; and the use

of $michi$ for $mihi$. There is frequent and inconsistent variation in the use of $i$ and

$y$ as in $Syon$ for $Sion$, and in the use of $f$ for $ph$ in $sicophanta$. Consonants are on

occasion doubled as in $Britannia$ for $Britannia$ (A), $protellauit$ for $protelauit$

(B), or omitted as in $suplicibus$ for $supplicibus$ (A) and $pennis$ for $pennis$ (A). The

letter $n$ is sometimes substituted for $m$ in $cum$-, $quamuis$, $quemdam$ and

$uerum$-, and $p$ is on occasion added to the last of these. The prefixes $imm$- and

$imp$- are from time to time replaced by $inm$- and $inp$-.

Angle brackets have been used to indicate material supplied by the editor to

supplement apparently defective passages. Round brackets are occasionally

used as parentheses to assist with the punctuation of Goscelin’s often lengthy

sentences.
CAPITULA LIBRI TRANSLATIONIS SANCTE MILDRETHE VIRGINIS

i. Prenotatur translatio virginis, quam famosam uirtutibus ex tota Britannia uisitabant pietate et nomine Mildretham, et filie emulabantur bonis studiis, aromatizantes post eam.

ii. Eadburge successit Sigeburga, quo tempore paulatim decidit in direptionem Domini uinea que est ecclesia, unde transferende Mildrethe iam parabatur uia.

iii. Vastant pirate virginis insulam, unde grex suus exercebatur ad patientiam, imitans doctrinam apostolicam.

iv. Vt familia beate Mildrethe per multos annos durauerit, donec uindemiant Dominus totam celo recipierit.

v. Tempus putationis aduinit; hostilis exercitus inundauit; sacerdotes iugulantur; uirgines cum monasterio conflagrantur; in plebem parrochiam monasterium deinceps destituitur.

vi. Sub rege Cnuto Ælfstanus abbas possessionem ecclesie sancte Mildrethe a secularibus ereptam adiecit sui Augustini cenobio, huc ipsam uirginem transferre iam meditando.

vii. Indoluit abbas destitute virginis iniuriam, quam ut ad meliora transferat diuinam pulsat beniuolentiam.

viii. Perseuerans in precibus docetur per uisum uotum suum explendum et adversa quidem eum passurum, sed palmam adepturum.

ix. Abbas Ælfstanus totam uirginalis monasterii hereditatem, dono regis et privilegio, dicioni sancti Augustini perpetuat. Petitam uero translationem rex in alijud tempus protelat.

x. Romam rex proficiscens protestatur apud sanctum Augustinum huc condignam Mildretham transferendam post suum reditum, affirmans illam maxime decere hunc locum parentum suorum regum et apostolicorum principum.

xi. Miraculum sancti Augustini, ubi rex in mare periclitans ejus nominis ad inuocationem subita serenitate liberatur, quod in hoc textu uirginis uelut commune refertur, sicut illa quoque sibi iam in eodem templo sociatur.

xii. Abbas Ælfstanus, imperata uirginis translatione, in insulam Tanetum properat, plebem conuiuiis caute supplantat.

xiii. Primo impetu uirginalis tumba duior calibe resistit; illa promissis placata ultro cedit.

xiv. Panditur aromatica tumba; erumpit in omnes paradisiaca fraglantia; effertur celestis margarita.

1 C omits the list of chapters.
2 huius B
xv. Sacri corporis asportatorem persequitur plebs armata. Quo elapso plangit sua damna Tanetus desolata, quos iugiter consolatur uirginis presentia.

xvi. Quo triumpho et gaudio Augustiniensi cenobio suscepta sit uirgo.

xvii. Squalentibus aruis siccitate, celtum dedit pluuiam et terra fructum, uirgine adueniente cum inundatione Helie.

xviii. Regina a summa opulentia deiecta, a gloriosa Mildretha per uisum consolata et priori copie iuxta suam promissionem est reddita.

xix. Quendam inter nocturnos ymnos lectulo sopitum uisa uirgo uerbis et alapis increpat et ad ecclesiam fugat.

xx. Alium quoque ad tumulum suum dormientem impacta alapa excitat et a sacrario suo exturbat. Quam dormiens uidit de tumulo exire et aperte iam uigilans eodem redire.

xxi. Quo uisionum mysterio et signo uerberati ac decaluati iussa sit uirginalis ecclesia in Taneto cooperiri.

xxii. Mercator ex diuite pauper a uisa sibi splendida Mildretha Roman iturus docetur et ditescendus promittitur et breuis uite terminus sibi insinuatur.

xxiii. Fur captiuitas inuocata Mildretha exsoluitur; per alta precipitia euadens ad Augustinianum uirginis asylum liberatur.

xxiv. Quidam paralyticus et calcaneo in terga affixo debilitatus iussu apostoli Petri deuenit in Tanetum ad ecclesiam sancte Mildrethe ibique donatur promissa sopitate.

xxv. Eodem quoque loco et hora mulier a caduco morbo eripitur, apparente sibi Mildretha per quam sanabatur.

xxvi. Vt frater a tertianis febribus liberatus sit in eius festiuitate.

xxvii. Quomodo puella a natiuitate paralytica et muta ad sacra uirginis pignora sit curata.

xxviii. Quomodo apud militem Cantuarie colonum puella mortis per beatam Mildretham noscitur uite reddita.

xxix. Vt ipse miles ad uirginis tumbam febres amiserit.

xxx. Superest anus anachorita que, ante translationem uirginis, in Taneto insula ad ipsius pignora dum moreretur deferri iussa, uite longiori est reddita.

xxxi. Eadem quoque post hec per annum cecitate temptata, eius iussu deducta ad sua busta, ibidem est illuminata.

xxxii. Quandam terre uirginis Mildrethe particulam rusticus quidam ad Christi Ecclesiam pertinere astipulans, strophose hoc dum iurat, eius oculi excutiuntur, postque dies bis septenos sicophanta probatus flebiliter moritur.3

3 In A, this entry is written in lighter ink and in a different, possibly later, hand. Written in a rough hand on the line above is a summary of this entry which reads, ‘De quodam per fallaciam perjurante utroque oculo ratione perijurii orbato’.
xxxiii. Cuidam filia Sion sacra ab sui structuram imperfectam monasterii anxio apparet incolarum, per illum suggillans tenaciam suamque ad inchoata consumanda spondens munificentiam.  

xxxiv. Tholis monasterii huius erectis, cum tigni ponerentur eorum unus parietibus ab oppositis pedibus tribus breuior reperitur; mane sex peduum metreta quam ante fuerat productior.

**Translatio Sancte Mildrethe Virginis**
**cum Miraculorum Attestatione**

Translationem exposituri gloriose uirginis Mildrethe ad locum quo nunc presentiam suam mirifice propalat, prius monasterii sui diuturnam institutionem uel distractionem, ut ibi per multa annorum lustra requiescens pietatis carismatibus ubique innotuerit, retexere ad temporis notitiam et fidei edificationem utile duximus.

Iam itaque precellentissima virgo, de celo quasi sol in centro terris refulgens, radios uirtutum longe lateque respersit ac totius Britannie nationes odorifera fama ad eius uiuifica requitionis merita contraxit. Nam quis tam benignam frustra uisitauit? Quis cecus, mutus, surdus, quocumque languore, quacumque debilitate infractus ab ipsa non rediit emendatus? Quis gemens, merens, anxius, morbilus non hic mutauit dolorem tripudio, infirmitatem remedio? Hic adeo sanus augetur uirtute, detritus reformatur sospitate. Reuera est gratia et nomine Mildretha, quod patria lingua sonat 'pia' uel 'pietate fundata', que in quascumque gentes se poscentes pio nectare redundat in secula. Certabant etiam deuotissima huius nardiflue matris pignora eius seruare instituta, et sancta conuersatione apud Deum et homines attollebant materna preconia. Stabant firma acie concordie ut Christiane Amazones contra demonum castra; et caritate, humilitate, pudicitia, temperantia, iugulabant odia, super-

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4 This and the following entry are found in B only.
5 A and C have the title 'Textus translationis et institutionis monasterii beate Mildrethe cum miraculorum attestatione'. Although the word *institutio* is presumably being used in the sense of *historia*, this version of the title nevertheless seems to make less sense and to relate less closely to the content of the text than B's.
6 *Mildrethe* om. AC.
7 A better translation of the name might be 'merciful strength' or 'mild strength'. In B, a marginal note in a modern hand gives the derivation of the name as 'milde rede', i.e., 'mild counsel'.
8 The subject of this sentence, *pignora*, is here used in the sense of 'children'. 
biam, iracundiam, luxuriam, gulam et cetera uitiorum agmina. Fugit Aquilo
pigritie hiemalis et ueniit Auster estiuie fructificationis. Perflauit hortum Domini
et in tota Anglia bono odorare Christi fluxerunt aromata illius. Sic matris emula
Eadburga, Christi famula, quam in calce uite uirginalis annotauimus, ducens
choros Domini in sanctitate et iustitia migravit ad celestia premia.\(^9\) Annus erat
septingentesimus quinquagesimus primus ab Incarnacione Dominica.\(^10\)

\(^9\) Eadburg’s career as abbess is described in the work to which Goscelin here refers, his \textit{Vita Deo dilectae uirginis Mildrethae} (BHL 5960), printed and discussed in \textit{ML}, pp. 20–21, 60–62, 77–
79 and 105–43. An abbess called Eadburg corresponded with St. Boniface; see \textit{Die Briefe des
Heiligen Bonifatius und Lull}, ed. M. Tangl (Berlin, 1916), pp. 8, 53, 54, 60, 137 and 143. The
identity of this person with the abbess of Minster-in-Thanet mentioned in the present text was
assumed by \textit{W. Levison, England and the Continent in the Eighth Century} (Oxford, 1946),
pp. 139 and 150. Doubt has been cast on this by P. Sims-Williams, ‘An Unpublished Seventh-
or Eighth-Century Anglo-Latin Letter in Boulogne-sur-Mer MS 74 (82)’, \textit{Medium Ævum} 48 (1979)
22 n. 119.

\(^10\) The date of Eadburg’s death is given as 751 by Thorne (\textit{Scriptores}, col. 1908) and by
Thomas of Elmham in \textit{HSAC}, p. 220; but this is probably taken from the present text. The
source of the date is obscure. Eadburg appears as the recipient of toll-remission in a charter of
748 (CS 177, Sawyer 91 and see below, n. 65). The latest extant letters addressed to her can be
dated no later than 746; see \textit{Bonifatius und Lull}, ed. Tangl, pp. 137 and 143. In C a second hand
has added in the margin \textit{anno domini 751}.

\(^11\) In C, a second hand has from chapter 2 onwards added chapter numbers in Arabic
numerals, often squeezed in above the text (see above, p. 149).

\(^12\) In A, a space has been left before ‘bertus’ and never filled; the corrector has added ‘Athel’
on the previous line.

\(^13\) \textit{Athelberto} B. Eadberht and \textit{Athelberhtii} were almost certainly joint rulers before the
former’s death. Goscelin’s erroneous assertion that \textit{Athelberht} succeeded Eadberht is probably
connected with (and may be based on) a late eleventh- or early twelfth-century interpolation to
that effect in the Canterbury manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. See \textit{ASC} 1.46 and
2.338; and \textit{HBC}, p. 8.

\(^14\) \textit{Athelberht} i (d. 616) was converted by Augustine of Canterbury. See \textit{EH} 1.25-2.5.

\(^15\) \textit{Cutberhto} C. Cuthberht was archbishop of Canterbury from 740 to 760. Sigeburg is mentioned as abbess of Minster-in-Thanet in charters of the period 759-764 (CS 189
and 188, Sawyer 29 and 143 – see below, text-note 65).
cum Iob, perdita priori substantia, hic recipieret duplicia. Satagebat primum electas animarum plantationes, uindemiante Domino, celo suspicere et diutina desolatione cum silentio patientie tanquam conscia diuinis examinis salutare Domini exspectare, donec ipse uindictam in hostes suos retribueret et propitius terre populi sui esset.

iii

Igitur pirate gentilium Danorum et ceterarum gentium transmarinarum, dum maria latrocinandi et predandi studio peruagantur, splendide uirginis insulam Tanetum populosissimam cunctisque rerum copiis refertissimam insperati irruptum, et in plebem longa pace solutam ceu lupi in pecudes grassantur. Cedunt, laniant, rapiunt, fugant et uastant omnia, nec Christi familiam et Dominica sancta secus habuere quam ludum et spolia. Initium dolorum hec. Sed adhuc parcente Domino abscedunt onusti preda et in alia similiter debanchantur loca. Ita per singulos fere annos, ut fera gustatum sanguinem sibi, regressi crebro impetu uexabant gregem Domini; et uelut unde maris insulam turbidis incursibus quatiebant ecclesiam. Hinc opulentissimum alme Mildrethe monasterium abstractis uel exhaustis possessionibus defecit; ablataque pascua grex suus defluxit et pauci facti sunt a tribulatione malorum et dolore. Pars tamen optima, que in temptatione remanserat cum Domino, pro muro habebat matris Mildrethe exempla, cuius imitando patientiam optabant consortia simul et apostolica (uelut armaturam Dei) induebant documenta. Omne gaudium inquit Iacobus existimate cum in temptationibus uariis incideritis. Et Petrus: Communicantes Christi passionibus gaudeete ut in reveulacione glorie eius gaudeatis exultantes. Paulus quoque ait: In omnibus tribulationem patimur sed non angustiamur, et cetera; et Per multas tribulationes oportet nos introire in regnum Dei; et Quis nos separabit a caritate Christi? et cetera usque ad id: Estimati sumus ut oues occasioanis. His sanctorum patronorum suorum ceterisque diuinis exortationibus fideles anime

16 The first line of chapter 3 makes clear that Goscelin envisages these Viking raids as occurring in Sigeburg’s time, that is, in the middle of the eighth century. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle does not mention any such events in Kent until 835, charter evidence suggests that Viking armies may have been operating there much earlier. See N. Brooks, ‘The Development of Military Obligations in Eighth- and Ninth-Century England’ in England before the Conquest. Studies in Primary Sources Presented to Dorothy Whitelock, ed. P. Clemoes and K. Hughes (Cambridge, 1971), p. 80.

17 Jac 1:2.
18 1 Pet 4:13.
19 2 Cor 4:8.
20 Ac 14:21.
21 Rom 8:35.
22 Rom 8:36.
armate ulterior gladiis hostilibus ceruices parabant, uel ad quascumque mortes et supplicia animum roborabant, quia maioribus certaminibus gloriosiorem coronam repositam nouerant. Quas et si persecutoris preterierit seuitia, non cassant martyrum premia, quibus erant martyrii uota.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{iv}

Post obitum vero abbatisse Sigeburge, Siledritha\textsuperscript{24} a rege Cuthredo subrogatur et ab archipresule Adelardo\textsuperscript{25} consecratur. Que consurgens et induens fortitudinem (brachium Domini) in tempore iniquo, non solum fessas sororum animas confirmare et ad pristinum numerum supplere certabat, uerum etiam res ecclesie absortas uelut a leonum faucibus eruere satagebat. Quod quantis laboribus et aduersitatibus consecuta sit, qua instantia etiam a Wilfredo archiepiscopo Adelardi\textsuperscript{26} successore terras abstractas reuocauerit, quam pie ipsa uixerit, in annalibus antiquorum patrum, priuilegiis quoque et cartis monasterii sui eidenter elucescit.\textsuperscript{27} Sic itaque in multa annorum curricula per prescriptas et succedentes matres, quarum omnium nomina uel gesta retexere longum est, sanctissime Mildrethe familia durabat et per paces ac bella more lune crescebat uel decrescebat, donec eam iustus Dominus uindemiaret totamque celo benignissimus reciparet.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{v}

Tandem ergo illud tempus putationis diuine aduenit et Diabolus, tanquam expetita non solum substantia sed et carnibus Iob,\textsuperscript{29} exultans malignitatis

\textsuperscript{23} 'And if the ferocity of the persecutor passes them by, they do not forfeit their martyrs' crowns, for which they had vowed themselves to be martyrs.'

\textsuperscript{24} Syledritha C.

\textsuperscript{25} Cu\textit{d}redo A; A\textit{delardo} B. Likely dates for King Cuthred are 798-807; Ethelheard was archbishop of Canterbury from 793 to 805 (\textit{HBC}, pp. 9 and 209). Elmham gives 797 as the date of Sigeburg's death but his source, if any, is unknown (\textit{HSAC}, p. 221).

\textsuperscript{26} Athelardi C.

\textsuperscript{27} Wulfred was archbishop of Canterbury from 805 to 832 (\textit{HBC}, p. 209). Much light has been cast on his policy with regard to monasteries by N. Brooks, \textit{The Early History of the Church of Canterbury: Christ Church from 597 to 1066} (Leicester, 1984), pp. 175-97. No annals corresponding to those referred to by Goscelin have survived and no extant privileges or charters relating to Minster-in-Thanet mention Abbess Selethryth. CS 317 (Sawyer 160, dated 804), however, does refer to a person of this name as abbess of Lyminster (Kent). On her probable identity with the abbess of Minster-in-Thanet mentioned by Goscelin, see \textit{ML}, pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{28} Elmham's assertion (\textit{HSAC}, pp. 221-22) that Selethryth and her nuns were massacred by Vikings and that this led to the conversion of Minster-in-Thanet to a parish church is clearly based on a misunderstanding of Goscelin's account. Elmham seems to have 'telescoped' the information given in this and the succeeding chapter, ignoring the content of the present sentence.

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. Job 1:12.

30 Viking armies are known to have been active in Kent at various times in the ninth century (*ASC* s.a. 832, 838, 851, 865 and 893). The most likely context for the invasion described in this chapter, however, is the period 994-1013 when Swein Forkbeard was attacking England. Goscelin would naturally have regarded the attacks of those years as a concerted attempt at conquest, since they led to the accession of the Danish king, Cnut. Kent was affected directly in 994, 999, 1009 and 1013 (*ASC* s.a.) and especially in 1011 when Canterbury was captured (*ASC* s.a.). William Thorne, an historian of St. Augustine's Abbey in the fourteenth century, believed that the events at Minster-in-Thanet described in this chapter were contemporary with the capture of Canterbury (see *Scriptores*, col. 1908). Goscelin's account later in the chapter suggests that he may have regarded the attack on Minster as having occurred in 1009 or 1010 (below, text-note 40).

31 *inhumana* B.

32 Ps 78:2-3.

33 The navigable channel separating Thanet from the mainland came as a result of silting to consist only of the courses of the River Wantsum, flowing northwest, and the River Stour, flowing southeast past Minster. Goscelin is presumably referring to the latter. His use of *fluuius* suggests that the silting process was already well advanced in his time. See D. Hill, *An Atlas of Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1981), p. 11.

34 *in nauim* B.
Dei immolarentur Domino. Iam incursante hoste mugitus emittunt in celum ut, si non mererentur ab instanti nece liberari, mererentur tandem a clementissimo Salvatore suscipi. Rigant pauimenta flebitis mox sanguine rigaturi. Tum uero sacratissima cohors virginum affuse humi cum sacerdotibus et leuitis, sacris uestimentis uelut armatura Dei inditius, commendant suet et suas et omnium animas in manus benignissimi Redemptoris, in psalmis scilicet et leuaniis, cum alta contritione cordis et estuantibus lacrimis. Sacerdotes item cum leuitis ac ceteris Dei ministris uel missas canere uel Dominicas cruces et euangelia tanquam celestia arma affectant manibus gestare, quatinus inter ipsa sacra et sacrificia sacrificium Domini mererentur fieri cum uoto tali: 'Sicut in holocaustis arietum et taurorum et sicut in milibus agnorum pinguium, sic fiat in conspectu tuo Domine sacrificium nostrum. Canite tuba in Sion 36 quia sacrificium et libamen Domino Deo nostro et solennitas uictimarum Domini est.' O beata commercia! De terrenis damnis fiunt celestia lucra. Inuadunt itaque uniuersum ouile Christi cruentissime bestie, sagittant, iugulant, transfigunt omnesque pariter nuptos et innuptos, parentes cum liberis et cunctis personis, diuersis armis ac pennis intermunt. Sacerdotes cum comministris sacrorum inter sua libamina maactantur. Beatissime uero virgines, Dominicis septis incluse, una cum monasterio suo cunctisque officinis pariter concrescerunt et tanquam aromatum incensa in odorem suavissimum Domino regi et sponsou suo offeruntur, a quo uelut astra splendentia in celesti sede, Mildretha duce, componuntur. 37 Talia nimium incensa data sunt angelo in turibulo aureo, ut adoleret ea in altari aureo coram Domino. 38 Tali igitur fine divina roseta et florigere Mildrethe plantaria collecta sunt ad Dominum, ut ipsa liberius aliquando mutaret habitaculum a Deo paratum. 39 Neque hoc neglegenter est animaduertendum, in tanta tamque frequenti licentia ipsius sanctissimum monumentum quanta protectione Dei celi semper manserit intactum. Hostes itaque omnia inmanitate tota Cantie provincia depopulata ad Orientales Anglos deuoluuntur, classe nauium ascensa; ibique similiter multa demoliuntur cenobia, nec paruum collegium sanctorum mittunt ad sidera, cesis

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35 commendauit C.


37 According to the twelfth-century compiler of the Historia regum, an abbess ‘of St. Mildrith’s monastery’ called Leofrun was captured in Canterbury by the Vikings in 1011. See Symeonis monachi Opera omnia, ed. T. Arnold, 2 vols. (RS 75; London, 1882-85), 2.143. The same account is given by Thorne (Scriptores, col. 1908). This should be compared with ASC s.a. 1011, where a certain Leofrun, abbess of an unspecified monastery, is said to have been captured by the Vikings in Canterbury. This event may be subsequent to the massacre described by Goscelin.

38 Cf. Apoc 8:3.

39 A reference to Mildrith’s translation to St. Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury (see below, pp. 170-76).
Dei famulis et famulabus cum plebe innumera.\textsuperscript{40} Cognito uero hostium discessu, insulani Taneti qui per diuersa latibula mortem euaserant ad propria recursant; sed uisa lugubri suorum strage et rerum uastitate miserios se clamitant qui superessent, illos uero beatos qui hec mala morte finissent, immo secundum ecclesie fidem de temporali tribulatione\textsuperscript{41} ad eterna gaudia transissent. Dehinc convenientes tecta monasterii beate Mildrethe restaurant, quod tamen ad pristinam dignitatem nequaquam ultra conualuit, sed quod pridem ter uiginti aut amplius sanctimonialium pollebat caterua, deinceps duorum aut trium clericorum plebeia erat parrochia.\textsuperscript{42} Iamque ibi Hesperie Mildrethe factum est uespere, ut apud amantissimum patronum Augustinum renascenti surget soliferum mane. His modo ad uirginis commeatum expositis, iam uia patet ipsius translationis. Res adeo diuersa et morosa, dignaque explicari potius quam transiliri, amicis auribus mauult satis fieri. Et primo quidem dicemus de rege cuius illa fauore ac de abbate cuius transducta est labore.

Anno Dominice Incarnationis millesimo septimo, post diuturnam tempestatem bellorum, Athelredo rex Cnutus quasi serenitatis aura successit. O Dei providentiam bene cuncta dispensantem et sepe nobis etiam contra nostram sententiam consulentem! Ille externus, ille barbarus, ille cedibus et flammis regna demoliens, cuius dicionem tota Anglia septeno congressu preliorum repulerat, quis crederet quod optento regno pater Anglorum fieret et de Saule quodammodo David exhiberet?\textsuperscript{43} Quis natiuus dux, quorum plerique suos deuorant, tantum subditis contulit, tarn modestis legibus populos beatificauit?\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Goscelin could be thinking of the period 1009-10 when the Viking army moved from Kent to East Anglia (ASC s.a.).
\textsuperscript{41} tribulatione temporali C.
\textsuperscript{42} Thorne emphasises the parochial functions of the church at this time (Scriptores, col. 1908). Minster-in-Thanet’s reduced status is confirmed by the fact that it does not appear as a mother church in the eleventh-century lists of such churches. See The Domesday Monachorum of Christ Church Canterbury, ed. D. C. Douglas (London, 1944), pp. 8-13. Instead it appears as a subordinate church of St. Augustine’s Abbey in a list contained in the White Book of that house. See G. Ward, ‘The Lists of Saxon Churches in the Domesday Monachorum and the White Book of St. Augustine’, Archaeologia cantiana 45 (1933) 85.
\textsuperscript{43} The date should be 1017 (ASC s.a.). For an account of Cnut’s accession, see ASE, pp. 386-93 and 398-99 and L. M. Larson, Canute the Great (London, 1912), pp. 85-107. Here and elsewhere Goscelin seems to be reflecting the rosy view of Cnut’s reign which was prevalent in England; see ASE, p. 398 and Larson, Canute, p. 325.
Sane nec sacerdos nec leuita tam erat proximus plagato quam Samaritanus qui fecit misericordiam in illo.\textsuperscript{45} De quo uiro, ut multa insignia pretermittantur, illud quo omnium regum uicit praehtiam memoretur quod, cum quattuor regnorum monarchia precelleret\textsuperscript{46} et in die sancto Pasce regalibus insigniis ornatus Wintonie procederet, regiam coronam (que tantam solennitatem debeat gestare) reuinit sed coram omni populo et curia sua uero regum Christo optulit et capiti crucifixi Domini deuotissime hanc imposuit, dicens se non esse regem nec dignum corona sed ilium per quem reges regnant, qui dominatur in regno hominum et cuicumque uoluerit dari illud, cuius regnum sine fine permanet, in cuius dicione cuncta sunt posita sicut et fecit omnia. Cumque decem et nouem annis potentissime regnaret, nunquam coronari regio fastigio acqueuit, dum se serum Domini Maiestatis prona reuerentia recolit.\textsuperscript{47} Cum uero religiosissima deuotione cuncta fere Britannie cenobia regia munificentia et opibus illustaret, ita precellentissimi protodoctoris Anglorum Augustini ac principum apostolorum Petri et Pauli habitaculum coluit, ut hoc solum sibi cure esse inter cetera uideretur, et uelut apicem regni sui et Anglice Christianitatis instrumentum subnixius ueneraretur.\textsuperscript{48} Augebant quoque haud inmemorem eius affectum experta sepe tanti patris beneficia. Simul etiam hoc illi non paruo erat miraculo acquieuit, dum se paganis uastantibus cetera monasteria, istud semper illesum manserit sub tanto defensore suo - nimirum hoc prouidente Domino ut cetera membra respirarent, uertice seruato. Adeo

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Lc 10:29-37.


\textsuperscript{47} Cnut died in 1035 (\textit{ASC} s.a.). Goscelin seems to be the earliest writer to tell this story of Cnut’s refusal to wear the crown. It appears in different words in the work of Henry of Huntingdon (fl. s. xn med.), Ralph of Diceto (d. c. 1201), Henry Knighton (d. c. 1396) and John Brompton (fl. 1437), who present it as a sequel to Cnut’s order to the tide not to rise. See \textit{The History of the English by Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon, from A.C. 55 to A.D. 1154}, ed. T. Arnold (RS 74; London, 1879), p. 189; \textit{The Historical Works of Master Ralph of Diceto, Dean of London}, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (RS 68; London, 1876), 1.174; \textit{Chronicon Henrici Knighton vel Cnuttho}, \textit{monachi leycestrensis}, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols. (RS 92; London, 1889-95), 1.28; and \textit{Scriptores}, col. 912. It is difficult to judge whether any actual incident lies behind it or whether it was invented to reinforce Cnut’s reputation for piety (on which, see \textit{ASE}, pp. 410-11). I am grateful to Dr. Simon Keynes for help with this note.

\textsuperscript{48} On Cnut’s benefactions, see Larson, \textit{Canute}, pp. 168-77. There is no evidence that he was especially generous to St. Augustine’s Abbey, Canterbury, although Thorne repeats Goscelin’s assertion (\textit{Scriptores}, col. 1782). The only extant documents purporting to record grants made by Cnut to the abbey are two writs of doubtful authenticity, one of which concerns the translation of St. Mildrith itself. See F. E. Harmer, \textit{Anglo-Saxon Writs} (Manchester, 1952), pp. 190-98 and below, pp. 166-67 and text-note 67.
autem hunc sibi elegerat in omnibus patronum et ita fratrum suorum religiosum amplectebatur contubernium, ut hinc episcopos et magistros aliarum affectaret ecclesiarum. Vnde et uenerabilem uirum Ælmerum, eiusdem cenobii tunc abbatem, in pontificalem cum uite merito assumpsit dignitatem.\footnote{Ælfmaer was abbot of St. Augustine's Abbey from 1006 to 1023+7 and then bishop of Sherborne until an unknown date not later than 1031 (HRH, p. 35). It is difficult to verify Goscelin's more general claim that monks of the abbey were widely promoted. Thorne repeats it but adds no further information (Scriptores, col. 1782). Goscelin's praise of Ælfmaer in this passage contrasts with his condemnation of him in 'The Life of Saint Wulsin of Sherborne by Goscelin', ed. C. H. Talbot, Revue bénédictine 69 (1959) 482.}

Ælfstanum uero tunc monasterii prepositum, uirum precipuarum uirtutum, ingenii apud ecclesiam et seculum prestantissimi, illum per quem tandem pretiosissima Domini margarita Mildretha dignaretur hoc ad desiderabiles patres suos transferi, Deo amabilis rex tam intimum habuit et uenerabilem ut ei illustrissimum Wintonie pontificatum infligeret, entis et flagitans omnibus modis ut susciperet. Qui cum pre humilitate nulla acquiesceret ratione, tandem regimen proprie abbatie (licet hic quoque tota uirtute retnitens) non potuit recusare, adeo illum obuerant fratrum uel regis preces uiolente, ita nimirum Dei prouidentia uolente.\footnote{According to HRH, p. 35, Ælfstan was abbot of St. Augustine's Abbey from 1023+7 till 1045/6. There is no corroboration of Goscelin's assertion that he was offered the see of Winchester. Doubt is cast on this by Goscelin's later statement (below, p. 166) that Ælfwine was appointed to the see when he refused. Since this person did not become bishop of Winchester until 1032, either Goscelin's account of the course of events is erroneous or the accepted dates of Ælfstan's and Ælfwine's careers are incorrect. See ASC s.a. 1032 and W. G. Searle, Anglo-Saxon Bishops, Kings and Nobles (Cambridge, 1899), pp. 72-73.}

Ordinatus ergo pro Ælmero ab archipresule Ælnotho\footnote{Alnotho AB. Æthelnoth was archbishop of Canterbury from 1020 until 1038; see Searle, ibid., pp. 10-11.} quod inuitus susceperat ita uoluntarie exercuit, quasi hanc potestatem iam olim sitisset. Vt prelatus ita certabat omnium esse officiosissimus. Quod monebat in se monstrare satagebat. Monasterium situm ut auctoritate ita et opibus principale reddidit; religione uero ac litterarum studiis in totius patrie speculam extulit.\footnote{Just as the monastery had been founded preeminently, so he rendered it foremost also in wealth; indeed with religion and scholarship he made it a watchtower for the whole kingdom.}

Erat carus omnibus meritis totius probitatis, maxime ipsi regi in omni consilio et familiaritate rerumque postulatione acceptabilis. Inter cetera quibus dilatabat ecclesie sue tentoria, emerat opulentissimam villam que Folkestan est appellata, pro qua uendor medietatem possessionis ecclesie beate Mildrethe (qui tunc possidebat) reposuit.\footnote{The meaning seems to be: 'Among other things with which he was expanding the possessions of his church, he had bought a very wealthy vill called Folkestone, for which the vendor put down half the lands of the church of St. Mildrith, which he held at that time.' The vendor in question may have been Christ Church, Canterbury, to which a number of pre-Conquest charters (of varying degrees of authenticity) assign land at Folkestone (see CS 660,}
Iacob supplantauit et nunc uersa uice Rachel pulcherrimam pro Lia subiecit.\textsuperscript{54} Quod diuina factum credivimus prouidentia quatinus, dicioni summi Augustini parte uirginalis possessionis adiecta, deuotissime abbati maior accenderetur fiducia, quod ipsa demum uirgo prosequeretur tota.

vii

Agebatur tunc filia Sion in manu secularis Babylonie captiua; uindemiabant earn omnes mundi uiatores, destructa protectionis Dei maceria; marcescebat humi celestis rosa; uilescebat hominibus angelica margarita; sedebat in terra cum Iob amissa substantia et ipsa ecclesia mundi erat sentina. Indoluit animosa fides abbatis tante dignitatis iniuria, totaque mente exardescit hanc sideream gemmam de raptorum illuuie eruere et decentissimo Augustino cum toto ipsius monasterio ac residua possessionis parte adiungere, ubi condigno celebraretur honore. Anhelabat hinc regem deposcere sed animaduertit prudenter tantum propositum sine superno\textsuperscript{55} nutu et ipsius diuina uirginis uoluntate nequaquam explebile:\textsuperscript{56} \textit{cor enim regis in manu Domini et bonum est sperare in Domino quam in principibus.}\textsuperscript{57} Ne quid ergo attemptaret temere, studuit assiduis precibus Domini arbitrium consulere ipsamque Deo dilectam magnidicis uotis inuitare.\textsuperscript{58}

viii

Cui iuxta euangelicum nocturni petitoris exemplum perseveranter pulsanti tandem aperuit, nunquam repellens fidelem inportunitatem, benignitas Dei.\textsuperscript{59} Nam quadam nocte, ubi lumina sibi sopor obduxit, internis oculis eius prefulgida apparuit, que uultu et habitu lucidissimo astitit

Sawyer 398; J. M. Kemble, \textit{Codex diplomaticus aevi saxonici}, 6 vols. [1839-48], nos. 896 and 1327, Sawyer 981 and 1047; and \textit{Scriptores}, col. 2224). By the time of Domesday Book, Folkestone was held by Odo of Bayeux, who may well have obtained it from St. Augustine's Abbey (\textit{Domesday Book}, ed. A. Farley, 2 vols. [London, 1783], fol. 96).

\textsuperscript{54} 'Thus Jacob supplanted the usurper Laban, and now in turn he substituted the most beautiful Rachel for Leah.' Cf. Gen 29-31.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{superbo} B

\textsuperscript{56} The need to ask Cnut's permission for the translation may have been connected with the stipulation of the Council of Mainz that no translations of saints' relics could take place without the consent of the bishop or prince; alternatively it could have arisen because Cnut was actively involving himself in translations as a means of showing himself a worthy heir to the piety of the English dynasties. See \textit{Concilia aevi karolini} 1, ed. A. Werminghoff (MGH Leg. 3.2; Hanover-Leipzig, 1906), p. 272; and (on Cnut's involvement in translations) Harmer, \textit{Writs}, p. 191, and \textit{ML}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{57} Prov 21:1; Ps 117:9.

\textsuperscript{58} '... and he strove to attract the one beloved of God (sc. Mildrith) by vows in which he offered her great things' (literally 'by bragging vows').

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Lc 11:5-8.
trepidantique hoc insolito iubare blandiens dixit: 'Letificare te, uenerabilis pater, hec amica presentia et hic iocundus splendoris intuitus debet, non terrere. Scias enim me tam fidelem quam optatum tibi nuntium adesse, tu modo dictis meis fidem et intellectum incunctanter adhipe. Certissime quippe de pretiosi corporis alme Mildrethe translatione desiderium et uotum tuum consequeris, Dominoque cooperante subsequenti tempore hoc gaudium tuum adimpletum uidebis. Sic enim placitum et decretum est gratie Dei dilecte sponsae sue honori multorumque saluti prosicienti, sic et ipsi in Domino suo gratissimum est virgini. Nil ergo dubites regis expetere beniuolentiam, apud quem Deo aspirante inuenies gratiam. Verumtamen angustiarum patieris procellam, quia adversarius Iob per inuidie satellites tibi excitabit pugnam, ut eo gloriosius quo laboriosius hanc optineas palmam.' His dictis qui loqui uidebatur disparuit, et somniator euigilans e stratu exiliit, ita in iubilo cordis exhilaratus ac si iam optata fuisset adeptus.

Continuo, remota omni ambiguitate, postpositis rerum negotiis, uelut uenditis omnibus que possidebat, ad emendum hanc unam pretiosam margaritam exestuat quam inuenerat. Ad summum amicum suum Wintone pontificem proficiscitur Elfuinum, quem pro se gaudet intronzatum, uirum illustris animi, excellentis consili, inuicte fidei, infatigabilis auxili et apud regem accessus potentissimi. Huic fidissimo cordis sui sigillo intimat et ministerium intentionis sue et revelacionis divinae, ipsumque in omni bono beniuolum et maxime tanti amici beniuolentie congratulantem ad regis interpellationem celerem et utroneum accipit comitem. Rex gratissime susciptiens utriusque suggestionem, dat ultimo per amicum abbatem dilectissimo patrono suo Augustino et reliquam possessionis alme Mildrethe portionem et totius simul iuris ac monasterii eius intra et extra insulam dicionem, partesque ab iniquorum tyrannide ereptas in ipsius summe ecclesie resolidat unitatem atque in unicam hereditatem. Id adeo regio testamento et privilegio est perpetuatum

60 placidum AC.
61 'For just as it was resolved and decreed by God's grace, providing for the honour of his beloved spouse and for the salvation of many, so also it is most pleasing to the virgin herself in her Lord.'
62 sc. Satan.
63 Cf. Mt 13:44 and 46.
64 Ælfwine, bishop of Winchester, 1023-47; see above, text-note 50, and Searle, Bishops, Kings and Nobles, pp. 72-73.
65 The early charters of Minster-in-Thanet claim that the abbey received lands on the Isle itself and also on the mainland at Sturry, Bodsham, bi Northanuude and various places in the Weald, as well as grants of privileges, specifically of toll-remission for ships entering London, Fordwich and Sarre (C.S. 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 86, 88, 96, 141, 149, 150, 177, 188, 189 and 846;
omniumque pontificum et magnatum regni subscriptione astipulatum. Petitionem autem transducendo virginis benignis modo pollicitationibus refuit, uerum in tempus oportunius et consultius uti tantam rem proteletat. Nec dubium diuinitus hoc fuisse induciatum, quatinus uenerabilis Elfstani ex dilatione cresceret desiderium et ex difficultate cumularetur gaudium. Hinc uero enarrare uetat series proposita quos aduersitatum impetus, quas supplantationes et seductiones pertulerit a quodam maxime Leofuinono potentissimo pecuniarum ac terrarum impendiis uix placabili, et ab insulanis diuitiarum fastu ac libertate tunc indomitis, aliisque ecclesie emulis insidiati-bus sibi diversis tegmis.

Interea religiosus rex, Romam proficiscens ad orationem principum apostolorum, illud apostolicum ipsorum apud suum Augustinum ante omnia reuisit domicilium, quatinus huius domus interuentu et huius patris comitatu ad ipsam arcem ecclesiariarum prosperum ageret cursum atque inde ad sua recursum. Aderat in reliquo primatum contubernio ille preclarissimus presul Sawyer 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 26, 29, 86, 87, 91, 143, 1180 and 1648). On the authenticity or otherwise of these charters see A. Scharer, Die angelsachsische Königsurkunde im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1982), especially pp. 73-84, 86-92, 103-106, 115-16, 196-207 and 210-11. Sturry, Bodsham and Fordwich were all held by St. Augustine's Abbey in 1086 (Domesday Book, fol. 12a-b) and Fordwich was the subject of a writ of Edward the Confessor in favour of the abbey (Harmer, Writs, no. 39). Tenterden may also have belonged to Minster at an early date since the name means 'den of the Thanet men' and the church there was dedicated to Mildrith (see ML, p. 36). The rights to Minster's estates had presumably reverted to the crown and were thus in Cnut's gift.

A document purporting to be a Latin translation of a writ of Cnut is preserved in the thirteenth-century cartulary of St. Augustine's Abbey (London, British Library Cotton Julius D.ii) and printed and discussed in Harmer, Writs, pp. 191-97, 198 and 454-57. Serious doubt can be cast on its authenticity but the possibility that a genuine Old English document lies behind it cannot be ruled out. If there was such a document, Goscelin's account is garbled since the Latin translation of the alleged writ has no subscribers (i.e., is a writ rather than a charter) and grants the body of Mildrith together with the lands of her monastery.

Hence indeed the <complexity of the> series of events which befell forbids us to narrate what attacks of adversity.... A document recording a settlement between Elfstan and Leofwine, possibly a priest of Dover, about St. Mildrith's property (?) is printed by A. J. Robertson, Anglo-Saxon Charters (Cambridge, 1939), p. 190. Its editor assigns it to 1044/5, suggesting that the dispute was indeed long-drawn-out. The document also suggests that Cnut's role may not have been as simple as Goscelin asserts since Leofwine is represented as saying that he bought the lands in question off Cnut. No other documents relating to Elfstan's dealings with holders of St. Mildrith's lands are extant.

Meanwhile the religious king, when he was setting out for Rome to pray to the princes of the apostles, revisited as a first priority that apostolic domicile of theirs at the monastery of his
Ælfuuinus,\textsuperscript{71} ad iter et consilia regis electissimus et abbatī (ut prenotatūm est) amicissimus. Hic, facta ab omnibus ad sanctos summissa oratione, iterum regem sollicitat de sancte Mildrethe transmigratione. Tum rex, coram ipso presule et patre monasterii ceterisque amicis, adiecta beati patris tumbe dextera, patria uoce se in hec astringit uota: 'Si larga Domini gratia me, huius sanctissimi patrōni mei Augustīni (sepe michi in necessitate probatissimi) sociorumque eius suffragiis, spersĕre deduxerit et reduxerit, sciatis quod promitto hoc suum sacrosanctum habitatūlum munifice donandum et, quod nostra pompa ditiōs est, beatissime virginis Mildrethe translatione – uoluntas Dei modo faueat – illustrandum. Vbi enim unqam deceptus conueniet hanc sanctam et regiam gemmam proponi quam in hac præcellentissima sanctorum aula inter beatorum scilicet parentum suorum regum insignia et inter apostolicorum Anglice renovationis princōpin splendentia candelabra?'\textsuperscript{72} Iam illam, credo, huc inuitant ipsi progenitores sui reges, quorum purpurās condecorat eternaliter uernans rosa quorumque ipsa est corona. Iam adducunt sibi diūini patres, archipresules et abbates in letitia, quos tota uirtute ac dilectione emulata est filia.\textsuperscript{73} Dignius itaque in hac arce preclara, inter tanta luminaria venerata rumque officia, lucebit hec lampas siderea quam in ilia desolata ubi iam uilescit ecclesia.' Hec memorabiliter prefatus omniumque comitatus, postpositum iter explet deuotus, gentibus et linguis gratiosus quod, regnorum basileus, apostolicus excessisset peregrinus. Rome quoque exorata precelsorum apostolorum soluendi et patrocinandi potentia, ubi regia litat dona, quod de beata Mildretha spoponderat prefati pontificis hortatu sedulo confirmat, quo spersere redeat.

\textsuperscript{71} Alfwinus A, Ælwinus B. See above, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{72} ‘... know that I promise to endow this his sacrosanct habitation munificently and, what is richer than all our pomp, I promise to make it illustrious by the translation of the most blessed virgin Mild rhith (if only the will of God should favour this). For where was there ever a place more suitable for this holy and royal jewel to be placed than in this preeminent hall of the saints, in other words, among the memorials of her blessed royal relatives and among the splendid candelabra of the apostolic princes who brought about the renewal of England? ’ Goscelin is referring to the functions of St. Augustine’s Abbey as a burial place of the kings of Kent and the early archbishops of Canterbury. See EH 1.33.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘Now in happiness the divine fathers, archbishops and abbots lead her to them, they whom the girl emulated in all virtue and love.’
Regressus tandem feliciter cum apostolica absolutione ac benedictione ad Anglicum oceanum, obuia suorum classe letissime excipitur ac deductus. Fauebat grata maris temperies et uenti comites, librant ad summum uela naute gratulantes. Iam mediate latio transversa, iam patria oculis hausta, insolesciant securitate uaga pectora. \textit{Turn regia fiducia plus forte intendebat regnum quam gubernatorem suum Augustinum.} Pungendus erat et docendus, cuius hactenus patrocinio esset deductus. Repente ergo horrida tempestas exoritur; mare subuertitur, procellosis montibus ad sidera surgit et in Tartara dehiscit. Puppes iactantur turbinibus et inter fluctuosos scopulos ac infernos gurgites pendula prora subitam voraginem. 

\textit{Insequitur clamorque virum, stridorque rudentum.} Pro ludo subiit letalis terror, pro gaudio plangor; presentemque uiris intentant omnia mortem. Rex ipse, qui se putauerat totum imperium suum, querula uoce notum inclamitat sui Augustini patrocinium: \textquoteleft Ad hocne' inquit \textquoteleft pater sancte, hucusque illesum deduxisti, ut sepelires in hac lacuna pelagi et marinarum beluarum traderes ingluuiei? An sepulchra non erant peregrino tuo in tanto terrarum spatio nisi in hac abysso? Quis ultra presumet de tuis subsidies si tantopere me tibi commendatum desueris? Succurre iam succurre, mi pater Augustine, et erue naufragum tuum solita subuentione ab instanti nece quatinus, una cum pretioso coadiutricis Mildrethe thesauro, uota mea reddam Domino in suo sancto. 


\textquoteleft Now, having crossed half the ocean and having drunk in their homeland with their eyes, the breasts of the wanderers became puffed up with a feeling of security. Now perhaps the king was placing all his trust in his kingdom rather than in his governor, Augustine.' Although the syntax of the second sentence is complicated by the fact that \textit{fiducia} is made the subject, the above seems to be Goscelin's meaning.

\textquoteleft ... the heaving bows were left hanging over a horrid void.' The vocabulary and imagery of this and the preceding sentence seem to be derived from Virgil, \textit{Aeneid} 1.102-107. The presentation of the whole incident of the storm seems in fact to have been inspired by the storm which Juno inflicted on Aeneas' fleet and which Neptune calmed (ibid. 1.81-156).

\textit{suum om. B.}

\textquoteleft The king himself, who had thought that his whole empire was then in his hands, also began to despair of his life and to look for no more from the rule of his four kingdoms than a place to be buried.'

\textit{sanc{t}o suo C.}
tu presides, templo.' Vix preces finierat et ecce ad nomen dilecti Deo presulis, cui Dominus amicissime diceret (ut intimo Moysi) 'Nouite ex nomine', evangelicum Dominici imperii miraculam apparuit.\textsuperscript{82} Extimplo enim omnis furor aeris et ponti uelut tenebre a facie lucis euaniu, utque populosa sedition a terrore potentioris presentie conquieuit.\textsuperscript{83} Fit dicto citius magna tranquillitas, mira serenitas atque a periculo gratior multo\textsuperscript{84} securitatis iucunditas. Ita celeberrimus Augustinus uirtutibus probauit se presentem\textsuperscript{85} adesse, et uidebatur proloqui in clamantibus leta rerum facie: 'Ecce assum: quid uocasti me?' 'Qualis est hic' dicebant et mirantes naute 'cui in uice Domini qui mirabilis est in sanctis suis parent elementa, obediunt uenti et mare?' Et quid mirum si imperat flatibus uentorum, qui dominatur spiritibus aeriarum potestatum? Nichil ergo rex damni pertulit uel rerum uel hominum in tanto turbine, ut sciret sanctum ductorem suum se probare uelle, non ledere.\textsuperscript{86} Nil agunt ale nauium cessantibus uentis; frustra protenduntur carbasa; naute remis nituntur ad litora. Hoc itaque miraculum terra pelagoque potentis Augustini haud onerosum uideatur\textsuperscript{87} in hac serie gloriose uirginis Mildrethe recenseri, siue proprium siue commune utriusque,\textsuperscript{88} cum illa iam unum idemque cenobium eius sortita sit cohabitationis et caritatis unanimitate.

\textit{xii}

Vbi ergo rex litus optatum contigit, sua Anglia congaudens occurrit, letis sinibus parentem suum excipit; turbe ecclesiarem solenniter candidate obuiam procedunt, canoris laudibus salutant, expetunt et conducunt. Ille haud immemor liberatoris sui cum omnibus ad precellentissimum Augustinum contendit. Susceptus omnium iubilo preces et uota sua regaliter persoluit, narransque omnibus prosperitatis uel temptationis sue seriem in celum gratias agit. Suggestionem episcopi \textit{Elfwin}\textsuperscript{89} de translatione sancte Mildrethe letissime annuit, ipsumque monasterii patrem \textit{Elfstanum} in diem Pentecostes iam imminentem uenire ad se precepit. Venit, immo ipsum diem prescriptum anteuenit, et in illo sancto Sabbato regis donum, regina Emma simul fauente, totumque desiderium suum cum regis litteris Deo aspirante optuinuit.\textsuperscript{90} Nec moram passus nec requiem (iuxta illud poeticum Lucani, 'necuit differre

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Ex 33:17, and Mt 8:26, Mc 4:37 and Lc 8:22.
\textsuperscript{83} The image of the storm as a popular sedition is taken from Virgil, \textit{Aeneid} 1.148-156.
\textsuperscript{84} multa B.
\textsuperscript{85} uirtutibus se probauit se presentem A.
\textsuperscript{86} '... so that he should know that his saintly leader wanted to test and not harm him.'
\textsuperscript{87} uideretur B.
\textsuperscript{88} ustrisque B.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Alfuinu} AC.
\textsuperscript{90} Formerly queen of King \textit{Æthelred} II, Emma was married to Cnut in 1017 (\textit{ASC} s.a.).
paratis91): eodem Sabbato rediit et crastino in Tanetum beate Mildrethe hospitium, ipso scilicet die Pentecostes, peruenit.92 Qui quamuis regia suiue domini auctoritate munitus sit, tamen efferum populi animum (dissimulato negotio ne quid turbaretur) prudenter eludit. Ingenti et uario conuiuiorum apparatu turbam primorum et plebis asciscit, suisque ministrantibus uel conuiuantibus sobrietatem priuatim indicit. Post epulas letum ducere tam solennem diem postulat, ipse a conuiuio quasi ab itinere fessus declinat causamque aduentus docte dissimulat.93

Sub noctem omnibus infatigata amministratione fatigatis et ad sua regressis, peruigil pater cum fidissimis et electissimis monachis ac militibus suis, quos prouide adduxerat, gloriose Mildrethe ecclesiam tanquam suam capellam intrat, ostia intrinsecus diligenter94 offirmat et quasi cuncta sibi in manus data exultat.95 Itaque prelibata oracione cum diuina reuerentia et tremore ad celestis thesauri tumbam accedunt, amouendo operculo manus cum ferramentis incutient. Quid enim nisi protinus cessurum uiribus96 lapidem crederent, primo modestius, deinde acrius instant.97 Deficiunt inanes conatus. Insurgunt, impellunt, insudant, et lapis instar scopuli manet immotus. Stupent brachia, languent uires, et contra omnia ferramenta saxum eis uertitur in calibem et clauos et malleos et secures retundit. Iam multum noctis transierat et nichil promouerant. Cum mora sit furtis contraria, non parum eos uexabat hec mora. Ad hec memorabilis pater, multa secum uoluens, ingemuit diuque elusos conatus cessare precepit. 'Aidis' inquit 'armis hec duricies uincenda est.' Itaque cum omnibus in orationem procidit et inter lacrimosa suspiria in tales questus prorupit: 'Heu beata domina! Que est hec offensio nostra, que auersio tua? Si hinc abduci uis cur resistis? Si uero renuis cur irritos labores imposuisti nobis?'

91 Lucan, Bellum ciuile 1.281.
92 This reference to a hospice of St. Mildrith is presumably evidence of active pilgrimage to her shrine, although Goscelin may of course be referring to a hospice which existed in his own time but may not have existed in Ælfstan's.
93 'After the meal he asked that such a day of festival should be spent happily, and he himself left the banquet (as if tired from his journey), cunningly concealing the real purpose of his coming.'
94 diligenter om. A.
95 For a discussion of the literary tradition and general significance of presenting translations as thefts (as Goscelin does here), see P. J. Geary, Furta sacra. Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages (Princeton, 1978).
96 suis uiribus B.
97 'For, believing nothing less than that the stone would at once yield to their strength, they attacked it, at first moderately, then fiercely.'

xiv

Panditur ut arca testamenti uirginalis apoteca; lucent oculis aurea pignora ut cerea mella. Verum precurrant bibulas nares incomparabilia odoramenta, omnen suauitatem spirantia. Eminus sentitur quod querebatur, antequam penitus uideat. Impletur intrinsecus ecclesia extrinsecus atria, omnesque inebriat effusa thimiamata uelut ab uberrimo fonte dulcedinis late erumpentia flumina. Reddebat scilicet nardiflua uirgo antiqua aromata, que supra scriptus in prima translatione sub abbatissa Eadburga late respersa, quando inuenta est ut uiuens integra. Nunc autem resoluto corpore in pulcherrimum partum et natiuitatem resurrectionis, tanquam tritis pigmentis dedit odorum perhennis. Igitur gaudentibus cunctis, sicut exultant victores capta preda, preclarus pater una cum fratribus reuerentissime cum incenso orationum accedit, oblata diuinitis pignora cum tremore colligit et, ut auarius auri ac gemmarum, totas reliquias exhaurit uixque ipsum puluerem pigmentarium orbate plebi relinquit. Ipsi fratres, impigi seruiiores, sacra spolia nitidis lintheis
excipiunt et parato scrinio inuoluta reponunt. Onus suave imponitur feretro, operitur pretioso pallio atque effertur euangelice quaterno humero,\textsuperscript{106} scilicet ab ipso abbate preclaro, a domno decano Goduuino, a confratribus honorificentis Benedicto et Rodulfo, ut erant columnæ monasterii insignes, persone honorabiles et sacre religionis proceres. Hoc diuino curru, hac quadriga Dei, cum indefessissi ymnis et precibus transportatur arca Domini.

\textit{xv}

Vix ad naues peruenerant, uix cum beato triumpho et suis omnibus intrauerant, cum repente hac fama plebs concitata undique accurrit armata. Dat animos et in pastorem suam semisopita grassatur temulentia.\textsuperscript{107} Lam uolucri cimba in tractum sagitte a terra abrepta, populus irruens ripam occupat acie glomerata. Quorum unus prestantior, Lyfstanus nomine,\textsuperscript{108} clamabat in abbatem librata cuspide: ‘Elfstane, Elfstane, nisi michi herili uidereris prestare, iam scirent latera tua uim huius dextere, quid hoc posset missile, quid reposceretur a te.’ Sed ad hec iactata inuentum iurgia taciti preteruolant, quibus tunc fugiendi cura erat, non disputandi. At minis suis frustrata in talen querimoniam plebis uertitur ira: ‘Quare, domina, a nativa hereditate tua tanto seculo inhabitata recedis et a propriis ad aliena transis? Quo reatu nostro nos relinquis? Quid debitorum tibi uel ecclesie tue non persoluimus?’ Ad hos planctus, quasi benigna uirgine respiciente, uidebantur brachia remigum languescere et nauis resistere uelle. Verum attention prece monachorum (ut iumentum stimulis) impulsa, euadit iam et minantium uultus et discrimina. Redit plebs confusa ad ecclesiam, gemit desolationem suam et suae negligentie culpam. Nec tamen beatam matrem totam amiserat cuius sacratissime carnis salutifer puluis remanserat, nec desinit consolari plebem suam crebrisque miraculis ac revelationibus suam ibidem nichilominus monstrare presentiam, quorum consequenti loco dabimus evidentiam.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{xvi}

At felicissimus abbas, ubi ad terram deuenit, tante glorie preconem celerrimum populis et monasterio suo dirigit, occurrere fratres cum omni plebe,
cum omni dignitate precipit. Fama dulciflua uernantibus alis ubique refundit tante fraglantie suauitatem, ac si fumus aromatum totum impleat aereum. Vndique occurritur; rura, domus, urbes uacuantur; postpositis rerum negotiis una processionis festiuitas agitur; tota obuiam Cantia effunditur. Vna omnium iubilatio, una uox exultationis et salutis, unica omnes tripudia ingeminant: 'Mildretha nobis uenit beata, beata uenit nobis Mildretha. Benedicta que uenit nobis\textsuperscript{110} in nomine Domini.'\textsuperscript{111} Sed frons huius letitie et signifera tota ornamentis suis induitur Augestini ducis ecclesia; et de hac arce et aula Dominica sua progradationem familia, monachorum scilicet et clericorum caterua festiue candidata purpureisque et aurotextis cultibus splendida.\textsuperscript{112} Augent sacratum cetum et alienum ecclesiariam collegia. Quicquid honoris erat et sacrorum in celestis aduene certatim effertur ambitum. Attolluntur gemmis et auro radiantia Christi trophea, cruces auree et fulgida uexilla, aurea sanctorum scrinia, aurei textus et philacteria, candelabra, turibula et thimiamateria sancti solaribus radiis respondentia et cuncta in sponsam Domini proferuntur ecclesie monilia. Iam extra urbe miliarium turbis anhelanter progressis occurrit uirgo Deo amabilis, angelis et hominibus desiderabilis, inuicta gratissime deuotorum fratrum humeris. A cuius aspectu letissimo mox una cum clero tertio in faciem ruit uniuersa multitude, Sanctam scilicet Trinitatem ad illud templum sanctum suum adorando, in quo sibi Christus perpetuam mansionem fecerat cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto. Ipse in ea adoratur qui et suscipitur.\textsuperscript{113} Tunc illud odoriferum corpus, illud celeste thimiamaterium, crematis aromatibus incensatur; tunc laudisonus ymnus resultantis choree in astra tollitur, cimbala et organa concrepantur simulque et dulcimodis canoribus et nardifluis uaporibus ethera permulcentur. Cantus et fletus uariantur uno gaudio, cumulatur populosa oblatio. Addunt choros senes et iuuenes, matres et uirgines ac letanias vel sacras laudes docte conjubilant patria uoce.\textsuperscript{114} Congratulantur superna contubernia et summis et imis Deum collaudantibus una consonat ecclesia. Videres fidei oculis et ipsos angelicos patres, Augustinum, Laurentium, Mellitum, Theodorum ceterosque diuine aule consulares\textsuperscript{115} sedibus suis assurgere, leto occursu filiiam.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{nobis} om. B.

\textsuperscript{111} Mt 23:39; Mc 11:9; Lc 13:35; Jo 12:13.

\textsuperscript{112} 'But the vanguard and standard-bearer of this happiness, the church of the leader Augustine, adorned herself with ornaments; and, from this citadel and hall of the Lord, his family came out, a crowd of monks and clerics dressed in white in festive style and splendidly adorned with purple and cloth-of-gold.'

\textsuperscript{113} 'At the sight of her the entire crowd, together with the joyful clergy, fall on their faces three times in adoration of the Holy Trinity in that holy church, in which Christ had made a perpetual dwelling for himself with the Father and the Holy Spirit. He himself is adored in the church into which he is received.'

\textsuperscript{114} Goscelin seems to be implying that the laity participated in the vernacular.

\textsuperscript{115} The persons named were archbishops of Canterbury respectively from 597-604, 604-619, 619-624 and 668-690. The other 'consuls' whom Goscelin had in mind presumably included.
dilectionis sue excipere, regiam sponsam Domini gloriose deducere et celestem regiam nouo thalamo inferre, nouo thoro collocare, quam tali uoto in suum sisterent habitaculum: 'Benedicta filia tu a Domino, mane nobiscum in eternum.' Tali supernorum et infimorum triumpho in principalem celestium ianitorum Petri et Pauli ecclesiam omni nitore suo redimitam uirgo triumphalis Mildretha inuehitur, et ante principale altare, loco deo parato, cum gloria et indefessis concentibus thesaurizatur, ubi perpetua ueneratione signisque ac uisionibus clarificatur. Nec dubium etiam precellentissimos apostolos, obvia congratulatio, carissimum pignus paterno sinu collegisse et hoc splendidissimum ornamentum de humilior ad sullimiorem domum suam transpositum triumphasse.

xvii

In cuius salutiferu aduentu ut appareret terrigenis\textsuperscript{117} etiam supernas uirtutes congraudere, protinus misericordiam celi distillauere et signa salutis dedere, Domino dante benignitatem et terra nostra fructum suum.\textsuperscript{118} Iam enim ultra trium mensium tempora, quibus semina rerum sumerent incrementa, parturientibus terris negabatur nutrix pluuia. Squalebat mundi facies macie et ariditate, et pro uirectis ac uernali flore senescere orbis cepit antequam pubescere. Defluxerant camporum come, caluities erat pro gramine, sterilitas pro germine, uastitas pro ubertate, desperatio uite desperatis prouentibus terre. In beate ergo Mildrethe presentia cuncta sunt restitutione. Celum dedit pluuiam et terra dedit fructum suum. Nam in ipso eius translatiuo aduentu tantus torrens imbrium inundauit, ut Heliam post trium annorum sterilitatem uenisse crederes.\textsuperscript{119} Recepit mundus decorem suum et rediuiua tellus reddit uerna gramina, pingit prata floribus et credita semina\textsuperscript{120} germinat in fructus. O dilecte Deo virginis gratia in qua mortalibus tanta proueniunt beneficia! Siccitate omnia moriebant; in huius declaratione omnia renascuntur. Tali nimirum

\textsuperscript{116} Mildrith's relics occupied this position only until the time of Abbot Wulfric (1047-59), who moved them into the north porticus in the course of his attempt to reconstruct the church. When the church was successfully rebuilt by the Norman abbots Scotland (1070-87) and Wido (1087-93), the relics were enshrined in the crypt of the new church. See W. St J. Hope, 'Recent Discoveries in the Abbey-Church of St. Austin', \textit{Archaeologia} 66 (1915) 390.

\textsuperscript{117} terrigenis s.s. C.

\textsuperscript{118} 'The heavenly powers, so that they might show earth-dwellers that they too rejoiced in Mildrith's salutary coming, at once distilled the mercy of heaven and gave signs of salvation, with the Lord giving his good-will and the earth its fruit.'

\textsuperscript{119} On Elijah's role in bringing rain, see 3 Reg 18:41-45.

\textsuperscript{120} credita semina: 'the seeds entrusted to it.'
signo ostendere voluit quod ad electum perpetue mansionis locum peruerit. Hic igitur (sicut pater Elfstanus pro omnibus et presentibus et posteris pollicitus est et effect) ad eius uitalem tumulum, parata ara, cotidie matutinalis missa in tante adiutricis patrocinia asiduatur, cotidie ipsa inter sanctorum iubilos recolitur et dies huius acceptissime translationis, huius salutaris usitationis, huius presentationis et letitie perhennis, dies que nunquam occidat in cordibus nostris, annuatim celebratur uotisque ac meritis mutuo hoc debetur ut indelebiliter celebretur. Que lucifera translatio acta constat anno Incarnationis Christi millesimo tricesimo, die Quinto decimo Kalendas Iunii, sub Benedicto apostolico Rome, Henrico imperatore, Cnutu Anglo orbis rege, Egelnotho Dorobernie archipresule, Elfstano huius triumphi baiulo, summi Augustini auguste domus rectore.

xviii

Iam inclita Mildretha promissio thalamo collocata, revelaciones ipsius et miracula, que oculis uidimus uel uidemus, assidue par est etiam lectione uel paeca de multis recolere ut, que cognouimus uisa, nepotes nostri post nos uideant et hereditent scripta. Igitur post regem Cnutum filii eius Haroldus quinquennio, Hardecnutus biennio, nam is subita morte raptus est, regna cum uita terminauerunt. Sic, Dei prouidentia ordinante omnia prout uult, suscepit Anglia indigenam regem Eaduuardum, Ethelredo rege et Emma progenitum. Quo Salomonica pace regnante, ipsa eius genitrix accusabatur regem Norduuegorum, Magnum nomine, ad inuadendum Anglicum imperium concitasse suosque thesauros infinites secum illi dedidisse. Hinc proditrix

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121 For the manner in which Mildrith's feast was observed at St. Augustine's Abbey, see Customary of the Benedictine Monasteries of Saint Augustine, Canterbury, and Saint Peter, Westminster, ed. E. M. Thompson, 2 vols. (Henry Bradshaw Society 23, 28; London, 1902-1904), 1.375, 377, 382 and 432, and 2.255, 260, 281 and 310, inter alia.

122 die eras. B, om. A.

123 Kenuto AC.

124 Goscelin repeats this clause dating Mildrith's translation in his 'Contra usurpatores' (HP, p. 84). The persons mentioned are: Pope Benedict ix (1033-48); either Emperor Henry ii (1002-24) or Henry iii (1039-56); King Cnut (1016-35); Ethelnoth, archbishop of Canterbury (1020-38); and Abbot Elfstan (1023 x 7-1045/6). The date 1030 clearly cannot be right and must be an error for 1035, in which year Whitsunday did indeed fall on 15 Kal. Iunii (18 May). In that case, the emperor's name must also be an error, the emperor in 1035 being Conrad and not Henry. See Barlow, 'Two Notes', 651.

125 Kenutum AC.

126 terminarunt B. Harold Harefoot, king of England (1035/6-40), and Harthacnut, king of England (1040-42). The dates are problematic (HBC, p. 30).

127 Edward the Confessor, king of England (1042-66). B reads 'Æduuardum'.

128 Emma's disgrace, which occurred in 1043, is also described in ASC (D) s.a. and in Florentii Wigorniensis monachi Chronicon ex chronicis, ed. B. Thorpe, 2 vols. (London, 1848-
regni, hostis patrie, insidiatrix filii iudicatur, uniuersaque substantia eius regni proscriptitur. Wintonie morabatur, ibi tota diripitur. Franguntur conclavea, penetraria, reserantur clausa, rimantur archana. Euerunt congestos regum thesauros, montes auri et argenti fulgidos. Extrahunt thecas et scrinia diuiliarum, insignia ornamentorum, uasa gemmea, aurea et argentea, et uix in plebeio cultu relinquitur uastata. Clamabat inter impuros dilapidatores anhela: 'Si non parcitis mulieri saltem parceretis duorum regum coniugi et regum genitrici.' 129 O ingens exemplum humane mutationis! Illa modo opulentissima, repente contrita est. Hodie regina, Hodie et mendica! Modo in regali solio, modo equata solo! De tam alta facta est tam infima; paulo ante proceres pascens, nunc pane indigens! Cuius opibus uix suffecerat regnum, nunc nimium est solitarius cubiculum. Quam omnes beatificabant, iam omnes proboant. Augebant delicatam mentem ignota penuria, abiectionis ignominia, parricidalis infamia. Omnium aspectus et colloquia fugiebat, nullum respicere pre merore poterat. Tanto igitur calamitatum baratro absorbt, emersit tandem ad salutem benignissime Mildrethe uisitatione et gratia. Quadam namque nocte fessam angustiis mentem in somnum reclinanti puella refulsit gloriosa, forma siderea rerum pulchritudinem superare uisa, sacro uelamine (quod est insigne castitatis et divinae desponsationis) mire decorata. Hec tenebrosam tristitiarum nubem proscindit luce iocunda et allocutione blanda 'Quare' inquit 'merore consumeris? Pro rebus perituris cur te perdis? Indignissimum est professioni Christiane infima dampna infimo sensu pueriliter lugere, eternum animum pro fugitiva specie affligere, cum cadentibus cadere et ad sempiternas opes nulla spe consurgere. Quam nichil sint terre diuitie pereundo te docuere, que a te cum amatoribus suis defecere; proinde bonum est sperare in Domino quam in principibus et thesauris pecunie. 130 Attamen, ne diutius tribuleris, obaudi meis consiliis et beate Mildrethe apud sanctum Augustinum quiescentis implora solacium, missis muneribus tuis. Eius enim suffragis priori dignitati tue restitueris et omnes persecutores tuos indulgentiam a te suppliciter flagitare videbis.' Tum regina uel lumine virginis uel consolatione releuata 'Quam te esse' ait 'O domina, credam que michi tam dignabilem polliceris clementiam?' Ad hec urigo quasi subridens celesti letitia 'Vt credas' inquit 'que uides sine ulla

49), 1.197. Neither mention suspected collusion with Magnus, king of Norway, as a reason. Barlow is sceptical of Goscelin's account of Magnus' involvement but accepts the essence of his statement that Emma was reconciled to Edward. See Barlow, 'Two Notes', 651-55 and Edward the Confessor (London, 1970), pp. 77-78.

129 Emma was wife successively of Ethelred ii and Cnut, and she was mother of Edward the Confessor.

130 'Their disappearance was intended to teach you the nothingness of earthly riches, which have failed you together with those who loved them; hence it is better to hope in the Lord than in princes (Ps 117:9) and in treasures of money.'
fantasie suspicione esse uera, ipsa sum cuius opem te exposcere suadeo Mildretha, quam transferri fecisti\textsuperscript{131} de Taneto insula, cuius interuentu diuina tibi presto sunt solacia.' Dehinc regina euigilans ita erat ab omni tristitie plaga curata, ita gratulata ac si iam promissis fuisset donata. Nec mora mutuo\textsuperscript{132} expetitos uiginti solidos (nichil enim de suo habebat) mittit ipsi sanctissime consolatrici sue Mildredetha ad Augustinianum cenobium per quendam militem suum \textit{Ægeluuerdum} Spearka cognominatum,\textsuperscript{133} abbatii \textit{Ælfstano} et fratribus mandans humillime ne dedignarentur suscipere et clementer ignoscerent sibi grauiter erubescenti pro tam exiguo munere, quod nec de suo proprio modo potuerit dare, cum ipsi scirent se magnificentius et liberalius assuetam beneficia expendere, si uero fallere nescia Mildretha reuelationem et promissionem suam comprobaret sibi ueram, iam illustrioribus largitionibus se gratias relaturam.

Abbas ergo et fratres, ubi tam pium respectum uise \textsuperscript{134} virginis ex nuntio regine atque oblatione ad uirginei monumenti altare facta suscepere, orationem protinus cum gratiarum actione fudere ut Dominus, qui erigit elisos et sanat contritos, quesite Mildredetha interuentu releuaret regine sensus destitutes.\textsuperscript{135}

Quid multa? Eodem tempore rex erubuit materne iniurie, recognoscit filius genitricem, reuocat earn in pristinam dignitatem, ab ipsa petit ueniam quam clamauerat ream. Omnis honor simul cum tota\textsuperscript{136} substantia redditur, uel amplior additur. Omnis accusator et raptor confunditur. Idem filius,\textsuperscript{137} qui ma- tris adversarius iudicatur, eiusque indulgentiam quisquis leserat flagitat, ne puniat. Reuersus iam celer nuntius, ac si sibi\textsuperscript{138} dictum esset illud evang- licum, \textit{Vade, filius tuus uiuit}\textsuperscript{139} aut illud Chananea, \textit{Fiat tibi sicut uis},\textsuperscript{140} uidet insperatum gaudium; inuenit dominam suam de pauperie ditissimam, de abiecta precelsam, de lacrimante iocundissimam; ita plane per adiuuantissimam Mildretham odium regine in gratiam, ignominia in gloriam, tristitia uertitur in letitiam.

\textsuperscript{131} fecitis BC.
\textsuperscript{132} mutuo B, corr. from mutuos A: mutuos C.
\textsuperscript{133} It is not possible to identify this person. The name \textit{Æthelweard} was a fairly common one (Searle, \textit{Onomasticon} s.n.).
\textsuperscript{134} uise corr. from pie C: pie A.
\textsuperscript{135} 'When they received such a pious token of respect as the virgin had given in her apparition (and which they had learned of from the queen’s messenger and from the oblation made at the altar of the virgin’s shrine), therefore the abbot and brethren began at once to pour out prayers and thanksgivings, so that the Lord, who raises the fallen and heals the repentant, might raise up the queen’s destitute condition by the intervention of Mildrith to whom she had directed her prayers.’
\textsuperscript{136} tota om. C.
\textsuperscript{137} filii ABC.
\textsuperscript{138} ihi A.
\textsuperscript{139} Jo 4:50.
\textsuperscript{140} Mt 15:28, being a reference to the story of the Canaanite woman whose daughter was possessed.
Iuuat hinc uicissim recolere quibus indiciis etherea uirgo, tarn in Taneto insula antique habitationis sue quam ubi nunc permanet corpore, beatam presentiam suam dignata sit reuelare. Memorabilis pater Ælfstanus, quadrien-nio languens ante obitum, probatissimum uirum Wulfricum, prepositum, successorem sibi ordinari in suo monasterio iuxta sui iuris autenici priuilegium fecit cum favore omnium fratrum. Is et egrotanti ministrum et defuncto emulum se prebebat fidissimum. Deuotione uero erga sanctam dominam Mildretham eundem patrem referebat yElfstanum. Solebat enim per singulos annos in die sui triumphalis transitus antiquum templum eius et monumentum in predicta insula cum fratribus reuisere laudesque ibidem diuinas summo festiuitatis tripudio celebrare. Inundabat ad hec solennia gaudia non solum tota insula sed et exterius optimatum et populi ampla uicinia, quos liberalissima abbatis caritas gaudebat opulentissimo conuiuio ac plenis domibus excipere, atque omnibus non tantum celestibus ymnis utiam terrestribus epulis affectum uirginis infundere. Quodam igitur tempore huius festiuitatis annuue venit ex consuetudine, assumptis secum fratribus tarn proprie quam Christi Ecclesie quos, primi et unici institutoris pietate, unum corpus esse unanimi affectabat caritate. Iam nocturnis concentibus abbate cum monachis ac plebe fidelium solenniter inuigilante, dispensator ipsius seculi dignitate non inflmus, uocabulo Brihtricus, in cubiculo abbatis dormiebat totis sensibus. Cumque iam tertium ordinem nocturnorum euangelica pronuntiatio Trinitati dedicaret,
ille potens somnista iuxta uidet puellam, uultu et habitu splendidissimo radiantem seseque pede pulsantem ac talibus uerbis increpantem: ‘Quid hic’ inquit ‘tibi negotii?’ 147 Ille tremens ad maiestatem aspectus etherei ‘Seruo’ ait ‘O domina, domum et res domini mei.’ Que uultu minaci subintulit: ‘Mea custodia, non tua, hactenus et hic locus et tota hec defensata est insula. An tua prouidentior est somnolentia quam mea uigilantia? Quanto salubrius nunc cum ceteris interesses diuinis excubiis, Conditori et Largitori omnium gratias personantibus quam faciem meo presidio poscentibus, quam hic premereris inerti sommo sepultus!’ Talibus dictis animosa insistens acrem illi in faciem urenti palma alapam incussit. Ab ictu repente sopore et stratu exturbatur, raptoque birro ut amens et persecutorem fugiens cursim in oratorium fertur; perque chorum medium psallentium raptus ad uirginis tumbam prostermitur, ibique prolixa oratione magna omnium huius novitatis ammiratione tenetur.148 Post matutinas laudes abbas aduocatum militem an sane mentis sit percunctatur, qui Dominicum chorum tam stolido incursu theatrum sibi facere non uereretur.149 Ille ostentans urentem adhuc a superno uerbere maxillam ‘Nescio’ ait ‘utrum adhuc uideatur quod eotenus sentio. Me vero non stolide, nec insana mente, sed magno terroris impulsu ecclesiam irrupisse scio.’ Referensque tremende apparitionem uirginis et correptionem, claram dedit omnibus astipulationis sue fidei per conspicuum adhuc districte ferule ruborem. Quod signum protinus fidelis abbas omnibus demonstrauit atque inde omnes in ammirationem et preconium ac uenerationem Dominice sponse amplius exactuit.

XX

In Augustiniana quoque basilica ubi iam requiescit uirginalis gleba, consimili signo nuper sub abbate Scollando150 est manifestata, quatinus et priori et presenti habitationi iugiter presidere eadem cognoscatur Mildretha. Res ita est declarata. In annua uirginis festiuitate, que priorum uotis ut premonstrauimus summis equatur celebratibus, cum iam esset ad sacras uigilias surgendum, totum pariter cimbalorum personabat classicum more precipuorum dierum.151 Post completum autem tinnitum unus ex sonorum ministris, ubi in porticu

147 In the absence of a breviary from St. Augustine’s Abbey, it is not possible to say what text is being referred to here.
148 ‘... and there by his long prayer he was held in great admiration by all because of the novelty of this.’
149 ‘After matins, the abbot summoned this knight and asked him whether or not he was of sane mind, seeing that he did not fear to make the Lord’s choir a stage for himself with such a rude incursion.’
150 Scotland (1070-87).
151 See above, p. 172.
beati Augustini orauit, ante altare et mausoleum gloriose uirginis assedit.\textsuperscript{152} Sedentem quies, quietem signites, signitiem sopor, soporem usio occupat. Vidit enim clausis in dormitionem malpebris sanctimoniale uirginem, inestimabili decore perlucidam, de tumba sua tanquam de thalamo proceden-
tem sibique minaciter imminentem. Que protinus elata palma alapam illi
protruit ingentem, docens eum modo\textsuperscript{153} tacito uerbo et loquaci uerbere
oratorium hie non dormitorium esse. Sic ille attactus celerrime a somno et sede
sua exilii miroque modo, sicut prius clausis oculis et dormiens uiderat pro-
deuntem, ita prorsus isdem nunc luminibus apertis et aperte uigilans conspicit
redeuntem tumbamque suam sueluntem. Tantus autem terror hunc a sacro
loco repulit ut per medium chori precipiti fuga excurreret, nec abbatis nec totius
contubernii eum reuereintia cohiberet. Quem cum secretarius de tam irreuereinti
exitu redargueret et an sobrii sensus haberetur inquireret, iureiurando satisfecit
quanta fuisset tremefactus et dormiens et uigilans uisione, quanta propulsus
percussione, nunquam se talem in utia alapam sustinuisse. Quod ubi
sagacissimus abbas diligenti inuestigatione et ueritatis assertione uerum
probauit, tantum signum in laudem Dei celebrare non distulit. Notandum
autem quomodo in superiori reuelatione apud Tanetum inclita uirgo dor-
mirem cesum a cubiculo usque ad suum monumentum per medium psallentium
fugere compulerit, hie uero hunc alterum a suo tumulo similiter per medium
chori profugum expulerit. Is ipse uocatur Hunfredus, tunc sancti Augustini
portarius nunc sancti Wandregisili monachus.\textsuperscript{154}

Redeundum est rursum ad insulam uirginalem ut utriusque loci candidissi-
mam presidem clarioribus indiciis monstremus, nunc hic nunc illic uice
Luciferi sese referentem. Quam hic narramus reuelationem, tam habemus
claram quam prefato abbati Scollando probabiliter destinatam. Iusserat prior
Willelmus rex totam uastari Tanetum ne foret presidio imminenti exercitui
Danorum.\textsuperscript{155} Hinc illud sacratissimum apostolorum Petri et Pauli ac uirginei
monumenti templum uetustate et rariors\textsuperscript{156} plebiis negligentia iam erat
desolatum atque ad omnem celi iniuriam diruptis tegulis patebat detectum;

\textsuperscript{152} According to a fifteenth-century plan of the abbey-church of St. Augustine in Cambridge,
Trinity Hall ms. 1, St. Mildrith's tomb-altar was in fact in a chapel adjacent to that occupied by
the shrine of St. Augustine. For a facsimile and discussion of the plan, see Local Maps and Plans
\textsuperscript{153} modo om. AC.
\textsuperscript{154} St. Wandrille (Normandy). Hunfrith is an English name.
\textsuperscript{155} According to ASC s.a., William I laid waste the coastal areas of England in 1085 as a
precaution against the threatened invasion of Cnut, king of Denmark.
\textsuperscript{156} rariors A; in C the first vowel of the word has been erased.
This was the church built by Abbess Eadburg and generally thought to have been on the site of what is now Minster Abbey. See ML, p. 16.

Ælwoldus B.

Ps 112:5; cf. 1 Cor 1:28.

cunctanti AC.

que hanc postponere intentionem uelut fantasticam illusionem aut brute mentis errorem. Dehinc altera sexta feria recurrente, exacte septimane octaua iterum theoreticus ille orationator, uti consueuerat, matutinales vigilias anticipans ad angelice urginis monumentum orabat, cum rursus mente excedens uident omnia eo ordine et tempore quo prius uiderat, quamodo ille apostolicus ierarcha, eadem forma et splendore glorie, urginem per ecclesiæ nauim ad altare usque dedebat. Dumque uirgo de lutoso ornamenti sui squalore querimoniam replicat, dux mysteriarches ad illum spectatorem appropiat ac de neglecto mandato suo districta examinatione increpat penamque interminatur nisi postposita omni dissuasione ac dubietate obediat. Ille continuo pre timore ecclesiam erumpens, presbitero iam matutinis horis interuenienti occurrit, repetite visionis preceptum retexit. At magister, adhuc in sua prudentie obstinacia perdurans, renuit hominem quasi mente captum et tam ignauum sensum spiritu fantastico sollicitat. 'Et putas' inquit 'illum abbatem, uirum eruditum ac reuerendum, tua deliramenta auditurum ne dicam crediturum.' Sic ergo rursus reuocato nuntio, tertia sexta feria successit, que iam in Epiphania Domini obuenit. In qua nocte tertiata uision tertia in cubiculo adhuc quiescenti representatur, ut extra ecclesie asylum multandus caperetur. Astitit illi iam agnoscibilis senior cum priori forma et claritate, sed fulgorem in fulgur indignatio verterat uirgamque manu gerebat, tanquam ille qui in epistolis transgressores territ: an in uirga ueniam ad uos qui occupans desidem? 'Iam' inquit 'in prima mea ammonitione uel secunda comminatione, cum apparitione tam evidentem, satis poteras edoceri te nullo fantasmate ludificari. An adhuc etiam somniare te putas hæc tam clara spectacula iam tercio tibi manifestata? Sed quoniam credidisti alienis eloquiis magis quam tuis oculis, eius nunc crede uerberibus, cuius credere dissimulasti uerbis.' Cum his et huiusmodi increpationibus siluestres animos et rudem hebetudinem cedibus et tumultibus discutit ac domat animaltemque tarditatem trucibus urge plagis ad fidem excitat, ut scriptura prophetizat: Sola uexatio intellectum dabit auditui, ac secundum cuiusdam sententiam: 'Caracteres flunt sibi res.' Resonabat autem uox supplicantis inter supplicia: 'Miserere, domine! Domine, miserere!' Tandem castigator parcens oranti et ultra indubitatam obedientiam pollicenti imperat ocius mandata exequi. Ille cernuus et tremens 'Pareo' inquit 'domine mi, sed quid dicam abbati, quisnam me miserit illi, cum quis sis nesciam, nec te

162 incedens C.
163 pre terrore B.
164 uerum B.
165 Cf. 1 Cor 4:21.
166 Is 28:19.
167 I have been unable to trace the source, if any, of this quotation.
percunctari presumpserim?' Tum senior, et nomine et auctoritate quod abbatia nuntiaret clare insinuans, subiunxit, "Paulus" inquies "apostolus Domini nostri Iesu Christi et beata Domini sponsa Mildretha me mittunt ad te, precipientes summopere quatominus uigilantiiori respectu satagas circa ecclesiam suam pristinas negligentias corrigeres festinesque tecta ipsius redintegrare, sicut amas salutem corporis aut anime. Quamuis enim Dei nutu transmigrauerit et maneat ibi corpore, antiquum tamen habitaculum non desinit recolere." Tum uero contemplator respirans gaudio de sanctorum notitia instat fiducialius signum, petens a ueritate apostolica nullum scilicet sue pusillitatis crediturum sine signi euidentia. 'Et signum' inquit apostolus 'habebit legatio tua.' Atque cum hoc dicto palmam eius capiti super aurem dextram, pansis digitorum radiis, applicuit moxque declivi manu ultro secutam cesariem a cincinni uertice detraxit et ita hominem, quantum sparsa digitorum series occupauerat, decalauauit ut noua cutis, pura et nitida tam ibi quam in palma uel planta, natum pilum uidetur abnegare, nec quicquam uelli frontium nuditati debere. 'Qui non crediderit' inquit apostolus 'uerbo tuo, credet huic signo.' Ad hec uisione disparente, conspector ille, uelut a lecto languoris enitens, ad sacerdotem suum contendit anxie ut attritus et afflictus celesti uerbere, capite operto pre confusione, quod pro densa capillatura insueto loco larga polleret caluatura. Fortasss tamen magis gaudebat de testimonio quam doleret de supplicio. Ad aspectum hominis lacrmosi ita diuinitus attriti et notati contremuit ualide cor presbiteri, sentientis se digniorem percussione, dum quod referenti semel et iterum non crediderat res loqueretur et innocentis pena acerius incredule repugnationi sue comminaretur. Nam si iste ita uapulauit, qui obauditionem quam preposito suo debebat incognite iussioni preposuit, quantam ultionem dissuasor magister commeruit?

Perterritus itaque unde nuntium prius reuocauerat, nunc ut illo festinet omnimodis instigat. Ille continuo impositus mannis (nam nec ambulare nec equum per se ascendere pre castigationis dolore poterat) ad sancti Augustini monasterium deportatur ubi statim, Deo peregrinum adiuuante, monachus abbatis capellanus astans ei insinuatur. Ad cuius pedes fusus optinet ut abbati presentetur. Abbas ut erat prestabilis et humanus, ulro ad aduenam egreditur, suaque mox uestigia prostrato corpore et lacrmosa prece amplementem ut sui miseretur surgere et causam exponere clementer adhortatur. Ille egre se subrigens omnem seriem

168 planta uel palma C.
169 The last clause is obscure. The new skin 'seemed to owe nothing to the nudity of the forehead.'
170 'For if the man was thus flogged who merely placed the attention which he owed to his overseer before the order of an unknown woman, how much greater a punishment did the master who had dissuaded him (from obeying the order) deserve?'
171 '... the monk standing by was made known to him as the abbot's chaplain.'
trine reuelationis pure edisserit, beatum uero Paulum apostolum et beatam uirginem Mildretham nominatim mandare abbati, quatinus tecta ecclesie sue in Taneto restituat et sollicitior circa ipsum locum quam fuerit hactenus existat sicut saluari cupiat. 'Nam primo inquit 'ab apostolo hoc destinatus, secundo negligenes redargutus, tertio uero tantis cedibus ab ipso multatus sum ut uix proloqui, uix stare uel progrediualem.' Cumque abbas sciscitaretur quonam modo tam nouam et insuetam credere posset legationem, ille relecto capite nouam ostentat caluitiem. 'Hoc inquit 'signum inflixit michi apostoli dextera, dum signum ab eo efflagitarem fidei gratia.' Quo uiso alii ex frequentibus iocunde ridere, alii pie compati, omnes uero gratulari cepere de miraculo tam spectabili. Tunc abbas credens certissime extimplo sexaginta solidos impendit fratri preposito Tanetensis insule, indicens attentissime conductis artiflicibus iussum diuinitus opus accelerare. Patris uero congratulatio ad sanctorum gloria non cessabat obnixius cuncta requirere, in nouam hominis notam aspectibus herere, narrata iterum uelle audire, assistentibus et aduentantibus theoreticum nuntium cum diuino indicio ostentare et coram omnibus frequenter inde disputare. Aggaudensque dicebat in fine: 'In omni seculo et turba caluorum, nec uisui nec auditui nostro huius unquam condicionis occurrit caluitium, ut quod anticipiti debebatur ad ueritatis probamentum capillata fronte post timpora requiratur.' Verum hec iniuria sicut negligenti est inflicta, ita obedienti est sanata. Nam post legationem factam prior ad plenum recreuit capillatura, ut sibi ad signum non ad damnum foret correptio diuina. Pensandum uero est in hac tam preclara reuelatione exposita, alma Mildretha quam sit Deo dilecta, quam ille summus dux ecclesiarum et princeps militie Christiane Paulus post Dominicas nuptias uisus est honorifice deducere eiusque postulationi obedire. Mysterium quoque visionis notabile est quod uestes uirginee, que per lutulentum pauimentum sordescebant, ipsa erat ecclesia sua quam inundations contaminabant.

xxii

Sed hinc iterum celestis ierarchie filia, recurrens ad Augustinum suum, ostendat se hic perpetuum elegisse habitaculum et clementie pretendere sinum.

172 The fact that the Minster estate was supervised by a monk rather than being committed entirely to a lay bailiff or 'farmed out' may be an indication of its importance to St. Augustine's Abbey's revenues. See D. Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1948), 1.35.

173 Presumably: 'to fix his gaze on the man's new appearance'.

174 The word anticipiti is obscure. The last clause seems to mean: 'so that what was rendered in order to prove the truth should be sought again after a time in a forehead provided with hair'. Alternatively anticipiti could be emended to ante capiti: 'so that what was owed formerly to the head ....'

Verum erudiebant eum recedentes fautores et pereuntes diuitie melius esse in Domino sperare quam in homine et in thesauris pecuniae. Sepe ergo cum uxore prudente et religiosa tante deiectionis agitans querimoniis, tandem remedii inuenit uiam quatinus diuine pietatis requireret abundantiam. Jam natalicia festiuitas sanctae Margarete uirginis accedebat, que diem feriati transitus alme Mildrethe octauam illustret, et eadem lux ut una uox prime et octaua diapason consonat. Vouit ergo uxore approbante tunc in ipsa vespere precedente quod, crasta solennitate beate Margarete illustrescente, nudis pedibus procederat ad ipsius ecclesiam, duodecim miliariis a ciuitate remotas, quatinus sibi succurreret tante martyris famosa gratia, ad quam frequentes populos attraxerant innumera curationum miracula. Verum ipsa nocte, diuina clementia eius intentionem preueniente, que merita precedit et desiderium pauperum exaudit, suum leuamen in beata Mildretha situm dormienti apparuit. Visum est sibi iter in matutino propositum iam se agere et ad montem qui Berhamdun dicitur deuenire. In cuius ampla planitie dum nudis (uti decreuerat) pedibus protraxit, tres uirgines in sanctimoniali cultu splendidas eminus aduenientes conspicatur, tanti decoris et gratiae ut nichil tale in suis Nimphis et Gratias fingere possent poete. Sed pulcherrimarum pulcherrima erat media et precellentior ornatu et gloria: aurea crux illi in dextra, calix aureus in leua cum aurotextae sindone super niuem candida miraque uarietate florigerata.
fulgoris radios effundebant ut solis diei uirtutem euincere uiderentur aut quasi modo sol uel luna ad mensuram mortalum usus uirginea manu gestaretur. Ad angelicos ignote claritatis aspectus hic rudis contemplator obstupuit et, dum occurrere properat, uel metuit, forte ligamina uel fascamenta femoralium circa crura soluuntur, tardantque eum tanquam carnalia opera dum religantur.\textsuperscript{181} Iam superueniebant illi in loco herenti, suppliciterque contra reuerentem\textsuperscript{182} prior compellat ipsa que preminebat: 'Qua causa' inquit 'aduenisti? Aut quo tendis? Quid uero merore consumeris?' 'Venio' inquit 'O domina, refrigerium paupertatis mee expetere a sancta uirgine Margareta. Iam enim rebus meis inaniter profusis ex opulento et claro coger ad opprobrium generis mei publice cum uxore uite sustentaculum mendicare.' At uirgo, hilari respectu tristem releuans, laudat quod ad fida sanctorum presidia confugerit sique prophetice subiungit: 'Certum quod dico tene, quia Romam ad sanctorum apostolorum suffragia proficisceris faustoque prouentu curarum et tristitiarum tuarum gratum remedium consequeris.' At ille ad tam inopinabile proloquium obstupescens 'Quomodo' ait 'tantum iter arripiam, qui nec uictum diei domi habeam?' Talia eo ore uel mente uersante, pannum inestimabilis candoris ex manica uirgo depromit hoeque illi uelut benedictionis et abundantie munus concedit, hisque uerbis fiduciam addidit: 'Hoc tibi ad uiaticum necessaria ministrabit, hoc beneficio comite nichil tibi deerit, commodare tibi quod postulaueris nullum pigebit. Tu\textsuperscript{183} modo fiducialiter age et ad profectus ac solacii tui cumulum iussam peregrinationem incunctanter perfice.' His diue medice fomentis eger animus in spem uelut ad uitam regreditur, gaudensque de promissis quasi iam diues effectus consolatrice suam sciscitatur, 'Queso' inquit 'domina mi, nomen tuum et quenam sis doce me, ut sciam cui debeam memores grates tante benignitatis tue pro posse rependere, que me tam indignum quam ignotum tanta spe dignaris attollere.' Ad hec ipsa, ut memores memorum, ut presens testis et fautrix in medio ueneratorum suorum, tale reddidit indicium: 'Recole cuius depositio proxime uobis celebrata est festiuam, que dies hac septimana exacta hodie recurrit octaua, et scito quia ipsa sum que rememoratur hodie uirgo Mildretha. Hoc etiam notum tene, temporalem affluentiam non defuturam tibi usque ad finem uite, nec uero longo te hic mansurum tempore.' In his contemplatione sullata somniator expergiscitur, quem uxor audiens ad peragendum in dictum iter uirili animo exhortatur, que cum facultas non esset fide roborabatur. Continuo illi equus et sumptus itineris

\textsuperscript{181} These cloths around the pilgrim's legs were presumably part of the penitential aspect of the pilgrimage, although Goscelin has not previously mentioned them.

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{reuerentem} C.

\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Tuim} B.

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{incunctanter in marg.} (in a different hand) C: om. A.
creditur; uxor et domus dimittitur, unde debitum reposcatur. Romam prosper-
rime adiit, et quicquid in usus uie expendit magis ac magis exuberauit. Tres
argenteorum libras secum detulit, sex domum retulit. Coniunx illum cum
familia letissima, non solum a debito absoluta uerum et diues effecta, suscepit
cum duplici eius presentie et mutue augmentationis palma. Benedicunt affatim
nomen Domini in benignissima adiutrice Mildretha. Cotidie ergo festinabat
crescere eius abundantia tanquam breui mansura vel cum ipso finienda. Nam
post paucos annos sullatus ex hac uita ostendit uerissima fuisse beate Mildrethe
uaticinia. Cuius tamen largiflua gratia ad breuem uite uiam superflua quoque
dedit uiatrica.

xxiii

Alio quoque benignitatis et uirtutis sue indicio locum habitationis sue
glorificauit celeberrima uirgo. Rege priore Willelmo conducticio exercitu
castella muniente contra exterorum impetus, castellum Cantuarie septime
armabatur militibus.\textsuperscript{185} Ex quorum armigeris unus noctu, infracto cuiusdam
militis contubernalis hospitio, magnam partem substantie eius furto abstulit.\textsuperscript{186}
Captusque mane artissimo ergastulo et compedibus in ipsa arce constringit,
custodibusque tanquam pro reo\textsuperscript{187} puniendi nisi redderent mancipatur.\textsuperscript{188}
Ea die instabat uigilia solennitatis beate Mildrethe. Cumque iam ad uesperam
excellentia signa (ut in precipuis festis usus est) personare captiuus audisset,
rogat anxie quid cause id esset.\textsuperscript{189} Cognoscensque ab assistentibus desuper beate
uirginis Mildrethe solennitatem instare, ubi sanctum nomen eius repetita
interrogatione addidicit, clamare cum lacrimis quas timor extorserat cepit:
"Sancta et pia domina uirgo Mildretha, succurre in mortem dampnato per tua
sancta merita et libera me in hac beata festiuitate tua." Res mira, uirtus prodigal
Ad nomen almum uirginis absoluendi prepotentis laxatur hie custodiis.
Rumpuntur arta uincula, aperta sunt ergastula et claustra cedunt omnia. Absunt
truces insidie cuncteque custodum mine. Cernens itaque exitum patere, ponit
animam suam in alea et libra superne misericordie ut qui iam dampnatus
uidebatur, alio discrimine a discrimine mortis exueretur. Repente muri pro-
pugnacula conscendit, et inde se in ima fosse uelut ab alta rupe in baratrum

\textsuperscript{185} The garrisoning of Canterbury Castle with mercenaries was probably associated with
William's preparations in 1085 against a possible Danish invasion. See above, text-note 155.

\textsuperscript{186} The injured party was presumably one of St. Augustine's Abbey's household knights
\textit{(miles contubernalis)} who had a lodging \textit{(hospitium)} in the city.

\textsuperscript{187} reo corr. from eo C: eo A.

\textsuperscript{188} He was 'held by guards who were to suffer in place of the guilty one if they failed to
deliver him (to the authorities).'

\textsuperscript{189} Mildrith's feast was 13 July. Goscelin again emphasises the special honours accorded to
the saint in accord with Ælffstan's vow. See above, p. 172.
Cumque a tanto iactu ante posset extingui quam a terra suscipi, quasi diue virginis subuectus manicis nil pertulit damni. Mira fugitii presumptio, mira uero virginis protectio, ut clara die et in conspectu tam populose urbis uelut inter obuias sagittas et plagas moliretur effugium. Nimirum tante protectricis obumbratione aut sensus et oculi omnium tenebantur ne integeriverunt, aut uidentes non uidebant. Emergens autem uolucri celeritate a fossa, altera nichilominus exterioris castelli exsuperat propugnacula atque, in tam alta quam prius desiliens fosse precipitia, saluus fugit preuentia periculis pericula. Tum uero re diiulgata tota in illum grassantur turbae uenabula. Insequitur clamorque uirum clangorque tubarum. Quisquis equum ascendere, quisquis pedibus currere poterat, in illum decertat. Ille ut ceruus ab arcu, ut alter Asahel,\textsuperscript{191} omnes anteuolat uolucremque fuga preuerit turu Hebrum.\textsuperscript{192} Defecit omnis impetus, frustratur omnis cornipes, ductricis exit alipes et siue deuio siue recto curriculo ad Augustiniani templi uenit assumptio ut ah miser! – ostium inuenit clausum. Tunc capiendus erat, nam hostis a calce urgebat. Ad fenestram cripte se inde proripit, insertisque brachiis ferrum inuadit et huic ut inuolutus anguis incumbit.\textsuperscript{193} Tunc persecutores irruunt et comprehendunt, gaudentes sicut exultant victores capta preda. Pulsant, trahunt capillis, collo, humeris, brachiis, pedibus, uestimentis et cingulis – nec sufficit unus homuncio qui tot manibus teneatur. Tunc uero erat uideri uirtutem uirginis quam inuocaverat, et cuius auxilio hue euaserat. Omnes enim tota ui trahendo lassantur, et ille ita inextricabiliter ad ferrum se tenet ac si inde teneatur. Clamor et furor et pudor uictos confundit. Acriter utrinque decertant, hic pro uita seruanda, hi pro fure persoluendo. Interea a tante turbe tumultu ac strepitu accurrit clauiger ecclesie, sua scilicet liberatrice capto auxilium ferente;\textsuperscript{194} et qui diceret zelus domus tue, Domine, comedit me\textsuperscript{195} increpat ecclesie expugnatores, Dominice pacis uiolatores, ipsi Christo uim

\textsuperscript{190} On Canterbury Castle in the Norman period, see D. F. Renn, Norman Castles in Britain (London, 1968), p. 130. This and the succeeding sentences seem to provide additional evidence relating to the complexity of the castle’s defences. See also E. Hasted, The History and Topographical Survey of the County of Kent, 12 vols. (Canterbury, 1797-1801), 11.59-66, and P. Bennett, S. S. Frere and S. Stow, The Archaeology of Canterbury, vol. 1: Excavations at Canterbury Castle (Maidstone, 1982).
\textsuperscript{191} Asael AC. Asahel, a nephew of David and one of his thirty heroes, was noted for his fleetness of foot. See 2 Reg 2:18 and 23:24.
\textsuperscript{192} Virgil, Aenid 1.317, there referring to Harpalyce. The proper noun probably refers to the River Hebrus in Thrace, although some editors have emended Hebrum to Eurum, one of the winds. See P. Vergili Maronis Opera, ed. J. Conington, 3 vols. (London, 1863-83), 1.63 and n.
\textsuperscript{193} This was the crypt under the presbytery, which the fugitive, in his flight from the castle, probably approached from the south (i.e., the side opposite the claustral complex). See A. Clapham, St. Augustine’s Abbey (London, 1955), pp. 18-20 and endpapers.
\textsuperscript{194} ‘... his own liberator bringing help to the captured man’.
\textsuperscript{195} Ps 68:10.
inferentes, paganos reuerentiores existere delubris suis quam tales Christianos ecclesiis suis. Illi e contra acclamant regis captivum et perfugam. Nec tamen ulterius reum tenere presumunt sed, datis uadibus in satisfactionem, territi abscedunt. Secretarius ilico adducit urginis libertum in ipsius requietionis templum sistitque supplicem ante suam sanctorum corporis tumulum, immensas gratias Deo et ipsi liberatrici sue tanquam pro uita reddita persoluentem ac de cetero emendationem prauritatis sue pollicentem. Cuius igitur urginis materna benignitas sic eripit noxios, qua caritate tueitur supplices suos. Hinc uero deuotus abbas Scollandus, exultans in Domino, tantam praeclarum archipresule Lanfranco, poscendo ueniam reo. Rex uero fauore sanctissime adiutricis clementer omnia donat et ultro suntem liberat, nec puniendum iudicat quem diua virgo soluerat. 'Absit' inquit 'ut a nobis dampnetur qui Dei et sanctorum suorum clementia liberantur. Immo uero ille dampnetur, quisquis sanctorum dicionem et antiquam eorum libertatem uiolare non ueretur. Ante omnia autem autentica protodoctoris huius regni nostri Augustini ecclesia, mea meorumque heredum et optimatum sanctione, sua semper regnet prerogatiua adeo ut quicumque dampnatus huc confugerit, mox ut hoc sanctum asylum uel de longinquo conspexerit, impunitatem et libertatem optineat. Huiusque iuris transgressor rei iudicium subeat.'

Eamus hinc iterum in Tanetum cum uirtutum signifera, ut ibi quoque respiciamus clara sue presentie argumenta. Quanta apostolice filie gratia, ut ethereus clauiger is, cuius umbra suscitat egrotos, hue suos destinare uideatur infirmos alme Mildrethe antidoto sanandos. Quod factum ita retexitur. De quadam Cantie uilla Scoreham nominata quemdam paralysis et neruorum contractio dupliciter debilitauerat. Medietate corporis premortua, semimiuaume diceres an semimortuum ambores. Manus pugilis digitos contorte palme

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196 Lanfrangus B. Scotland, abbot of St. Augustine's (1070-87); Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury (1070-89).
197 et libertatem om. B.
199 The meaning seems to be: 'How great was the grace of the daughter of the Apostle that the heavenly keybearer, he whose shadow cured the sick, is seen to send his sick to be cured by the medicine of sweet Mildrith.' The reference is to Ac 5:15.
200 Shoreham (GR: TQ 5161), four miles north of Sevenoaks.
insertos ac si clauos gemenbat infixos; nodosum genu se in terga curuauerat; pes calcaneum ex talibus affixerat; et caro carni concreta uelut brachium humero inoleuerat. Passus resupinus quasi inde natus prominebat de coxa; celum respiciebat planta calcande terre debita; et pars quam ire oportuerat sedendi locum occupabat. Tante miserie ille miserabilis per sanctorum patrocinia querens remedium, ad sanctum Britannie protomartyrem in ipsius festiuitate perrepset Albanum atque inde uenit Westmonasterium ad sanctorum apostolorum Petri et Pauli natalicium. Ibi itaque in ipsa apostolica et lucifera nocte cum festiuo populo uigilias agenti, iamque fessis luminibus obdormitanti uel adhuc pene uigilanti, senior canicie cignea et angelica auctoritate reuuentissimus in alba candidissima reliquit, cui sic ait: 'Quid hic tibi uis, O aduena, quid quesisti?' 'Vi inquit 'miserante Deo per beatum dominum meum Petrum debilitatis mee consequar subsidium.' 'Nec me latet' ait sacer heros 'postulatio tua, unde scias sospitatem tuam in beata Mildretha positam et ab ipsa in Taneto sui monumenti insula donandam; tantummodo enitere ut illuc peruenias ad festiuitatem et ecclesiam suam.' Vnde ergo hec data monita possunt decentius arbitrari quam ab ipso beato Petro, cuius eger intererat monasterio et celebritati? Paruit ille celestibus preceptis et, gemellis innitens bacillis, in Tanetum ad sepulchrum uirginis in uigilia natalis ipsius tripes scilicet uenit, qui bipes non poterat. Hec celebratur tertio Idus Iulii, quinto decimo die a natalicio apostolorum. Pernoctabat ibi salutis appetitor inter sacras uigilias, perdurans ad sancte curatricis sacrarium usque ad missas. Confluente autem undique tarn nobilium quam vulgi multitudine ad hereditarie domine solennia, debilis formidans pressuram contendit exire ecclesia. Verum populo uelut fluuo inundante in ianuis, repulsus est (Dei uidelicet nutu) ad tumbam uirginis, ut quesitam misericordiam prestolari, non fugere doceretur, et populus conspicui miraculi fide altius illustraretur. Ad missam decantato officio ange-

201 *affixerat* BC.

202 Goscelin’s description of this cripple is difficult to translate and the Latin may be defective. It seems to mean: ‘With half his body effectively dead, you might doubt whether you should call him half-alive or half-dead. He bewailed his hand which was like a boxer’s fist, the fingers locked into the contorted palm and fixed there like nails; his knotted knee had curved itself up into his back; his foot had fixed his heel in a similar way; and his flesh had grown stiffened against other flesh (as the arm to the shoulder). The movement of his leg was backwards from the hip (as if born from there); the sole which should have trodden on the ground looked up to heaven; and the part meant for walking occupied the place meant for sitting.’

203 *perrepset* s.s. C: om. A.

204 The cripple visited St. Albans (Herts.) on 22 June and Westminster on 29 June.

205 13 July.

206 This appears to be an example of the penitential practice of keeping vigil by the saint’s shrine. Physical provision was sometimes made for this in pilgrimage churches, the ‘watching chamber’ in St. Albans Abbey being an example. See F. H. Crossley, *The English Abbey. Its Life and Work in the Middle Ages* (London, 1935), pl. 82.
licus ymnus *Gloria in Excelsis Deo* intonabatur, et ecce eger ad supernam medelam arripitur.\(^{207}\) Ad urginale monumentum uelut in extasi facie tenus proicitur ibique immobiles ac si examinis detinetur, tanquam qui pro se offerretur. Iam lectio apostolice\(^{208}\) epistole Pauli recitabatur. Tunc ille inuisibili uiutute mouetur; tunc concreta et solida caro calcanei et lumborum diuellitur; pars utraque recenti hiatu ululuris, uelut ferro excisa, cruendatur, unde uberrimo stillicidio profui sanguinis pauimentum imbuetur. Nec mora incurrum robur poplitis porrigitur, tibia extenditur. Iamque ad lectionem euangelicam (tanquam ad uocem diuinam dicentem *Surge et sta super pedes tuos*, et *extende manum tuam*) proinus postpositis cambutis et humano ammicinulo surgit et exluit, solidatisque ac equatis post diuurnam debilitatem gressibus uigoratus astitit, gaudens fortius incedere et currere propriis uestigiis quam portari alienis subsidii.\(^{209}\) Simul etiam pugnus globosus digitorum aculeis exsoluitur; palma manus extenditur, qua se diu crucis signaculo cum gratiarum iubilo gratulabatur munire, populo simul inspectore et teste laudes Christo in sancta sua signifera diuius personante.

**xxv**

Addidit adhuc gloriosa Mildretha duplici signo, uelut duorum testimonio, solemnitatem suam glorificare talique presentie sue indicio astantem turbam letificare. Nam simul ad eandem missam, eodem loco et die eademque pene hora, femina eiusdem insule indigena, notis parentibus, a caduco morbo sanata est hoc ordine. Cum ad euangelicam lectionem eger (ut iam exposuimus) sospitaretur, illa, simul astans dum salutem operitur, imminentis doloris non solum penam sed et confusionem coram tanta multitudine ueretur. Preuenit ergo pruode consciam horam, et ulterior in oratione proster nutur ne tam precipitata quam posita humi uideretur. Sed repente omnibus\(^{210}\) patuit eius calamitas quatinus omnibus claresceret eius incolomitas et miseriam in curia Christi benignitas. Ecce autem seuissim\(^{211}\) morbi tyrannides tanquam leo ruginis captuam suam inuadit et, quia in iacente non inuenit quam more suo diruat, uelut a letali uulnere morientem pecudem tremulis membroium pulsibus uexat et exagitat. Spumabat miserabilis inter angustias ore anhelo et

\(^{207}\) The hymn mentioned was 'angelic' because based on the song of the angels to the shepherds on the night of Christ's birth (Lc 2:14). It is found as a hymn with the wording given here, for example, in the eighth-century manuscript London, British Library Royal 2.A.XX. See *A Dictionary of Hymnology*, ed. J. Julian (London, 1892), p. 425.

\(^{208}\) *apostolice* om. AC.

\(^{209}\) Ac 26:16 and Mt 12:13.

\(^{210}\) *precipitata ... omnibus* add. in bottom margin C.

\(^{211}\) *seuissima* B, *seuissim* with a add. s.s. C.
fluxuoso; uomebat\textsuperscript{212} crebro et resorbebat\textsuperscript{213} obscenas saliuas – horrendum tam dictu quam uisu. Moxque sensum exhaauriente pena iacebat diu immoblis quasi funus extenta, ita ut ab omnibus estimaretur extincta. Videres hic Paulum et Palladiam\textsuperscript{214} quorum salutem eximius scriptor Augustinus Hipponensis\textsuperscript{215} presul protomartyri Stephano consecrat. Nam et hic apparebat quid in altero esset Deo reddendum, quid pro altera supplicandum. Tandem ubi aqua benedicta super eam aspergitur, illa uelut a suaui somno aut (ut putabatur) a mortuis erigitur suamque sortem stupentes ac miserantes anhela letitia affatur: 'Vestre pie compassioni reddat Dominus, O Domini mei benedictionem! Simulque benedicamus in benedicta Mildretha ipsius sanctum nomen, per quam michi contulit non solum firmam huuius infirmitatis salutem sed etiam salutis ipsius tutam certitudinem, ut nec ultra inde patiar formidinem. Nam cum modo iacerem in oculis uestris uelut mortua, uidi ipsam dominam nostram aduentantem, immensi splendoris circumfusam gloria, quam hinc inde manibus deducebant due puelle laterales, ita speciose uelut materni decoris emule. Que me benigno uultu respiciens rogat comites ut me citius sustollant et loco dimoueant. "Gressibus" inquit "nostris cur hec obsistit et sacrarii aditum intercludit?" – ac si sua Clementia dicaret: "Orate illi sospitatem ut surgat et letificet quos grauat." Ad hec ille respondent pietati uotissime: \textsuperscript{216} "Tibi, O beata\textsuperscript{217} dominan, derelicta est hec misera. Te requisit, tuam opem efflagitat. Adauge nobis gaudium in hac die communis solennitatis nostre, hanc sanando et omnes letificando diuino medicamine." Tum splendida uirgo, reuelata pietatis facie uelut sol refulgens e nube, "Et ego" inquit "eius salutem optinui a benignissimo Domino Saluatore ita ut a modo nunquam tangatur hac infestatione." Sicut ergo promisit: et, nunc uti uidetis, sanam me quasi de morte reduxit et deinceps securam huius curationis reddidit. Hec referente femina sana mente et corpore, iterata gloria Christo ac dilecte sue Mildretheuersatur affatim in frequentissima plebe.

Sic operata uirgo in sua Tanetensi insula, iterum lucifero recurso habitare se comprobat in sua Augustiniana Cantuaria. Fratrem ecclesie sancti Augustini

\textsuperscript{212} uomebat corr. from ueniebat C: ueniebat A.

\textsuperscript{213} sorbebat with re s.s. C.

\textsuperscript{214} Paulus and Palladia were a brother and sister affected by a condition of tremor. Their cure at the shrine of St. Stephen is described by Augustine of Hippo, De civitate Dei 22.8 (CCL 48.825-27). Paulus was cured before Palladia, whose cure is presented as a separate incident; hence the significance of the second sentence here.

\textsuperscript{215} Ypponiensis AC.

\textsuperscript{216} notissime B.

\textsuperscript{217} "This miserable girl has been left here for you, O blessed lady."
proiecit ibique pro nata supplicans (dum missa completeretur) perduruit.\textsuperscript{219} Sic nimirum exemplo euangilice Chananeu perseuerantia uotum extorsit.\textsuperscript{220} Sed tandem egrediens, ubi domum suam intrauit, miseram suam in suo caduco morbo uelut exanimem iuxta ignem iuenit; luctuque et ululatu tecta implens sancte Mildrethe auxilium incolmatit. Sed adhuc differendo uraeus fides exercebat. Quod et ut uidetur factum quasi ipsum proclamasset malum: 'Vlciscemur modo dum licet, quia interuentu sancte Mildrethe ultra non licebit.'\textsuperscript{221} At uero anxia mater, ut et opus preces adiuuet, ilico ceram comparat, candelam apparat et ad uesperas cum illata filia altario sancte uirginis oblationem dedicat, humique fusa cum sua seminece tam fletibus quam questibus orat. Res mira! Puella post paululum, elevata manu (quod nunquam antea poterat) signo sancte crucis, cunctis uidentibus, se consignat erectaque in pedes subito constitit atque hastenus muta aperto ore benedixit Dominum in sanatrice sua Mildretha. Que exinde sanissima de informe glomere uiget formosa puella. Mater tunc se sobolum habere tripudiat que ante monstrum genuisse gemebat, tantaque iam in illa possidet gaudiorum oblectamenta quanta prius passa est dolorum lamenta. Miraculum in astantem vel accurrentem populum diffunditur; laus et gratiarum actio ab omnibus Domino iubilatur. Ad hoc etiam inestimabili saeculorum odore ecclesia repletur, ut gloriosa Mildretha cum superno contubernio solenniter adesse crederetur et, cuius uisationis experta est egra uiritute, alii sentirent sauciatatem. Nam uiam uenerabilis frater, egressus a uesperis eadem hora, reuertebatur in chorum ad divinum sancte Dei Genitricis canticum. Qui tante nouitate fraglantie\textsuperscript{222} attonitus, leta ammiratone quod sentiebat innuebat fratribus. Qui quamquam sentirent et factum signum ex conflua turba cognoscerent, modestc tamen rem distulerunt in crastinum, ne calumniatores derogandi haberent emolumentum. Mane uenit parrochianus presbiter cum matre et sanata filia, et testes probatissimi cum assertore populo. Facta salus presentialiter monstratur et in publicum declamatur et ab omnibus tam clarum indicium approbatur.\textsuperscript{223} Tunc omnis chorus ymnum laudis ad ethera intonat, gratias Deo in dilecta Mildretha omnis lingua personat, omne eramentum in cimbalis bene sonantibus concrepat.


\textsuperscript{220} See above, text-note 140.

\textsuperscript{221} 'And such is seen to be the case, as if the evil itself had proclaimed: "We will punish only while that is allowed, because by the intervention of St. Mildrith it will not be allowed later on."'

\textsuperscript{222} 'fraglantie nouitate BC (nouitate s.s. C).

\textsuperscript{223} The fear of scepticism and the legalistic method of proof used should be noted. The 'calumniators' may have been specifically the canons of St. Gregory's Priory, Canterbury, who claimed to possess the true relics of St. Mildrith. See HP, pp. 60-108, and ML, pp. 62-64.

224 gratifice B.
225 The cure which was soon revealed showed that this cry, enunciated by divine instinct, had been heard by the great lover of hospitality, that is, through the grace of the virgin invoked by name, whose bowels are always overflowing with all mercy.’
226 terreni sensus s.s. C: om. A.
227 ad corpus moribund- add. in bottom margin (by a different hand) C.

xxix

Decebat nichilominus ut et prefatus miles in se urginis uirtutem experiretur, quam in hospitibus suis factam letabatur. Hic namque eodem tempore aci febre percellitur eaque diutius exagitatur quatinus et mundiali fece purgaretur et fide probaretur, eoque gratior quo dilatior\textsuperscript{228} sospitas redderetur. Tempore ergo placito uolente Deo et dilecte sibi sponse famam adhuc amplificare et castigatum suum alleuare, intrauit cum solita exactrice febre ecclesiam ad sanctum patronum Augustinum orare, sicque concessit ad uitale glebam salutifere Mildrethe. Vbi dum pro sui liberatione ad preces et suffragia urginis prostenitir, somno placido quasi sanatricis antidoto perfunditur. Iamque expergefactus, ita morbo cum sopore exuitur, ut cum plena sospietate et letitia crebrisque gratiarum actionibus regredetur, nec ulterior hac molestia temptaretur uir scilicet hospitalis, qui Christum colligendo in hospitibus suis certat coniungi ouibus dextris.\textsuperscript{229}

xxx

Adhuc in suburbio Cantuarie degit anus fere octogenaria, iamque anachorita trigeneraria, inclusa celle in beati protomartyris Stephani basilica, nomineÆlfuenna, in qua plane, simili in predicta puella mirificentia, apparat magna

\textsuperscript{228} dilatior s.s. C.

\textsuperscript{229} Cf. Mt 25:31-47.
Deo dilecte Mildrethe prestantia. Iam olim enim antequam eius uriginalis gleba huc transferretur de Taneto insula, hec cum esset ibidem in puellari flore similiter moritura, ita est apud illam ad uiam reuocata ut sibi etiam promitteretur (quam in hac etate grandevia profitetur) diuturnior uita. Hoc quoque exemplo illi iuniori (quam prescripsimus taliter resuscitatam) speramus accessuram longeuitatem promissam. Pulchre enim alma uirgo in duabus personis et duobus locis per consonam uirtutem esse se eandem ostendit, que alteram hic ubi nunc requiescit, alteram illic unde translata est, et uita et annositate donauit. Sed quid moramur ordine suo rem explanare propositam, uti scilicet memoratu dignissimam ? Immo ipse uenerabilis prior monasterii precellentissimi Augustini (cuius nomen et industria, quia presens est et famam refugit, supprimimus) hec illius uerbis, que curata est, referat et sicut ab ea accept, cum testibus qui adhuc eam audire possunt. Taliter edisserat:


231 See above, chapter 28.

232 memorabilis B.

233 Little is known of the priors of St. Augustine’s in this period. The only person with whom the prior mentioned here might be identified is the Antony who was introduced into the abbey with monks of Christ Church in or after 1089 (ASC 1.292).
Virga illi in manu, rectricis dignitate pretenta, croceo uel cereo colore prelucida, desuper ecclesiastico pignore formose incuru.a A staff was in her hand, held forward with the dignity of a ruler, glowing with a yellow-waxed colour, and beautifully curved at the top in ecclesiastical pledge. The exact meaning of pignore is unclear.

Adhuc uideere michi uideor illa oblectamenta terrenas uloterpates longe excedentia. Que clementie sue in me figens lumina, hac anxiam releuabat allocutione dulciufla: “Si ab hac” inquit “leti instantia respirare malueris, meis necesse est obtemperes consiliis, quatinus ad salutiferam glebam beate virginis Mildrethe celerius deporteris. In ipsius enim manu data est reparatio tua. Hanc requiringo recipies non solum uite sospitatem sed etiam diuurnitatem. Alioquin iam nunc morieris, nisi petito ipsius patrocinio libereris.” A tam beatifico presentia et promissione uiuifica, ego uelut odore et unguento suauitatis perfusa iam me recepisse uigorem sentiebam et redisse de mortis faucibus ad uitam, de ultimo periculo ad sanitate, de profundo carcere ad lucem. Vnde, iam quasi semiuigilans, in hunc prosiliui clamorem: “Quenam es, O domina, cuiusue audio tam amabilia mandata?” “Ipsa sum” inquit “quam tibi nominai, Mildretha, et ipsa tibi mea incunctanter complebo promissa.” Obstupuere itaque assidentes parentes mei, audientes me quidem interrogantem, neminem autem audientes uel uidentes respondentem. A quibus per cuntata cum quo haberem colloquia, “Cum domina nostra” dicebam “Mildretha.” Bis hec uidi et audiui per somnium mee recuperationis solamina.b Tertio vero non iam somnianti sed aperte uigilanti et manifeste aspicienti, eadem que prius refulsit gloria, eadem et forme et ornamentorum claritate conspicua, simul et eadem uox et uerba clare auribus meis sunt iterata: “Accelera mea mandata exsolue, si uis incumbentem mortem promissa uiuacitate mutare.” “Ego uero” inquam “O domina, prona deuotione parata sum gratissima tua exequi iussa.” Statimque quasi sponsione suscepta ab oculis meis uisa iocunditas est sullata. Mirabantur iterum parentes me (quam funerare putabantur) tam uiuaciter loquentem; mirabantur nil preter me perpendentes quern interrogassem, cui respondissem. Mirabar et ego illos tam manifestam et claram non sentientes lucem ac uocem. “An uobis” inquam “ut michi luciflua urigo Mildrethe modo in tanto nitoris iubare non est uisa, nec tam duiuna uoce audita?” Negantibus illis quicquam sibi preter solitum apparuisse, “Michi uero” inquam “iam tertio est manifestata, bis scilicet clausis in soporem palpebris, deinde peruigili acie reseratis. Cuius forma omni humana eligantia speciosior, facies sole splendidior, uestitus niue candidior, a cuius radiis mira claritate tota hec domus refulsit et in manu eius baculus insigne ducis ac matris melliflue emicuit. Vox eius dulcis et suauis in auribus meis
sonuit, que me sanandam (ea condicione – si ad sui corporis tumbam deferar) sponpondit." Hinc genitores cognatique gratulati et una mecum in spem rediuiui "Qualis" inquiynt "et quam uera hec promissio sit, consequentia probabit." Sic diluculo ad ecclesiam, in qua ipsa urigo Tanetensium gloria adhuc corpore (ut premonstratum est) persistebat, me secum deportari fecerant, meque deposita ante ipsius salutaria pignora in preces suspiriosas una se prostauerunt. O magnam dilecte Domini sponse gratiam ! O potentiam alme Mildrethe copiosam ! Ego illa pene per annum languida, que ipsa die credebar certissime humanda, extimplo irruentibus uiribus, quasi somno refectis artibus surrexi et ingressus firmos erecta constiti. Et quid237 moror ? Mira celeritate plenissima ibi sospitate triumphaui. Quas laudes ego misella, quas grates rediuuia mecum totius parentele letitia, quas benedictiones tumc238 dabat in celum accurrentis plebis frequenta ! Per ecclesie aluearia et atra,239 per rura et competa, euntium et occurrentium agmina uelut apum examina magnificabant Christi magnalia in ammiratione digna Mildretha; tantique miraculi fama ubique reolebat tanquam aromatum odoramenta. Et quid multa? Ipsa die uel interuallo, quo debebam alienis manibus ad sepulchrum efferri, mea Mildretha fecit me propriis pedibus domum regredi. Cumque me cognati et amici luctuosis exequiis exportare cogitant ad tumulum, mutatis repente in gaudia fletibus, proprio euntem incessu ad paternum comifantur consuiium. Iam uero quam uera sit hec assertio mea, quam certa uirginis uatidica promissa, satis scilicet comprobat hec etas mea. Nam hodie anni sunt circiter septuaginta, ex quo hec promissio in me est perpetrata.'

xxx

Hec ubi probatissime de se ipsa disseruit religiosa Christi solitaria, post propheticas uel apostolicas euangellii nuntias, haud abnuenda ad nostram approbationem simulque adhuc impetratam audientiam addidit quoque ista uirginis retexere gesta, tam certa quam in se iterum liquide comperta. Prosequitur secunda signa uelut acceptiora duorum testimonia. 'Postea' inquit 'cum ego per incremena temporum adolescerem et rerum iocunditas cum incolomitate240 arrieret, diuina corrumpio iterum occurrit oculosque michi terrenis illecebris patentes occulisit et quasi obductis fenestris per mundum aberrantes sensus meus reoecuatu. Credo etiam quod hec temptatio amplius me docuerit de mea curatrice Mildretha presumere, et rursum post tenebras lucem sperare, ut que dudum michi uitam impetrauerat auferendam, lucem etiam

237 quid s.s. C.
238 tunc s.s. C.
239 et atra om. B.
240 incolomitate corr. from intellectu C: intellectu A.
reddere posset sullatam. Igitur per continuum aut amplius annum obscurem cecitatis pertuli ergastulum. Solaris globus nil egit sui radiis, uastus orbis carcer erat orbibus meis. Poscebam crebro consolatricem meam ut misereretur in tenebris palpanti, sicut quondam miserta est in funere iacenti, et redderet diem, que dederat diuturnitatem. Itaque post continuam unius anni noctem, exacto tempore castigationis et instante tempore\textsuperscript{241} miserationis, quadam nocte dormienti michi refusit ipsa lux, mea nota Mildretha, et cessante mundi aspectu species celestis est uisa. Precepitque ut properarem deduci ad ipsius corporis tumulum, tanquam ad mee salutis refugium, uix finita oratiuncula rarescentibus tenebris sensi michi modice lucis oriri diluculum matrice astanti ilico intimaui id ipsum. Illa interim indixit michi silentium, ne ambigua res audientibus daret magis ridiculum quam miraculum. Cumque hortatu matris obnixius orarem, protinus abstersa omni caligine pleno uigore hausi diem rerumque speciositatem. Tum quidam manu tenens cornu temptabat inaniter in una re an uiderem que omnia iam clare uidissem. Eo tempore, id est inter paschales et rogationum dies,\textsuperscript{242} aderat honorificentissimus abbas \textit{Ælfstanus}, qui postea hanc pretiosissimam margaritam Mildretham ad hec apostolica loca transtulit, que ilia nunc perpetuo illustrat. Cumque in ipsa ecclesia assistens perspexisset me uere illuminatam, continuo cum toto collegio fratrum uel clericorum erumpens in laudationem Dominam optulit auctori Domino sueque\textsuperscript{243} dilecte magnificentiam et ubique diffudit hanc \textit{mirificentiam}.\textsuperscript{244} Hinc ego iam non alienis manibus sed propriis luminibus domum reducta, tante sanatricis gratia propinquorum tristitiam conuerti in gaudia.‘ His aliisque innumeris signis siderea Mildretha et antiquam et hodiernam habitationem ita sua presentia perpetuo uendicat et elucidat, ut nec inuidia nec fraudulentia nec audacia detrahendi, immo nec mentiendi, locum inueniat. Nam sicut in sole et oculis omnium furta, ita mendacia in splendore ueritatis sua perdunt argumenta.\textsuperscript{245}

Sic itaque uenerabilem priorem, quem superior margo pretitulat, ueridice et adhuc impresentiarum superstitis femine probabilem sententiam retulisse sufficiat.

xxxii

Lucet semper Tanetus Deo amabilis Mildrethe uirtutibus, omnisque eius memorie et ubicumque poscitur locus. Sic etiam supplicibus accommoda, ita

\textsuperscript{241} castigationis ... tempore om. B.
\textsuperscript{242} Rogation Days are the Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday before Ascension Day.
\textsuperscript{243} -que s.s. A: om. BC.
\textsuperscript{244} et ubique ... \textit{mirificentiam} om. B.
\textsuperscript{245} On the context of these possible doubts about Mildrith and her powers, see above, text-note 223.
non nunquam suis est seuera. Rusticus possederat agrum de Christi Ecclesia, habebat et partem de beate Mildrethe possessione in Taneto sua.⁴⁴⁶ Ab hoc dum a prepositis eiusdem virginiis debitus census exigitur, ille omne prorsus debitum inficiatur. Percunctantibus exactoribus qua fronte legitime dicioni obsisteret, iam spiritu nequitie inflammatus, eo effrenate uociorie processit, ut hanc possessionem de qua agebatur nequaquam ad beatam pertinere Mildretham, sed tantum ad Christi assereret Ecclesiam seseque id sacramento, quocumque postularetur, probare paratum. Statuto ergo die probationis, conuenitur populo senatus et alius partibus. Ille autem rurali dolositate tale artificio commentatus est, quasi iudicii ueritatem arte fallere posset, nec periuraret dum falleret. Imluearet quippe sibi calceos de puluere terre que erat Christi Ecclesie, accedensque infelix ad propositum iusiurandum iurauit sic: 'Per Deum, cui hec sancta sacrata sunt que manibus teneo, terra supra quam asto est uere Christi Ecclesie et non sancte Mildrethe.' ⁴⁴⁷ Dixerat; et cum dicto fallentis ueri utrosque orbes oculum, excussos in terram in quam mentitus est, amissus simulque eiuans cum horrore et amentia concidit. Tum uero populo inclamante et improbante periurom, confessus peruersitatem cum uociferatione et gemitu, soluit calciamenta qui pedibus adherens, impleuerat quippe sibi calceos de puluere terre que erat Christi Ecclesie, uterque ubique iniquitas sua in uerticem ipsius descenderit et mentita sit iniquitas sibi. Monstrauit omnibus puluerem effusum a calceis quem ipse ultra uidere nequiuit; et qui in terra sanctorum iniqua gessit, iam nec celum nec terram nec quicquid in eis est amplius cernere meruit. Ve captiosis sicophantarum strophis, ue qui fodiunt foueam et incidunt in earn! ⁴⁴⁸ Stulte autem dum omnes uel ipsam ueritatem se fallere posse putauit, se ipsum perditus fefellit. Non enim tantum stabat super terram quam in soleis habebat, que eum continere non poterat, sed potius in illa uel super illam stabat que eum, ne hiando in baratrum dimitteret, continebat. Nam quamuis stabat super puluerem alterius agri, uel super alienum lutum suis pedibus adherens, uel super soleas aut calceos aut super ipsos pedes suos, prorsus stabat super terram iustissime ultricis Mildrethe, in quam, debita pena iudice, probatus est periusasse. Vnde eum merito interna cecitas dolose mentis in exteriores tenebras dimersit – perpetua cecitas corporis! ⁴⁴⁹ Ut ergo ipse in

⁴⁴⁶ Thanet was divided between the lands of Christ Church in the west and those of St. Augustine’s Abbey (identified with St. Mildrith’s former lands) in the east. The manors in question were respectively those of Monkton and Minster-in-Thanet. See Domesday Book, fols. 4a and 12b, and D. W. Rollason, “The Date of the Parish-Boundary of Minster-in-Thanet (Kent),” Archaeologia cantiana 95 (1979) 7-17.

⁴⁴⁷ The oath described here was taken on relics held in the hand. On such oaths in Anglo-Saxon legal and other sources see M. Förster, Zur Geschichte des Reliquienkultus in Altenland (Munich, 1943), pp. 15-19.

⁴⁴⁸ Eccl 10:8.

⁴⁴⁹ Possibly this sentence could be understood and punctuated in several ways.
exemplum terribile sit periuris fraudulentis, uersutis et calidis, maxime autem ecclesiasticarum facultatum peruaosoribus perditis, tumefacto et putrescente corpore infra duas ebdomadas interiit. Clementior tamen ultio virginis extitit, ne sceleratus repentina raptu totus periret, sed penitendi induciis forte resipisceret.\textsuperscript{250}

xxxiii

Iam olim uero assumpta uirgo Mildretha ad regnum et delicias sponsi non cessat etiam loco terrre peregretionis cellitus prosperarie, unde colligat animas eternae dilectionis sui. Nam cum nuper templum pristine requietionis sue euersum est ad in melius reparandum, et de sumptu sollicitarentur auctores operis propostit, ur æmemorabilis Blakemannus, cujus iam opibus opus profecit, tali per somnum confortatus est uisione.\textsuperscript{251} Collectus uidetatur totus Tanetii populus in loco edificii, qui inter se sollicité conferebant de structure effectione. Verum modice fidei et sterilis beniuolentie homines desperabant se ad hoc posse conuolare. Dubitantibus fere omnibus et multa revoluuentibus, astitit in medio puella regia, regali aspectu conspicua, dicens omnibus uoce publica: ‘Audite, amatores seculi et corruptibilium facultatum servatores ac serui. Vos graue fertis succurrere edilicio domus Dei, quia ueremini uestrí opibus minui, de cujus profectu multo copiosius ditaremini. Confiditis in perituris, nec speratis in bonis permansuris. Sed que retinetis peribunt, que expenditis multiplicata eternaliter maneubnt. Ecce ego sola femina, uestrí opibus exilior, plus omnibus uobis huic structure proficiam donec perficiam. Plus, inquam, mea hic ualebit inopia quam uestra copia.’ Nulli dubium etheream Mildretham in hac specie revelationis sue plebis increpasse duritiam atque tenaciam, omnesque claro mysterio docuissse non in falsis sed in uerís diuittis habere fiduciam et largifluam in ecclesia et egenis exercere beneficientiam. Quod autem uisa est suam proponere inopiam, que ditior est in ethere, intelligitur in sui persona significasse penuriam ecclesie sue, uel etiam supradicti suffragatoris maiorem efficaciam quam facultatem, per quern ipsa deserentibus locupletioribus cepti operis efficerc consummationem. Quam uero uera sit ista in uisu promissio, iam ipsa indicat usque ad sarta tecta ascendens perfectio.

\textsuperscript{250} A very similar story is to be found in M. Lapidge, ‘Dominic of Evesham “Vita S. Ecgwinii episcopi et confessoris”’, \textit{Analecta bollandiana} 96 (1978) 96-97.

\textsuperscript{251} The church of Saints Peter and Paul, usually identified with the chapel recovered by archaeological excavation at Minster Court, is probably meant. There is some Norman work in the complex of buildings there. See \textit{HSAC}, p. 218; J. Lewis, \textit{The History and Antiquities as well Ecclesiastical as Civil of the Isle of Tenet in Kent}, 2nd edition (London, 1736), pp. 92 and 102-103; and C. Platt, \textit{The Monastic Grange in Medieval England} (London, 1969), pp. 18-20.
Sed hic uirgo iam non in somnis, uerum nouo miraculo omnium coruscat oculis. Lignum trabale, in quo laquearia tecti templi seriatim figerentur, tribus pedibus inuentum est breuius parieta cuj superponeretur. Sepius temptantes eadem inaequalitas cassabat. Tristabantur egre opus differri, dum competentis longitudinis lignum non facile esset reperiri, totaque nocte sollicitabantur expertes consilii. Artifex alam presidem Mildretham inclamat quatinus sui destitutis consulat. Mane ergo iterum ad metiendum acceditur, ut solet humana audivitas iam exquisita curiosius repetere, et (O Dei mirificentiam! O uirginis gratiam!) lignum, quod ad opportunam mensuram tribus pedibus diximus breuius, ultra necessarium modum alis tribus pedibus factum est productius. Sex enim pedum spatio prolongatum est. Laudent alii ac debito stupore grande hoc attollant miraculum. Michi uero gratius est quod hinc amputatum quam quod est additum. Iocundior mouet stupor et tripudium, quod hoc augmentum quasi superuacuum supra praedictum fecit gloriosum, ut quod inde absideretur tanquam superfluum ad sublime ecclesie proficeret signaculum, atque ad celsiorem conuenientem ammirationem in Dominice crucis transiret honorem. Denique ex hac tripodali particula detruncata a sufficienti metreta, crux Domini conuenientissime est in fronte nauis ecclesiastice sublimata tam delectabili scilicet superne gratie ordine, ut sub ipsa cruce intus resideat blecta tumba dudum acquiescentis crucifere Christi Mildrethe.

Est in centenario preminentis Ecclesie Christi choro senior, uero honorabilis, uerbo et actu fidelis, conversacione, orationibus et psalmodia preclarus, nomine Liuinus. Hunc de beata Mildretha errantem quod in Gregoria parrochia teneretur, hunc, inquam, post actas uigilias uirginalis natalicii strata obdormientem, uisio presignata tali modo concitauit.

Astitit angelus Domini et aspectu et habitu lucidissimo, uocansque placide 'Surge' inquit 'et uade ad nuptias.' Sensit dormiens iussum sed somnus inhibuit responsum. Venit secundo excitator dicens: 'Surge, iam surge et ad nuptias procede.' Ad hec contemplator: 'Ad quas' inquit 'nuptias?' 'Ad nuptias' refert nuntius 'sancte Mildrethe.'

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252 This chapter is also found in Goscelin's 'Contra usurpatores' and printed in *HP*, pp. 92-94. A omits it and C gives it after the chapter here numbered 'xxxvii'. Where C diverges from B it agrees with the 'Contra usurpatores', so it seems possible that the scribe of C copied the chapter from the latter text as an afterthought.


254 On the claim of St. Gregory's Priory, Canterbury, to possess Mildrith's relics, see *ML*, pp. 62-64, and *HP*.
uirginis.\textsuperscript{255} Sed auditorem rursus sopor oppressit. Tertio tandem cicola
regrediens \textquoteleft Cur\textquoteright inquit \textquoteleft tardas ad festas\textsuperscript{256} beate Mildrethe surgere nuptias?\textquoteright
Tum uero contemplator intellectualiter respondens celestibus monitis \textquoteleft Vbi
queso\textquoteright ait \textquoteleft domine, eam esse credemus?\textquoteright \textquoteleft Apud sanctum Augustinum\textquoteright respondet testis ethereus. At ille \textquoteleft An non potius est\textquoteright inquit \textquoteleft apud sancti Gregorii
parrochiam, ut nos arbitramur?\textquoteright \textquoteleft Nequaquam id credas\textquoteright ait ueri symmista. \textquoteleft Ibi
scilicet nunquam fuit, nec est, nec erit. Verum hoc indubitanter scito quia apud
sanctum Augustinum est. Iam enim uidebis ueri indicium.\textquoteright Ad hoc angelicum
dictum uisa est inspector tota aula qua quiescebat splendore flammeo ultra
quam dici possit coruscare. Tum uero, mirabile dictu, aperta desuper celi
monstratur fastigia et inestimabili luce effusa; Angeli, Archangeli, Throni,
Dominationes atque innumera supernorum agmina cum immensa claritate
descendere sibi sunt uisa, inter que omnia gloriosa Mildretha resplenduit
etherea pompa, tanquam de thalamo proceduit etherea pompa, tanquam de thalamo procedens regia\textsuperscript{257} Domini sponsa. Cernitur forma siderea, regio diademate prefulgida, purpura aurotexta, gemmis,
margaritis, ac monilibus incomparabilibus omnique ornatu glorie decorata,
tanquam regina qua uenit a sponsi dextris, cui dicat pulcherrimus amator
intemerata pulchritudinis: \textit{Tota pulchra es, amica mea.}\textsuperscript{258} Sic igitur inserta ac
circumfusa celestium choris ab ipsa occidentali regia, qua contemplator
excubans hec speculabatur, summo omnium triumpho et concentu usque in
Augustinianam aulam deducitur, simulque nouus suus assertor mentis acie
comitabatur. Hic demum, hoc est in Augustinianam suam,\textsuperscript{259} usque in porticum
monumenti et altaris sui cum angelicus laudibus uirgo perductur et, circum-
stante supernorum exercitu, finito ymno tumbam ululat supplex regia
ingreditur. Nam ut miram huius mysterii atque ineffabilis gratie Dei con-
sonantiam amplectamur, eadem hora noctis qua prefatus senior uitalem uirgi-
nem apud sanctum Augustinum subeuntem tumbam suam per usum\textsuperscript{260} uidit,
Augustinensis chorus, exactis nocturnalibus sacris eiusdem uirginalis solennii,
duodecimum responsorium finuit et prior ymno laudis intonuit simulque
maximorum cimbalorum clangor insomnit et contemplator in se reuersus
proinus e lectulo\textsuperscript{261} cum magna animaduerionis exiliit, tremensque ad sacra
altaria confugit et in honore beate uirginis missam celebrat.\textsuperscript{262} Cum ergo
credamus (psalmista docente) in conspectu angelorum nos Domino psallere,\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{255} uirginales C, HP.
\textsuperscript{256} festivas C.
\textsuperscript{257} regis A.
\textsuperscript{258} Cant 4:7.
\textsuperscript{259} Augustiniana sua C: Augustinia sua B.
\textsuperscript{260} somnum B.
\textsuperscript{261} somnator somno et lectulo excitus for contemplator ... lectulo B.
\textsuperscript{262} et in honore ... celebrat om. B; missas for missam C, HP.
\textsuperscript{263} Cf. Ps 137:1.
nec designare conciues angelos cum deutos famulis Deum laudare. Pulchre
sane uietur hec uisio illi duodeno responsorio consonare, in quo uirginis
aduentui superna cum infimis congratulanti canitur, quod et264 pro intellectu hic
inseritur:265 'O diem illum festium, quo patrie salus Mildretha aduehitur! Tota
adeo prouincia obuiam furt, ymnus laudis in celum tollitur, superna
congratulantur. Et Helie inuondatione terra exusta renouatur.266 Rerum siccitate
omnia morieantur, sed aduentu salutifere uirginis omnia renascuntur.'267
Perpendat itaque omnis beniuola anima quam iocunda sit ista conuenientia, ut
in isto sui aduentus carmine uideretur cum superno contubernio aduenire et,
hoc finito, sue requietionis apothecam subire.

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Ipsius etiam persone in hac Augustinensi uirgine experimentum adiungimus,
qui inter honorabiles exstitit uenerabilis. In eisdem gloriosa uirginis signis sepe
memorabilis abbas Scollandus,269 ex quo eius sacrum corpus (reserata urna)
incorrupto annoso uelamine inspexit, multa reuerentia ei iugiter extitit deuotus.
Contigit autem illum per septime septimanae tanto linguare artari ut, addictus
lectulo quasi sepulchrali, nequaquam sine oficialium subsidio, sine acerbo
detrimento a latere in latus posset conuerti. Siquando illum ecclesiis usitare
promptus animus impulisset sed inbecillitas corporis inhibuisset, uix quattuor
uirorum lacertis agebatur ut magis supportari quam sustentari uideretur. Sic
longa nocte angustiato et oppresso tandem salutifera beate Mildrethe festiuit.
Triste erat gaudium egro et egra afflicto (uelut nubili solis) consolatio.
Mulsebat desolatum dulcis concentus chorizantium fratrum et tetrum chaos,
quod obuoluerat morbidum, rupit uirgineis radiis solare uirginis festum.
Grauabat nox dolentem ut suos solet detritos; sed ipsam nostra luna longe
clarior gentilium Diana splendidissime illustrabat uirginea lampade, et
oppressum refouebat dulcimodo vigilium se Domino offerentium canore.270

264 responsorium for et C.
265 R add. HP.
266 V add. HP.
267 This responsory and versicle are part of the text entitled 'Historia de s. Mildretha' which is
set to music and occupies fols. 43r-50v of Harley 3968. The words quoted here occur on fol. 48r.
268 xxxvi om. A. The hand which added Arabic chapter numbers to C here wrote 'c. 35' but
then drew a line through it, adding a now partially illegible marginal note which seems to say
that chapter 35 is to be found after chapter 37.
269 Abbot Scotland (1070-87) was a Norman. On the attitudes of Norman churchmen to
English saints, see ML, pp. 59-60, and R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer
270 The meaning of this difficult sentence seems to be: 'The night oppressed the man, grieving
as was his wont over his sad condition; but our moon, brighter by far than the Diana of the
heathens, illuminated the night most splendidly through the virgin's lamp, and comforted the
oppressed with the sweet singing of the watchers offering themselves to the Lord.'
Ipsam tunc noctem solennem abbas insomnem agebat, cui simul et morbi acerbitas et modulata suavitas soporem auerterat. Gemebat angustate absentie penam, sed respirabat et clamabat ad blandientis armonie cantilenam. 'O' inquit 'Iesu Domine, utinam me indignum dignareris huius letitie collegio representare. Splendida uirgo Domini Mildretha, solue, queso, horum dolorum uinacula tua intercessione quibus prohibeor ad te accedere.' Iam irrandiante festo die iubet se apportari ad eiusdem uirginis tumulum et altare. Huc laboriose adductus, ministris hinc inde suffulcentibus aut euehentibus simulque fratibus uallantibus, ad orationem deponitur supplicissimus. Post anhelas et longas preces, dum pararet se erigere, irruentes adiutores repulit manus significatione. Ipse, mirabile uisu, per se uigorose surrexit, diu in pedibus astitit, poplitum flexionem frequentauit. Iam gratiarum sacrificio exacto, ad beati Augustini preminentem tumbam absque ullo amminiculo inoffense processit, quasi beata Mildretha hunc ad amicum sui sponsi deducente atque dicente: 'Recipe ualidum quem misisti michi morbidum.'

Ibi quoque oratione protelata et genuflexione repetita uotorum Deo reddebat libamina. Ad singula nichilominus adiacentium sanctorum patrum se prosternendo corpora, ad sanatricis sue Mildrethe gratifica compensatione rediit oracula. Sic denique totum se hinc referens sospitem et lethum, abdicat lectulum, fraternum sibi applicat contubernium et cum ipsis de sua incolomitate, de beate Mildrethe mirificatione, de eius instante solennitate triplicat tripudium. Notabiler itaque compleuit septies septem dies (tanquam suam quinquagesimam aut Pentecosten) inoffense potiretur salute. Vixit autem diu in hac sospitate, usque ad terminum scilicet mortalis utile.

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Sue quoque requiationis et hereditarie possessionis insula Tanetus sibi dicata, ex quo etiam inde ad sanctum Augustinum transmigrauit, multis signis et revelationibus quam sibi sit grata ostendit. Ex quibus pleraque noster codicellus notissima exposuit, sed et his hoc unum in presenti declaratum miraculum nunc subiungit. In Orientalium Saxorum provincia quedam puella, in domo parentium adhuc paruula, fidei pignus dederat cuidam iuueni, se nulli unquam nuptam nisi ipsi. Iam etate et sensu maturior, ubi didicit mundi contemptoribus premia et luxurie tormenta reposta, altis suspiris ingemuit et, conubialia uincula quasi perpetuam captiuitatem abhorrens, a diuina clementia doceri anxie deprecatur quomodo ab his laqueis et naufragio eruat ur. Cui per beatam Mildretham (ut ex consequentibus colligitur) hac uoce supernum

271 On the layout of the crypt, see above, text-note 193.
272 A omits the number and has a blank space between this and the preceding chapter.
mandatum in sopore defertur: `Exi de terra tua et de cogitatione tua et, abiecla
terrene cure sarcina, libera mente aggredere Dei seruitia.' Tum uero exultans,
propalata sibi euadendi uia, clam patrem et matrem cunctosque notos tanquam
captitiatus uenabula ac retia aufugit et in quandam insulam uelit in asylum
salutis Dei perfuga recepta se abdidit. Ibiue sub quodam presbitero Christi
tyrocinia in sancta continentia per aliquot annos exercuit. Tandem conspecta ibi
et recognita ab his quibus ante erat quam clara, uehementi pauore concu-
scusasa (quasi iam esse in patrios neruos retracta) alto gemitu Saluatorem
iniam, ut eam a laqueo uenantium eripiat et ad certum locum eisib
complacitum perducat, quo ei in pace desertiat. Sic oranti virgo pulcherrima,
facie et ueste splendida, alluxit trepidantique dixit: `Desere huius loci
habitationem et uade ubi Deo sub beate Mildrethe patrocinio debitam reddas
seruitutes.' Ad hec puelle querenti ad quem locum se iuberet transire, `Ad
Tanetum' inquit `insulam perge et ibi ad perennem requiem persisted Sic per
reuelationem certificata iterumque a mundiali rictu excussa, ut

cerus sitiens ad fontes aquarum273
ad celitus iussum peruenit habitaculum, gratias agens pietati

diuine, quo se per beatam Mildretham a parentibus et a suspecto eripuisset
proditore. Ibi itaque attentius abstinendo, psallendo et orando mente
t et corpore sacrificabat se Domino. Hostem antiquum impugnantem repug-
nando expugnat et (O superbie dedecus!) ille cui olim astrorum et etiam
angelorum regia non suffecerat, nunc cum puella fragili certat. Illa superatum
calcit; ille tumore suo disruptus crepat. Fit ursus qui erat angelus, rugit leo,
ululat lupus, sibilat chelydrus; Dei tyruncula cuncta fantasmata propellit
orationibus. Tali lucta per septem annos ibidem exercitata, usu proficiebat ad
meliora. Mine clausulam suspirans solitariam, obtinuit sub ala ecclesie edificari
sibi cellulam. Quam ibi includere conati dum licentiam uillicis petunt clerici, ab
ipsis uillicis prorsus sunt prohibit.

273 Cf. Is 35:6-7 and Ps 41:2-3.
274 Later sources stress the need for the permission of the bishop or the patron when a person
embarked on the life of a hermit or anchorite. Goscelin's account suggests that the situation was
less well defined in his time. See Clay,

275 This place is probably Wickhamberix, five miles northeast of Canterbury. An earlier
form of the name appears to have been Wicham. See Ekwall,

Cf. Is 35:6-7 and Ps 41:2-3.
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embarked on the life of a hermit or anchorite. Goscelin's account suggests that the situation was
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Hermits and Anchorites, pp. 85-96.
This place is probably Wickhambreux, five miles northeast of Canterbury. An earlier
form of the name appears to have been Wicham. See Ekwall, 

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of

English Place-Names s.n.
solium suum ac similis esse Altissimo grassatur, in execrabilissima reptilia, bufones et rubetas uel ranas deuolutus convuertitur; et tali satellite, tali milite, tali exercitu pugnans uictus et confusus a mediocrì certatrice conculoctatur et exterminatur. Ila fortior in fide Dei effecta absterritum hostem tam in leone quam in uermiculo contemnit. Exercuit uitam uigiliis, orationibus aut parsimonia. Tribus aut quattuor oblatis altaris aut exiguo legumine aut pomo plerumque contenta erat. In Quadragesima tribus diebus in ebdomada tantum cibum capiebat. Cui cum quidam suggereret ut modestius abstineret ne deficeret, hec tanquam de alio referebat: 'Noui, domine mi, aliquem amicum a quaesta feria usque in diem Resurrectionis Dominice nil gustasse et sine ulla molestia letu et incolomi uigore perstitisse.' Hoc illam constat patrasse sub alterius pretentione. Iam ipsa in Domini misericordia propositum suum compleuit, et in eodem loco sub beate Mildrethe patrocinio ubi certauit requieuit.²⁷⁷

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²⁷⁷ C now gives the chapter numbered 'xxxv' above.
The most significant mathematical innovations of the high Middle Ages were the introduction of algebra into Western Europe through the translations of al-Khwārizmī’s al-Kitāb al-mukhtasar fi hisāb al-jabr wa’l-muqābala (Liber algebre et almuchabala) and the foundation of abacist arithmetic in the Liber abaci by Leonardo da Pisa. The latter work has been subjected to considerable study, more is certainly warranted. The translations of Hisāb al-jabr, however, have long been in a process of sorting and study. In 1838 Guillaume Libri published a faulty edition of Gerard’s translation. Twelve years later Prince Baldassarre Boncompagni presented a transcription of William of Lunis’ translation which the Prince incorrectly accepted as that of Gerard of Cremona. Louis Karpinski in 1915 offered a critical edition of a late copy of Robert of Chester’s translation. Several years ago I reported on sixteen copies of the three translations; and in the near future my new critical edition

5 L. Karpinski, Robert of Chester’s Latin Translation of the Algebra of Al-Khowarizmi (New York, 1915). Note here a second spelling for ‘al-Khwārizmī’ and there are more; see for instance n. 8 below. My preference is based on the spelling used in DSB 7.358.
of Robert of Chester's translation will be published. The core of the present article is a critical edition of the oldest extant copy of the translation made by Gerard, together with variants found in the three older manuscripts which reproduce it most faithfully. Remarks about the other manuscript copies and an analysis of the tract complete the article.

**ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT**

According to the translation the treatise is divided into eight chapters and an appendix. These discuss in turn decimal and algebraic numbers, six canonical first and second degree equations, geometric demonstrations for three quadratic solutions, methods for multiplying with binomials, computing with roots, further examples for each type of equation, a variety of algebraic problems, business problems involving proportion, and (as an appendix) additional problems illustrating some of the standard equations. In the following analysis of each section the discussion will employ modern terminology, such as constant and coefficient, rather than the labored phraseology of the translator. The text of the latter can always be consulted to appreciate the efforts made and success realized by al-Khwārizmī as he sought to put new concepts and techniques in old words.

One may well wonder if al-Khwārizmī had forgotten that he had written a tract on the decimal system entitled *On Hindu Numerals*. There he acknowledged that the decimal system originated with the Hindus; but here in the *Liber algebræ* he credits himself with the discovery. As for algebraic numbers al-Khwārizmī set the terminology: square (*census*), root (*radix*) and constant (two names: *numerus simplex* and *dragma*). While he may have developed these ideas from a study of Diophantos' *Arithmetic* or Euclid's *Elements*, no one may...
deny him the creation of an entirely new approach to problem solving, the standardization of types of equations.

Combining variously three algebraic numbers, al-Khwārizmī constructs six types of equations, three which we will call *simple*, since he himself labeled the last three *composite*. They are:

- **simple**:
  - $ax^2 = bx$
  - $ax^2 = c$
  - $bx = c$

- **composite**: 
  - $ax^2 + bx = c$
  - $ax^2 + c = bx$
  - $bx + c = ax^2$

The three simple equations are exemplified and solved with dispatch:

- $x^2 = 5x$ \implies x = 5
- $5x^2 = 80$ \implies x$^2 = 16$
- $\frac{1}{2}x = 10$ \implies x = 20.

Apparently the student was expected to memorize the paradigms, for no explicit rules are offered for solving simple equations, save one: if the coefficient of the unknown is greater or less than unity, divide or multiply all terms by the inverse of the coefficient to reach unity. A geometric structure supports all these equations, both simple and composite, as the proofs of the methods show. The strategy of setting one side of an equation equal to zero did not occur until the seventeenth century; the thinking of al-Khwārizmī and his successors aligned number with geometric magnitude, a concept difficult to dispose of.

The first example for composite equations is the oft-quoted $x^2 + 10x = 39$ and it is solved by completing the square. The root 3 is found, of course, but it is not the unknown; the unknown is the square, 9. In other problems the unknown is the root. Al-Khwārizmī seems to want his readers to be flexible in opinion is in line with that of Rodet who claims that al-Khwārizmī was 'purely and simply a disciple of the Greek school'. See S. Gandz, 'The Sources of al-Khowarizmi's Algebra', *Osiris* 1 (1936) 263-77; W. Hartner, 'DIBAR'. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, 5 (Leiden, 1965), pp. 360-62; L. Rodet, 'L'Algèbre d'Al-Khârîzî et les méthodes indienne et grecque', *Journal asiatique* 11 (1878) 5-98.

10 See below, II.A.11-12: 'Similiter quoque quod fuerit maius censu aut minus, ad unum reducteur censum.' (References are to chapter and line numbers of the text edited on pp. 233-61) below).


what is to be sought. Following the example he reiterates the need to reduce, where necessary, the coefficient of the squared term to unity. Three additional problems exemplify the first of the composite types, all solved by completing the square. It should be noted that al-Khwārizmī had no word for coefficient and that he expects his readers to understand that 'Media igitur radices' means 'Halve the coefficient of the second degree term'. Moreover, he uses the word questio to signify our term equation.

Within the explanation accompanying the solution of the second type of composite equation, al-Khwārizmī discusses whether or not an equation in the form $ax^2 + c = bx$ can be solved. He says that if the square of half the coefficient of the first degree term is less than the constant, the solution is impossible. Furthermore, he remarks, if the same square equals the constant, then the root is immediately equal to half the coefficient. All of this, obviously, is a beginning of an analysis of the discriminant, $\sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}$. Additionally, and for the first time, he observes that there may be a second root to an equation, which the student may find if he wishes: 'Quod si volueris....'

Mindful of the foregoing remarks, al-Khwārizmī shows that he is a careful teacher as he explains how to solve each of the three types of equations. The rules are easily followed and well exemplified; in fact, a certain commonality among the steps becomes obvious. Regardless of the type, the first two steps are the same: halve the number of roots and square the half. Then, for the first and third types exemplified by $x^2 + 10x = 39$ and $x^2 = 3x + 4$ respectively, the constant term is added to the square; for the second type such as $x^2 + 21 = 10x$, the constant term is subtracted from the square. Hence, as noted above, if the subtraction cannot be done, the equation cannot be solved. (Only much later, in the sixteenth century, would Cardano begin to tinker with what Descartes would call imaginary numbers whereby the second type can always have a solution.) The fourth step is the same for all types: take the square root of the sum or difference. Only the fifth and last step which directly produces the value of $x$ is unique for each type. For the first type, subtract the half of the number of roots from the fourth step; for the second, subtract the square root from the half; and for the third, add the half to the root. Clear, complete and concise: the rules need only be memorized. In the next section the student comes to realize why the process always produces a solution. The didactic technique employed by al-Khwārizmī, therefore, is first to familiarize students with the canonical types of equations and methods for solving them and then, after some expertise had been realized, to demonstrate the reliability of the methods.

13 See below, II.B.53-56.
The meaning he intends for the word *demonstrate*, which appears as ‘quod demonstrare voluimus’ at the end of the last two proofs, is made explicit by the word which introduces the unit, *causa*. Rather than offer Euclidean proofs for the methods, al-Khwārizmı constructs a framework that shows visibly why the methods produce the results. His approach is in fact pedagogical (to bring understanding) rather than logical (to order understanding). All of this becomes obvious in an analysis of one demonstration.

Underlying the demonstration for the method of solving equations of the second composite type is book 2, proposition 5 of Euclid’s *Elements*: ‘If a straight line be cut into equal and unequal segments, the rectangle contained by the unequal segments of the whole together with the square on the straight line between the parts of the section is equal to the square on the half.’ Euclid of course proves the theorem synthetically; al-Khwārizmı on the contrary reaches it analytically. The proposition is illustrated in the text edited below (III, p. 239); but it must be observed that the diagram is a composite picture showing all the steps together. The reader is expected to draw the figure step by step in order to appreciate the force of the demonstration. Here is how one should proceed to solve $x^2 + 21 = 10x$:

1. Construct a square to represent the area of $x^2$; 2. attach a rectangle to a side of the square to represent the area $21$; 3. thus added together by juxtaposition, the two areas equal the area of a rectangle of dimensions $10$ by $x$, as shown in fig. 1.

4. Bisect the side of length $10$ at $t$ and on the half construct square $tklg$ (fig. 2) whose area is $25$. 5. On $hk$ (fig. 3) construct the square $hkmn$.

With the constructions complete, al-Khwārizmı leads the reader through a chain of reasoning which I will abbreviate. The area of rectangle $ahip$ equals the area of rectangle $mldn$, and therefore the area of composite figure $thmnlg$ equals $21$. Hence the area of square $kmhn$ is $4$, and segment $hk = ah = 2$. But since $eh = ea + ah = x + ah = 5$, then $x = 3$. If the length of segment $x$ is known, the area of the previously unknown square $x$ is $9$. And that was what was sought; the demonstration is complete. Through a series of visible constructions and a sequence of logical steps, therefore, the student has been led

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15 See below, III.48-80.
to realize that the verbal technique, tantamount to completing the square, always produces a correct solution.

The scope of the chapter on multiplication is limited to the multiplication of binomials by monomials and by binomials, the second term of a binomial being either positive or negative, the first term always positive. Al-Khwārizmī makes it clear that the first term of a binomial is in tens (articuli) and the second in units (unitates), and that if a binomial is multiplied by a binomial, four multiplications are required (each term of one by each term of the other) to reach the final product. He notes that if the second terms are both positive or negative, their product is added to the sum of the other partial products; if one is positive and the other negative, their product is taken from the sum. He begins with three specific examples: \(- (10 + 1)(10 + 2), (10 - 1)(10 - 1),\) and \((10 + 2)(10 - 1)\) – which are worked out in detail. Since the student is presumed to know that each of these problems is only a reformation of familiar factors \((11 \times 12, 9 \times 9, \text{and} 12 \times 9)\), he is forced to accept the reasonableness of the rules for multiplying and adding negative numbers. Then he gives examples of binomials multiplied by a monomial \(- (10 - x) 10 \text{ and } (10 + x) 10 -\) and works these out in detail. Thereafter follow nine examples, eight of which have an unknown in the binomial:

1. \((10 + x)(10 + x)\)
2. \((10 - x)(10 - x)\)
3. \((10 - x)(10 + x)\)
4. \((10 - x)x\)
5. \((10 - x)x\)
6. \((10 + x)(x - 10)\)
7. \((10 + x)(x - 10)\)
8. \((10 + x)(x - 10)\)
9. \((x + 10)(x - 10)\)

Repeating the sixth example in what I call the eighth, he varies the first factor to make the ninth example which he solves. The third example is interesting for its answer: \(\left(1 - \frac{1}{6}\right)\left(1 - \frac{1}{6}\right) = \frac{2}{3} + \left(\frac{1}{6} \cdot \frac{1}{6}\right)\). He closes this section by repeating the rule that, if the second terms of the binomials are opposite in sign, their product is subtracted from the sum of the other partial products.

Three completed problems introduce the fifth chapter on computing with roots. Instead of explaining how these are solved as he did with solving equation, al-Khwārizmī proceeds immediately to methods for multiplying and dividing radical numbers. While he explains the techniques by examples, the steps in performing various operations are perhaps best displayed in modern generalizations:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) \quad a\sqrt{x^2} &= \sqrt{a^2x^2} = ax \\
(b) \quad a\sqrt{b^2} &= \sqrt{a^2b^2} = \sqrt{c} = d \\
(c) \quad \frac{\sqrt{a^2}}{\sqrt{b^2}} &= \sqrt{\frac{a^2}{b^2}} = \frac{a}{b}
\end{align*}
\]
(d) \[ \frac{a\sqrt{c^2}}{\sqrt{b^2}} = \sqrt{\frac{a^2c^2}{b^2}} = \frac{ac}{b} \]
(e) \[ (\sqrt{a^2})(\sqrt{b^2}) = \sqrt{a^2b^2} = \sqrt{c} = d \]
(f) \[ (a\sqrt{b^2})(c\sqrt{d^2}) = (\sqrt{a^2b^2})(\sqrt{c^2d^2}) = \sqrt{e} = f. \]

For several of these he expects the student to recall how to find the square roots of numbers, whether they are perfect squares or not.

The last section on proofs (cause) offers intuitive explanations for the first two problems which introduce the fifth chapter. This is done by clever addition and subtraction of line segments set equal to the components of the left side of each problem:

\[
(\sqrt{200} - 10) + (20 - \sqrt{200}) = 10 \\
(20 - \sqrt{200}) - (\sqrt{200} - 10) = 30 - 2\sqrt{200}.
\]

But the solution of the third problem,

\[
[100 + (x^2 - 20x)] + [50 + (10x - 2x^2)] = 150 - (x^2 + 10x),
\]

is offered verbally, much as it would be done today: similar terms on the left side of the equation are collected to yield the answer on the right. The verbal explanation was required because al-Khwarizmi knew of no way to combine line segments and geometric squares to produce the answer. In view of the verbal explanation, however, one may wonder why he did not sum up by remarking that the two previous problems solved by construction could be resolved easily, in so many words, by collecting like terms.

The discussion on radical numbers completes what may be called al-Khwarizmi's elementary theory of equations. The sixth chapter, on equations (questiones), poses six problems each illustrating a different type of equation, the techniques necessary to reduce each to its canonical form, and their respective solutions. The equations are:

1. \[ x^2 = x(10 - x) \]
2. \[ 10^2 = 2\frac{7}{9}x^2 \]
3. \[ \frac{10 - x}{x} = 4 \]
4. \[ \left(\frac{x}{3}\right) + 1)\left(\frac{x}{4}\right) + 1) = 20 \]
5. \[ (10 - x)^2 + x^2 = 58 \]
6. \[ \left(\frac{x}{3}\right)\left(\frac{x}{4}\right) = x + 24. \]

Four technical words which describe operations necessary to put the problems into canonical forms appear in the solutions. They are:
(1) *reducere*: to reduce the coefficient of the squared term to unity by multiplying all terms of the equation by the reciprocal of the coefficient;

(2) *reintegrare*: the same as *reducere* except that the coefficient is less than unity;

(3) *opponere*: to subtract a positive term on one side of an equation from itself and from its like term on the other side;

(4) *restaurare*: to add the absolute value of a negative term from one side of an equation to itself and to the other side.

Twelve additional problems < VII. Questiones varie > reinforce much of what has preceded. They are a mixed bag containing a surprise. First, only four of the model equations receive further exemplification:

\[
\begin{align*}
ax^2 &= c: \text{ (example 9)} \\
bx &= c: \text{ (examples 2 and 7)} \\
ax^2 + bx &= c: \text{ (example 12)} \\
a^2 + c &= bx: \text{ (examples 1, 2-6, 8, 10-11)}.
\end{align*}
\]

Secondly, the surprise is new material: fractional equations in examples (4), (5), (7), (8), (11), and (12). Two methods for solving these fractional equations are presented: first, the equivalent of cross-multiplication in (5), (7), (8), and (11); second, the equivalent of multiplying each term of the equation by the lowest common denominator in (4) and (12). Furthermore, example (7) requires the reader to readjust his thinking; the object of the problem or unknown is a square. Since the initial equation will eventually become a quadratic, al-Khwārizmī tells the student to treat it as *res*, the usual word for the first degree variable, *x*; otherwise, the problem produces a fourth degree equation which is outside the scope of the text.16 Finally, the statements of the problems become these equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad x(10-x) &= 21 \\
(2) \quad (10-x)^2 - x^2 &= 40 \\
(3) \quad (10-x)^2 + x^2 + (10-x) - x &= 54 \\
(4) \quad \frac{10-x}{x} + \frac{x}{10-x} &= 2\frac{1}{6} \\
(5) \quad \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{5x}{10-x} \right) &= 5(10-x) \\
(6) \quad (10-x)^2 &= 81x
\end{align*}
\]

16 The technique of substituting *y* for *x^2* is used extensively in *Liber augmenti et diminutionis*; see Libri, *Histoire des sciences mathématiques en Italie* 1.308 and passim.
AL-KHWĀRIZMI'S *AL-JABR*

(7) \[ x^2 = y, \quad \frac{y}{y + 2} = \frac{1}{2} \]

(8) \[ \frac{x(10 - x)}{(10 - x) - x} = \frac{51}{4} \]

(9) \[ (4x)(5x) = 2x^2 + 36 \]

(10) \[ (\frac{2}{3}x - 3)^2 = x \]

(11) \[ \frac{\frac{3}{2}}{x + 1} = 2x \]

(12) \[ \frac{1}{x + 1} = \frac{1}{x} - \frac{1}{6} \]

The last chapter in *Liber algebræ* is a short section on proportion applied to business problems, the well-known ‘Rule of Three’. Following clear statements about possible variations attendant upon three given numbers with the fourth to be found, i.e.,

\[ \frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{x} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{a}{b} = \frac{x}{c} \]

two examples are worked through in detail. Interesting is the translator’s use of the expression *numerus ignotus* for ‘the number to be found’, a phrase that does not appear in the theory of equations, as well as it might; there the unknown is always referred to as *res* or *census*. A third example closes the chapter; it was probably included for its practical value since it focuses upon payment for six days’ work where the salary is set for one month’s work. With this last problem the older manuscript copies of Gerard’s translation conclude *Liber algebræ*.

Found only in Gerard’s translation are the contents of the Appendix on pp. 257-61 below. Robert of Chester’s version shows an appendix that summarizes the rules for solving the six types of equations; William of Lunis offers, as though his own, nearly all of the algebraic section of chapter 15, part 3, of Fibonacci’s *Liber abaci*; Rosen’s Arabic source (ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library Hunt 214, fols. 1-34) includes three additional chapters, on mensuration, legacies, and computation of returns.17 Gerard made it clear that he incorporated the material from another font, for he wrote: ‘Liber hic finitur. In alio tamen libro repperi hec interposita suprascriptis’ (below, Appendix 2). His statement certainly suggests that he recognized that the material was not written by al-Khwārizmī, yet he saw another copy of *al-Jabr* which contained the set of

problems. Since one aspect of the value of the present critical edition is to appreciate a translation which from the sheer force of the number of extant copies is assumed to have provided a major thrust toward the development of algebra in medieval Europe, I judged it important to include the Appendix as a cognate part of al-Khwārizmi’s tract, although I have no evidence that he was its author.

The Appendix is a selection of twenty-one problems making a very uneven group. About half the solutions are straightforward; the remainder do not come so easily. Early on, the student is confronted with three quartic equations in a row, (4)-(6), followed by a cubic. Although their solutions are shown to be similar to simple types studied before, the student does have to refine his tools for solving problems. Enough practice is offered, however, particularly for thinking of \textit{census} in terms of \textit{res} or \textit{radix}.

Problems (15) and (19) are the most interesting, if not the most difficult. The former begins with the squares of two unknowns, instead of the customary ‘Divide ten into two parts’. Two relationships are established between them, which permit a substitution from one equation into the other thereby reducing the problem to one equation in one unknown. In problem (19), for the first time, the student is confronted by a radical binomial in an equation. The wording of problem and solution, however, is obscure (the scribe’s fault?); and the medieval Latin reader may have ignored this part as unintelligible. This is a pity, since a new technique lies here: squaring both sides of an equation to remove a radical term. Both problems are finally solved quite conventionally.

The problems in the Appendix may be expressed as follows:

\begin{align*}
(1) \quad (10 - x)^2 &= 81 \\
(2) \quad 10x &= (10 - x)^2 \\
(3) \quad \frac{2}{3} \left(\frac{1}{3} x^2\right) &= \frac{1}{7} x \\
(4) \quad x^2 \cdot (4x^2) &= 20 \\
(5) \quad (x^2) \cdot \left(\frac{x^2}{3}\right) &= 10 \\
(6) \quad (x^2) \cdot (4x^2) &= \frac{x^2}{3} \\
(7) \quad (x^2) x &= 3x^2 \\
(8) \quad (3x) \cdot (4x) &= x^2 + 44 \\
(9) \quad x \cdot (4x) &= 3x^2 + 50 \\
(10) \quad x^2 + 20 &= 12x \\
(11) \quad \left(\frac{x^2}{3}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{x^2}{4}\right) &= x^2 \\
(12) \quad \left(\frac{x^2}{3} + 1\right) \cdot \left(\frac{x^2}{4} + 2\right) &= x^2 + 13
\end{align*}
\[(x^2 - \frac{x^2}{3} - \frac{x^2}{4} - 4) = x^2 + 12\]

\[x^2 \left(\frac{2}{3}\right) = 5\]

\[x^2 - y^2 = 2 \text{ and } \frac{y^2}{x^2} = \frac{1}{2}\]

\[x^2 \left(3x\right) = 5x^2\]

\[(x^2 - \frac{x^2}{3}) 3x = x^2\]

\[\frac{1}{3} (x^2 - 4x) = 4x \text{ and } x^2 = 256\]

\[\sqrt{x^2 - x} + x = 2\]

\[(x^2 - 3x)^2 = x^2\]

\[(x^2) \left(\frac{2}{3} x^2\right) = 5.\]

**The Latin Manuscripts**

Manuscript copies of Gerard’s translation begin ‘Hic (or Sic) post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit (or inquid)’ and generally conclude ‘... cuius radix est quinque’. They are easily separated into two groups. Most of the seven manuscripts in the first set are from the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and exhibit few significant variations among themselves. The second set of eight manuscripts are later in composition, show many variations from the first set and among themselves, offer fewer or more problems, and suggest that the terminology has been edited. The critical edition is based on the first group whose members are described below in detail; the various titles of the tract are given immediately after identification of the codices. The members of the second group are recognized as witnesses to the importance (or perhaps the availability) of Gerard’s translation and are described in less detail. All and only scientific works in the codices of the first group are itemized; some works are marked with an asterisk to signal a translation to Gerard of Cremona. The diad TK following a title refers to Thorndike and Kibre’s *Catalogue of Incipits*.18

**Fonds of the Critical Edition**

C = Cambridge, Cambridge University Library Mm.2.18, fols. 65rb-69vb ('Liber maumeti filii moysi alchoarismi de algebra et almuchabala incipit'). France, c. 1360.

Contents:


The codex was commissioned by Geoffrey de Wighton, O.F.M., and paid for 'by alms given by his friends'. Thomas Knyvett (d. 1622), Baron Escrick who discovered the gunpowder plot, obtained the book as his name and motto within testify. Thereafter it passed into the library of Thomas Moore (1646-1714). Upon his death the collection was purchased by King George I and presented to Cambridge University in 1715. Items 2 through 7 may have been copied directly from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 9335 or from its exemplar, since they are in exactly the same order as they appear in the Paris codex. The algebra, item 3, is the manuscript mentioned by Montfaucon. By and large, it is a very good copy with few variations from Paris lat. 9335, notably *kaficī* for *cafficī* (fol. 115rb) and only three omissions of significant length (fols. 113ra, 113va, 116rb), the first and third due to homoeoteleuton.


F = Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Conv. soppr. J.V.18 (Codex S. Marci Florentini 216), fols. 80r-86v (no title). France/Italy, saec. xiii ex.

Contents:


20 Many of the details here were graciously supplied by Jayne Cook, Assistant Under-Librarian of Cambridge University Library, to whom my thanks.
The algebra was obviously copied piecemeal by two scribes: the first was responsible for fols. 80r-81v and the second for fols. 82r-86v. The manuscript is significant for three reasons. First, although it contains more variants than the other three manuscripts used for the critical edition, its early date suggests a strong interest in al-Khwarizmi's algebra. Second, it is the only manuscript with the unusual spelling of census, namely, sensus, which occurs in the section copied by the first scribe. Third, a (near?) contemporary gloss attributes the translation incorrectly to William of Lunis: 'Incipit liber gebre de numero translates a magistro Guillelmo de lunis in quadriviali sciencia peritissimo' (fol. 80ra). While the note is excellent testimony to the fact that William of Lunis did translate al-Khwarizmi's al-Jabr, it miscredits William with this translation. He is responsible for an entirely different translation which spawned its own family of copies.


M = Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana A 183 inf., fols. 115r-120r ('Incipit liber Mulumecti de algebra et almuchabila'). Northern Italy, saec. xiv in.

Contents:

See n. 6 above.
corpore et solido. (17) fols. 80-114 desunt. (18) fols. 115r-120r: al-Khwārizmī, Liber de algebra et almuchabala* [TK 624]. (19) fols. 120v-122v: Anon., Algorismus [TK 990].

A noteworthy gathering of treatises copied by several Italian (and French?) scribes from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century, the codex is witness to a strong interest in scientific topics. The copy of Liber algebre displays differences in notation as well as improvements upon explanations. For instance, to represent $\frac{3}{3}$ the scribe wrote $\frac{1}{3}$. For textual emendation, in place of "Dic: “Hic ... equales rei”’ (below, VII.102-104), there appears this clearer statement: ‘Pro minori censu pone rem. Pro maiori vero censu pone rem et duas dragmas. Quibus multiplicatis per mediam dragmam quae provenit ex divisione minoris censi (sic) per maiorem et eveniunt media res et dragmam (sic), id est, que equantur uni rei’ (fol. 118va27-34). Seemingly, early fourteenth-century scholars were seeking clarifications and improvements upon texts handed them. Yet the copy has numerous defects; a representative selection are shown in the apparatus.


N = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale fr. 16965, fols. 2r-19v (‘Liber mahumeti filii moysi alchorismi de algebra et almuchabala incipit’). France, saec. xvi in.

Contents:


Sometime in the Saint-Germain collection, the codex is an anthology of scientific works copied in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both in Latin and in French (twelve titles not identified above). The algebra was written in a very clear humanistic hand, most probably copied from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 9335, and at one time the manuscript was part of the Lustierine Library. There are no significant variants to recommend its use for the critical edition.


P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 9335, fols. 110vb-116va (‘Liber maumeti filii moysi alchroismi de algebra et almuchabala incipit’). Southern France/Italy, saec. xiii in.

Contents:

(1) fols. 1r-19r: Theodosius of Bithynia, De speris* [TK 1523]. (2) fols. 19r-21v: Autolycus of Pitane, De motu spere* [TK 1151]. (3) fols. 22r-23r: Ascleius, De ascensione signorum* [TK 1449]. (4) fol. 23v: Anon., (inc.) ‘Cordam per archum et
Recognized as 'perhaps the most important manuscript of Gerard of Cremona's works', the codex is a valuable mine of medieval resources, twenty-nine tracts in pure and applied mathematics. The 161 leaves are of parchment, the two columns of text were written by a single hand, initials are red and blue, and an early table of contents appears on fol. 1. The algebra, item 20, is obviously the best text of all the manuscripts reviewed; the wording is unambiguous, the diagrams are helpfully complete, and the marginalia evince careful corrections by the same scribe who penned the text. (I incorporated these corrections as well as others made by him, interlinear or overhead, into the text of the critical edition and noted them in italics). These features, reinforced by the manuscript's having been copied within perhaps fifty years of the translation and, conjecturally, from the final draft of Gerard, make P the exemplar for all copies in its genre.

Q = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 7377A, fols. 34r-43v (‘Liber maumeti filii moysi alchoariximi de algebra et almuchabala incipit’). France, saec. xiii.

Contents:


The Liber de algebra was copied directly from Paris lat. 9335 (P) during the third quarter of the thirteenth century, possibly by a Parisian university scribe, and the codex was sometime in the Colbertine Library. Not only are there comparatively few variations between the two manuscripts, but the corrections found in the margins of Paris lat. 9335 were often copied onto the same relative places in Paris lat. 7377A. Two noteworthy variations in spelling occur: kaficī for cafficii and centexime for centessime. This copy has nothing to offer the critical edition.


V = Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. lat. 5733, fols. 275r-287r (‘Incipit liber Mahumed filii Moysi Algorismi de algebra et almutabala transcriptus a magistro Simone Cremonensi in Toleto de arabico in latinum’). Italy, saec. xvi in.

Contents:


This collection of scientific tracts centers on the work of Petrus Pomponatius of Mantua (1462-1524) and was sometime part of the library of the gymnasium at Bologna. In general, the algebra text is reliable as far as it goes; but it ends with the last of the Questiones varie, without the section on proportion nor with the set of extra problems. On a separate folio (274r) is a unique title for the tract, Ars algebrae, which begins on fol. 275r along with the completely erroneous ascription of the translation to ‘magistro Simone Cremonensi’. The body of the text is well-written in a simple cursive hand and is divided into clearly stated sections, much as I have done, with subtitles. The only addition of any significance to the text is an insertion carefully placed within parentheses (fol. 282r) which I have included in the critical apparatus at VI.18 below. While a good witness to the continuing interest in the work of al-Khwārizmi, this manuscript has nothing further to add to the critical edition.

A comparison of variants between the texts of the first group of manuscripts produces ten readings whereby the manuscripts can be separated into two families, $\alpha$ and $\beta$, namely:

- V-1: comprehendi potest de numeris ulterius (I.13-14)
- V-2: ad infinitam numerorum comprehensionem (I.13-14)
- V-3: questio est impossibilis (II.B.55)
- V-4: questio est destructa (or destructa) (II.B.55)
- V-5: dupla ergo radicem novem (V.37-38)
- V-6: multiplicata ergo radicem novem (V.37-38)
- V-7: capitula numerationis et eorum modos (VI.2)
- V-8: capitula et eorum modos (VI.2)
- V-9: reintegres censum tuum (VII.142-143)
- V-10: reintegres novem radices (VII.142-143).

V-1 and V-2 are different conclusions for the first paragraph of the tract; each of the seven manuscripts shows either one or the other expression. V-3 and V-4 are different though meaningfully the same description of the possibility of solving a particular type of an equation. Six of the manuscripts have one or the other reading; the Vatican manuscript lacks the clause in a long passage omitted possibly because of homoeoteleuton. Again, with respect to V-5 and V-6, all manuscripts have either one or the other variant reading. The same holds for V-7 and V-8, and for V-9 and V-10. The manuscripts with their respective variants can be displayed in a matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manuscripts</th>
<th>V-1</th>
<th>V-2</th>
<th>V-3</th>
<th>V-4</th>
<th>V-5</th>
<th>V-6</th>
<th>V-7</th>
<th>V-8</th>
<th>V-9</th>
<th>V-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris fr. 16965</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris lat. 9335</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris lat. 7377A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatican</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern recommends a clear division of the manuscripts into two families. Hence, the members of the $\alpha$ family are C, N, P, and Q. Members of the $\beta$ family are F, M, and V.

Regarding intrafamilial relationships: in the $\alpha$ family P is clearly the oldest in the group and the best extant copy. Q is a nearly perfect reproduction of P, with only one omission of any length (below, Appendix 115-116). N seems to be a better copy of P, for it has the passage missing in Q. C has its own set of omissions which are not found in N, P, or Q, and it does contain the sentence missing in Q. These factors make a case for the genealogy shown below for the
members of the $\alpha$ family. The $\beta$ family consists of three strikingly different manuscripts. They may be briefly described as exhibitors of at least one major characteristic unique to each. $F$ explains the word ‘algebra’ by oppositio and ‘almuchabala’ by responsio. $M$ has a unique substitution at VII.102-104. $V$ would have us believe from the title that the tract was translated by Simon of Cremona. Hence, none is a direct descendant of either of the other two members of the $\beta$ family. A stemma sets forth the relationships:

![Stemma Diagram]

**Manuscript Witnesses**

The eight manuscripts briefly described below witness to efforts of scholars to improve upon Gerard’s translation. Each offers modifications in terminology, addition or omission of problems, or additional textual material. Hence, none of these manuscripts was used to construct the critical edition. They merit attention, however, as witnesses to the importance of Gerard’s translation which served as their foundation, not to overlook the burgeoning interest in algebra.

(1) Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Hamilton 692, fols. 279r-291v (‘In nomine dei eterni. Incipit liber Mauchumeti in Algebra et Almuchabula qui est origo et fundamentum totius scientia arismetice’). Italy, saec. xvi in.

_inc._: Hic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit...

_expl._: ... et proueniunt 25, cuius radix est 5.

In general this copy has the characteristic variants of the $\beta$ family. It is classified as a witness because of the numerous subtitles which were added to the text. Furthermore it adds six problems to the _Questiones varie_ and omits problems 1, 14, and 15 from the Appendix.

**Bibliography:** H. Boese, _Die lateinischen Handschriften der Sammlung Hamilton zu Berlin_ (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 334-35.

(2) Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz Lat. qu. 529, fols. 2r-16v (‘... Macumetii ... Algebra...’). Italy, saec. xv med.

_inc._: <$H>$ ic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit...

_expl._: ... et proueniunt 25 cuius radix est quinque.
Despite considerable water damage (humidity?) to the outer edges of the leaves, much of the text can be read. It is clearly a member of the \( \beta \) family, but several times removed. There are a number of editorial changes in the text ans problems 1, 14, and 15 are missing from the Appendix.


*inc.:* Hic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquid...

*expl.:* ... provenit .25. dragme cuius radix est .5.

While the text has many characteristics typical of the \( \beta \) family, it also evinces numerous editorial changes, some of which are simply erroneous. Furthermore, the text does not end with the twenty-first supplementary problem but continues on (fols. 360v-363v) with sixteen additional algebraic problems, twenty-eight definitions for arithmetic and geometry, a tract on extraction of roots, and eighteen problems and rules for geometry and astronomy. Only a large \( Q \) in the margin introducing the word Quod signals the beginning of this second appendix.


(4) Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana P 81 sup. (olim YS), fols. 1r-22r ('Machumeti de Algebra et Almuchabala, id est recuperationis et oppositionis. Liber incipit'). Italy, saec. xv in.

*inc.:* <H> ic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquid...

*expl.:* ... provenit radix de xxv et illa est v. Et cetera.

This copy is a member of a family of four displaying the same unique characteristics, notably, the frequent use of \( \text{cosa} \) for \( \text{res} \) and the addition of two lengthy paragraphs which begin 'Modus dividendi'. As a matter of convenience, I identify the set as 'the Modus family'. Also characteristic of the family is the sentence 'Sed ut res gravis leuis tibi fiat, sequatur id quod ex questionibus in textu propinquus cum ille erat per quorum significationem in aliis consimiliter operaberis, si deus voluerit' (fol. 11r). The codex was one time the property of Gian Vincenzo Pinelli (1535-1601).

\( ^{23} \) The manuscript is not recorded by V. Rose and F. Schillmann, *Verzeichnis der lateinischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1893-1919). However, the microfilm shows two parts (what appears to be the first and last third) of a label:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{B. B} \\
\text{agnis} \\
\text{1229}
\end{array}
\]

The obvious deduction led me to Narducci's catalogue whose description fits exactly the contents of the manuscript shown on the microfilm.

(5) New York, Columbia University, Butler Library Plimpton 188, fols. 73r-82v (‘Liber Mahucmeti de Algebra et Almuchabala id est recuperationis et oppositionis’). German hand, 1456.

*inc.:* Hic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit...

*expl.:* ... provenit radix de 25 et illa est 5. Et cetera.

The text clearly belongs to the Modus family. Apart from a single space of one line, there is nothing to signal the end of al-Khwarizmi’s tract and the beginning of what I would call *collectanea mathematica*: a miscellany of problems solved verbally and symbolically (fols. 82v-84v), a precis of al-Khwarizmi’s algebra (fols. 85r-88r), two more problems solved symbolically (fols. 88v-89r), and a set of notes on arithmetic, algebra, and geometry (fols. 90r-94r).


*inc.:* Hic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem...

*expl.:* ... et prouenient 25 dragme cuius radix est 5.

A remote member of the β family, the manuscript shows interesting marginalia in the hand of the scribe; for instance, next to the term ‘medietas census et 5 radices equantur 28’, the reader sees ‘. c . ra . dg .’ under which lies ‘. 1 . 10 . 56 .’. These suggest an attempt at abbreviation as well as the procedure for changing the coefficient of the second degree term to unity (fol. 227v). Nonetheless the copy has a number of flaws, particularly the omission of problems 1, 14, and 15 from the Appendix.


(7) Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria H V 45, fols. 1r-36r (‘Machvmeti de Algebra et Elmchabala id est de recuperatione et oppositione’). Saec. xvi ex.

*inc.:* Sic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem, quam ad computationem consideravi necessarium...

*expl.:* ... provenit radix de 25. et illa est quinque.
The copy is a member of the Modus family and is the only item in the codex. Its interest lies in the beautiful cursive hand of the scribe and the large number of errors which must have proved frustrating to any average student; the errors begin with the initial capital of the *incipit*.


(8) Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Urb. lat. 1329, fols. 43r-63r ('Machumeti de algebra et almuchabala, id est recuperationis et oppositionis'). Rome, 23 October 1458.

*incipit:* Sic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit...
*expl.:* ... pervenit radix de xxv et illa est v. Et cetera.

While this copy is a member of the Modus family, two items make it special apart from the initial error in the *incipit*. First, and for the earliest time I have found the expression to be used, the text contains the words 'Probacio huius satis pulchra' (fol. 57v). The beautiful proof, however, turns out to be nothing more than a clever manipulation of numbers to produce a desired root. The second is the use of Roman numerals to write fractions; for instance, $2\frac{1}{2}$ is written $\text{II-I}$ $\text{III}$. There are changes in wording of some problems and the entire section, *Capitulum conventionum negotiatorum*, is omitted.


**THE CRITICAL EDITION**

Gerard of Cremona's translation of al-Khwārizmi's *al-Jabr*, as transmitted in P, fols. 110v-116v, follows. Corrections by the scribe are included in the text of the critical edition and are printed in italics. Significant variations from P are noted, as they appear in C, F, and M. The apparatus also contains more than eighty variant readings, additions, or omissions found in Libri's edition (L).24 Contractions and abbreviations have been expanded according to conventional usage. The orthography of P is preserved except that $u$ is used for $v$. Numbers in P are written as words, and this feature has been retained. I have supplied many paragraph divisions and subtitles as would benefit the sense of the text.

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24 See n. 3 above; Libri's edition was made from the manuscripts I have here designated NPQ.
SIGLA

C Cambridge, Cambridge University Library Mm.2.18
F Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Conv. soppr. J.V.18
M Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana A 183 inf.
P Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 9335

Hic post laudem dei et ipsius exaltationem inquit: Postquam illud quod ad computationem est necessarium consideravi, repperi totum illud numerum fore, omnemque numerum ab uno compositum esse inveni. Unus itaque inter omnem consistit numerum. Et inveni omne quod ex numeris verbis exprimitur esse quod unus usque ad decem pertransit. Decem quoque ab uno progressiris, qui postea duplicatus et triplicatus et cetera quemadmodum fit de uno. Fiunt ex eo viginti et triginta et ceteri usque quo compleatur centum. Deinde duplicatur centum et triplicatur quemadmodum ex decem, et fiunt ex eo ducenta et trecenta, et sic usque ad mille. Post hoc similiter reiteratur mille apud unumquamque articulum usque ad id quod comprehendi potest de numeris ultime.

Deinde repperi numeros qui sunt necessarii in computatione algebre et almuchabale secundum tres modos fore, qui sunt: radicum et census et numeri simplices non relati ad radicem neque ad census. Radix vero que est unum eorum est quicquid in se multiplicatur ab uno, et quod est super ipsum ex numeris, et quod est preter eum ex fractionibus. Census autem est quicquid aggregatur ex radice in se multiplicata. Sed numerus simplex est quicquid ex numeris verbis exprimitur absque proportione eius ad radicem et ad census.

Ex his igitur tribus modis sunt qui se ad invicem equant. Quod est sicut si dicas: ‘Census equatur radicibus, et census equatur numero, et radices equantur numero.’ Census autem qui radicibus equatur est ac si dicas: ‘Census equatur quinque radicibus.’ Radix ergo census est quinque. Et census est viginti
quinque. Ipse namque quinque suis radicibus equalis existit. Et sicut si dicas: 'Tertia census equatur quattuor radicibus.' Totus igitur census est duodecim radices qui est centum quadraginta quattuor. Et sicut si dicas: 'Quinque census equantur decem radicibus.' Unus igitur census duabus equatur radicibus. Ergo radix census est *duo*, et *census* est quattuor. Similiter quoque quod fuerit maius censu aut minus, ad unum reducetur census. Et eodem modo fit ex eo quod ipsi equatur ex radicibus. Census autem qui numero equatur est sicut cum dicitur: 'Census equatur novem.' Ipse igitur est census et radix eius est tres. Et sicut si dicas: 'Quinque census equantur octoginta.' Unus igitur census est quinta octoginta qui est sedecim. Et sicut si dicas: 'Medietas census equatur decem et octo.' Ergo census equatur triginta sex. Et similiter omnis census augmentatus et diminutus ad unum reductur census. Et eodem modo fit de eo quod ei equatur ex numeris. Radices vero que numeris equantur sunt sicut si dicas: 'Radix equatur tribus.' Radix est tres. Et census qui est ex ea est novem. Et sicut si dicas: 'Quattuor radices equantur viginti.' Una igitur radix equatur quinque. Et similiter sic dicas: 'Medietas radicis equatur decem.' Ergo radix est viginti. Et census qui est ex ea est quadringenta.

< B. TRES Modi COMPOSITI >

Hos preterea tres modos qui sunt radices et census et numerus inveni componi. Et sunt ex eis tria genera composita, que sunt hec: census namque et radices equantur numero; et census et numerus equantur radicibus; et radices et numerus equantur censui. Census autem et radices que numero equantur sunt sicut si dicas: 'Census et decem radices equantur triginta novem dragmis.' Cuius hec est significatio: ex quo censu cui additur equale decem radicum eius aggregatur totum quod est triginta novem. Cuius regula est ut medies radices que in hac questione sunt quinque. Multiplica igitur eas in se et fiunt ex eis viginti quinque. Quos triginta novem adde, et erunt sexaginta quattuor. Cuius radicem accipias que est octo. Deinde minute ex ea medietatem radicum que est quinque. Remanet igitur tres qui est radix census. Et census est novem. Et si duo census aut tres aut plures aut pauciores nominentur, similiter reduc eos ad census unum. Et quod ex radicibus aut numeris est cum eis, reduc ad similitudinem ejus ad quod redundisti census. Quod est ut dicas: 'Duo census et...
decem radices equantur quadraginta octo.' Cuius est significatio quod cum quibuslibet duobus censibus additur equale decem radicum unius eorum, aggregantur inde quadraginta octo. Oportet itaque ut duo census ad unum reducantur censum. Novimus autem iam quod unus census duorum censuum est medietas. Reduc itaque quicquid est in questione ad medietatem sui. Et est sicut si dicatur: 'Census et quinque radices equales sunt viginti quattuor.' Cuius est intentio quod cum cuilibet censui quinque ipsius radices adduntur, aggregantur inde viginti quattuor. Media igitur radices et sunt duo et semis. Multiplica ergo eas in se et fient sex et quarta. Adde hoc viginti quattuor et erunt triginta et quarta. Cuius accipias radicem que est quinque et semis. Ex qua minue radicum medietatem que est duo et semis. Ex qua minue radicum medietatem que est duo et semis. Erunt ergo tres qui est radix census, et census est novem.

Et si dicatur: 'Medietas census et quinque radices equantur viginti octo.' Cuius quidem intentio est quod cum cuilibet census medietati additur equale quinque radicibus ipsius, proveniunt inde viginti octo. Tu autem vis ut rem tuam reintegres donec ex ea unus proveniat census. Quod est ut ipsam duplces. Duplica ergo ipsam et duplica quod est cum ea ex eo quod equatur ei. Erit itaque quod census et decem radices equantur quinquaginta sex. Media ergo radices, et erunt quinque. Et multiplica eas in se et provenient viginti quinque.

Adde autem eas quinquaginta sex et fient octoginta unum. Cuius accipias radicem que est novem. Et minuas ex ea medietatem radicum que est quinque. Et remanent quattuor qui est radix census quem voluisti. Et census est sedecim cuibus medi(P 111rb)etas est octo. Et similiter facias de unoquoque censuum, et de eo quod equat ipsum ex radicibus et numeris.

Census vero et numerus qui radicibus equantur sunt sicut si dicas: 'Census et viginti una dragma equantur decem radicibus.' Cuius significatio est quod cum cuilibet censui addideris viginti unum, erit quod aggregabitur equale decem radicibus illius census. Cuius regula est ut medies radices et erunt quinque. Quas in se multiplica et proveniet viginti quinque. Ex eo itaque minue viginti unum quem cum censu nominasti et remanebit quattuor. Cuius accipies radicem que est duo. Quam ex radicum medietate, que est quinque, minue. Remanebit ergo tres qui est radix census quem voluisti; et census est novem. Quod si volueris, addes ipsam medietati radicum et erit septem. Qui est radix census; et census est quadraginta novem. Cum ergo questio evenerit tibi deducens te ad hoc capitulum, ipsius veritatem cum additione experire. Quod si non fuerit, tunc procul dubio erit cum diminutione. Et hoc quidem unum trium
capitulorum in quibus radicum mediatio est necessaria progreditur cum
additione et diminutione. Scias autem quod cum medias radices in hoc capitulo
et multiplicatas eas in se, et fit illud quod aggregatur minus dragmis que sunt cum
censu, tunc questio est impossibilis. Quod si fuerit eisdem dragnis equalis, tunc
radix census est equalis medietati radicum absque augmento et diminutione. Et
omne quod tibi eveniret ex duobus censibus aut pluribus aut paucioribus uno
censu, reduc ipsum ad censum unum sicut est illud quod in primo ostendimus
capitulo.

Radices vero et numeros que censi equantur sunt sicut si dicas: 'Tres radices
et quattuor ex numeris equantur censui unu.' Cuius regula est ut medies radices
que erant unus et semis. Multiplica ergo ipsas in se, et provenient ex eis duo et
quarta. Ipsum itaque quattuor dragmis adde et fiunt sex et quarta. Cuius
radicem que est duo et semis assume; quam medietati radicum que est unus et
semis adde; et erit quattuor qui est radix census. Et census est sedecim. Omne
autem quod fuerit maius censu uno aut minus, reduc ad censum unum.

Hii ergo sunt sex modi, quos in huius nostri libri principio nominavimus. Et
nos quidem iam explanavimus eos et diximus quod eorum tres modi sunt in
quibus radices non mediantur. Quorum regulas et necessitates in precedentibus
ostendimus. Illud vero ex mediatione radicum in tribus aliis capitulis est
necessarium cum capitulis verificatis posuimus. Deinceps vero uniuique
capitulo formam faciemus, per quam pervenitur ad causam mediationis.

< III. DE DEMONSTRATIONE REGULARUM >

Causa autem est ut hic. Census et decem radices equantur triginta novem
dragmis. Fit ergo illi superficies quadrata ignotorum laterum, que est census
quem et eius radices scire volumus. Que sit superficies ab. Unumquodque
autem laterum ipsius est radix eius. Et unumquodque latus eius cum in aliquem
numerus multiplicantur, tunc numerus qui inde aggregatur est numeros
radicum quarum queque (P 111va) est sicut radix illius superficies. Postquam
igitur dictum est quod cum censu sunt decem radices, accipiam quartam decem
que est duo et semis. Et faciam uniuique quarte cum uno laterum superficie
superficiem. Fiunt ergo cum superficie prima que est superficies ab quattuor
superficies equales cuiusque quarum longitudo est equalis radicis ab et latitudo
est duo et semis. Que sunt superficies g, h, t, k. Radici igitur superficie
equalium laterum et etiam ignotorum deest quod ex angulis quattuor est

52 progreditur cum] probatur quod ex F 53-56 scias ... diminutione om. ms. Vat. lat. 5733
55 impossibilis] destructa falsa vel libera opinabilis F: destructa id est falsa vel inoppinabilis M
56 radicum] radicis F 72 formam] figuras F
III 5 aliquem] aliquo L 10 post prima add. postea F 11 quorum om. F post
longitudo add. 4 superficium F 12 k] v F post superficiei add. ab F 13 et etiam] est L
13-14 quod ... deest om. F
AL-KHWĀRIZMĪ'S *AL-JABR* (III)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d</th>
<th>h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

diminutum, scilicet unicuique angulorum deest multiplicatio duorum et semis
in duo et semis. Quod igitur ex numeris necessarium est ad hoc ut superfici
ei quadratura compleatur, est multiplicatio duorum et semis in se quater. Et
aggregatur ex summa illius totius viginti quinque. Iam autem scivimus quod
prima superficies que est superficies census et quattuor superficies que ipsum
circumdant, que sunt decem radices, sunt ex numeris triginta novem. Cum ergo
addiderimus ei viginti quinque, qui sunt ex quattuor quadratis que sunt super
angulos superficiei ab, complebitur quadratura maioris superficiei que est
superficies de. Nos autem iam novimus quod totum illud est sexaginta quattuor.

Unum igitur laterum eius est ipsius radix que est octo. Minuam itaque quod est
equale quarte decem bis ab extremitatibus duabus lateris superficiei maioris que
est superficies de. Et remanebit latus eius tres. Qui est equalis lateri superficiei
prime, que est ab, et est radix illius census. Non autem mediamus radices
decem et multiplicamus eas in se et addimus eas numero qui est triginta novem,
nisi ut compleatur nobis figure maioris quadratura cum eo quod deest quattuor
angulis. Cum enim cuiusque numeri quarta in se multiplicatur et deinde quod
inde provenit in quattuor, erit quod proveniet multiplicationi medietati eius in
se equale. Sufficit igitur nobis multiplicatio medietatis radicum in se, loco
multiplicandi quartam in se quater.

Est eius preterea forma altera ad hoc idem perducens: que est superficies ab
que est census. Volumus autem ut addamus ei equale decem radicibus eius.

Mediabimus igitur decem et erunt quinque. Et faciemus eas duas superficies

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15 ad hoc| adhuc L 18 que| in C 20 ei| eis CF 23 minuam| minus L 26 non

nos L 28 nobis om. F post figure add. quadrature C 29 deinde| deinceps L 29-30 quod inde om. F 30 multiplicationi| multiplo F 31-32 sufficit ... quater| non igitur
curamus de multiplicatione medietatis radicum in se postquam eorum quartam in se quater
multiplicavimus F 34 ut| quod F

super duas partes \textit{ab}, que sint due superficies \textit{g} et \textit{d} quarum cuiusque longitudo sit equalis lateri superficie\textit{ab}, et latitudo eius sit quinque que est medietas decem. Remanebit ergo nobis super superficiem \textit{ab} quadratum quod fit ex quinque in quinque, qui est medietas decem radicum. Quas addidimus super

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{g} & \text{census} \\
\hline
\text{quinque} & \text{b} \\
\hline
\text{quinque} & \text{d} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

40 duas partes superficie\textit{i} prime. Scimus autem quod superficies prima est \textit{census}, et quod due superficies que sunt super duas ipsius partes sunt decem radices eius. Et hoc totum est triginta novem. Ad hoc igitur (P 111vb) ut maioris superficie\textit{i} quadratum compleatur erit totum illud quod aggregatur sexaginta quattuor. Accipe ergo radicum eius que est unum laterum superficie\textit{i} maioris: quod est octo. Cum ergo minuerimus ex ea equale ei quod super ipsam addidimus quod est quinque, remanebit tres. Qui est latus superficie\textit{i} \textit{ab} que est \textit{census}. Ipse namque est radix eius, et \textit{census} est novem.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Census} autem et \textit{viginti unum} equantur decem radicibus. Ponam itaque censum superficie\textit{i} quadratam ignotorum laterum que sit superficies \textit{ab}.
\item Deinde adiungam ei superficie\textit{i} equidistantium laterum cuius latitudo sit equalis uni lateri superficie\textit{i} \textit{ab}, quod sit latus \textit{gd}. Et superficies sit \textit{ga}. Et ponam ipsam esse viginti unum. Fit ergo longitudo duarum superficierum simul latus \textit{ed}. Nos autem iam novimus quod longitudo eius est decem ex numeris. Omnis namque superficie\textit{i} quadrate equalium laterum et angulorum, si unum latus multiplicatur in unum, est radix illius superficie\textit{i}. Et si in duo, est due radices eius. Postquam igitur iam dictum est quod \textit{census} et \textit{viginti} una dragma equantur decem radicibus. Et \textit{scimus} quod longitudo lateris \textit{ed} est decem, quoniam latus \textit{be} est radix \textit{census}. Ergo dividam latus \textit{ed} in duo media super
\end{itemize}


punctum $h$, et erigam super ipsum lineam $ht$. Manifestum est itaque quod $hd$ est equalis $he$. Sed iam fuit nobis manifestum quod linea $ht$ est equalis $be$. Addam itaque linee $ht$ quod sit equale superfluo $dh$ super $ht$, ut quadretur superficies, quod sit linea $hk$. Fit ergo $tk$ equalis $tg$, quoniam $dh$ fuit equalis $tg$; et provenit superficies quadrata que est superficies $lt$. Et ipsa est quod aggregatur ex multiplicatione medietatis radicum in se, que est quinque in quinque. Et illud est viginti quinque. Superficies vero $ag$ fuit iam viginti unum qui iam fuit adjunctum ad censum. Post hoc faciamus super $hk$ superficiem quadratam equalium laterum et angulorum, que sit superficies $mh$. Et iam scivimus quod $ht$ est equalis $eb$. Sed $eb$ est equalis $ae$. Ergo $ht$ est equalis $ae$. Sed $tk$ iam fuit equalis $he$. Ergo $ha$ reliqua est equalis relique $hk$. Sed $hk$ est equalis $mn$. Ergo $mn$ est equalis $ha$. Sed $tk$ iam fuit equalis $kl$, et $hk$ est equalis $mk$. Ergo $ml$ reliqua est equalis $ht$ relique. Ergo superficies $ln$ est equalis superficie $ta$. Iam autem novimus quod superficies $lt$ est viginti quinque. Nobis itaque patet quod superficies $gh$ addita sibi superficie $ln$ est equalis superficie $ga$ que est viginti unum. Postquam ergo minuerimus ex superficie $lt$ superficiem $gh$ et superficiem $nl$, que sunt viginti unum, remanebit nobis superficies parva que est superficies $nk$. (P 112ra) Et ipsa est superfluum quod est inter viginti unum et viginti quinque. Et ipsa est quattuor cuius radix est $hk$. Sed ipsa est equalis $ha$ et illud est duo. Sed $he$ est medietas radicum, que est quinque. Cum ergo minuerimus ex $ea$ $ha$ que est duo, remanebit tres qui est linea $ae$ que est radix census. Et census est novem. Et illud est quod demonstrare voluimus.

Dictum est autem 'Tres radices et quattuor dragme equantur censui.' Ponam ergo censum superficiem quadratam ignotorum laterum sed equalium et
equalium angulorum, que sit superficies *ad*. Tota igitur hec superficies congregat tres radices et quattuor quos tibi nominavi. Omnis autem quadrato superficie unum latus in unum multiplicatum est radix eius. Ex superficie igitur *ad* secabo superficiem *ed*, et ponam unum latus eius quod est *eg* tres qui est numerus radicum. Ipsum vero est equale *zd*. Nobis itaque patet quod superficies *eb* est quattuor qui radicibus est additus. Dividam ergo latus *eg* quod est tres radices in duo media super punctum *h*. Deinde faciam ex eo superficiem quadratam que sit superficies *et*. Et ipsa est quod fit ex multiplicatione medietatis radicum, que est unum et semis in se, et est duo et quarta. Post hoc addam linee *ht* quod fit equale *ae* que sit linea *tl*. Fit ergo linea *hl* equalis *ah*, et provenit superficies quadrata que est superficies *hm*. Iam autem manifestum fuit nobis quod linea *ag* est equalis *ez*, et *ah* est equalis *en*. Remanet ergo *gh* equalis *nz*. Sed *gh* est equalis *kt*. Ergo *kt* est equalis *nz*. Sed *mn* est equalis *tl*. Superficies igitur *mz* fit equalis superficie *kl*. Iam autem scivimus quod superficies *az* est quattuor qui est additus tribus radicibus. Fiunt ergo superficies *an* et superficies *kl* simul equales (P 112rb) superficie *az* que est quattuor. Manifestum est igitur quod superficies *hm* est medietas radicum que est unum et semis in se, quod est duo et quarta, et quattuor additi qui sunt superficies *an* et superficies *kl*. Quod vero ex eo aggregatur est sex et quarta, cuius radix est duo et semis. Que est latus *ha*. Iam autem remanit nobis ex latere quadrati primi, quod est superficies *ad* que est totus census, medietas radicum que est unum et semis. Et est linea *gh*. Cum addiderimus super lineam *ah*, que est radix superficie *hm* quod est duo et semis, lineam *hg* que est medietas radicum trium

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que est unum et semis, provenit illud totum quattuor. Quod est linea \textit{ag}. Et ipsa est radix census qui est superficies \textit{ad}. Et ipse est sedecim. Et illud est quod demonstrare voluimus.

Inveni autem omne quod fit ex computatione in algebra et almuchabala impossible esse quin proveniat ad unum sex capitulorum que retuli tibi in principio huius libri.

\textit{<IV.> CAPITULUM MULTIPLICATIONIS}

Nunc quidem referam tibi qualiter res multiplicentur que sunt radices alie scilicet in alias cum fuerint singulares et cum numerus fuerit cum eis, aut fuerit exceptus ex eis numeros, aut ipse fuerint excepte ex numero, et qualiter alie alii aggregentur, et qualiter alie ex aliis minuantur. Scias itaque imposibile esse quin unus omnium duorum numerorum, quorum unus in alterum multiplicatur, duplicetur secundum quantitatem unitatum que est in altero. Si ergo fuerit articulus et cum eo fuerint unitates aut fuerint unitates excepte ex eo, imposibile erit quin eius multiplicatio quater fiat; videlicet, articuli in articulum et unitatum in unitates, et unitatum in articulum et articuli in unitates. Quod si omnes unitates que sunt cum articulo fuerint addite aut diminue omnes, tunc quarta multiplicatio erit addita. Sin autem unae earum fuerint addite et alie diminue, tunc quarta multiplicatio minuetur. Quod est sicut decem et unum in decem et duo. Ex multiplicatione igitur decem in decem fiunt centum. Et ex multiplicatione unius in decem fiunt decem addita. Et ex multiplicatione duorum in decem fiunt viginti addita. Ex multiplicatione duorum in unum fiunt duo addita. Totum ergo illud est centum et triginta duo.


Quod si fuerint decem et duo in decem uno diminuto, multiplicabis decem in decem et fient centum. Et unum diminutum in decem et erunt decem diminuta.
Et duo addita in decem et erunt viginti addita. Quod erit centum et decem. Et duo addita in unum diminutum et erunt duo diminuta. Totum ergo illud erit centum et octo. Hoc autem non ostendi tibi nisi ut per ipsum perducaris ad multiplicationem rerum aliarum scilicet in alias, quin cum eis fuerit numerus aut cum ipse excipiuntur ex numero aut cum numerus excipitur ex eis.


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40 additus: see Euclid, Elements, book 2, prop. 4.


<V.> CAPITULUM AGGREGATIONIS ET DIMINUTIONIS

Radix ducentorum diminutis decem adiuncta ad viginti diminuta radice ducentorum est decem equaliter. Et radix ducentorum exceptis decem diminuta ex viginti excepta radix ducentorum est triginta diminutis duobus radicibus ducentorum. Et due radices ducentorum sunt radix octingentorum. Sed centum et census diminutis viginti radicibus, ad quem adiuncta sunt quinquaginta et decem radices diminutis duobus censibus, sunt centum et quinquaginta diminutis censu et decem radicibus. Ego vero illius causam in forma ostendam, si deus voluerit.

10 Scias itaque quod cum quamlibet census radicem notam sive surdam duplicare volueris, cuius duplicationis significatio est ut multiplices eam in duo, oportet ut multiplices duo in duo et deinde quod inde pervenerit in censum. Radix igitur eius quod aggregatur est duplum radicis illius census. Et cum

59-60 et... diminue om. L 62 diminutas cum M 74 post res add. addite C
77 sicut sunt L
V 1 om. FM
volueris triplum eius, multiplicabis tres in tres et postea quod inde provenerit in
15 censum. Erit ergo radix eius quod aggregatur triplum radicis census primi. Et
similiter quod additur ex duplicationibus aut minuitur erit secundum hoc
exemplum.

Scias ergo ipsum quod si radicis census medietatem accipere volueris, oportet
ut multiplices medietatem in medietatem, deinde quod provenerit in censum.
20 Erit ergo radix eius quod aggregatur medietas radicis census. Et similiter si
volueris tertiae aut quartae eius aut minus aut plus, usquequo possibile est
consequi, secundum diminutionem et duplicationem. Verbi gratia: si enim
volueris ut duplices radicem novem, multiplica duo in duo, postea (P 113ra) in
novem et aggregatur triginta sex, cuius radix est sex. Qui est duplum radicis
novem. Quod si ipsam volueris triplicare, multiplica tres in tres, postea in
novem, et erunt octoginta unum, cuius radix est novem. Qui est radix novem
triplicata. Sin autem radicis novem medietatem accipere volueris, multiplicabis
medietatem in medietatem et proveniet quarta. Quam postea multiplicabis in
novem. Et erunt duo et quarta cuius radix est unus et semis. Qui est medietas
30 radicis novem.

Et similiter quod additur aut minuitur ex noto et surdo ert. Et hic est eius
modus. Quod si volueris dividere radicem novem per radicem quattuor, divides
novem per quattuor et erunt duo et quarta. Cuius radix est id quod provenit uni
quod est unus et semis. Quod si radicem quattuor per radicem novem volueris
dividere, divide quattuor per novem et erunt quattuor none. Cuius radix est id
quod provenit uni que est due tertie unius. Sin vero duas radices novem per
radicem quattuor dividere volueris et absque hoc aliorum censuum, dupla ergo
radicem novem secundum quod te feci noscere in opere multiplicium. Et quod
aggregatur, divide per quattuor aut per quod volueris. Et quod ex censibus
35 fuerit minus aut maius, secundum hoc exemplum operaberis per ipsum, si deus
voluerit.

Quod si radicem novem in radicem quattuor multiplicare volueris, multiplica
novem in quattuor et erunt triginta sex. Accipe igitur radicem eius que est sex.
Ipse namque est radix novem in radicem quattuor. Et similiter si velles
multiplicare radicem quinque in radicem decem, multiplicares quinque in
decem et acciperes radicem eius. Et quod inde aggregaretur esset radix quinque
in radicem decem. Quod si volueris multiplicare radicem tertie in radicem
medietatis, multiplica tertiam in medietatem, et erit sexta. Radix ergo sexte est
radix tertie in medietatem.
Sin autem duas radices novem in tres radices quattuor multiplicare volueris, producas duas radices novem secundum quod tibi retuli donec scias ciusus census sit. Et similiter facias de tribus radicibus quattuor, donec scias ciusus census sit. Deinde multiplica unum duorum censuum in alterum et accipe radicem eiusmod quod aggregatur. Ipsa namque est due radices novem in tres radices quattuor. Et similiter de eo quod ex radicibus additur aut minuitur secundum hoc exemplum facias.

Cause autem radicis ducentorum diminutis decem, adiuncte ad viginti diminuta radice ducentorum, forma est linea $ab$. Ipsa namque est radix ducentorum. Ab $a$ ergo ad punctum $g$ est decem. Et residuum radicis ducentorum est residuum lineae $ab$ quod est linea $gb$. Deinde protractam a puncto $b$ ad punctum $d$ lineam que sit linea viginti. Ipsa namque est dupla linee $ag$ que est decem. A puncto igitur $b$ usque ad punctum $e$ quod $e$ sit equale linee $ab$ que est radix ducentorum. Et residuum de viginti sit a puncto $e$ usque ad punctum $d$. Et quia volumus aggregare quod remanet ex radice ducentorum post projectionem decem quod est linea $gb$, ad lineam $ed$ que est viginti diminuta radice ducentorum. Et iam fuit nobis manifestum quod lineae $a$ $ab$ que est radix ducentorum est equalis linee $be$, et quod linea $ag$ que est decem est equalis linee $bz$, et residuum lineae $ab$ que est linea $gb$ est equale residuo linee $be$ quod est $ze$. Et addidimus super lineam $ed$ lineam $ze$. Ergo manifestum est nobis quod iam minuitur ex linea $bd$, que est viginti, equale linee $ga$ que est decem que est linea $bz$, et remanet nobis linea $zd$ que est decem. Et illud est quod demonstrare voluimus.
Causa vero radicis ducentorum exceptis decem diminute ex viginti excepta radice ducentorum est alia cuius forma est linea \( ab \) que est radix ducentorum. 

75 Sed ab \( a \) usque ad punctum \( g \) sit decem, qui est notus. Protaham autem a puncto \( b \) lineam usque ad punctum \( d \), quam ponam viginti. Et ponam ut quod est a \( b \) usque ad punctum \( e \) sit equale radici ducentorum, que est equalis linee \( ab \). Nobis vero iam fuit manifestum quod linea \( gb \) est id quod remanet ex radice ducentorum post projectionem decem, et linea \( ed \) est id quod remanet ex viginti post reiectionem radicis ducentorum. Volumus itaque ut linea \( gb \) minuatur ex linea \( ed \). Protaham ergo a puncto \( b \) lineam ad punctum \( z \) que sit equalis linee \( ag \) que est decem. Fit ergo linea \( zd \) equalis linee \( zb \) et linee \( bd \). Sed iam fuit nobis manifestum totum illud fore triginta. Secabo itaque ex linea \( ed \) quod sit equale linee \( gb \) quod est linea \( he \). Patet igitur nobis quod linea \( hd \) est id quod remanet ex tota linea \( zd \) que est triginta. Ostensum vero est quod linea \( be \) est radix ducentorum, et linea \( zb \) et \( bg \) est etiam radix ducentorum. Et quia linea \( eh \) est equalis linee \( gb \), ergo manifestum est quod illust quod minuitur ex linea \( zd \), que est triginta, est due radices ducentorum. Et due radices ducentorum sunt radix octingentorum. Et illud est quod demonstrare voluimus.

80 Centum vero atque censui exceptis viginti radicibus, quibus coniunguntur quinquaginta et decem radices exceptis duobus censibus, non convenienter

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74 ducentorum\(^2\): although the explanation in the text is correct, the figure is faulty in one particular: \( dh \) does not equal R800 but rather 30 – R800. It is \( hz \) which equals R800. (Note: the figure here was drawn to scale, and the arrow was added to indicate where R800 is found in the figure in P).

VI. CAPITULUM QUESTIONUM

Iam processerunt ante capitula numerationis et eorum modos sex (P 113va) questiones quas posui exempla sex capitis precedentibus in principio huius libri de quibus tibi dixi, quoniam impossibile est quin computatio algebre et almuchaba eveniat tibi ad aliquod capitulum eorum. Postea secutus sum illud ex questionibus cum eo quod intellectui propinquius fuit, per quod difficultas alleviabitur. Et significatio facilior fiet, si deus voluerit.

Questio earum prima est sicut si diceres: 'Divide decem in duas partes, et multiplica unam duarum partium in alteram; et sit multiplicatio eius in se equalis multiplicationi unii duarum sectionum in alteram quater.' Eius vero regula est ut ponas unam duarum sectionum rem, et alteram sectionem ponas decem excepta re. Multiplica igitur rem in decem excepta re, et erunt decem res excepto censu. Deinde multiplica hoc totum in quattuor, que dixisti. Erit ergo quod proveniet quadruplum multiplicationis unius duarum sectionum in alteram. Erunt itaque quadraginta res exceptis quattuor censibus. Postea multiplica rem in rem que est una duarum sectionum in se; et erit census qui est equalis quadraginta rebus exceptis quattuor censibus. Deinde restaurabis quadraginta per quattuor censuras. Post hoc addes census...
censui. Et erit quod quadraginta res erunt equales quinque censibus. Ergo unus 20 census erit octo radices qui est sexaginta quattuor. Radix ergo sexaginta quattuor est una duarum sectionum multiplicata in se. Et residuum ex decem est duo, qui est sectio altera. Iam ergo perduxi hanc questionem ad unum sex capitulorum, quod est quod census equatur radicibus.

Questio secunda: 'Divide decem in duas partes et multiplica decem in se. Et sit quod aggregatur ex multiplicatione decem in se equale uni duarum sectionum multiplicate in se bis et septem nonis vicis unius.' Computationis vero huius regula est ut ponas unam duarum sectionum rem. Multiplica igitur eam in se, et fiat census, deinde in duo et septem nonas. Erunt ergo duo census et septem none census unius. Deinde multiplica decem in se, et erunt centum. 30 Est ergo ut centum sit equale duobus censibus et septem nonis census unius. Reduc ergo totum illud ad censum unicum, qui est novem partes viginti quinque, quod est quinta et quattuor quinte quinque unius. Accipe igitur centum et quattuor quintas quinte ipsius, quae sunt triginta sex. Et ipse equantur censui cuius radix est sex, qui est una duarum sectionum. Iam ergo produximus hanc questionem ad unum sex capitulorum, quod est quod census equatur numero.

Questio tertia: 'Divide decem in duas sectiones et divide unam duarum partium per alteram, et provenient quattuor.' Cuius regula est ut ponas unam duarum sectionum rem et alteram decem excepta re. Deinde dividis decem excepta re per rem, ut proveniat quattuor. Iam autem scivisti quod cum multiplicaveris quod provenit ex divisione in idem per quod divisum (P 113vb) fuit, reditit census tuus quem divisisti. Sed proveniens ex divisione in hac questione fuit quattuor et id, per quod divisum fuit, fuit res. Multiplica igitur quattuor in rem, et erunt quattuor res. Ergo quattuor res equantur censui quem divisisti, qui est decem excepta re. Restaura itaque decem per rem, et adde ipsam quattuor. Erit ergo quod decem equatur quinque rebus. Ergo res est duo. Iam ergo perduxi hanc questionem ad unum sex capitulorum, quod est quod radices equantur numero.

Questio quarta: 'Multiplica tertiam census et dragmam in quartam eius et dragmam, et sit quod provenit viginti.' Cuius regula est ut tu multiplices tertiam...

ut equentur uni censui et ut ad regulam reducamus. Compleo quadraginta res auferendo negationem quatuor census. Et sic in complemento quadraginta rerum sunt additi quatuor census. Totidemque operatione addere uni censui, et exuent quadraginta res equallium quinque censibus. 24 questio secunda om. FM 29 et septem none census om. F 31 post partes add. de F 32 post quinque add. F: siccelet partibus que sicut dicunt est equalis 100 quod est novenarius 11 (? ) constituitur ex denario quod est quinta pars 25 et quoniam qui est quartum quinte quinarii, id est, ex quo 24 quintis quinte, id est, 25 quattuor est 4/5 unius quinte. 33-34 centum ... sectionum om. C 37-48 questio ... numero om. F 47 perduxi] produxi L (et alibi infra) 49 questio quarta om. M


70 Remanet ergo viginti unum et census, que equantur decern rebus. Media ergo radices, et provenient quinque. Eas igitur in se multiplica, et erunt viginti quinque. Prohice itaque ex eis viginti unum, et remanebunt quattuor. Cuius radicem accipias que est duo. Minue ergo ipsam ex quinque rebus, que sunt medietas radicum; et remanet tres, qui est una duarum sectionum. Iam ergo perduximus hanc questionem (P 114ra) ad unum sex capitulorum, quod est: census et numerus equantur radicibus.

Questio sexta: ‘Tertia census multiplicetur in quartam eius, et proveniat inde census. Et sit augmentum eius viginti quattuor.’ Cuius regula est quoniam tu nosti quod cum tu multiplicas tertiam rei in quartam rei, provenit medietas sexte census que est equalis rei et viginti quattuor dragmis. Multiplica igitur
medietatem sexte census in duodecim ut census reintegretur et fiat census perfectus. Et multiplica etiam rem et viginti quattuor in duodecim et provenient tibi ducenta et octoginta octo et duodecim radices, que sunt equales censui. Media igitur radices et multiplica eas in se. Quas adde ducentis et octoginta octo; et erunt omnia trecenta et viginti quattuor. Deinde accipe radicem eiusmod que est decem et octo. Cui adde medietatem radicum, et fiat census viginti quattuor. Iam igitur perduximus hanc questionem ad unum sex capitulorum, quod est: numerus et radices equantur censui.

\textless VII. Questiones varie \textgreater

\<1\> Quod si aliquis interrogans quesierit et dixerit: 'Divisi decem in duas partes. Deinde multiplicavi unam earum in alteram et provenuerunt viginti unum.' Tu ergo iam scivisti quod una duarum sectionum decem est res. Ipsam igitur in decem, re excepta, multiplica, et dicas: 'Decem excepta re in rem sunt decem res, censu diminuto, que equantur viginti uno.' Restaura igitur decem excepta re per censum, et adde censum viginti uno; et dic: 'Decem res equantur viginti uno et censui.' Radices ergo mediabis et erunt quinque. Quas in se multiplicabis et proveniet viginti quinque. Ex eo itaque prohice viginti unum, et remanet quattuor. Cuius accipe radicem que est duo, et minue eam ex mediate rerum. Remanet ergo tres qui est una duarum partium.

\<2\> Quod si dixerit: 'Divisi decem in duas partes et multiplicavi unam quamque earum in se. Et minui minus ex maiore et remainserunt quadraginta.' Erit eius regula ut multiplices decem excepta re in se et provenient centum et census, viginti rebus diminutis. Et multiplica rem in rem, et erit census. Ipsum ergo minue ex centum et censu exceptis viginti rebus. Remanet itaque centum exceptis viginti rebus que equantur quadraginta. Restaura ergo centum per viginti, et adde ipsum quadraginta. Habebis ergo quadraginta et viginti res que erunt equales centum. Oppone igitur per eas centum; prohice quadraginta ex centum. Remanet sexaginta que equantur viginti rebus. Ergo res equatur tribus, qui est una duarum partium.

\<3\> Si autem dixerit: 'Divisi decem in duas partes et multiplicavi unamquamque partem in se, et aggregavi eas. Et insuper addidi eius superfluum

< 4 > Quod si dixerit: ‘Divisi decem in duas partes et divisi hanc per illam et illum per istam. Et provenerunt due dragme et sexta.’ Huius autem regula est. Quoniam cum tu multiplicabis unamquamque partem in se et postea aggregabis eas, erit sicut cum una duarum partium multiplicatur in alteram. Et deinde quod provenit multiplicatur in id quod aggregatur ex divisione, quod est duo et sexta. Multiplica igitur decem excepta re in se, et erunt centum et censum exceptis viginti rebus. Et multiplica rem in rem, et erit censum. Aggrega ergo illud. Et habebis centum et duo census exceptis viginti rebus, que equantur rei multificate in decem minus re. Que est decem res excepto censu multiplicato in id quod provenit ex duabus divisionibus, quod est duo et sexta. Erit ergo illud viginti et una res et due tertie radicis exceptis duobus censibus et sexta, que equantur centum et duo censibus exceptis viginti rebus. Restaura ergo illud, et adde duobus censibus et sextam centum et duobus censibus exceptis viginti rebus. Et adde viginti res diminutas ex centum, viginti uni et duabus tertii radicis. Habebis ergo centum et quattuor censum et sextam censum que equantur quadraginta uni rei et duabus tertii rei. Reduc ergo illud ad censum unum. Tu autem iam scivisti quod unus census quattuor censuum et sextae est quinta et...
quinta quinte. Totius igitur quod habes accipe quintam et quintam quinte; et habebis censum et viginti quattuor dragmas que equantur decem radicibus.

Media ergo radices et multiplica eas in se. Et erunt viginti quinque ex quibus minue viginti quattuor que sunt cum censu, et remanebit unum. Cuius assume radicem que est unus. Ipsam ergo minue ex mediate radicum que est quinque. Et remanet quattuor, qui est una duarum secundum tionum. Et provenit ex hoc ut cum illud quod provenit ex divisione quarumlibet duarum rerum, quarum una per alteram dividitur, multiplicatur in id quod provenit ex divisione alterius per primum, erit semper quod proveniet unum.


Et fuit quod aggregatum est quinquaginta dragma.’ Erit huius regula ut ex decem accipias rem et multiplices easm in quinque. Erunt ergo quinque res divise per secundum que est decem excepta re, accepta eius medietate. Cum ergo accepseris medietatem quinque rerum que est duo et semis, erit illud quod vis dividere per decem excepta re. He ergo due res et semis divise per decem excepta re, equantur quinquaginta exceptis quinque rebus. Quoniam dixit: ‘Adde ipsam uni duarum sectionum multiplicate in quinque’, est ergo totum illud quinquaginta. Iam autem scivisti quod cum multiplicatas quod provenit tibi ex divisione in id per quod dividituri, redit census tuus. Tuus autem census est due res et semis. Multiplica ergo decem excepta re in quinquaginta exceptis quinque rebus. Erit itaque quod proveniet quingenta et quinque census exceptis centum rebus, que equantur duabus rebus et semis. Reduc ergo illud ad census unum. Erit ergo quod centum dragma et census exceptis viginti rebus equantur medietati rei. Restaura igitur centum et adde viginti res medietati rei. Habebis ergo centum dragmas et censum que equantur viginti rebus et medietati rei.

Ergo media radices et multiplica eas in se, et minue ex eis centum, et accipe residui radicem, et minue eam ex mediate radicum que est decem et quarta. Et remaneebit octo que est una duarum sectionum.


58 quintam]
59 radicum]
60 radicem L 62 duarum]
63 earum F 64 duarum]
65 duorum L 67 in duas partes om. F 74-75 he ... re om. F 90 decem] 4th F
AL-KHWĀRIZMĪ'S *AL-JABR* (VII)

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centum et census erunt equales centum radicibus et uni radici. Media igitur radices et erunt quinquaginta et semis. Multiplica eas in se et erunt bis mille et quingente et quinquaginta et qua. Ex eis itaque minue centum. Et remanebunt bis mille et quadriradice et quinquaginta et qua. Accipe igitur eius radicem que est quadriradice et remanebit unus qui est una duarum sectionum.

100  <7> Et si aliquis dixerit: 'Duo census sunt inter quos sunt due dragme quorum minorem per maioresm dividit, et (P 114vb) provenit ex divisione medietas.' Dic: 'Hic rem ponit pro censu.' Ergo res et due dragme in medietatem, que est id quod provenit ex divisione, est medietas rei et dragma, que sunt equales rei. Prohice ergo medietatem rei cum medietate, et remaneat dragma que est equales medietate rei. Dupla ergo, et dic ergo quod res est due dragme et altera est quattuor.

105 <8> Quod si dixerit tibi: 'Divisi decem in duas partes. Deinde multiplicavi unam earum in alteram. Et post divisi quod aggregatum fuit ex multiplicatione per superfluum quod fuit inter duas sectiones antequam una in alteram multiplicateur. Et provenereunt quinque et qua. Erit eius regula ut accipias ex decem rem, et remanebunt decem excepta re. Unum igitur multiplica in alterum et erunt decem radices excepto censu. Et hoc est quod provenit ex multiplicatione unius eorum in alterum. Deinde divide illud per superfluum, quod est inter ea, quod est decem exceptis duabus rebus. Provenit ergo quinque et qua. Cum ergo multiplicavoris quinque et qua in decem exceptis duabus rebus, proveniet inde census multiplicatus qui est decem res excepto censu. Multiplica ergo quinque et qua in decem exceptis duabus rebus. Et erit quod proveniet quinquaginta due dragme <et semis> exceptis decem radicibus et semis, que equantur decem radicibus excepto censu. Restaura ergo quinquaginta duo et semis per decem radices et semis, et adde eas decem radicibus excepto censu. Deinde restaura eas per censum et adde censum quinquaginta duobus et semis. Et habebis viginti radices et semis que equantur...
quinquaginta duabus dragmis et semis et censui. Operaberis ergo per eas secundum quod posuimus in principio libri, si deus voluerit.

125 <9> Si quis vero tibi dixerit: 'Est census cuius quattuor radices multiplicat in quinque radices ipsius reddunt duplum census et augent super hoc triginta sex dragmas.' Huius regula est. Quoniam cum tu multiplicas quattuor radices in quinque radices, fiunt viginti census qui equantur duobus censibus et triginta sex dragmis. Prohice ergo ex viginti censibus duos census cum duobus censibus. Ergo remanent decem et octo census qui equantur triginta sex. Divide igitur triginta sex per decem et octo. Et proveniet duo qui est census.


135 <11> Et si dixerit: 'Dragma et semis fuit divisa per hominem et partem hominis, et evenit homini duplum eius quod accedit parti.' Erit eius regula ut dicas: 'Homo et pars est unum et res.' Est ergo quasi dicat: 'Dragma et semis dividitur per dragmam et rem, et proveniunt dragme due res.' Multiplica ergo duas res in dragmam et rem. Et provenient duo census et due res que equantur dragme et semis. Reduc ea ad censum unum. Quod est ut accipias ex

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123 operaberis: a contemporary hand adds in the margin of P in libro erat oppones as an explanation of operaberis; the same addition is found in Q. 133 census: the census is the square of (√[(x − 3)] which equals radix in line 135. 145 facies: a contemporary hand adds in the margin of P the gloss vel oppones; the same gloss is found in Q.
unaquaque re ipsius medietatem. Et dicas: ‘Census et res equantur tribus quartis dragme.’ Oppone ergo per ea secundum quod ostendi tibi.


160  VIII 1 The chapter is an application of ‘The Rule of Three’; that is, given three of four terms in proportion, the fourth is easily found. See Euclid, Elements, book 7, prop. 19.
ergo proveniet, est numerus ignotus pro quo querens interrogat. Qui etiam est oppositus numero per quem dividitur.

Cuius exemplum secundum primum modum eorum est ut querens interroget et dicit: 'Decem cafficii sunt pro sex dragmis; quot ergo provenient tibi pro quattuor dragmis?' Sermo itaque eius, qui est decem cafficii, est numerus appretiati secundum positionem. Et eius sermo, qui est sex dragme, est numerus eius quod est pretium secundum positionem. Et ipsius sermo, quo dicitur quantum te contingit, est numerus ignotus appretiati secundum querentem. Et ipsius sermo, qui est per quattuor dragmas, est numerus qui est pretium secundum querentem. Numerus ergo appretiati qui est decem cafficii opponitur numero qui est pretium secundum querentem, quod est quattuor dragme. Multiplica ergo decem in quattuor, qui sunt oppositi et manifesti, et erunt quadraginta. Ipsum itaque per alium numerum manifestum divide, qui est pretium secundum positionem, quod est sex dragme. Erit ergo sex et due tertie qui est numerus ignotus. Qui est sermo dicentis quantum. Ipse namque est appretiatum secundum querentem, et opponitur sex qui est pretium secundum positionem.

Modus autem secundus est sermo dicentis: 'Decem sunt pro octo; quantum est pretium quattuor?' Aut forsitan dicitur: 'Quattuor eorum quanti pretii sunt.' Decem ergo est numerus appretiati secundum positionem. Et ipse opponitur numero qui est pretii ignoti, qui notatur per verbum illius 'quantum'. Et octo est numerus qui est pretium secundum positionem. Ipse namque opponitur numero manifesto qui est appretiati qui est quattuor. Multiplica ergo duorum numerorum manifestorum et oppositorum unum in alterum, scilicet quattuor in octo, et erunt triginta duo. Et divide quod proveniet per alium numerum manifestum, qui est appretiati, et est decem. Erit ergo quod perveniet tres et quinta, qui est numerus qui est appreciate. Et ipse est oppositus decem per quem divisum fuit. Et similiter erunt omnes conventiones negotiationis et earum regule.

Quod si aliquis querens interrogaverit et dixerit: 'Quemdam operarium conduxi in mense pro decem dragmis, qui sex diebus operatus est; quantum ergo contigit eum?' Tu autem iam scivisti quod sex dies sunt quinta mensis, et quod illud quod ipsum contingit ex dragmis est secundum quantitatem eius quod operatus est ex mense. Eius vero regula est quod mensis est triginta dies quod est appretiatum secundum positionem. Et sermo eius qui est decem est pretium secundum positionem. Eius vero sermo qui est sex dies est appretiatum secundum querentem. Et sermo eius quantum contigit est pretium secundum

querentem. Multiplica ergo pretium secundum positionem, quod est decem, in appretiatum secundum querentem, quod est ei oppositum et est sex. (P 115va)

Et provenient sexaginta. Ipsum ergo divide per triginta qui est numerus manifestus qui est appretiatum secundum positionem. Erit ergo illud due dragme quod est pretium secundum querentem. Et simili iter fiunt omnia quibus homines inter se conveniunt in negociatione, secundum cambium et mensurationem et ponderationem.

Liber hic finitur. In alio tamen libro repperi hec interposita suprascriptis.

1 Iterata quod si quis dixerit tibi: 'Divisi decem in duas partes et multiplicavi unam duarum sectionum in se. Et fuit quod provenit equale alteri octagies et semel.'

Erit eius regula ut dicas: 'Decem excepta re in se fiunt centum et census exceptis viginti rebus que equantur octoginta uni rei.' Restaura ergo centum et addes viginti radices octoginta uni et erunt centum et census, que erunt equales centum et uni radici. Radices igitur mediabis et erunt quinquaginta et semis. Multiplica ergo eas in se, et erunt bis mille et quingente et quinquaginta et quarta. Ex quibus minue centum, et remanebunt bis mille et quadringente et quinquaginta et quarta. Huic itaque accipe radicem. Quae est quadranginta novem et semis. Quam minuas ex mediate radicem, que est quinquaginta et semis. Et remanebit unum, qui est una duarum sectionum.


3 Quod si dixerit: 'Due tertie quinte census, septime radicis ipsius sunt equales. Tunc tota radix equatur quattuor quintis census et duabus tertii quinte ipsius, que est quattuordecim partes de quindecim.' Erit huic regula ut multiplicies duas tertiis quinte in septem ut radix compleatur. Due vero tertie quinte sunt due partes de quindecim. Multiplica igitur quindecim in se, et erunt ducenta et viginti quinque, et quattuordecim in se, et erunt centum et nonaginta sex. Minue igitur ex ducentis viginti quinque duas

55 sexaginta] 16 F  56 due om. L

Appendix 1 The Appendix added by Gerard ('repperi') is not found in Robert of Chester's translation (see Karpinski, Robert of Chester, p. 124) nor in the translation ascribed to William of Lunis.
tertias quinte ipsius que est triginta, et erit pars de quindecim. Quam dividis per
septimam diminutam ex centum nonaginta sex que est viginti octo. Et proveniet unum
et quarta decima unius, que est media septima et est radix census.

<4> Si autem dixerit: 'Multiplicavi censum in quadruplum ipsius et provenenter unum
viginti.' Erit eius regula. Quoniam cum tu multiplicas ipsum in se, provenit quinque.
Ipse namque est radix quinque.

<5> Quod si dixerit: 'Est census quem in sui tertiam multiplicaui, et provenit
decem.' Erit eius consideratio. Quoniam cum tu multiplicas ipsum in se, provenit
triginta. Dic ergo quod census est radix triginta.

<6> (P 115vb) Si dixerit: 'Est census quem in quadruplum ipsius multiplicavi, et
provenit tertia census primi.' Erit eius regula. Quoniam si tu multiplicaveris ipsum in
duodecunplum ipsius, proveniet quod erit equale censui. Quod est medietas sextae in
tertiam.

<7> Quod si dixerit: 'Est census quem multiplicaui in radicem ipsius, et provenit
triplum census primi.' Erit eius consideratio. Quoniam cum tu multiplicas radicem
census in tertiam ipsius, provenit census. Dico igitur quod istius census tertia est radix
eius. Et ipse est novem.

<8> Si vero dixerit: 'Est census cuius tres radices in ipsius quattuor radices
multiplicavi, et provenit census et augmentum quadraginta quattuor.' Erit regula huius.
Quoniam cum tu multiplicas quattuor radices in tres radices, fiunt duodecim censui.
Qui sunt equales censui et quadraginta quattuor harmoniae. Ex duodecim igitur censibus
prorifice census unum. Remanet ergo undecim censui equales quadraginta quattuor.
Divide itaque quadraginta quattuor per undecim, et perveniet unus censui qui est
quattuor.

<9> Et similiter si dixerit: 'Est census cuius radix in quattuor radices eius
multiplicata reddit triplum census et augmentum quinquaginta dragmarum.' Erit eius
regula. Quoniam radix una in quattuor radices multiplicata facit quattuor census qui
equantur triplo censui illius radicis et quinquaginta dragmaras. Ergo prorifice tres census
ex quattuor censibus. Et remanebit censui qui erit eandem quinquaginta dragmaris. Ipse
enim est censui. Cum ergo multiplicabis radicem quinquaginta in radices quattuor
quinquaginta, proveniet triplum census et augmentum quinquaginta dragmarum.

<10> Quod si dixerit tibi: 'Est census cui addidi viginti dragmaras, et fuit quod
provenit equale duodecim radicibus censui.' Erit eius regula. Quoniam diceis quod
census et viginti equantur duodecim radicibus. Ergo media radices et multiplica eas in
se, et minue ex eis viginti dragmas, et assum eadem eius quod remanet. Ipsam ergo ex
medietate radicum que est sex minue. Quod igitur remanet est radix census, quod est

duo. Et census est quattuor.

<11> Si vero dixerit: 'Multiplicavi tertiam census in quartam ipsius, et rediit census.'
Erit eius regula. Quoniam cum multiplicas tertiam rei in quartam rei, provenit medietas
sexta census que equatur rei. Ergo census est duodecim res. Et ipse est census.

<12> Quod si tibi dixerit: 'Est census cuius tertiam et dragmam multiplicavi in
quartam ipsius et duas dragmas, et rediit census et augmentum trdecim dragmarum.'
Erit eius consideratio ut multiplicis tertiam rei in quartam rei et proveniet medietas
sexta census, et dragmam in quartam rei. Ergo census est duodecim dragmas et undecim
partes duodecim ex radice, que equatur radici et tredecim dragmis. Prohice ergo duas
dragmas ex quattuor et remanebunt undecim. Et prohice undecim partes ex radice, et
remanebit medietas sexta radicis et undecim dragmas, qui equatur medietati sexte
census. Ipsum ergo reintegra quod est, ut ipsum in duodecim multiplicis et multiplices
omne quod est cum eo in duodecim. Proveniet ergo quod census equatur centum et
triginta duabus dragmis et radici. Oppone ergo per ea.

<13> Quod si dixerit: 'Est census cuius tertiam et quartam proieci, et insuper
quattuor dragmas. Et multiplicavi quod remansit in se. Et quod provenit fuit equale
censi et augmento duodecim dragmarum.' Huius regulam igitur ut accipias rem et auferas
tertiam et quartam ex eo, et remanebunt quinque duodecim partes rei. Et minue ex eis
quattuor dragmas, et remanebunt quinque duodecim partes rei exceptis quattuor
dragmis. Eas igitur in se multiplias. Erunt ergo quinque partes in se multiplices, viginti
quinque partes centesimae quadragesimae quarte census. Postea multiplica quattuor
dragmas exceptas in quinque partes duodecim rei duabus vicibus. Et erunt
quadraginta partes, quorum queque duodecim sunt res una. Et quattuor dragma
dimine in quattuor fiunt secundum dragma addivite. Fiunt ergo quadraginta partes, tres
radices et tertia radicis diminute. Proveniunt ergo tibi viginti quinque partes centesimae
quadraginsimae quarte census et sedecem dragmas exceptis tribus radicibus et tertia, que
equantur radici et duodecim dragmis. Per eas igitur oppone. Prohice igitur duodecim ex
sedecem et remaneant quattuor dragmas. Et adde tres radices et tertiam radicis et
proveniunt tibi quattuor radices et tertia radicis que equantur viginti quinque partibus
centesimae quadraginsimae quartis census et quattuor dragmis. Oportet igitur ut census
tuum reintegretur. Ipsum ergo multiplica in quinque et decem et novem partes vigesimas
quintas donec reintegretur. Et multiplica quattuor dragmas in quinque et decem et
novem partes. Erunt ergo viginti tres dragmae et pars una vigesima quinta. Et multiplica
quattuor radices et tertias in quinque et decem et novem partes vigesimas quintas.
Erunt ergo viginti quattuor radices et viginti quattuor partes vigesimas quintas radicis.

Si vero tibi dixerit: 'Est census quem in duas tertias multiplicavi et provenit quinque.' Erit eius consideratio ut multiplices rem aliquam in duas tertias rei et sint due tertie census equales quinque. Ipsam ergo reintegra per equalitatem medietatis ipsius, et adde super quinque ipsius medietatem. Et habebis censum equalen septem et semis. Radix ergo eius est res quam multiplicable in duas tertias et proveniet quinque.

Quod si dixerit tibi: 'Duo census sunt inter quos sunt due dragme. Quorum minorem per maiorem divisi, et evenit ex divisione medietas.' Erit eius regula ut multiplices rem et duas dragmas in id quod ex divisione provenit quod est medietas; et erit quod proveniet medietas rei et dragma que equantur rei. Prohice ergo medietatem cum medietate. Remanet dragma que equatur medietati rei. Duplica eas. Ergo habebis rem que equatur duabus dragmis, et ipsa est unus duorum censuum. Et alter census est quattuor.

Si autem dixerit: 'Multiplicavi censum in tres radices et provenit quintuplum census.' Quod est quasi dixisset: 'Multiplicavi censum in radicem suam et fuit quod provenit equale censui et duabus tertie. Ergo radix census est dragma et due tertie. Et census est due dragme et septem none.'


Sin autem dixerit: 'Est census cui abstuli quattuor radices. Deinde accepi tertiam residui, que fuit equalis quattuor radicibus. Census igitur est ducenta et
Erit eiusmod regula. Quia enim scis quod tertia eiusmod quod remanet est equale quattuor radicips eiusmod, et sic illud quod remanet est equale duodecim radicips. Ergo adde ei quattuor radices quis prius abstulisti, et erit sedecim radices. Ipse enim est radix census.


Est census ex quo proieci tres radices suas. Deinde residuum in se multiplicavi et provenit census.' Iam ergo scis quod illud quod remanet est etiam radix, et quod census est quattuor radices. Et ipse est sedecim dragme.

Glossary of Latin Mathematical Words

With few exceptions, the locations of words are the first places where they occur. If a word has a second use or meaning, its location also appears within parentheses. References are to chapters (A = Appendix) and line numbers of the text edited above.

accipere, see radicem accipere.
adde (II.B.7), to add.
additio (II.B.50), addition.
additio (III.50), act of adding one figure to another.
aggregare (II.B.8), to add.
aggregatio (V.1), sum.
algibra (titulus operis 2), neither this word nor the next is formally defined.
almuchabala (titulus operis 2), see algibra.
angulus (III.54), angle.
appratitum (VIII.5), a quantity to be purchased, known or unknown (VIII.6), according to its position in a proportion.
articulus (IV.9), two-digit number.
aufere (A 130), to take away, subtract.
augmentare (II.A.18), to increase.
augmentatus (II.A.18), a coefficient greater than one.
augmentum (II.B.56), an increase.
cafficius (VIII.20), unit of liquid measure.
cambitio (VIII.3), exchange.
cambium (VIII.58), change.
causa (III.2), reason, explanation.
census (I.19 – definition), a square number (but see p. 218 n. 16 above).
compleare, see quadratum compleare and radicem compleare.
computatio (I.5), computation.
conductio (VIII.3), payment.
conietngere (V.90), to join (particularly, line-segments).
conventiones negotiationis (VIII.2), commercial methods.
demonstrare (III.80), to show or explain, but not to prove.
diminuere (IV.12), to subtract.
diminutio (II.B.51), subtraction.
diminutus (IV.12), a coefficient less than one; also missing or removed (III.14), also past participle of diminuere (IV.12).
dividere (III.58), to cut a line segment into parts, or to divide one number by another (V.32).
dragma (II.B.6), synonym for units.
duplicare (I.10), to double a number.
duplicatio (V.11 – definition), the doubling of a number.
duplum (V.13), twice.
emptio (VIII.3), buying.
equalis (II.A.7), equal.
equaliter (V.3), equally.
equare (II.A.3), to equal.
equidistantes (III.50), of equal length.
extremitas (III.24), part of a line segment, including its end points.
fractio (I.19), fraction.
genera composita (II.B.3), generic term for quadratic equations having two terms equal to a third.
ingnotus (III.3), an unknown length of a line segment, or an unknown number (VIII.10).
impossibilis (II.B.55), an equation impossible to solve.
intentio (II.B.29), meaning.
laticudo (III.37), width of a quadrilateral.
latus (III.3), side of a plane figure, a line segment.
linea (III.59), line segment.
longitudo (III.36), length of a quadrilateral.
maius (II.A-11), the coefficient is greater than one.
mediare (II.B.8), to halve (see next two phrases).
medietas census (II.A.16), half the coefficient of the square number.
medietas radicum (II.A.22), half the coefficient of the roots.
menstratio (VIII.59), measuring.
minuire (II.B.11), to subtract.
minus (II.A.12), the coefficient is less than one.
modus (I.16), kind or type of number.
multiplicare (II.B.9), to multiply; *in se* means to square (I.18).

negociatio (VIII.1), see conventiones.

notus (V.10), known (in the sense of rational number).

numerus (I.6 - definition), the specified number of a quantity.

numerus simplex (I.20-21 - definition), constant.

 opponere (VI.74), to subtract a positive term on one side of an equation from its larger like term on the other side; also in problems involving proportions, given \(a:b = c:d\), then \(a\) opposes \(d\) and \(b\) opposes \(c\) (VIII passim).

pars (VI.8), part of a number.

pauciores (II.B.13), the coefficient of the square is less than one.

plures (II.B.13), the coefficient of the square is more than one.

pondaratio (VIII.59), weighing.

pretium (VIII.5), a price known or unknown (VIII.34), according to its position in a proportion.

pro(h)icere (VI.54), to subtract (used together with opponere).

proiectio (V.65), subtraction.

proportio (I.21), relationship or ratio but not proportion.

protrahere (V.60), to extend.

punctum (V.59), point.

quadraire (III.61), to create a square figure.

quadratura (III.28), square area; also a square.

quadaturam complere (III.16), to bring a polygon into the shape of a square by adding one or more squares to it.

quadratum complere (III.43), see preceding phrase.

qualiter (IV.2), in which way.

quantitas (IV.7), the number of.

questio (II.B.9), equation.

radix (I.17 - definition), the root of the square in the problem.

radicem accipere (II.B.11), to find the square root of a number.

radicem complere (A.21), to reduce or increase the coefficient of the root to one; analogous to reducere.

reducere (II.A.18), to bring the coefficient of a square term to unity by multiplying it by its multiplicative inverse.

regula (II.B.8), procedure.

reintegrare (II.B.31), same as reducere.

reintegratio (VI.57), noun for the preceding verb.

res (IV.31), an unknown quantity, often a first degree variable.

residuum (V.68), remainder.

restaurare (V.98), roots opposite in sign are added together; a negative term on one side of an equation is transferred to the other side (VI.18), which is the meaning of restaurare hereafter.

secare (III.86), to cut or divide a line segment.

sectio (VI.10), part of a number.

sensibilis (V.94), visual.

significatio (II.B.16), meaning.

superficies quadrata (III.3), a square.

superfluum (III.76), excess; also difference (VII.23).

surdus (V.10), surd (in the sense of irrational number).

totus (III.83), complete, entire.

triplicare (I.11), to triple a number.

triplum (V.14), thrice.

unitas (IV.8), one-digit number.

venditio (VIII.3), selling.
Decisive importance, regarded as hitherto missed, has recently been attributed to the argument offered by St. Thomas Aquinas in these two consecutive sentences of his *De ente et essentia*: 'It follows that there can be only one reality that is identical with its being. In everything else, then, its being must be other than its quiddity, nature, or form.' The importance attached to the passage would lie in its alleged function of bringing to a successful conclusion Aquinas' demonstration of real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. What follows in the text would then be regarded as showing how essence and existence, already established as really distinct, can enter into composition as potentiality and actuality in the constitution of finite beings.

1 *On Being and Essence* 4.6, trans. Armand Maurer, 2nd rev. edition (Toronto, 1968), p. 56. The Latin text is: 'Vnde relinquitur quod talis res que sit suum esse non potest esse nisi una; unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re preter eam alius sit esse suum et alius quiditas vel natura sua forma sua' (4.119-123; Leonine edition 43.377a). The text with a new English translation may be found in Scott MacDonald, 'The *Esse/Essentia* Argument in Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 22 (1984) 171-72. Cf. 'Surprisingly, the importance of this part of Thomas's argumentation is passed over lightly or even ignored by many commentators' (John F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* [Washington, D.C., 1984], p. 107). 'The question which has occupied commentators is whether or not the conclusion (E/E 12) is to be taken as claiming that there is a *real* distinction between esse and essence or esse and thing' (MacDonald, p. 167). Actually, the question in its precise focus is of very recent date. But the problem is still the centuries-old one, that of "the famous, if poorly named, "real distinction between essence and existence"", as it has been called by Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, 'The Priority of Judgment over Question: Reflections on Transcendental Thomism', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (1974) 486. At the opposite pole in the discussion is the claim that the distinction is in some way seen to be real in the first section of the *De ente* argument. A defense of that stand may be found in Lawrence Dewan, 'Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real Distinction between Being and Essence', *The Modern Schoolman* 61 (1984) 145-56. The notion of 'stages' in the argument may be found discussed in my article 'Stages and Distinction in *De ente*'; *The Thomist* 45 (1981) 99-123.

2 'What phase three does contribute to Thomas's views concerning the essence-esse relationship in creatures is not, in my opinion, additional proof that they are really distinct but
If correct, this interpretation would mean that with Aquinas a real distinction between essence and existence in created things can be made manifest before the existence of God has been positively demonstrated. Here the issue no longer bears on the misplaced question whether a real distinction is to be found between essential being and existential being. Taken at face value, rather, is the explicit and firm mention, made five times in the earlier writings of Aquinas, that for him the distinction is real. What now is examined is the process by which the reality of the distinction is proved. In this perspective the discussion touches upon the most sensitive nerves of Thomistic metaphysics. Its queries accordingly promise insight into the vital structure and dynamics of the Thomistic metaphysical reasoning, thereby exciting renewed interest in a theme that readers would otherwise be prompted to look upon as long since dated and dead.

In this respect, the fact that only five times in the voluminous works of Aquinas is the distinction called ‘real’ should give rise to a query about how relevant the designation ‘real’ was for Aquinas himself. He brings in the distinction time after time without express characterization of it as ‘real’. Just the mention that existence is distinct from essence in creatures seems to satisfy his purposes on nearly all occasions. As long as the two principles are regarded as distinct, most of the time no further qualification appears needed. Rarely does there seem to be any occasion with him to insist on the designation ‘real’. The attitude is notably different from the mentality that prevails with Giles of Rome two years or so after Aquinas’ death. For Giles none of the other customary descriptions of the distinction can safeguard creation. The distinction has to be bluntly designated as ‘real’, in the sense of lying between two different

rather explicit evidence to show that in addition to this they are also (really) composed as potency and act.' (Wippel, ibid., pp. 124-25 n. 46; cf. pp. 119, 132). 'At (E/E 12) the conclusion that esse and essence are really distinct is left in its negative form. ... The argument from (E/E 15)-E/E 22) provides the positive characterization of the distinction' (MacDonald, ibid., 167).

1 e.g., in Joannes J. Urráburu, Ontologia (Paris, 1891), pp. 704-39, where existence in creatures is conceived in quidditative fashion: ‘Existenta ipsa suam habet essentiam realem, nam est aliquis actus realis et quidditative definibilis’ (4.1.2.253 [p. 733]). It seems fairly well agreed now that the various formulations of the relation between the terms, such as distinct from, different from, other than, diverse, or ‘one is not the other’, are used synonymously in this problem without significant nuances on the part of the writers concerned. See Leo Sweeney, ‘Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 37 (1963) 104-105. 1 have discussed the crucially important difference in the formulation of the terms themselves in Aquinas on Being and Thing (Niagara Falls, N.Y., 1981).

4 Sent. 1.13.1.3 Solut. (ed. Mandonnet, 1.307); 1.19.2 Solut. (1.471); De ver. 27.1 ad 8; In Boeth. De heb. 2, Calcaterra nos. 32 and 33. For the chronology see James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City, N.Y., 1974), pp. 358-87.
realities.\footnote{See Edgar Hocedez, \textit{Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia} (Louvain, 1930), pp. (13)-(16), and works cited in Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Themes}, p. 123 n. 42.} Since that time the qualification 'real' has been regarded by both proponents and opponents as a vital issue. But according to the indications available, it was not for Aquinas an issue that needed to be specified on each occasion. His reasoning in the \textit{De ente et essentia} is not geared to answering a question about the reality of the distinction. That is a question we ourselves are asking the text. The answer has to be deduced from assertions and implications made in the course of the argument. It is not to be looked for as something already prepared and offered in the text itself. It has to be reasoned to from the different considerations involved at each stage.

One may well begin by asking if there is any indication elsewhere in the writings of Aquinas during the early period that the reasoning in the \textit{De ente et essentia} leads up to a distinction recognizable without hesitation as being real. If the overall structure of the argument in the \textit{De ente} can be shown to have the same general orientation as arguments in which the distinction reached is explicitly designated as 'real', the role played in Aquinas' metaphysical thinking by its reality can hardly help but be brought out. Hence the importance of this investigation of the parallel passages that are fairly contemporary with the \textit{De ente}.

II

One may well begin, then, with a glance at those five places in the earlier works of Aquinas in which the distinction is expressly called 'real'. Do they parallel at all, either wholly or in part, the structure found in the \textit{De ente} reasoning? If so, the reasoning thus matched in the \textit{De ente} may be taken as meant to lead up to a real distinction. One might also ask if they indicate in any way the point in the reasoning at which real distinction is reached. At least, since they are roughly contemporary with the \textit{De ente} in the academic career of Aquinas, they may be expected to provide a helpful background against which the successive steps in the reasoning of the \textit{De ente} chapter may be gauged.

The first passage is from the \textit{Scriptum super libros sententiarum}. It outlines its argument sharply but very succinctly: 'For to have the universal and particular there is required, as has been said above, a real diversity between the communicable quiddity and the existence which is proper.'\footnote{\textit{Ad hoc enim quod sit universale et particulare, exigitur aliqua diversitas realis, ut supra dictum est, quidditatis communicabilis, et esse quod proprium est (Sent. 1.13.1.3 Solut. [1.307])}. The same reasoning is found without mention of 'real' at \textit{Sent.} 1.19.4.2 Solut. (1.483): \textit{... ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est'. Here the particular is the species as related to genus, instead of the individual as related to species. In both cases the starting point is a conceptual distinction.} The starting point
is the distinction between a universal nature and the particular instance in which that nature is found. This is obviously enough a conceptual distinction, the distinction that arises when the same thing is conceived in different ways by the human mind. The one and the same person may be represented in the mind as Socrates, as a man, as an animal, as a living thing. For convenience in discussion each of these objects, distinct from one another as Socrates, man, animal, living thing, may itself be called a concept. Here the term 'concept' refers directly not to the conceptualizing activity of the mind nor to the product of the activity, but to what is thereby conceived. It means the object of the conceptualization, the object upon which the mental product bears. Accordingly when the term 'concept' is taken as meaning the product of the conceptualization, it is obviously something that exists in the mind. In that sense each concept is really distinct from every other concept. Each is produced by a really different act of the mind. Your concept of one and the same object is really different from my concept of it, for they are located in really different places. Even in the same person the concept of the same object, say 'animal', is really distinct on each new occasion from the concept of that object produced by a former act. They are really separated by time. On the other hand, when 'concept' is taken to mean the object, such as man, animal, or living thing, it remains the same no matter who is thinking of it or at what time the thinking takes place. In this sense it signifies objects that are distinct not necessarily in reality but in the way they are represented in human conceptualization. It is between these objects that conceptual distinction, in contrast to real distinction, occurs. 'Intentional distinction' or 'distinction of reason' may be used as literal translations of the Latin terms for it, but 'conceptual distinction' is much clearer and more convenient in English.

It is in this objective sense of 'concept' that the distinction between universal nature and particular instance is a conceptual distinction. If the sense were that of concept as a mental product the distinction between the concepts would be real. However, the argument now being considered infers that this conceptual distinction requires real diversity between the quiddity, which is common, and the existence which is individual in the sense that it belongs exclusively to the instance in which it is found. The inference, therefore, is from conceptual

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7 On existence as the object of a 'concept' for Aquinas, see Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd edition (Toronto, 1952), pp. 221-27.
8 This may be compared with the inference of real distinction between matter and form from the conceptually distinct parts of a definition: '... et sic definitio composita ostendit realem compositionem' (Sent. 1.25.1.1 ad 2 [1.603]). The conceptual distinction between the parts of the quiddity as expressed in the definition may be seen in the example 'Nulla res potest cogitari sine sua quidditate, sicut homo sine eo quod est animal rationale mortale' (Sent. 1.3.1.2 arg. 4 [1.93]).
distinction between universal and particular to real distinction in the existent between quiddity and existing, between what the thing is and that it exists. For the explanation of the way this conclusion may be inferred, a backward reference is made by Aquinas in the text. It may be found in a passage introduced as the argument of Avicenna:

Everything that is in a genus has a quiddity different from existence, for instance man. For to exist in actuality does not belong to humanity insofar as it is humanity, since humanity can be thought of without knowing whether a particular man exists. And the reason for this is that the common notion that is predicated of the things that are in a genus predicates the quiddity, since genus and species are quidditative predicates. But existence does not belong to that quiddity except through its reception in this or that individual. And therefore the quiddity of the genus or species is not communicated to them all in accord with one existence but only according to one common aspect. Hence it is clear that the thing’s existence is not its quiddity. But in God, his existence is his quiddity. Otherwise it would be accidental to the quiddity and thus it would be acquired by him from something else, and he would not have existence through his essence. And therefore God cannot be in any genus.9

The reasoning here is that a thing whose existence is identical with its quiddity cannot be in a genus. It is being appealed to for justification of the conclusion that whatever is in a genus will have to have real diversity between quiddity and existence. Its force rests upon the consideration that a quiddity like that of man can be known without knowledge that a certain particular instance exists, even though the quiddity can exist only in particular instances. The quiddity is common, the existence is not. Existence is not provided by the quiddity itself. It has therefore to be acquired from something else. Though the distinction between the universal and particular is conceptual only, this reasoning is called upon to substantiate real diversity between existence and quiddity in anything that is located in a genus. But it gives no express mention of how or where the difference is recognized as real. The notion that existence is accidental to the quiddity and therefore acquired from something else would however seem, by its position, to be what caps the whole argument.

9 ‘Tertio ratio subtilior est Avicennae.... Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem differentem ab esse, sicut homo; humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit. Et ratio hujus est, quia commune, quod praedicatur de his quae sunt in genere, praedicat quidditatem, cum genus et species praedicentur in eo quod quid est. Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas suae. In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas suae: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset acquisitum sibi ab alio, et non habetur esse per essentiam suam. Et ideo Deus non potest esse in alioqugenere’ (Sent. 1.8.4.2 Solut. [1.222]).
Three neighboring texts in the same Distinctio of the Scriptum may help fill out the background offered by the passage just considered. Two of these texts come before the passage, and the third after it. In the first, difference of quiddity from existence, in the perspective in which quiddity does not furnish knowledge of existence, is illustrated by the distinction between animality and rationality: “Accident” here means what is not contained in the notion of something, as “rational” is said to be accidental to “animal”. And in this way existence is accidental to every created quiddity, because it is not contained in the notion of the quiddity itself. For the humanity can be understood, and yet whether the man has existence can be made a question.\textsuperscript{10}

Here the distinction as known from the failure to attain knowledge of the existence through inspection of the quiddity, and the consequent accidental status given to the existence from this viewpoint, is placed under the same type as the conceptual distinction between specific and generic objects. The one real person, Socrates, is seen as identified with two conceptually distinct objects, namely, a man and an animal. He is both, in reality. In comparable fashion quiddity and existence, as objects of human knowledge, are regarded as distinct from each other. That is as far as the example goes. Nothing is said that would preclude a further and real distinction between them. That will have to follow from the reasoning in the longer passage examined above, quite as a conceptual distinction between substance and faculties provides the basis for metaphysical demonstration of real distinction between them.\textsuperscript{11}

The second of the three neighboring texts approaches the distinction through the words of Avicenna: ‘A fourth reason can be taken from the words of Avicenna. ... Since in everything that exists one may consider its quiddity, through which it subsists in a determined nature, and its existence, through which it is said to be in actuality, ... the name “he who is” or “being” is given it from the very actuality of existing.’\textsuperscript{12} Here the existence is specified as the

\textsuperscript{10} ‘Ad quod dicendum, quod accidens dicitur hic quod non est de intellectu alicujus, sicut ratione dicitur animali accidere; et ita cuilibet quidditati creatae accidit esse, quia non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatibus; potest enim intelligi humanitas, et tamen dubitari, utrum homo habet esse’ (Sent. 1.8, exp. 1\textsuperscript{st} partis textus [1.209]). At the same time, from the viewpoint of metaphysical priority existence is essential to the quiddity, since without existence the quiddity would be nothing, ‘... cum nihil sit essentiale rei quam suum esse’ (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{11} The faculties, conceived as different from the substance, are shown to be really distinct from it only through a difficult reasoning process in terms of form as cause of being for Aquinas: ‘... et inter essentiam et talem operationem cadit virtus media differens ab utroque, in creaturis etiam realiter, in Deo ratione tantum’ (Sent. 1.7.1.1 ad 2 [1.177]; cf. 1.3.4.2 Solut. [1.116]).

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Quarta ratio potest sumi ex verbis Avicennae, ... cum in omni quod est sit considerare quidditatem suam, per quam subsitit in natura determinata, et esse suum, per quod dicitur de eo quod est in actu, hoc nomen “res” imponitur rei a quidditate sua, secundum Avicennam, ... hoc nomen “qui est” vel “ens” imponitur ab ipso actu essendi.’ The Latin text goes on: ‘Cum autem ita sit quod in qualibet re creatae essentia sua differat a suo esse, res illa proprie denominatur a
actuality of the existent thing. More pointedly in the third text the reasoning leads to a composition in which the components are respectively actuality and potentiality: 'If that quiddity is its existence, it will be the essence of God himself, which is his existence, and it will be altogether simple. But if it is not its existence, it has to have existence received from something else, as does every created quiddity. ... And since everything that does not have something from itself is potential in regard to it, a quiddity of this kind, since it has existence from something else, will be potential in regard to that existence, and in regard to him from whom it has existence, in whom no potentiality lies. And therefore in quiddity of this type there will be found potentiality and actuality insofar as the quiddity itself is potential, and its existence is its actuality.'

In this text the created thing's existence is described as an actuality received from an external cause, and ultimately from a cause that has no potentiality whatever and is accordingly pure actuality. In a created quiddity, the result is, both potentiality and actuality are found. The quiddity itself is the potentiality, while the existence is its actuality.

These excerpts from the *Scriptum* proceed clearly enough under the same general inspiration. A difference between quiddity and existing is at once recognized, as observable things exhibit a quiddity that provides no knowledge of their existence. Their existence, since it does not spring from the quiddity, has to be received from something else and eventually from something that is pure actuality. The last text concludes that a created thing has in consequence two components, the one an actuality, the other a potentiality. Together, the excerpts sustain the backward reference asserting that the *Scriptum* has already given the proof for the real distinction between quiddity and essence as worked out from the starting point of the readily recognizable distinction between a generic or specific nature (the universal) and a particular instance of the nature. The further quality of the distinction, now called 'real', is looked upon as reached by a difficult reasoning process, in contrast to the easily known aspect of conceptual difference from which the reasoning started. But the way the reality of the distinction becomes evident in the reasoning referred to as leading

quidditate sua, et non ab actu essendi, sicut homo ab humanitate. In Deo autem ipsum esse suum est sua quidditas. ...' (Sent. 1.8.1.1 Solut. [1.195]).

13 'Si illa quidditas sit esse suum, sic erit essentia ipsius Dei, quae est suum esse, et erit omnino simplex. Si vero non sit ipsum esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquisitum ab alio, sicut omnis quidditas creata. ... Et quia omne quod non habet aliquid a se, est possibile respectu illius; hujusmodi quidditas cum habeat esse ab alio, erit possibilis respectu illius esse, et respectu ejus a quo esse habet, in quo nulla cadit potentia; et ita in tali quidditate inveniatur potentia et actus, secundum quod ipsa quidditas est possibilis, et esse suum est actus ejus' (Sent. 1.8.5.2 Solut. [1.229-30]). Avicenna is mentioned immediately before this passage as a source for the notion of quiddity that is at issue here.
up to it is not specified. For the present one can merely note that all the well-known stages of the De ente argument are present in these combined excerpts from the Scriptum except the stage represented in the two sentences upon which the present inquiry (above, n. 1) centers.

The second relevant passage in the Scriptum merely asserts as an accepted tenet the reality of the distinction between the existence and what the existence actualizes in eviternal beings, without developed argument for it. The De veritate, in the course of showing, as in the Scriptum, that God cannot be in a genus, restricts the consideration to the category of substance: 'Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite with a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things with which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity.' In order to have the common generic quiddity and the individual thing a distinction between the thing and its existing is required here, quite as in the Scriptum. The composition between the two is expressly called real, and is regarded as following upon their distinction. The conceptual distinction is the starting point for the reasoning to the difference in reality. But again, no express indication is given as to how the distinction is seen to be real.

In the commentary on Boethius' De hebdomadibus a conclusion runs: '... just as in simple beings existence and that which exists differ in their notions, so in composites they differ really.' Backward reference for the reason why is made to the preceding sections (Calcaterra nos. 24-25), where 'existence itself' because of its abstract manner of signification is shown to be unable to participate in any other notion. Dealing first with the abstract 'existence itself' as most universal (communissimum — no. 24), the discussion shows that

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14 'Actus autem qui mensuratur aevo, scilicet ipsum esse aeviterni, differt ab eo cujus est actus re quidem....' (Sent. 1.19.2.2 Solut. [1.471]).
15 De ver. 27.1 ad 8, trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago, 1954), p. 311. The Latin is: '... omne quod est in genere substantiae est compositum reali compositione eo quod id quod est in praedicamento substantiae est in suo esse subsistens, et oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum: alias non posset differre secundum esse ab aliis cum quibus convenit in ratione suae quidditatis' (Leonine edition 22.792, ll. 221-228).
16 '... sicut esse et quod est differunt in simplicibus secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter' (In Boethii De heb. 2, Calcaterra no. 32). Cf. 'Si enim esset aliud realiter id quod est et ipsum esse, iam non esset simplex, sed compositum' (ibid., no. 33). In this context intentio and ratio are taken synonymously: 'Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones' (ibid., no. 22). A discussion of the various meanings of intentional distinction in medieval Scholasticism and the Arabian sources may be found in Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique (Paris, 1938), pp. 220-37.
because it is abstract it cannot partake of anything in the way matter or subject participates in form or accident. Nor can it partake of a notion more universal than itself, as whiteness participates in color, since ‘existence itself’ is the most common of all. Deliberately set aside from the discussion is the way an effect is said to partake of the nature of its cause, especially when doing so to a lesser degree as in the case of air participating in the sun’s light. The discussion then (nos. 31-33) applies to things the notions of existence and what exists. Because, in a thing, ‘existence itself’ does not partake of anything either essentially or accidentally, it is not a composite. In it the existence and that which is will differ as notions but without real difference between them. A composite thing, on the contrary, will not be its own existence.

In this passage the assertion of real difference between a composite thing and its existence is sharp and clear. But the exact reason for the reality of the distinction is not so readily forthcoming. In outline the reason is that existence is of such a nature (ratio) that it cannot partake of anything else. Where it subsists as a thing it will in consequence have no composition. In contrast, any composite thing will not be subsistent existence. As a thing, it will have to be in reality something other than its existence. Here the reasoning seems to parallel that contained in the two sentences of the De ente from which the present study (above, n. 1) began. But it is presupposing that ‘existence itself’ is a thing, that is, that existence subsists in reality. With the existence of a simple thing (God) presumed in that way, the contrasted composite things will have to be really distinct from their existence. Existence, now taken as a real nature, cannot enter into real composition with anything else. Where it is found in other things, it will have to be really other than what the things are. Again, however, the precise way in which the distinction becomes seen as real is not made explicit.

Naturally, the terminology of the discussion is adapted to the text of Boethius upon which commentary is being made. There is no express attempt to show that ‘simple being’ can have only one instance in reality, though that conclusion does follow from the tenet that ‘existence itself’ as a thing cannot be participated in by subjects or matter. Curious, perhaps, is the deliberate omission of the way in which it can be participated in degrees lower than substantiality. Finally, one might note how in simple things existence can be real and thing can be real, yet the distinction between them can be called ‘intentional’ or conceptual. The reality of the terms of the distinction is a different question from that of the reality of the distinction itself.

This combined group of passages, in which the distinction between quiddity and existence is expressly designated as ‘real’, contains in one way or another all the elements of the long reasoning in the De ente argument. All the passages are from the early writings of Aquinas. Taken together they show how the argument starts in a readily recognized conceptual distinction. The participation
theme is introduced, though the participation of a cause’s perfection in a lesser
degree explicitly recedes into the background. Existence is received from
without, ultimately from subsistent existence, with the consequent distinction
between the received existence as an actuality and the recipient as the
 corresponding potentiality. The existence of God, however, is not posed in
those passages first hypothetically but is looked upon all the time as either
demonstrated or accepted in positive fashion. In them the reasoning leads up to
what is called explicitly a ‘real’ distinction, but without exact indication of how
it is so recognized.

With this general setting in mind, contemporary as it is to the De ente, one
may with considerably more confidence approach questions about the structure
and nature of the reasoning in the longer and continuous presentation given in
that much discussed work.

III

Prior to an analysis of the text of the argument itself, however, some general
considerations about the problems of its structure and nature, and about its
background in the immediately preceding sections of the De ente, are in order.
The importance of understanding the structure and nature of its reasoning has
been emphasized recently, together with the claim that ‘no one has yet offered a
detailed account of exactly what the argument is.’ Aquinas, it is true, was not
writing for a public accustomed to the etiquette of modern logic. But his
arguments, as arguments, are not at all exempt from the requirement of
conforming to its norms. In their light need arises ‘to be clear about the precise
structure of the argument’.

There need be no reluctance today in regard to formalizing the reasoning of
Aquinas for the purpose of bringing out its logical clarity and consistency. As
long as the variations in the meaning of concepts in accord with Aquinas’
doctrine of analogy and focal reference are taken into account, the ease in
formalization might prompt the remark that if he were writing today and were
challenged he would readily use modern logical form with suppressed premises
made explicit. The formalizing may make the arguments seem very long drawn
out in writing, and might leave an impression that they are more forcefully
expressed when one can go through whole portions of them at a glance, as with

17 MacDonald, 'The Æsse/Essentia Argument', 157. The logical structure of the De ente
argument is given by MacDonald on pp. 158-59.
18 ibid., 157.
19 e.g., in Jan Salamucha, 'The Proof “Ex Motu” for the Existence of God: Logical Analysis
a spatial continuum, instead of having to traverse in staccato fashion each of its seemingly innumerable parts. However, there can be no question as to the help given by the formalization. The important sections of the present argument do benefit by precise logical analysis.

Along with the structure of the argument its nature, too, demands careful consideration. The reasoning is geared to the conclusion that immaterial substances are mixed through and through with potentiality: 'Substances of this kind, though pure forms without matter, are not absolutely simple; they are not pure act but have a mixture of potentiality.' The subsequent argument is not precisely directed towards demonstrating a real distinction between the actuality and potentiality with which it is concerned. It does not use the terms 'real' or 'intentional' (cf. above, n. 16) to describe the distinction at any of the stages. Sufficient for its purpose is the proof that finite immaterial substances are composed of actuality and potentiality and therefore are not entirely simple.

Further, the nature of the argument will depend to a perhaps surprising extent on the way the objects upon which it bears are understood. These objects have been clarified to considerable extent in the preceding sections of the *De ente*. 'Matter' in its primary instance has been described, with reference to Averroes, as something that entirely lacks form (*De ente* 2.236-238). Whatever existence it has it receives from the form (4.46-48). On the other hand, form may either be an actuality of matter (2.31-32) or else exist without matter and in this way be closer to pure actuality (4.49-60). Where immaterial, an essence or quiddity or nature (three terms used interchangeably in the present context [1.14-52]) is form alone (4.65). The essence or quiddity or nature is isolated through abstraction from individuals. The abstraction is precise if the individuality is positively excluded from the content of the concept, as in the case of 'humanity'. The result is that the nature so abstracted cannot be identical with the individual in a way that allows predication. You do not say that Socrates is humanity. In contrast, the abstraction is non-precise when the individuality is neither included nor excluded. Rather, the abstracted nature is left open to it. So abstracted the nature may be predicated of the individual, as when you say that Socrates is a man. This notion of abstraction is not familiar to modern philosophy. In the present context it deeply affects the notion of

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20 *De ente* 4.90-93 (trans. Maurer, p. 55). The Latin is: 'Huiusmodi ergo substantie, quamuis sint forme tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actu purus, sed habent permixtionem potente; et hoc sic patet' (Leonine edition 43.376b). As MacDonald, 'The *Essel* Essentia Argument', 157 notes, it is 'stating the conclusion at the outset.' In this way the beginning and end of the one continuous argument are marked off with exactitude.

21 *De ente* 2.243-308. Cf. *Sent.* 1.23.1.1 Solut. (1.555-56). It can have existence only in this or that individual (above, n. 9). Even cognitional existence, including that of the universal, is in the individual cognitive agent. See *De ente* 3.102-107.
essence or nature or quiddity. In either precissive or non-precissive abstraction, however, the nature just in itself abstracts from all existence whatsoever (\textit{a quolibet esse} [3.69]) without prescinding from any. In the abstraction the nature is neither one nor many (3.37-45), as well as neither existent nor non-existent insofar as it abstracts from all existence without prescinding from any kind or instance of it.

Still more important, and perhaps fully as strange today, is the notion of existence that is at play in Aquinas. The existence that actuates the essence can be either existence in singular things themselves or existence of those same things in a soul’s activity (\textit{unum in singularibus et alid in anima} [3.52-53]). Both are genuine kinds of existence, though of different grades, and both come by way of efficient causality from God, with cognitional existence always coming through the real activity of the cognitive agent though ultimately from subsistent existence, God.\textsuperscript{22} For convenience existence in singular things may be called real existence, and existence in a soul may be named cognitional existence.

The contemporary 	extit{Scriptum} carefully distinguishes the two different kinds of cognitive activity by which quiddity and existence are known. A thing’s quiddity or nature is known through conceiving what a thing is, through an act of apprehension that may be regarded as simple insofar as it is what Aristotle (\textit{De an.} 3.6 [430a26]) called a knowledge of indivisibles. But the thing’s existing is known through a synthesizing activity by which the cognitive agent apprehends that the thing exists.\textsuperscript{23} It may be called judgment. The existence so grasped consists in a synthesis that is not a quiddity, though it can later be conceptualized for purposes of reflection on it and discussion about it.\textsuperscript{24} These considerations need not be lightly dismissed as epistemological and irrelevant to the nature of the argument.\textsuperscript{25} They are our means of penetrating into what

\textsuperscript{22} With regard to the existence of sin, Aquinas notes: ‘Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse, et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse habet, constat quod a Deo est’ (\textit{Sent.} 2.37.1.2 ad 3 [2.947]). As God is the sole instance of existence as a quiddity, as a \textit{what}, he may be designated the existence of all things in causal fashion: ‘... et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat’ (\textit{Sent.} 1.8.1.2 Solut. [1.198]).

\textsuperscript{23} ‘Sed intellectus noster ... non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo’ (\textit{Sent.} 1.38.1.3 ad 2 [1.904]).

\textsuperscript{24} ‘... esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum’ (\textit{Sent.} 1.38.1.3 Solut. [1.903]). On existence as later conceptualized but without finitizing restrictions, see ‘Discussion Articles’ between Barry Miller and myself in \textit{The New Scholasticism} 53 (1979) 475-85 and 56 (1982) 371-80.

\textsuperscript{25} The stand ‘that Aquinas’s epistemological views are relevant for interpreting the E/E Argument’ is challenged by MacDonald, ‘The Esse/Essentia Argument’, 169.
Aquinas understands by essence and existence, and in consequence into the nature of his reasoning about them. It is true that for Aquinas there is no epistemology prior to metaphysics. Yet for us to misconstrue his starting points as Cartesian ideas or as Lockean or Humean sensations, instead of as sensible things existent both in themselves and in the human mind, would be to vitiate his reasoning from its very beginning.

Misunderstanding here would function like a cancerous growth continually invalidating the successive steps of the reasoning. The difference between essence as a still-life object expressed by a concept or a single word and existence as a dynamic synthesis expressed by the complexity of a proposition and sentence is forcefully brought to our attention by the epistemological considerations. But the metaphysical objects themselves, namely, the quiddity and the existence, come under our immediate awareness. They are not at all the result of epistemological study, though clearer and more philosophical understanding of them is achieved through examining how they are reflected in the cogitional and vocal signs by which they are expressed. The epistemological considerations about precisive and non-precisive abstraction of essence are used tellingly by Aquinas himself in the De ente. To grasp how he is understanding existence, similar recourse must be had to the explanation given in the contemporary Scriptum. But both quiddity and existing need to be understood in the way Aquinas had already come to see them at the period in which the De ente was written. Otherwise the nature and structure of his thought in the treatise will be seriously misunderstood. The relevant texts, both in De ente and in the other early works, have been collected and discussed before in various articles and books. What is envisaged now is a reexamination of them to see what light they can throw on the kind of distinction made manifest at the end of the second stage of the De ente argument. With that focus steadily maintained, the reasoning in the text of the De ente may now be approached.

IV

As found in the De ente (4.90-166) the argument intends to show that composition of actuality and potentiality is present in immaterial substances.

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26 The De ente (prologue 1-2) opens with the warning that 'a slight initial error eventually grows to vast proportions' (trans. Maurer, p. 28), and immediately notes (3-4) that the intellect's first conceptions are "a being" and "an essence". The actuality of 'a being' is its existence. The De ente does not profess to be offering an explanation of the term esse, even though using it frequently. It is what constitutes the essence an ens, and is thereby observable in the grasp of anything as an ens.
other than the first principle (4.54-56) of the universe. These other immaterial substances are the intelligences or, in Christian terminology, the angels. The reasoning starts from the essence or quiddity of observable things, but its stated scope is of wider range. It purports to establish that in regard to *everything* the quiddity, namely, *what* the thing is, can be understood without knowledge of the thing's existence — unless perhaps there be something that might be defined as its own existing. From the wording in its opening sentence (*de intellectu essentie* [4.94]) the first part of the reasoning, when isolated as a unit in itself, has been termed the *intellectus essentiae* argument. It runs:

> Everything that does not belong to the concept of an essence or quiddity comes to it from outside and enters into composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without its parts. Now, every essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality. From this it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a reality whose quiddity is its being.27

The notion of quiddity had already been explained carefully by Aquinas in the preceding chapter. It is something understood in abstraction from the individuals in which it has existence either in the real world or in cognition.28

When read against its immediate background in the *De ente* (above, nn. 21-22) the argument is accordingly starting from existing things, understood as comprising both things that exist in the real world and things that exist in the

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27 *De ente* 4.94-104 (trans. Maurer, p. 55). The Latin is: ‘Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentie uel quiditatii, hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est alius ab essentia uel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, ...’ (Leonine edition 43.376b). On ‘parts of an essence’ see above, n. 8.

28 *De ente* 3.52-53, 102-107. MacDonald, ‘The *Esse*/Essentia Argument’, 164 correctly insists that ‘... these conceptual activities are not the starting point of the argument.’ The conceptual activities are known only concomitantly and reflexively, while the thing with its quiddity and existence is grasped directly. The fact that the quiddity is understood in abstraction does not make it any less real. Taken non-precisively it remains identical with the thing of which it is predicated (above, n. 21). Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes*, p. 121 n. 39 has qualms that speaking of the distinction as between thing and existence, instead of as between essence and existence, ‘might confuse some readers’. But the essence that is really distinct from real existence is the essence taken non-precisively. Taken precisely, the essence can have existence only in the mind — you cannot say that Socrates or any other individual is humanity. The essence that really exists is therefore the essence that does not prescind from the individual difference. When taken as a transcendental a thing (*res*) signifies what is able to exist, in the sense of potential being as one of the various meanings of *ens*. It may be applied even to subsistent existence (e.g., *De ente* 4.103-104 — text above, n. 27) on account of the conceptual distinction between it and its existence. Accordingly there should be no danger of confusion here. But cf. below, n. 40.
world of human thought. The question faced is whether their existing is other than their quiddity. Here the participle ‘existing’ conveys the message much more sharply than the abstract noun ‘existence’, for it preserves the verbal force from the Latin infinitive esse. In the Latin the infinitive functioned as a verbal noun in a way that is expressed accurately by the English participle used in nominal fashion. Correctly one may say in English that a hockey player’s stickhandling is his forte, or that a man’s right living is the secret of his longevity, or that his drinking was his ruin, or that the quality of a product is its own advertising. English idiom does not permit the infinitive in these cases. On the other hand, the abstract noun ‘existence’ tends to give the impression of a quality or characteristic added after the fashion in which color or size is asserted of an individual. The existing, however, is not something consequent on the substance but is on the contrary prior to the substance or quiddity, for without existing in some way the thing would be nothing.29

When close probing of the relations between the quiddity and the existence is at issue, therefore, the interests of clarity will be better served by fairly frequent use of the participle ‘existing’, at least to the extent the idiom of English speech allows. This will help keep before one’s mind the fact that for Aquinas the thing’s existence is the synthesis reflected by the copula in a proposition or by a verb used absolutely. The existence will not then be understood after the manner of an object represented by an ordinary noun or adjective, or as a categorial relation. In contrast, the quiddity is regularly expressed by a single ordinary noun and is understood through acquaintance with the parts by which it is defined, the parts contained in its definition.

In the present context, consequently, the question whether existing is a part of a thing’s definition arises. The answer given by Aquinas is no. A thirteenth-century mind could understand what a phoenix is, namely, a bird that arises from its own ashes, and still not know whether it ever existed in reality. The thirteenth-century person, just like ourselves, would know immediately that the phoenix was existing in his mind while he was thinking about it. But he knew that fact through immediate apprehension by judgment, and not through his

29 See above, n. 10. Cf. ‘S. Thomas parle comme si les essences possédaient de soi une réalité diminuée capable de recevoir l’esse venu de la Cause première. Ce n’est certainement pas ce qu’il veut dire, car il sait fort bien que les essences n’ont aucune réalité avant d’être créées et que l’être fini est tout entier le terme de l’acte créateur’ (Fernand Van Steenberghen, ‘Note d’herméneutique: la “tournure dialectique” dans la littérature de l’école’ in Pascua mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J. M. De Smet, ed. R. Lievens et al. (Louvain, 1983), p. 281. MacDonald, ibid., 165 notes that ‘... Aquinas must assume the knowledge that esse in fact belongs to things.’ But it is a prior requisite, rather than an assumption, since for Aquinas nothing is more essential to a thing than its existence, even though the existence is not contained in its essence nor follows from its essence. There is no need to be tricked by the ‘tournure dialectique’. 
conceptualization of the quiddity. Correspondingly, though we know that the phoenix is existing in our own mind as we think about it, that knowledge of its cognitional existence comes to us through an apprehending act of judgment. The knowledge of the quiddity does not tell us anything about its existing in our cognition, any more than it informs us of the cognitional existence of the phoenix in the minds of other persons who may be reading the text of Aquinas at the given moment.

The same holds correspondingly in the case of a man. I know through judgment that the man with whom I am talking exists in the real world in front of me. No more than Locke (Essay 4.11.3), who in spite of his philosophical tenets was sure of that fact, can I doubt about real existence here. But it is through my act of direct judgment that I know the man exists in reality. What I conceptualize about his quiddity does not tell me anything about his existing. My concept of him has the same quidditative content when I think about him again after a long interval without immediate knowledge that he is still existent.

On this ground Aquinas draws the conclusion that existing is other than quiddity except where the existing itself would be the quiddity. The two-faceted conclusion covers cogently the observable type of quiddity on which the opening consideration was based, and a tentatively introduced type in which quiddity and existing would be by definition identical. Untouched as yet by the reasoning and left open for examination is the case of the unobservable created substances with which the whole argument is primarily concerned, namely, the angels.

What kind of otherness, though, has been demonstrated? Is it merely conceptual distinction? Existing, while originally grasped through judgment, is for purposes of thought and discussion at once conceptualized as an actuality or perfection, notions taken from quidditative objects. Existence becomes the object of this concept, while quiddity remains an object originally attained through conceptualization. The two are the objects of different concepts, and in this way conceptually distinct. That is the strongest distinction that appears for the time being. It is the distinction only between the objects of two different concepts. Accordingly it may be compared in the *Scriptum* (see above, n. 10) to an established conceptual distinction. For Aristotle (Metaph. 4.2 [1003b22-29]) a man and an existing man were the same, involving at most a distinction between two different notions of the same thing and (10.2 [1054a16-18]) without predicating anything over and above the category to which a thing belonged. Need one see for the present any stronger distinction made manifest in this passage of Aquinas between a thing and its existing?

There can easily be at first acquaintance a temptation to argue that in the context Aquinas has already demonstrated absence of identity between a thing's quiddity and its real existence. The quiddity, for him, remains the same when
existing in somebody's cognition. In the cognition it is separated in place and perhaps also in time from its real existence in itself. Or, a house can exist in the mind of the architect long before existing in the real world. Yet it was the same house, separated from its real existence. The quiddity of an outer galaxy was really different for millennia from the existence it receives in the mind of a present-day astronomer. Real separation in place or time for the quiddity would seem to be the strongest sign possible of real distinction.

This way of arguing, however, rings hollow. Existence belongs to individuals. The suggested argument does not show that the existence of an individual is really different from the quiddity it actuates, but only from the quiddity existent in another individual. The quiddity as common to both individuals, and so the same in both, is the quiddity taken in abstraction. In that consideration no existence pertains to it at all, for the common quiddity abstracts from all existence quite as it does from all individuals. As common, it does not exist in time and space for making the above comparison. The prior role played by existence (see above, n. 29) does not allow the quiddity to be projected in that fashion. The distinction between it and its existing, therefore, does not as yet appear on the surface as a difference in reality but only as a distinction between the objects of two different concepts. Whether or not these are two different ways in which the same real thing is known is not as yet made manifest.

Further, and all important for the issue at hand, the intellectus essentiae argument if alleged to conclude immediately to a real distinction would be taking for granted that existence has a real positive content of its own over and above the content of the quiddity. But this is something very difficult to prove. Spontaneously, when the question is faced for the first time, a thing and its existing may appear to be really the same. The expression 'existing' would seem to add merely a reference to duration between beginning and end, but imply no real content besides the thing itself. For a number of modern thinkers, in fact, existence has been an empty concept, a blank, a surd.30 For Aquinas himself existence was not among the objects of immediate conceptualization (above, n. 23). Existence is not seen anywhere as a quiddity or a quality. Difficult demonstration is required to show that it has positive content of its own, a content that does not coincide in reality with the individual as specific and generic natures do. But until those points have been demonstrated, the distinction between a quiddity and its existing does not appear any greater than a distinction between two different notions of the same thing.

30 A discussion of this topic may be found in my article 'The Content of Existence' in Logic and Ontology, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New York, 1973), pp. 21-35.
That was the way in which the two notions were regarded as distinct in simple things by the *De hebdomadibus* (above, n. 16). The existence could be real, and the quiddity could be real, without any real distinction whatever between them. Why could not the same view be taken in the case of the distinction in finite things? The notion of what a thing is and the notion that it exists are taken from composite beings. When applied to simple things the content can be shown to coincide in reality. But that is a conclusion. It is not something immediately evident from the notions. Whether or not they so coincide in composite things is similarly a matter for demonstration, as here for Aristotle or for Suarez the objects of the two concepts really coalesce. But the demonstration is not easy. To conclude at once that there is real distinction between them would be traveling much too quickly. There need not be any objection, however, to calling the distinction factual, in the sense that it is a fact that the two are distinct conceptually. To the extent of that objective, then, the reasoning is valid and cogent. It is a genuine part of Aquinas' argument here.31

But the argument has every appearance of not being meant to stop at this point. It goes straightway on in natural sequence to explore the status of a thing whose quiddity would be its existing. This suggested object, the reasoning shows (4.104-119), will be both unique and primary. It will be unique in allowing no more than one instance of itself as a quiddity. It will be primary as the instance upon which all non-quidditative occurrences of itself depend. It will not permit multiplication through species or through individuals. But a third way of plurification is described and left open for it. This is the prospect indicated by mention of it as the primary instance of a perfection, conjuring up the possibility of multiplication in secondary instances of lesser perfection, in the manner of Aristotelian focal reference.32 These less perfect occurrences of existence will have accidental status (above, nn. 9-10). In them existence will no longer be a quiddity. In consequence this alternative is rightly left out of

31 Van Steenberghen, ‘Note d’herméneutique’, 279 sees this first section of the *De ente* reasoning as a victim of the Scholastic ‘tournure dialectique’. MacDonald, ‘The *Essel/Essentia* Argument’, 161 takes the adueniens extra *De ente* 4.95 to mean ‘coming from without’ instead of over and above. For him this introduces a new alternative proposition besides the ‘Esse is not part of the essence’, allowing the claim: ‘If my remarks about the underlying logical structure of Aquinas’ argument are right, then the IE argument is not to be found in *De ente* 4’ (p. 162). This change in the logical structure of the argument, however, does not affect its probative force. Anything that comes to something comes from a source.

consideration in the immediate conclusion, which is that subsistent existence cannot be multiplied either by differentiae or by matter.\textsuperscript{33}

At this point comes the twofold conclusion expressed in the sentences upon which the present article focuses: ‘It follows that there can be only one reality that is identical with its being. In everything else, then, its being must be other than its quiddity, nature, or form’ (above, n. 1). An advance over the immediate conclusion of the intellectus essentiae portion of the argument may be expected. But does that advance consist in a demonstration that the distinction is real? Or does it consist rather in extending the conceptual distinction already reached to all possible instances other than one individual thing, thus universalizing the conclusion in this fashion? It will thereby bring the angels under its scope. In everything, except for a unique individual, existing will be other than quiddity. The new wording does not reveal anything more. The conclusion of the intellectus essentiae section had been that ‘being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a reality whose quiddity is its being’ (4.102-104). The intervening discussion had shown that this reality was limited to only one individual, allowing the conclusion to read that in everything else ‘its being must be other than its quiddity, nature, or form’ (4.122-123). It reads as though the same conclusion had now been exactly determined in regard to extent. Nothing has been introduced to show that existing adds a positive content of its own over and above the quidditative content of the thing. The further reasoning has safeguarded the first conclusion against the charge that the human intellect in its conceptualization may be missing the thing’s existence just as it misses the specific differentiae of natural things, even though these specific traits are part of the essence. It also provides the framework for showing that existence is a positive perfection that is found in varying degrees. These contributions amply justify its place as a stage in the overall argument. But they do not as yet prove real distinction between the thing and its existing.

There need be no hesitation, then, in agreeing that if Aquinas ‘has successfully shown that it is impossible for there to be more than one being in which essence and existence are identical, then he can conclude to factual otherness of essence and existence in all other entities.’\textsuperscript{34} There is no doubt

\textsuperscript{33} This is tellingly noted by MacDonald, ‘The Esse/Essentia Argument’, 164: ‘Aquinas’s failure to deal with the third account of pluralization does not represent a lacuna in need of explanation but is, in fact, a deliberate strategy which links pieces of the argument together.’

\textsuperscript{34} Wippel, Metaphysical Themes, p. 127 takes ‘factual’ as contrasted with ‘merely hypothetical’, and notes that the point at issue is whether ‘such a “factual” and “real” distinction has been established at this stage of the argument: cf. p. 115. But the hypothetical form of the reasoning indicates clearly enough a modus ponens. The apodosis is that subsistent existence can have only one instance. The contradiction thereby excluded would be a plurality of its instances. Nothing is said in that apodosis about a plurality in real accidental existence. There need be no hesitation in accepting as a consequence of the whole statement taken in a composite sense the
about the fact of the distinction. But still no demonstration has been offered that it is a real distinction, even aside from the absence of the term 'real'. A factual distinction need not be equated with a real distinction. Outside the mind what the creature is is not existence. Yet that does not immediately imply that there is a real distinction between a creature and its real existence. Nor does this immediately follow from the demonstration that 'it is not possible for there to be more than one entity in which essence and esse are identical', as Wippel seems to maintain. Until existence has been shown to have a positive content of its own over and above the quidditative content of the finite thing, a conceptual distinction suffices as it did with Aristotle and Suarez to explain the fact that in the extramental world every finite thing's nature is something other than its own existing, yet in a way that would leave the two really identical. The finite thing is still a stone, a cat, a man. What it is does not become existence, even though in this view the existence is held to be nothing really over and above the thing itself.

MacDonald has offered 'two considerations' in support of the claim that real distinction has been made manifest at this stage of the argument. The first is that here 'the result must be a conclusion about the relation of esse to essence in existing things, i.e., in reality.' To this the reply may be made that for Aquinas (De hebd. 2.32; above, n. 16) essence and existence may be really the same in a real thing when they are conceptually distinct. They are so in a simple being. If what the reasoning at the present stage has accomplished is the universalizing of the conclusion stated in the intellectus essentiae section, namely, as universalized to all things except a unique primary instance of being, the present conclusion is still showing a distinction between two objects of conceptualization. Later it can be demonstrated that in subsistent existence the two are really identical, and that in all other things they are really distinct.

MacDonald's second consideration is that here there is no way to '... show that intelligences are not simple in every way unless it is the claim that there is a further conclusion that in all other things existence will differ from quiddity. It will then follow cogently whether or not existence subsists in that unique instance, as Wippel (pp. 114, 115, 117, 119-20, 126) repeatedly asserts. The issue rather is whether the otherness as yet shows itself to be real, or whether the otherness established in the intellectus essentiae stage is now merely being universalized to all created things.

35 ibid., p. 126.
37 This is done (De ente 4.127-166) in terms of efficient causality. Yet MacDonald, ibid., 170 writes: 'The whole of the argument, then, is concerned with things in reality, and no shift from the order of formal to the order of efficient causality occurs later in the argument.' There is of course no doubt that the argument from start to finish is concerned with reality, for the formal cause is a real cause. But the shift to efficient causality is explicit as it bursts into prominence at De ente 4.132-133: 'by "caused" I mean by an efficient cause' (trans. Maurer, p. 56).
real distinction in intelligences.' Against this, one may say that 'not simple in every way' does not occur in the text at the present stage. It was used for the overall purpose of the whole argument at the commencement *(De ente 4.91-92)*. From the start the purpose of Aquinas had been to prove real distinction, as emerges from the parallel discussion of the theme in the *Scriptum* (above, nn. 6 and 9) where real diversity was expressly intended. But the present stage of the argument in the *De ente* does not mention the ultimately envisaged conclusion that the intelligences are 'not simple in every way'. What it does say is that in the intelligences the existence 'must be in addition to their form' (trans. Maurer, p. 56) because it is other than form or quiddity in all things except subsistent existence. The conclusion that an intelligence is not simple in every way can be left for the proof that it itself is a real potentiality for actualization by existence.

Here a general remark is in order. Without sensitivity to the way Aquinas understands the notions of essence and existing, a reader may very easily be inclined to interpret the middle part of the *De ente* argument as manifesting a real distinction. If essence in the real world is regarded as something finished in itself instead of as an object abstracted non-precisively and thereby left open for completion by its metaphysically prior existence, it can hardly help but be looked upon as rounded off in the distinct contours of a fully constituted recipient of existence (cf. above, n. 29). It will be regarded as possessing some kind of essential being of its own, like an Avicennian common nature, and as having its essential predicates in independence of any efficient causality. Gilson noted incisively how Cajetan took created substance as 'un récepteur déjà pleinement constitué' in relation to the existence that actuates it. Correspondingly, without keen and continued awareness that existing is first grasped through judgment and only later conceptualized as an actuality, it can hardly escape being viewed in the manner of a quality or other incomplex object. It will then tend to be looked upon as something having of itself the finitude of an object originally known through conceptualization and marked off as in itself a distinct unit.

Between the two terms so conceived, real distinction may be expected to appear when they are found together in the outside world. A real distinction is one that lies between its terms even though no human mind is thinking about them. Between real quiddity and real existence conceived in the way just

38 MacDonald, 'The Esse/Essentia Argument', 167.
mentioned, a real distinction may be expected to appear if one is not willing to grant that the intrinsic content of the two concepts is exactly the same, with only a difference of reference in one of them to something external. But if real difference between the objects so conceived is maintained, it will face the problem of showing how it is not the distinction upheld by Giles of Rome as between two realities, between *rem* and *rem*. If on the other hand the quiddity is seen strictly as in itself an unfinished recipient, and its existence a prior and accidental actuality undetermined in itself and requiring specification by the quiddity, the way is left open for inquiry whether the two can really coalesce or whether they must stay distinct in reality as well as in conceptualization.
That final stage in the argument, however, is another story. The present inquiry had as its topic the meaning of the conclusion reached in the middle section of the reasoning and expressed in the two sentences quoted at the beginning (above, n. 1). It comes to its end in showing that what has been attained in the middle section is the universalizing of the first section's distinction, by way of extension to all created things. At the same time it has presented the participation framework in which secondary instances of a perfection can be multiplied under the causality exercised by the primary instance. The middle section is thereby a further stage towards the demonstration of real distinction between quiddity and existence in all things except subsistent existing. But taken just in itself it leaves open the question whether existence, like animality or corporeity, is something that coalesces in reality in the one nature of man, or whether it is a perfection that has to remain really distinct from anything it really actuates quite as color has to remain really distinct from the substance in which it inheres. Predicamental accidents, of course, are subsequent to the thing in which they inhere, while existence is metaphysically prior to the subject it actuates. But as far as remaining distinct in the real world regardless of human consideration, both existence and real predicamental accidents have to meet this criterion if real distinction is to be upheld. Otherwise the content of each, though conceptually different from the other's content, may yet merge in reality into the one nature, as do animality and corporeity in a man or ox. Though greater than the distinction through external reference as found in the conceptual distinction between quiddity and being in a simple thing (above, n. 16), the conceptual difference in intrinsic content does not guarantee real distinction. Real distinction still has to be demonstrated. Between body and animal the distinction remains conceptual.

The foregoing inquiry likewise shows how the structure of the argument will be gauged differently in accord with the different ways in which quiddity and existing are understood. For many, the reasoning of Aquinas on the topic has been divided into a number of separate arguments. For those who see one

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43 The argument cited by Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes*, p. 116 n. 26 from CG 2.52 *Si enim* starts from subsistent esse, already established, and shows that to be diversified the esse has to be accidental to the subject in which it is joined. This seems as much akin to the final stage of the *De ente* argument as to the second stage. However, any stage of the *De ente* reasoning is in solidarity with all the others. This allows the demonstration to be recalled in any of the numerous ways used by Aquinas for referring to the distinction between being and thing. The charge that the demonstration of the existence of God in the final stage of the argument presupposes real distinction of existence from thing may be found met in my article 'Being and Natures in Aquinas', *The Modern Schoolman* 61 (1984) 160-61.
continuous argument running through the long text, the first stage may manifest a conceptual distinction between quiddity and existence, the second stage a real distinction, and the final stage an application of the real distinction in positive fashion in their composition as parts. Or the distinction may appear in observable things as conceptual in the first stage, in the second stage come to be extended to all things except subsistent existing, and in the final stage reach the point where it is known to be real. The logical formalization may remain the same, since the term 'real' is nowhere expressed in the De ente argument. The argument has to be fleshed out for the nature of the distinction to appear, and the way in which that takes place will differ radically in keeping with the understanding of the terms 'quiddity' and 'existence'.

Precisely here does the importance of close study of the De ente argument lie. Its reasoning penetrates to the inmost depths of the metaphysical treasure buried beneath the not always pleasant Latin of Aquinas' writings. The skeletal structure of his proofs for the existence of God, of his demonstration of perpetual existence for the spiritual soul, and of his location of human destiny in intellectual activity and possession is to be found in his understanding of essence and existence as contained succinctly in the De ente reasoning. Renewed and continued attention to it, such as is demanded by discussions like the present one, cannot help but be rewarding. But, emphatically, the topic should not be approached as though Giles of Rome and Suarez and the modern epistemologists had never had their say.

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CATALAN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF SERFDOM

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Peasant servitude in medieval Catalonia grew slowly from the first efforts of aristocrats to impose arbitrary exactions in the mid-eleventh century to the fully developed servile conditions of the fifteenth century that would provoke the celebrated rebellions, the so-called Wars of the Remençà. Even if we accept the narrow definition of Verriest, that serfs were those peasants who belonged to their lords and whose condition was hereditary, for Catalonia the existence of serfdom is indisputable. On the long road to peasant enserfment the early

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The following abbreviations are used:

ABL = Antiquiores Barchinonensium Leges, Qvas Vvlgvs Vsaticos appellat, cvm comentariis Supremorvm Ivrisconsultorvm Iacobi a Monte Ivdaico, Iacobi et Gvielermi a Vallesicca et Iacobi Calicii (Barcelona, 1544).
ACA = Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó (Barcelona).
ACB = Arxiu de la Catedral de Barcelona.
ACF = Arxiu de la Curia Fumada (Vic).
ACS = Arxiu de la Catedral de Solsona.
ACV = Arxiu Capitular de Vic.
ACSU = Arxiu Capitular de la Seu d'Urgell.
ADB = Arxiu Diocesà de Barcelona.
ADG = Arxiu Diocesà de Girona.
ADV = Arxiu Diocesà de Vic.
AHDE = Anuario de historia del derecho español.
AHN = Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid).
AIEC = Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans.
APO = Archives des Pyrénées-Orientales (Perpignan).
BPP = Arxiu de la Biblioteca del Palau de Peralada.

Recueil ... = Recueil de mémoires et travaux publié par la Société d'histoire du droit et des institutions des anciens pays de droit écrit.

1 Léo Verriest, Institutions médiévales: introduction au corpus des records de coutumes et des lois de chefs-lieux de l'ancien comté de Hainault (Mons-Frameries, 1946), pp. 168-70, 246.

thirteenth century is especially important because at this time a legal structure of servitude was first defined. What had previously been a spectrum of tenurial arrangements of almost infinite variety started to become ordered into categories. Questions arose over what ties bound peasants to their lords and which of those ties implied hereditary and inescapable obligations. Shortly after 1200 lords began to demand oaths and recognition charters from peasants in which the unbreakable, hereditary ties to the land and its lord were acknowledged. In order to redeem his liberty the peasant would have to pay a fine, and thirteenth-century documents recording such payments are common.

The inclination to regularize and define servitude coincided with the first penetration of Roman law into Catalonia. Among the effects of this momentous intellectual movement was a tendency to simplify customary arrangements and to define personal status rigorously. Roman law encouraged the separation of free from unfree peasants and the relation of tenurial obligations to personal status. It is not that Roman law in itself helped impose serfdom, but rather that in helping the growth of a more ordered society Roman law aided the definition of privileges and classes. Lack of rights or privation of legal standing before courts identified serfs more clearly than had been possible in a less disciplined era.

This article attempts to discover the influence of the revived Roman law on the conditions of the Catalan peasantry. Naturally legal treatises did not always have an immediate impact on the actual arrangements between peasants and lords. It is the tendency of lawyers to impose a merely verbal order on a complex social situation, and this has discredited them in the eyes of social historians of our era. Medieval lawyers often dismissed as serfs all those below the rank of privileged townsmen. When Beaumanoir described the third estate as simply ‘serfs’ he was reflecting an outlook common to medieval lawyers.

2 The worsening of conditions is evident in Vic; cf. Paul Freedman, ‘The Enserfment Process in Medieval Catalonia: Evidence from Ecclesiastical Sources’, Viator 13 (1982) 236-38. Servile recognitions also became common elsewhere in Old Catalonia in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, for example in Roussillon: APO, B50 (liasse), unnumbered parchment, 30 November 1182; B48 (liasse), unnumbered parchment, 11 March 1222; Série H, Temple, St. Hippolyte 1757 (1209); and in the Vallès: document of 1218 from Sant Pere de Vilamajor, ed. E. de Hinojosa, ‘Origen y vicisitudes de la pagesia de remensa en Cataluña’, Discursos leídos en la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1902), p. 12; ADB, Perg. Santa Anna, carpeta 2A, 109 (1227) and carpeta 8, 138 (1240).

3 Some examples from a variety of locations in Old Catalonia: ADG, Cartulari de Carlemany i, fol. 280 (1205); ACV, calaix 7, 122 (1239); ACF, Anònims I, fols. 38, 48 (1231), 104, 106v, 108v (1232); BPP, Sec. C, 30 (1243), ed. Miquel Golobardes Vila, Els remenqes dins el quadre de la pagesia catalana fins el segle xv, 2 (Peralada, 1970), no. 36; ACA, Canc. perg. Jaume I, 1747 (1263); APO, B48 (liasse), unnumbered parchment, 14 August 1246; ACB 1-6-2094 (1243) and 1-1-609 (1293).

4 Philippe de Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. Amédée Salmon, 3 vols. (Paris, 1899-
At one time the medieval lawyers were considered reliable guides to the social conditions of their time. Historians of the nineteenth century were misled by this group of sources into believing that the medieval peasantry formed a single, almost completely servile class, a view that careful regional studies have destroyed. Doubts over the alleged strength of medieval serfdom are in fact so strong that many experts question whether it is even possible to speak of serfdom apart from the abstractions of the jurists. Marc Bloch, who emphasized the diverse geography of medieval social development, is himself open to criticism for excessive reliance on legal indices of servitude (chevage, formariage and mainmorte).\(^5\) Large regions at the heart of the supposedly ‘classic lands of feudalism’ turn out to have had virtually no peasant servitude. In other areas, as in much of southern France, servitude existed but was weak and short-lived.\(^6\) Confrontation of legal with archival sources has ended reliance on the former for the description of medieval society.\(^7\)

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss entirely the legal writings concerning serfdom. In Catalonia, where the growth of servitude included legislation that had the effect of binding peasants and their progeny to the land, the role of lawyers was not that of mere theoreticians. Jurists, more than other learned persons, dealt with how to define peasant classes, what rights lords held over peasants, what the standing of peasants was with regard to royal government, and how customary law might be reconciled with Roman law. Even if they did not accurately depict the distribution or origins of servile tenure, the lawyers are a legitimate source for understanding what contemporaries thought serfdom

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was. This is particularly important when we look at the terms used to describe peasants, such as *homo proprius*, *rusticus*, or *homo de remença*, terms that appear not only in legal texts but in routine documents as well. As long as the nature of medieval servitude remains poorly understood, much of the controversy surrounding it will hinge on how to explain these technical terms, and whether or not they implied a degraded social status. The lawyers' discussions must be used in conjunction with archival evidence reporting sales, establishments of tenants, charters of redemption and the like. Taken together, the legal and archival material may inform each other instead of appearing as contradictory sources.

**The Reception of Roman Law in Catalonia**

The study of the revived Roman law was introduced into Catalonia late in the twelfth century. As was true elsewhere in Europe, the new jurisprudence was absorbed slowly and its influence was not immediately obvious. It was not a discovery that at once dazzled contemporaries or led them instantly to revolutionize justice and government. Nevertheless, although slow in its initial manifestations, Roman law eventually assisted in a transformation of legal procedure, administrative practices and images of society. In Catalonia, and elsewhere in Europe, a degree of central authority was built by means of both Roman and a more organized customary law, the latter often interpreted by lawyers trained in the Roman system.

The Roman law of the high Middle Ages, derived from the *Corpus iuris civilis* of Justinian, was understood by its practitioners to be rational, universal and centralized. These characteristics brought it into conflict with the customs governing the Crown of Aragon and other European kingdoms whose institutions were based on local diversity, practices sanctioned by time rather than legislation, and limited executive authority. The task of Catalan jurists was to reconcile to Roman law the variations of customary law and its often

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9 The essays of Gaines Post, collected in his *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100-1322* (Princeton, 1964) describe the importance of Roman law in the formation of nations and the notion of public law.
different assumptions. To explain the nature and origin of peasant servitude was part of the effort to make two legal systems and philosophies compatible.

The Catalan reception of Roman law is visible in occasional indications of familiarity with the *Corpus iuris civilis* (via the Provençal *Summa trecensis*) offered in a judicial decision in Vic in about 1185, or in the bequests of Roman legal books by canons of the cathedral of Barcelona in 1188, 1195 and 1197. There are traces of legal defenses using Roman exceptions in pleas after 1210: renunciation of the right of a defendant to dispute an agreement because the money provided for in the contract was not received (*exceptio non numeratae pecuniae*), and renunciation of any future challenge on the grounds that one of the parties was a woman (*exceptio Senatusconsulti Velleiani*). The influence of Roman law is evident in the privileges of the town of Lleida collected in 1228. By 1243 the penetration of the new learning was sufficient to provoke an order from King Jaume I prohibiting the allegation of Roman law in cases for which customary law was available. In 1251 Roman and canon law were summarily banned from secular courts of the Crown of Aragon. Neither of these orders had more than a temporary effect, if that, but they show the unease arising from the perceived threat of Roman law to custom.

Description of the bonds tying certain peasants to their landlords and farms provided one of the many occasions for conflict of laws in the thirteenth century. Roman law, with its emphatic distinction between slave and free, admitted only with difficulty the existence of intermediate conditions such as that of attached peasants, and provided few opportunities for free persons to subordinate themselves. The problem is presented succinctly in the collection of feudal customs known as the *Commemoracions*, composed by Pere Albert, a canon of Barcelona who wrote in the mid-thirteenth century. In discussing non-noble commendation Pere Albert wrote:

> Although according to Roman law, a free man cannot make himself the *servus* of another by mere agreement or public recognition, it is possible to agree by

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12 Font Rius, ‘La recepción’, 94. The *Senatusconsultum Velleianum* forbade a woman from assuming the liability of another person.


14 Font Rius, ‘La recepción’, 93.

recognition to a lowering of one's condition because by means of a written document a free man can make himself the man of a noble and do him homage. ... And although homage is not found in Roman civil law, it is established by very ancient use in Catalonia and is to be taken to be the law and aided and defended by the laws, for licit agreements must be protected.16

In cases of clear disparity, custom was deemed to preempt Roman law: in the words of a late medieval maxim, 'ius Cathaloniae derogat iuri romano'.17 Such a solution was not really satisfying to a society in which considerable ingenuity was marshalled to reconcile apparent contradictions in theology, law and philosophy so as to bring harmony from the dissonance of Greek philosophy and Christian teaching, or papal authority and conciliar claims, or of Roman law and feudal society.18

Throughout medieval Europe the common way of fitting Roman law to make it accept medieval serfdom was to elaborate on the rules governing the coloni.19 The late-Roman colonus was a peasant who was free in his personal condition but could not leave the land he tilled and was transferred with it when the land changed hands. It was thus possible to make the legal structure of medieval serfdom more or less compatible with Roman law. More important and more difficult than this technical reconciliation were problems created by the ambiguous status and obligations of the medieval peasantry. The medieval tenants were not governed by a single body of written laws and their status was not as well-defined as that of the Roman colonate. It would be a difficult task to enclose the panoply of medieval tenurial arrangements within Roman definitions. This was the difficulty for Catalan lawyers who concerned

16 Pere Albert wrote in Latin and was translated into Catalan. The Catalan text of the passage quoted is in Josep Rovira i Ermengol, Usages de Barcelona i Commemoracions de Pere Albert (Barcelona, 1933), pp. 174-75. Latin text is from Joan de Socarrats, In tractatum Petri Alberti canonici Barchinonensis, de consuetudinibus Cathaloniae inter Dominos et Vasallos ... (Barcelona and Lyons, 1551), pp. 324-25: ‘Licet de iure Romano homo liber non possit se facere seruum: aliquis per aliquam simplicem pactionem, nec etiam per confessionem factam in iure, potest tamen per confessionem aliquis suam conditionem grauare: quia per pactionem, interueniente scriptura, potest aliquis homo liber se constituere hominem aliquis nobilis, & potest ei facere homagium ... Et quamuis illud homagium introductum non sit de iure Romano ciuili scripto, introductum tamen est de vsi diuturno Cathaloniae, qui legem imitatur, & ideo legibus adiuuat, & defenditur; quia pactiones licitae custodiendas sunt.’

17 As Jesús Lalinde Abadia points out (La persona y la obra del jurisconsulto vicense ‘Jaume Callís’ [Vic, 1980], pp. 74, 158-59), the phrase was originally more limited: ‘ius novum Cathaloniae derogat iuri antiquo romano’. The sovereignty of the ruler of Catalonia was thus protected against the imperial implications of the ius commune but it was left possible for Catalan custom to be modified by Roman law.

18 The expression 'harmony from dissonance' is taken from Stephan Kuttner, Harmony from Dissonance. An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law (Latrobe, Pa., 1960).

19 Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies, pp. 136-38; Gouron, ‘Liberté’, 44-46.
themselves with peasants. In applying some of the Roman terms and outlook they influenced the development of customs governing peasant conditions.

**LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF PEASANT STATUS**

The growth of peasant servitude from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century was aided by the desire of lawyers to resolve ambiguities of status. Jurists wanted to reduce local and customary variation to a simplified hierarchy of peasant classes. In this effort it is not easy to say that Roman law in itself encouraged or discouraged servitude. Both custom and Roman law could be used to support either liberty or servitude. In their commentaries medieval lawyers attempted to describe peasants by using both Roman and customary texts, and it was partly this very process of definition that contributed to the progressive enserfment of much of the Catalan peasantry.

Most legal works from 1250 to 1500 are commentaries on the *Usatges of Barcelona*, the fundamental customary law code, or on subsequent collections of customary laws (the *Consuetudines Cathaloniae*), or on the enactments of kings and their councils or ‘Corts’ (a list of jurists and their works is given in Appendix 1). At the heart of this massive and imperfectly understood literature is an effort to harmonize Roman and customary law, particularly in regard to relations between knights and their lords. The status of peasants was a subordinate aspect of the problem of reconciling a system of graduated dependence with a Roman emphasis on the stark contrast between slave and free.

If one begins with the *Usatges* themselves, a collection formed in stages between the late eleventh and early thirteenth century, the uncertainty surrounding the status of peasants is apparent. The word for peasants in the *Usatges* is *rustici*, a broad term that implies nothing about status or obligations. At one point the *Usatges* speaks of a ‘rustic or any man who has no dignity other than that of being a Christian.’ Commentators would regard this as defining a *rusticus* as a person who possesses no privileges. In none of the chapters of the *Usatges* written before 1200 is there any indication that rustics...
were legally unfree or that they were attached to their land, although there are forms of subordination to a lord or other customs that could be glossed as the basis for servitude by jurists of the fourteenth and fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{22}

The only appearance in the \textit{Usatges} of different levels of status within the peasant class comes in the pair of customs entitled ‘Sacramenta rustici’ and ‘De alis namque rusticis’.\textsuperscript{23} In the latter a higher kind of \textit{rusticus} appears, a \textit{bachallarius}, whose oath is acceptable in cases involving sums of four mancuses or less, as opposed to the smaller limit of seven sous for common rustics provided for by ‘Sacramenta rustici’. Apart from this example the \textit{Usatges} presents an undifferentiated peasantry, neither privileged nor yet subjugated by their lords.

In glosses to the \textit{Usatges} by jurists of the thirteenth to fifteenth century, \textit{rusticus} would remain the most common term for peasant. Rustics were considered free men,\textsuperscript{24} but at the same time they might be mistreated by their lords and had no legal recourse against such mistreatment.\textsuperscript{25} In the mid-thirteenth century the anonymous standard gloss to the \textit{Usatges} applied the Roman notion of thirty years’ prescriptive right to the question of determining at what point a rustic was considered bound to his land.\textsuperscript{26} By the fourteenth century \textit{rusticus} often meant a peasant bound to the land without reference to the thirty-year provision.\textsuperscript{27}

Pere Albert was the first jurist to use the term \textit{homo proprius} or \textit{homo solidus} to describe peasants, although the use of \textit{solidus} alone in documents concerning

\textsuperscript{22} The fifteenth-century jurist Narcís de Sant Dionís listed thirty-two \textit{usatges} concerning peasant servitude (ed. Valls i Taberner, ‘El Compendium Constitutionum Cathaloniae de Narcís de Sant Dionís, Revista jurídica de Catalunya 33 (1927) 442-43. A modern list of supposedly relevant \textit{usatges} is given in Guillermo Maria de Broca, \textit{Historia del derecho de Cataluña especialmente del Civil} (Barcelona, 1918), pp. 212-15. The \textit{Usatges} that were used as occasions for discussions of servitude were not really all that numerous: ‘Rusticus interfactus’, ‘Placitare’, ‘De omnibus hominibus’, ‘Sacramenta rustici’, ‘Similiter si senior’, ‘Tutores’, and ‘Qui solidus’ were the most important.

\textsuperscript{23} Bastardas, ed., \textit{Usatges}, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{24} As, for example, in the standard gloss to the \textit{Usatges} in \textit{ABL}, fol. 109v: ‘non datur licentia dominis in seruos proprios surreire ... multominus in rusticos qui sunt liberi ...’ and in Jaume de Montjuic, \textit{ABL}, fol. 23 (commenting on ‘Rusticus interfactus’): ‘Quod autem hie loquatur de libero patet ...’

\textsuperscript{25} See below, nn. 65, 66, 67. The right of mistreatment was also upheld by Jaume Callis, \textit{ABL}, fol. 47, 69.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{ABL}, fol. 125. Pere Albert (Socarrats, \textit{In tractatum}, p. 331) considered homage, both noble and servile, as unbreakable after thirty years.

\textsuperscript{27} Guillem de Vallseca, \textit{ABL}, fol. 46: ‘Quid de rustico non ne poterit sibi dominus mandare placita vbicunque dominus voluerit, dic quod non, quia non debet extrahi a loco ubi manet, cum a gleba non debet separari.’ The words ‘quia non’ are not found in the fifteenth-century manuscript, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 695, fol. 16. The passage was repeated by Jaume de Marquilles, \textit{Comentaria Jacobi de Marquilles super vsaticis barchinone} (Barcelona, 1505), fol. 72v.
dependent peasants is earlier. These rather fluid terms denoted persons who had pledged themselves to lords, and could be applied to both vassals and rustics. Until the late thirteenth century peasant servitude was often seen as a debased form of vassalage. For Pere Albert rustics were *hominiores solidi* who were not vassals and who were tied not only personally to a lord (like a vassal) but to the land as well. In this same passage of Pere Albert's *Commemoraciones* is found the first statement that bondage to the land is characteristic of Old Catalonia, the lands of the east and north that were first reoccupied by the Christians of the eighth to twelfth centuries. Servitude would be less common in the more recently conquered lands south of Barcelona and west of the Llobregat River. For Pere Albert, therefore, there was a subordinate class of peasants, the *hominiores solidi*, who had to redeem themselves to acquire liberty, and this class was limited to Old Catalonia.

Lawyers of the fourteenth and fifteenth century used both *rusticus* and *homo solidus* but also tried to employ more precise terms, often derived from Roman law. This effort at precision often merely confused things further, if not for contemporaries then at least for modern observers. In their works the jurists tended to consider all *rustici* within Old Catalonia as in some sense unfree. This is similar to the efforts of canonists to describe servitude by reference to a variety of terms whose total effect was to shift the status of peasants in the direction of increased dependence. Unlike the canonists, however, the Catalan lawyers never used the word *servus* except to deny that attached peasants were *servi*, a word used only for slaves.

To describe what terms the Catalan lawyers did use requires a slightly tedious look at texts in which words used to describe peasants are matched or contrasted. This exercise is worth performing because of the confusion among historians about what servitude was, and the degree to which it was a

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29 Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 338: ‘Si autem est rusticus, servatur diuersimode in Cathalonia quia in quadam parte Cathaloniae, que dicitur vicus (should be, as in mss., vetus) Cathalonic ... homines solidi, qui non sunt milites, sunt sic astricti dominis suis, quod filii eorum sunt homines dominorum suorum, sic quod non possunt contrahere matrimonia, nec de mansis recedere. Quod si fecerint, oportet quod redimant se ...’
significant feature of land tenure in medieval Europe. Part of this confusion is caused by uncertainty over what various terms mean. Here again the medieval jurists can be faulted for abstracting terms from their readings that do not reflect social reality, but they are the only ones whose thoughts on differentiation among peasants survive. To read the archival evidence requires some idea of what significant words meant to those who wrote them.

Although the terms homo solidus or homo proprius might cover both vassals and rustics, and one might therefore expect the lawyers of the late Middle Ages to have discarded them, the expressions remained in use. Perhaps this was in order to preserve a notion of personal commendation as opposed to a bond exclusively to the land. It is clear from archival documents that homage by peasants was not uncommon, but as Poly and Bournazel have noted, the homage of Catalan homines proprii remained based on land tenure more than on personal commendation.32 In any event rustics could be homines solidi, according to Jaume Callis writing near 1400, in effect repeating what Pere Albert had said 150 years earlier.33 More significant is the statement that homines proprii may be mistreated by their lords, a teaching found in a treatise by Callis on criminal law and in the Customs of Girona drawn up in 1430.34 The right of a lord to mistreat peasants under his control was thought to have been sanctioned by legislation of 1202 that, as will be seen, was considered a basis for enserfment. In the text of that enactment the term used is simply rustici.35 Thus homines solidi would appear to have been the same as rustici and both words possessed the same imprecision. By the late fifteenth century, however, Joan de Socarrats, the jurist who treated the subject of peasant status most thoroughly (and most harshly), said that homines solidi were the same as homines de remenga, those who had to redeem themselves and who are considered by modern writers as the most debased class of peasants.36 Here the tendency to group all peasants as serfs is evident.

33 *ABL*, fol. 104.
34 J. Callis, *De sono emisso*, fol. 6v; bound with *Solempnisstnt auretique tracatus Excell. ...
35 *dnt. Jacobi de Calllico, videlicet de Pace et Treuga et de Sono emisso* (Barcelona, 1518) although there is reason to believe *De sono emisso* was originally printed separately in Valencia between 1513 and 1515, according to Lalinde Abadía, *La persona*, p. 47; *Consuetudines dioeces gerundensis*, ed. J. Rovira i Ermengol, *AHDE* 5 (1928), c. 26.
36 Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 501: 'cum ista iura intestiae & exorchiæ ac etiam cugutiae sint de illis malis vsibus, in quibus homines proprii & solidi, de quibus fit mentio supra in c. habito tenetur eorum dominis, propterea quia isti sunt homines de redemptione ....' In New Catalonia there was a distinction between homines solidi and peasants of the remenga: Agustí Altisent, 'Un poble de la Catalunya Nova els segles xi i xii: l’Esplugà de Francolí de 1079 a 1200', *Anuario de
More than *homines solidi*, it was the only partially understood Roman term *adscripticius* that was favored by Catalan lawyers. It was generally agreed that *rustici* and *adscripticii* were the same but the meaning of the latter was more precise.\(^{37}\) The *adscripticius* was understood to be a type of Roman colonus who became tied to the land by voluntary written confession (the origin of the word was erroneously ascribed to the requirement that the confession be written).\(^{38}\) Use of this classicizing term had two advantages: it gave a Roman precedent for the servitude of previously free peasants, and it avoided the confusion with vassalic loyalty that arose from use of *homo solidus*. There was no doubt that *adscripticiii* were of free personal condition but bound to the land.\(^{39}\) The use of *adscripticius* further reflects therefore the inclination to view all rustics as serfs.

There was, it must be noted, a simultaneous counter-tendency to elevate the status of some rustics by reviving another classical word, *emphyteuta*. In Roman law emphyteusis was a contract by which a lord conceded land for a long period for little payment. The tenant (the *emphyteuta*) could pass his right to his heirs but the land could not be alienated. Emphyteutic leases were a means to encourage exploitation of vacant or marginal land and were of importance during the late Empire.\(^{40}\) In the medieval version the lease was perpetual, it could apply to urban or rural land, the *emphyteuta* paid a small annual sum (a *census*), and could alienate the property, eventually even without the lord’s consent, provided a certain portion of the price received were given to the lord.\(^{41}\)

The word *emphyteusis* first appeared in Catalonia at the same time that the institutions of serfdom arose, that is, at the end of the twelfth century.\(^{42}\) Its use...
was at first limited to legal texts and it is rarely found in actual contracts until the mid-thirteenth century, although long leases of the emphyteutic type had been common since the late eleventh century. The appearance of the word in the thirteenth century split what had previously been an almost infinitely diverse tenurial practice into two major categories: the emphyteutic tenants whose position was near that of unencumbered owners of land, and tenants who might be called adscripticii, rustici, or simply homines, whose freedom of movement was restricted, whose tenurial conditions were increasingly onerous and whose status was hereditary. Legislation of 1283 sealed the bondage of servile tenants by limiting their right to seek refuge on royal land (an enactment known from its first words in the Catalan text as ‘En les terres o locs’), while a year later a privilege conceded to Barcelona permitted alienation by an emphyteutic tenant without his lord’s consent and limited the lord’s share of income from any alienation. The growth of servitude and of emphyteusis are two aspects of the same thirteenth-century effort at classification of tenure and status.

Separated from the privileged emphyteutic tenants, rustici were regarded increasingly as serfs, although a diversity of terms persisted. In addition to homines solidi and adscripticii several other expressions were used. Writing shortly before 1448 Jaume de Marquilles defined seven types of rustics: bacalarii, adscripticii, originarii, censiti, coloni, villani and pagenses. About ten years earlier Tomàs Mieres offered the somewhat eccentric taxonomy of rusticus as a ‘master agriculturalist’, borderius as a ‘baccalaureate or minor master’, and iuvenis homo as a ‘student agriculturalist’. These hierarchies were speculations, unimportant in comparison to the jurists’ consensus on peasant status that, once having separated emphyteutic tenants from ordinary rustici, tended to refer to the latter indifferently as pagenses, agricultores, homines proprii, or that most obvious term for subjugated peasants, homines de remença (or more formally de redemptione). They were tied to the land, subject to mistreatment by their lords, and to controls on inheritance and marriage by means of exactions called ‘bad customs’ (mals usos) that by the fifteenth century served as indices of serfdom.
As already noted, the peasants, despite all these oppressive obligations, were not considered *servi*. Mieres, in denouncing what was thought to be a right of mistreatment given to lords by the Corts of Cervera in 1202, stated ‘rustics are not *servi*.’ The more pro-seigneurial Marquilles agreed, noting that *adscripticii* possess rights denied to *servi*. Socarrats said that *adscripticii* in some respects resemble *servi*, in that they are under the power of their lords and can be sold with the land, but *servi* may be sold apart from their land as well, while *adscripticii* possess the ability to buy, sell, marry, and enjoy other rights denied to *servi*. Yet Socarrats admitted that the bad customs paid by *adscripticii* were a type of servitude and a violation of natural liberty. In the Code of Justinian it is noted that really there is no difference between *adscripticii* and *servi*. That opinion was echoed among the canonists and civilians, notably by St. Raymond of Penyafort and Azo of Bologna in the thirteenth century. The Catalan lawyers, without using the tendentious word *servus*, had come to the same conclusion between 1250 and 1450 and had assimilated all peasants save emphyteutic tenants to at least potential servitude.

### The Nature of Servile Tenure

Now that we have described some of the terms used by Catalan jurists in their discussions of serfdom, we can describe what the conditions of servitude were thought to be. At the close of the Middle Ages the *mals usos* would be considered the salient characteristic of servile status. This is apparent in the work of Socarrats, writing in 1476, for whom the *mals usos* were the index of servitude, although in this he was anticipated by the fourteenth-century jurist Bertran de Ceva. The hated exactions were also regarded as symbols of

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48 Mieres, *Apparatvs* 2.514; Marquilles, ibid., fol. 75.
49 Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 330: ‘Quaero, an sit differentia inter seruum & adscriptitium? Et dico quod in aliquibus conueniunt, & in aliquibus disconueniunt. Conueniunt autem sicut seruus est in potestate domini, ita & asscriptitius. Item sicut dominus potest vendere seruum cum peculio, ita asscriptitium cum terra .... Disconueniunt autem, quia seruus potest vendi cum peculio, & sine peculio .... asscriptitius enim nuncuam venderetur sine terra: vt C. de agricol. & censsi i.ii .... Item et si seruus habet peculium, potest esse sine eo, & ab eo recedere, asscriptitius autem non potest a terra recedere.’
50 ibid., p. 503: ‘cum tal eius sit seruitus, quae est contra naturalem libertatem.’
51 Cod. XI.xlvii.21: ‘Quae enim differentia est inter servos et adscripticios intellegeatur, cum uterque in domini sui positus sit potestate, et possit servum cum peculio manumittere, et adscriptitium cum terra dominio expellere?’
53 For Socarrats see above, n. 36. For Bertran de Ceva see the beginning of the passage transcribed below, Appendix 3.
degradation by the rebellious peasants of the late fifteenth century who accomplished the abolition of the *mals usos* by the Sentence of Guadalupe in 1486. The *mals usos* included several levies of which the most important were a fine on a peasant’s estate if he died intestate (*intestia*), a fine in the event of death without a direct heir (*exorquia*), or if the wife of a peasant committed adultery and left him (*cugucia*). The fines were supposed to be between one third and one half of the movable property.

Some of the bad customs are found individually as early as the eleventh century, and occasionally they were grouped together as *mals usos* as early as the twelfth century and hence characteristic of servile status. This is especially true for charters granted to towns and villages exempting their inhabitants from the *mals usos*. For most lawyers, however, the *mals usos* were not the significant indication of servitude, and in fact there was no particular set of exactions recognized as proving servile condition. The most common attribute of servitude, which in effect defined it, was the prohibition on leaving the land without payment of a substantial redemption fine. In Pere Albert’s *Commemoracions* servitude was defined by restrictions on moving off the land and a levy in the event of marriage. Noting the increasingly evident difference in practice between Old and New Catalonia, Pere Albert observed that in the former:

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54 The Sentence of Guadalupe has been edited several times, including Jaime Vicens Vives, *Historia de los remensas (en el siglo xv)* (Barcelona, 1945; rpt. 1978), pp. 337-35 of reprint.

55 On the *mals usos*, Bonnassie, *La Catalogne* 2.825-28; Wladimir Piskorski, *El problema de la significación y del origen de los seis ‘malos usos’ en Cataluña*, trans. Julia Rodríguez Danilevsky (Barcelona, 1929; Russian edition, Kiev, 1899). Marquilles, *Comentaria*, fol. 349v, noted the tendency of lords to extract more than the one-third share for *intestia*. On the other hand lords did not always insist on receiving the one-half share of an adulterous wife’s property to which they were entitled; cf. José Coroleu é Ingleda, *El feudalismo y la servidumbre de la gleba en Cataluña: ensayo histórico-jurídico* (Girona, 1878), pp. 25-26, referring to Marquilles and Jaume de Montjuic.

56 *cugucia* is first found in the mid-eleventh century, *exorquia* and *intestia* in the twelfth century (Bonnassie, *La Catalogne* 2.826). Many documents mention *usatici* but this means seigneurial rights in general, not the particular group of *mals usos*. This is obvious from documents in which *usatici* are mentioned along with *cugucia, exorquia* and *intestia*: ADB, perg. Santa Anna, carpeta 2A, 154 (1234); AHN, Clero, Santas Creus, carp. 2800, 2 (1249); ADV, Cartulari de l’Estany, fol. 16 (1240). *mals usos*, referring to the group of inheritance and marriage exactions, first appear in privileges to Barcelona and Constanti in 1163 and 1164, ed. J. M. Font Rius, *Cartas de población y franquicia de Cataluña* 1 (Madrid-Barcelona, 1969), nos. 120, 125. In these and most clearly in no. 203 (1195) for Solsona exemption from the *mals usos* means immunity from servitude. This is also apparent in later documents that are not urban privileges: ACA, Canc. perg. Jaume I, Apéndiz 37 (1254); ACA, Registre 1955, fols. 105v-106 (1388), ed. Monsalvatje, *Noticias históricas* 13 (Olot, 1906), no. 1737.

57 In judgments over the status of a particular peasant, continuous residence on a manse was sometimes taken as proof of servile condition, e.g.: ACA, Canc. perg. Jaume I, Extrainventario 2814 (1247); ACV calaix 7, 235 (1261), while in at least one case the performance of homage proved servile dependence: APO, B48 (liasse), unnumbered parchment, 19 April 1231.
Non-noble vassals are so tied to their lords that their sons are men of their lords, and they cannot (freely) marry nor leave their manses. If they do leave, they must redeem themselves and, if they marry, the lord has the right to one fourth of the marriage settlement.58

A constitution of King Pere II in the Corts of Barcelona of 1283 (‘En les terres o locs’) stated that peasants from areas in which redemption payments were customary could not henceforth move to royal lands without redeeming themselves.59 Those fugitives now on royal lands had to redeem themselves unless the prescriptive period of a year, a month and a day had passed.60 ‘En les terres o locs’ was seen by later commentators as the legal basis for bondage to the land, although book 11, title 48 of the Codex, ‘De agricolis censitis vel colonis’, was at times cited for the same purpose.61 The force of the Catalan legislation was somewhat vitiated by interpreting the prescriptive rights as not only a temporary relaxation but a permanent possibility for freedom. If a peasant moved and was not actively sought by his lord within a year and a day (the month seems to have dropped out), he should be considered free.62 Despite this loophole, the constitution of 1283 sanctioned the practice of bondage to the land and so provided the foundation for the harsh conditions of the next two centuries.

In legal commentaries, however, the characteristic most often cited to differentiate subjugated peasants and fully free men is liability to the lord’s arbitrary demands. An act of the Corts of Cervera in 1202 forbidding rustics from appealing to royal justice against seigneurial mistreatment was thought to

58 Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 338: ‘homines solidi, qui non sunt milites, sunt sic astrici dominis suis, quod filli eorum sunt homines dominorum suorum, sic quod non possunt contrahere matrimonia, nec de mansis recedere. Quod si fecerint, oportet quod redimant se. Et si contrahunt matrimonia, domini ipsorum rusticorum habent quartam partem laudimii de sponsalitio.’
59 Ed. *Cortes*, p. 147: ‘Item quod in terris sive locis ubi homines redimi consueverint non transferant domicilia sua ad loca nostra nisi se redimerint....’
60 ibid.: ‘De hominibus vero dictorum locorum qui nunc sunt in locis nostris ita volumus observari quod, si fuerint de locis illis in quibus redimi se consueverint, se redimant nisi iure aliquo vel prescripiscione anni mensis et diei vel ultra poterunt se tueri.’
62 Socarrats, *In tractatum*, pp. 340-41. An anonymous marginal comment in a fifteenth-century manuscript of Pere Albert (Barcelona, Col.legi d'Advocats Vitr. I-92, fol. 157) notes that the year and a day prescription, on which Pere Albert and ‘En les terres o locs’ agree, is a good custom although contrary to a Roman law concerning miners bound to their labor for whom there is no prescriptive right of refuge: ‘Not. sit bonam consuetudinem ... concordat C. Curie Barchinone celebrate per dominum Rex Petri quod intro. sit quod in terris, quod est contra I. metallorum C. de metallo et metallic et procuratoribus metallo. I. vii.’ The law cited is Cod. XI.vii.7. Servile recognitions by peasants often included a renunciation of the rights of refuge and prescription. Such renunciations were valid, according to another fifteenth-century marginal comment to Pere Albert's *Commemoracions* (ACSU ms. 2045, fol. 30v).
be the basis for a right of mistreatment. The text of that meeting is not reliable and it is difficult to be certain about what was intended. It is evident, however, that by the late thirteenth century the clause ‘Ibidem’ of the Corts of Cervera was repeatedly cited as giving lords a right to oppress peasants. It was considered the foundation for a legalized injustice imposed on those of servile condition. In the fifteenth-century *Customs of Girona* the legitimation of mistreatment reached the point of permitting a lord to hold his serf in chains or in stocks. Without being quite so graphic most Catalan lawyers of the Middle Ages acknowledged a *ius maltractandi* applicable to dependent peasants with or without cause. Significantly one finds no Roman law cited to parallel what was thought to have been legislated at Cervera. The lawyers exhibit some unease over this flagrantly unfair privilege. In the mid-thirteenth century the standard gloss to the *Usatges* said that, since in Roman law slaves could not be mistreated with impunity, this should hold all the more for rustics who, after all, are free. Yet, the gloss continues, recent legislation (the constitution ‘Ibidem’) has gone against this. Early in the fourteenth century, Jaume de Montjuic stated that Catalan law upheld the lord’s arbitrary rights, although Roman law did not concur. Mistreatment was sanctioned by human custom but was not in accord with the higher justice of the heavens. Guillem de Vallseca said that while it appeared from the *Usatges* that lords could not mistreat peasants, it was ‘differently arranged today’ by reason of the constitution ‘Ibidem’ of the Corts of Cervera.

It was not unanimously accepted that legislation could override the *Usatges*. A case between Guilabert de Rajadell, lord of Les Pallargues, and a peasant whose goods and person he had seized turned on whether it was possible to prohibit appeals to royal courts over seigneurial mistreatment. The case is

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63 Ed. *Cortes*, p. 86: ‘Ibidem eciam constituit inviolabiliter quod si domini suos rusticos male tractaverint, vel sua eis abstulerint, tam ea que sunt in pace et treuga quam alia nullo modo teneantur Domino Regi in aliquo nisi sint de feudo Domini Regis vel Religiosorum locorum, tunc enim feudataris non liceat.’

64 *Consuetudines dioecesis gerundensis*, c. 26: ‘Item quilibet potest capere suum hominem solidum suum et tenere captum sub tina vel tavega vel in ferris vel in biga.’

65 *ABL*, fol. 109v: ‘Nunquid dominus poterit rusticum suum punire quomodo voluerit videtur quod non, ex eo quod hic dicatur et in glo. hic positis sicue enim non datur licentia dominis in seruis propriis se sim, vt eos interficiant vel mali afficiant vt ff. de his qui sunt sti vel alie. iur. i. i. et ii. vel aliquod membrum abscedere sive occultum eilellre vt l. got. ut v. praecedentium, multominus in rusticos qui sunt liberi... sed quicquid hic dicatur contra statutur ita in constitutionibus nouis, in primis, et in nouis constitutionibus anno domini §. ibidem.’

66 *ABL*, fol. 37v: ‘Imo etiam sine iudicio poterit rusticum suum punire quomodo voluerit videtur quod non, ex eo quod hic dicatur et in glo. hic positis sicue enim non datur licentia dominis in seruis propriis se sim, vt eos interficiant vel mali afficiant vt ff. de his qui sunt sti vel alie. iur. i. i. et ii. vel aliquod membrum abscedere sive occultum eilellre vt l. got. ut v. praecedentium, multominus in rusticos qui sunt liberi... sed quicquid hic dicatur contra statutur ita in constitutionibus nouis, in primis, et in nouis constitutionibus anno domini §. ibidem.’

known through a discussion by the late fourteenth-century jurist Jaume Calbet, who cited as an argument against the legislation of Cervera the inability of constitutions to cancel the *Usatges*. In the fifteenth century Tomàs Mieres was appalled by the *ius maltractandi*, deeming it a violation of divine law. Against those who cited the Corts of Cervera Mieres said that the king, even with his parliament, could not institute a law contrary to the law of God. Moreover, the mistreatment of peasants violated God’s command to love one’s neighbor, and rustics were not *servi* to be mistreated at will. To answer criticism of this sort and to justify servitude would be an increasingly urgent task for Catalan lawyers as peasant agitation increased in the fourteenth and fifteenth century.

**JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SERVITUDE**

Objections such as those of Mieres received their most thorough response in the work of Joan de Socarrats who wrote during the acute crisis of the civil war. Socarrats admitted that servitude was contrary to natural liberty but argued that it was sanctioned by custom. Regarding the objection that custom could not preempt natural law, he observed that both natural and divine law are subject to modification and limitation without thereby ceasing to be essentially immutable. Even Socarrats, however, admitted that the details of servitude
were objectionable. In noting that a lord may not extend the bad customs of *exorquia* and *intestia* to those of his men not previously liable to them, Socarrats observed that especially for ‘onerous and odious customs’ the rule against spreading local practices to other places must be followed.\(^7^2\)

It would be in the form of an historical myth about the origins of servitude that the most ingenious and durable justification would be offered. A fifteenth-century Escorial manuscript contains a group of glosses to constitutions of King Pere II. Among them is an anonymous commentary to ‘En les terres o locs’ from probably the early fourteenth century that begins by admitting that, according to both Catalan and Roman law, all men are presumed free unless proven otherwise (for the text see Appendix 2). Those who, contrary to this norm, must redeem themselves from servitude are descended from Christian peasants who remained on their lands during the Islamic conquest and occupation and who, when summoned by the conquering Christian armies to rise up against the Moslems, failed to do so out of fear. Once the reconquest was realized these cowardly peasants were condemned to servitude. The gloss notes that a slightly different version holds that the sin of the peasants consisted in remaining on their lands at the time of the Islamic invasion and accepting the domination of the infidel. Once the Christian conquest was realized, these collaborators were condemned to make to their new Christian masters the same degrading payments and services they had rendered to the Saracens.

This legend occurs again in the same Escorial manuscript in a collection of feudal customs and comments on them made by the fourteenth-century scholar Bertran de Ceva (see Appendix 3). Here the story has the hallmarks of a venerable truism, complete with attestations from a conveniently unnamed jurist of Barcelona who had read somewhere an account of the peasants’ treachery.\(^7^3\) Bertran elaborated on the earlier story by making Charlemagne the leader of the Christian armies and specifying the *mals usos* (rather than bondage to the land) as the consequence of the failure to aid the reconquest. According to Bertran, Charlemagne was advised simply to kill the cowardly peasants, but he decided instead to have them serve the conquerors by tilling the soil subject to the exactions they had accepted under Islam.

\(^7^2\) ibid., p. 507: ‘Quia consuetudo vnius loci, prēsertim onerosa & odiosa, non potest, nec debet ad alia loca, vel ad alias personas extendi, iuxta not. per Innocentem in c. dilecto, de offic. archi.’

\(^7^3\) Bertran attributed the entire legend in its two versions to ‘Guillelmus’ and ‘Henricus’. Guillelmus could be one of the several Guillemes de Vallseca, Guillem Puig, Guillem de So, or any of a number of fourteenth-century jurists who are little more than names to us. A certain Enric d’Horta is mentioned by G. de Broca, ‘Juristes y jurisconsults catalans del segles xiv-xvii’, *AIEC* 3 (1909-10) 487, but there were doubtless other fourteenth-century jurists named Enric.
A primordial link between bravery and liberty forms the core of many medieval accounts of the origins of nations and peoples. Historical legends would ascribe the formation of national identity to an original act of heroism, and Catalonia developed numerous legends of this sort centered on the Carolingian era. A corollary to this idea is that cowardice was the origin of servitude. The two ideas are found in the French belief, first discernible in 1200 but popular only after 1500, that nobles were descended from the Franks while peasants' ancestors were the often-conquered Gauls.

The Catalan legend of the cowardly peasants probably has its origin in twelfth-century French accounts of Charlemagne's deeds. The Chronicle of Pseudo-Turpin, written in the first half of the twelfth century, has Charlemagne liberating Frankish serfs willing to follow him against Moslem Spain. In the related collection of Carolingian adventures known as the Descriptio qualiter Karolus Magnus clavum et coronam Domini a Constantinopoli Aquisgranii detulerit..., Charlemagne punishes those unwilling to follow him to the East by servitude extending also to their descendants.

The pseudo-Turpin material was well known in Catalonia and it was possible to adapt its moral and historical information to the problem of justifying Catalan servitude. The notion of earlier pusillanimity as the origin of the oppression of peasants appears to have been accepted even outside legal circles by 1400. King Joan I in 1388 ordered his bailiff to make a search of the royal archives for information concerning the length of time in which the servile population of Old Catalonia was to be subjugated. The king said that he understood, 'according to the chronicles', that the era of servitude (specifically

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74 Examples of such tales are found in Ferrán Valls i Taberner, Matisos d'història i de llegenda (Barcelona, 1932; rpt. in vol. 4 of the author's Obras, Madrid-Barcelona, 1961) and Miquel Coll i Alentorn, 'La llegenda d'Otger Catalo i els nou barons', Estudis romàntics 1 (1947-48) 1-47.

75 Susan Reynolds, 'Medieval Origines gentium and the Community of the Realm', History 68 (1983) 384.

76 C. Meredith Jones, ed., Historia Karoli Magni et Rotholandi ou Chronique du Pseudo-Turpin (Paris, 1936), p. 121: 'Et praecepit mandans per totam Galliam, ut omnes servi qui sub malis consuetudinibus pravorum dominorum religati tenebantur soluta servitute proprii capitis et venditione deposita, cum omni progenie sua praesenti et ventura usque in sempterus liberi permanerent. Et ne alicui barbarae genti Franci amplius servirent, illi scilicet, qui cum eo in Hyspaniam ad expugnandum gentem perfidam irent, praecepit' (following 'Codex Calixtinus' version).

77 Included in Gerhard Rauschen, Die Legende Karls der Grossen im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1890), p. 108: 'Quo audito benignissimus dux unaque rex et imperator illico per totam Francorum regionem edici citissime imperat, quo omnes, qui ad sese defendendum arma possent ferre tam senes quam juvenes, pariter secum pugnaturi in paganos versus orientales plagas inevitabiliter ire satagent. Alioquin quicumque huius edicta non perageret, ipse in vita sua et filii eius similiter ex regis decreto quattuor nummos de capite quasi servi solvent.'
CATALAN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF SERFDOM

the *mals usos*) had already expired.\(^78\) The implication of this royal order is that serfdom was commonly acknowledged to be punishment for an historical crime affecting the peasants of Old Catalonia. In this particular version the exactions were supposed to be of limited duration (perhaps 500 years?) and the king was attempting to prove that this period of expiation was completed.

The most complete statement of the cowardly peasants legend was that of Joan de Socarrats, written in 1476 and, for the most part, copied from Bertran de Ceva (see Appendix 4).\(^79\) In commenting on two customs governing *intestia*, Socarrats stated explicitly that Carolingian events explained the predominance of the *remença* peasantry in Old Catalonia and its relative absence from New Catalonia, the anomaly noted earlier by Pere Albert. Old Catalonia, the sphere of the Carolingian reconquest, was subject to the bad customs and other incidents of servile tenure because of the weakness of the medieval serfs' ancestors. New Catalonia was free because it had been settled later by those untainted by history.\(^80\)

This pseudo-historical theory was more elegant in justifying serfdom than were appeals to royal legislation which ran up against the problem of positive versus natural or divine law. It was also preferable to a simple argument based on custom because, as Mieres in another context remarked, an unjust custom does not become legitimate through long usage.\(^81\)

The argument of Socarrats concerning possible limits to natural and divine law may be considered a first, legalistic line of defense against Mieres' critique, but the myth of the cowardly peasants offered a more sweeping and convincing rebuttal. The theory explained why certain places were subject to the bad customs while others were not. It allowed one to admit that the *mals usos*, like


\(^79\) Socarrats' discussion of the origins of servitude appears in a commentary on two customs concerning *intestia* that were added to Pere Albert's collection. Socarrats, *In tractatum*, pp. 501-502, cites Bertran de Ceva as his source for the two *intestia* customs. The Escorial manuscript of Bertran (d.II.18) contains both the two customs (fol. 119v) and an account of the cowardly peasants (fols. 118-117v), making it almost certain that Socarrats used Bertran directly for both customs and justification.

\(^80\) Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 501, does note what he thought an exceptional case of a free peasant community in Old Catalonia, the village of Ridaura: 'Sed in dioecesi Gerundensi apud montaneas est quaedam parochia vocata de Ruidario, quae est exempta a dictis iuribus, ex eo quia, vt auduii, homines de illa parochia fuerunt obedientes dicto regi Carolo, vel non fuerunt consci in dicta priditione, nec remanserunt cum infidelibus.'

\(^81\) Mieres, *Apparatvs* 1.252: 'quod male adinuentae consuetudines nec ex longo tempore, nec ex longo consuetudine confirmantur ....'
the *ius maltractandi*, were in themselves contrary to the traditions of Catalonia (in one version they were a Moslem invention) but nevertheless justifiable in their historical setting. The legend also served at least to hint at a Roman legal sanction for servitude. Repetition of the word *captivi* to describe the peasants is a reminder that one of the few ways a free person could be degraded according to Roman law was by being captured in battle.82

Overall the implication of the legend was that servitude might indeed be unjust, but the circumstances of its origin made it a legitimate penalty. As death and suffering were humanity’s price for the Fall, the exactions of the senyors could be considered licit punishment for the sins of a primordial Catalan peasantry.

The legend was accepted by many historians from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. Certain variations appear: for example, Louis the Pious rather than Charlemagne as the author of the call to the Christian peasants.83 Although first questioned in the eighteenth century,84 the theory persisted even in books sympathetic to the plight of the medieval peasant.85 In 1899 the Russian historian Piskorski felt it necessary to devote a section of his account of the *mals usos* to the refutation of this legend.86

As history or social analysis, it goes without saying, the notion that servitude began as a punishment for cowardice is worthless. It is, among other things, a quintessential example of the impossibility of relying on jurists to explain the causes of social change. Similarly the statements of Pere Albert and Socarrats implying that servitude was universal in Old Catalonia are not true. We are also justified in ridiculing the sociology of scholars like Mieres who described a peasant hierarchy in terms borrowed from the university.87

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82 Each account of the legend transcribed in Appendices 2-4 refers to the peasants under Islam as *Christiani captiui* and so they remained under the new conquerors because of their treachery. Socarrats, *In tractatum*, p. 366, cites Bartolus in holding that captives taken by the pope or emperor are to be considered slaves.

83 This version is first found in a work written in 1438: Pere Tomich, *Historias e conquistas dels excellentissims e Catholics Reys de Arago e de lurs antecessors los Comtes de Barcelona* (Barcelona, 1534), fol. 18v. Similar accounts appear in Hieronymus Pviades (Geroni Pujades), *Coronica Universal del Principat de Cathalvnya* (Barcelona, 1609), fols. 359v-360; pseudo-Bernat Boades (actually Joan Gaspar Roig i Jalpi), *Libre de feyts d’armes de Catalunya* 2 (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 52-54; Narciso Feliu de la Peña y Farell, *Anales de Catalvha* 1 (Barcelona, 1709), p. 235.

84 Bonnassie, *La Catalogne* 2.824.

85 Luis Cutchet, *Cataluña vindicada* (Barcelona, 1860), pp. 199-201, considered it wrong to have held succeeding generations of peasants responsible for the errors of the Carolingian peasants, but did not doubt the traditional story of collaboration and cowardice.


Did the lawyers have any influence on the growth of servitude from 1200 to 1450, or did they simply supply after-the-fact theories and justifications? In Catalonia lawyers helped order and extend peasant servitude by defining classes and their rights or absence of rights. The impact of such definitions was substantial because previously peasants had simply been tenants under a multiplicity of arrangements in which formal status played no part. Once the question arose over what implications payment of certain dues had on personal status, the way was open to define privileged and enserfed peasants. Some were now considered emphyteutic tenants, while others, whose obligations may originally have been similar, were now homines proprii or adscripticii. Naturally local conditions and the relative power of peasants and lords determined which peasants ascended and which were degraded. The contribution of the lawyers and of legislation was to categorize and to impose those categories on what had been the vagaries of local practice. In so doing, the jurists helped deprive many peasants and their descendants of liberty.

The significance of legal commentaries and legislation was not that they invented arbitrary seigneurial exactions or the mals usos, but that they legitimated them. Similarly, the importance of the recognition charters demanded in the early thirteenth century was not that they radically altered what a peasant owed his lord, but that they defined him and his progeny as the lord’s possessions. The introduction of new terms or definitions might not have had an immediate impact on the peasants but the same terms could later serve lords in subjugating their tenants. The simple substitution of a term such as homo proprius where before peasants had been known as rustici did not in itself mean very much. When the lords were sufficiently powerful, however, they could make legal forms such as charters work in their favor. The growth in the number of redemption charters, the exaction of the mals usos and the rebellions of the fifteenth century testify to the uses made of the newly defined servitude.

We should not underestimate the activity of medieval lawyers in their society. They were powerful within the royal administration and also, in a less grand setting, frequently intervened in cases involving peasants. The activity...
of medieval lawyers should be understood as part of a rationalization of practices and customs, a process clearly visible in the thirteenth century. Roman law alone did not encourage lawyers to define servitude. Catalan customary law offered a way of its own to enserf the peasantry and, as it happens, the most frequently cited seigneurial right, the *ius maltractandi*, owes nothing to Roman law. What the reception of Roman law encouraged, and also symptomized, was the desire for an abstract order and the destruction of what had previously been haphazard, local, and undefined.

**APPENDIX 1**

This is not by any means a definitive list of Catalan legal sources but rather a brief description of sources cited and an indication of some manuscripts.

1. *Usatges of Barcelona*
   
   Manuscripts: see list given in Josep Rovira i Ermengol, ed., *Usatges de Barcelona i Commemoracions de Pere Albert* (Barcelona, 1933), pp. 30-34; and Joan Bastardas, ed., *Usatges de Barcelona: El Codi a mitjan segle xn* (Barcelona, 1984), which includes an evaluation and comparison of important manuscripts.

   Editions: Ramon d'Abadal i de Vinyals and Ferràn Valls i Taberner, *Usatges de Barcelona* (Barcelona, 1913) (in Latin).
   
   Joseph Gudiol in *AIEC* 1 (1907) 287-318 (Catalan)
   
   Rovira i Ermengol, *Usatges*, pp. 51-137, 207-76 (Catalan)
   
   Bastardas, *Usatges* (Latin and Catalan)
   
   Cortes, pp. 10-46 (Latin).

   
   Manuscripts (Latin): Barcelona, Col.legi d'Advocats Vitr. I-92
   
   ———, Biblioteca de Catalunya 485 and 1216
   
   ———, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó Cod. Ripoll 32, 38 and 82
   
   Cagliari, Biblioteca Universitaria 6
   
   El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo d. II.12 and d.II.18
   
   Madrid, Real Academia de la Historia II.3.4/12 (damaged)
   
   Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 4760A and lat. 4761
   
   La Seu d'Urgell, Arxiu Capitular 2045 and 2100
   
   Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ottob. lat. 3058.
   
   (Catalan): Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó Cod. Generalitat 3
   
   El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo z.II.10
   
   (ms. 2108, fols. 134-136v) that resumes arguments made in a case involving the *ius maltractandi* and the degree to which a peasant was prohibited from seeking relief from mistreatment in royal courts.

Manuscripts: in many manuscripts of the Usatges, including Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó Cod. Ripoll 39; El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo z.I.3; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 4760A and lat. 4761; La Seu d’Urgell, Arxiu Capitular 2045; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ottob. lat. 3058.

Edition: Antiquiores Barchinonensivm Leges ... (Barcelona, 1544) (= ABL).

4. Jaume de Montjuic, commentary on Usatges, written between 1314 and 1317, according to Ficker, ‘Über die Usatici’, 239.

Manuscripts: Cagliari, Biblioteca Universitaria 6
El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo d.II.18
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 4760A and lat. 4761
La Seu d’Urgell, Arxiu Capitular 2045.

Edition: ABL.

5. Jaume de Vallseca, commentary on Usatges, written between 1359 and 1385, according to Ficker, ‘Über die Usastici’, 239-40.

Edition: ABL.


Commentary on several customs of Catalonia.
Manuscript: El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo d.II.18, fols. 121v-114r (foliation reversed).

7. Guillem de Vallseca. Died c. 1413, according to Antonio García y García, ‘El jurista catalán Guillem de Vallseca: datos biográficos y tradición manuscrita de sus obras’, Anuario de estudios medievales 7 (1970-71) 678, but possibly to be identified with an earlier, late thirteenth-century Guillem de Vallseca,
according to Aquilino Iglesia Ferreirós, ‘Dura lex sed servanda’, *AHDE* 53 (1983) 543-49.

Biography and list of works and manuscripts: García y García, ‘El jurista’, 677-708.
Commentary on *Usatges*, completed 1393 (according to García y García, ‘El jurista’, 693), but may have been written considerably earlier.
Manuscripts: El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo v.II.16
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 695.
Edition: *ABL*.

Works in which serfdom is considered:
Commentary on *Usatges* (written 1401 [Lalinde, ibid., p. 22]).
Manuscript: El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo e.II.4.
Edition: *ABL*.
*De sono emisso* (written 1406 [Lalinde, ibid., p. 115]).
Manuscript: La Seu d’Urgell, Arxiu Capitular 2105.
Edition: see above, n. 34.

J. Rovira i Ermengol in *AHDE* 5 (1928) 450-84.
Jaime Cots y Gorchs, *Consuetudines dioecesis gerundensis* (Barcelona, 1929).

Manuscript: El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo e.II.12.

11. Jaume de Marquilles, commentary on *Usatges* completed 1448, according to Marquilles’ preface (fol. 1v).
Manuscripts: Barcelona, Museu de l’Història de la Ciutat S.N.
El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo e.II.16 (incomplete).
Edition: *Comentaria Jacobi de Marquilles svper vsaticis Barchinone* (Barcelona, 1505).

12. Joan de Socarrats, commentary on Pere Albert and on other customs of Catalonia, completed 1476, as noted by Socarrats, p. 606.
Edition: *In tractatum Petri Alberti ...* (Barcelona and Lyons, 1551).
APPENDIX 2

From a collection of anonymous glosses to the Constitutions of King Pere II, a gloss to the Constitution 'Item quod in terris siue locis', enacted at the Corts of Barcelona, 1283. Our excerpt explains the origins of servitude in Catalonia.

El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo d.II.18, fols. 94r-93v (foliation reversed), saec. xv (described in Guillermo Antolin, *Catalogo de los códices latinos de la Real Biblioteca del Escorial* 1 [Madrid, 1910], pp. 451-58). The orthography of the manuscript has been preserved; punctuation follows modern practice and angle brackets enclose editorial additions.

(f. 94r) *Item quod in terris consueuerunt...* Dico quod de iure communi presumpio est quod omnes homines sunt liberi nisi contrarium probetur, item de iure istius terre generaliter vltra et citra flumen Lupricati nisi sit consuetudo quod consueuerunt se redimere vt habes hic in aperto. Unde debes scire quod quando Ispania sit occupata a Saracenis propter prodicionem comitis Iuliani, et tenebant Christ <i>anos quasi captiuis (f. 93v) et erant (?) se redimi et facere istas seruitutes. Ex post venerunt Christiani et conquistabant istam terram et, cum continue preliabant contra Saracenos, petierunt secretely adiutorium ab istis Christianis captiuis, qui timore Saracenorum nullum sufragium voluerunt dare Christianis. Et Christiani per gratiam Jesu Christi totam terram conquistarunt et aplicarunt fidey Christiane, et mult et fuerunt in oppionione quod interficerent Christianos istos sic captiuis ex eo quare tempore conquiste nullum sufragium voluerunt prestare Christianis. Ali <i>tenuerunt quod illesi remanerent et sub Christianis sicuti erant tempore Saracenorum, et quod redimerent se et cultiuarent et alia seruicia facerent Christianis sicuti facere solebant Saracenis et sic fuerunt a morte liberati. Et eo dicunt antiqui quibus est credendum cum dicta antiquorum probant, vt super iura, et in salmo *Deus, auribus nostris audimus.*

APPENDIX 3

From Bertan de Ceva, *Consuetudines Cathaloniae*, an excerpt containing an account of the Catalan *mals usos*.

El Escorial, Real Biblioteca de San Lorenzo d.II.18, fols. 118r-117v (foliation reversed), saec. xv (described in Antolin, *Catalogo* 1.451-58. The editorial principles used for Appendix 2 have been followed here.

(f. 118r) Audiui a quodam iurisper <i>to ciuitatis Barchinonensis quod legerat quod eo in Cathalonia soluitur cugucia, intestia, exorquia et sunt homines de redemptione quia tempore prodicionis comitis Iuliani rema <n> serunt in hac patria alias terra 2 multi Christiani captiui. Et rex Karolus, dum adquirebat terram que est citra flumen Lubricati, indicavit Christianis captiuis quod ipse debet habere bellum cum Saracenis certa die preix, quare rogabat quod insurgent contra Saracenos et die

1 *Ps 43:2.*
2 *alias terra* seems to be a gloss.
belli essent cum Christianis. Christiani captiui, dubitantes quis eorum obtineret triumphum, noluerunt prebere auxilium regi Karulo nec Christianis. Deo duce Christiani deuincerunt Saracenos (f. 117v) et hanc terram subdiderunt fidei Catholice. Et, facta subieccione huius patrie, dixerunt Christiani regi ut interficeret Christianos captiuous eo quia cum eo noluerunt debellare pro fide. Rex deliberauit habito consilio, cum ipse tenuit gentes armigeras et non poterant cultuare, ut sinirent illos captiuous Christianos viuere et ut captiui, sicut antea faciebant\(^1\) apud infideles, viuerent et nunch et in perpetuum apud Christianos, et iura ad quae tenebantur facere infidelibus facerent et Christianis, secundum Guillelmu. Alii dicunt quod fuerunt illi qui consenserunt in proditione comitis Iuliani et remanserunt apud infideles; in conquista fuerunt sicut captiuiati, secundum Enricum.

**Appendix 4**

Joan de Socarrats, *Joannis de Socarratis Ivrisconsulti Cathalani in tractatum Petri Alberti canonici Barchinonensis, de consuetudinibus Cathaloniae inter Dominos et Vasallos ... doctissima ac locupletissima commentaria* (Barcelona and Lyons, 1551), p. 501:

... cum ista iura intestiae & exorthiae ac etiam cugutiae sint de illis malis vsibus, in quibus homines proprii & solidi, de quibus fit mentio supra in c. habito tenentur eorum dominis, propterea quia isti sunt homines de redemptione, non in toto principatu Cathaloniae sed secundum d.c. habito. Et referunt antiqui sapientes quod ex eo dicta iura soluntur, & fuerunt introducta, ac dicti homines fiunt de redemptione, & eis ipsa seruitus fuit imposita: quia tempore proditionis Comitis Iuliani remanserunt in hac patria multi Christiani captiui, & Rex Carolus, dum acquirebat terram, quæ est sitra flumen Lupricati, indicauit Christianis captiuous quod ipse debeat habere bellum cum Saracenis certa die praefixa, quare rogabat eos quod insurgenter contra Saracenos, & die belli essent cum Christianis: Christiani vero captiuii dubitantes quis eorum obtineret, noluerunt praebere auxilium Regi Carolo, nec Christianis: Deo duce Christiani deuincerunt Saracenos, & hanc terram subdiderunt fidei orthodoxae, & facta subieccione huius terrae dixerunt Christiani regi ut interficeret Christianos captiuous, eo quia cum eis noluerant debellare pro fide. Rex autem deliberauit habito consilio quod cum ipsi essent gentes armigeras, & non poterant cultuare, ut siniret illos captiuous Christianos viuere, & sicut ut captiui viuebant apud infideles, ita viuerent & in perpetuum apud Christianos: & iura, ad quae tenebantur facere infidelibus, facerent & Christianis. Alii dicunt quod fuerunt illi, qui consenserunt in proditione comitis Iuliani, & remanserant apud infideles, & in conquestia & recuperaione huius patrie fuerunt sic captiuiati.

Vanderbilt University.

\(^1\) sicut antea faciebant] sint autem faciebat ms.
ÆPPLEDE GOLD:
AN INVESTIGATION OF ITS SEMANTIC FIELD

Pauline A. Thompson

But one October morning, at first drop
Of appled gold ...
(R. Browning, 'Red Cotton Night-Cap Country', 3.21-22)

BROWNING's use of the words appled gold in this little-known poem is proba-
ibly unique in post-Conquest English literature. In the Old English corpus,
the phrase æppleðe gold occurs only three times: at Elene 1259, The Phoenix
506 and Juliana 688, and the word æppleðe occurs only in this collocation.
The fact that all three works are poems, that the phrase twice (in Elene and
Juliana) occurs in or near the Cynewulfian signature, and that The Phoenix is
next to Juliana in The Exeter Book strongly suggests that the three poems are
linked in some way, and raises the possibility that æppleðe gold is the coinage of
a particular poet or school.

In Elene and Juliana, æppleðe gold is something given out in the winehall,
parallel in the poetic structure to maðmas 'treasures' (Elene) and beagas 'rings'
(Juliana); in The Phoenix it is consumed in the fires of the Last Judgment,
parallel to æhtigestreon 'possessions' and fraetwe 'treasures'. The phrase has long
perplexed students of Old English and there is still no consensus as to its
meaning. The difficulty, of course, lies with the word æppleðe and interpreters
usually opt for one of four possibilities: that the phrase means (a) golden apple-

1 A check of approximately thirty concordances to major English and American poets turned
up no further occurrences of the phrase appled gold and only two occurrences of the word
applied alone: Browning, 'Aristophanes' Apology: Heracles', 1. 3971 and Yeats, 'Island of
Statues', i.ii.60.
2 All three poems are in the Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records (ASPR), two (The Phoenix and
third (Elene) in vol. 2, ed. G. P. Krapp (New York, 1932), pp. 66-102. Other editions are referred
to below.
3 For this and other helpful suggestions I am grateful to Dr. Ashley Crandell Amos.
Dr. Antonette diPaolo Healey also offered helpful advice which was much appreciated.

shaped objects, e.g., a pomander;\(^4\) (b) embossed gold, or gold bosses;\(^4\) (c) gold rings or coins;\(^6\) or (d) golden objects having a dappled or streaky appearance.\(^7\) The first three derive from stressing the shape of an apple; the fourth derives partly from the concept of an apple's shape and partly from the color and texture of its surface appearance.\(^8\)

This article offers a new interpretation of this troublesome phrase: it rejects the idea that *æppled* is primarily a term referring to shape; it supports Blake's contention that *æppled* is more likely to refer to the colour or texture of the gold, but rejects his suggestion that it might mean "dappled gold, gold with streaks in it".\(^9\) It supports a suggestion offered but not pursued by R. Woolf (whose preferred interpretation is that *æppled* means 'round' because of its parallelism with *beagas* in *Juliana*) that *æppled* gold is the metaphorical equivalent of the common literal phrase *read* gold 'red gold'.\(^10\) The article further suggests that the heart of the metaphor may well lie not in the fruit which we commonly term 'apple' today, but in the *mala punic* 'pomegranate', the only referent in our extant corpus for OE *read æppel*.

There are several areas of study which should ideally play a part in solving the riddle of *æppled* gold: historical arboriculture, Anglo-Saxon metallurgy, archaeology and anthropology can provide us with helpful information on, respectively, species of apple trees, alloying of gold with silver and copper, golden artifacts recovered from the period and Anglo-Saxon color perception and labelling. But we can also gain much vital information from examining the semantic fields in Old English of the words *æppel* and *gold*, and this article limits itself to just such an investigation. Since the publication of *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*, this type of study can be more conclusive than ever before. All the collocations of *æppel* and *gold* in their various forms and compounds, with a few exceptions outlined below, are examined. To my knowledge nothing so far discovered in the fields of study just mentioned contradicts the conclusion reached in this investigation. On the contrary, there

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9 Blake, *The Phoenix*, p. 82.

is much evidence to support it, some of which will be discussed below. First, however, the statistical information from the *Concordance* is presented.

I

The following restrictions were imposed on the investigation. The nouns *æppel* and *gold* have been noted if they are modified by an adjective. Of particular interest are adjectives of appearance (especially hue, brightness and intensity) and shape, but all modifiers have been noted. Phrases which contain the key words unmodified, such as ‘payment in silver and gold’, have not been listed. Also noted are phrases in which other words are qualified by the key nouns (e.g., *wos æples ‘juice of apples’, gefrætwod golde ‘ornamented with gold’*). In addition, all compounds of *æppel* and *gold* are listed, except compounds of *æppel* which are place-names. Finally, occurrences of the adjectives *æpplede* and *gylden*, including compounds of the latter, are noted.

Since the *Concordance* is unlemmatized, the study of all the collocations and compounds of *æppel* and *gold* involves searching for every possible spelling and inflection, but because neither the spelling nor morphology is of primary interest in this study, the reporting of data has been simplified by using the spellings *æppel*, *gold* and *gylden* for the simplex form and in all compounds. Variant spellings can be located under *apel*, *apil*, *apl*, *apol*, *appel*, *appil*, *apul*, *æpel*, *æpl*, *æppyl*, *eapl*, *eapol*, *eappul*, *eapul*, *eapyl*, *epel*, *epl*, *epyl*, *golde* and *gilden*. The number of occurrences of collocations and compounds, except for the phrase *read gold* which stood out because of its unusual frequency, has not been noted. One citation is given for every reference; others, if they exist, can easily be located in the *Concordance*. The abbreviation system for texts is that used by the *Concordance* and can be decoded from its accompanying manual.  

The reader should note that the line numbers given refer to the line at which the sentence containing the cited word or phrase begins, not to the actual line containing the key word.

(i) The word *æppel* and its modifiers

(a) Adjectives relating to species of ‘apple’ (apple = fruit)

| affricanisc | pomegranate | CIGI 1 (Stryker) 4039 |
| brembel    | blackberry  | Lch II 64.1.2         |

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gecyrnlod</td>
<td>pomegranate</td>
<td>AldV 1 (Goossens) 3733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milisc</td>
<td>dates</td>
<td>C1G1 1 (Stryker) 4287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Adjectives relating to taste

<table>
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<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>lide</td>
<td>sweet</td>
<td>ÆGram 274.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sur</td>
<td>sour</td>
<td>Lch II(1) 61.1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surmelsc</td>
<td>sour-sweet</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 1.1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swete</td>
<td>sweet</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 1.1.17</td>
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(c) Miscellaneous adjectives

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gebräded</td>
<td>roasted</td>
<td>Lch II(1) 61.1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forbodene</td>
<td>forbidden</td>
<td>Phoen 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unselga</td>
<td>bringing misery</td>
<td>GenA.B 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lef</td>
<td>weak, damaged (eye)</td>
<td>Bo 38.121.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(d) Adjectives of color

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>grene</td>
<td>green</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 22.1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hwit</td>
<td>white, unripe</td>
<td>Med 1.1 (de Vriend) 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>read</td>
<td>reddish yellow</td>
<td>CP 15.95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swegle</td>
<td>bright, shiny</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 65.5.12</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(e) Adjectives of material and/or color

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gylden</td>
<td>of gold, golden</td>
<td>Mart 5 (Herzfeld-Binz) 1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AU29/A/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iren</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>MSol 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Phrases containing the word æppel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gor æpples</td>
<td>pulp?</td>
<td>MCharm 2 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hordera æppla</td>
<td>custody</td>
<td>PsGlI (Oess) 78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hyrdnesse æpplena</td>
<td>custody</td>
<td>PsGlII (Lindelœf) 78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppel lef</td>
<td>violet</td>
<td>OccGl 84 (Gough) 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>palmtreowa æppla</td>
<td>dates</td>
<td>LS 23 (Mary of Egypt) 2.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppel screada</td>
<td>parings</td>
<td>AntGl 2 (Kindschi) 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seawe æpples</td>
<td>sauce</td>
<td>Med 1.1 (devriend) 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wos æpples</td>
<td>juice</td>
<td>Med 3 (Gratton-Singer) 82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wudu æppla</td>
<td>crab apples</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 12.1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) The word æppel as the first element of a compound

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>æppelbearu</td>
<td>orchard</td>
<td>PPs 78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelbere</td>
<td>apple-bearing</td>
<td>C1G1 1 (Stryker) 3851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelcyn</td>
<td>kind of apple</td>
<td>Lch II(2) 2.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelcyrnel</td>
<td>pip</td>
<td>C1G1 1 (Stryker) 3849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelder</td>
<td>apple tree</td>
<td>AntGl 4 (Kindschi) 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppeldertun</td>
<td>orchard</td>
<td>C1G1 2 (Quinn) 440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
æppelfæt (-fæc)  
æppelfealu  
æppelsceal  
æppeltreow  
æppeltun  
æpelwin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>æppelfæt</td>
<td>dish</td>
<td>Abbo 1 (Zupitza) 423, 401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelfealu</td>
<td>bay, chestnut</td>
<td>Beo 2163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppelsceal</td>
<td>pithy film separating the seeds in a pomegranate</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 1186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æppeltreow</td>
<td>apple tree</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 2919</td>
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<tr>
<td>æppeltun</td>
<td>orchard</td>
<td>PsGIC (Wildhagen) 78.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>æpelwin</td>
<td>cider</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 3481</td>
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</table>

(iii) The word æppel as the second element of a compound

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>cisæræppel (ciris-)</td>
<td>cherry</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codeæppel (go[ø]d-)</td>
<td>quince</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 2762</td>
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<tr>
<td>cornæppel</td>
<td>pomegranate</td>
<td>AldV 1 (Goossens) 3732</td>
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<tr>
<td>córtæppel</td>
<td>cucumber</td>
<td>Num 11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ficeæppel (fisc-)</td>
<td>fig</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 1457</td>
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<td>fingereæppel</td>
<td>date</td>
<td>AldV 1 (Goossens) 3734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hunigæppel</td>
<td>round cake made with honey</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 4817</td>
</tr>
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<td>milscheæppel</td>
<td>date</td>
<td>CollGI 25 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>palmaæppel</td>
<td>date</td>
<td>CIGl 1 (Stryker) 1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weaxæppel</td>
<td>ball of wax</td>
<td>Sol II 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wudusurseæppel</td>
<td>crab apple</td>
<td>MCharm 2 64</td>
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</table>

(iv) The word æppel in adjective form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>æpplede gold</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Phoen 503, El 1256, Jul 683</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(v) The word gold and its modifiers

(a) Adjectives relating to appearance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Word</th>
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<tr>
<td>adeorcad</td>
<td>darkened</td>
<td>CP 18.133.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asuerartod</td>
<td>blackened</td>
<td>CP 18.133.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ðòrawenan</td>
<td>twisted</td>
<td>HIGl (Oliphant) 537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beorht</td>
<td>bright</td>
<td>PPS 67.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>read</td>
<td>reddish yellow</td>
<td>GenA,B 2405 + 19 other references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>readestan</td>
<td>superlative form of read</td>
<td>HomS 7.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scinende</td>
<td>shining</td>
<td>ÆLS (Pr Moses) 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scir</td>
<td>shining</td>
<td>Beo 1694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wunden</td>
<td>twisted</td>
<td>Beo 1192</td>
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</table>

(b) Adjectives relating to refinement, production and purity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agoten</td>
<td>cast, melted</td>
<td>ÆCHom II 38, 286.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asoden</td>
<td>refined</td>
<td>LawAGu 2</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### (c) Adjectives relating to value and quantity

<table>
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<td>æðelan</td>
<td>valuable</td>
<td>Rid 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brad</td>
<td>ample</td>
<td>Beo 3101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deorwurðan</td>
<td>costly</td>
<td>LS 29 (Nicholas) 468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dyre</td>
<td>precious</td>
<td>Ridd 49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>icge</td>
<td>rich? shining? native?</td>
<td>Beo 1107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>selost</td>
<td>best</td>
<td>Gen 2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unrime</td>
<td>unlimited</td>
<td>Beo 3010</td>
</tr>
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### (d) Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>arabie</td>
<td>Arabian</td>
<td>PsGlE (Harsley) 71.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aroden</td>
<td>prepared</td>
<td>Ch 355 (Birch 581) 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forhydde</td>
<td>hidden</td>
<td>CP 49.377.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hæðen</td>
<td>pagan</td>
<td>Beo 2275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eordan</td>
<td>of (or in) the earth</td>
<td>ÅEHom I 247</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### (vi) Phrases containing *golde*

#### (a) Appearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>blacunge golde</td>
<td>pallor, hue?</td>
<td>PsGlI (Lindeloef) 67.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hiwe golde</td>
<td>hue, appearance</td>
<td>Lch I (Herb) 182.2.1</td>
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</table>

#### (b) Weight

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gewihte golde</td>
<td>weight</td>
<td>ApT 6.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yndsan golde</td>
<td>ounce</td>
<td>Or 4 10 196.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (vii) Phrases containing *golde*

#### (a) Use and/or appearance

<table>
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<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>awritten golde</td>
<td>written</td>
<td>GDPref and 4(C)27.299.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>befong golde</td>
<td>encased</td>
<td>CP 22.171.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beweorcean golde</td>
<td>adorned</td>
<td>El 1022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bunden golde</td>
<td>bound</td>
<td>Beo 1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fah golde</td>
<td>ornamented</td>
<td>Beo 925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fættan golde</td>
<td>ornamented</td>
<td>Beo 2101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gefrætewod golde</td>
<td>ornamented</td>
<td>Jud 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gegiered golde</td>
<td>adorned</td>
<td>Ridd 26.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
glædra golde  brighter  MSol 487
geglenged golde  adorned  El 88
gyrlan of golde  apparel  ÆLS (Agatha) 35
gehrsten golde  adorned  Beo 303
gehyrsted golde  adorned  El 329
gerenod mid golde  adorned  CP 14.83.22
gescrid mid golde  clothed  ChronE (Plummer) 1086.55
siowode golde  trimmed  CIGl 3 (Quinn) 1960
getucode golde  bedecked  Ps 44.11
gewefen myd golde  woven  VSal 1 (Ass 16) 249
gewelgode golde  enriched  Alex 565
geworhton golde  adorned  ÆHom 21 41
gehyrsted golde  adorned  
gyrlan of golde  apparel  

(b) Other
bereafod golde  deprived  Beo 3014
foryldan golde  rewarded  Beo 1050

(viii) Nominal compounds with gold as first element

(a) General
goldæht  wealth in gold  Beo 2747

(b) Plants and animals
goldfinc  goldfinch  AntGl 2 (Kindschi) 1000
goldweard  guardian of gold (dragon)  Beo 3079
goldwyrt  heliotrope, marigold  AldÆ 2 (Nap) 36

(c) Persons
goldbloma  gold-bloom = marigold?  HomS 40.2 (BlHom 9) 10
goldgiefa  giver of gold  Sea 80
goldsnið  goldsmith  Ch 1497 (Whitelock-Ker) 50
goldœæof  thief of gold  LawAf 1 9.2
goldwine  a liberal prince  El 198

(d) Places
goldburh  a rich city? a town in which gold is distributed? a town ornamented with gold?  And 1654
goldhord  treasury  ÆCHom I, 4 62.1, AntGl 6  
(Kindschi) 655 (for ms. goldhold)  
Beo 714

goldsele  a hall in which gold is  
distributed? a hall  
adorned with gold?

(e) Materials

goldsæt  gold setting  Phoen 301

goldfel  gold leaf  ClGl 1 (Stryker) 680

golfrætwe  gold ornaments  ChristA,B,C 994

goldhoma  gold-adorned coat of  
mail  El 990

goldlefeor  gold leaf  HomS 7 134

goldmæðm  gold treasure  Beo 2413

goldmæstling  brass  ÆGI 8.98

goldora  gold ore  AldV 1 (Goossens) 1794

goldweorc  mass of gold  AldV 13.1 (Nap) 451 (for ms.  
goldweecd)

goldwlecan  golden ornament  HomS 14 (BlHom 4) 247

goldeweorc  goldwork  Mart 2.1 (Herzfeld-Kotzor) 404

(f) Other

goldfinger  ring finger  Law Abt 54.5

(ix) Adjectival compounds with gold as first element

goldbeorht  bright with gold  Ruin 31

goldbled[h]  gold-colored  AntGl 4 (Kindschi) 300

goldfah  adorned with gold  Beo 1799

goldfyld  covered with gold  ClGl 3 (Quinn) 1498

goldhilted  with a golden hilt  Rid 55 7

goldhladen  adorned with gold  Finn 13

goldhroden  adorned with gold  Beo 639

goldhwæte  gold-abounding?  
gold-bestowing?

goldspedig  wealthy in gold  Jul 38

goldtorht  bright with gold  OrW 76

goldgewevenum (?)  woven with gold  AldV 13.1 (Nap) 4297

goldgewevenum (?)  woven with gold  AldV 1 (Goossens) 4173

goldgewefer  splendidly adorned with  
gold  Beo 1880

goldwrecen  inlaid with gold  Ch 1537 (Whitelock 27) 6
The word gold as the second element of a compound

cynegold
fætgold
heafodgold
halsberigold
readgoldlæfer
smætegold
crown
beaten gold
crown
gold neck ornament
red gold leaf
pure gold
Phoen 605
Beo 1920
HomS 40.1 (Nap 49) 66
OccGl 77.2 (Riehle) 1
AldV 13.1 (Nap) 1070
CorpGl 2 (Hessels) 13.24

Words qualified by the adjective gylden

N.B. Words marked + in sections (xi) and (xii) are golden in color rather than material; words marked + + are metaphorically golden.

anlicnes
æppel
bænd
beag
beard*
béd
biemne
bul
burh
byrne
calic
candelsticca
cæg
cealf
clað
cleowen
idol
apple
band, crown
ring
beard
bed
trumpet
brooch, earring
castle, town
corset
chalice
candlestick
key
calf
cloth, covering
ball
ÆELS (Julian and Basilissa) 163
ÆHomM 14 (Ass 8) 15
ÆHom I, 26 368.34
ÆELet 1 (Wulfsige T) 58
ÆCHom I, 26 368.34
ÆCHom I, 29 434.3
MSol 63
ÆCHom I, 10 162.13
ÆCHom I, 10 162.13
HomU 38 (Nap 47) 53
Ex 32.8
CIGl 1 (Stryker) 4435
Mart 1 (Herzfeld-Kotzor) 14
(DE25/A/17)
Alex 101
Josh 7.20
Ex 32.2
Sol II 23
OccGl 49 (Zupitza) 25.13
Sol II 104
PsGl J (Oess) 44.14
VSal 1 (Ass 16) 251
feoh  pledge  AntGl 2 (Kindschi) 386
fetels  vessel  Ch 1503 (Whitelock 20) 14
finger  finger  Sol II 71
fyðerhama  wing-covering  ÆLS (Cecilia) 72
gad  goad, point  MSol 90
geat  gate  ChristA,B,C 249
gield  idol  Dan 200
gierela  garments  ÆLS (Agnes) 252
gimm  gem  Sat 647
god  god  Ex 32.31
godgeld  idol  Mart 5 (Herzfeld-Binz) 1416
(grima  mask, helmet  (JY19/A/5)
gyrd  staff  El 125
gyrdel  girdle  ÆCHom I 4 68.16
heafod  head  ÆLet 2 (Wulfstan 1) 31
heafodbeag  headband, crown  Sol II 46
healsmyne  necklace  HomS 24 (VercHom 1) 198
hilt  hilt  Gen 41.42
hiltsweord  swordhilt  Beo 1677
hneæpp  bowl  Bo 37.111.15
hors  horse  LS 29 (Nicholas) 468
(hrace  throat  Mart 2.1 (Herzfeld-Kotzor) 400
hrægl  raiment  (DE21/A/22)
hring  ring  Sol II 60
lac  lake  Mart 5 (Herzfeld-Binz) 1596
læfr  leaf  (AU02/B/8)
leaf  leaf  Or 5.10 234.8
leoht*  light  ÆHom 22.259
leon  lion  AntGl 4 (Kindschi) 571
leohtfato  lantern  Alex 111
loccas*  hair  HyGl 3 (Gneuss) 24.1
maðm  treasure  Ex 319
maðmfatu  costly vessel  Alex 366
mel  crucifix  LS 16 (Margaret Herbst) 151
mor  mountain  Met 21.20
muð**  mouth  ÆCHom II, 33 253.136
mynet  coin  Bede 2 16.150.11
nys  mice  HomS 4 (FoerstVercHom 9) 164
organ  organ  GDPref and 3(C) 179.1
pænig  penny  Mart 5 (Herzfeld-Binz) 1990
       (SE14/B/16)
       ÆHom 22.271
       Sol II 97
       ApT 51.20
(xii) The adjective *gylden* as part of a compound

(a) Nouns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gyldenbend</th>
<th>crown</th>
<th>Lev 8.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gyldenmelle</td>
<td>cup? dish?</td>
<td>Ch 812 (Birch 1187) 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gyldenwecc</td>
<td>gold mine</td>
<td>HIGl (Oliphant) 5131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gyldesester</td>
<td>gold vessel</td>
<td>Rec 27.1 (Thorpe) 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II

Before we make use of this material to discuss the most likely meaning of the phrase *cepplede gold*, some cautions (and some justifications) are in order. First, we know that the extant corpus of Old English represents a biased sample, so that any analysis of occurrences of words or phrases also has an inevitable bias. The bias is, of course, to religious works and certain secular works (like charters and medical recipes) likely to be preserved in monasteries. To some types of semantic investigation, e.g., the terminology of pagan worship, this might be a real handicap. In this case, however, there is sufficient variety in the contexts for each of the concepts being investigated, and a sufficiently large number of occurrences (e.g., ninety pages of concorded references to the word *gold* and its compounds alone), that the bias is probably not a serious disadvantage. Second, the corpus provides many more collocations for *gold* and *glylden* than it does for *ceppel*; nevertheless, fifty different phrases containing a form of the word *ceppel* is a significant number. It should be noted that, in order to minimize the problems of bias and imbalance, all collocations, not just a selected sample, are considered in this study. Third, these collocations are drawn from a wide variety of sources: prose and poetry; originals and translations (including glosses); works religious and secular, medical and legal, literary and historical. The broad base and significant size of the study might be thought to weight the evidence unacceptably because the phrase *cepplede gold* appears only in poetry. However, *ceppel* and *gold* are not specifically poetic words. Indeed, if we can judge from the number of times they occur in the extant corpus, they were no doubt part of common parlance, and the many different collocations in which they appear should throw light on this specialized poetic usage. In addition, the three contexts of the phrase *cepplede gold* point to the widely-held belief that gold was precious, lovely to receive and distressing to lose, a belief likely to be expressed in any genre. For these reasons, an examination of other contexts in which *gold* is mentioned is sure to be worthwhile. In spite of the dangers, it is well worth looking at the accumulated evidence; this evidence may not lead to utter certainty about the meaning of *cepplede gold*, but it can point the way to highly probable conclusions.
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from this material? Since three of the four previously suggested interpretations favor the idea that *æpplede* refers to the shape in which the gold was formed, evidence for this should be examined. Sections (i) (a) and (iii) suggest that when *æppel* means fruit in a generic sense, the fruit is usually, but not always, round (dates and cucumbers are exceptions). Section (i) (e) also indicates that *æppel* means something round: the *irennum aplum* are iron balls. A sentence from the *Leechdoms* (Lch I [Herb] 134.2.1) provides further evidence that the idea of forming things into apple shapes was quite familiar to the Anglo-Saxons: it instructs one to take certain herbs, ‘cnuca tosomne þam gelice þe þu anne æppel wyerce, syle þicgean þam untruman’ (‘pound them together as if you were making a ball, give to the invalid to eat’). In section (i) (e) is the only reference to golden apples in the corpus: Herod delivered the head of John the Baptist to Salome on a dish, ‘forðæm þe waes kyninga dohtra þæaw, þonne hi plegodon mid gyldenum aplum on selfrenum disce’ (‘because it was the custom of kings’ daughters that they played with golden apples on silver dishes’). Whether the golden apples are to be understood as apples made out of gold (as in the Greek myths) or as apples the color of gold (as in ‘Golden Delicious’) is not clear. It is very unlikely, because of the analogy between apples and John the Baptist’s head, that the phrase means ‘embossed apples’.

In sections (v) to (x) there is no evidence for any spherical gold object. In fact, in these six sections only nine words (*wynen, yre, goldfæt, goldfel, goldlæfer, goldhilted, cynegold, heafodgold and halsberigold*) give any idea of the shapes into which gold was formed. Section (xi), which contains 103 words modified by the adjective *gylden*, yields only three spherical shapes: *æppel* (see above), *cleowen* ‘ball’ and *heafod* ‘head’. It seems likely that the *heafod* (of Pater Noster in Sol II 46) is of gold material, but whether the *gylden cleowen* which the Romans saw (Mart I [Herzfeld-Kotzor] 14 [DE25/A/17]) were of gold metal or of gold color is not easy to deduce. On analogy with the *firen cleowen* ‘balls of fire’ in the same sentence, they could be balls made out of gold, but in either case they do not appear to have been man-made.

It is clear from this analysis that the corpus contains the concept of ‘golden apple’ and that of forming ball-shaped objects, metal and otherwise. What is not

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12 OED, s.v. *apple* states that apple can refer to any fruit, and has been used ‘from the earliest period ... with the greatest latitude’. It is conceivable, even if unlikely, that if *æpplede gold* means ‘gold in the shape of an apple’ the gold could be cucumber-shaped!

13 These are presumably cast iron; the word *agoten* (section [v]) is the Old English word for ‘cast’, but no examples of its being used in a context of forming apple shapes are recorded. (Horses, gods, a chariot and a sword are *agoten*.)

14 This is possibly a reference to Pr 25:11: ‘mala aurea in lectis argenteis’ (‘golden apples on silver beds’), but there is no mention there of a custom that kings’ daughters played with them.
clear is whether the word ‘golden’ refers to color or material; further, if it does refer to material, the contexts give no clues that the Anglo-Saxons themselves made balls out of gold: the golden balls and golden apples mentioned are both in An Old English Martyrology and form part of anecdotes set in first-century Palestine, far removed from anything Anglo-Saxon.15

Evidence in the literature for æpplede gold meaning ‘embossed gold’ is slight. Sections (v) (b) and (x) contain the only words to describe the process of refining and working in gold. Asoden, claene, smæte and hluttor all mean ‘refined’; sæted means ‘hammered’ or ‘beaten’ into gold leaf. There is nothing to suggest that any of these words means æpplede in Holthausen’s sense of embossed into apple shapes.16

The third possibility is that æpplede gold means golden objects of circular shape, like rings or coins. What evidence is there for this? Section (vii) (a) contains yre gold; goldfinger (viii) (f), cynegold (x), heafodgold (x) and halsberigold (x) are all ring-shaped. Section (xi) adds to this bænd, beag, bul, cynehelm, dalc, earhring, earspint, gyrdel, heafodbeag, healsmyne, hring, mynet, pentig, sigila and swurbeah; and section (xii) (a) provides the compound gyldenbend. There are, then, twenty-one words indicating that gold was made into ring or coin shapes (assuming the brooches are all round like the Kentish Sarre brooch). Several denote items of personal adornment such as one might expect to be handed out in the wine hall. This significant number of words lends some support for the hypothesis that æpplede gold might mean coin- or ring-shaped gold, and the fact that one of the three occurrences of the collocation is structurally parallel to beagas in Juliana lends added weight.

The chief difficulty in accepting this interpretation is that, apart from Juliana 688, we have no basis in Old English for connecting any form of the word æppel with anything that is merely circular rather than spherical. Of all the apple-shapes listed in sections (i) to (iii), only dates and cucumbers are not spherical – and they are not circular either. The possibility that æpplede might mean ‘circular’ is based on the supposition that æpplede is in some way related to Teutonic, French and Russian forms of ṭapple-grey, rendered in ModE as ‘dapple-grey’.17 There are several problems here: the connection between dapple-grey (which is first recorded c. 1400) and the Teutonic forms of ṭapple-grey is mediated by a compound in English, although it is in the OED as an obsolete form. See The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford, 1966), s.v. dappled.

15 ‘The idea of a golden apple-shaped object is completely alien to Anglo-Saxon, and indeed Germanic, archeology’, according to Blake, The Phoenix, p. 82.

16 Gradon cites the Sutton Hoo helmet as an example of embossed work. But this helmet is Swedish sheet-iron work overlaid with bronze leaf and only a small amount of gilding. It is decorated with patterning from Swedish dyes. See R. Bruce-Mitford, Aspects of Anglo-Saxon Archeology. Sutton Hoo and Other Discoveries (London, 1974), pp. 198-99.

17 See OED for details of cognate forms. Onions claims that apple-grey has no standing as a compound in English, although it is in the OED as an obsolete form. See The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford, 1966), s.v. dappled.
**Applede Gold: Its Semantic Field**

Grey is not, for want of data, established; nor is there any equivalent for them in Old English. Further, the compounds of apple in all the languages referred to above have a strong association not only with horses but with the color grey. They, like the OE color terms fealu, blanca, dunn, and græg, form part of what Nigel Barley refers to as a ‘lexical sub-set’ of words ‘originally restricted to horses’. The appearance of OE applede uncompounded, always with the word gold and never in a context of horses, suggests that there is little, if any, connection between the Continental developments and the use of applede in Old English.

The last possibility to be investigated is that applede gold is a phrase indicating color or texture rather than shape. This is the interpretation favored by N. F. Blake and is also partly based on the assumed analogy between applede gold and ModE apple-green, apple-grey, ON apal-grár. Now it has been argued already that this connection is so uncertain that it is risky to suggest that applede means ‘circular’ on the basis of it; it is equally problematic to suggest, as does Blake, that applede means ‘dappled’ or ‘streaky’ from the same evidence. However, there still remains the option that applede might refer to color without its having to mean ‘dappled’. It is for this possibility that the corpus provides the most evidence.

The color term which we are most likely to apply to gold is ‘yellow’, but OE geolit is not once used to describe gold. The only color term applied is read and it occurs more than twenty times in our extant corpus. Although Mead suggested that the adjective read was used of gold because their gold was darker

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18 Woolf comments: ‘Some association with the later “dapple-grey” seems inescapable, but the meaning of the latter is so uncertain (“streaked like an apple”, “spotted like a pool”...) and its relation to ON apalgrár, OHG aphelgra etc. so unclear, that it does not elucidate the OE meaning’ (Juliana, p. 88).

19 R. Barnes argues that the word appelfealu, applied to horses in Beo 2163, means ‘dappled dun’. He assumes the apple/dapple connection to have existed in OE, and that the different color in the second half of the compound (fealu, not græg) is insignificant. See his ‘Horse Colors in Anglo-Saxon Poetry’, Philological Quarterly 39 (1960) 510-12.


21 It is worth noting that although the use of the word ‘dappled’ to describe gold is classed under texture and appearance rather than shape, the idea has its root in the concept of color rather than shape, though the precise meaning of Vigfusson’s apalgrár, viz., ‘dapple-grey, i.e. apple-grey, having the streaky colour of an apple’, is hard to fathom: apples are never grey (the ‘grey’ of ‘dapple-grey’ comes from horse, not apple), and the link between ‘apple-grey’ and the streaky colour of an apple is far from clear. If, however, the idea of ‘gold with streaks in it’ is intended to be rooted in the concepts of both color and shape, it is difficult to see what the connection between ‘streaky’ and ‘dappled’ is: streaks are linear markings, not circular. It is also difficult to see how ‘gold with streaks in it’ could be a laudatory description.
in color than ours and ‘contained a considerable alloy of copper’, this is not true of all, or even most, of the Anglo-Saxon gold which survives. The explanation for the epithet *read* is more likely to be that suggested by Barley, that OE *read* is not our ‘red’ but fits half-way between red and yellow on the Modern English hue axis. But OE *read* when applied to gold is not simply a color term: the word is also a term of the highest praise used to describe the purest gold. A few illustrations will make this clear. Compare the following two glosses:

obrizum, i. aurum optimi coloris / smæte gold, platum (AldV 13.1 [Nap] 3534)
aurum obrizum / read gold (AntGl 4 [Kindschi] 570).

The implication is clear: gold ‘of the best color’ is ‘pure’ gold; ‘pure’ gold is *read*. In Met 19.5 ‘gold daet read’ renders what in the original Latin of Boethius is simply *aurum*; the context, in which it is parallel to ‘wlitige gimmas’ (‘shining gems’), suggests that the Old English translator added ‘daet read’ to heighten the literary effect of his rhetorical question. One final example occurs in an

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22 W. F. Mead, ‘Color in Old English Poetry’, *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 14 (1899) 195. Recent analysis of Anglo-Saxon jewellery shows, in fact, a very low copper content, usually under 3 per cent. The silver content in the Sutton Hoo jewellery ranges from just under 2 per cent up to almost 21 per cent; silver is therefore the chief alloying metal. The sword-pommel in that find is 97 per cent pure gold. See R. Bruce-Mitford, *The Sutton Hoo Ship-Burial* 2 (London, 1978), chap. 10, sect. 8.

23 Barley, ‘Old English Colour Classification’, 19. The compound *appelfealu* used of horses in *Beowulf* 2163 is interesting in this regard. Although Barnes, ‘Horse Colors in Anglo-Saxon Poetry’, argues that it means ‘dappled dun’, the more widely accepted meaning for the compound is ‘bay’ or ‘chestnut’. This definition seems to have arisen from combining the meaning ‘reddish-yellow’ for *appel* and ‘tawny’, ‘glossy brownish-yellow’ for *fealu*.

Actually, the word *red* to describe reddish-yellow objects is by no means limited to the Old English period. Even at the end of the twentieth century we still speak of *redheads* and *red cheddar* and mean something reddish-yellow. Nor is the use of the term red to describe gold limited to the English language. In addition to its frequent use in Icelandic poetry, it turns up in less likely places. For example, the late twelfth-century French writer, Petrus Riga, claims: ‘Omne quod est rubeum nomen non impetrat auri’ (‘not everything red achieves the name of gold’) (Aurora. Petri Rigae Biblia versificata, ed. P. E. Beichner, 2 vols. [Notre Dame, Ind., 1965], 1.360: ‘Liber Danielis’, 1.457). A century later, a Danish writer who taught in France, Johannes Dactus, states: ‘... verbi gratia in cognitionem auri deuenimus per notiora sicut per sensibilia, puta per pondus, per colorum rubeum, etc.’ (for example we obtain knowledge of the meaning of gold through more familiar things, say, things which can be perceived by the senses, e.g., by its weight, by its red color) *Uohannis Doci Opera*, ed. A. Otto, 1.1 [Copenhagen, 1955], ‘Summa gramatica’, p. 69.7-9). My thanks to Professors A. G. Rigg and David L. Mosher for these references.

24 The speaker asks ‘hweaper ge willen on wudu secan gold ðæt reade on grennum triowum’ (‘whether you would seek in a wood for gold that is “red” on green trees’). He continues, ‘Ic wat swa peah ðæt hit nan witena ðider ne sceæþ, for þæm hit ðær ne werþ, ne on wingeardum wlitige gimmas’ (‘I know, however, that no wise man would seek it there, for it would not be there, nor would glittering gems be in vineyards’).
Ælfrian homily: ‘ealle þæs goldsmiðas secgad þæt hi næfre ær swa clæne gold ne swa read ne gesawon’ (all the goldsmiths say that they have never seen such pure nor such “red” gold) (ECHom I 4, 64.8). In all these examples, read gold, far from being alloyed with a high percentage of copper, is specifically or by implication the equivalent of pure gold.

A curious interchange of two superlative adjectives in two related Old English homilies leads to a further deduction about the meaning of read: not only is it the purest gold, but it is also gold with a brilliant sheen. In one homily is the phrase ‘readestan godwebbe and ... beorhtestan golde’ ("reddest" fabric and ... brightest gold) (HomS 40.1 [Nap 49] 265) and in the other ‘readestan golde and ... beorhtestan godwebbe’ (HomS 7 128). If these adjectives are truly interchangeable in this context, we learn that read, when applied to gold or fine clothing, carries a connotation of brilliance. This is further illustrated in another homily: the phoenix who, as king of all birds, is always described in extravagant terms, ‘gliten[æ] swa read gold’ (‘glistens like “red” gold’) (HomU 17.1 [Kluge] E 48). Should any doubt remain that the concept of brilliance is implicit in the word read, three glosses to Aldhelm’s De virginitate put the case beyond doubt: rubentis micantis ‘reddish gleaming’, flaventis fulgentis rubentis ‘golden yellow glittering reddish’ and, most telling of all, rubentis i. micantis ‘reddish, that is, gleaming’ are all glossed simply by reades (AldV 1 [Goossens] 539, 1795; AldV 13.1 [Nap] 454).

I have spent some time outlining the importance of the term read as applied to gold because I am convinced that it is this term which provides us with the clue to the meaning of æpplede gold. For this word read is also applied to the word æppel (from which the adjective æpplede is probably derived). Read is applied to æppel four times in the extant corpus. The collocation occurs twice in King Alfred’s Old English translation of Gregory’s Pastoral Care (CP 15.95.1 and 15.95.4) and twice in glosses to Aldhelm’s De virginitate (AldV 1 [Goossens] 547 and AldV 13.1 [Nap] 463).

What makes this a clue of surprising interest is that in none of these instances does the word æppel refer to the fruit which we commonly designate by the term ‘apple’ – ‘the round firm fleshy fruit of a Rosacious tree (Pyrus Malus)’ (OED). The reade appla of the Pastoral Care and the De virginitate are pomegranates: mala punica. In the

25 See J. Wright and E. M. Wright, Old English Grammar, 3rd edition (Oxford, 1925), sect. 624. This hypothesis saves having to posit a verb *æplian.

26 Once in a medical recipe a leech is instructed to ‘nim ... hwitne æppel þe þonne gyt ne readige’ (‘take a white “apple” that is not yet ripe’) (Med 1.1 [de Vriend] 90). In this case the æppel is a mulberry or blackberry.

27 Both of the manuscripts which contain these glosses were from Abingdon originally, the glosses in Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 146 (edited by Napier) being copied from those in Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 1650 (Van den Gheyn 1520) (edited by Goossens).
Pastoral Care the reade appla are pomegranates embroidered around the hem of the high priest's robe. The mala punica, glossed read appla, of the De virginitate occur in the introductory section of the work (chap. 9), in a passage which compares silver with gold, marble with a red gem, wool with taffeta and silk, and pomegranates with dates. (Actually, Aldhelm prefers dates to pomegranates because they are sweeter, but the Latin glossator of the manuscript, now Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 1650 [Van den Gheyn 1520] pronounces them dulce multum and adds that they are 'magnum quasi duas pugnas aliquotiens' ['sometimes as big as two fists'].)

Because the occurrences of reade appla that have come down to us always mean 'pomegranates', it is possible that the pomegranate is the fruit which lies at the heart of the metaphor applede gold. There are some cautions necessary in accepting this interpretation, but there are also some good reasons for doing so. One drawback is that four occurrences of a term is not a large number from which to draw conclusions. We cannot be certain that the fruit Pyrus Malus was not also, at least in some variety, fit to be called read. On the other hand, the terms mala granata, mala punica and the gloss genus pomorum suggest that the ancient world thought apples and pomegranates belonged to the same family; that the Anglo-Saxons used the term read as equivalent to punica suggests that read would distinguish a pomegranate from an ordinary apple.

A second objection might claim that Anglo-Saxons would probably have had no immediate knowledge of pomegranates, since they are a tropical fruit. This is an interesting but ultimately unimportant objection. Both Aldhelm and Alfred travelled to Rome and may have seen pomegranates on their travels; the glossators, who term them also affricanisc, gecynlode and corn as well as reade appla, also seem to be familiar with them, but both Aldhelm and Alfred (following Gregory) give a detailed description of the fruit, and the glossators' knowledge might be book-learned.28 Whether the knowledge of pomegranates is first- or secondhand, it spans a period of about 400 years, from the late seventh to the late eleventh centuries, from Aldhelm to the latest glossator, with Alfred's translation of the Pastoral Care at the midpoint. If the pomegranate lies at the heart of the metaphor applede gold, it matters not whether its creator had ever seen the original fruit: a pomegranate of the imagination is as useful a source for metaphor as one held in the hand. With either the De virginitate or the Pastoral Care to hand, a not unlikely eventuality, a poet would have had adequate stimulation for his creative imagination.

There are other arguments in favor of this interpretation. First, although to our way of thinking pomegranates are frequently 'redder' than gold, the Anglo-

28 There is also a description of pomegranates in Isidore, Etymologiae 17.7.6.
Saxons did not hesitate to class them in the same color category, and there is no doubt that they share a considerable similarity in appearance, in sheen and in shading. Perhaps no other fruit could so easily be mistaken for a 'golden apple'.

Second, the contexts in the De virginitate and Pastoral Care in which pomegranates are mentioned have an exotic flavor. In the former they belong with precious metals and jewels, royal purple taffeta and silken robes. In the latter they are embroidered in purple and crimson threads at the hem of the high priest's robe, alternating with bells of pure gold; the garment is worn with an ephod and pectoral of the same rich colors interwoven with gold strips and adorned with precious stones set in gold mesh (Exod 39). The association of pomegranates with gold and other luxuries suggests that the fruit is as romantic as gold itself and a metaphor which links the two is well suited to the exotic tenor of Juliana, Elene and The Phoenix.

There is one further reason why an interpretation of æpplede gold which stresses surface appearance rather than shape is preferable. Although in Juliana æpplede gold is parallel to beagas, the immediate contexts of the other two poems in which it occurs place it parallel to māpmas (Elene 1259) and to æhtgestreon and frætwe (Phoenix 506). These three words are non-specific words meaning 'treasures' or 'possessions'. For this reason, an interpretation of æpplede gold which stresses the luxurious appearance of the finest possible gold, no matter what its shape, is preferable. What are given out over the beorsete 'beer bench' in the winsele 'wine hall' (Juliana) and medohealle 'mead hall' (Elene) are the lord's choicest riches, whose actual shapes are far less significant than the nature and quality of the materials with which they are made; what the flame destroys at the Last Judgment (Phoenix) are all man's earthly possessions, even the most precious.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the only person known to have made use of the phrase in the last millennium was so steeped in classical imagery that he used it to mean 'golden apple'. It is probable that Browning's phrase is an independent coinage; it is also probable that the appled gold of 'Red Cotton Night-Cap Country' is as far removed in meaning as it is in time from its puzzling ancestor.

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29 Section (xi) notes many different shapes into which gold might be formed, but it is important to realize that what dictated the manufacture in gold of all these different objects was not so much the shape into or on to which the gold could be worked, but the desire to make any object, no matter what its shape, into an objet d'art. Thus, although the form of a golden brooch, calf or thread is important, it is the color and brilliance of their appearance that give them their ultimate value and significance.
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE RENEWAL OF PHILosophICAL AND SCIENTIFIC STUDIES IN THE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY: THE CAPITA 150 OF GREGORY PALAMAS

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The Capita 150 are well known to students of Byzantine theology for their summary statement of the doctrinal teaching of Gregory Palamas on the question of the divine substance and the uncreated energies; and for many years this was one of the very few published works of the great hesychast doctor. Nevertheless, a large section from the early part of the work has been almost universally ignored.

In mediaeval studies generally and in Byzantine studies particularly, there has been a tendency to relegate theology to the narrowly restricted domain of a specialty. Byzantinists have indeed begun to appreciate the value of saints' lives for the understanding of Byzantine culture, although the current sociological and anthropological reading of these texts often fails to recognize that these are, first and foremost, theological documents. Few Byzantinists ever take the trouble to read works of what might be called 'high theology' and fewer still have shown any enthusiasm for wading through the many weighty tomes written by the Palamite and anti-Palamite theologians. The blame for this state of affairs should be placed largely on the shoulders of the theological specialists who have not communicated and interpreted the importance of their specialty to the larger community of Byzantinists. Confessional concerns have been too much of a preoccupation, to the detriment of the discipline of theology.

The Capita 150 of Gregory Palamas is a good example of this situation. The focus of scholarly interest has been concentrated on the final two thirds of the work (c. 64-150) where the principal concern was the controversial issue of the
ineffable distinction between the divine substance and the uncreated energies. The early chapters were passed over by theologians because their subject matter was natural science and philosophy or non-controversial theological discussion. Byzantinists have paid little attention to the *Capita 150* because it is a theological work and the early chapters appeared to show no intrinsic scientific or philosophical merit.

In the area of theology the result has been a failure to appreciate the key role played by theological anthropology in Palamite doctrine, especially in its mature form in the *Capita 150*. On the other side, Byzantinists have missed an opportunity to observe and analyze the interaction between Christian theology and the renewed interest in the Hellenic science and philosophy of antiquity. The general monastic reaction against this profane wisdom has long been acknowledged by Byzantinists. Unfortunately, this monkish reaction has become a cliché, rather than a phenomenon worthy of further exploration.

Palamas opened his discussion of profane wisdom on the occasion of his controversy with Barlaam the Calabrian. However, both in the *Triads in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts*, written at that time, and, later, in the *Capita 150* Palamas was replying not only to Barlaam’s use of the profane sciences but also to the more widespread contemporary interest in Hellenic wisdom. To some extent, Barlaam was merely an example of how seriously one could go wrong. Nor was Gregory’s response an absolute rejection of the secular sciences; he did in fact allow them a place, albeit a limited one. Finally, Palamas had something very positive to say about man and the human endeavour. Palamism cannot justly be qualified as anti-humanist.

This paper proposes to analyze in detail the most important features of the first twenty-nine chapters of the *Capita 150* in order to determine the specific Hellenic theories Palamas objected to, the nature of his response, his own use of Aristotelian philosophy, and his understanding of the limits of natural knowledge and the superiority of spiritual gnosis. Gregory’s attention was ultimately directed towards the pseudo-sciences of astrology and Chaldean philosophy which were currently major interests of Nikephoros Gregoras. Finally, a short text of Nikolaos Kabasilas offers an opportunity for comparison of the views of two major fourteenth-century Byzantine theologians on the subject of profane learning.

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2 I have treated this subject in some detail in a forthcoming article.
The early part of the *Capita 150* presents two *De mundo* accounts, the Hellenic version and the Christian one. The treatment of subjects follows the old definition of cosmos as ‘a system composed of heaven and earth and the natures contained in them’. Thus, Palamas covered the areas of the celestial sphere, then the terrestrial sphere, and finally, the topic of rational nature. The first two chapters serve as a sort of preface where Palamas affirmed that the world had a beginning, depends on a First Cause, and also will have an end, or rather, a transformation. In his discussion of the celestial sphere (c. 3-7) Palamas was primarily concerned with the issue of the World Soul. According to the Hellenes (whom the text does not identify), the heaven revolves by the nature of the World Soul. This soul serves as the creator, guide and controller of the entire sensible world, of our souls, and indeed of all souls. It has its generation from Mind, which in turn is distinct from the Highest One or God.

In his refutation, Gregory evoked Aristotelian tenets to demonstrate the absurdity of the Hellene position and himself proposed a more or less Aristotelian account as an acceptable alternative. His principal sources were Aristotle’s *De caelo* and the *De anima*. For example, Palamas quoted the commonplace definition for the soul: ‘The soul is the actuality of a body possessed of organs and having the potentiality for life.’ He then pointed out that neither the heaven, nor the earth, nor the elements in them are possessed of organs. And if they were, that would make them composite, whereas Aristotle asserted that the elements (and heaven itself, according to Palamas) are simple bodies. Since the heaven has no member or part to serve as an organ, it can have no potentiality for life and therefore does not possess a soul.

Although the celestial body could not be moved by the nature of some mythical World Soul, Palamas did allow that it was moved by its own nature. It is the highest and lightest body, encompassing all other bodies and leaving only the void beyond itself. The celestial body thus turns back upon itself in a revolving motion and does so by its own nature.

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6 Palamas referred to the World Soul with the terms κοσμική ψυχή, οφέλως ή παγκόσμιος ψυχή, and once as κοσμική ψυχή και ἄστροφρος.


8 This is based on Aristotle, *De anima* 2.1 (412a27-28 and 412b5-6).

9 Cf. ibid. 1.2 (268b26-29), 3.1 (298a29-31), 3.8 (306b9-11).

10 Aristotle, *De caelo* 1.3 (270b20-25).

11 ibid. 1.9 (278b8-279a12).

12 ibid. 2.3 (268a11-13).
Behind this there is of course a theological concern: 'The only rational soul is the human one, which is not celestial but supercelestial, not because of its location but by its own nature, inasmuch as it is an intelligent substance' (c. 4).\(^{13}\)

In chapters 8-14 Palamas turned to the topic of the terrestrial sphere. After a transitional chapter on the winds in which he reiterated his denial of the World Soul (c. 8), Gregory launched an attack on the Hellenic theory regarding the habitable zones of the earth. According to this theory there are two temperate zones and, when each of these is divided in half, the result is four habitable zones on earth and four races of men. Gregory's description of the earth sphere is close to the classical one, although there is some confusion of terminology. It is the notion of four distinct and separated races of men which offended Palamas. The problem would seem to lie with his sense of the uniqueness of man and of God's plan of salvation.

At this point, however, Palamas did not resort to theological arguments. Instead, he produced a rather unusual cosmography of his own. His starting point was a quotation from the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De mundo*: 'There are five elements, located in five spherical regions, the lesser element always being encompassed by the greater, earth by water, water by air, air by fire, fire by aether, and this constitutes the world.'\(^{14}\) Because of their different densities, the spheres enclose one another with earth at the centre and then water, air, fire and aether, as one moves outwards. Since the water sphere is larger than the earth sphere, they both cannot have the same centre, or else the entire surface of the earth would be covered with water, which is obviously not the case. The centre of the sphere of water must in fact lie below that of the earth.

Palamas then proceeded to determine the exact mathematical relationship of the two spheres. The one habitable region on earth occupies one tenth of its surface: that is, the earth has five zones and half of one of these is habitable. If the water sphere, then, is fitted around the earth onto this tenth part of the surface, the diameter of the exterior sphere will be twice that of the interior sphere, and the exterior sphere will be eight times the size of the interior one and will have its centre at the lowest extremity of the interior sphere. This is aptly illustrated by the diagram that Palamas included in his text for the convenience of his readers.\(^{15}\) In reference to this diagram he indicated that the diameter of the outer circle (or sphere) is twice that of the inner one. Palamas then explained that there are mathematical proofs to show that the sphere with twice the diameter is eight times the size of the sphere with half the diameter. It

\(^{13}\) i.e., νομίζειν οὐκέτα.
\(^{14}\) *De mundo* 3 (393a1-4). Palamas altered the text slightly.
\(^{15}\) PG 150.1129.
follows then that an eighth part of the water sphere is merged with the earth sphere, thus explaining the existence of springs, rivers, seas and marshes.

Although it is difficult to be certain about the source for Gregory’s mathematical proof, one need look no further than Euclid’s *Elements* 12.18 for one possibility. Euclidean geometry was a standard subject in Byzantine schools and was taught as part of the *quadrivium*.

Palamas, therefore, concluded that “besides the world-region we live in there is no other” (c. 14). From this conclusion he moved on to treat rational nature, focusing at first on man’s faculties of knowing (c. 15-20). Behind this, Gregory’s purpose was to underscore the inadequacies of the means of natural knowledge at man’s disposal and the corresponding potentiality for error in any purely human science. Here lies the real problem of the Hellenic *De mundo* speculations.

Bodies in the material world are intimately associated with their forms and these in turn produce impressions or images in the five senses. At this point the impressions are still inseparable from the corporeal forms, but the imaginative faculty receives these images and separates them from the material order. These images can then remain in the imagination even when bodies are no longer present. Finally, the mind ponders the images present in the imagination and formulates thoughts. However, because of the presence of the passions, error is an almost ineluctable possibility.

But there is yet a further problem with the knowledge attained through the ordinary human faculties. Even if such knowledge succeeds in avoiding error, it has serious limitations: it is purely natural and cannot attain the things of the Spirit. To illustrate his point Gregory presented the Christian version of the *De mundo* account in chapters 21 to 29. Denying the Hellenic belief in the pre-existence of matter, Palamas asserted the doctrine of an *ex nihilo* creation in six days. But in reference to the opening words of Genesis (‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’) he explained that all things were created *at once* (*ad proo*).

Heaven and earth were created as ‘a sort of all-containing receptacle of matter, bearing all things in potency’ (c. 21). The work of creation was then

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17 Gen 1:1. For *ad proo* see Basil, *Hexaemeron* 1.6 (PG 29.16c-17a) (SC 26bis): ἕ τάχα διὰ τὸ ἀκατάκτων καὶ ἄφρουν τῆς δημιουργίας εἰρήται τό, ‘Εν ἄρχῃ ἐποίησεν, ἐπιείκει ἀμερές τι καί ἀκατάστατον ἄρχῃ ... ἦν τούτων διδαχθέν μία τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ θεοῦ ἄχρονως συνορεύονταί τὸν κόσμον, εἰρήται τό, ‘Εν ἄρχῃ ἐποίησεν ... Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς, τούτισσον, ἀδήμος καὶ ἐν ὄλγῳ. In this last sentence Basil quotes Aquila’s version of Gen 1:1. Compare Gregory of Nyssa, *Hexaemeron* (PG 44.72ab).

one of ordering and adorning the universe: 'God established these things and their proportion to one another in due order so that the all may truly be called the cosmos' (c. 23).

The superiority of spiritual gnosis in the *De mundo* doctrine becomes most evident when rational creation comes under consideration. It was a key concern of Palamas in the first sixty-three chapters of the *Capita 150* to reaffirm the high dignity of man and the privilege of his place before God. According to c. 24, the entire sensible world was created for the sake of man and to him was given the stewardship over all creatures. As body and soul, man belongs not just to this material world but also to the spiritual realm. Created in the image of the triune God, man is capable of both knowing and receiving God. So high is the dignity of human nature that it was deemed worthy of being united to God in a single hypostasis in the Incarnation (c. 24). Chapters 24 and 30-63 are devoted, first of all, to a lengthy and very significant elaboration of the doctrine of the dignity of man and its foundation in the divine image in which he was created, and secondly, to man's quest for healing and for the rediscovery of his dignity together with the restoration of the likeness of God in the soul.

Gregory's valuation of natural intellectual pursuits was by no means entirely negative, even though he insisted that the Christian was obliged to recognize these as purely natural attainments. Among the various subjects of *tà φυσικά* discussed in the *Capita 150* Palamas allotted a certain prominence to astronomical phenomena. For example, in chapter 19 he described the process of natural knowledge in terms of the investigation of certain phenomena related to the sun and the moon:

On the basis of sense perception, imagination and intellection you could arrive at an understanding that the moon gets its light from the sun, and that the moon's orbit is quite near the earth and is much below that of the sun: that is, if you should gaze with your senses at the moon which follows upon the setting sun and which is illuminated in that small part which is turned towards the sun and which then recedes little by little in the following days and is illuminated to a greater extent until the process becomes reversed, and in turn, as the moon little by little draws near the other part, it gradually diminishes in its light and moves away from the place where it originally received illumination.

In the following chapter (c. 20) he listed other astronomical phenomena that can be investigated through natural gnosis:

We know not only the phenomena of the moon but also those of the sun, both the solar eclipses and their nodes, the parallaxes of the other celestial planets and the distances separating them and the manifold configurations formed thereby, and the phenomena of the heavens in general.
Such detailed references to astronomical science are found not only in the *Capita 150* but elsewhere.\textsuperscript{19}

Although Palamas attributed no evil *per se* to the study of natural science and astronomy, he hastened to point out that the Hellenes failed to discern the true order of the universe and so fell into error. Not only have they denied the supreme sovereignty of the Creator, but they dishonoured our nature by their refusal to recognize man’s high place in the order of creation. They have endowed the insensate stars with intelligence and worship them as superior and inferior gods, entrusting them with dominion over the universe (c. 26). In chapter 28 Palamas went still further:

But natural scientists, astronomers, and those who boast of knowing everything have been unable to understand any of the things just mentioned on the basis of their philosophy and have considered the ruler of the intelligible darkness and all the rebellious powers under him not only superior to themselves but even gods and they honoured them with temples, offered them sacrifices, and submitted themselves to their most destructive oracles by which they were fittingly much deluded through unholy holy things and defiling purifications, through those who inspire abominable presumption and through prophets and prophetesses who lead them very far astray from the real truth.

In chapter 29, when he wished once again to emphasize the superiority of spiritual gnosis and saving knowledge, Gregory yet again referred to astronomical studies as a primary preoccupation of the Hellenes. Knowing our weakness and searching for healing stands far superior to all their investigations into the magnitudes of the stars, the reasons for natural phenomena, the origins of things below, the circuits of things above, their changes and risings, their fixed positions and retrograde motions, their disjunctions and conjunctions.

Why did astronomy figure so prominently in the backdrop of the discussions of the early part of the *Capita 150*? First of all, the study of Ptolemaic astronomy was enjoying an important revival almost from the beginning of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{20} The prime mover in this enterprise was the Great Logothete, Theodore Metochites, aided and abetted by his devoted student, Nikephoros Gregoras. Barlaam, of anti-Palamite fame, also spent time on astronomical subjects in rivalry with Gregoras, the first of his many enemies. For some three years Metochites poured over the difficulties of Ptolemy’s *Almagest* and in 1316 produced an updated handbook of Ptolemaic astronomy.

\textsuperscript{19} *Ep 1 Akindynos 11* (Γρηγόριον τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα 1, ed. P. K. Chrestou [Thessalonica, 1962], pp. 215.21-216.6); *Homily 17* (PG 151.224bc).

Following in his mentor’s footsteps, Gregoras made some important contributions of his own: viz., in regard to the prediction of solar and lunar eclipses, the calculation of the date of Easter, and the construction of the astrolabe. Whatever Gregoras could do, Barlaam thought he could do better. The Calabrian made his own calculations for predicting eclipses and for determining the date of Easter.²¹

On another, more lowly plain, astronomy continued to have its part in the quadrivium whenever this was taught. The ever popular Anonymi logica et quadrivium written in 1008 appears to have been widely copied and read in the fourteenth century.²² Towards the end of the thirteenth century George Pachymeres (1242-ca. 1310) composed his own quadrivium textbook, the Σύνταγμα τῶν τεσσάρων μαθημάτων. In the mid-1330s Gregoras himself opened a school where he taught the traditional quadrivium of the sciences.²³

Gregory Palamas was born into an aristocratic family with close connections to the imperial palace. When Gregory’s father died, the emperor, Andronikos II, undertook to oversee the young man’s education. From the biographical Encomium of Palamas by Philotheos Kokkinos, it appears that Gregory excelled in his secular studies, easily mastering grammar, rhetoric, physics, logic and all the subjects treated by Aristotle. He was much admired by all the teachers and masters of oratory. When he was seventeen years old (ca. 1313), Palamas, at the emperor’s invitation, gave a public display of his expertise in Aristotelian logic. This merited him high praise from Theodore Metochites.²⁴

Palamas received his education within the milieu of the great Byzantine literati of his day and there is every likelihood that he took instruction from

²¹ On Metochites see I. Ševčenko, Études sur la polémique entre Théodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choummas (Corpus bruxellense historiae byzantinae, Subsidia 3; Brussels, 1962), pp. 68-87, 109-17. For Gregoras see H. van Dieten, Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte I (Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 4; Stuttgart, 1973), pp. 50-52. A list of Barlaam’s scientific treatises can be found in R. E. Sinkewicz, ‘The Solutions Addressed to George Lapithes by Barlaam the Calabrian and Their Philosophical Context’, Mediaeval Studies 43 (1981) 185-86. Palamas was well aware of Barlaam’s interest in astronomy for he quoted the Calabrian as saying, ‘Not only do we busy ourselves with the mysteries of nature and measure the vault of heaven and explore the opposing movements of the stars together with their conjunctions, phases and risings, but we pursue the consequences that follow therefrom and we are proud of it (Triad 1.1.q [5.21-26], ed. Meyendorff, Défense).

²² J. L. Heiberg, ed., Anonymi Logica et quadrivium (Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab., Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser 15.1; Copenhagen, 1929). Heiberg lists six manuscripts from the fourteenth century, but his list is seriously incomplete.


Metochites himself. It is not surprising then that Palamas had some acquaintance with astronomical science.

This alone, however, does not fully explain the background of the early chapters of the *Capita 150*. The other important factor was the close association, or perhaps better, the confusion between astronomy and astrology. Gregoras was well aware of this problem. Several of his letters dating from the 1330s refer to the circulation of outrageous astrological predictions which gave a convenient pretext to those who wished to denigrate the science of astronomy. Some of these curious prophecies were apparently western in origin. The conjunction of Kronos and Ares under the same sign, preceded by a solar eclipse, presaged the unleashing of the winds and a terrible destruction to follow. Gregoras inveighed against the silliness of such predictions and their total lack of any veracity. In contrast, his own predictions of solar and lunar eclipses stood on the solid foundation of Ptolemaic astronomy. Beyond this strictly scientific level, Gregoras allowed that the prediction of future events was indeed possible, but only under the influence of divine inspiration (*ηπνοΐα θεία*). Although there were occasions when Gregoras came out clearly against astrology, he may not have been entirely free from some of the opinions associated with that pseudo-science. In a letter to an unknown addressee Gregoras spoke of the relation between celestial and terrestrial phenomena as a *xωμωλιαν άφων τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω*. The influence of astral phenomena on earthly events is a fundamental tenet of astrology based on the notion that a universal sympathy exists between heaven and earth. However, the actual examples given by Gregoras are limited to phenomena which he would have considered as empirically observable, ‘scientific’ relationships: e.g., the influence of the sun on the seasons, on fruits, changes in the moon having a good or bad influence on sickness or causing the destruction of seeds and plants, and sailors’ observations that the moon effects changes of temperature and changes in the winds.

But there are also less innocent examples. In the section of his *History* devoted to the reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus, Gregoras recounted the following incident:

At this time the moon overshadowed the sun, just as it was passing beyond the fourth part of the Twins, about the third hour before noon on the 25th of May in the year 6775 [A.D. 1267]. Thus the full eclipse was approximately twelve

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26 Leone, Ep 53 (Chrysoloras) 2:164-69 (especially 168-69). In Ep 105 (the Protosebastos) 2:270-76, Gregoras was defending astronomy against its detractors.
27 *Hist.* 4.8(2) (Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae 19; Bonn, 1829), 1.108-109.
During the time of the eclipse darkness covered the earth for so long that many of the stars appeared. This was a portent of the most dire and destructive misfortunes which the Romans were to suffer at the hands of the Turks, for the oppression of the people which began from that time on has not found an end, but has been continuously mounting towards a crisis little by little. That such occurrences among the celestial lights foretell the manifestation of earthly sufferings, I think no one at all would doubt, unless someone insisted on being vainly and excessively disputatious. And if one were to attempt to persuade this man with arguments, when events occurring at one time or another on the stage of this world were unable to persuade him, he would be foolish and quite tiresome for his attempt to instill understanding in those who are thoroughly hard-headed. What would hold true for the body of an individual man would also hold for the entire body of the world. For the world is a single cohesive body, like man, made up of parts and members. Just as suffering in the head or neck shoots out distress to the leg and ankle, so too in the body of the world the changes that occur in the celestial lights have an impact on the earth and display their effect.

In the text there is no indication that Gregoras was reporting a popular, commonly accepted interpretation of the event, distinct from his own. His brief explanation of the astrological doctrine of sympathy seems to be offered as an acceptable opinion.

In his commentary on the De insomniis of Synesius, Gregoras went one step further. Synesius had made the following statement:

Let the foregoing be proof that divinations are amongst the best of the vocations of man; and if all things are signs appearing through all things, inasmuch as they are brothers in a single living creature, the cosmos, so also they are written characters of every kind, just as of those in a book some are Phoenician, some Egyptian, and others Assyrian.

This was the text that Gregoras commented on:

As he too is a Hellene in his opinions, Synesius expounds the same doctrines as they do and claims that the world possesses a soul (σώματος ἔμπνευσις). He says: ‘Each

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28 i.e., it was a near total eclipse. A digit is a twelfth part of the apparent diameter of the sun or the moon. Cf. Cleomedes, De motu 2.3.1 (172) and the commentary by Goulet, p. 218 n. 311.
29 Cf. Marinus, Vita Procli 37, in V. Cousin, ed., Procli philosophi platonici Opera inedita (Paris, 1864), p. 64.30-34.
31 PG 149.534b-535a.
living being in the world is composed of parts and members which share a commonality and affinity (κοινωνίαν καὶ συγγένειαν) with one another. In like manner, the world which is made up of heaven and earth and what lies between them is a living being possessed of a soul (ζωὸν ἐνεργοῦ), sharing activities and experiences similar to those of each living being. And as its parts possess an affinity and fraternal relationship with one another through one another to a greater or lesser degree they all give indications of future events.\(^{32}\)

To be fair, it must be said that Gregoras was ascribing opinions to Synesius without making any commitment to them on his own part. However, the similarity of terminology and ideas between this text and that from the History quoted above suggests that Gregoras may have been taking these doctrines seriously.

The link now established between astronomy, astrology and the doctrine of the World Soul goes a long way towards explaining the concerns of Gregory Palamas in the Capita 150.\(^{33}\) But there is yet another link to be added to the chain. Gregoras held to the view that 'it was not right for a wise and learned man to refrain from the examination and exploration of the reasons for all deeds, words and practices to the greatest extent possible.'\(^{34}\) In this spirit, Gregoras took up the work of commenting on the De insomniis of Synesius. In the course of this enterprise he took a special interest in what Synesius had to say about the Chaldean Oracles. Throughout his research and the resulting commentary Gregoras made extensive use of the writings of Michael Psellus on the Chaldean Oracles.\(^{35}\) Such a contemporary interest in the Oracles and the theurgic practices associated with them would explain many of the references to occult beliefs and rites in the early part of the Capita 150. Theurgy is based, in part at least, on the notion of a sympathetic relationship between particular animals, plants, minerals, etc. and their corresponding gods.\(^{36}\)

\(^{32}\) This is not a direct quotation from Synesius. Gregoras was putting words into his mouth.

\(^{33}\) Note the terms that Gregory used for the World Soul in c. 3 and 4: viz. κοινωνίαν ψυχή καὶ ἀστροφής (c. 3) and οὐράνιος ἡ παγχόμιος ψυχή (c. 4). Both expressions suggest that Palamas was well aware of the connection between astrology and the doctrine of the World Soul.

\(^{34}\) PG 149.524b-525a. Although Gregoras was here speaking of Synesius, there can be little question that this Palaeologan scholar shared the same attitudes. Cf. H.-V. Beyer, Nikephoros Gregoras, Antirrhetika I (Wiener byzantinistische Studien 12; Vienna, 1976), pp. 27-28.

\(^{35}\) Many passages in the commentary are little more than paraphrases of Psellus’ ‘Εξήγησις τῶν χαλδαίων μυθῶν. E.g., the following passages in Gregoras have exact parallels in Psellus: Gregoras, PG 149.584ab, 619b, 619b, 540ab, 540bc; the corresponding passages in Psellus are PG 122.1124a, 114b, 114d-45a, 1148c, 1133a [E. Des Places, ed., Oracles chaldaiques (Paris, 1971), pp. 161-86]. It is worth noting that of the 6 manuscripts that Des Places used for his edition 2 are from the thirteenth century and 3 from the fourteenth. L. G. Westerink noted the dependency of Gregoras on Psellus some years ago: 'Proclus, Procopius, Psellus', Mnemosyne, 3rd Ser., 10 (1942) 280 [= Texts and Studies in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Literature (Amsterdam, 1980), i].

\(^{36}\) See the classic essay on theurgy by E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley,
In chapter 3 of the *Capita 150* Palamas questioned the Hellenes who held the belief that the World Soul extended its presence into the sphere of the earth and the regions immediately surrounding it. This belief enabled them to consider as animate any stone or metal and also the four elements themselves, namely, earth, water, air and fire. The universal presence of the World Soul was another way of explaining the sympathy between the heavenly and earthly spheres which allowed for astrological predictions or magical manipulations.

Chapter 28 contains some even more obvious references to theurgic practices. There Palamas had spoken of pagan temples, sacrificial offerings, demonic oracles, unholy rites, defiling purifications, and the false guidance offered by prophets and prophetesses. One of these phrases, *katahrimwv molonwntwv*, can be associated with a reference made by Palamas some years earlier to *katahrmoww χαλδαϊκοίς*.\(^{37}\) This indicates that Palamas was referring to a contemporary interest in the *Chaldean Oracles*.

These references in the *Capita 150* have a close parallel in a passage of the *Triads* where Palamas railed against the reputed wisdom of the Hellenes:\(^{38}\)

> And so, caught up with that senseless and foolish wisdom and untutored learning, they maligned both God and nature, raising the latter to lordship and deposing the former from lordship, at least as far as they were concerned. They bestowed the divine name on demons, but they were so far from discovering the knowledge of beings, which was important to them and the object of their zeal, that they referred to inanimate things as animate and claimed that these participated in a soul superior to ours. They called irrational things rational, since they were capable of receiving a human soul. They said the demons are superior to us and – o, the impiety of it! – our creators. They claimed as coeternal with God and uncreated and without beginning, not only matter but also what they call the soul of the entire world and the intelligent beings not clothed with the thickness of the body and also our own souls.

Although the polemic against profane learning both in the early writings of Palamas and in the *Capita 150* had Barlaam as its ostensible object, it seems that there was also an underlying agenda. In the early fourteenth century these

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1951), pp. 283-311 [p. 292: ‘Each god has his sympathetic representative in the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral world, which is, or contains, a *symbalw* of its divine cause and is thus *en rapport* with the latter’]. Byzantine superstition traditionally associated the magic of stones and plants with the planets. Cf. A. Delatte, ‘Le traité des plantes planétaires d’un manuscrit de Leningrad’ in *Mélanges Henri Grégoire* (Annales de l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales et slaves de l’université de Bruxelles 9; Brussels, 1949), pp. 145-77.

37 *Ep I Barlaam* 47 (PS 1:253.7). In the same paragraph Palamas quoted from the *Life of Proclus* by Marinus of Neapolis.

38 *Triad* 1.1.18 (51.24-53.11).
allusions, which might readily escape us today, were undoubtedly quite transparent to Gregory's contemporaries. In a work probably very close in date to the *Capita 150* Nikolaos Kabasilas remembered very clearly the interests of Nikephoros Gregoras in the *Chaldean Oracles* and in the occult theories of Late Antiquity.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, the *Capita 150* were written about 1349-50,\textsuperscript{40} just at the time when Gregoras was assuming the leadership of the anti-Palamite cause.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that Gregory Palamas was already launching an anonymous counter-attack against Gregoras in his *Capita 150* just as he had done against Barlaam in his first *Triad*.

In roughly the same period that saw the publication of the *Capita 150* Nikolaos Kabasilas was himself confronted with the problem of the compatibility between Christian holiness and the pursuit of profane learning. By the time of the final phase of the controversy Kabasilas had sided with the cause of the Palamites, although he wrote only one rather brief work on their behalf, against Nikephoros Gregoras.\textsuperscript{42} However, he seems at first to have been reluctant to commit himself.\textsuperscript{43}

Nikolaos Kabasilas was both a learned theologian and a man of profound piety, and yet he had no hesitation about engaging in philosophical and scientific studies. He wrote commentaries on the third book of Ptolemy's *Almagest* and on a portion of Aristotle's *Physics*.\textsuperscript{44} He even had some acquaintance with Sceptic philosophy.\textsuperscript{45} By far the majority of his writings, how-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[40] The complex question of dating has been treated in detail in my forthcoming book on the *Capita 150*.
\item[43] David Disypatos had addressed a discourse to him earlier in an attempt to win him over. See D. Tsames, ed., Αδελθοί Διαπάτου Άγιος κατά Βασιλαίμ καὶ Άρχιεπίσκοπος Νικηφόρου Καβασίλα (Θεσσαλονίκη, 1973).
\item[44] For the commentary on Ptolemy there is only a sixteenth-century edition: ed. S. Grynaeus, *Claudii Ptolemaei Magnae constructionis, id est perfectae coelestium motuum pertractationis, lib. xii. Theonis Alexandrini in eosdem commentarium lib. xi* (Basel, 1538), pp. 131-94. The following manuscripts are known: Vaticanus gr. 198, fols. 318-340; Ottobonianus gr. 26, pp. 183 ff.; Marcianus gr. (Thesaurus antiquus) 310, 311, and 313; Monacensis gr. 482, fols. 91-92; Parisinus gr. 2398, fols. 78r-139v; Noremburgensis (Stadtbibliothek) gr. Cent. V, App. 8, fols. 189-215. There is only one manuscript for the Aristotle commentary: Meteorα, Μονή Βαρλαάμ 202, fols. 62v-64r.
\item[45] The short treatise on the criterion of truth was published by L. Radermacher, 'Nicolai Cabasilae, Kata tōn leptomén tov kritirion tis allēgēsia eis tois para Pλóromos tov katafratón' in *Natalicia Regis ... Guillelmi n... indicant universitatis rector et senatus* (Bonn, 1899), pp. 6-12. Radermacher used only ms. Paris, gr. 1213, fols. 285r-286v, but the text can also be found in Vindobonensis Theol. gr. 262, fols. 387v-389r.
\end{footnotes}
ever, are religious in character. Although he was associated at various times in his career with hesychast theologians and, of course, their imperial champion, John Kantakouzenos, his own religious and theological writings bear a distinctive and original cast which cannot be completely assimilated to the hesychast model. Because he was a layman for most of his career and because of his originality, his views on profane learning are worth considering in relation to those held by Gregory Palamas.

Sometime between 1347 and 1349 Synadenos, a prelate (διστάριος) of the metropolitan church of Thessalonica, wrote to his friend Nikolaos Kabasilas in Constantinople. There had apparently been some discussion about the real merit of profane wisdom in relation to Christian holiness and Synadenos wanted his friend’s opinion on the subject. Kabasilas replied:

You asked how those who pursue virtue while neglecting reason are perfect. This is self-evident, for they are imperfect in that they are not also wise. Even though they are holy, nevertheless, they are lacking in the present life a certain human good which they were capable of acquiring, for anything is imperfect whenever the actuality is not realized for some good for which there was a potentiality. Men are in potentiality with respect to wisdom to the extent that they have a capacity for intelligence and understanding, unless perhaps they should receive wisdom and instruction through grace as was the case with the apostles. Men such as these are no longer imperfect. But men who have not received wisdom in this way are holy, on the one hand, for they have disciplined the passionate part of the soul, but, on the other hand, they are not yet wise and are in this respect imperfect so that they seek to learn what is necessary from the wise saints. St. Amphilochios, although he was ordained by angels and as far as regards his holiness he was inferior to no one, nevertheless, asked Basil the Great about what necessary actions to take, and Basil gave him instruction, setting out for him canons and laws. But teaching is nothing other than the perfecting of the one taught, and perfecting applies to those who are still imperfect. Teaching is both a light and a guide, and a man who requires a guide and the eyes of others is blind in that respect. Though he sees in another part he possesses only one eye, and if

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46 There is of course no serious conflict or incompatibility between the theology of Kabasilas and that of the fourteenth-century Palamite hesychasts, but it is important to recognize and explore more thoroughly the distinctive characteristics of Kabasilas’ work.

47 A good summary of the life of Kabasilas with detailed references can be found in G. T. Dennis, ed., *The Letters of Manuel Palaeologus* (Corpus fontium historiae byzantinae 8; Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. xxx-xxxiv.


he should not have someone to guide him he becomes a complete laughingstock
and a disgrace. Thus, they are apparently imperfect and indistinguishable from
people with only one eye.

Apparently, Nikolaos thought that the subject deserved further elaboration, for
he composed a short treatise on the same topic. As this work is little known, I
give the translation in full.50

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THAT THE WISDOM ASSOCIATED WITH REASON
IS FOLLY

1. Reason can lead towards the end proper to man. Without reason man can attain
his proper and natural end, namely, God, and with reason it is possible not to attain it.
Therefore, it contributes nothing to man with regard to his proper end. What makes no
contribution towards the proper end for the one using it is folly. Reason, therefore, is
folly.

2. Further, many have in this way become worse off and have not attained their
end. Such a thing is evil and evil serves no purpose. Thus, it is folly. Reason, therefore,
is folly.

3. Further, those who seek their proper and natural end have considered a life
wasted on reason as worthy of lamentation. It is therefore folly.

4. Further, those who have made use of reason have not obtained perfect
knowledge of beings through reason. Therefore, there is error involved in reason. It
does not then produce what it promises. Thus, it does not proceed towards the proper
end. It is therefore folly.

5. Further, for those who spend their time on reason alone without something else
in addition either bad or good, there is no advancement towards the proposed end. It is
therefore folly.

RESOLUTION OF THESE ARGUMENTS

1. Not everything with or without which man can possibly achieve perfection is
unprofitable towards the end proper to man, as, for example, virginity or piety, which
are far from being follies.

2. Now, on the one hand, reason has been a cause of perdition for some, not in
itself but accidentally. But, on the other hand, our concern is with reason itself. If we
consider as evil what is accidentally the cause of evil, many absurdities will follow. For
example, the law and the commandment concerning God were for those who rejected
them cause of death, accidentally but not in themselves, and it is absurd to consider
them as evil. For he says, 'When the commandment came, sin revived and I died' (Rom
7:9).

50 A. Angelopoulos, Νικόλαος Καβάσλας Χαματός, 'Η ζωή και τό έγγον αὑτοῦ (‘Ανάλεκτα
Βιλατάδων 5; Thessalonica, 1970), pp. 111-13. On p. 112, ll. 33 and 63 the editor has incorrectly
read οίς instead of οἶνον.
3. Not everything which does not of its own lead to the end is folly. For while there are two things which bring nature to perfection, good works and faith (Jac 2:22), if one devotes his time to either one alone, he will live a life worthy of lamentation. But on this account neither faith nor works is folly by its own nature. For Paul says, 'Our faith is not in vain nor is our preaching futile' (1 Cor 15:17, 14). Those who completely malign reason because some people have misused its power are, first of all, ignorant of the original hypothesis, for the sages and their way of life are not in question but rather the concern is with their statements. And, then, they are acting ridiculously, attacking one man but hitting another like madmen – as if someone, wanting to slander Socrates said nothing about him but pointed out that Xerxes was poor at naval warfare. There is a great difference between the proposition, the subject of their enquiry, and their conclusion. For reason is the subject under enquiry, but when they show that those who have pursued it became evil, they think that they have proved reason to be evil. And so their syllogism proceeds in this way. Those who follow the pursuit of reason have not used it for its proper end. Such people are foolish. And as it is necessary to connect the [minor] extreme term with the major, they conclude by saying, 'Those who follow the pursuit of reason are foolish.' Then by taking part of the [minor] extreme, reason, and joining it to the major extreme, they conclude, 'Reason is therefore folly.' It is a simple matter to draw any conclusion in this fashion. For example, he who hates the impious man is a friend of God. Such a man is good. The impious man is therefore good. Thus, one must not take part of the [minor] extreme term into the conclusion. And if anyone thinks it absurd to take it so in this case and in others, but thinks there is no objection with regard to the case of reason, he is begging the question.

4. If error is present in reason it is not on account of itself nor on account of its nature, for its nature is knowledge of beings as they truly are. Error occurs with the deception of the senses when there is a deficiency of reason. One who maligns the deficiency cannot put the blame on the faculty. The opposite then is true, for one who discredits evil has praised the good by discrediting the former. Or else we will malign sight because of blindness and chastity because of licentiousness. And how is that not absurd?

5. Since reason is knowledge of beings as they truly are and since there is no knowledge which does not concern beings, practical wisdom is either itself knowledge of beings or subordinate to it, for it cannot be more universal. Now the rational part of the soul is superior to the passionate part, for the latter we share with the irrational animals, but by the former we are the superior. Such is the case with practical wisdom or knowledge of beings or reason, for they bear the same relation to the rational part as do chastity and courage to the passionate part. Conversely, therefore, as the rational part is to the passionate part, so is reason to chastity and courage. It thus has a purpose and is not folly, and from this it is clear that it is superior to the virtues, for the rational part is superior to the passionate part.

Kabasilas cited five arguments produced by those who claim that reason is devoid of any value. The nature of these arguments leads almost inevitably to the identification of this anonymous group with the hesychast monks and the
supporters of the Palamite cause. According to his first *Triad* Palamas himself would certainly have considered a life devoted entirely to secular studies lamentable.\(^{51}\) Both in the *Capita 150* and in the *Triads* he demonstrated how error enters the process of natural knowledge or reasoning.\(^{52}\) And with little doubt, Palamas would not have considered imperfect someone who had abandoned natural wisdom for the sake of pursuing holiness. Finally, if the hesychast doctor had been aware of the counter-arguments and the syllogistic style employed by Kabasilas, they would surely have reminded him of the logical demonstrations that someone else had once used to bolster the value of profane wisdom.

The position of Palamas was not, however, so completely negative as the five arguments cited by Kabasilas. Gregory was quite careful to avoid claiming that reason is evil in itself.\(^{53}\) Nor did he forbid profane education absolutely, except to monks. Secular studies are certainly good to the extent that they contribute to sharpsightedness of soul, but one should spend only a short time in this pursuit and then move on to better things.\(^{54}\) Palamas was also quite insistent that the wisdom of God in creation can be contemplated without taking the risks of philosophical studies. 'An unworried life lived in the hope of God naturally moves the soul to a comprehension of the creatures of God.'\(^{55}\)

While it would be unjust to set the positions of Palamas and Kabasilas in any kind of absolute opposition to one another, there does seem to be some disagreement. In the *Triads* Gregory was dealing with Barlaam who had gone to the extreme of exalting knowledge over the direct experience of God in grace. In common with other Byzantine writers, Palamas indulged in a certain amount of polemical hyperbole: at times he overstated his case. On the other hand, if his writings are any indication, Nikolaos Kabasilas engaged most of his efforts in the pursuit of the knowledge and love of God. Only a very small percentage of his works treat non-religious subjects. In the case of his letter to Synadenos and the little treatise that followed, he may have been attempting to mitigate an extreme position advocated by some overly enthusiastic hesychast

\(^{52}\) *Capita 150*, c. 15-20; sin, ignorance and the revolt of the passions hinder and corrupt the process of knowing (*Triad* 1.1.3 [13.3-10]).  
\(^{53}\) 'Nothing evil is evil in itself, but only in that it has fallen away from its proper and fitting activity and the goal of that activity' (*Triad* 1.1.19 [57.1-3]). In the case of profane wisdom the proper goal is θεογνωσία. With the proper precautions Hellenic philosophy can become an ἐγκαίναν πρὸς τι χαλάν, but even so, it is not genuinely a gift of God and spiritual inasmuch as it is natural and not sent down from above (*Triad* 1.1.21 [59-61]).  
\(^{54}\) *Triad* 1.1.6 and 1.1.12.  
\(^{55}\) *Triad* 1.1.20 (59.5-7).
monks. In the lay, aristocratic society in which Kabasilas moved there were many learned men who were also pious and orthodox Christians. He may have thought it necessary to defend them against unjust criticism.

However, this still leaves two issues where there would certainly have been disagreement between the two theologians. In Kabasilas' fifth response he states that there is no knowledge other than knowledge of beings. Such an unguarded statement could too easily lead to the conclusion that there can be no knowledge of God because God is not a being but rather beyond beings; or, God must be placed on the level of beings and thereby ceases to be God. Kabasilas would never have allowed such conclusions and so his statement must simply be taken as unguarded and insufficiently qualified. Secondly, in the same paragraph, Kabasilas restricted the virtues (he cites courage and chastity as his examples) to the passionate or affective part of the soul. Then, he concluded that, since the rational part of the soul is superior to the affective part, reason must be superior to the virtues. Palamas would have wasted no time in correcting such a wayward notion. At the time he wrote this work, Nikolaos was probably still under thirty years of age and so any theological improprieties might be attributed to the inexperience of youth.

The Christian response to the renewal of philosophical and scientific studies in the first half of the fourteenth century was a complex one which cannot be described as absolutely negative or entirely unenlightened. The Christians who responded were themselves influenced by this renewal and saw nothing wrong with it as long as it remained within certain bounds. The goal of the human endeavour is life with God and as long as philosophy and science serve this end, or at least do not oppose it, they can be considered as good. Palamas was not an obscurantist. Knowledge of God and knowledge of beings, both joined to love, are the proper pursuit of man. Knowledge, however, can be abused. The empirical evidence of history offers too many examples. When knowledge is perverted from its proper end, the dignity of man suffers and the humanist enterprise itself is thwarted. Man starts to serve knowledge, rather than knowledge serving man in the search for his true goal. Created in the triadic image of God and called to grow once again into his likeness, man occupies a unique place in the universe, serving only the Creator but never debasing himself to the level of serving creation. In his advocacy of the high dignity of man, Gregory Palamas must certainly be considered one of the great humanists of the Palaeologan renaissance.

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THE FORTUNES OF A LOLLARD SERMON-CYCLE
IN THE LATER FIFTEENTH CENTURY

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I

INTRODUCTION

I t is well known that the Lollards were in the habit of expropriating orthodox writings into which they would insinuate their own invidious opinions. Examples of the reverse process whereby the more conservative – or more cautious – attempted to ‘decontaminate’ Lollard texts are harder to seek\(^1\) and are consequently of particular interest when they may be found. It is likewise well known that, after Archbishop Arundel’s repressive legislation of 1407, vernacular religious writing (and secular literature too on occasion) was viewed with suspicion by the authorities. The effect of this legislation and this suspicion on the writing of the later fifteenth century, when the initial furore engendered by the active persecution of leading Lollards might be expected to have somewhat abated, has been little studied. I propose to examine here the manuscript tradition of a collection of Lollard sermons which exemplifies both these virtues: the text was copied and selectively expurgated in the second half of the century. The nature of the expurgations provides a case history which illustrates both what was still thought to be offensive and what still merited comment. Furthermore the textual tradition gives an intriguing, not to say puzzling, insight into the way in which some sermon compilers might adapt for their own purposes the vernacular resources available to them. For recourse to translation in the extant English Sunday sermons\(^2\) and internal borrowing


between collections\(^3\) together suggest first that compilers were reluctant to produce original sermons and secondly that compendious scriptural commentary in the vernacular was in short supply. Need might outweigh fastidiousness, especially when it is remembered that the Wycliffites as a group had attempted to imitate the comprehensiveness of the Latin theological writings in English.\(^4\) Moreover the demand for biblical knowledge was not confined to Lollards, nor was it extinguished by Arundel’s legislation or assuaged by Nicholas Love’s authorised translation of Pseudo-Bonaventure’s gospel harmony.\(^5\)

Cambridge, Sidney Sussex College 74, a manuscript of s. xiv-xv, has already attracted attention as a derivative of the Sunday gospel section of the enormous vernacular sermon-cycle which forms so conspicuous a part of the Wycliffite output.\(^6\) Accordingly we need do no more than recapitulate the points most salient to the present discussion. The collection is a complete Sunday series, beginning at Whitsun, with some ancillary material in the form of treatises, Wimbledon’s *Sermon* and a Nativity sermon,\(^7\) and also a group of seven further supplementary sermons which will be more adequately described in the

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ensuing section of this study. The compiler of the main Sunday series was evidently compendious in intention: he added two sections to each of the Wycliffite Sunday gospel sermons in order that the whole duty of a preacher be contained in one handy volume. In their recorded form the Wycliffite Sunday gospel sermons are rather brief; accordingly the compiler used them as prothemes before he proceeded to commentary on the Sunday epistles and on various pastoral subjects. This epistle and pastoral commentary owes nothing to the Wycliffite Sermons. There are but two exceptions to this pattern: in the sermon for Trinity 6, and almost certainly in the preceding sermon for Trinity 5, the compiler substituted a gospel commentary other than the one found in the corresponding Wycliffite sermon to serve as his protheme. At first the disposition of material in this sermon collection is a trifle bewildering since the theme which heads each sermon is taken from the relevant epistle, but the commentary which follows it without any preamble concerns the gospel:

**Epiphany 2**

_Benedicite et nolite maledicere, ad Romanos xii°_; [Jo 2:1-11] tellipe today of pe firste miracle pat Crist dude in presence of hise disciples (91r).

The gospel is often, but by no means invariably, located in a marginal reference. After the Wycliffite gospel protheme, the epistle theme is repeated and its incidence is noted by the regular marginal entry 'Iteratio thematis'. The third part, the pastoral scheme, is not marked out in any special way: the syllabus consists of the Gifts of the Spirit, Sins, Precepts and Commandments, Wits and Cardinal and Theological Virtues. The pastoral instruction is often continued serially from week to week; the commentary on Faith, for example, gives rise to a commentary on the Creed which lasts for five weeks, from Lent 4

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1 The numbering and ordering of the Commandments is eccentric. The numbers assigned to them in Sidney Sussex 74 may be collated with the standard Catholic enumeration as follows:

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The gospel precepts are included in the commentary on Commandment 1. A fifteenth-century reader of the manuscript observed in a marginal note that what was called Commandment 4 was in fact the second Commandment of the first table 'et ideo caue' (74v).
to Easter I inclusive. Thus the pastoral scheme pursues a largely independent course: there is little if any attempt to make any connection between it and the preceding gospel and epistle commentaries. Indeed the compiler may deliberately pass over invitations provided by the lections for pastoral teaching because they conflict with his own predetermined scheme:

Trinity 4

Spe enim salui facti sumus [Rom 8:24]... In bat heuently leche vs owep to hope bat al monkynde hap sauyd ... Perfore rede I pat þou do as þe prophet conseilet, Spera in Domino et fac bonitatem, et cetera [Ps 36(37):3]: 'Hope in God and do goodnesse', and þerne þou hopest rɪgt. Of hope haue I spoken muche her byefore and þerfore wul I tellen you forth of þe fyue wittus. Twyen I lafe vntold, þe wuche ben syðhte and touchyng. And, ʒef we kepe wel þuse fyue, ource hope is wel þe bettur (13v).

Although the epistle and pastoral commentaries are unrelated to the Wycliffite sermons, they nonetheless contain Wycliffite sentiments. The Pater and Ave are noteworthy omissions from the pastoral scheme and the deficiency is repaired by the two additional treatises, there is also a discourse on the Decalogue in two parts in addition to the lengthy exposition within the sermon-cycle.

Sidney Sussex 74 has suffered considerable mutilation. The Reformed view of the collection was that:

Although there be som thinge not altogether agreable to the great light which it hath pleased God to reveale vnto vs at this present tyme, yet let vs not altogether condemne the author, who hath bestowed his talent according to the measure which he hath received.

Accordingly references to purgatory and pilgrimages have been obliterated; naturally the funeral sermon, which has much to say of the afterlife, suffered

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9 English Wycliffite Sermons 1.120-23.
10 The Pater Noster commentary occupies fols. 143r-166v; see P. S. Jolliffe, A Check-List of Middle English Prose Writings of Spiritual Guidance (Toronto, 1974), M3(b), O9(b). The text is edited by F. G. A. M. Aarts, De Pater Noster of Richard Ermeye (The Hague, 1967). The commentary on the Ave occupies fols. 189v-191v. The Pater and Ave were also omitted from Thoresby's syllabus, although they were added in the Wycliffite adaptation in London, Lambeth Palace Library ms. 408: see The Lay Folks' Catechism, ed. T. F. Simmons and H. E. Nolloth (EETS OS 118; London, 1901).
11 Incipit 'Christene childur in God, sepen þe seruyse and þe wurchep of God is so nedful to vs' (181r-184v, 184v-189v).
12 From the seventeenth-century description on fol. iii. The book was donated to Sidney Sussex College by Samuel Ward, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Master of the College, in 1643.
most from these attentions. More serious damage was caused by the excision of many leaves, which often coincide with the beginning and end of the sermons.

One other copy of the dominical cycle survives, now Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 95 (S.C. 1905). This manuscript also contains a commentary on the Sixteen Conditions of Charity (fol. 111r-113r) which is not found in Sidney Sussex 74. The Sunday cycle is complete save in two respects: the Wycliffite gospel commentaries were in most of the sermons reduced to a single sentence and the group of sermons from Sexagesima to Lent 3 inclusive were omitted in their entirety. Since no leaves are missing, this gap in the sequence cannot be a simple mechanical loss, but the omission is hard to explain: the corresponding sermons in Sidney Sussex 74 are not notably extreme, the gap affects Lent when most preachers were most busy, and moreover the omission disrupts the sequence of pastoral teaching. Possibly the antecedent of ms. Bodley 95 was defective. Nonetheless, despite these deficiencies, Bodley 95 tells us much about the fortunes of the sermon collection later in the fifteenth century. Because of its particular interest, and because it has attracted little public notice hitherto, it merits a full description here.

For the purpose of my argument it is essential to date the manuscript with some care, the more so since the Summary Catalogue assigns it to the ‘early fifteenth century’. Yet, in view of the script and the paper used, a date of s. xv2 seems more satisfactory. The book is, then, paper, with medieval parchment endleaves: i + 113 + ii; the leaves measure 208 mm. (8 1/4") by 142 mm. (5 3/4") and the written space is approximately 164 mm. (6 1/4") by 116 mm. (4 1/4"). The paper exhibits a single watermark (the letter p) which resembles Briquet no. 8527: this would suggest German provenance of the 1460s or 1470s.

The first parchment flyleaf was originally a pastedown and it is the sole survivor of a quire of six flyleaves: five stubs follow it, of which the centre bifolium was paper. The second bifolium consisted of parchment re-used from an older book, although its contents cannot now be ascertained. The quires of the text regularly have a centre bifoliate stub to support the sewing: if we discount these the collation is as follows:

References to purgatory are erased on fol. 202r-v. References to pilgrimages are erased and replaced by ‘journey’ on fol. 89r in the sermon for Epiphany 1, for which the gospel is Lc 2:42-52, the finding of Jesus in the Temple, a text often utilised by preachers for discussion of pilgrimages.

The excisions are discussed in English Wycliffite Sermons 1.70-71. Since it was not always correct, the medieval foliation is not always a wholly reliable guide to the extent of the damage, but it is nonetheless a useful indication.

There is a disruption in the order of the text in the second half of quire 4; the rubricator has elucidated the correct sequence by a series of crosses. Instead of the order 1-12, we find 1-8, 11, 12, 9, 10: because the disturbance has not affected the first half of the quire, it would seem that the mistakes occurred in copying rather than in binding. Quire signatures appear in the book (arabic numerals, except for quire 6 which is small, roman), but there are no catchwords or leaf signatures. The foliation is ink and modern.

No traces of ruling or pricking are visible: the text is written in a variable number of long lines from 26 to 37. Two scribes were responsible for the book: Scribe B on average fitted more lines of text onto the page than his partner. The scribes’ stints corresponded to the quire: Scribe B wrote quires 2 and 5 only. In both cases the script is a small Anglicana with many Secretary features: the proportions of Scribe B’s hand are more upright and square. Scribe A may also have been the rubricator, at least of those quires which he wrote, since the rubricator’s tag on fol. 113r is in his hand:

Nunc feci iinem, pro Christo da μihi/ vinum;
Nunc feci totum, pro Christo da mihi potum.

Rough, red, two-line initials head each sermon and capitals within the text are touched with red. Latin quotations were boxed in with red (many were overlooked).

The Summary Catalogue makes mention of a reed bookmarker between fols. 30v and 31r; if this was indeed its purpose, then the survival of a pressed grass stalk between fols. 50v and 51r is perhaps not wholly insignificant.16

The binding is late fifteenth-century, English work, blind-stamped on bevelled oak boards. The design consists of a rectangular frame of stamps contained within crudely-made intersecting fillets; the central space is filled with two vertical rows of stamps, surrounded by more fillets. A clasp has been lost, while two holes bored in the top right-hand corner of the front cover indicate that it was once chained.17 The stamps depict an agnus Dei, a stag couchant and

17 For discussion of the chained books kept in parish churches see W. A. Pantin, ‘Instructions for a Devout and Literate Layman’ in Medieval Learning and Literature: Essays Presented to Richard William Hunt, ed. J. J. G. Alexander and M. T. Gibson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 398-422. See also J. C. Cox, Churchwardens’ Accounts from the Fourteenth Century to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (London, 1913). It is also possible that the book was chained after
a two-headed eagle: the first two of these resemble Oldham pl. XI, nos. 89 and 91, while the eagle resembles no. 92, except that it is smaller and set within a square stamp rather than a lozenge. Oldham styles the artisan who used these stamps the ‘Heavy Binder’, a Cambridge man who worked from c. 1485-1505.\textsuperscript{18} The dies may however have had a wider currency.

Because the medieval binding has been preserved, together with a number of the original flyleaves and the memoranda they attracted, we fortunately have a good many indications of the book’s use and provenance. Several of the notes concern parish business: the book seems to have been in clerical ownership until at least 1530, a date recorded on the inner flap of the back binding, along with the information that ‘\textit{pe Sunday after Relycke Sunday there were 87°}, perhaps a note of attendance figures? This annotating hand was also responsible for accounts, perhaps tithe accounts, on this end flap: ‘Item, a marke owyng me of one Pole. Item, att Weyuer Remane (?) in varne ix li.’, and on fol. i\textsuperscript{v} (the pastedown) he remarks that ‘Bryan. owyth to me \textsuperscript{19} to pownde off wolle and D. for \textsuperscript{19} a/ cawffe wyte and a cawffe wych he solle.’ More significantly, this hand has also noted on fol. 113\textsuperscript{v} the location of certain topics of pastoral instruction discussed in the sermons, for instance ‘The commawmentis byne rehercyd in \textit{the 18\textsuperscript{v} Sunday}, information which was repeated on fol. 115\textsuperscript{v}. Also noted on fol. 113\textsuperscript{v} is the incidence of commentary on love, wrath, envy and gluttony. Presumably then these sermons were still seen as a quarry for preaching material; indeed it is clear that medieval sermons were still being read and used in preaching down to the Reformation. If it were not so, Bishop Bonner would not have bothered to forbid the practice.\textsuperscript{20}

Notes in other hands strengthen this assumption that ms. Bodley 95 was owned by working parish clergy in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. A record of a marriage licence is written lengthwise on fol. 115\textsuperscript{v} in a hand of s. xv ex. There are furthermore what appear to be sermon notes on fol. 113\textsuperscript{v} written in an early sixteenth-century hand in English, changing into Latin towards the end and composed in an altogether more ambitious style than the workaday prose of the sermon-cycle itself.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{19} ‘For’ erased.

\textsuperscript{20} The prohibition appears in Bonner’s 1542 Injunctions, ‘\textit{All priests shall take this order when they preach; first that they shall rehearse no sermons made by other men within this two or three hundred years}’ (\textit{Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae}, ed. D. Wilkins, 4 vols. [London, 1737], 3.866).

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Incipit ‘And castinge ony eie vppon the diall or vewe of commen wrounges’}. 
Two names and a place feature among this welter of memorabilia. On fol. 113r we are told in a late fifteenth-century note that 'iste liber constat Domino Iohanni Jeffys', and on fol. 113v a later hand records that 'Robart Wallard w/ yeUes in SSanfford'. Local provenance seemed a possibility and indeed, although Robart Wallar remains untraced, a John Jeffys was vicar of Sandford St. Martin, Oxfordshire, between 1485 and 1491 when he resigned the living. Unlike a number of Sandford's other fifteenth-century incumbents, he had not been at university. Unfortunately Sandford's parish records survive only from the late seventeenth century, so it is now difficult to ascertain whether Remane, Pole or Wallar were local family names, but it may not be wholly gratuitous to note that wool and flax were Sandford's main produce in the late Middle Ages.

It is likely that the book was passed on from one clerical owner to his successors in the office. Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 110 (S.C. 1963), another collection of preaching material suitable for parish use, may be cited as a parallel case: it was bequeathed by the rector of Cliffe, Kent, one William Cleve, to 'Domino Willelmo Camyl', chantry chaplain at the same place and to his successors in this office (fol. 182v).

The significance of other scribbles in Bodley 95 is obscure. Scrutiny of an extensive erasure on fol. 115r with the aid of ultra violet light reveals nothing of more moment than the opening lines of Ps 8 in Latin. On the same leaf in a different hand occurs the remark 'Y trow 3e be sory pat ye ha < . > gaue me so moche lyberdy; Y pray you, be nat sory', a tantalising piece of historical jetsam of which the meaning will probably never be recovered.

The history of the book in the later sixteenth century is unknown. It was acquired by the Bodleian Library about 1620.

\[22\] Misread in the S.C. as 'lessye'.
\[23\] Misread in the S.C. as 'Fairford'.
\[24\] See Lists of Medieval Incumbents of Oxfordshire Parishes Compiled for the Oxfordshire Victoria County History (Bodleian Library ms. Top. Oxon. D. 460, p. 188), where the name is said to be 'John Jeffs'. However consultation of Lincoln, Lincolnshire Archives Office Episcopal Register 22, fol. 229d (new foliation) shows the name to be 'Domini Iohannis Jeffis'. 'St. Martin' is a modern addition to distinguish this Sandford from Dry Sandford and Sandford on Thames, also in Oxfordshire.


\[26\] VCH Oxford 11.175.
II

TEXTUAL AFFILIATIONS

The sermon-cycle witnessed by mss. Sidney Sussex 74 and Bodley 95, and the material which it shares with four otherwise independent collections, have been authoritatively described by Anne Hudson in her edition of the Wycliffite Sunday gospel and epistle sermons.\(^{27}\) Nevertheless, since these derivative sermons were not, as she acknowledged, her primary concern in that edition, her account may here be amplified and in a few respects supplemented. For the present discussion we may permit ourselves the convenience of mnemonic sigla; Dr. Hudson was concerned with a large number of manuscripts and some of her necessarily arbitrary or two-letter sigla are unsuitable here. Accordingly ms. Sidney Sussex 74 is designated 'S' (Hudson 'N') and ms. Bodley 95 is called 'B' (Hudson 'By'). The four remaining manuscripts are Manchester, John Rylands University Library English 109 ('R'; Hudson 'Ry'),\(^{28}\) Cambridge, University Library Gg.6.16 ('C'; Hudson 'Gg'),\(^{29}\) London, British Library Royal 18.B.xxiii ('Ross'),\(^{30}\) and London, British Library Additional 37677.\(^{31}\)

The overlap between the last-named book and our sermons is the most straightforward and may be described first. Additional 37677 shares two items with S but with none of the other manuscripts. The recurrence of the first item, Wimbledon's Sermon, is likely to be fortuitous: its editors judge S and Addi-

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\(^{27}\) *English Wycliffite Sermons* 1.115-23.

\(^{28}\) A manuscript of the Middle English translation of Robert of Gretham's *Miroir* and accordingly described by Duncan, 'The Middle English Mirror' as well as by Ker, *Medieval Manuscripts* 3.418-19.


In transcription from these vernacular manuscripts I have supplied modern punctuation, word-spacing and capitalisation. Initial ff has been interpreted as a capital F and has therefore been accorded the same treatment as the other manuscript capitals. Abbreviations are expanded and italicised, except for the common forms and, pat, pe, wip, pou, which I have adopted as a standard in quotations from a number of manuscripts which vary considerably in date and dialect. I am however aware that in single editions of these texts the following forms might prove preferable: ande in C; that, the, with or wyth in B; whit or with in S. Similarly, marks which may or may not indicate the abbreviation of final -e have been ignored, although they clearly are not wholly negligible, especially in the earlier manuscripts.

Variant readings from manuscripts other than the one cited in quotations are given only when they seem significantly to illustrate that the compilers or the scribes have made small expurgations, or have modernised the text or if the variants provide further substantial evidence of the sermons' textual history.

\(^{30}\) *Middle English Sermons Edited from British Museum ms. Royal 18 B. xxiii* by W. O. Ross (EETS OS 209; London, 1940).

\(^{31}\) Since the manuscript contains Wimbledon's Sermon, it has been described by Owen, Knight and Wilson (n. 7 above).
tional 37677 to be independent witnesses; moreover it was a popular, much-copied text. The coincidence of the other text, a sermon on *Ememus panes* [Jo 6:5] (Additional ms., fol. 98v; S 204v-207v), is more arresting. In both copies this sermon is incomplete.

The interrelationships between R, C and the Ross sermons with S and B concern a group of eight sermons: the three sermons for Trinity 5-7 in the main dominical series and five other, supplementary sermons. These five additional texts appear, moreover in the same order, in S, R and C, whereas B contains only one of them, a funeral sermon on the theme *Mortuus viuet*. The little post-Trinity group is found in R and Ross, while in S the scribe started to copy out Trinity 5 as a member of the supplementary set (204r-v), but desisted with the comment ‘Alius sermo’ (204v) when he realised that this text was merely duplicating the Trinity 5 sermon (now lost by excision) from the main series. Thus, whereas only R now contains all eight members of the group, it is a fair presumption to say that the scribe at work in this part of S also had access to a copy text in which all eight were present. Three provisional deductions follow: since S breaks off part way through Trinity 5, R is unlikely to have copied the set directly from S (unless by some mysterious instinct he knew that Trinity 6 and 7, as well as 5, were germane to his material and that other preaching texts in S were not, or alternatively that he decided on his own initiative to include Trinity 6 and 7). Palaeographic considerations make the possibility that this section of S might have been copied from R itself unlikely. The main section of R (Gretham’s *Mirror* in English) is dated 1432, and the list of contents in a hand of s. xv1 which begins the book shows at least that the initial group of sermons was not bound in later than this. Even while the date and the list of contents do not in themselves conclusively prove that the preceding sermons are also s. xv1, the script of S looks to be somewhat older. Accordingly there seems to have been a genuine manuscript tradition in which all eight sermons travelled together: the combination is unlikely to have occurred at hazard in R.

Before we proceed to more detailed assessment of the texts’ interdependence, the reader may find it helpful to see the correspondences between the manuscripts set out in tabular form. Folio references in R allude to the modern pencil foliation at the foot of each leaf.

i. *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum, Mt. xxii*° capitul:o [:37]. ße helpe and ße grace of God ... Gode men, 3ee schul vndurstonde ßat euer vche mon in ßis worlde is seruaunt to sumwat.

ii. *Estote prudentes et vigilate in orationibus* [I Pet 4:7]. De helpe and pe grace ... euervcbe cristen mon is holden to here Goddes worde.

iii. *Sana, Domine, animam meam, quia peccaui tibi, Psalmo xi°* [(41):5]. Gode cristen men and wymmen, thre causes mouen me forto prech vnto 3owe.

iv. *Hodie oportet me in domo tua manere, Luc. xix° capitulo* [:5]. De helpe and pe grace etc. At pe begynnyng, wyth Goddes grace, I purpose me to teche 3owe pe byddyng of God.

v. *Mortuus viuet, Ioh. xj°*:25]. Dere frendes in God, as Seynt Anselme sayth in his sentence, of alle thynge pat men mowe do for pe dede, pe first and pe pryncypal is to preye for hem.

vi. *Christum sanctificate in cordibus vestris, prima Petri iii° capitulo* [:15]. De gospel of pis daye telles when pat muche puple schulde wende vnto Ihesu [Lc 5:1-11]

vii. *In nouitate vite ambulemus, ad Romanos vj°* [:4]. *Euangelium Mt. v°* [:20-24]. Cryste in po gospell of pis daye telles how we schulden be ryghtwis.

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33 This ascription in R (together with the others listed below) was made in a s. xv hand different from that of the main text.
Now, although our eight sermons seem—at least in one branch of their textual history—to have travelled together, it is clear that they naturally fall into two groups: the three post-Trinity sermons form a liturgical series whereas the other five do not; indeed leaving aside the funeral sermon, the occasions on which they might have been preached are far from clear. Nor is this all, since sermons i-v do not resemble vi-viii in structure either. Unlike vi-viii and the rest of the S-B main set, which are homiletic in structure, their form is predominantly modern; moreover three of them (items i, ii and iv) share a characteristic opening invocation not otherwise used in S-B. One suspects then that the same author may not be responsible. *Mortuus viuet,* which, it will be remembered, was the only item of the set i-v to be included in B, does bear a striking likeness to the other S-B sermons in its extensive use of lists of authorities. Whoever compiled this sermon (or S-B for that matter) probably had access to a theological dictionary.

Quite why the three sermons for Trinity 5-7 should have become associated with the other five is unclear. Either they have become detached from S-B, or the S-B compiler adopted them to fill a gap in his own series. If the latter, then it must be said that they follow the structural pattern of the rest of the main series with remarkable consistency, and must therefore have been considerably adapted. However in practice the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: it seems likely both that the compiler made some extensive substitutions in two of the sermons and that the three may subsequently have become detached from the rest. One could cite a number of manuscripts in which it is evident that, for whatever reason, a section of a larger liturgical series has become detached. 

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34 'pe helpe and pe grace of God pat is almyghty helpe vs alle at pis tyme and worlde wythouet ende. Amen' (S 194r). The manuscripts often abbreviate this to 'pe helpe and pe grace et cetera' (S 196r).

The activity, although it raises questions about the regularity of *de tempore* Sunday preaching in some—perhaps many—pulpits, is by no means uncommon. The substitutions affect Trinity 5 and 6 in which gospel commentary is included which was not taken from the corresponding Wycliffite sermons. Because the commentary in these two corresponding Wycliffite sermons is not notably extreme, Dr. Hudson suggested that the copy of the Wycliffite sermons available to our compiler may have had a lacuna at this point, thus compelling him to have recourse to alternative resources. It may well be so. Almost certainly these substitutions were not made by the person who thought that Trinity 5-7 would make an appropriate pendant to the other five sermons: B’s text of the three post-Trinity sermons in his copy of the main series likewise contains these substituted gospel commentaries in Trinity 5 and 6, while the scribe of S, who started to copy Trinity 5 but broke off when he realised that the sermon was the same as one in the main series, got no further than the gospel commentary. Clearly it was the gospel commentary that he recognised.

Three of the eight sermons are concerned with such serviceable material as penance, prayers and vigils and the keeping of the Commandments, while the utility of a funeral sermon to a working priest would seem indisputable, even if only as an all-purpose meditation on mortality. There is furthermore a shared preoccupation in several of the eight with the office of preaching. Sermons for Trinity 5 by long custom devoted some space to this subject; the day’s gospel (Lc 5:1-11), which told of the miraculous draught of fishes, was naturally treated as an allegory of evangelism. This Trinity 5 sermon is no exception, while Trinity 7 likewise dwells on the matter. Of the other set of five, item ii was adjudged sufficiently evangelistic by a later reader of C to be given the appellation ‘Exortacio ad audiendum verbum Dei’ and the following sermon, too, opens with a preaching apologia: ‘thre causes mouen me forto prech vnto 3owe’. Such a bias in the content may have been a conscious choice in anthologising the sermons or it may simply be a passive reflection of the frequency with which the subject was canvassed in preaching at the time. Especially after Archbishop Arundel’s restrictions of preaching, it is scarcely surprising to find that preachers were touchy about their duties.

One possibility concerning the sermons’ textual history may straightway be disposed of: it has been clearly demonstrated that B cannot represent something approximating to the original state of the sermon-cycle before the S compiler insinuated his invidious opinions into it. B’s lack of the sermons for Sexa-

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36 *English Wycliffite Sermons* 1.119.
38 *English Wycliffite Sermons* 1.120-21.
gesima to Lent 3 shows this and furthermore B has altered the series to begin with Advent, although, from the evidence of the pastoral material, the more unusual Whit opening in S is manifestly earlier in the textual history. It would require uncommon intuition for a scribe beginning at Advent 1 to realise that this was wrong: he would need to tabulate the pastoral material in the third part of each sermon to ascertain from internal evidence that the series' natural opening is at Whitsun. And collation of S and B soon shows that B must have had something resembling S in front of him rather than the other way about. This is the best way of accounting for the abrupt transitions of thought and dislocations of syntax that occur in B: the compiler has made an *ad hoc* decision to abridge material in the process of copying it out. A good example occurs in Advent 3, in which B's text ends:

Sotell theues byn ther \ / that scily robben men wip mony colored wordes, as wip fals behest/s, the whiche leue we pat we may come to the blis, to the whiche he brynge vs fat we died for vs (6r).

1 ther\ ij add. and eras. B

Since a consideration of 'subtle thieves' has been promised as the final section of a tripartite account of thievery, this somewhat breathless halt would in itself lead one to wonder if the text had not been curtailed. Inspection of S soon reveals why this was. The self-interest of these beguilers of the people, better known as pardoners and friars, is denounced in no uncertain terms. B's compiler evidently glanced through the passage and decided it would never do. As it happens, this part of this sermon also turns up independently in one of the Advent sermons in the Ross collection, a consideration to which we must return in this section. But for the present we may note that the Ross compiler liked the commentary on thieves no better. By dint of leaving out intemperate sentences here and there he got a little further than B, but he finally gave up with the comment 'Et cetera, ad placitum. Non post hec'.

If it be accepted that S was not derived from an antecedent of B, could it be that B was put together by someone who actually had S in front of him? This is harder to determine, but I am inclined to think not. There are indications that B's readings seem on occasion more likely to be right than those of S. For B not

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39 This was the only occasion when a day of recognised liturgical importance coincided with the beginning of a pastoral subject (the Gifts of the Spirit). Beginning the cycle with Advent 1 interrupts the commentary on the Commandments which was carried over from the weeks after Trinity.

40 fols. 80v-81r. Pardoners hire out their letters and pardons as others would cows or horses. They do not dare to resort to lords, who are better able to perceive their wiles, they only rob the poor. False preachers preach merely for gain. They seduce children with small gifts to recruit them into their Orders. Such thieves will be hanged in hell.

41 Ross, p. 125.10-21.
infrequently gives the correct source of an authority where S is wrong, or continues a quotation beyond its length in S. Examples are:

S 78r: ‘for Salomon seif ... “Vir duplex” ....’
B 4r: ‘for James seythe ... “Vir duplex” ...’ (Jac 1:8).

S 83r: ‘perfore seif Seynt Iohn ... “Ve illis qui in via Caym” ....’
B 7v: ‘therfor seyje Seynt Iude ... “Ve” ...’ (Judae 11).

S 78r: ‘Nolite iurare per celum neque per terram, et cetera.’
B 4r: ‘Nolite ... terram neque per creaturam aliquam, sed sit sermo vester “est, est” \_et/ “non, non”'; quod amplius est a malo est’ (cf. Mt 5:34-37).

S 79v: ‘Non secundum visionem oculorum neque secundum audidum aurium iudicabit sed iudicabit in justicia et arguet in equitate, et cetera.’
B 5r: ‘Non ... oculorum iudicabit neque ... aurium arguet sed iudicabit in justicia pauperes et arguet in equitate, et cetera’ (cf. Is 11:3).

S 92v: ‘Benedicció eorum vertetur in malediccionem et oracio in peccatum, attestante Domino per prophetam, “Maledicam”, inquir “benediccionibus vestris”.’
B l5r: adds ‘hostie eorum abhom(i)nabiles Domino’ (cf. Mal 2:2).

It is possible, though it would argue for unusual diligence on the B compiler’s part, that he could have checked scriptural references as he came to them in a concordance, and from time to time have added to them. There are, however, other instances in the main text which seem to show that B has preserved a more authentic reading:

B 7v: ‘all thez menscleers fallepe in the same chapter that a]gen charite scléthe eny men in procurynge.’
1 chapter] synne S (83r)

B 10r: ‘Y sey for non euyll, but forto saue myne othe.’
othel soule S (86r)

B 14r: ‘Tho that stelyn monnus chylde, and namelyche whyle that they byn yong, to put hem to howses of relygyon a]gen the wyl of fadyr and modyr....’
2 howses of relygyon] vse S (90v).

In the first of these examples B has the lectio difficilior: ‘chapter’ may refer to part of a source text, or possibly signify ‘assembly’. In the other two examples particular abuses, familiar from other texts, are being alluded to. A number of commentaries on the Second Commandment include the excuses made by habitual swearsers; one is that a man’s bare word is no longer a sufficient surely:
it must needs be supported by an oath. This appears to be the idea referred to in B. The somewhat awkward expression perhaps invited the substitution by copyists of the more familiar, but inappropriate, formula 'save my soul'. Again, it is a commonplace of anti-Mendicant literature that the friars had recourse to near-kidnapping in order to restock their Orders. Although the culprits are not named, the reference in B is clear, too clear seemingly: 'vse' in S has the appearance of an expurgation, at a point where (contrary to the usual pattern) B, rather than S, has preserved the more polemical version.

Furthermore B, on two occasions at least, includes Latin which was not taken from scripture: a reviser is unlikely therefore in these cases to have had independent knowledge. The examples are:

B 13r: "Concupiscencia carnis, concupiscencia oculorum et superbia vite", pat ys to sey "desyre of flesche, desyre of yeye or els pride of lye".

B 29v: 'Quid est fides? Fides est credere.'

Again both examples, especially the latter, suggest that a collection of distinctions was being drawn upon.

If we turn to consider the evidence supplied by the other related manuscripts, it begins to appear that no extant manuscript in the group can be a direct copy of any of the others. We have already provisionally excluded the possibility that R was copied from S, unless he borrowed from it piecemeal; this supposition is strengthened by examination of the Trinity 7 sermon in which we find that S and B on three occasions lack Latin authorities found in both R and Ross. This sermon concludes with a commentary on wrath, of which B has the longest version. S has lost a leaf, possibly because the exciser took exception to the incendiary gospel commentary of the following sermon for Trinity 8. For no

44 'Loke the prophete for this mater, Prouerbiorum x° et xj°' (Ross, p. 302.15-16, R 16vb; cf. S 22r, B 63r). 'Vnde Psalmus [90(91): 15]: "Cum ipso sum in tribulacione; eripiam eum et glorificabo eum - with hym I am in tribulacion; I shall deliuer and glorifie hym"' (Ross, p. 303.2-4, R 17ra; cf. S 22r, B 63v). R and Ross both give Ecclus 23 as the source of the quotation 'Fili, prebe michi cortuum' [Pr 23:26], whereas neither S nor B do (Ross, p. 302.28-29, R 17ra; cf. S 22r, B 63v). The text of R is unfortunately incomplete, but Ross's complete text has other material not found in S or B: 'Ad Ephesios, iii° [3:29], "Omnis sermo malus ... procedat" ... And also ad Ephesios, vi° capitulu [3:4]: "Fornicacio ... graciarum accio - lechery ... gyfynge of thankes"' (Ross, p. 304.25-37; cf. S 22v, B 64v).
45 See the text of the Trinity 8 sermon as printed in English Wycliffite Sermons 1.252-55.
discernible reason R’s scribe stopped mid-sentence, midway down the page. Ross preserves more of the text, but this version likewise comes to an abrupt halt; seemingly this compiler decided independently that he had had enough. Because Ross has more of the text than R, it cannot consequently be a copy of R.

The Trinity 6 sermon also shows that S omits material found in R. S contains independent error, and a reading peculiar to itself. We also find that S and B agree in error, as do R and Ross, which furthermore share material

The sermon ends ‘For when an irus man oft tymes hym wrathes, his hert swelles a-non for tene’ (Ross, p. 306.7-8). The editor notes (ibid.) that the lower half of the folio and the recto facing have been left blank. Seemingly paper was allowed for the completion of the sermon, but an ad hoc decision was made not to finish it.

Only S and R include the entire gospel commentary, but its evidence shows independence between them. Compare S, ‘Hire r^twisnesse was also hire frendes forto loue and forto haten hire enemy, bote oures mot passe pis pat we louen not only oure frend/yn God bote also oure enemy for pe loue of God, and so bydde Crist hymself in pe gospel vbi sic dicit, “Diligite ...”’ [Lc 6:27, Mt 5:44] (18r-v). R reads at this point ‘For he pat hates his broper is a ma/isleer: l Ioh. iii° [: 15] “Qui odit fratrem suum homicida est” ... and perf or byddes Criste in his holye gospell ... “Diligite...” (14rb). R also has other short passages in the gospel commentary which have no counterpart in S (cf. S 18r-v; R 14r-v).

R reads (15rb):

“For Cryste hymselfe is pis waye, both lyfe and trewth: Ioh. xiiij° [:6] ‘Ego sum via, veritas et vita: I am waye - veritas et vita - treuth and lyfe’, and he pat entres in by hym fode schall he fynde of al comfortes and dayntes pat mannes herte may yerne, for Criste in po gospell says pus hymselfe: Ioh. x° [:9] ‘Si quis per me introierit’.

2 treuth] rep. and eras.

This is also substantially the text of Ross (p. 299.15-22) and B (61v). S however reads (19v):

“For Crist hymself is pis wey, hope lyfe and troupe, for he pat entrep in by hym fode he schal fynde of alle coumfortes and deynte pat mannes herte may yerne. For Crist in pe gospell seith pus hymselfuer ‘Ego sum via, veritas et vita. Si quis per me introierit.’

S has thus misplaced the first authority and conflated it with the second. S also has the peculiar error ‘pe dygnyte of pe deuell’ (19r) where R (15va), Ross (p. 297.20) and B (61r) read correctly ‘po dynte of pe deuell’.

S alone reads (20r) ‘Bote enuye pat regnep now in pis world letteb men to walke in pis newenesse of lyfe, and pis enuye is a foule synne of pe fend’. R (15va) has ‘Now will I tell you forth po seconde hede synne pat lettes uos to walke in newnes of lyfe, pat is calde enuye, pat is a foule synne’. This is substantially followed by Ross (p. 299.31-33) and B (61v) except that B substitutes ‘branche of synne’ for ‘hede synne’.

S (19v) and B (61v) wrongly attribute the saying ‘Spiritus sanctus discipline effugiet fictum’ (Sap 1:5) to ‘Seynt Iohn’ in ‘his epistel’, although S correctly gives the source in a marginal note as ‘Sap. primo’. Since R (15rb) and Ross (pp. 298-99) also include passages at this point in the sermon which have no counterpart in S or B, and since these passages both contain citations from John’s epistles, it seems possible that S, or his antecedent, has abridged the text now witnessed by R and Ross, and in the process became confused as to the attribution of the authority. This would be the more likely to have occurred if, as in S itself, S’s exemplar gave the sources for authorities in the margins rather than in the text.

R (14vb) and Ross (p. 297.28, corrected by the editor) share the distinctive error ‘in charyte owes us to blede’ for the more unfamiliar ‘bleve’. S (19r) and B (61r) share the reading ‘in charyte owe vs to be cladde’ (B, ‘clothed’). Likewise R (15va) and Ross (p. 300.11) agree upon the error
not found in S or B.\textsuperscript{52}

Collation of the \textit{Mortuus viuet} sermon found in SBCR suggests that, because of independent errors, neither R nor B can be the source of any of the others.\textsuperscript{53} R and S contain a phrase omitted in C and B.\textsuperscript{54} R, C and B also contain idiosyncratic readings: R has added phrases to clarify and strengthen the argument;\textsuperscript{55} C and B have independently modified the phrasing and lost the whereabouts of authorities. Since B preserves information lacking in C as to the sources of some authorities, the B compiler is unlikely to have had access to C.\textsuperscript{56}

\'to [Ross, 'tyl'] he haue by wyll'; compare S (20r) 'til he haue cast by sum while', B (62r) 'til he haue cast by some wise'. The antecedent of R and Ross perhaps read 'by wyle' (i.e., 'wile': the passage speaks of the deceits practised by the envious man to discomfort his neighbour).\textsuperscript{52} These are strings of authorities; R (15ra), Ross (p. 298.20-29); compare S (19v) and B (60v).

Of greater interest is the divergence between R (15rb), Ross (p. 299.6-10) and S (19v), B (61v). R and Ross read:

\begin{quote}
\textit{For he says he \textit{hat} has chosen po way of sothfastnesse, and \textit{po} apostle says, ij}° Ioh. ij°[3 Jo 1:4] Maiorem horum non habeam graciam quam ut aud[iam filios meos in veritate ambulantes.}
\end{quote}

2 audiam\textsuperscript{52} audiam R

\begin{quote}
It will be seen first that R and Ross agree in the error \textquote{ij}° Ioh. \textquote{ij}° and secondly that there is a lacuna after \textquote{sothfastnesse}. The text of S makes better sense of this, although the quotation from John that is omitted may be original:

\begin{quote}
\textit{For he seith \textit{hat} he hath chosen \textit{pe} way of sothfastnesse: \textit{viam veritatis elegi}, et cetera [Ps 118(119):30]. And \textit{her}fore take we ensaumple of \textit{pe} prophet.}
\end{quote}

1-2 viam ... prophet om. B

\textsuperscript{53} Thus both scribes commit errors of haplography, as it happens at the same point in the text, although the results are very different. S reads as follows (203r; cf. C 23v):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Per is thre manere of deth: bytter and mor eesy and kuyndely deth. Pe first is in jonge men, \textit{pat} \textit{oper} is in chyldre and \textit{pe} thrydde deth is of olde men. Jonge men suffren more in deth \textit{pen} don jonge chyldre or elles olde folke \textit{hat} dyen in her elde.}
\end{quote}

B (108v) reads:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ther is iij maner dethe: bytter and more esy and kyndely, and \textit{pe} iij is in old men. 3eonge men sufferen more peyne in here dethe than don 3eonge chyldre \textit{oper} old folke.}
\end{quote}

R (10va) reads:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Per is thre maner of dede: bytter and more esye and kyndelye dede. Pe fyrst is in 3ong men, \textit{pat} \textit{opur} is in children or elles olde folke \textit{hat} dyen in \textit{per} elde.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{54} S 202v, R 10rb: \textquote{but preyer profyteth more} (cf. B 107v, C 22v).

\textsuperscript{55} R (10ra) reads as follows (I italicise comments not found in the other three manuscripts):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Succour we hem \textit{pat} bene dede \textit{wiþ} almesdede gyuyenge to \textit{ho} pore nedye of Cristie, \textit{wiþ} deuoute prayers groundid in chartie [and] \textit{wiþ} deuoute fastynge out of dedelye synne and \textit{wiþ} messe syngyng \textit{wiþ}outen symonye.}
\end{quote}

2 and\textsuperscript{1} as R.

\textsuperscript{56} For example B 108r (cf. C 23r), \textquote{As a grete clerke, Hugo de Sacramentis, libro primo, parte secunda seyjhe}. C merely ascribes the ideas to \textquote{a grete clerke off the Sacramentis in hys boke}. S (202v) and R (10rb) cite \textquote{Hughe of \textit{pe} Sacramentes in his boke}; S (but not R) adds in the margin \textquote{Libro primo, parte secunda}. The ideas expressed correspond rather to book 1, part 6 of Hugh of St. Victor's \textit{De sacramentis christianae fidei}, especially chaps. 18 and 24 (PL 176.275-78).
We may now properly enquire into the affiliations of the Ross anthology. Ross contains the three post-Trinity sermons, but it has already been hinted that it also contains material from other sermons found in the S-B dominical collection. These other sermons, it may now be revealed, are those for Advent 1-3 (Ross, Sermons 18, 20 and 21). Different scribes were responsible for these two groups of sermons. If we accept Ross’s account, then Sermons 18, 20 and 21 were written by Scribes 1 and 3, whereas Scribes 5, 6 and perhaps 4 copied Sermons 44-46. If we accept Warner and Gilson’s more modest reckoning, then Sermons 18, 20 and 21 were written in the same hand as all the other sermons edited by Ross except for Sermons 44-46, which occur in a section of the manuscript where a number of hands are represented. In either case the changeover of scribes working on the two sets might suggest that they were working from more than one exemplar: one which contained the main dominical cycle of S-B (or at least its Advent sermons) and another which contained Trinity 5-7, probably as a separate set, since it would seem overmuch of a coincidence to suppose that the Ross compiler (or compilers) independently sensed the peculiar merits, whatever they may be, of the Trinity 5-7 sermons and seized upon them and only them as worthy of being copied in full. If however we assume that the different groups of scribes were working from a single exemplar, then this cannot have been S itself, since the copyist at work in this part of S realised that these sermons were part of the main set and so desisted from copying them. One would need to propose an antecedent of S in which the scribes were less observant. From information set out below, however, it is clear that the Ross compiler did have access to a variety of vernacular sermon manuscripts: his is a patchwork compilation.

If, for the moment, we confine ourselves to the post-Trinity group, it is evident that, although the Ross compiler omitted the gospel commentaries at the beginning of two of the sermons (Trinity 6 and 7), he decided to do so independently. For that he had access to a copy which included the gospel commentaries (or at least a part of them, as in B) is apparent from his absent-minded inclusion of the remark ‘vbi prius’ in these two sermons immediately after the opening announcement of the theme. In other words, the compiler had decided simply to begin at the iteracio thematis. Thus we have two compilers of the later fifteenth century, Ross and B, who decide on their own initiative that it might be diplomatic to leave out the scriptural commentary: we should remember that the post-Trinity group does not contain extreme views;

57 Ross, p. xvi.
59 Ross, pp. 297.10, 301.21.
indeed in two of these sermons the commentary is unrelated to the Wycliffite set. Ross, then, probably had access to a text resembling S or R and, from what has already been said, it appears that Ross has a marked tendency to agree with R against S. Yet Ross cannot have been made directly from R since R’s sermon for Trinity 7 is incomplete. If the association between R and Ross is correct, we must posit an antecedent for R.

It would be foolhardy indeed to attempt to devise a stemma to account for these preliminary and provisional observations. It may however be said that, if, as seems likely, none of the extant manuscripts was copied from any of the others, it follows that there were once other copies in existence. However the chance of contamination cannot be entirely dismissed.

In her edition Dr. Hudson remarked on the likelihood that further interconnections between the S-B sermons and other vernacular compilations would come to light. In one respect this prophecy has already been fulfilled and it is no doubt possible that further affiliations await discovery. It comes increasingly to seem that much of the extant English preaching is an elaboration of a fairly small corpus of influential material.

Accordingly some further observations can be made concerning Ross Sermons 18, 20 and 21, sermons for Advent 1-3. It will be noticed that this further borrowing again affects a liturgically coherent group; indeed it is probable that the majority of the sermons in this anthology of de tempore preaching edited by Ross consists of small groups of sermons from diverse sources.60

The Ross compiler, or an antecedent, drew upon the three Advent sermons from S-B in an unusual way. Unlike the Trinity 5-7 group, he took passages here and there from S-B and interspersed them with passages from another vernacular collection now extant in Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 806,61 and other passages probably from another sermon collection so far untraced. He may furthermore have had independent knowledge of a commentary on the Ten Commandments which was used in the Bodley 806 sermons, as well as S-B, but which may have had an autonomous existence. To add to all the other complications, the material which indubitably did come from the collection represented by Bodley 806 did not come from the corresponding sermons for Advent 1-3. Some of it is not even Advent preaching. It may be said that this method of composition by piecing together scraps of other men’s prose suggests

60 See Ross’s discussion of the groupings (pp. xix-xxvi).
61 S.C. 2688. This collection is another that derived material from the Wycliffite cycle and as such it is described in English Wycliffite Sermons 1.110-15. Two sermons from the collection are edited with their source, sermons by Odo of Cheriton, in Spencer, English Vernacular Sunday Preaching, pp. 421-534.
a degree of reluctance, remarkable to my knowledge even among the vernacular sermon writers, to produce original prose. Almost inevitably the compiler did not fully succeed in the creation of a fluent or even wholly coherent discourse out of such disparate ingredients: the argument from paragraph to paragraph in the modern edition proceeds somewhat unevenly; indeed Ross's paragraphs very often unconsciously reflect a change of source.

The correspondences between Ross and S-B and Ross and Bodley 806 are set out in the following table. Considerations of space make it impracticable to set out the whole of the parallel passages: instead I have given substantial *incipits* and *explicits* of each passage to enable the reader to make some independent assessment of the nature of the borrowings. It may be noticed that the passage which is indebted to the Advent 4 sermon in Bodley 806, and which in content strikingly resembles a well-known passage in the *Ancrene Wisse*, is ultimately based upon a Latin source: the Sunday gospel sermon for Advent 4 by Odo of Cheriton.62

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**ROSS SERMON 18 (ADVENT 1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ross, pp. 103.33-104.16</th>
<th>S 74r (B 1r)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good men ... 3ef a man shulde goye a wey that he must nedys gowy, or els feght with a slye enmye for is right and is heritage ... For and he ouercomm vs, þan we shall lose oure heritage fore euermore.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**ROSS, p. 104.22-32**

| And when þou felist commyng of temptacion of þe feend, and fowle ymaginacions and euell thowthes, sey to þat cruell terraunt þe feend, 'Quid stas, cruenta bestia? - what stondib þou here, þou wicked beeste?' And make þe strongly with þe staffe of þe Crosse, and smyte hym with þe worde of God, with good almosse 3eynghe, and in suche 3pur |

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**MS. BODLEY 806, FOL. 11v**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(ADVENT 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whenne þou felust þe fende weende vp wiþ temptacion, and drawiþ nije vnto þe, willynge by his sleyþtus to putte þee into þe slydurnesse of letcherie, anon holde þee by þe staffe of strenge and smyte þe deuel on þe heued, þat is wþstonde his firste temptacion, for whenne þe fleysche begynnþ to wexe hoot, and þou felist comyng foule ymaginacions, seye þou þanne to hym, 'Quid hic astas, cruenta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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62 The material from Odo's sermon has been cited from a reliable manuscript of s. xiii, Cambridge, Peterhouse 109. Corrections are made from another good copy, Cambridge, Trinity College ms. B.15.22 (James 358), also s. xiii.
good occupacions doyinge, and bete πi flesh with πe yerde of penaunce; and πus πou shalte ouercomm πe feend and trede hym vndir πi fete.

6 make] sic but marke?

Ross, pp. 104.36-105.16

For so fawght Dauid when πat he ouercomm Golias. He assaied is armour and felte πat it was hevy, and threwe it aveye, and toke is slynge with iij stones, and πer-with he slew3 is emeny πe terraunt ...

'Vincenti dabo manna et nomen nouum; vincenti dabo edere de ligno vite.' ...

Esto fidelis usque ad mortem, et dabo tibi coronam vite', ... to all πo pat trewly loveπ hym.'

Ross, p. 105.17-35

Manny men seke Crist in sekenes and in tribulacion, but πei fynde hym not, why-for πei lost hym wilfully afore, forçetynge hym in πere worldly prosperite, and seche hym with noon affecion. And per-for I reddy you do as πe holy prophete teches bestia?': 'What stondist πou heere, synful, wickide beest?' βenkynghe wherof he is icome, and wharto he schal turne aγen, strongly markynge πee [wiπ pe] staf of πe cr < o > s, smyte πou hyme wiπ Goddis worde redynge, or wiπ sum oπer good occupacion doynghe, as to ryse vp nakid and bete πi stynkynghe fleysche wiπ a 3erde wher πe fende hideπ hyme in πat fleysche, and so πou schalt al totrede vndir πi feete Sathanas.\(^63\)

14 wiπ pe om. ms.

S 74r-v (B 1r)

\(\text{πus fougste Dauid when he slowp Golyam: he assayede his armure and felde hit was to heuy and caste hit fro hym awey whemne πat he schulde fyaste and tok his slynge wiπ pre stones and so he slow πis tiraunte ... 'Vincenti dabo manna et nomen nouum et vincenti dabo edere de / ligno vite quod est in Paradiso Dei mei', ... to hem πat ben trewe in πis gostely ba-
taylle.}

ms. Bodley 806, fol. 22r

(Epiphany 1)

Manye sechen Criste in tribulacion and fynden hym not, for πey losten hym wil-
fully and forçeten hymne in wordely pros-
perite and be slowe in sechinge, and per-
fore, as holy writte sei], I rede πat πee doo,
'Querite Dominum dum inveniri potest,

\(^63\) Compare ms. Peterhouse 109, fol. 10v-11r (modern pencil foliation):

Cum sentis [diabolum] accedere, et te in lubricitatem luxurie uolentem inpellere, statim baculo fortitudinis te appodias, immo cum baculo diabolum / percupias. Diabolum sentis accedere cum caro incipit calere et turpes ymaginaciones intelligis uenire. Tu attim dicas, 'Quid hic astas, cruenta bestia?' et baculo crucis te ipsum signando, fortiter ipsum percias et uiriliter te ipsum ad aliquod opus transferas, uel nudus surgas, cum uerberas ubi in carne diabolus latitat, et sic conteres ipsum Sathan.

1 diabolum] baculum ms. 5 uel corr. ex ut ms. 6 uerberas] uerbera ms.

The expression 'Quid hic astas, cruenta bestia?' may reflect an exorcism formula. Compare 'Quid stas & resistis cum scias eum tuas perdere vires?' (E. Martene, De antiquis ecclesiae ritibus libri quattor..., 3 vols. [Rouen, 1700-1702], 3.510 passim) or 'Conjuro te ... diabole ... nec stare nec discurrere nec latere nec saevire in corpore istius' (ibid., p. 512).
you, 'Querite Dominum dum inveniri potest; invocate eum dum prope est.' ... Or els he will sey to you as he seid to pe Iewes, 'Queritis me et non inveni' eti' ... For lastingly 3ee sechent me, not sorowynge for your s <y> nnes, bot in riot, laugter and ioye, drunknesse and swerynge, as men sechen nouyardayes deede stocks and stonous. Perfore 3ee musten seche hym whenne he, þorou synne, is lost from 30ou, as Marie dide and Ioseph, þe dayes til þe founden hym, þat is to seye wip ful desyre of herte, wip preyer and almesde, and weende towarde Jerusalem, for þere þou schalt fynde hym; not[i] in þis worlde wanyte as schappemen sechen þer ware.

Ross, pp. 108.21-110.10

The secunde Commandement is, 'Non assumes nomen Dei tuui in vanum.' ... Þe wiche is all day broken amonge lered and lewed, with yonge men and old, with riche and pore, from a yonge childe þat vnnep can speke till þat age haue rafte is speche. And þus þei dismembur he þat is Lord ouer all lordes, as Seynt Poule wittenes where þat he seis þus. 'Deus exaltauit illum et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Ihesu omne genu flectatur celestium, terrestrium, et inferrorum.' ... And þerfore seis þe vise man in is boke, 'Omni iuramento non assuescas os tuum — to iche swerynge custom not þi mowthe.' He beleivþ not in Crist þat troweþ not is wordes; and he beleivþ in Crist þat wilfully leveþ is synne and þat kepis is commandementes. Perfor let vs leue oure synne and wrechednes with all oure myght, and caste we a-vey suche werkes of derkenes, and liff we in þe lawe of God, þat we may com to þat infinite blisse þat God hæp ordeyned for vs. Amen.

You, 'Querite Dominum dum inveniri potest; invocate eum dum prope est.' ... Or hellis, as he seye to þe Iewes, 'Queretis me/ et non inveni'etis' ... For lastingly 3ee sechen me, not sorowynge for your s <y> nnes, bot in riot, laugter and ioye, drunknesse and swerynge, as men sechen nouyardayes deede stocks and stonous. Perfore 3ee musten seche hym whenne he, þorou synne, is lost from 30ou, as Marie dide and Ioseph, þe dayes til þe founden hym, þat is to seye wip ful desyre of herte, wip preyer and almesde, and weende towarde Jerusalem, for þere þou schalt fynde hym; not[i] in þis worlde wanyte as schappemen sechen þer ware.

8 me] add. s.s. ...
Ross, pp. 114.24-115.16

Sirs, þise be þe wordes of Seynt Poule, and ben þus muche to sey in Ynglish, ‘Haue we trew feyth.’ For and we faill hope, þan oure helpe and oure socure is farre from vs, for as oure dedis be, so shall we be comforted ... And also he seis þat we haue a vokett to þe Fadur, Ihesus Crist, þe wiche is ryghtfull and mercyfull for oure synnes – not oonly for ours, but for all þe world. And þerfore lett vs knalage oure synnes, and turne vs to God.

Ross, pp. 115.20-117.18

And so þe puplicane þat com in-into þe churche to prey was preysed of God in foure pinges ... ‘And þan þiff þat we seche spase of penaunce, we shall non fynde ne may haue no tymeper-to.’ Þerfore whils þat God abideþ vs, amende ich man hym-selfe.

And take we not Goddes name in vayn in swerynge and forswerynge as many men do. Som will swere þe more þat a man blameþ hym, and so wilfully þei dispice God; and þei be Caymes childere ... Iterum crucifixerunt Filium Dei. And þerfore iche man amend hym-selfe, and so haue we hope in God. But swerynge of preestes is cause of many mo, and þerfore seyþ Seynt Gregore in is boke, ‘Ruina populi maxime ex sacerdotum et cleri est culpa.’ ... ‘As þe werst of þe peple is, so is þe preeste now-a-daiet.’

S 76v-77r (B 3r)

‘Haue we hope.’ In trewe hope lyȝt al oure helþe and help for evermore, and, þef we fayleþ of trewe / hope, oure hele is al aweye, bote aftur þat oure dedes ben, so schule we hope, for good hope may he nouþ haue þat wol not lyue wel. And so moste he be comforted wherne he wenden heþer away ... ‘Whoso synneþ, we han a voket, Ihesu Crist, at þe Fadur, wuche þat is rjtwys: he is help for oure synnes’, and not only for ours, bote also he is help for þe synnes of al þe world. Be þe þerfore trusty and turne we to hym. And, ‘haue we hope’, as Y ﬁrste seide.

4-5 so schule we hope] so schall oure hope be comforted B

ms. Bodley 806, fols. 98v-99v
(Trinity 11)

And so þis publican was preised of God in foure pinges ... / ... ‘And þanne we seche space to do penaunce and we shul mowe fynde noo space.’ Þerfore þe while þat God abidip vs to amende / doo eche man hymselfe and his neiþebore to his miȝt þat we be amendide or we diȝe.

S 77r-78r (B 3v-4r)

Somme wolen swere muche þe more þef þat men blamen hem, and so willefully / and wytering þey dispisen God, þe wuche ben ludas childeren ... ‘Et milites crucifixerunt eum.’ And þerfore vche mon amende hym, and so ‘haue we hope’, as I ﬁrst seide ... Bote now, þe more harme is, þei þat schulden beste lyue: byschopes, erchideknes, ofiﬁciales and denes and oþer men of þe chirche, þat reden Godes lawe, cursyde ensaumple þey þeye, for þey meyeþine suche sweryng, and þerfore mony of hem taken no hede hou cursidely þey swere, and þerfore seyþ Seynt Gregor...
Frendes, pise been pe wordes of pe holy apostell Seynt Poule and ben þus myche to þus in his Omelyes, 'Ruina populi maxime est sacerdotum culpa.' ... / ... 'As þe wurste of þe pepul, so is þe prest.'

7-17 Bote now ... prest] on. B

ms. Bodley 806, fols. 37v-38r (Quinquagesima)

'Memento vt diem saboti sanctifices' ... as þer ben þre Persons in Trinite, so þese þre hestis be proprid to þe Trinite. Se for þre causes þou schalt halawe þine halyday. Oon is þat þou haue leyser to þanke God and wrschippe hym for alle þe medeful werkis þat þou hast doon in þe woke ... / ... And þerfore, frendis, make þee not þour halydayes curside þorow cursed werkis, but in holynesse halewe þee hit as holy sones of God þat he wel clepe 30w at þe ende wip his holy blessyng to þe sabot of euerelastynge ioy.

B 105r (Trinity 24)
The second fader that þou scholdest wurschupp is a man of age, not only of age but also of vertue ... 'Maledictus fit puer centum annorum.' ... 'Non vocaberis Abram, sed Habraham.' And we shuld worschepp suche holy old faders.

64 It will be seen that this definition of the 'second father' in Ross is not derived from the corresponding S-B sermon for Advent 2, but resembles a local passage in Trinity 24. This would seem to add weight to the supposition that the Ross compiler may also have consulted independently a commentary on the Commandments which had an autonomous existence and which was also drawn upon in S-B and in Bodley 806, so that the Ross compiler may have encountered it in three different sources.
sey to youre vndirstonynge: 'Will ye not deme be-fore tyme.' Bis synne is muche vsed now amonge men, and þerfore it is nedefull to knowe what demynge þat we shuld leue. There bethe ij maner of demynges, foly demyng, and ryghtwisem demyng. ... 'ryghtfull dome', he seij, 'is turned aeyn, and sothfastenesse stood al ofeer. Trefpe fel down in þe feld, and equyte myyte not entre in.'

Ross, pp. 124.5-125.21

Also God biddeþ þat þou shalt do no thefte, for iij maner of theves þer been þat robben men of þer goodes: open robbers, and prevey theves, and setell theves ... þe wiche þeis sell all for þe penny and for no mans mede, with many fals lesyngges, as þe feend here maistur techeþ hem for to robbe þe pore pepull sotelly of þer goodes. And þerfor seid Crist, 'Attendite a falsis prophetis.' Et cetera, ad placitum. Non post hec.65

S 80r-v (B 5v-6r)

And þerfore telle we for þe toþer Comaundement of seuen þat God byddeþ þou schalt not do, and þis is þat þou do no þehte. And þrie maner of þeues þer þat robben þen of hire goodes: opene robbers þer þen, and pryuey þeues and sotell þeues ... / ... and al is for þe penye and not for monnes mede, wip mony false curside lesyngus as þe deuel hem techeþ. Vnto grete lordus wolen none suche wende, bote forto robbe þe poure men sutely of hire goodus, for lordus han more wisdam hire falseness to knowe. And þerfore bëþ we war of suche as þe gospel byddeþ, 'Attendite a falsis prophetis.'

III

THE NATURE OF THE ALTERATIONS IN B

B's alterations of S most commonly and characteristically take the form of omissions rather than of additions and substitutions other than such modi-

65 The deliberate omission of any further material on theft in Ross is scarcely surprising. S continues with an intemperate denunciation of clerical depredations (the passage 'and al is for þe penye ... prophetic' and the ensuing material is likewise omitted in B). The original S-B compiler appears to have drawn upon the Rosarium or Floretum in this section: on fol. 81r of S there is the comment 'Parisience, þe grete clerk, seij þis in his bok, "Quidam enim sunt mercenarii munera querentes per mendacia, per falsas reliquias, sigilla et literas, per falsa et miracula"', with a marginal reference 'In libro abreviato de pseudo-predicatoribus, capitolo xlv66'. Compare The Middle English Translation of the Rosarium Theologie, ed. von Nolcken, p. 91.31-35 and the editorial note, p. 123. In the Rosarium and Floretum the reference is located either in chap. 50 or, as here, chap. 45 of the liber abbreviatus.
fications as were necessary to smooth over the effect of the omissions. The compiler does however evince a desire to make the sermons more accessible by updating archaisms and by modification of some of the more difficult or ponderous syntactic constructions. 'go' is substituted for 'wende', 'duell' for 'wone', 'commaundement' for 'hest', 'curse' for 'malesoun', 'forbedythe' for 'forfended'.

‘lest we lese heuen blis’ replaces ‘do we ri t so for 

\[ \text{(B 4v; S 78r), and the elephantine paronomasia ‘take another custom and custome ojicwyse hire tonge’ becomes ‘constrayne ther tonges frome oifes’ (ibid.). Many other instances could be adduced, but the updating of archaisms is primarily of interest in so far as this strengthens the supposition that B is considerably later in date than the Summary Catalogue suggests.}\]

A dual intention may be discerned in B’s omission of copy: the desire to render the text more acceptable by the expurgation of controversial or invidious remarks and the wish to make it more palatable by simple abridgement. Inevitably these twin concerns overlap. Thus B’s (and Ross’s) removal of the gospel translations and their accompanying commentaries may be explained by either motive or both together. Quite how the user of B was supposed to cover the Sunday gospels is unclear: with a few exceptions

\[ \text{the translation of the pericope breaks off after a sentence or so with the formula ‘Ut patet in Evangelio’. This direction is presumably addressed to a preacher rather than a congregation and is perhaps best interpreted as an invitation for him to continue the translation or to paraphrase \textit{ad hoc}, unless one posits the unlikely alternative that he is being referred to a copy of the Wycliffite Sunday gospel sermons also in his possession. B has retained many comments in S on the supreme importance of making ‘God’s word’ available to the people in sermons; accompanying gospel translations would fulfil this requirement without adding unduly to the length.}\]

Length certainly seems to have been a consideration. A number of the substantially omitted passages seem innocuous or uncontentious enough. Examples are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Easter 2}
  \begin{itemize}
    \item \textit{Summe men suffren willefully, and somme men ayeyn per wille. And somme men suffren togedur pe toum and pe toper. Men schulden suffre willefully for loue of per soule, as pey wolen suffre willefully for loue of per luste bope hoot and cold, hunger and purste} (S 133r).
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\[\text{Examples are: ‘If a man schuld go a wey pat he muste nedes goo’ (B 1r; cf. S 74r); ‘pat we may duell wip hym’ (B 10v; cf. S 87v); ‘the commaundementis of God’ (B 14r; cf. S 91r); ‘curse he couetithe’ (B 8r; cf. S 83v); ‘he forbedythe hyt’ (B 14r; cf. S 91r).}\]

\[\text{Palm Sunday (29v-30r); Trinity 4 (53r); Trinity 5 (55v-56v); Trinity 6 (60r-v); Trinity 24 (103v-104r).}\]
Some sufferyn wilfully for the loue of òper bothe hete and cold, hunger and furst (B 37r).

Trinity 9

For wíp trauel þe han geten hem [earthly goods] noun òpurwyse certes þen a thef þat fro his lor <d> hath stolen a gret pak of his goode and schal be honged þerfore. Wíp muche trauel he hit stelope and holdeth hyt wíp drede bote, whenne he wended toward þe galewes and bereþ hit in his nekke, luytel ioy may he haue to say þat hit is hyss, for hit is taken fro hym soone and he deede þerfore (S 29v; cf. B 71r).

Trinity 16

And so þey [men] sunnen in pruyde and wasten her complexium on mony manere wyse and maken hem so feble þat þey mowe not serve God, summe wyth lecherye and drunkenhede and suche òper sumnes þat maken men forto dye longe or þey schulde – and wíp vnwyse abs(i)f(h)ence and òper penaunce doyng – and myghten lerne, and wote noghte, hou þey schulden plese God (S 46v).

But they byn ycaste into the deuels daunger and seruyce that they haue no mynde on the blis of heuen, ne on the peynes of hell, bot gon forthe as vnresenabull bestis and woll not lerne to plese God (B 86r).

Not infrequently the B compiler practised a mild form of expurgation in order to mitigate the force of certain harsh or coarse sayings. Thus a passage in Trinity 16 which spoke of the rape of religious women has been toned down (B 86r; S 46v) and a reference to sins against kind has been removed from Trinity 17 (B 89r; S 50r). In Trinity 12 ‘summe by summon’ became the ‘synne of glotony’ (B 77r; S 36r). The following diatribe concerning the soul’s prostitution to the devil will illustrate B’s greater sense of decorum:

Trinity 14

Denne as a hore quene of þat foule harlot hire conceyueth wyth sorowe and bryngeth forthe wíp schome in horedome and harlottrye foule cursed bastardes: lothly sumnes and foule, as chylдре of helle (S 41v).

Sche conceyuuythe and brynythe forthe cheldren of synne, þat is to sey foule cursed bastardes and foule children of hell (B 82r).

In the following example from Epiphany 4 the whole cast of the original has been altered:

Mony folk for pryde vset mony rynges, bope ʒunge and olde – and dritte vnndur þe nayle/ – þe wuche wolde helpe mony poure and wynne men grete mede and grete loue of God, for ‘loue is fulfullyng of þe lawe’, as I firste seide (S 99r-v).69

Mony folke for pride vse thez thyngis, bothe yong and olde (B 21v).

A reference to the non-celibacy of priests in scripture was also removed from Trinity 24.70 B was not consistently fastidious however. He retained for instance a reference to false confessors who debauch women (B 10r; S 86r), and most of the extensive commentary on the degrees of lechery which takes up four weeks from Trinity 14-17.

Of greater significance is the pervasive, although again not wholly consistent, expurgation of controversial matter. The epistle and pastoral sections of the sermons (which are of course the parts of the sermons which principally remain in B) have been provisionally described as ‘the work of a Lollard sympathiser, though not on the extreme wing of the movement’.71 Perhaps the most doctrinally extreme remarks are those which concern confession. The sermon-writer commented that true confession ought to be made ‘wiþ meke schewyng to a prest of good lyf þat con boþe leuse and bynde’ (88r): he did not discount oral shrift, but it is not clear whether he shared the view that confession to an evil-living priest was invalid. He was in any case too outspoken for B: the very phrasing, whatever the doctrinal implications, was reminiscent of Lollard polemic.72 B likewise jibbed at the plain statement ‘and so for̂euenesse of synne only to God longejf (S 130r), preferring instead the blander ‘he schall ... haue for̂euenes of synne’ (35r). Accordingly in B ‘wiþ meke schewyng ... leuse and bynde’ was altered to ‘wiþ meke schewynge to hym þat hathe cure of hym’ (11v); it is evident from many passages that B, like the original writer, sided with the secular clergy in their long and bitter contention that they and they alone, not peripatetic friars, should hear their parishioners’ confessions. Presumably both B and the original compiler were themselves seculars. Indeed B felt sufficiently strongly about this to elaborate the point: ‘he þat is þy curatt hathe vnertake thi soule, if þou wolt wurche as

69 ‘Plenitudo legis est dilectio’ (Rom 13:10) is the theme, taken from the day’s epistle.
70 Leaves have been excised from S at this point, but the text follows the corresponding Wycliffite sermon: see English Wycliffite Sermons 1.317.9-11.
71 ibid. 1.123.
72 Compare Select English Works of John Wyclif, ed. T. Arnold, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1869-71), 3.461. Compare also ‘Of Confession’ in The English Works of Wyclif Hitherto Unprinted, ed. F. D. Matthew (EETS OS 74; London, 1880), p. 333.4-6, ‘it is fylly þat a prest ordeyned to be damned assyfel not þus; but what prest or man confessid wot wher þis prest shal be damned.’ Compare also English Wycliffite Sermons 1.276-77.28-58. B likewise omitted to translate a saying of St. Augustine (although he included the Latin), ‘No man doþ away synne, no bote only Crist, þe wuche is lomb doynge away þe synnes of þe world’ (S 130r; B 35r).
he bidde be the' (11v). S also suggests that, because forgiveness comes from God, the mediation of a priest is not in all cases necessary. Following Ambrose, he adduces the example of St. Peter: 'whenne þat he had trespaced, wel Y fynde þat he wepte bitturly þyrefore; hise teres Y rede, bote not his schrift to a prest' (S 130v). This was apparently too reminiscent for B's comfort of the Wycliffite view that:

If it were nedful to man, crist wolde have vse it or tau it. Whenne crist forþaue marie magdeleyne hir synnes, he vse not siche rownynge; and whenne he forþaue petir hise synnes, & poule his, & oþer men heren þat he clensid, he vseid not siche rownyng in ere, ne siche asoylyng as prestis vse nowe.73

The passage from S was expunged in B. Moreover, by instancing Judas, the S compiler suggested that confession was not only not always necessary, but that it was also not always efficacious (87v). B again left this out (11v). There is again perhaps an implicit challenge to the priest's power to bind and unbind in the following passage, likewise censored in B, although the main point is that oral shrift and satisfaction by money payment are insufficient without true contrition and subsequent reform of life:

Mony lewede folk wene it sufficeþ vnto hem wherne he hæþ spoken wip þe prest and payed a schrift peny and leyd his hond on his hed and seþ he assolleþ hym forto pay a trental and syng he hymself, or vche Friday to ofre to ymages in þer chirche or elles to þeue a pound of waxe to þe hye auter, or elles pay a porcion to þe poure freres, and þe man turneþ æþyn to his olde lyfe (S 130r).

The need for contrition and subsequent amendment of behaviour were commonplaces in discussions of penance: the passage quoted develops from commentary on contrition which B included (35v). Yet the implied criticism of contemporary outward expressions of satisfaction was unacceptable; doubtless too the slighting reference to 'ymages' was scarcely conciliatory.74 B elsewhere shows however that he shared S's dislike of satisfaction by gifts 'to þe poure freres', although he has a tendency in common with other moderate critics to shrink from explicitly naming the enemy:

A \\syke/ man schuld rather chese hym þat woll ley his lif for him than anþer þat woll nott butt ley a plaster to him, takynge largely therfor, proft ye what he may (B 11v).75

73 'Of Confession' (Matthew, p. 328.9-14). S includes explicit discussion of this subject in the gospel protheme for Trinity 19 (54r-v; English Wycliffite Sermons 1.298-99).

74 B has omitted a long passage in Trinity 25 which condemns the worship of images and the adornment of churches (S 71r-v; B 105v).

75 Compare 'Fifty Errors and Heresies of Friars' (Arnold 3.374-75, 393-94).
Yet if B was certainly no friend of the friars, he nonetheless often found S's outspoken denunciation of them too pungent. A passage concerning letters of fraternity was deleted, as was a long passage on clerical peculation which included detailed anti-Mendicant polemic (S 80v-81r; B 6r). The old charges are made: friars (and other regulars) entice away men's children to entrap them into their Orders, 'perfore to alle suche, be þei freres, monkus or chanones, God in þe gospel þeuef hem his curs' (S 81r). They are deceitful and preach merely for gain and personal vainglory. In the sermon for Trinity 1 a covert passage directed against unchaste friars, whose clerical garb wards off suspicion, is turned in B into an unexceptionable diatribe against 'louers of lustes, blasphemyng wiþout pes, wicked wiþout mekenes, not buxom to here frendes, wiþout affecte, wycked and vnkynde, the whiche that folowen here lust wiþ synne ycharged' (46v). Originally this read:

loueres of lustus more þen of God, þe wuche han colour of holynesse as holy habitus — bote hem wontþ þe vertu — þe wuche wolen wende from hous to house and wrecchid wymmen leden abouten þat folowen þer luste whit / mony synnes chargid (7r-v).

B has however preserved outspoken criticism of itinerant mendicants, in which category both pardoners and friars seem to be comprehended, although friars are again not explicitly named:

Theuys and robbers owþt to be ware here, and al covetous men, for dampnyng of hell. And namely fals beggers that beggon and haue no rede: pardoners

76 S 49r; B 87v-88r.
77 S 80v. Many parallels could be adduced (the point is a commonplace) but compare FitzRalph, *Defensio Curatorium*, translated by Trevisa (EETS OS 167; London, 1925), p. 56. See also *Jack Upland* (Heyworth, p. 63.209-11); the 'Epistola Sathanae ad Cleros' (Hudson, *Selections*, p. 92.116-17). The text of S perhaps most resembles 'The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy' (Hudson, *Selections*, p. 76.46-63, and see the note on these lines, p. 178). Mention is made of the small gifts used to lure children and the two share an authority in common: 'Ve vobis scribe et pharisei, ipocrite, qui circuitis mare et aridam ut faciatis vestrum proselitum' (Mt 23:15). However, as has been noticed above, B has elsewhere retained a prolonged attack on 'tho that stelyn monnus chyldren' (B 14r; S 90v). Many of the same points are made.

78 S 80v-81r:

And þus dowþ false prechours þat sellþ Godes word, þe wuche wolen / preche in no place bote bere þey hope to wynne corn, chese or masse pons, wolfe, bred or ale; þat byhoten men preieres and to be hire breperen, of þe wuche Seynt Gregor spekeþ and seip on þis wyse: Quisque ideo predicat ut hic vel laudis vel munier mercedem accipiat, eterna procul dubio mercede se priuat, 'Whoso precheþ perfere here to haue reward of preisyng or of 3ifte, whitouer any doute he deprivþ hymself of mede euerlastynge.'

1 wuche] wuche S

79 Compare *Upland's Rejoinder* (Heyworth, pp. 102.29, 103.58-59 and the note on these lines, p. 164).
and fals prechours wip othyr suche, that yf a man haue but on peny they wol haue hyt thowj he schuld [ete] bred and water and al hys howsehold. Or yf a man had but a buschel of corne 3yt wol they haue halffe and ryzt haue they non thereto (B 14r; cf. S 91r).  

2 beggers] a add. and eras. B 3 wip othyr suche] and alle suche stronge beggares add. S 4 ete] 3ete B hous meyne S

S is substantially the same; B’s only significant alteration is the omission of the phrase ‘stronge beggares’, which may well, in view of the extensive criticism of able-bodied beggars in Wycliffite writing, have gained undesirable connotations. B has elsewhere retained an aside to the preacher which invited him to discourse on idle beggars.

The major part of the controversial material in S consists of criticism of contemporary ecclesiastical abuses, rather than doctrinal aberration. Even so there was a long-standing convention that one did not lessen the people’s respect for the ministry by proclaiming the faults of the clergy from the pulpit. One confined criticism of particular occupational vices to the appropriate congregation. Because Lollard preaching persistently flouted this principle of decorum, Archbishop Arundel had underwritten the convention by legislation. Such criticism, although not necessarily heterodox per se, had come to

80 See also the extensive discourse on ‘false brethren’ in Trinity 17 (B 87v-88r, S 49r-v), perhaps based on a distinction on frater.


82 B 28v, ‘Men may touche of beggers and of theues her, pat trauelyn not’ (cf. S 123r).

83 A view expressed, for example, by Thomas Waleys:

Si enim soli clero praedicet, licitum est et expediens quod contra eos vel eorum vitia et quae sunt clerici propri a ... dure increpet ... Similiter ubi solum est populus, non invehatur contra clerus aut vitia quae solum clericis consueverunt inesse, quia hoc esset exhortari populum ut clerus contemmat.


84 Compare the gibe at the ad status preaching of the friars in Jack Upland, ‘Frere, sib he wolen opinli preche aen we defautis of prelatis, of prestis, lordis, lawiers & marchauntis & comouns, whi be so wode bat prestis prechen of 3oure defautis?’ (Heyworth, p. 65.251-53). Knighton saw vituperation as a hallmark of Lollard rhetoric:

Sicque mellis suavitatem in capite eloquii gerebant, in cauda venenum. Nam doctrina eorum in quibuscumque loquellis in sui principio dulcedine plena apparuin et devota, in fine quoque invidia subtili et detractione plena defloruit.

(Cited from Chronicon Henrici Knighton, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols. [RS 92; London, 1889-95], 2.186.17-21). ‘Blaming of sin’ was one of the duties of a ‘true’ preacher, along with teaching God’s law and God’s word. It will be seen that S and B tend to associate the two ideas.

85 Wilkins, Concilia 3.316, Constitution 3.
be associated with heretical preaching. Accordingly it is not surprising that passages which concerned the vicious living and ambition of clerics have been suppressed in B. The original author considered that 'fe cursedest ensaumple of al fe world is taken of men of fe chirche: to loke to alle fe seuen synne pes pou may(f) fynden hem in hem alle' (90v; cf. B 13v). Men of the church are simoniacal hypocrites: they conform to the outward demands of religious observance, but only so that they may satisfy their greed for wealth and honours. Thus they waste the church’s substance in riotous living and display to impress the very commons from whom they have extorted the money to waste on 'hie horses and strumpetes and on day holdynges, on baselardes and gurdeles herneyesd wip seluer, on tregetoures and mynystreles to crye hire name aboute' (S 135v; cf. B 39r). 'Puse flaternity freres' proclaim their poverty, yet desire to be called and to have the state of masters of divinity, 'and is als wyse before as euer is he aftur' (S 135v; cf. B 39r). Simony is anatomised in Trinity 8: again the material is omitted from B (S 26v; cf. B 68v).

Nonetheless the material wealth of the church evidently irked the B compiler, as did the friars. It seems that circumspection was necessary, but he did not perhaps object to the general principles of S. Accordingly it is not clear whether his modifications reflect the greater temperateness of his views or a concern for his personal safety: the polemical matter that remains perhaps indicates the degree of acerbity that he thought he might be able to get away with. On occasion he has retained passages that are very strident indeed. The following outstanding specimen, in which the pomp of modern churchmen is contrasted with Christ’s poverty, deserves quotation in full. It illustrates the tendency of late fourteenth-century or early fifteenth-century religious or polemical prose to give way momentarily to alliterative metre for heightened effect. B has made little, if any, attempt to stifle the rhythm of the original and has either added to the inventory of abuses, or he has had access to a fuller text than S:

But that that men clepen holy churche is full ferre therfrome, but as the synagoge of Sathanas, \textsuperscript{88} pat gretelty hit is to sorow. For they pat / schuld rule holy churche wip Ihesu Crist, they forsake Cristes rule and rule hem after lustes; and yet they seyn they byn rewers to lede men vnto heuen, but all by a wronge wey pat is not Ihesu Crist, for he is wey and he is life, as hymselue tellepe \textit{Ego sum via, veritas et vita} [Jo 14:6]. But Crist was pore and pey byn rych. He is meke and they byn prowde. He was dispised and they byn wurschuped. He was pursewed and they

\textsuperscript{86} Elsewhere S criticises the array of lords 'and puse riche men, byschopws, abbotus and prioures' (14v), a passage likewise censored in B (55v).

\textsuperscript{87} Compare Jack Upland (Heyworth, pp. 57.69-74, 57-58.79-89, and 71-72.401-end, and see Heyworth's comments, pp. 28-29).

\textsuperscript{88} Compare Hudson, Selections, pp. 81.262, 82.284, 87.151-52.
pursewen. He fasted and they faren full well. He seruyd and they byn seruyd. He kneled and men knele to hem. He praid and they done curse. He preched and they hold hem stytle. He forseuue and they pursewen and punyschen. He bade pece and they byd sclee. He wepte and they lawyen. He fedd pepell and helped his folke and they robbyn and dispoylen. He suffered cold and they sitten full warme. He had but on cote and they haue xx. He was wiþ the pore and they byn wiþ lorde. He was barefoote and they byn yschudde; he in hyllys and they in halles; he in water and they yn dry. He bare the crosse and they bere the pylche. He forsoke worschuppes and they taken hit. He sauyd and they dampnythe. He tasted eysell and gall and they pyment and full suete drynkes. He was crowned wiþ thornes and they wiþ pereles. He bouýt and they sullen. He stied vp and they go doune. He went to heuen and they to hell. Thus is this ychaunged þat it is to hyre. God forbede it þat we schuld lyue in suche a maner; but amend we vs to better þat we haue done amysse (B 33v-34r; S 128r-v).

10 hold hem stytle] he bad hise preche and þei forfende add. S pursewen and punyschen] punische S 14 he was barefoote ... yschudde om. S 14-15 he in water ... dry om. S 15 pylche] purse S 17 and full suete drynkes om. S 19 ychaunged] þus is þis chirche chaungyd S 20 we schuld lyue in suche a maner] we schulen blyue in suche maner chirche S

Doubtless, since readers are lulled into moments of inattention, the reviser’s vigilance, like that of a proof-reader, might lapse from time to time, but the sustained vehemence of the piece is surely unlikely to escape the censor’s notice, while the alterations that were made argue that the copyist was not in a state of trance at the time. With reference to preaching S includes the clause ‘he bad hise preche and þei forfende’, one of those frustratingly vague references to proscription which recur in Wycliffite writings. It may refer to Arundel’s Constitutions, or it may not. The conclusion drawn from this sorry state of affairs is in S more extreme: ‘þus is þis chirche chaungyd þat pyte is to here. God forbede we schulden blyue in suche maner chirche.’ S, like a number of other Wycliffite sympathisers of the earlier period, but apparently

89 For a sardonic review of the friars’ controversies over discalceation see English Wycliffite Sermons 1.343.74-79:

And þus me þinkup þat frerus chyden in veyn: Prechowres seyn þat Crist hadde hyge schon as þei han, for ells wolde not Baptist mene þat Crist hadde þwongus of syche schone; Menowres seyn þat Crist wente barefoot, or ells was schoed as þei ben, for ells Mawdeleyne schulde not haue fownde to þus haue wasche Cristes feet.

unlike B, felt himself to be forcibly, albeit unwillingly, alienated from the manifestation of Christ's church on earth: the contrast between holy church and a travesty of it, often called Antichrist's church, is a common one in these writings.91

The passage just cited is both repetitious and a web of satiric commonplaces. The Wycliffites were neither the first nor the last to liken churchmen who neglected preaching to the proverbial 'dumb dogs' and suggest that their omission would be rewarded with everlasting damnation. However one would expect Arundel's legislation to have kept such comment out of the pulpit: after all, Pecock's zealous claim that bishops need not preach – a claim which tacitly conceded that a significant number of them did not in fact do so – found little favour.92 Other remarks included in the passage are more surprisingly controversial. Although they are imprecise (and therefore could perhaps just be countenanced), references to persecution remain which, in the light of the more explicit Lollard writings, are most naturally interpreted as allusions to the harassment of Wycliffite preachers and sympathisers.93 There is also the apparent dislike either of the form of general excommunication proclaimed four times yearly in the parish churches, or alternatively of the use of excommunication as a punishment meted out in the church courts. As is well known, the Wycliffites endorsed the letter of the Second Commandment;94 indeed a puritanical dislike of oaths was apparently enough in itself to raise a suspicion of Lollardy in the minds of the common people.95 B retains more extended commentary on this subject in Epiphany 2:

Thus ys ful hard of hem that cursyn here evyn cristynne, and bothe here chylderen and here mayne, when they haue not trespassyd, for malyce and

91 For example, ‘But certis holy Chirche is seet in virtues and good lik; but certis Anticristis chirche is set in pride coveitise and opere synnes’ (Octo in quibus seducuntur simplices Christiani [Arnold 3.451.14-16]). See also The grete sentence of curs expouned (ibid., p. 315.10-13); ‘On the Twenty-Five Articles’ (ibid., p. 496.1-2).
93 These are not the only allusions to persecution. See for example 'Thow myst fynde all to mony that crucifien Crist ... and helpe to wipstond hem þat prechen truthe, and menteyne fabels rather þan þe gospell' (B 4r, S 77v); 'Mony folke cursyn men for that they down well, as they that cursyn prestis for that they preche the gospell and for they blame synne' (B 16r, S 93r); 'And so they byn chefetens to destroy Cristes lawes, for they letton þat þey may the truthe of the gospell' (B 30r, S 124r, English Wycliffite Sermons 1.424.10-12).
94 One of the points abjured in Hawise Moone’s Confession of 1430 was ‘þat it is not leful to swere in ony caas’ (Hudson, Selections, p. 35.64-65, and see other examples listed in the note on these lines, p. 161).
rankyrrre that dwellythe in her hert. And muche more nede it were to byd God amend hem, for thorow suche cursynge they do neuer the bettur. But gladdely suche cursers wold gladlyche that veniaunce fel vpon them and the same they pray onto God that hyt fal apon hemsylue at euery tyme that they pray to God here Pater Noster (B 15v; S 92v-93r).

1 cursyn] u add. s.s. and eras. B

The target of this attack is again perhaps just sufficiently unclear for it to be taken as a general caution against swearing.96 Much of the Wycliffite polemic has this cryptic quality, perhaps for safety's sake. References are supplied by the reader or hearer from his wider acquaintance with Wycliffite terminology.

We may turn now to B's views on preaching, the subject above all others which prompted him, and other moderate reformers, to throw caution to the winds. He was after all writing sermons. There are two main lines of attack: first, as suggested above, those who fail to preach are excoriated:

Then may thus by prelates sorow the tyme that þey euer office had: curat/s, prestis and tho that holden hem styll and wol not crye as Crist byddythe hem by hys þroþþe Clama ne cesses [Is 58:1] (B 13v; S 90v).

Secondly 'false preachers' are indicted, by which term is meant all who do not preach in a manner which the Wycliffites approved of, particularly friars.97

The most extensive commentary on the preacher's duties appears in the sermon for Trinity 5. This, it will be remembered, is the first of the set of three post-Trinity sermons which enjoyed an independent manuscript tradition. This is fortunate for us, since the relevant leaves of S were excised, apart from the beginning of the sermon which was copied out as a part of the supplementary set. The manuscripts largely agree on the form of the conventional allegory: St. Peter and his companions signify doctors of the church:

By þuse fyscheres ben vnderstonden doctor \ / s, þe whuche zeden doun thurghe mekenesse and grace to þe water of mercy and wysdome to wasche her nettes: to clanse her byleue and lere be lawe of God, þe wuche is knutted togedre wib vertues as knottes in a nette, wip þe whuche nette þey schulden drawe in floses of þis worlde men grete and smale to þe londe of lyfe, þat is þe blysse of heuene (S 204v; B 56r; R 12ra; Ross, p. 289.11-18).

96 But see for example ‘Sixteen Points on Which the Bishops Accuse Lollards’ (Hudson, Selections, p. 19.12-13): the fifth point is ‘bat neiþer bischoppis neiþer popis eurs byndþ any man not, but him þat is first cursed of God’ (amplified p. 21.96-104, and see the note on these lines, pp. 147-48).

97 If preachers tell lies rather than the truth, they are ‘maysters of errorour’ (B 10r; S 85v). ‘Loke who that can pleace tyl they haue getyn what they wol haue, wip flaterynge fabelys and feynyng wordys’ (B 13r; S 90r). ‘Tru prechynge synne blamythe and that oþer – tyls and fableys – do not ... a fals precher vsythe lesyngis and leuythe Goddis wordys ... / ... thus ys Goddis word stole from the pepyll' (B 22v-23r; S 101v-102r).
However the full text of the development of this allegory is now irrecoverably lost, since the relevant leaves of S are missing and since B, R and Ross all expurgate a section of it; R and Ross appear to be textually related, but B seems to have made an independent decision. Evidently the missing section was conspicuously outspoken. R’s text reads:

And Peter answerde and sayde, Comaundyr, by all þis nyght trauelynge noght haue we take; sothlye in þi worde I schall lette outhe þo nette. Bot iff our instrumentis be letten outhe in þo worde of heuenly grace, aboute noght [els] trauelynge, þe prechourys þat prechynne. And þerfore schull men leuern þer fables and tryfuls and tell trewlye Goddes lawe as Cryste hymselfe byddes, for elles we trauelen in þo nyght of merknesse and of synne thorgh covetyse and veyneglorye þat we prechen for and so we cachen no fysches bot foule blake todes (R 12rb; Ross, p. 290.2-13; B 56v).

By omitting the sentence left incomplete in R and Ross, B has effected a smoother transition; this compiler also discreetly dropped the insinuation about preaching for gain. R and Ross include further material in this sermon on the virtue of God’s law which does not appear in B, although from what has already been included it is sufficiently clear that he sided with those who favoured scriptural truth in preaching rather than entertaining fictions. These views are endorsed many times in the collection by B. Masters (‘masters of divinity’ in S) are perjured when they fail to teach God’s law (B 3v; S 77v). For God’s law is all-sufficient and man’s law, ungrounded as it is in scripture, is worthless by comparison (B 8v; S 84v). Indeed, man’s law was founded by the Devil’s counsel and is maintained by the Devil’s supporters in the church as a means of obstructing God’s law. Thus man’s law shields the robbers and extortioners of poor men. Those who speak of God’s law are reviled and

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98 See also B 53r and S 13v.
99 ‘But ther bube other dyuere lawes, made by mannas witt, þat lette þe ofetymes Goddes lawe to haue his cours, but sothely hit is but a bastard lawe ymade by the fendas councell’ (B 79r).
100 B 79r-v:

Men thenkyn þis oper lawe better, but it is lyke to the brere busche þat suffere þe adders / and snakes and suche venymes wormes lyȝtyly to go awey wipout eny harme, but and if
persecuted,\textsuperscript{101} so that the light of true preaching is withheld from the people by the very church that should proclaim it.\textsuperscript{102} Knights renege on their oath to maintain the gospel and they hinder the men who would preach the truth.\textsuperscript{103} The passage is deliberately allusive, but even so stops perilously short of the fully-developed Wycliffite opinion that the aristocracy should assume the duty of proclaiming the gospel in default of churchmen.\textsuperscript{104} He berates the people who are partly to blame for this state of affairs in their preference for idle romances and profane entertainment, rather than sacred truth:

Mony men wol leue fablesse rathyr than the gospell; remaunce of Robyn Hode leuer than Powles pystyles; a rebaued song in a tauerne than euensong; of wynnyng of ij pens leuer than the bllys of heuen. Leuer bythe some to hyre houndys wip opyn mowthe in the wood than the prest at the masse to rede of Cristis passyong (B 19r; S 96r).\textsuperscript{105}

that a schepe come herby and touche hit but a lyttyll he schal be so todrawen wip the busche that woo schall hym be ... Ryyet so, lett bosters and stryuers, robbers and extorcyoners, and pey pat buthe grete venym\(\textsuperscript{u}\)ls men of hemenlew, and tho that can start aboutg and quyte hem zgen, that lawe truly woll lett hem scape lytly awey.

The friar who wrote the sermons in ms. Longleat 4 also made use of this similitude: 'Serpent\(\textsuperscript{u}\)s and neddrisy restyn vndwr pornyys and brembelis but, yf a schep come amongis pornys and brym\(\textsuperscript{u}\)belys, he letith pere a pece of his flees' (80rb). The evil-doers are not precisely identified, but include heretics who envenom the people 'wip here wyckid speche', and wicked men who torment 'opere cristene peple' by 'opyn persecuc\(\textsuperscript{i}\)i\(\textsuperscript{o}\)n'. See also B 53r and S 13v: 'afur men\(\textsuperscript{u}\)s law men loken to wynne worschyppys, how that they may gete money by scley\(\textsuperscript{u}\)thys'.

\textsuperscript{101}'They pat speken of Goddus lawe byn called foles' (B 79r; also B 16r, S 93r).

\textsuperscript{102}'The lanterne of trewe lore is hidd vnder the buschell... /... By this lanterne Y vnderstond holy churche, bothe of worde and of dede, that schew\(\textsuperscript{e}\)e the worde of Goddus lawe vnto every man and wom\(\textsuperscript{m}\)man' (B 69r-v; two leaves have been excised from S at this point).

\textsuperscript{103} B 3v-4r; S 77v:

And also thes that falsly forswerepe hem when they haue / [taken pat] state to menteyne the gospell, to defend wedows and to menteyne maydons, how few byn ther of them. Thow mygt fynde all to mony that crucifien Crist.

\textsuperscript{104}Seculer lordes shulden in defaute of prestes lerne and teche pe lawe of God in per moder tonge' (Dublin, Trinity College ms. 241, fol. 26vb; compare also Cambridge, University Library ms. Additional 5338, fol. 50r[I follow the ink foliation in the lower left-hand corner]). This forms part of a commentary on the Creed, included in a sermon for Trinity 19, but it was taken from a separate treatise: see Arnold 3.114.6-13.

\textsuperscript{105}Compare S 96r. This is not the only complaint of this kind:

\textsuperscript{106}'Every man welny\(\textsuperscript{g}\)s ys glad now to hyre yuell of o\(\textsuperscript{p}\)er and to herkyn fowle talys, chydyng

and siryueyn, and that gol they record mony wynteres after, to here songis and remanses, rebaud and lechery; and of thus worldly wyynnyng men bythe seld wery ... But forto hyre of goodnes and of God ... o\(\textsuperscript{p}\)er/ of prechyng, they byn ful sone wery (B 52r-v; S 12r).

Compare also B 22v, S 101v; and see further The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman in Three Parallel Texts, ed. W. W. Skeat, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1886), B. V.400-401.
So far we have considered the general tenor of B's expressed views as they emerge from a comparison with the other manuscripts, especially S. We may now turn to the smaller omissions which indicate B's distaste for certain contentious words and phrases. For even the slightest acquaintance with the vernacular Lollard writings soon engenders an awareness that the familiar arguments are couched in a common repertoire of turns of phrase, mannerisms and habitual collocations that may amount to a 'Lollard sect vocabulary'. It seems as though the movement fairly rapidly evolved a kind of shorthand that allowed its members to present their case in an economical way that seems scarcely designed to convert the outsider since it presupposes knowledge of the premises of the arguments. Especially in the more moderate texts, among them B, the authors employ this language to convey their full meaning in an oblique way that perhaps imparted sufficient decent obscurity. B's minor expurgations, then, provide evidence of what was still thought to be seditious vocabulary in the later fifteenth century.

Perhaps the best-known hallmark of Lollard vocabulary was the expression 'God's law', especially when contrasted with the antithetical 'man's law'. B betrays occasional squeamishness about using the phrase: thus 'Godes lawe' becomes 'the lawe of God' (S 77v; B 3v), or 'Godus commaundementis' (S 75v; B 2v), 'as Goddes lawe vs telleth' (S 31r) and 'as God teche th vs in hys lawe' (S 51v) are replaced respectively by 'as God hy(m)selue seythe' (B 72v) and 'as God seythe hymselue' (B 90r). 'Folily to deme, Godes lawe forfende' (S 79v) was rendered 'be ware of demynge' (B 4v). On at least one occasion 'as Goddes lawe telleth' was simply left out (S 50r; B 88v). Doubtless too the occurrence of this phrase and others contributed to make the longer omitted passages that we have already considered seem unacceptable. However it is also indubitable that a merely human censor may overlook such minutiae: many references to God's law remain. Moreover B obviously agreed that God's law, whatever he precisely meant by this vague expression, was pre-eminently important: he

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106 Hudson in 'A Lollard Sect Vocabulary?' conducts a preliminary investigation of this topic.

107 Compare the identification of the 'false prophets' in sermons for Trinity 8 (on Mt 7:15-21). 'bese wordys mowen ben aplied vnto false frerus' (English Wycliffite Sermons 1.252.2-3). 'Pe fals prophetis ben clepid heretiks and be po pat for coueite of wordli goodis preche fablis and trifles and opere vntrewpes pat ar contrarious to Goddis lawe' (Cambridge, St. John's College ms. G.22, fol. 22r). 'Be 3ee warre of false prophetis pat comen vnto you in clofings of cheep, as is white, blacke and russet, pat 3ee byleue to none at 3e firste aqueyn(t)auence, 3f al 3ey speke mekely and fayr and byhite 3ou grete heuenely medis' (ms. Bodley 806, fol. 91r). The 'false prophets' appear to be the same in all three cases: friars.

108 Thus Knighton remarked on their fondness for the expression: 'talem enim hæbeant terminum in omnibus suis dictis semper pretendentendo legem Dei Goddis lawe' (Chronicon 2.186). See also Hudson, 'A Lollard Sect Vocabulary?', 21 and n. 31.

109 Thus 'God's law' may signify the moral law of the church, the precepts contained in scripture or scripture itself.
has for example retained a lengthy passage, perhaps derived from a distinction on *lex Dei*, in which God's law and man's are expressly contrasted. The Lollards did not invent the phrases ‘God's law’ or ‘God’s word’: both were indispensable ideas. It was perhaps the sheer frequency of their appeals to these sources of authority that characterised Lollard rhetoric: they were ‘forever asserting’ (*semper praetendendo*) God’s law in Knighton’s phrase. B has certainly reduced its incidence.

References to Antichrist and Satan, especially in the genitive case, might also be thought suspicious: ‘Satanas exampill’ is kept in B, however (B 13v; S 90v). ‘Sathanas lawe’ became ‘the fendes law’ (S 121r; B 27r), while B also kept ‘the synagoge of Sathanas’ in what was perhaps the most incendiary passage he allowed himself (B 33v; S 128r). Allusion to ‘Antecristus clerkes’ was dropped (B 16r; S 93r). Again B was not consistent: a reference to ‘Antecristus scolers’ is kept (B 7v; S 83r). Because ‘Caim’ (especially in the phrase ‘Caim’s castles’: friaries) had become a popular acronym of the four Orders of friars, one would expect B to shy away from the name, but apparently the disguise, even if by no means impenetrable, was enough. A commentary on man-slaughter justified frequent mention of the first author of the crime (B 7r-8r; S 83r-v). B stops short however when it is clear in S that the ‘Caymes cheldren’ who seek to bring men to execution single out those who ‘prechen þe gospel and wolen not sulle hire prechynge, bote blame þat curside coueitise’ (S 83r; B 7v). In S at least they appear to be identified with the friars and church authorities.

Anti-fraternal Lollard writing is peppered with identifications of the friars (and other regulars) not just as limbs of the Devil and servants of Antichrist, but as modern pharisees. ‘Scribes and pharisees’ indeed become merely a way of saying ‘church authorities and religious’. Not surprisingly therefore B removed a passage such as the following:

110 In the sermon for Trinity 13, B 79r-v. A leaf has been excised from S at this point (fol. 38). Since two sides of one folio in S contain more text than the corresponding space in B, it is likely (as one might expect) that the commentary on ‘law’ was originally longer and that B has effected some cuts.

111 An expression derived from Apoc 2:9, 3:9. The passage has been transcribed in full above. Compare *Jack Upland* (Heyworth, p. 56.53): ‘holy chirche’ has become the ‘synagoge of Satanas’.

112 See the references given in Hudson, *Selections* in a note on p. 185 to the ‘Epistola Sathanae ad Cleros’ (p. 92.127). See also *Jack Upland* (Heyworth, p. 58.86 and the note on this line, pp. 119-20).

113 As for example in *English Wycliffite Sermons* 1.244.12-15, ‘We may understande by scribes and pharisees men of þe fendys chirche as we duden byfore, so þat scribes ben clepud secular prelates, and pharisees ben clepud þes newe religious.’
And such religious men as Pharisees, for they be divided as Pharisees by the common lyving, by many venye traditions (S 10r; cf. B 50v).\textsuperscript{114}

\textquoteleft Such religious' was perhaps in itself too explicit; elsewhere the phrase was changed to \textquoteleft princes' (S 124r; B 30r).\textsuperscript{115}

The contrast between God’s law and man’s illustrates the general propensity of Wycliffite rhetoric to make its points by oppositions. Dr. Hudson has already described their habitual antithesis, remarked upon by contemporaries, between true and false preachers, and also the tendency of Lollards to designate themselves ‘true men’.\textsuperscript{116} Thus B removed a reference to ‘a gederyng of trewe cristene men’ (B 106r; S 71r), which probably sounded overmuch like a conventicle. ‘False prechoures’ in Epiphany 1 is altered to ‘tho’ (B 13v; S 90v), but is also kept in Epiphany 1 and 5 (B 14r, S 91r; and B 22v, S 101v); ‘fals brethern’ is removed in Trinity 17.\textsuperscript{117}

Attacks on beggars and beggary may create the suspicion of Lollardy, but it has been observed that the charge is a hard one to press since these useful lexical items were by no means confined to Lollards.\textsuperscript{118} It was perhaps most dangerous to criticise able-bodied mendicants: thus B found the phrase \textquoteleft suche stronge beggares\textquoteright unacceptable, although he agreed with the anti-Mendicant argument since he has retained an invitation in the Passion Sunday sermon to discourse on the subject, ‘Men may touche of beggers and of theues her, pat travelyn not’ (B 28v; S 123r). This invitation to the preacher was of course not to be preached. ‘Beggerie and flateringe’ in the text of another sermon was thought too shrewd a hit and removed.\textsuperscript{119}

Other alterations perhaps shed some new light on unacceptable phrasing. ‘Cristns reule’ became ‘Cristus lawe’ (S 82v; B 6r). A reference to ‘he fendes vscheres’ was removed (S 85v; B 10r). The expression to ‘preche fredam’ which occurred twice in one sermon was on both occasions omitted; presumably it had too seditious a ring (S 131r, B 35v; cf. Jer 34:17).

Conversely B occasionally retains phrases that might be thought unguarded: possibly they were losing some of their opprobrium by this date. Thus B has an inimical reference to ‘hy prelatus’,\textsuperscript{120} and another in the same sermon to \textquoteleft youre

\textsuperscript{114} Compare ibid., pp. 232-33.16-18.
\textsuperscript{115} Compare ibid., p. 424.6. B may simply have wished to emend an apparent error: the passage glosses \textquoteleft princes of preestis and be pharisees comen togydre to Pilate\textquoteright.
\textsuperscript{116} Hudson, \textquoteleft A Lollard Sect Vocabulary\textquoteright, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{117} B 88r \textquoteleft feyre spekers\textquoteright; compare S 49r. Conversely B keeps ‘feynyd brethern’ (B 87v; S 49r), ‘fals fyned bretherne’ (B 88r; S 49r) and ‘fals bretherne’ (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{118} Hudson, \textquoteleft A Lollard Sect Vocabulary\textquoteright, 20.
\textsuperscript{119} S 101v; in B this is reduced to ‘flatering’ (22v).
\textsuperscript{120} ‘Then may thus hy prelatus sorow the tyme that they euer offyce had’ (B 13v; S 90v).

‘Prelates’, as distinct from ‘bishops’ (a neutral descriptive word), had hostile force; see Hudson, \textquoteleft A Lollard Sect Vocabulary\textquoteright, 22-23.
secte’ (B 14r; S 91r). He also speaks of the necessity to ‘grounde well oure beleue’, perhaps because it is not actually specified in the text that this means a foundation in scriptural authority (B 36r; S 131r). The high importance of the subject for B may explain his bitter allusion to those who say that ‘Godis lawe is fals, but if they glosen hit’, and a disparaging reference in the same sermon to ‘here glose’ (ibid.).

Some of B’s alterations are hard to explain. Apparently he disliked the proverb ‘ʒung seynt, old deuele’ (S 64r; cf. B 100v), and for some reason he substituted ‘extorcyoners, raueners, theues and men of law’ for ‘bosteres and braggeres, mynstrelus and messageres, knytus and men of lawe’ (B 55r; S 14v). To exclude knights might be common prudence; the other offenders perhaps described their followers. Lawyers, a traditional target of pulpit satire, were evidently regarded as fair game: B elsewhere announces that ‘bothe in constry and in chapter, in seculer court and / other, fals domes gothe for money’ (5r-v), although he leaves out an allusion to the law ‘of londe and of þe chirches lawe’ (B 48v; S 5r).

IV

CONCLUSIONS

It will be seen that a fairly coherent picture has emerged of B’s views. For the most part he agreed with the reforming views expressed in his source, although he often found their expression too extreme. However it is unclear whether his greater moderation reveals his personal views, or a greater dislike of living dangerously, or the effects of greater vigilance by the authorities. He was prepared to be more outspoken on two related subjects which touched him closely in his capacity as a secular priest: preaching and the friars, his traditional rivals. He particularly disliked what he saw as their erosion of his spiritual authority over his parishioners (and their commercial competition) by their popular preaching and easy penances. These attitudes resemble those which may be found in other Middle English sermon collections written by men of

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121 See also ibid., 21 and n. 32.
122 See also ibid., 21-22.
123 B 30r. He continues ‘þus here glose schuld be trowed as beleue of cristen men’, but discontinues the text at this point. S (and the Wycliffite sermon) go on: ‘bote þe texte of Godes lawe þei seien is perelouse to trowen’ (S 124r; English Wycliffite Sermons 1.424-25.16-19). Glose, sb. and v., is classed as a possible item of Lollard vocabulary, but, like beggar, one which is not restricted to Lollard usage (Hudson, ‘A Lollard Sect Vocabulary?’, 20).
124 Attention is called to the saying by a marginal Nota.
similar standing. He upheld the traditional roles of the various social classes, but felt unable to subscribe to S’s detailed social critique, particularly his rebukes of church authorities and the aristocracy. For the most part it is the materialism of the church, rather than its doctrines, that is condemned in the sections of the original sermons which covered the Sunday epistles and pastoral commentary. B, by omitting the gospel commentaries, has avoided most of the doctrinal discussion and, as we have seen, he obliterated the speculation in the remaining parts of the sermons on the priestly powers of binding and unbinding, on the value of oral confession and on the worthlessness of images. Clearly it was unacceptable to express dubiety concerning the sacraments. When opponents of the Lollards wished to vilify the movement in addresses to the faithful in the vernacular they tended to express their abhorrence of the Lollards’ more spectacular heresies with regard to the Eucharist and confession.

Yet B was not wholly discreet. The objects of his satire are but thinly disguised. His main precaution was to avoid over-explicitness, especially in identifying his opponents. Disingenuous as it may seem to us, this habit that he shares with other more cautious polemical writers of his day of using pronouns or some oblique method of identification apparently conferred sufficient immunity. There is usually just enough leeway to permit the criticism to be read as a decently generalised assault on vice and viciousness.

B was not only discreet, he was also inconsistent. As we have seen, in dealing with some controversial topics he often censored one passage but allowed its import to be expressed elsewhere. A number of explanations suggest themselves, though no one of them is entirely satisfactory. Momentary inattention might account for the inclusion of short passages or phrases that were better suppressed, but this will not serve to explain away the more extensive or more strident passages. Moreover the small modifications that were made to such passages show that the compiler was not blind to their existence or purport. An alternative explanation would be that there was more


126 For example, in Nicholas Love’s translation of Pseudo-Bonaventure, pp. 208.5-7, 180, 121.26-30. Love also attacked their views on church offerings (p. 187) and obedience to the clergy (p. 193). The writer of sermons in London, British Library ms. Harley 2268 reaffirms the orthodox view that the sacrament is ‘noght als þese wykkyd pepyll techy, þe Lollardys, materiall or figuratiue brede, but verrai Goddys owne body’ (190v). Likewise these ‘wykkyd pepyll, þe Lollardys, says pat yt is na nede to schryue a man or a womman to a prest, but all anly to God’(191v). Mirk attacks their views on images (Festival, ed. T. Erbe, 1 [EETS ES 96; London, 1905], p. 171.18-21).
than one compiler. The manuscript was after all written by two scribes, one of whom may have been more sympathetic to controversial ideas than the other. Is it not conceivable then that there was not one 'B' but two? It is certainly possible, though hard to prove, that the two scribes may have tampered with the phrasing here and there: this might for instance account for the sporadic changes of 'God's law' into the 'law of God' and related expressions, but the pattern of expurgation does not neatly correspond to the scribal stints. Unless the scribes were also the preachers, it is after all more likely that they would make local and minor changes than that they would be entrusted with the task of making ad hoc revisions of sensitive material which might cost a preacher his life or liberty. It is nonetheless possible, though it is not an economical or demonstrable hypothesis, that more than one censor may have been responsible for the alterations.

The inconsistencies do however suggest the important point that the views of the compiler (or compilers) were at heart more sympathetic to S than a first inspection of the cuts might lead one to think. It seems to have been the manner, rather than the matter, which prompted circumspection. There may also have been a desire simply to reduce the wearisome frequency with which the points were made. The two chief matters of complaint which dominate B, dislike of the friars and desire for greater access to the text of scripture, were popular concerns by no means confined to the Lollards. People shared these feelings whose views were otherwise, so far as we may ascertain, orthodox enough. John Heywood's early sixteenth-century interlude, The Pardoner and the Friar, is a mordant satire on the deceits practised on parishioners by wandering preachers. The Friar's duty does not conform to his practice:

I com not hyther to glose nor to flatter,
I com not hyther to bable nor to clatter,
I com not hyther to fable nor to lye,
But I com hyther youre soules to edyfye!

The friar who wrote the sermons in ms. Longleat 4, although in many ways vehemently orthodox, was prepared to court persecution in order to further scriptural teaching: Hudson and Spencer, 'Old Author, New Work'. See also A. Hudson, 'The Debate on Bible Translation, Oxford 1401', English Historical Review 90 (1975) 1-18. On the anti-Mendicant tradition see J. Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 37-54. Among post-Chaucerian examples, compare the comic low-life tale of 'Jak & his Stepdamde & of the Frere' in which the boy, Jak, gets the better of both the other two unpopular characters. The tale is included in Richard Hill's early sixteenth-century commonplace book (Songs, Carols and Other Miscellaneous Poems, from the Balliol MS. 354, ed. R. Dyboski [EETS ES 101; London, 1908], pp. 120-27, no. 103). See also the ironical friar's complaint 'Allas what schul we freris do', printed in Cambridge Middle English Lyrics, ed. H. A. Person (Seattle, 1953), p. 42, no. 51; or the macaronic poem 'Freeres, freeres, wo ze be!', Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, ed. T. Wright, 2 vols. (RS 14; London, 1859-61), 2:249-50.
For we freres are bounde the people to teche,
The gospell of Chryst openly to preche.\textsuperscript{128}

The text of his sermon however is \textit{Date et dabitur vobis} (Lc 6:38). Since the parish priest who attempts to stop the two imposters preaching in his church is presented as a slow-witted booby, Heywood can scarcely be accused of partiality. Yet he was no heretic; he ended his days as a Catholic exile in Louvain. Again, Richard Hill included in his otherwise orthodox, indeed devout, commonplace book a poem on prelates who do not preach and who keep the gospel from the people. In St. Peter’s day

\begin{quote}
... þe gospell was not hide,
To kyng ne knyght, mayd ne wyffe.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

\textit{B} provides evidence that preachers were still bridled by Arundel’s Constitutions. He was not able to indulge freely in social criticism in the way that had been customary for the better-known writers of the late fourteenth century. The controversies over scriptural preaching had left their mark. Another writer, from the early years of the sixteenth century, stressed the importance of preaching the gospel, but he insisted strenuously on the grave responsibilities it entailed:

\begin{quote}
The most noble exercsy[es]e and þe moste worfii office Þat is in þis wourld is to announce þe gospell and to preche of Jesu Christ. But þose w\textsuperscript{e} saye þat þei haue auctorite to preche muste be maruelously well ware for þe abuse of it, and also þe people to be also wel auised not to be seducted ner beglyd, for þe saluacion and þe da(m)pnacion of þe soule hangeth on it.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{I exercysel exercyte} ms.
\end{quote}

It was not possible to return to the unqualified enthusiasm expressed by orthodox and heterodox alike at the outset of the fifteenth century.

\textit{Lincoln College, Oxford.}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Songs, Carols}, p. 82, no. 74a.35-36.
\end{footnotes}
The first list of Ocelli nominum in Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983) grew out of a need for students of art history to locate manuscripts often cited only by name. This second list is designed as a supplement and follows the same principles governing its arrangement:

(1) English is the principal working language and names and terms are usually given in their English equivalent. Thus the words Heures, Bibbia, Evangelia, Sacramentarium are given as Hours, Bible, Gospels, and Sacramentary. However, where ocelli nominum are found cited most frequently or only in a non-English form, these forms will be given, as Registrum Sancti Gregorii. There are some hybrid forms where it is customary to cite the vernacular in combination with a term from another language as the Miracles of Notre Dame.

(2) Manuscripts to be identified with an author are grouped under the simple English name of that author, such as Bede, Virgil, Sedulius, and the manuscripts are numbered individually as a), b), c), etc. If the manuscripts listed for this author begin not with a), but with c), or d), then two or three manuscripts are listed for that entry in the first list. Manuscripts of literary works without a known author, like the Alexander Romance, are entered in the same way.

(3) Where several ocelli nominum designate a single codex, there will be a main entry listing all forms and given usually under the name first in alphabetic order, with cross-references thereafter in the appropriate places. Thus the main entry for the Liber Landavensis will be the Book of Llandaff and the = sign indicates other names. Slight variations in spelling and small occasional additions are placed in parentheses.

(4) If two or more codices have the same name, they are numbered 2), 3), etc. beneath the first entry.

(5) For purposes of simplification, ‘Hours of’, ‘Pontifical of’, and similar generic terms follow the proper name. Exceptions are ‘Book of’, ‘Liber’, ‘Llyfr’) and ‘Codex’ which if transposed give an uncommon expression.
(6) ‘Llyfr’ in this index is alphabetized as it is written. ‘Saint’ as a geographic name is ‘Saint’, ‘San’, ‘Sankt’ as required. ‘Saint’ as a title of respect is abbreviated ‘St.’ and placed after the personal name (hence ‘Pancratius, St., Bible’).

(7) When a manuscript is written entirely or to a large extent in a language other than Latin, its language is indicated in square brackets placed after the name.

(8) Names of libraries that have been abbreviated in the list are cited in full in the Index of Manuscripts on pp. 413-21 below.

(9) The shelf marks given for all entries derive from investigation of manuscript catalogues and scholarly studies, both recent and earlier, and every care has been taken to ensure that the shelf marks are accurate and current. Occasionally two shelf marks are given, that is, both old and new, as for example, in the case of the Trinity College, Dublin manuscripts where the serial numbers in T. K. Abbott, Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (Dublin-London, 1900) are now preferred to the older press marks. The citation of both is not intended to sanction the continued use of the original shelf mark singly or in combination with the serial number, but rather to aid in identification since the older designation is found not only in earlier works but also in modern studies.

Undoubtedly there are numerous other named manuscripts which have been omitted or could not be included because their present locations are unknown. I shall be grateful for suggestions regarding manuscripts which should be included as well as for notice of errors and inaccuracies.

Special thanks must go to many keepers of manuscripts who have provided information about shelf marks and current location of manuscripts. I am indebted to Dr. Sigrid Krämer of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften for many names and to Miss M. Pemberton of the Bodleian Library for providing others.

Abingdon Chronicles: see Chronicles I a)
Abraham, Bishop of Freising, Sacramen-
tary
München, SB: Clm 6421
Adam de la Halle Chansonnier: see Song-
books I a)
Admont Bible
Admont, SB: C/D
Ætheling Æthelstan, Will of
London, BL: Stowe Charter 37
Æthelbald, Charter of: see Charters b)
Agrimensores veteres Romanorum
a) Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Pal. lat. 1564
b) = Codex Arcerianus
Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. 36.23 Aug. 2°
Alardus Bible (of Saint Amand)
Valenciennes, BM: 9-11 (4)
Alaric, Breviary of
Paris, BN: lat. 4404
Alaverdy Gospels [Greek]
Tbilisi, IR: A 484

Albert V (Albrecht) Prayerbook
München, SB: Clm 23640

Albert of Brandenberg Hours
Cambridge, FM: 294

Albert von Sternberg Pontifical
Praha, PNPS: I A 4

Albi Pontifical
Albi, BM: 34

Aldersbach Miscellany
München, SB: Clm 2599

Alexander Romance (Roman d’Alexandre)
[French, English]
  a) Oxford, BL: Bodley 264
  b) Paris, BA: 3472
  c) Paris, BN: fr. 789
  d) Venezia, BN: Marc. ital. VI 665
(6033) [Italian]

Ambraser Heldenbuch [German]
Wien, ÖNB: Ser. n. 2663

Amiens Missal
’s-Gravenhage, KB: 78 D 40

Andreas Psalter
Roma, BV: E 24

Andrews, (Gwynne M.), Bible
New York, MMA: Cloisters 31.1134.9

Anglo-Norman Apocalypse [French]
Paris, BN: fr. 403

Anglo-Saxon Charters: see Charters

Anglo-Saxon Chronicles: see Chronicles I)

Anglo-Saxon Chronicles E-Text: see Chronicles I b)

Angoulême Sacramentary
Paris, BN: lat. 816

Anne of Austria Hours
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 3090

Anselm
  a) Bodleian
    Oxford, BL: Bodley 271
  b) Littlemore
    Oxford, BL: Auct. D.2.6

Antwerp Bible
= Bohemian Bible
Antwerpen, MPM: 15.1

Apuleius (Pseudo-) Herbal
  a) Kassel, GB: Phys. fol. 10
  b) Leiden, BR: Voss. lat. Q. 9
  c) [English, Latin]
    London, BL: Cotton Vitellius C.iii
  d) [English, Latin]
    London, BL: Harley 585

Aratus
  a) Harleian
    London, BL: Harley 647

Arles Sacramentary
Paris, BN: lat. 2812

Arras Chansonnier: see Songbooks I b)

Aspremont Hours
Melbourne, NG: 1253/4

Astruc Bible [Hebrew]
New York, PM: G. 48

Augsburg Liederbuch: see Songbooks II a)

Augsburg Sacramentary
München, SB: Clm 30040

Bamberg Psalter
Bamberg, SB: Msc. Bibl. 48 (A.II.47)

Bankes Leaf: see Offa Bible

Barking Ordinal/Hymnal
Cambridge, TC: 1226 (O.3.54)

Barlow Psalter: see Peterborough Psalter

5)

Barnwell Antiphonal
Cambridge, UL: Mm.2.9

Basel Pontifical
Freiburg i. Br., UB: 363

Beaupré Antiphonal
= Johannes von Valkenburg Antiphonary
Baltimore, WAG: W. 759-762

Beauvais Missal
London, BL: Harley 2891

Beauvais Sacramentary
Paris, BN: lat. 9429

Bede
  f) Sirmond ms.
    Oxford, BL: Bodley 309

Bellegay Gradual
Porrentruy, BEC: 18

Berblock, Nicolas, Chansonnier: see Songbooks I d)

Bérenger I Sacramentary
Monza, BC: S.N.

Bernard, St. of Clairvaux, Bible
Troyes: BM: 458
Bernward Bible
Hildesheim, Dom: 61
Bernward Gospels
Hildesheim, Dom: 18
Berry Antiphonary/Gradual
Cambridge (Mass.), HU: pfMS Typ 79
Bertrand de Deux, Cardinal, Missal
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Arch. S. Pietro C 63B
Biaasca Bible
Milano, BA: E 26 inf.
Bible (San Isidoro) of 1162
León, CSI: 1.3
Biburg Bible
München, UB: 2° 28 (Cim. 19)
Black Book of Basingwerk [Welsh]
Aberystwyth, NLW: 7006D
Black Book of Carmarthen [Welsh]
= Llyfr Du Caerfyrddin
Aberystwyth, NLW: Peniarth 1
Black Book of Chirk [Welsh]
= Y Llyvyr Du or Weun
Aberystwyth, NLW: Peniarth 29
Blackburn Psalter
Blackburn, MAG: Hart 21001
Blois Gospels
Paris, BN: lat. 265
Bobbio Sacramentary
Firenze, BMed: Aedil. 121
Bodleian Carol Book [Latin and English]
= Selden Song Book
Oxford, BL: Arch. Selden. B. 26
Bohemian Bible: see Antwerp Bible
Bolonski Psalter [Slavonic]
Bologna, BU: 2499
Bonadies ms.
Faenza, BC: 117
Bondol (Pseudo-) Bible [French]
Hamburg, KK: fr. 1
Bonnont Psalter
Besançon, BM: 54
Book of Aneurin [Welsh]
= Llyfr Aneurin
Cardiff, PL: 2.81
Book of Llandaff [Welsh]
= Liber Landavensis
= Llyfr Llandaf
Aberystwyth, NLW: 17110E
Bouillon Bible [French]
Baltimore, WAG: W. 125-126
Brantwood Bible
London, BL: Yates Thompson 22
Broadley Pontifical
Cambridge (Mass.), HU: fMS Typ 217H
Brooke Antiphonal
London, SA: 450
Buildwas Gospels
London, BL: Harley 3038
Burchell Bible and Missal
San Marino, HL: HM 26061
Burghley Polychronicon
San Marino, HL: HM 28561
Caerlaverock (Karlaverok) Poem [French]
London, BL: Cotton Caligula A.xviii (fols. 23v-30v)
Cahors Pontifical
Paris, BN: lat. 1217
Caimin, St., Psalter
Killiney, FL: A I
Calahorra Bible
Calahorra, AC: III
Camarin Gospels
El Escorial, BSL: v.i.14 (gr. 434)
Cambrai Gospels
Cambrai, BM: 327 (309)
Cambridge Songs
Cambridge, UL: Gg.5.35
Camden Roll
London, BL: Cotton Roll XV.8
Cangé Chansonnier: see Songbooks I e)
Capucins’ Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 16743-16746
Cardeña Bible
Burgos, BC: Dep. Seminario de San Jerónimo de Burgos: S.N.
Carmina Cantabrigiensia: see Cambridge Songs
Cartularies
a) Abingdon Abbey
London, BL: Cotton Claudius C.ix
b) Cok’s
London, St. Bartholomew Hospital Archives: S.N.
c) Denton Black Book
OCELLI NOMINVM (II)

Windsor, St. George’s Chapel: Muniments IV.B.2-3

d) Glasgow
Glasgow, UL: Gen. 198

e) Gloucester Abbey
London, PRO: C. 150/1

f) Hemming’s [Latin and English]
= Worcester Cathedral Priory
London, BL: Cotton Tiberius A.xiii

g) Oak
Cambridge, KC: Muniments S.N.

h) Oswald
London, BL: Cotton Nero E.i (fols. 181-184) + Add. 46204

i) Saint Denys
London, BL: Add. 15314

j) Sherborne
London, BL: Add. 46487

k) Winchester Cathedral Priory [Latin and English]
= Swithin, St.
London, BL: Add. 15350

Casanatense Homiliary
Roma, BCas: 716-717

2) Prato, BR: O VIII 2

Certosa Breviary
Cambridge (Mass.), HU: MS Typ 219

Chabellan, Richard, Missal
Paris, BN: lat. 879

Chansonnier [French, Latin, English, Spanish, Italian]: see Songbooks

Charlemagne Psalter
Paris, BN: lat. 13159

Charles of Orléans Hours
= Ducs d’Orléans Hours
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 3115

Charters
a) Æthelred II, King, to Æthelred [Latin and English]
London, BL: Stowe Charter 35

b) Æthelbald [English]
London, BL: Cotton Augustus II.3

c) Cnut, King, to Archbishop Lyfing [Latin and English]
London, BL: Stowe Charter 38

d) Eadgifu, Queen, to Christ Church, Canterbury [English]
London, BL: Stowe Charter 28

e) Edgar, King, to Abingdon Abbey [Latin and English]
London, BL: Cotton Augustus II.39

f) Edgar, King, to Wulfric
London, BL: Cotton Augustus II.40

g) Edward I for Newminster [English]
London, BL: Cotton Vespasian A.viii

h) Hlotharius of Kent
London, BL: Cotton Augustus II.2

Chaucer (Canterbury Tales) [English]
p) Chatsworth
Tokyo, Toshiyutsi Takamiya Collection 24

Chertsey Abbey Breviary
Oxford, BL: Lat. liturg. d. 42 + e. 6 + e. 37 + e. 42 + San Francisco, USF: BX 2033 A2

Chester-le-Street Gospels
London, BL: Cotton Otho B.ix

Chichele, (Henry), of Canterbury Pontifical
Cambridge, TC: 248 (B.11.9)

Christoph von Utenheim Missal
Forrentruy, BEC: 5

Chronicles

1 Anglo-Saxon [English]
a) Abingdon Abbey
London, BL: Cotton Tiberius A.vi

b) Anglo-Saxon E-Text
= Laud
= Peterborough

Oxford, BL: Laud. Misc. 636

c) Christ Church [English and Latin]
London, BL: Cotton Domitian A.viii

d) Parker Chronicles and Laws
Cambridge, CCC: 173

e) Worcester
London, BL: Cotton Tiberius B.iv

f) London, BL: Cotton Domitian A.ix (fol. 9)

g) London, BL: Cotton Otho B.xi (fols. 39-47)

II

a) Peterborough Abbey
Cambridge, CCC: 53 (fols. 185-187)

b) San Vincenzo al Volturno
Codex Gothanus

Gotha, FB: I 81 (olim Memb. 57)
--- Hammer: see Leonardo da Vinci a)
--- Huntingtonianus = Codex Tarragona
New York, HSA: B 1143
--- Juvenecus Cantabrigiensis
Cambridge, UL: Fl.4.32
--- Juvenianus
Roma, BV: B 25th
--- Laudunensis
Laon, BM: 473 bis
--- Leicester of Leonardo da Vinci: see Leonardo da Vinci a)
--- Mavrocordatianus [Greek]
Bratislava, SAS: 394 kt.
--- Petrov [Greek]
--- Pfisteri
Basel, SA: St. Alban R
--- Regius [Greek]
Paris, BN: gr. 62
--- Rupefulcadinus [Greek]
Berlin, DSB: Phillippis 1450
--- Schlettstadensis
Sélestat, BH: la (olim 1093)
--- Tarragona: see Codex Huntingto-
nianus
--- Toletanus
Madrid, BN: Vitr. 13.1
--- Vindobonensis Mexicanus [Mexi-
can]
Wien, ÖNB: Mexikanus 1
--- Vitebergensis: see Cicero a)
--- Waldeckensis et Marburgensis [Greek and Latin]
Marburg, HS: Bestand 147 lat. + Arol-
sen, SM: II. Abt., 1. Abschnitt Konv. 49, Fasz. 15-16
--- Washingtonianus (W)
Washington, D.C., FG: 06.274
Cœur, Jacques, Hours
München, SB: Clm 10103
Cœur, Jacques, Pontifical
   New York, PM: G. 49
Collins Hours
   Philadelphia, PMA: 45-65-4
Colmar Liederbuch: see Songbooks II b)
Comitissa Bible
   London, BL: Royal 3.E.i-v + 3.E.viii
Conrad von Thüngen Breviary
   New York, PM: G. 13
Copenhagen Chansonnier: see Songbooks I f)
Cormac Psalter
   London, BL: Add. 36929
Coronation Book of Charles V
   London, BL: Cotton Tiberius B.viii
Coronation Book of Kings of England
   Pamplona, AGN: 197
Correctoria
   a) Dominicanum (Hugo de Sancto Caro)
      Vaticanano, Città del, BAV: Ottob. lat. 293
   b) Parisienne
      Paris, BN: lat. 16719-16722
   c) Sorbonicum
      Paris, BN: lat. 15554
   d) Vaticanum (William de la Mare)
      Vaticanano, Città del, BAV: Vat. lat. 3466
C(o)upar Angus Psalter
   Vaticanano, Città del, BAV: Pal. lat. 65
Courtney, Catherine, Empress of Constantineople, Hours
   New York, PM: M. 730
Crowland Psalter: see Peterborough Psalter 3)
Cuthbert, St., Collectar
   = Durham Ritual
   Durham, CL: A.IV.19
Y Cwtta Cyfarwydd [Welsh]
   Aberystwyth, NLW: Peniarth 50

David Psalter
   Oxford, BL: Bodley 953
De Bernham Pontifical
   Cambridge, SSC: 100 (d.5.15)
Decani Gospels [Slavonic]
   Leningrad, GPB: Gilf. 4
De Lisle Hours
   New York, PM: G. 50
De Mortivall, (Roger), Bishop of Salisbury, Pontifical
   Oxford, BL: Rawl. C. 400
Derby, Stephen of, Psalter
   Oxford, BL: Rawl. G. 185
Dering Roll
   London, BL: Add. 38537
Donizo ms.
   Vaticanano, Città del, BAV: Vat. lat. 4922
Dresden Prayerbook
   Dresden, SL: A.311
Du Bois de Dourduff Pontifical
   Toronto, BC: 28
Dublin Apocalypse
   Dublin, TC: 64 (K.4.31)
Ducs d’Orléans Hours: see Charles of Orléans Hours
Durham Ritual: see Cuthbert, St., Collectar
Dyson Perrins Statutes
   San Marino, HL: HM 19920

Eadgifu, Queen, Charter to Christ Church, Canterbury: see Charters d)
Eales Hours [Latin and French]
   Reading, UL: 2087
Eberhard Psalter
   München, SB: Clm 7355
Ebrach Bible
   Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. 1.3.1
   Aug. 2°
Echternach Bible
   Luxembourg, BN: 264
Echternach Psalter
   Stuttgart, WLH: Bibl. fol. 12a-c
Echternach Sacramentary
   Darmstadt, LH: 1946
   2) Paris, BN: lat. 9433
Edgar, King, Charter to Abingdon Abbey: see Charters e)
Edgar, King, Charter to Wulfric: see Charters f)
Edward I Charter for Newminster: see Charters g)
Egmond Gospels
   's-Gravenhage, KB: 76 F 1
Eleanora, Empress, Hours
Wien, ÖNB: 1942
Eleanora de Toledo Hours
London, VAM: L. 1792-1953
Elizabeth of York Prayerbook
Toronto, BC: 60
Ellinger, Abbot, Gospel Book
= Tegernsee Gospel Book
München, SB: Clm 18005
Emma, Queen, Encomium
London, BL: Add. 33241
Eretrude, St., Collector
München, SB: Clm 15902
Erlyngham Breviary
Salisbury, CL: 152
El Escorial Apocalypse
El Escorial, BSL: Vitr. 5
Eton Apocalypse [French]
Eton, EC: 177
Eton Choir/Anthem Book
Eton, EC: 178
Evergerus Lectionary
Köln, EDBB: 143
Fairfax Book
London, BL: Add. 5465
Faure Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 47
Ferdinand I of Aragon Breviary
Napoli, BN: I B 57
Fichard Liederbuch: see Songbooks II c)
Fleury Play Book
Orléans, BM: 201 (178)
Flora Hours
Napoli, BN: I B 51
Floresté Gospels
Bruxelles, BR: 62 (10527)
Florence Sacramentary
Firenze, BLaur: Aedil. 122
Foigny Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 15177-15180
Forrest-Heather Part Books
Oxford, BL: Mus. Sch. e. 376-381
Foucarmont Bible
Neufchâtel-en-Bray, BM: 1-5
Francis I, King of France, Hours
London, BL: Add. 18853
Franciscan Missal
Oxford, BL: Douce 313
Frankfurt Dirigier Roll [German]
Frankfurt am Main, UB: Barth. 178
Frederick III, Emperor, Breviary [German]
München, SB: Cgm 68
Freising Memorials
München, SB: Clm 6426
Freising Pontifical
München, SB: Clm 6425
Fressac Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 58
Friedrich von Köln Lectionary
Köln, EDBB: 59
Friedrich ze Rhin Breviary
Basel, UB: A N VIII 28/29
Fritzlar Bible
Pommerfelden, GSB: 335
Frowin, Abbot, Bible
= Richene Bible
Engelberg, SB: 3-5 (olim I/1-3)
Froymont-DeVinck-Wittert Prayerbook
Liège, BU: Wittert 35
Fulda Gospels (of Mainz)
Berlin, SBPK: Theol. lat. fol. 18
2) (of Werden)
Berlin, SBPK: Theol. lat. fol. 359
Fulda Sacramentary
Bamberg, SB: Msc. lit. 1 (A.II.12)
2) Berlin, SBPK: Theol. lat. fol. 192
3) Göttingen, NSUB: Theol. 231
4) Lunel, BM: 1
5) München, SB: Clm 10077
6) Udine, BC: 75 V
7) Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Vat. lat.
3806
8) Vercelli, BC: 181
Gaignières Lectionary
Paris, BN: lat. 1126
Geneva Bible
Genève, BPU: 1
Genoa Bible
Genova, BC: Berio R. B. 2554
Giles of Luxembourg Pontifical
Toronto, BC: 39
Gimont Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 7
Giovannino de' Grassi Sketchbook
Bergamo, BC: A.VII.14

Glagolita Clozianus: see Codex Clozianus

Glezier Psalter
= Hachette Psalter
New York, PM: G. 25

Goderamnus Bible
= Lobbes Bible
= Saint Peter of Lobbes Bible
Tournai, BGS: 1

Gonson, William, Hours
Chicago, NL: 35

Gonzaga, Cecilia, Hours
New York, PM: M. 454

Gospel of 1316 [Armenian]
Jerusalem, APG: 1950

Gospel of the Sea [Armenian]
Jerusalem, APG: 1794

Goteboldus (Guntbald) Bible
= Gumbertus Bible
Erlangen, UB: 1 (Irmischer 121)

Gouffier, Claude, Psalter [French]
Paris, BA: 5095

Gough Psalter: see Peterborough Psalter
6

Grande Chartreuse Bible
Grenoble, BM: 3

Granvelle Hours
London, BL: Add. 21235

Grillinger, Peter, Bible
München, SB: Clm 15701

Grimold Sacramentary
Köln, EDBB: 88

Gueldre Breviary [German]
= Maria von Gelden Hours
Tübingen, UB: Germ. 42

Guerin (Garin), John, Hours
New York, PM: M. 27

Gumbertus Bible: see Goteboldus Bible

Gundekar Pontifical of Eichstätt
Eichstätt, SSB: (S) S.N.

Gundolf Gospels
Stuttgart, WLB: Bibl. qu. 2

Guntibald Gospels
Hildesheim, Dom: 33

Guy de Mohun, Bishop of St. David, Pontifical
Cambridge, CCC: 79

Haarlem Hours
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Habert du Berry d’Artois-Hoe Hours
Cambridge (Mass.), HU: Richardson 7

Hachette Psalter: see Glazier Psalter

Hadrian Sacramentary
= Hildoard, Bishop, Sacramentary
Cambray, BM: 164 (159)

Hakon Psalter
Berlin, KK: 78 A 8

Halle Inventory (Heiltumsbuch)
Aschaffenburg, HB: 14

Halle Lectionary
New York, PM: M. 299

Hamersleben Bible
= Pancratius, St., Bible
Halberstadt, Dom: 1

Hamilton Süddur [Hebrew]
Berlin, SBPK: Hamilton 288

Hardehausen Gospels
Kassel, GB: Theol. fol. 59

Hartker Antiphonal
Sankt Gallen, SB: 390-391

Hartmut Biblical ms.
Sankt Gallen, SB: 83

Harvard Hannibal: see Livy f)

Hastings, William, Lord, Hours
London, BL: Add. 54872
2) Madrid, MLG: No. 15503

Heidelberg Psalter
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Pal. lat. 39

Heisterbach Bible
Berlin, DB: Theol. lat. fol. 379

Helgesinus von Vinstingen Psalter
Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. 64 Aug. 2°

Helmarshausen Gospels
Malibu, JGPM: Ludwig II 3

Hemming’s Cartulary: see Cartularies f)

Henry II Gospels
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Ottob. lat. 74

Henry II Lectionary
München, SB: Clm 15713

Henry II Pericopes
Bamberg, SB: Misc. Bibl. 95 (A.II.46)

Henry VII Hours
Tournai, BM: 122

Henry VIII Hours
New York, PM: H. 8

Henry VIII Psalter
   London, BL: Royal 2.A.xvi

Henry the Lion Gospelbook
   Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. Noviss. 2°

Herman van Lochorst Bible
   Cambridge, FM: 289

Hildebrandslied [German]
   Kassel, GB: Theol. fol. 54

Hildbrand, Bishop, Sacramentary: see Hadrian Sacramentary

Hildegard Gospels
   Köln, EDDB: 13

Hlotharius of Kent, Charter of: see Charters h)

Hohenems-Münchener Nibelungenlied
   [German]
   München, SB: Cgm 34

Homer [Greek]
   e) Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga Iliad
      Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Vat. gr. 1626
   f) Lefort Papyrus
      Louvain-la-Neuve, AUC: Pap. Gr. 1
   g) Munich Briseis
      München, SB: Pap. graec. mon. 128

Honoré Breviary
   = Philippe le Bel Breviary
   Paris, BN: lat. 1023

Huesca Sacramentary
   Huesca, AC: 5 (olim 8)

Hungerford Missal
   Cambridge, UL: Add. 451

Huth Hours
   London, BL: Add. 38126

Hval New Testament [Slavonic]
   Bologna, BU: 3575B

Hyde Abbey Psalter: see Peterborough Psalter 6)

Hymnarium Severinianum
   Paris, BN: lat. 1092

Iliad of Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga: see Homer e)

Isabella di Chiaromonte Hours
   Cambridge (Mass.), HU: fMS Typ 463

Jacques de Luxembourq Hours
   Malibu, JPMG: Ludwig IX 11

Jean Cœur Pontifical: see Cœur, Jean, Pontifical

Jean de Foix Missal
   Paris, BN: lat. 16827

Jean, Admiral, de Montaubon and wife
   Anne de Kérénrais, Hours [Latin and French]
   Paris, BN: lat. 18026

Jena Liederbuch: see Songbooks II d)

Johannes de Pagah(am) Psalter
   Oxford, BL: Bodley 862

Johannes von Valkenburg Antiphonary: see Beaupré Antiphonal

Johannes von Valkenburg Gradual
   Köln, EDDB: 1 b
   2) Bonn, UB: S 384

Johannes von Venningen Breviary
   Porrentruy, BEC: 22

Johannes von Venningen Liber officiorum
   Porrentruy, BEC: 3

John of Nassau and Vyanden Historiated Bible
   Kopenhagen, KB: Thott 123 2°

Juana la Loca Hours
   Cambridge (Mass.), HU: fMS Typ 443 + 443.1

Judith of Flanders Gospels
   Fulda, LB: Aa 21

Jumièges Bible
   Rouen, BM: 8 (A.6)

Jumièges Gospels
   London, BL: Add. 17739

Jutta Tursina of Lichtenfels Psalter
   Zwettl, SB: 204

Kederminger Gospels
   London, BL: Loan 11 (Langley Parish, Buckinghamshire, Kederminger Library 267)

Kingston Lacy Leaf: see Offa Bible

Kiara Hätzlerin of Augsburg Liederbuch: see Songbooks II e)

Klosterneuburg Bible
   Klosterneuburg, SB: 1
Klus Gospels
Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. 843.3
Aug. 2°

Konrad von Rennenberg Missal
Köln, EDBB: 149

Kurij anivii Fragments [Glagolitic]
Leningrad, GPB: F.I.1.58

La Clayette ms. [French and Latin]
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. fr. 13521 + lat. 11411

Lacy, Bishop Edmund, Pontifical
Exeter, CL: 3513

Lallemant, Guillaume, Missal
New York, PM: M. 495

Lambach Gospels
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Vat. lat. 14008

Lambert le Bògue Psalter
Cambridge, FM: 288

Laud Chronicles: see Chronicles I b)

Lefort Papyrus: see Homer f)

Le Mans Sacramentary
Le Mans, BM: 77

León Bible of 1162: see Bible (San Isidoro) of 1162

Leonardo da Vinci
a) Codex Hammer
= Codex Leicester (from Holkham Hall)
Los Angeles, Armand Hammer Foundation: S.N.

Liber Landavensis: see Book of Llandaff

Liber Sancti Jacobi: see Codex Calixtinus

Liechtenstein-Káljmáncehi ms.
New York, PM: G. 7

Liederbuch [German, English, Latin, French, Spanish]: see Songbooks

Liège Sacramentary
Bamberg, SB: Msc. lit. 3 (Ed.V.4)
Little Canterbury Psalter
Paris, BN: lat. 770

Livy
f) Harvard Hannibal
Cambridge (Mass.), HU: Richardson 32

Llanfaes Bible
London, BL: Add. 54232

Llyfr Coch Talgarth [Welsh]
= Red Book of Talgarth
Aberystwyth, NLW: Llanstephan 27

Llyfr Du Caerffyddin: see Black Book of Carmarthen

Llyfr Gwyn Rhydderich [Welsh]
= White Book of Rhydderich
Aberystwyth, NLW: Peniarth 4-5

Y Llyvyr Du or Weun: see Black Book of Chirk

Lobbes Bible: see Goderamnus Bible

Louis de Busco Psalter/Hours
Baltimore, WAG: W. 286

Louthe, Thomas, Hours
Louvain-la-Neuve, AUC: A 2 (olim G 5)

Lucan
a) Milan
Milano, BA: H 33 inf. (= S.P. 50)

Lucretius
a) Lucretius oblongus
Leiden, BR: Voss. lat. F. 30
b) Lucretius quadratus
Leiden, BR: Voss. lat. Q. 94

Lyon Bible
Lyon, BM: 410-411 (337)

Lyre Psalter
London, BL: Add. 16975

Magdalen College Pontifical
Dublin, TC: 98 (B.3.6)

Mahaut d’Artois Hours
Cambrai, BM: 87 (88)

Maldon, Battle of [English]
Oxford, BL: Rawl. B. 203

Malines Bible
Bruxelles, BR: 1 (9107-10)

Mansi Breviary
Lucca, BCF: 5

Marco Polo (Li livres du Graunt Caam) [French]
a) Oxford, BL: Bodley 264

Margaret of Cornwall Hours
Nürnberg, SB: Solger 4.4°

Marguerite de Valois Prayerbook
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 83

Maria von Gelden Hours: see Gueldre Breviary

Maurdramnus Bible
Amiens, BM: 6-9 + 11-12 + Paris, BN: lat. 13174 (fols. 136, 138)
Maximus Apocalypse [Greek]
— McCormick, Elizabeth Day, Apocalypse
Chicago, UL: 931 (ND 3361 R5M1 81210934)
Mayence/Mainz Pontifical
Bruxelles, BR: 387 (1814-16)
Mayence/Mainz Sacramentary
Oxford, BL: Auct. D.1.20
Mellon Chansonnier: see Songbooks I g)
Merceburg Bible
Merceburg, AD: I. 1-3
Merwas, First, Bible [Hebrew]
London, BL: Or. 2201
Metz Cathedral Bible
Metz, BM: 2
Michaelbeuern Bible
Michaelbeuern, SB: Perg. 1
Michaelbeuern Gospels: see Ellinger, Abbot, Gospel Book
Michel Jouvenel des Ursins Hours
= Yolande de Montbrion Hours
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 3113
Milan Bible of (Cardinal) Francesco Pizzolpasso
Milano, BA: B 48 inf.
Milan Lucan: see Lucan a)
Milan Pontifical
Milano, BC: 4
Mildenfurth Bible
Jena, UB: Elect. theol. fol. 12 + 14
Mindum Sacramentary
Berlin, DSB: Theol. lat. fol. 2
Miracle Gospels [Armenian]
Jerusalem, APG: 2649
Miracles of Notre Dame (of Pucelle) [French]
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. fr. 24541
Mirandola Hours
= Ruskin, John, Hours
London, BL: Add. 50002
Missale Parvum de Vic
Vich, AC: 71
Monte Amiata Sacramentary
Lucca, BCF: 606
Montserrat Sacramentary
Montserrat, BM: 815
Mordramne Bible: see Maurdramnus Bible
Morgan Library Sketchbook
New York, PM: M. 346
Mosen Psalter
Berlin, KK: 78 A 6
Mosburg/Moosburg Gradual
München, UB: 2° 156
Mulliner Virginal Book [Music]
London, BL: Add. 30513
Munich Briseis: see Homer g)
Munich Parzifal [German]
München, SB: Cgm 19
Munich Tristan [German]
München, SB: Cgm 51
Nagler Liederbuch: see Songbooks II f)
Namur Breviary
Berlin, DSB: Theol. lat. fol. 285
Nevers Pontifical
Paris, BN: lat. 17333
Nibelungenlied [German]
Berlin, DSB: Germ. fol. 855
Nicolaus Gospels
Chicago, UC: 129 (BS 3552 1133 879920)
Nicomedia Gospels [Greek]
Kiev, GPB: 25 (Lebedev)
Niederaltaich Gospel Book
München, SB: Clm 9476
Nivelles Sacramentary
Zürich, ZB: Rh. 30
Nonantola Sacramentary
Paris, BN: lat. 2292
Non(n)berg Pericopes
München, SB: Clm 15903
Novalesa Troper
Oxford, BL: Douce 222
Ochrid Gospels [Slavonic]
Odessa, OGNB: R 2/532
Odilo Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 15176
Offa Bible
London, BL: Add. 37777 (= Greenwell Leaf) + Add. 45025 (= Middleton Leaves) + Loan 81 (= Bankes Leaf = Kingstumph Lacy Leaf)
Oña Bible
Silos, ASD: frag. 19
Oporto Chansonnier: see Songbooks I h)
Ostromirovo Gospels [Slavonic]
Leningrad, GPB: F. VII.1.5
Oswald Breviary
= Portiforium Oswaldi
Cambridge, CCC: 391
Ottheinrich, Count Palatine, Bible [German]
München, SB: Cgm 8010-8011
Ottobeuren Homiliary
Roma, BN: Vittorio Emanuele 1190

Padua Sacramentary
Padova, BC: D 47

Pancretius, St., Bible: see Hamersleben Bible
Parc Bible
= Park Bible
= Saint Mary de Parc Bible
London, BL: Add. 14788

Paris, Matthew, (Chronica)
a) Cambridge, CCC: 16
b) Cambridge, CCC: 26
c) London, BL: Royal 14.C.vii

Paris Chansonnier: see Songbooks I i)
Passau Psalter
München, SB: Clm 11020

Penwortham Breviary
London, BL: Add. 52359

Pepin Sacramentary
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Reg. lat. 316A

Peterborough Chronicles: see Chronicles I
b)

Peterborough Psalter
3) = Crowland Psalter
Oxford, BL: Douce 296
4) Cambridge, CCC: 53
5) Barlow
Oxford, BL: Barlow 22
6) Gough
= Hyde Abbey
Oxford, BL: Gough liturg. 8
7) Ramsey
New York, PM: M. 302 + Sankt Paul im Lavanttal, SB: XXV/2,19

Phébus, Gaston (Livre de la chasse) [French]
a) Paris, BN: fr. 1291

Philiargi, Cardinal Peter, [Alexander V] Pontifical

Cambridge, FM: McClean 54
Phoenix Hours
New York, CUL: BP096 F
Pierre de Bosredont Hours
New York, PM: G. 55
Pierre de Foix Hours
New York, PM: M. 6
Plantagenet Psalter
London, VAM: Reid 53
Poncii Bible
London, BL: Add. 50003
Pontigny Bible
Paris, BN: lat. 8823
Portcullis Book
London, BL: Harley 521
Porter, Sir William, Hours
New York, PM: M. 105
Portiforium Oswaldi: see Oswald Breviary
Powell Roll of Arms
Oxford, BL: Ashmole 804.IV
Prigent de Coëtivy Hours
Dublin, CBL: W. 82
Priscian
a) Leiden, BR: B.P.L. 114B
b) Quinity of Winchester Miniature
London, BL: Cotton Titus D.xxvii (fol. 75v)

Rado Bible
Wien, ÖNB: 1190
Raleigh, Sir Walter, Hours [Latin and French]
Oxford, BL: Add. A. 185
Ramsey Psalter: see Peterborough Psalter 7)

Ratisbon Pontifical
Paris, BN: lat. 1231
Ratisbon Sacramentary
Verona, BC: LXXXVII (82)

Ravensburg Lectionary
Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Pal. lat. 502

Red Book of Talgarth: see Llyfr Coch Talgarth
Regensburg Antiphonary
New York, PM: M. 870-874 + Baltimore, WAG: W. 754 (2 fols.) + Montréal, Philippe Verdier Collection: S.N.
Regensburg Gospels of St. Emmeram
Pommersfelden, GSB: 2821
Registrum Sancti Gregorii
Trier, SB: 1711 + Chantilly, MC: 14 (1353)
Reina ms. [French and Italian]
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. fr. 6771
René, duc d’Alençon, Hôurs
Reims, BM: 358 (C. 205)
Rheinau Sacramentary
Zürich, ZB: Rh. 43
Richene Bible: see Frowin, Abbot, Bible
Rivoire Hours
Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 3114
Robert le Clerc, Abbot of Dunes, Pontifical
Cambridge, UL: Nn.4.1
Robertet, Jean, Hours
New York, PM: M. 834
Robertbridge ms./Fragment [Music]
London, BL: Add. 28550
Rochefoucauld Hours [Latin, French]
Bruxelles, BR: 750 (15077)
Rode (Rohde) Gospels
Wolfenbüttel, HAB: Cod. Guelf. 576.2
Novi
Roi, Manuscrit du, Chansonnier: see Songbooks I j)
Romance of Alexander: see Alexander Romance
Romance of the Rose (Roman de la rose)
[French]
a) London, BL: Add. 42133
b) London, BL: Harley 4425
c) London, BL: Royal 19.B.xiii
d) London, BL: Royal 20.A.xvii
e) Oxford, BL: Selden Supra 57
Romance Papyrus [Greek]
Paris, BN: suppl. gr. 1294
Roochoister Breviary
London, BL: suppl. gr. 1294
2) Bruxelles, BR: IV.860
Roseberry Hours
Glasgow, UL: Gen. 288
Rostock Liederbuch: see Songbooks II g)
Rous Roll [English]
London, BL: Add. 48976
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<td>Maria degli Angeli Bible</td>
<td>Firenze, BLaur:  Conv. soppr. 630</td>
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<td>Maria del Vergaro Missal</td>
<td>Perugia, MO: 8 (16)</td>
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<td>Maria della Rosa Legendary</td>
<td>Vaticano, Città del, BAV: Vat. lat. 6074</td>
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<td>Paris, BN: nouv. acq. lat. 2652</td>
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<td>Savvina Kniga [Slavonic]</td>
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<td>a) Augsburg</td>
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<td>Squarcialupi ms. [Italian]</td>
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<td>Stablo (Stabloo, Stavelot) Bible</td>
<td>London, BL: Add. 28106-28107</td>
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<td>Oxford, BL: Lat. liturg. b. 2</td>
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Strasbourg ms.
  Strasbourg, ABV: A. VI. 19 (said to have been destroyed in fire of 1870)

Strassburg Heldenbuch [German]
  Berlin, SBPK: Germ. qu. 781

Sutton Bible
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Muniments IV.B.2-3: 401a

WOLFENBÜTTEL, Herzog August Bibliothek (HAB)
Cod. Guelf. 1.3.1 Aug. 2°: 403b
36.23 Aug. 2°: 398b
64 Aug. 2°: 405b
84.3 Aug. 2°: 407a
61.2 Aug. 4°: 413a
576.2 Novi: 410a
105 Noviss. 2°: 406a
521 Helmst.: 413a

WORCESTER, Cathedral Library (CL)
F. 160: 413a

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THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE GOVERNORS
OF AL-ANDALUS
TO THE ACCESSION OF ĀBD AL-RAHMĀN I

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The only detailed discussion of this complex of problems as a whole is that provided by E. Lafuente y Alcántara in an appendix to his valuable edition and translation of the Akhbār Madjmu’ī’a, published as long ago as 1867.¹ That has been regarded as the standard treatment, and subsequent historians have tended to adopt Lafuente’s conclusions. He sought to establish not only the year but the month in which each of the Muslim governors, up to the assumption of power by the Umayyad prince, Ābd al-Raḥmān I, began and ended his tenure. Dates in such terms are given, in a sporadic way, by the Arabic chroniclers, biographers and historians. However, the indications they afford are not only incomplete but often contradictory and self-evidently undependable. Another class of data that Lafuente brought into account comprised statements about the length of time for which a governor was in office. These statements, too, are often in conflict with one another. Nevertheless, Lafuente believed it possible to arrive at a correct solution of the chronographic problem, and he succeeded in producing a list of the governors of Spain, from A.H. 92 to 138, in chronological sequence and with no temporal hiatus. Each governor follows immediately on the heels of his predecessor, apart from one explicit interregnum.

It will be useful for the purpose of orientation, and eventually comparison, if we begin by setting forth Lafuente’s list of governors and their dates. Here, personal names are given in simple form and with orthography based on the conventions of The Encyclopaedia of Islam;² and for the sake of clarity the

¹ Colección de obras árabicas de historia y geografía que publica la Real Academia de la Historia, vol. I: Ajbar Machmū‘ (colección de tradiciones). Crónica anónima del siglo XI, dada a luz por primera vez, traducida y anotada por Don Emilio Lafuente y Alcántara (Madrid, 1867), Appendix 3, pp. 220 ff. (This volume is cited henceforth as Lafuente, Colección 1.)

names of the months, both Islamic and Julian, are replaced by the appropriate Roman numerals.

1. ʿṬāriq b. Ziyād. VII.92 to IX.93 (IV/V.711 to VI.712): (1 year 2 months)
2. Mūṣā b. Nuṣayr. IX.93 to II.95 (VII.712 to X/XI.713): (1 year 5 months)
3. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Mūṣā. II.95 to VII.97 (X/XI.713 to III.716): (2 years 5 months)
4. Ayyūb b. Ḥabīb. VII.97 to XII.97 (III.716 to VIII.716): (6 months)
5. Al-Ḥurr b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. XII.97 to IX.100 (VIII.716 to III/IV.719): (2 years 8-9 months)
6. Al-Samḥ b. Mālik. IX.100 to XII.102 (III/IV.719 to VI.721): (2 years 3 months)
7. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbd Allāh. XII.102 to XI.103 (VI.721 to VIII.721): (1 month)
8. Anbasa b. Suḥaym. II.103 to VIII.107 (VII.721 to I.726): (4 years 5 months)
9. Udhra b. ʿAbd Allāh. VIII.107 to X.107 (I.726 to II/III.726): (2 months)
10. Yahyā b. Salāma. X.107 to III.110 (II/III.726 to VI/VII.728): (2 years 1 months)
11. Ḥudhayfā b. al-Āḥwā. III.110 to VIII.110 (VI/VII.728 to XI/XII.728): (6 months)
13. Al-Haytham b. ʿUbayy. I.111 to XI.111 (IV.729 to I/II.730): (10 months)
14. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. XI.111 to II.112 (I/II.730 to III/IV.730): (2 months)
15. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān iterum. II.112 to IX.114 (III/IV.730 to X.732): (2 years 7 months)
16. Abī al-Malik b. Qatan. IX.114 to X.116 (X.732 to XI.734): (2 years)
17. Uqba b. al-Hadjdājdāj. X.116 to II.123 (XI/XII.734 to I/II.741): (6 years 4 months)
18. Abī al-Malik iterum. II.123 to XI.123 (I.741 to IV.741): (9 months)
20. Thaʿlabā b. Salāma. X.124 to VII.125 (VIII.742 to V.743): (10 months)
21. Abū 1-Khaṭṭār b. al-Husām b. ʿIrār. VII.125 to VII.127 (V.743 to IV.745): (2 years)
22. Thawāba b. Salāma. VII.127 to I.129 (IV.745 to IX/X.746): (1 year 6 months)
Interval. I.129 to IV.129 (IX/X.746 to XII.746/I.747): (4 months)

The chronology of Lévi-Provençal in his *Histoire de l’Espagne musulmane* is not quite so detailed in its presentation, but follows Lafuente very closely. The only variations occur in the case of Mūṣā (2), whose termination is deferred to the end of 95; and of (21) and (22), where the transition from Abū 1-Khaṭṭār to Thawāba is dated ‘after’ the month of Raḍjab. The slightly less complete chronology of Valdeavellano in his *Historia de España* in turn follows closely that of Lévi-Provençal, with no material variation. I propose to argue that there

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3 Since I have frequently used the Islamic month-names elsewhere it may save time and trouble if I list their order here: I = Muḥarram; II = Saḥf; III = Raḥf 1; IV = Raḥf 2; V = Djamāda 1; VI = Djamāda 2; VII = Raḍjab; VIII = Shaʿbān; IX = Raʾdān; X = Shawwāl; XI = Dhū l-qaʿda; XII = Dhū l-hiḍjādja.
is significant error in two sections of Lafuente's list, the first quarter and the final third: and thus, that the standard chronology of this period requires considerable revision.

I

Lafuente, in reviewing the sources available to him, acknowledged that there exists an important Latin source for Spanish chronology of the period. This is the Latin chronicle of unknown authorship which used to be attributed to the fictitious 'Isidorus Pacensis episcopus', a name which necessarily and inevitably lingers on in library catalogues. It was cited by Lafuente from the text then available, the slightly contaminated one given by Flórez in *España sagrada*. It was subsequently edited, rather grotesquely, by Tailhan under the title 'Anonyme de Cordoue', and then by Mommsen in the Monumenta Germaniae historica as 'Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV'; it has recently been reedited by Juan Gil and again by José E. López Pereira. The importance of this *Chronicle of 754* (as it will be styled from here on) is, self-evidently, that it was produced in the year 754 (in the Islamic year 136), and its author must have been truly contemporary with at least the latter part of the period under study. Lafuente, however, while paying lip-service to the *Chronicle of 754*, preferred to base his calculations, in practice, on the indications given by Arabic sources, and was not moved by the fact that his resultant chronology distanced itself considerably from the (admittedly difficult) evidence of the *Chronicle of 754*. The earliest extant Arabic sources are, unfortunately, not contemporary but about a century later in date than the Latin Chronicle. We have the rather scrappy account of the Islamic conquest of the west, composed by the Egyptian Ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 871), and there is the brief relation of the conquest of Spain and even briefer account of its subsequent government up to 888/9, attributed to the Andalusian ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ḥabīb (Ibn Ḥabīb, d. 852/3). Even these were

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9 Cited from 'Notas de Ibn Abi Riqa de las lecciones de Ibn Ḥabīb acerca de la Conquista de España por los Árabes', trans. M. M. Antuña in *Cuadernos de historia de España* 1-2 (1944) 255 ff. Pascual de Gayangos, *History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain* 2 (London, 1843), p. 405 n. 7, translated the summary list of governors and the periods during which they ruled (Antuña, pp. 265 f.) and attributed it to Ibn Ḥabīb. The list is undoubtedly derived from Ibn Ḥabīb: it begins, 'we were told by ʿAbd al-Malik (Ibn Ḥabīb), who had it from Ibrāhim b. al-
not much used by Lafuente. The Arabic sources he was attracted to, and for the most part followed, are of still later date. With the lapse of time, as the facts of the conquest receded in memory, the Arabic writers patently felt free to resort to fiction in describing it and to borrow the tall tales of others (a process which had begun well before our earliest extant sources), and some of them developed the habit of supplying fanciful chronological detail to augment the verisimilitude of their accounts. Such detail immediately became part of the tradition, to be passed on by subsequent authors. The absurdity of the situation produced is neatly illustrated in the following extract from a famous essay by Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz:

... the Islamic authorities ... date the disembarkation of Ţarîq b. Ziyâd on 5, or 8, of Radjab 92 (28 April or 1 May 711), on a Saturday of the month of Sha'âbân of the same year (30 May, 6, 13 or 20 June 711), or in Râmâdân of the same 92 (June-July 711); and that of Mûsâ b. Nuṣayr in Ṣafar of 93 (19 November to 18 December 711), in Radjab of the same year (April-May 712), and mostly in Râmâdân of the same 93 (June-July 712).

Lists of such variants for the dates of the governors of Al-Andalus have been compiled, and will be found in the Appendix.
Let us begin our reexamination of the question by observing the strange case of the governorship of Baldj son of Bishr. There is general agreement that Baldj went to Ifriqiya as second-in-command to his uncle Kulthûm in A.H. 123, arriving in the ninth month, Ramadân, and that the battle (at the Sabû River) against the insurgent Berbers, in which Kulthûm was killed and Baldj forced to flee with a remnant of the army, is to be dated to Dhû l-ḥijûdja, the last month, of 123 (17.X-14.XI.741). How, then, is it possible for Baldj to have commenced his governorship in Spain in the previous month, Dhû l-qaḍa, the eleventh month, of 123, as is recorded by several Islamic ‘authorities’ and unthinkingly retailed by modern historians? Lévi-Provençal simply puts down these two mutually contradictory dates, at different points in his text, without comment or critique. Obviously it is not possible at all. The traditional dates for Baldj’s governorship have to be revised, and this will affect by chain reaction the chronology of other governorships in that period.

Equally grave is the case of Yusuf, the last of the series of governors preceding ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1. The Chronicle of 754 was undoubtedly contemporary with Yusuf, who was actually ruling in 754. In fact, the Chronicler of 754 must have been one of those ruled by Yusuf. Nothing could be more absurd than to disregard the Chronicle’s evidence on Yusuf’s dates. Yet that is what Lafuente did.

The Chronicle of 754 offers two consistent observations relevant to the chronology of Yusuf’s governorship. It says that Yusuf was chosen governor in Era 785 (A.D. 747), at the completion of A.H. 129 and beginning of 130; and that at the time of writing, Era 792, in A.H. 136 (i.e., the first half of A.D. 754), Yusuf was in his seventh year.
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1 Yusuf: I.130 to XII.130 (IX.747 to VIII.748)
7 Yusuf: I.136 to XII.136 (VII.753 to VI.754).

It follows, as the night the day, that when Yusuf was ousted by `Abd al-Rahmân i in XII.138 (V.756), he was close to the end, not of his tenth year, but of his ninth year as governor:

9 Yusuf: I.138 to XII.138 (VI.755 to V.756).

Most of the Arabic sources fall into the error of attributing ten or nearly ten years to the government of Yusuf. The correct figure, nine years, happens to be preserved by Ibn `Idhârî. The truth is also implicit in the Akhbâr Madjmu‘a, which in this segment of its narrative reproduces, as is well known, the account of a contemporary of the events. Lafuente preferred to be guided by a statement cited by Al-Maqqari from Ibn Ḥayyân (d. 1076), that Yusuf

luzzif patricie VII, Arabum CXXXVI, anni VDCCCCLIII. The Chronicle of 754 errs constantly about the regnal years of Constantine v (and of most of his predecessors); these errors must be disregarded. The year of Caliph Marwân ii is correct. At the start of A.H. 130 he was still in his third year, which would end in Ṣafar of 130: his accession-date was 26 Ṣafar 127, according to J. Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz, 2nd edition (Berlin, 1960), p. 235, citing Elias Nisibenus; 14 Ṣafar according to the Persian epitome of Al-Ṭabarî (cf. H. Zotenberg, Chronique de Abou-Djafar-Mo’hammed-Ben-Djarir-Ben-Yezid Tabari, traduite sur la version persane d’Abû-‘Ali Mo’hammed Bel'ami 4 [Paris, 1874], p. 314); the date is absent from the text of Al-Ṭabarî, Annales, 2nd Ser., 3 (Leiden, 1885-89), p. 1890; the 13th of the same month according to the intricate and entertaining calculations of Fournel, Les Berbers 1.311 f. (‘I would be very close to the truth in fixing 13 Ṣafar, given by Soioutî, who wrongly says Monday the 14th’).

The year of Caliph `Abd Allah Abu l-‘Abbas Al-Ṣaffâh, as given, is technically incorrect: he was first proclaimed at Al-Kûfâ on 12/13 Râbî‘ i of 132 (29/30.X.749) (cf. Wellhausen, p. 339, and Zotenberg 4.335 f., for the 12th, and Fournel 1.319 n. 5, for the 13th). Therefore, at the start of A.D. 754, corresponding to VII.136, he was in his fifth, not his fourth, year. But the elimination of his predecessor, Marwân, took a long time. The decisive battle at the Zâb, which ensured the overthrow of Marwân, did not occur until three months later, 11 Djumâdâ‘ ii of 132 (25.I.750) (Fournel 1.319 n. 7; Wellhausen, p. 341); and his death in Egypt did not come until the end of 132 (VIII.750) (Fournel 1.320 n. 1; The Encyclopaedia of Islam 1.106; Robert Mantran, La expansion musulmana (siglos VII al XI) [Barcelona, 1973], pp. 79, 264). In distant Spain it must have been hard to tell precisely when the transition from Marwân to Al-Ṣaffâh occurred. It could not have been known there until well into 750, so that it seems not surprising that the Chronicle should count Al-Ṣaffâh’s first year as running from 750 to 751, and so on.

Cf. Appendix, no. 23.


Cf. C. Sánchez-Albornoz, El 'Ajbar Maymû'a'. Cuestiones historiográficas que suscita (Buenos Aires, 1944), pp. 79 ff.

See the translation by Lafuente, Colección 1.207; cf. Gayangos, History 2.54. The date Râbî‘ ii of 129 probably arose through reckoning the nine years of Yusuf back from the date when `Abd al-Rahmân i landed in Spain (Râbî‘ ii of 138; cf. Lafuente, p. 76; Ibn Ḥayyân apud Al-Maqqari [Gayangos, History 2.66]).
became governor in Rabī‘ II, the fourth month, of 129. The *Akbār Madjmū‘a* says, in Lafuente’s translation,¹⁹ that Yūsuf’s predecessor, Thawāba, died in 129, 'al año de su mando', and in absolutely literal translation that Thawāba was governor for a year, then died in the year 129. It further states²⁰ that there was a time of vehement dissension, without actual fighting, before Yūsuf finally acceded to the governorship; the interval appears as a period of four months in other sources. Lafuente handled the problem with great dexterity. By making Thawāba die in the first month of 129, and reckoning inclusively, he reconciled this evidence, though he could not avoid leaving the ragged edge that, according to him, Thawāba governed for eighteen months, instead of a year as clearly stated by the *Akbār Madjmū‘a* (along with other sources, including the *Chronicle of 754*, as we shall see). There was no need for this fiddling and scraping. The two contemporary accounts, that in the *Akbār Madjmū‘a* and that of the Latin Chronicler, are not in conflict and should be combined. After a year in office Thawāba died in 129, not early in Muḥarram, but several months later. There was a period of uncertainty and dispute over the succession, until Yūsuf took power at the beginning of 130, just as the *Chronicle of 754*, writing only six and a half years later, says that he did.

III

The cases of Baldj and Yūsuf suggest that, if we are to reconstruct the chronology of the governorships properly, it will be wiser to begin from the point where we possess contemporary evidence. Therefore, we shall have to start at the end of the series and work backward in time from there, rather than follow the natural and obvious course, as Lafuente did, of beginning at the beginning.

Yūsuf. We have already established that this governorship, by far the longest of the series, must have commenced about the start of 130. That it ended with the triumph of the Umayyad, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, at the time of the festival days in Dhū l-Ḥidjja of 138, is variously attested and is recounted with copious and authentic detail in the *Akbār Madjmū‘a*.²¹ The date of the foundation of the Emirate of Córdoba ought to be, and is, reasonably secure.

Thawāba. As noted already, there was, according to several sources, an interval or interregnum between the accession of Yūsuf and the death of his

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¹⁹ Lafuente, *Colección* 1.63 (p. 57 of the Arabic text).
²⁰ ibid., pp. 63 f.
predecessor, Thawaba. The figure of four months was supplied by (Aḥmad) Al-Rāżī (d. 955) according to Al-Maqqari, and it was copied by the anonymous Fath al-Andalus, by Ibn al-Athīr, and by Ibn ‘Idhāri. It would place the death of Thawaba about the beginning of Ramaḍān 129 (V.747). But we cannot be sure that the figure of four months, which is attached to an incorrect chronological series, is reliable. No chronographic statement of Al-Rāżī can safely be approached without suspicion. That popular historian is ultimately the source of most of Lafuente’s erroneous chronology. It is unlikely, at any rate, that the period of anarchy was much longer than four months; it might have been shorter.

The Chronicle of 754 says that Thawaba acceded to power in Era 784 (A.D. 746), in A.H. 128 (which ended on 21.IX.746), and ruled for one year before dying a natural death. The same term of one year was given by Ibn Ḥabīb, and it is found again in the encyclopedia of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm (dated A.H. 557), which was quoted from manuscript by P. de Gayangos, and which lists a chronology almost identical with that of Ibn Ḥabīb. The pseudo Ibn Qutayba made Thawaba’s term last for a year and a month. But the Akhbār Madjmū’a, as we saw, states that he governed for a year and died in 129. In face of this solid evidence it is obvious that we should not assign more than a year to Thawaba. We might concede that ‘a year’ could mean here twelve and a half, or thirteen months, but not eighteen; and we must altogether disregard the sources which, in order to compensate for their earlier mistakes about the chronology, are forced to credit Thawaba with two years or more. There remains, however, the doubt about the length of interval before the accession of Yusuf, and that will make it somewhat futile to seek precise dates for Thawaba. The best we can do is to say that his governorship almost certainly began in the second half of 128 (IV.746-IX.746) and ended in the second half of 129

22 ibid., p. 207; Gayangos, History 2.54.
25 Fagnan, Histoire 1.66, 2.52.
27 Antuña, ‘Notas’, 265.
28 Gayangos, History 2.405 n. 7; cf. 1.xxv and 516 n. 1. Lafuente, Colección 1.223, refers to this work by the title Reihan el Olhab.
29 In Colección de obras arábicas de historia y de geografía que publica la Real Academia de la Historia, vol. 2: Historia de la Conquista de España de Abenalcotia el Cordobés (seguida de fragmentos históricos de Abenalcotia, etc.), Traducción de Don Julián Ribera (Madrid, 1926), pp. 161 f. On (pseudo) ‘Abencotaiiba’ see Sánchez-Albornoz, Fuentes, pp. 21 ff.
30 Cf. Appendix, no. 22.
(III.747-IX.747), to be followed by a period of uncertain duration until the accession of Yusuf.

**Abū l-Khaṭṭār.** The governorship of Abū l-Khaṭṭār, who preceded Thawāba, is the subject of widely differing statements in the Arabic sources. The period of rule attributed to him ranges variously between two years and four years nine months. Part of the reason for the confusion is that Abū l-Khaṭṭār survived his deposition by Thawāba and was not eliminated until the battle of Secunda early in Yusuf’s governorship,31 consequently the duration of his rule is confused with the period of time from his arrival to his death in Spain. Our best source, the *Chronicle of 754*, does not give the duration of Abū l-Khaṭṭār’s governorship, but it places his accession under Era 782 (A.D. 744 = 10.III.126-21.III.127) and his deposition in Era 784 (A.D. 746) and in A.H. 128 (= 3.X.745-21.IX.746).32 The tradition stemming from Ibn Ḥabīb gives Abū l-Khaṭṭār two years.33 A later tradition puts his accession back into 125, either soon after Muḥarram (supposedly the date of his departure from Tunis)34 or in Radjab (Ibn Ḥayyān and others).35 The earlier of these two dates is in any case ruled out as impossible, for the appointment of Abū l-Khaṭṭār came in the reign of Al-Walid II, which did not start until 6.IV.125 (ending on 27.VI.126).36 The fact about the appointment is preserved in the *Akhbār Madjmu’a*,37 even though it does not accord with that work’s chronology, which shares the common confusion at this point: Abū l-Khaṭṭār is credited with four years six months, but the end of his governorship is correctly put in 128 — so that, logically, it should have begun in 124!38

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37 Lafuente, *Colección* 1.54.

38 ibid., p. 62.
We are evidently faced with the position that some of the sources are giving dates a year in advance of the true one. This explains why they had to make up time by extending the term of Thawāba. These misplacements and maladjustments plague the chronology from the time of Baldj and before him. It may well be that Abū l-Khaṭṭār did set out from Ifriqiya in the earlier part of the year; but the year was 126, not 125. Indeed, if we follow the *Chronicle of 754* literally and strictly, and date the accession of Abū l-Khaṭṭār to 744, we shall not be able to go back earlier than the third month of the Islamic year 126 (1.1.744 = 10.III.126). We obviously cannot advance later than the sixth month, since that was when the Caliph Al-Walid ii died. We therefore have excellent grounds for dating the commencement of the governorship of Abū l-Khaṭṭār in the first half of 126. Further refinement on this can wait until we have taken a closer look at his predecessors.

**Tha‘labā.** This preceding governor is not registered by the *Chronicle of 754*, whose author unfortunately chooses to refer us to another work in which he had dealt with these strife-torn times:

> qualiter Spanie bella sub principibus Belgi, Talama et Umeia concreta sunt vel per Abulcathar exempta sunt. ... nonne haec scripta sunt in libro verborum dierum seculi....

Here ‘Talama’ is presumably Tha‘labā b. Salāma.

When Baldj was killed in internecine war, a period of confusion followed. As Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥakam has it, Spain was split under four commanders until Ḥanzala, the governor of Ifriqiya, sent Abū l-Khaṭṭār. Nevertheless, Tha‘labā was considered, as early as Ibn Ḥabib, to have been one of the line of governors, and the figure of five months was assigned to his term. Pseudo Ibn Qutayba and Ibn Abi 1-Fayyād (d. 1066) likewise give Tha‘labā five months of government. The *Akhbār Madjmū‘* also treats him as a governor, but its only temporal indication is that his period included the date of a major festival, either Fitr (1-3 Shawwāl) or ʿAdhā (10-12 Dhū l-ḥijjdja). If so, and if Tha‘labā’s term was only five months, it must have begun in, or just before, the second half of an Islamic year, since those festivals belong to the final quarter of the year. A longer term, ten months, was assigned to Tha‘labā by Ibn Ḥayyān.

40 See Vidal, *Conquista*, p. 63.
41 Antuña, ‘Notas’, 265.
42 Ribera, in *Colección* 2.162.
43 See the fragment of his *Ibar* translated by M. M. Antuña in the Appendix to Sánchez-Albornoz, *Fuentes*, p. 359.
44 Lafuente, *Colección* 1.53.
45 *apud* Al-Maqqari, in Lafuente, *Colección* 1.204.
and several later historians adopted this calculation.\textsuperscript{46} But the tradition of Ibn Ḥabīb clearly must have priority, while the later one again comes under suspicion of trying to make up for lost time. If we accept that the governorship of Tha'labā ran for about five months from some point in the second half of 125, we come within reach of our previous conclusion that his successor arrived in the first half of 126. We can endeavour to be more specific after considering the chronology of Baldj, whose death date marked the beginning of Tha'labā's period of command.

**Baldj.** In earlier remarks we noted that Baldj was in Ifriqiya from about Ramaḍān 123 (VII/VIII.741)\textsuperscript{47} and was a chief participant in the disastrous defeat at the River Sabū in Dhū l-Ḥijjah 123 (X/XI.741).\textsuperscript{48} There followed a period of considerable duration while he was under siege in Ceuta. The *Akḥbār Madjmu'a* makes his stay in Ceuta last a whole year,\textsuperscript{49} which is evidently a vast exaggeration. At all events there is no avoiding the conclusion that Baldj must have remained in North Africa for some time into the year 124. It is probable, in short, that he had to hold out during the winter, while he was negotiating

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Appendix, no. 20.

\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, in Vidal, *Conquista,* p. 60. Kulūthūm was sent to Ifriqiya in Djujmādā n of 123, and Baldj commanded the vanguard (Ibn ʿIdhārī, in Fagnan, *Histoire* 1.54). Kulūthūm entered Ifriqiya in Ramaḍān 123. These statements clearly dovetail well together. The two sources are also agreed that Kulūthūm’s predecessor as governor of Ifriqiya was recalled in Djujmādā i of 123 (Vidal, p. 59 and Fagnan 1.54, respectively). Cf. also Ibn al-Athīr, in Fagnan, *Annales,* p. 65, where the date for this is given, incompletely, as Djujmādā 123. Al-Nuwayrī (M. Gaspar y Remírno, *Historia de los musulmanes de España y África,* por En-Nuguairi, 2 vols. [Granada, 1917-19], 2.38), provides the same information as Ibn ʿIdhārī on the recall of Kulūthūm’s predecessor and the date of Kulūthūm’s arrival in Ifriqiya.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, in Vidal, *Conquista,* p. 61, records an alternative tradition – from Yahyā b. Bukayr (b. 770, d. 845) citing his master Al-Layth b. Saʿd (b. 712, d. 791) – that the Battle of the Sabū took place in 124, but he does not accept it. The date of the battle is known through the date of Kulūthūm’s death, which is given as Dhū l-Ḥijjah 123 by Ibn Khallīkān and by Abū l-Mahāsīn (cited by Fourtene, *Les Berbers* 1.297). The passage from Ibn Khallīkān (*Biographical Dictionary,* trans. MacGuckin de Slane [Paris, 1843], 2.218) runs as follows: ‘Ibn al-Kalbī says in his *Jamharat an-Nisab,* that the person who presided at the flogging of Ali Ibn Abd Allah Ibn al-Abbās was Kulūthūm Ibn Iyād Ibn Wahwah ... the commander of the Khalif al-Walid Ibn Abd al-Malik’s police guards; he afterwards governed North Africa in the name of Hishām Ibn Abd al-Malik, and he was slain in that province. Another author mentions that Kulūthūm was slain in the month of Zū ʿHijja, A.H. 123.’ The next governor of Ifriqiya after Kulūthūm, namely, Hanzāla, was sent from Egypt in II.124, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (Vidal, pp. 64 f.). He arrived in Ifriqiya in IV.124, according to Ibn al-Athīr (in Fagnan, *Annales,* p. 67), and this is repeated by Ibn ʿIdhārī (Fagnan, *Histoire* 1.59) and by Al-Nuwayrī (in Gaspar y Remírno, *Historia* 2.39). These dates serve to confirm the dating of the Battle of the Sabū to the end of 123.

\textsuperscript{49} Lafuente, *Colección* 1.47. The *Akḥbār Madjmu'a*’s dates at this point are consistently a year out; according to it, Kulūthūm’s fatal battle was in 122, Hanzāla came to Ifriqiya in 123, and (p. 49) ʿAbd al-Malik brought Baldj to Spain in 123.
with the governor of Spain, Abd al-Malik, for permission to enter his territory; the beginning of 124 corresponded to the middle of November 741. Even after his arrival in Spain, there is a substantial period when Baldj is serving under the governor and fighting the rebels on his behalf. When we put all these things together, it appears practically certain that Baldj did not oust Abd al-Malik and assume the governorship before the summer of 124, and highly probable that he did so late in the summer and the campaigning season. As it happens, the month of Dhū l-qa’dā, given by some of the Arabic sources for the starting-point of his governorship in 123, corresponded in 124 to the period around the autumnal equinox (6.IX-5.X.742). When the Akhbār Madjamū’a says that Baldj remained in Ceuta about a year after the death of Kulthūm, this might well reflect the fact that about a year passed between the death of Kulthūm and the assumption by Baldj of the governorship in Spain.

Turning back to the Chronicle of 754, we find that these conclusions are entirely in accord with its account. It dates the supersession of Abd al-Malik by Baldj, not to A.D. 741 or A.H. 123, but to Era 780 (742) and to the 20th year of Hishām 1 (which began on 26 Sha’bān 124 = 5.VII.742); and it indicates that the battles of Baldj with the sons of Abd al-Malik went on into the following year.

The duration of Baldj’s rule is represented as moderately short by the Arabic sources, although different estimates are put forward. Ibn Ḥabib assigned eleven months to Baldj, but noted that some made Thaʿlabā governor with Baldj instead of after him. Eleven months is the period given by Gayangos’ source Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm (who omits Thaʿlabā). Al-Rāzī probably adopted the same figure. He is cited by Ibn Khaldūn for the view that Baldj ruled approximately one year, dying in 124, and he is the likely source of Ibn al-Athīr, who states with characteristic definiteness that Baldj ruled from Dhu 1-qa’dā 123 to Shawwāl 124, for eleven months. Another view, that the eleven

51 Cf. Appendix, no. 19.
52 Mommsen, ‘Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV’, p. 364, no. 116; ibid., no. 120: ‘Tanta vero inter orientalia cum duce Belgi et occidentalia cum filio Humeia collecta exercita compta era supra fata anno imperii Leonis supra dico, Arabum iam prescripto, Iscam Emir Almuminim iam notato, fuerunt prelia ab utrisque patrata....’
54 Gayangos, History 2.405 n. 7.
56 Fagnan, Annales, p. 71. Ibn al-Athīr, finding the notices of his model, Abū Djaʿfar (al-Ṭabarī), rather skimpy on the subject of Spain, decided, as he tells us (p. 36), ‘to make a more complete recital, which I shall borrow from indigenous authors, better placed to know the
months were the total for Baldj (six) and Tha'lab (five), found several supporters, and the eclectic Ibn cIdhārī managed to endorse both versions.57 It should be noted that Ibn Khalūn, while citing Al-Rāzī, explicitly dissent from him: he correctly proposes to date the entry of Baldj in Spain to the year 124, while accepting the figure of about one year for the duration of the governorship.58 This plainly has to be the right solution. Baldj began his rule about XI. 124 and died about X. 125. Consequently, to return to an earlier question left unsettled, the term of Tha'lab began about X. 125, and probably it ended about III/IV.126: which would be the date when Abū l-Khaṭṭār succeeded him.

57 cAbd al-Malāk (iterum). The terminal date of the governor ousted by Baldj is automatically set by the preceding discussion. The second governorship of cAbd al-Malāk was rudely ended about Dhū l-qa'da 124 (not 123). The Chronicle of 754 gives no figure for its duration. It reports both his accession and his deposition under one and the same year, Era 780 (742), A.H. 124 (= 15.XI.741-3.XI.742), 20 Hishām i (beginning 26.VIII.124).59 This is clearly unsatisfactory. cAbd al-Malāk cannot have acceded in 124, for he was already governor in 123. According to Ibn cAbd al-Ḥakam,60 cAbd al-Malāk was the governor of Spain to whom Kūlthūm wrote demanding aid and reinforcements: before XII. 123, therefore, and probably about IX. 123, when Kūlthūm arrived in Iḥrīqiya.

The earliest extant source to pronounce on the duration of this governorship happens to be the Crónica profética (c. 883), which says that it lasted a year and a month.61 The same statement is found in Ibn Abī l-Fayyāḍ62 and Ibn al-Khaṭīb.63 Other sources, however, extend cAbd al-Malāk's rule over a period of several years. Thus the Akhbār Madjamū'a64 — the remainder of 121, all 122, and history of their own country. On his use of Al-Rāzī see Sánchez-Albornoz, El 'Ajbār Ma'yīmū'a', pp. 303 ff.

57 Fagnan, Histoire 1.56 (eleven months); 2.45, 47 (six months, but from XI.123 to X.124!).
60 Vidal, Conquista, p. 62.
61 See M. Gómez-Moreno, 'Las primeras crónicas de la Reconquista: el ciclo de Alfonso III', Boletín de la Academia de la Historia 100 (1932) 626 f. This chronicle's list is also printed by Gil, Corpus (n. 7 above) l.xv f., with some variants not noted by Gómez-Moreno.
64 Lafuente, Colección 1.41. Al-Maqārī says the same (Lafuente, p. 200): 'No sé si le mató ó le hizo salir de España, quedando dueño de ella lo restante del año 121, y los de 122 y 123 (739, 40 y 41), hasta que vinó á este país Balch ben Bixr con los siriacos....' In Gayangos' version (History 2.38) Al-Maqārī is made to cite Ibn Bashkūwāl and Ibn Khalūn for this. In fact, Al-
123 up to the arrival of Baldj. Ibn Khaldūn,\(^{65}\) knowing that Baldj succeeded ʿAbd al-Malik in 124, not 123, consequently adds the year 124, making his governorship run from 121 to 124. Ibn ʿIdhārī, as sometimes happens, has two versions:\(^{66}\) in volume 1 (North Africa), ʿAbd al-Malik begins his rule in 121; in volume 2 (Spain), he starts in 122. The terminal date can be inferred from the inauguration of Baldj, viz., XI.123.\(^{67}\) But according to Al-Rāzī, as is noted by Ibn Khaldūn,\(^{68}\) ʿAbd al-Malik succeeded ʿUqba in II.123 and was deposed by Baldj in 123. In fact, we can see from Ibn al-Athlr\(^{69}\) that Al-Rāzī’s dates for the second governorship of ʿAbd al-Malik must have been, in all probability, from II.123 to XI.123. The terminal date, however, is clearly impossible. We would have Baldj, after the disaster of Dhū l-hidjdja 123, appealing for help to an ʿAbd al-Malik he had already eliminated in the previous month.

Great disorder and dissension among the sources, then. This is obviously a critical point in the chronology. We shall make more progress if we bring into consideration the preceding governorships, that of ʿUqba, and that of ʿAbd al-Malik himself in his first term.

ʿUqba and ʿAbd al-Malik. From here on (retrogressively speaking) we have more detailed but, unfortunately, less accurate information from the Chronicle of 754. It declares\(^{70}\) that ʿUqba came to supersede ʿAbd al-Malik in Era 775 (737), A.H. 119 (= 8.I-28.XII.737), 15 Hishām i (which began on 26.VIII.119 = 28.VIII.737); and that he died after completing a quinquennium, being forced by illness to ‘restore the kingdom’ to ʿAbd al-Malik. The Chronicle is consistent, for it has given ʿUqba a quinquennium from Era 775 to 780, from A.H. 119 to 124, and from 15 Hishām to 20 Hishām. But it is painfully obvious that the ending-point is too late. It would mean, for example, that ʿUqba was still governor after the death of Kulthūm and the defeat of Baldj at the Sabū which is plainly impossible. Previously the Chronicle had erred in a similar way about the year of ʿAbd al-Malik’s first accession. This is given as Era 772 (734), A.H. 116, 12 Hishām. With complete consistency, ʿAbd al-Malik is said to have governed for almost four years (e.g., 116 to 119, and so on).\(^{71}\) But ʿAbd al-Malik succeeded ʿAbd al-Rāḥmān, whose death at the

Maqqārī makes no mention of Ibn Khaldūn here, and he cites Ibn Bashkuwāl for a different matter, the arrival of ʿUqba in 117 (see Dozy, Analectes 2.11, ll. 17 ff.; cf. Lafuent, p. 201).


\(^{66}\) Fagnan, Histoire I.52, 2.39.

\(^{67}\) ibid. 2.45.

\(^{68}\) Machado, ‘Historia de los Arabes’, 143.

\(^{69}\) Fagnan, Annales, pp. 70 (Safar 123), 71 (Dhū l-qaʿda 123).


\(^{71}\) ibid., p. 364, no. 117.
notorious ‘Battle of Poitiers’ is dated with certainty to October 732 (= 6 Sha’bān - 7 Ramadān 114). Therefore, the accession-date of ʿAbd al-Malik must fall in A.H. 114 and A.D. 732. The Chronicle of 754 is out by two years.

With regard to the duration of ʿAbd al-Malik’s first governorship, the Chronicle of 754 is by no means alone when it ascribes to it almost four years. According to Ibn Khaldūn, four years was the figure supplied by Al-Wāqīdī (d. 823), who is known as the ultimate source of Ibn Ḥabīb. And we duly find the same figure in the tradition of Ibn Ḥabīb and in his faithful follower, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm. It also occurs in pseudo Ibn Qutayba. A later variant reduces it to two months (Ibn Abī l-Fayyād, Ibn al-Khaṭīb), but this is still within range of ‘almost four years’ and is probably meant to be. One variant in the Crónica profética (transmitted with the Chronicon albeldense) gives two years eight months. A quite different
tradition, of two years, is found in Ibn Bashkwâl, Ibn al-Athîr (probably from Al-Râzî), etc.

Consideration of the governorship of Ifriqiya may throw a little light. The governor of Ifriqiya, ʿUbâyd Allâh b. al-Ḥabhâb, named his patron ʿUqba to Spain (which was also in his province), after he himself had been sent to Ifriqiya by the Caliph Hîshâm, either in 116 or in 117, so says the annalist Ibn al-Athîr. But Ibn al-Athîr surprisingly intervenes, and declares ‘the more exact version’ to be that Ibn al-Ḥabhâb was not named to his post till 117. If so, the appointment of ʿUqba, according to the more correct account, cannot be dated before 117, and probably should be dated in 117. And indeed, Al-Athîr, having recorded the two appointments in the annals of 116, following the one version, details them again in the annals of 117, in accordance with the more exact version. If, then, the correct date of ʿUqba’s appointment was 117, we find that the Chronicle of 754, having dated ʿAbd al-Malik’s first accession two years too late, consistently did the same with ʿUqba (119 instead of 117).

We now have ʿAbd al-Malik’s first governorship placed in the period from 114 to 117, a four-year period, as indicated by our best sources. After that ʿUqba accomplished a quinquennium. In the style of the Chronicle of 754, just as ‘four years’ for ʿAbd al-Malik is compatible with a figure between three and four years, so a completed quinquennium will be compatible with a figure between five and six years. There is a repeated tradition stemming from Ibn Ḥabîb in favour of five years two months for ʿUqba. Completely isolated here

81 *apud* Al-Maqqârî, trans. Lafuente, *Colección* 1.200, where it is said that Ibn Bashkwâl mentioned both traditions: ‘Ebn Bacual cuenta que vinó a España en Ramadhan de 114, y duró, segun unos dos años, y cuatro segun otros.’ This is not brought out clearly in the version of Gayangos (History 2.37).

82 Fagnan, *Annales*, p. 94; this comes in the recapitulation of the history of the governors of Spain from the conquest to the entry of ʿAbd al-Raḥmân i (pp. 91–97), not in the annalistic treatment.

83 ibid., p. 61. Ibn al-Athîr appears to be correcting his Spanish sources (e.g., al-Râzî) from authorities better informed about the chronology of Ifriqiya.

84 ibid.: (p. 137) In 116 Hîshâm took ʿUbâyd Allâh b. al-Ḥabhâb Mawsîlî from Egypt, where he was governor, and appointed him to Ifriqiya. ... In 116 ʿUbâyd Allâh b. al-Ḥabhâb appointed to Spain ʿUqba b. al-Ḥadjîjâd Qaysî, who took the administration of this province in the month of Shawwâl in replacement of ʿAbd al-Malik, dismissed. ... According to another version, more exact, ʿUbâyd Allâh b. al-Ḥabhâb was not appointed to Ifriqiya until 117. We will speak of him again’; ibid., p. 62: (p. 141) *Administration of ʿUbayd Allâh in Ifriqiya and Spain*. In 117 Hîshâm b. ʿAbd al-Malik named as governor of Ifriqiya and Spain ʿUbâyd Allâh b. al-Ḥabhâb and gave him the order to present himself there. ... This leader, who was then governing Egypt, left his son in that country and presented himself in Ifriqiya. He named to Spain ʿUqba b. al-Ḥadjîjâd and to Tangiers his son Ismâîl.’ (Fagnan thought the sense required the addition of ‘at once’ after ‘present himself there’, but it does not.)

is Al-Rāzī, who gave ʿUqba six years four months. Since he is known to have put ʿUqba's terminal date in II.123, which, reckoning backward, brings one to X.116 in the count of six years four months, it is probable that Al-Rāzī is responsible for the incorrect starting-date, Shawwāl 116, which crops up in several accounts, although they avoid accepting the term of six years four months. The less exact version recorded by Ibn al-Athīr, with dates in 116 instead of 117, almost certainly derives from Al-Rāzī.

The first governorship of ʿAbd al-Malik cannot have begun, it is self-evident, before the death of his predecessor in October 732. The terminal date Shawwāl 116 may result from ‘correction’ of a transmitted Shawwāl 117; or perhaps from counting two years from ʿAbd al-Malik’s assumption of office in Córdoba, if some time was allowed for news of the death of ʿAbd al-Rahmān in the heart of France to reach the governor in Qayrawān, and for the new appointee to arrive at his post. At all events, with ʿAbd al-Malik’s term beginning c. IX/X.114, it is obvious that, when replaced before the end of 117, he cannot have accomplished more than three and a quarter years, although his governorship spanned four Islamic years (114, 115, 116, 117). Here then is the justification for the figure of three years two months presented by Ibn Abī l-Fayyāḍ and, after him, by Ibn al-Khāṭīb.

In sum, ʿAbd al-Malik was appointed to succeed the fallen ʿAbd al-Rahmān in Ramaḍān of 114 and in practice may have taken up the command in Shawwāl, the following month. His governorship lasted into the final quarter of 117. He was then replaced by ʿUqba, whose term ran for five years and some months: from the final quarter of 117 to the final quarter of 122, or, just as likely, to the first quarter of 123. Here Al-Rāzī’s mysterious, lonely date, Ṣafar 123, fits perfectly. Since it seems not to owe its existence to any artificial calculation, it is probably a genuine chronological datum, and should be adopted. Thus we conclude that ʿAbd al-Malik succeeded (or ousted) ʿUqba in II.123, and held office until c. XI.124 when Balдж finally ended his long career.

The period from ʿAbd al-Malik’s first accession to his second, IX/X.114 to II.123, would then be about eight and a half years – nine, in round numbers.

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87 See preceding note.
88 Cf. Appendix, no. 17.
89 See n. 84 above.
90 Ibn Khaldūn, trans. Machado, ‘Historia de los Arabes’, 143, not making such allowance, dates ʿAbd al-Rahmān’s defeat and death to Ramaḍān 114, and the supersession of ʿAbd al-Malik, after two years, to Ramaḍān 116. He then says, oddly, but correctly, that ʿUqba came in 117.
91 Cf. nn. 78-79 above.
Here, if anywhere, may lie the reason for the weird and seemingly senseless figure of nine years which the medieval translation or adaptation of Al-Razi, the so-called Crónica del Moro Rasis, assigns to ‘Uqba: a chronological note of Al-Razi’s, completely misunderstood. Misunderstandings of one kind and another are certainly characteristic of that chronicle.

For the whole period we have discussed so far (the commencement of ‘Abd al-Malik to the termination of Yūsuf) we have a relatively firm chronological frame: IX/X.114 to XII.138, that is, a period of twenty-four and a quarter years. For this same period Ibn Ḥabīb may be assumed to have given a total of twenty-three and a quarter years; his list and that of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm both omit the second term of ‘Abd al-Malik, which would help to account for the one year short.

Pseudo Ibn Qutayba produces the sum of twenty-five and a quarter years, one too many, in spite of cutting five months from the term of Baldj. The list of Ibn Abī l-Fayyāḍ is defective in the version provided by Antuña, but can be satisfactorily emended by comparison with the tabulation of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, which is virtually identical: it would then add up to twenty-five years plus or minus one month, an excess of about three quarters of a year. Calculations of this sort are bound to be rather rough and ready, and errors can partly be ascribed to the accumulation of uncounted months and days or, on the other hand, to the counting of sets of months and days as whole years or months respectively.


93 Muhammad, as noted before, omits Thaīlaba (Gayangos, History 2.405 n. 7). The text of Ibn Ḥabīb (ed. Makkī, p. 236, and in Antuña, ‘Notas’, 265 f.) gives only seven years nine months for Yūsuf, whereas Muḥammad (loc. cit.) gives nine years nine months. Since no other source gives a figure lower than nine years, it is obvious that seven years nine months in Ibn Ḥabīb is a mistake for nine years nine months, probably a scribal error; Gayangos noted, in another case, that the Arabic words for seven and nine are ‘easily mistaken’ (History 2.404 n. 5).

94 Ribera, Colección 2.161 f.

95 The list of Ibn Abī l-Fayyāḍ (in Sánchez-Albornoz, Fuentes, pp. 358 f.) omits Yūsuf and assigns nine years eleven months (clearly belonging to Yūsuf) to Thawābā. The necessary emendation is to restore Yūsuf and give him his nine years eleven months from Thawābā, while awarding to Thawābā the two years two months assigned to him by Ibn al-Khaṭīb (Hoenerbach, Islamische Geschichte, p. 60). It is sad that this brilliant emendation still results in the wrong dates. There is a minor difference between these two sources on Abū l-Khaṭṭār (cf. Appendix, no. 21).

96 It is difficult, or impossible, to make such calculations on other sources for lack of complete lists. The Crónica del Moro Rasis (Gayangos, ‘Memoria’, 85 ff. and Cintra 2.357 ff.) – which might have given rough guidance on the chronology of Al-Rāzi – goes to pieces completely with ‘Abd al-Malik and ‘Uqba; after assigning them six and nine years respectively, it fails to give any indications of period for the subsequent governors – except three
IV

The problems of the preceding period, from the death of Al-Samḥ to that of ʿAbd al-Rahmān, are by comparison insignificant. The two mortalities are fairly securely dated and provide a solid chronological frame: namely, Dhū l-Ḥijjah 102 to Shaʿbān/Ramaḍān 114 (June 721 to October 732). Changes of governor are rather frequent, so that the average term is short and several are measured in months, not years. The sources still show variations with regard to minor details, but there is not much scope for serious error. Nothing in this part of Lafuente’s chronology is demonstrably wrong. We need only note that Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, if his term was from XI.111 to II.112, would normally be credited with three months, not two; but that, since the Chronicle of 754 indicates Muhammad, an interim governor, to have had charge for a month (and some days),97 while the Arabic sources who notice this appointment give it only two months,98 it makes more sense to reckon Muḥammad’s term as running from Dhū l-Ḥijjah 111 to Şafar 112.

Al-Samḥ. The Caliph ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz succeeded his cousin Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik on Friday the 19th of Şafar, A.H. 99 (2.X.717).99 He proceeded to make a number of new appointments to governorships,100 and Spain and Ifriqiya were included. For Ifriqiya, ʿIsāmāʾil b. ʿUbayd Allāh was named to succeed Muhammad b. Yazīd. The nomination took effect in the first month of 100 (VIII.718), according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Halām.101 For Spain, ʿUmar appointed his worthy friend Al-Samḥ b. Mālik. To quote Ibn al-Athīr:102

months for a non-governor, ‘Abderrame son of Tocir’, who is no doubt the judge ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Kathīr, said to have officiated during the interregnum preceding the accession of Yūsuf (cf. Lafuente, Colección 1.239, and, citing Ibn ʿIdhārī, p. 242). Gayangos, History 2.414 n. 33, cites Ibn Khalīdūn in a rather confused note.

The list in the Crónica profética, ed. Gómez-Moreno, ‘Las primeras crónicas’, 626 f., omits Balḍī and Thafīlab, having earlier omitted ʿAnbasa. The Fatḥ al-Andalus, ed. González, pp. 31 ff., has a very complete, but not very accurate, accounting for this period (cf. the Appendix, nos. 16 ff.) for a total of twenty-three years one month; it loses heavily on ʿAbd al-Malik’s first term but gains a bit on Yūsuf. Compilers such as Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn ʿIdhārī scarcely lend themselves to this exercise, because of their use of alternative datings.

99 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, in Vidal, Conquista, p. 53; Al-Ṭabarī, II, III, 1336 (cf. Zotenberg, Chronique 4.235); cf. Fournel, Les Berbers 1.268 n. 7 (a note which explains clearly why the reading ‘19 Şafar’ is to be preferred to ‘10 Şafar’; to have read this note would have saved Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich, p. 164, from error).
101 Vidal, Conquista, p. 53.
102 Fagnan, Annales, p. 56.
In 100 c. Umar b. c. Abd al-Aziz named as governor of Ifriqiya, Isma’il b. c. Abd Allah, client of the Banu Makhzum, and as governor of Spain, Al-Samh b. Malik Khawlani, whose righteousness and piety he had appreciated close to Al-Walid b. c. Abd al-Malik.

These were obviously important appointments. The persons selected were meant to carry out, in the part of the Empire they were sent to rule, c. Umar’s ideas for reform in the Islamic world. The impression is given by Ibn al-Athir’s notice that the appointments of Isma’il and Al-Samh were connected, as indeed one might reasonably expect. We are consequently led to think that, if Isma’il’s appointment started in Muharram of 100, that of Al-Samh also commenced early in 100.

When we turn to the Chronicle of 754, we find this assumption supported. The Chronicle states that Al-Samh governed for a little under three years. Now the governorship of Al-Samh was ended by his death about three weeks before the close of 102. In order to have served for a term not much less than three years, he must have begun early in 100. The Chronicle of 754 is not alone

103 On c. Umar’s plans see Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich, pp. 168 ff.; cf. Mantran, La expansion musulmana, p. 74.

104 Mommsen, ‘Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV’, p. 358, no. 86.

105 Al-Maqqari, trans. Lafuente, Collection 1.197, quotes Ibn Baskhuwal (Gayangos, History 2.33, incorrectly adds Ibn Khalidun) to the effect that Al-Samh was slain on the day of al-taruwiya of 102, which would be the 8th of Dhul-hijja (cf. M. Ocaña Jiménez, Tablas de conversión de datos islámicos a cristianos y viceversa [Madrid, 1946], pp. 24 f.), i.e., 9 June 721. Ibn Khalidun, trans. Machado, ‘Historia de los Arabes’, 141, merely says that he died in 102. The Fath al-Andalus, ed. González, p. 28, puts the death of Al-Samh on the day of ‘Arafa, 102, which would be the 9th of Dhul-hijja (10 June 721); the same date is given by Ibn ‘Idhārī (Fagnan, Histoire 2.36). Gayangos, History 2.407 n. 15, mentions other variants, with dates in 103, clearly worthless (Al-Dabbī, Al-Azdī, Al-Hidjarī); he also misidentifies 8 Dhul-hijja 102 with 10 May 721. This event is, in fact, a potent source of odd errors. J. A. Conde, Historia de la dominación de los Árabes en España 1 (Madrid, 1820), p. 72, gives the incompatible dates 721, al-taruwiya, and 9th of Dhul-hijja 103. T. Breysig, Die Zeit Karl Martells (Leipzig, 1869), p. 38 n. 7, compounds this by saying that Conde dated the Battle of Toulouse in the month of May 721. Fournel, Les Berbers 1.275, avers that the battle in which Al-Samh perishèd is dated to May 721 by ‘our’ annals, citing the Chronicon moissiacense and (J.-T.) Reinaud, Invasion des Sarrasins en France (Paris, 1836), p. 20, and produces the date 9 Dhul-l-qaḍa 102, wherein Dhul-l-qaḍa has evidently been substituted for Dhul-l-hijja, a strange proceeding in itself. But in fact there is no mention of the date May 721 in the Chronicon moissiacense: see the extracts conveniently printed in Lafuente, Collection 1.165 f. and the Monumenta Germaniae historica Script. 1 (Hanover, 1826), p. 290; the Annales laureshamenses (MGH Script. 1.24) provide the simple date 721.

C. E. Dubler, ‘La crónica arábigo-bizantina de 741’, Al-Andalus 11 (1946), similarly dates the Battle of Toulouse to 11 May 721, 9 Dhul-l-qaḍa 102, without offering explanation or justification, unless it is his reference to F. Codera, ‘Narbona, Gerona y Barcelona bajo la dominación musulmana’ in Estudios críticos de historias arábe española, 2nd Ser. (Madrid, 1917), pp. 277 ff. In that study Codera demolishes the date in May.
here. The tradition of Ibn Ḥabīb assigns two years nine months to Al-Samḥ; reckoned back from XII.102, this would bring his starting-date to III.100. Further, Ibn Khaldūn states unequivocally that ʿUmar sent Al-Samḥ at the beginning of 100.106

That being so, we are obliged to reject the claim made in a number of the Arabic sources, that Al-Samḥ acceded in Ramaḍān, the ninth month, of 100. That date is given by Ibn Ḥayyān (apud Al-Maqqarī),107 who also, however, assigns two years eight months to the governorship and proceeds to confuse the death of Al-Samḥ at the Battle of Toulouse with the death of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān a dozen years later at the Battle of the Road of the Martyrs. Obviously, if Al-Samḥ succeeded in Ramaḍān 100 and governed for two years eight months, the Battle of Toulouse would have to be dated to Džumāda i of 103 (X/XI.721), which would fit nothing else in the chronology. Ramaḍān 100, Dhū l-Ḥijdja 102, and a period of about two and three-quarter years are simply incompatible items. The date Ramaḍān 100 is repeated by the Fath al-Andalus,108 Ibn al-Athīr,109 and Ibn ʿIdhārī;110 the typology of the group strongly suggests that Al-Rāzī was the begetter of this version.

The appointment and the arrival in Spain of Al-Samḥ clearly have to be set in the first quarter of A.H. 100, in accord with our best evidence.

Al-Ḥurr. Thereby the concluding date of the governor Al-Ḥurr, whom Al-Samḥ displaced, is automatically determined. The length of tenure of Al-Ḥurr is indicated to have been about the same as that of Al-Samḥ. The Chronicle of 754 reports his accession under Era 753 (715) and A.H. 97 (= 5.IX.715-24.VIII.716), and subsequently notes that he governed for almost three years.111 This dating is undoubtedly correct, but does not afford a close determination within these years, unless we insist on the Era date, 753, as well as the Hidjra date, in which case Al-Ḥurr’s accession would fall in the first four months of 97, since the following months correspond to Era 754 (716). But the Chronicle has probably arrived at this date by a simple formula of conversion frequently applied (A.H. + 656 = Era: 97 + 656 = 753),112 so that it would be hazardous to give the Era date significance.

107 Lafuente, Colección 1.197; Gayangos, History 2.32.
109 Fagnan, Annales, p. 92.
110 Fagnan, Histoire 1.45.
112 This formula (A.H. + 656 = Era) can be observed in application frequently throughout the Chronicle of 754 (cf. nos. 12, 13, 21, 49, 52, 53, 58, 62, 65, 66, 73, 79, 80, 90, 92, 100, 107, 109, 112, 121, 130, 131, 137). It is based on the fact that at the time of final composition, early in 754, Era 792 (see no. 137), the Islamic year was the 136th from the Hidjra: 136 + 656 = 792.
Ibn Habib\textsuperscript{113} gave Al-Hurr two years eight months, a figure accepted by several later authors.\textsuperscript{114} The \textit{Crónica profética} comes closest to 'almost three years' with its two years ten months.\textsuperscript{115} Al-Rāżī probably attributed two years nine months. This is the figure in the \textit{Crónica del Moro Rasis},\textsuperscript{116} as well as in Ibn al-Athīr,\textsuperscript{117} and it is in accord with Al-Rāżī's own date for the accession of Al-Ḥurr (as presented by Al-Maqqārī),\textsuperscript{118} namely, Dhū l-ḥijjah of 97, for then

In no. 9 the Chronicler dates the first year of Muḥammad to Era 656 (792 minus 136) instead of the true date, A.D. 622-623 (Era 660-661), and instead of the formula date, Era 657. This seems to represent an alternative formula, for it certainly occurs quite frequently at first (cf. nos. 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 35, 37, 41, 46, 92, 93, 95, 96, 134). It could be based on the fact that part of the current year, A.H. 136, had corresponded with Era 791; the alternative formula, then, is A.H. + 655 = Era.

Needless to say, these formulas distort the chronology of the seventh century. But in the period that concerns us here, A.H. 92-136, the effects are not so disastrous. The main formula (+ 656) tends to operate so that, at the beginning of the period, the Era year which is in its last few weeks or months will be equated with the Islamic year that is for most of its length concurrent with the \textit{following} Era year: around the middle of the period, the correspondence becomes close (A.H. 119 fitted completely inside Era 775): at the end, the correspondence, diminishing every year, has dropped to about 50 per cent (A.H. 136, an intercalary year, contained 178 days of Era 791, and 177 days of Era 792).

It is instructive to observe a modern chronographer grappling with this problem of equation of years. Stanley Lane-Poole, \textit{The Mohammedan Dynasties. Chronological and Genealogical Tables with Historical Introductions} (London, 1893; Paris, 1925), writes in his preface, p. vii, note: 'The Hijra date is of course the more exact, as it is derived from Arabic historians; whilst the date A.D. is merely the year in which that Hijra year began, and does not necessarily correspond with it for more than a few months. The correspondence is near enough, however, for practical purposes. ... When the Hijra began at the close of the Christian year, \textit{the following year} A.D. is given' (my italics).

\textsuperscript{113} Antuña, 'Notas', 265.
\textsuperscript{114} Cf. Appendix, no. 5.
\textsuperscript{115} Gómez-Moreno, ‘Las primeras crónicas’, 626.
\textsuperscript{116} Gayangos, ‘Memoria’, 84; Cintra, \textit{Crónica} 2.353.
\textsuperscript{117} Fagnan, \textit{Annales}, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{118} Lafuente, \textit{Colección} 1.196. Gayangos' version (\textit{History} 2.32) gives the year as 98, but 97 is the reading in Dozy, \textit{Analectes} 2.8, l. 18.

According to Ibn 'Iḍhārī (Fagnan, \textit{Histoire} 2.32 ff.), Al-Rāżī dates the death of 'Abd al-ṢAzīz to the beginning of VII.97, after which he allowed a period of some months with no governor until Ayyūb took the office, which he held for six months. With this chronology we should be 'some months' advanced into 98 by the end of Ayyūb's term. Something is amiss. The notion of a period of some months with no governor between 'Abd al-ṢAzīz and Ayyūb is not at all sensible (it originated from the fact that Ayyūb's short period was itself merely an interregnum). It may have been foisted on Al-Rāżī when it belonged elsewhere. It is found, in extreme form, in Ibn Abī l-Fayyāḍ (in Sánchez-Albornoz, \textit{Fuentes}, p. 358), who credits an interregnum of some two years. A chronology which dated the end of 'Abd al-ṢAzīz to the beginning of VII.97 (Al-Rāżī), then gave Ayyūb nearly six months (Al-Rāżī: five months twenty days, according to the \textit{Crónica del Moro Rasis}, which fits perfectly) and thus terminated Ayyūb towards the end of XII.97 (Al-Rāżī), so that Al-Hurr had a term of two years nine months (\textit{Crónica del Moro Rasis}) from there to IX.100, would certainly not be all correct, but it would at least make some sense and would accommodate the information and indications we have on Al-Rāżī's dates, provided the vague interregnum of 'some months' is removed from him.
the two years nine months would expire in Ramaḍān 100, the supposed date of Al-Samḥ’s accession. Thus the false date, Ramaḍān 100, results from counting two years eight or nine months from the end of 97 or beginning of 98, an equally false date. It is the period that is genuine, not the dates.

We should therefore count back from the first quarter of 100, which we have established as the proper range of dates for the replacement of Al-Ḥurr by Al-Samḥ. Two years ten months (Crónica profética) from I.100, reckoned exclusively of both termini, will yield the date II.97, and two years eight months (Ibn Ḥabīb) from III.100, inclusively, will give VIII.97. This ought to be, broadly, the range of dates for the accession of Al-Ḥurr, Ẓafar to Shaʿbān of 97: with some preference for the later part of this period because, if Al-Samḥ was sent from the East in I.100, it would clearly take a fair amount of time for him to get to Spain and relieve Al-Ḥurr of his post.

Ayyūb. Al-Ḥurr was sent from Ifriqiya with official appointment as governor, replacing the assassinated ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. In the meantime, a man on the spot, Ayyūb, a cousin of the murdered governor, took charge; there is no evidence that he had any official sanction. The Chronicle of 754 simply says that Ayyūb held Spain for a month, after which Al-Ḥurr officially succeeded to the governorship:

(Abdellazis) ob consilio Aiub occiditur atque eo Spaniam retinente mense impleto Alaor in regno Esperie per principalia iussa succedit.119

The Crónica profética likewise gives only one month to Ayyūb.120 Ibn Ḥabīb was apparently unaware of Ayyūb’s significance. He omitted him from the list of governors, just as he omitted the other interim and short-term vicegerents (ʿAbd al-Rahmān, ʿUdhra, Muḥammad); this is clear from his list and also from that of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm.121 But later writers knew better. The initiative may well have come from Al-Rāzī. The Crónica del Moro Rasis122 and the Crónica geral de Espanha de 1344123 assign precisely five months twenty days124 to the son of Abed or Abib (Ayyūb b. Ḥabīb), between Abelagin and Alohor. This naturally appears as six months in pseudo Ibn Qutayba,125 Ibn Ḥayyān,126 Ibn Abi l-Fayyād,127 and so on. It is a piece of fiction, and has no

120 Gómez-Moreno, ‘Las primeras crónicas’, 626.
121 Antuña, ‘Notas’, 265, and Gayangos, History 2.405 n. 7.
123 Cintra, Crónica 2.353.
124 On the significance of this figure, cf. n. 118 above.
125 Ribera, Colección 2.161 f.
126 Cited by Al-Maqqari; see Lafuente, Colección 1.196 and Gayangos, History 2.31.
127 Sánchez-Albornoz, Fuentes, p. 358.
claim whatever to be preferred to the prior account of the *Chronicle of 754*. It is not even plausible that after the violent death of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Spain should have been left for six months without an officially appointed governor, especially so soon after the conquest.

The brief interlude of Ayyūb should not, therefore, cause much disturbance in the chronology. On the basis of the range of dates for Al-Ḥurr’s accession, Ayyūb can be assigned a month or so within the period from c. I.97 to c. VIII.97.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. We can deduce from the above a range of dates for the assassination and termination of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, which must be an approximation and yet cannot be far from the truth: namely, between XII.96 and VII.97. How does this deduction compare with the direct testimony of the sources? It at once collides with the version found in Al-Maqqārī and others, according to which ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was killed in XII.97, and *a fortiori* it knocks out the version of Ibn al-Qūṭiyya (d. c. 977) and the *Ākhbār Madīmuṯaʿa*, that he was murdered at the end of 98. Ibn al-Aṯīr retails both these stories, and neglects the account of Al-Rāzī, found in Ibn ʿIdhārī and also in the *Fāṭḥ al-Andalus*, that the assassination took place at the beginning of Radjab of 97. This date is left upstanding, for it is just within our range. And it is not without attraction, for it permits the following straightforward chronology: early in VIII.97 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz is killed and Ayyūb takes over; early in VIII.97 Al-Ḥurr arrives as governor; towards the end of III.100 Al-Samḥ reaches Spain and replaces Al-Ḥurr.

The *Chronicle of 754* records the death of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz under Era 753 (715), A.H. 97 (= 5.IX.715-24.VIII.716), and states that he had ruled for three years, which is consistent with the date given for his appointment by Mūsā, namely, Era 750 (712), A.H. 94 (= 7.X.712-25.IX.713). The Hīdjar dates here are likely to be more exact than the Era dates. The *Chronicle* is dealing with Muslim events, almost certainly by derivation from an Islamic source. The dating is bound to be by the Islamic year, which is then converted into an Era

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128 Cf. Gayangos, *History* 2.30 f. and 404 nn. 2 and 5. This version seems to be present also in pseudo Ibn Qutayba (Ribera, *Colección* 2.161), but there it is exceedingly confused.
129 Ribera, *Colección* 2.8.
130 Lafuente, *Colección* 1.32.
131 Fagnan, *Annales*, pp. 54 f.
132 Fagnan, *Histoire* 2.32.
133 *Fatḥo-l-Andalufi*, ed. González, pp. 23 f.
135 ibid., pp. 353-54, no. 73.
date in accordance with the formula previously discussed. Clearly it would have been more convenient if A.H. 94 had been equated not with Era 750 but with Era 751 (713) since nearly three quarters of its length coincided with the latter year.

Let us make an experiment and subtract the three years given by the *Chronicle* from the rough dating of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s death. This would yield an inaugural date for ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz between XII.93 and VII.94. From one point of view the result is highly interesting because it would dispose of the question raised by the Tudmir treaty. This well-known document, recording the terms of peace accepted by the Gothic leader Theudimer, reveals ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as the contracting party on the Muslim side and bears the date Radjab 94. Though it is possible to devise more elaborate explications of these facts, there can be no doubt that the simplest explanation of all would be provided if in Radjab of 94 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz had gubernatorial power in Al-Andalus.

The *Chronicle of 754* ought to be taken seriously when it says that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz governed Spain for three years from A.H. 94 to 97. As for the other sources, their opinions, as usual, vary. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam is in agreement to the extent of saying that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was killed in 97, but gives no further information. Little is said in any source about the governor’s inaugural date. Ibn al-Qūṭiya and the *Akhbar Madjmuʿa* have him ruling from 95 to the end of 98, so that their dates seem consistently staggered by one year in comparison with those of the *Chronicle of 754*. Apart from these, we have some statements as to the duration of the governorship and sometimes a date of death: according to the *Crónica profética* the term was two years six months; according to Al-Rāzī, one year ten months, which evidently is to be interpreted as the period from IX.95 to the beginning of VII.97. There was already the authority of Ibn Ḥabīb for ascribing two years to the governor-

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136 See n. 112 above.
137 Cf. Mommsen, ‘Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV’, p. 354, no. 74, especially ‘... et pactum, quem dudum ab Abdilaziz acceperat (Theudimer).’
139 Vidal, *Conquista*, p. 52.
140 Ribera, *Colección* 2.8.
141 Lafuente, *Colección* 1.31 f.
142 Gómez-Moreno, ‘Las primeras crónicas’, 626.
143 As cited by Ibn ʿIdhārī (Fagnan, *Histoire* 2.32). The *Crónica del Moro Rasis* rounds the figure to two years (Gayangos, *Memoria*, 83). In Cintra, *Crónica* 2.353, ‘dez annos’ would appear to be a corruption for ‘dous annos’, unless it is a corruption or misrendering of Al-Rāzī’s one year ten months.
ship. The reason for shortening the period of cAbd al-cAziz from three years is not difficult to see. The purpose is to create harmony with the movements of Mūsā, supposedly still active in Spain in 95 and consequently making it (seemingly) impossible for his son to have been governor in 94. But a different solution to that problem is suggested by Ibn Abī l-Fayyād\(^{145}\) (repeated by Ibn al-Khaṭīb\(^{146}\)). The three years of cAbd al-cAziz become the three years of Mūsā and cAbd al-cAziz together: that is, the latter's rule is understood to have begun before Mūsā's departure. This is not at all an absurd idea and may provide the answer. At any rate our best evidence leads us to the conclusion that cAbd al-cAziz did hold power as governor of Spain for about three years, having received it in 94, not later than the beginning of Radjab; and that he was murdered in 97, again no later than Radjab.

Mūsā. The main reason why insufficient attention has been paid to the chronological data of the Chronicle of 754 is, without doubt, to be found in the strange and bewildering confusion the Chronicler creates in his account of the entry of the Muslims into Spain. The problems resulting from contradictions between the various sources are hard enough. That the main Latin source should, on this crucial topic, repeatedly contradict itself has seemed intolerable. Nevertheless, it will be worth our while to scrutinize carefully the relevant passages.

According to the Chronicle of 754, lavish here with conflicting chronological sign-posts, events occurred as follows (we ignore his regnal years for the Byzantine emperors, which, as usual, only add to the confusion):

A. Era 749 (711),
   A.H. 92 (= 29.X.710-18.X.711),
   5 Al-Walid (14/15.X.90-13/14.X.91: = 26/27.VIII.709-14/15.VIII.710):
   Rudericus became king of Spain; reigned for one year; mobilized an army against Ṭāriq, 'Abuzara', etc.\(^{147}\)

B. Era 750 (712),
   Rudericus marched to the Transductine Promontories, was defeated and slain.\(^{148}\)

Thus far, we find that in A the Era and Hidjra dates are in harmony, the more so because the Chronicler deviates from his usual formula (A.H. 92 + 656

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\(^{145}\) Sánchez-Albornoz, Fuentes, p. 358.

\(^{146}\) Hoenerbach, Islamische Geschichte, p. 51.

\(^{147}\) Mommsen, 'Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV', p. 352, no. 68.

\(^{148}\) ibid.
= Era 748). Since the reign of one year is distributed over two years in A and B, we expect A to give the year when Rudericus acceded and B the year of his demise. And this function is performed by the regnal years of Al-Walid, which do not agree with the Era and Hidjra dates, but are correct both for A (Rudericus’ accession) and for B (Rudericus’ fall); the Chronicle actually emphasizes by repetition at the end that the destruction of Rudericus and his kingdom belonged to the sixth year of that Caliph. But the Era and Hidjra dates in A do not provide an accurate indication of the year of Rudericus’ accession. They are rather the dates we would expect to appear in B. The Era date that does appear in B is manifestly one year too late.

The reason for this initial muddle can be discerned. The Chronicler had a source which told him the true date for the end of Rudericus’ rule and the Gothic kingdom, namely, Era 749 (711), A.H. 92, 6 Al-Walid. But he had also received the notion that the round number Era 750 represented the year when the Gothic monarchy was terminated. His fondness for round numbers is unabashedly stated at the end of his opuscule, when he expounds at great length the attractiveness of treating 5,200 rather than 5,196 as the number of the Year of the World at Christ’s Nativity (§§ 137-139). In § 67 we find the source of the number 750:

In the western regions, too, the kingdom of the Goths, firmly established with ancient solidity for almost 350 years (from Era 400, reckoning from its first beginnings), but in Spain by Liwigildus for almost 140 years, and continuing peacefully up to Era 750, he (Wafid) attacked through the leader of his army, named Mūsā, and conquered and made it tributary, abolishing the monarchy.

He adds a marginal note that the years of the Goths are actually 345, the additional five (to make 350) being computed ‘in the interval of the months’, a further example (along with ‘Era 400’ in the text) of his devotion to round numbers.

We observe that in this passage, which is introductory to his account of the invasion and conquest of Spain, he has a date for Mūsā’s invasion that

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149 According to Al-Ṭabarī, II, II, 1172 (cf. Zotenberg, Chronique 4.152), the death-date of ʿAbd al-Malik (father of Al-Walid who succeeded him directly) was a Thursday in the middle of Shawwāl of 86: i.e., the 14th (Thursday, 8.X.705). Thursday, 14 Shawwāl 86 is accordingly the date given by Wellhausen, Das arabisch Reiche, p. 139, but he wrongly equates it with 9.X.705, which was a Friday. Fournel, Les Berbers 1.227 opts for 15 Shawwāl 86, which is also attested. Owing to the dependence of the Islamic calendar on observation of the new moon, it was possible for 15 Shawwāl 86 to have been a Thursday in practice (i.e., Thursday, 8.X.705), in spite of the theoretical correctness of the equation 15.X.86 = Friday, 9.X.705. (On this curious phenomenon see Ocana Jiménez, Tablas, pp. xvii f., 129 ff., and also his ‘Notas sobre cronología hispano-musulmana’, Al-Andalus 8 [1943] 333 ff.) We should say, then, that Al-Walid’s first year ran from 14 or 15 Shawwāl 86 to 13 or 14 Shawwāl 87, and so forth.
apparently conflicts with B. The sources of his perplexity may be traced to the following propositions, which all have some truth in them:

1. Mūsā was the commander who ended the Gothic monarchy;
2. the Gothic monarchy was ended by the defeat and death of Rudericus;
3. Rudericus was defeated and killed in Era 749, A.H. 92;

The complications are intensified when we come to the Chronicle's next dating sequence:

C. Era 749  (same as A)
A.H. 92    (same as A)
5 Al-Walid  (same as A)

While the fighting in Spain continued, Mūsā himself arrived, battered his way to the royal capital, Toledo, etc.  

D. Era 750  (same as B)
A.H. 94    (= 7.X.712-25.IX.713)

Mūsā, having completed fifteen months, was recalled from Spain, leaving his son ʿAbd al-ʿAziz in his place.  

E. Last year of Al-Walid (the 10th, beginning 14/15.X.95 = 2/3.VII.714, and ending with his death on 13.VI.96 = 23.II.715)

Mūsā presented himself before Al-Walid.  

In C, the combination of propositions (1) and (3), as analysed above, seems to have caused the Chronicler to deviate from the year for Mūsā's invasion which he had previously given.

In D, we find that he has returned to his formula for the equation of Era and Hidjra dates (A.H. 94 + 656 = Era 750), which, as we noticed before, tends to produce a misleading result, and which here leads to further inconsistency. It is probable that the date A.H. 94 comes from his source. The same date is found in some of the Arabic writers for Mūsā's departure from Spain. It is not made

150 Mommsen, 'Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV', p. 353, no. 70.
151 ibid., pp. 353 f, no. 73.
152 Al-Walid died on a Saturday in the middle of Djumādā ii of 96, according to Al-Ṭabarī II, 1269 f. (cf. Zotenberg, Chronique 4.195): i.e., 13.VI.96 (Saturday, 23.II.715). This date is accepted both by Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich, p. 141, and by Fournel, Les Berbers 1.256.
153 Mommsen, 'Continuatio hispana a. DCCLIV', p. 354, no. 73.
154 See n. 112 above.
155 So pseudo Ibn Qutayba (Ribera, Colección 2.120, 122); cf. the sources cited by Fournel, Les Berbers 1.254 n. 5 (this is the reference intended by Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.466 n. 32, where a statement about Al-Farāḥi is attributed to Fournel that seems not to be there). Contrary to Gayangos, History 1.292, Al-Maqqari does not have the date XII.94; the correct translation is given by Lafuente, Colección 1.193, 'Dhū l-hijjdja of the year 95' (not 94); see Dozy, Analectes 1.175, 9. Al-Maqqari elsewhere cites Ibn Bashkuwāl as dating Mūsā's departure simply to 94 (cf. Analectes 1.182).
wholly clear, however, what the Chronicle’s date actually refers to. The straggling sentence or period that begins with D ends in E, so that it carries two dates:

Nam in era DCCL, anno imperii eius sexto, Arabum LXIII, Muze expletis XV mensibus a principi iussu premonitus Abdellaziz filium linquens in locum lectis Spanie senioribus, qui evaserant gladio, cum auro argentove trapezitarum studio conprobato vel insignium ornamentorum atque pretiosorum lapidum, margarum et unionum, quo ardere solet ambitio matronarum, conierie simulque Spanie cuncta superficie que longum est scribere, adunatis, Ulti regis repatriando sese presentat obtutibus anno regni eius extremo.

Mūsā’s departure from Spain is not even explicitly signalled here, though it is of course implied. In principle, the initial date might refer to Mūsā’s receipt of the notice of his recall, to his appointing his son as governor, or to his gathering together the treasures of Spain in preparation for the return home. If it does refer to Mūsā’s departure from Spain, there is a problem in explaining why Mūsā did not reach Damascus until after an interval of more than a year (E). Where was Mūsā throughout 95? The answer would evidently have to be that he spent the year 95 in his province of Ifriqiya. This is certainly not impossible. But it would undoubtedly be very strange that Mūsā should hastily depart from Spain at the Caliph’s urgent summons, only to dally for twelve months or more in Qayrawān.

It is worth-while to consider a different interpretation, viz., that the date 94 and the period of fifteen months ought to refer to Mūsā’s appointment of ēAbd al- ēAzīz to govern Spain. In other words, fifteen months after entering Spain, Mūsā appointed his son ēAbd al- ēAzīz as governor, just as he had earlier appointed his son ēAbd Allāh governor of Ifriqiya. Obviously these appointments did not entail that Mūsā, the supremo, ceased to have authority over these provinces. As indicated by Ibn Abī l-Fayyād, seconded by Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Mūsā remained in Spain during the first part of ēAbd al- ēAzīz’s governorship. Presumably he began his return to Ifriqiya and then on to Syria late in 95, as is stated by several of the Arabic sources. Consequently he arrived in Damascus not long before the death of the Caliph Al-Walīd.

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156 Sánchez-Albornoz, ibid., p. 467, throws out this tradition on similar grounds, perhaps over-confidently.
158 See nn. 145, 146 above.
159 See the citations in Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.469 f.
160 Cf. ibid., p. 466 n. 35. (In the text ‘25’ should be corrected to ‘23 de febrero’.)
Thus, when ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz put his authority to the treaty with Theudimer in Radjab 94, he did so having been invested already with the gubernatorial power. But Mūsā, supreme governor of the western Empire (which he had himself vastly augmented), was still in Spain.

It would follow that Mūsā’s entry should be dated in 93, fifteen months before some point in the first half of 94. That would point to IV.93 as probably the latest admissible date for Mūsā’s arrival in Spain. Certain Arabic sources actually support this dating, namely, pseudo Ibn Qutayba\(^\text{161}\) and Ibn al-Faraḍī,\(^\text{162}\) both apparently drawing on a biography of Mūsā written by a descendant about 800.\(^\text{163}\) The former dates Mūsā’s entry to ‘a Thursday in Safar 93’, while the latter starts him out from Ifriqiya in Muḥarram of 93, bringing him into Spain by way of Tangiers. Clearly these dates fit together perfectly.\(^\text{164}\)

From a historical standpoint a date for Mūsā’s invasion early in 93 (at the end of 711 or start of 712) makes better sense than the standard ‘Ramadān 93’ repeated by one Arabic chronicler after another\(^\text{165}\) and then by their modern successors. According to that version, Mūsā, seriously concerned (as well he might be) about what was going on in Spain thanks to Tāriq’s startlingly rapid progress, nevertheless waited a whole year after the defeat of Rudericus and the collapse of the Gothic régime before coming in person to Spain to make sure that all things were put in proper order in the new province. On the contrary, Mūsā must have come as soon as he was ready. The season presented no problem along the southern coast of Spain and the work of the invasion had already been done by Tāriq, Mūsā’s Patton. The standard dates are probably based on a merely mechanical assumption that Mūsā will have come at the same time of the year as Tāriq: hence the existence of the alternatives, Radjab or Ramadān.

If Mūsā entered Spain in Safar of 93, the appointment of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz fifteen months later would fall in Djumdat 1 of 94. But it is better to hold to a more general formulation. Mūsā came to Spain in the first quarter of 93, and in the second quarter of 94 he appointed his son to be its governor. As for the date of

\(^{161}\) Ribera, Colección 2.108.
\(^{162}\) See Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.394, with nn. 7, 8, and 10.
\(^{163}\) Cf. ibid., p. 351 n. 113, and his Fuentes, pp. 49 ff.

\(^{164}\) Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.394, ‘suspects’ that these two authors (who carry weight with him), when they speak, respectively, of departure from Ifriqiya in Muharram and entry into Spain in the following month, Safar, are actually referring to Mūsā’s preparations for an expedition months away in the future. Self-evidently this is not what they are referring to.

\(^{165}\) See the citations assembled by Sánchez-Albornoz, ibid., p. 367 n. 5. A few chose Radjab. The rightness of the date Safar 93, which apparently comes from the family tradition of Mūsā, must make one less confident in rejecting the departure date in 94, which might come from the same tradition. Pseudo Ibn Qutayba, however (n. 155 above), seems to put forward different authorities, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, son of Sālim, ‘who was with Mūsā in Spain’, and Yazīd, son of Sād, son of Muslim, client of Mūsā.
Mūsā's leaving Spain, the evidence is dubious. It may have been in 95, in the final quarter of the year.

Ṭāriq. The precise date of the invasion of Spain by Ṭāriq b. Ziyād is not strictly within the purview of this enquiry, for Ṭāriq had no claim to be regarded as a governor of Al-Andalus. Nevertheless it would be eccentric to omit him altogether. As pointed out by Sánchez-Albornoz,¹⁶⁶ there is broad agreement on the year of his landing, and some disagreement on the time within the year. Military logic would suggest that Ṭāriq came in the good season, and consequently, in 92, the months of Radjab, Shaʿbān and Ramaḍān cover the most likely period for the invasion, and even Ramaḍān would be rather late (Radjab = 24.IV-23.V.711; Shaʿbān = 24.V-21.VI.711; Ramaḍān = 22.VI-21.VII.711). A whole chain of Islamic sources¹⁶⁷ would propose to fix the date on ‘Monday, 5 Radjab’. Such precision justifiably creates suspicion, which is slightly increased by the fact that 5 Radjab would normally have been a Tuesday (= Tuesday, 28.IV.711).¹⁶⁸ Other fancied dates include 21 Ayyār (= 21 May = 28 Radjab), which has a curious story attached to it,¹⁶⁹ and 8 Radjab (= May-day).¹⁷⁰ Ibn Hayyān, however, offers¹⁷¹ the seductive ‘a Saturday in Shaʿbān 92’, which recalls the Christian monk’s date for the Battle of Poitiers, ‘a Saturday in October 732’, as well as that for Mūsā’s entry, ‘a Thursday in Ṣafar 93’, apparently given by his descendant. It is probable, at any rate, that the landing of Ṭāriq can safely be fixed in VII/VIII.92 (between 24.IV and 21.VI.711).

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In conclusion, we may now follow the example of Lafuente and recapitulate the total of the results of this investigation in a tabular list.¹⁷²

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¹⁶⁶ El Reino 1.389 f. (the passage quoted in the text, corresponding to n. 10 above).
¹⁶⁷ See the citations accumulated by Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.389 n. 119, 368 nn. 7, 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 23-25, 369 n. 35.
¹⁶⁸ But, as pointed out in n. 149 above, the discrepancy of one day of the week from another does not invalidate the date automatically.
¹⁶⁹ Ibn Ḥābīb, trans. Antuña, ‘Notas’, 253; cf. pseudo Ibn Qutayba (Ribera, Colección 2.105 f.), where the author has confused the Syrian months Ayyār and Adār; he puts the invasion on 21 Adār (which he correctly says is equivalent to 21 March) in Radjab (which in A.H. 92 coincided with May and Ayyār).
¹⁷⁰ See Sánchez-Albornoz, El Reino 1.369 n. 34.
¹⁷¹ apud Al-Maqqari (Gayangos, History 1.267, cited by Lafuente, Colección 1.224, but not included in the portion translated by him; see Dozy, Analectes 1.142). Al-Maqqari himself adopts this date (Lafuente, p. 175; Gayangos 1.266).
¹⁷² In this list an expression such as VII/VIII.92 stands for ‘a date in the 7th or 8th month (Radjab or Shaʿbān) of A.H. 92’; X.711-I.712 for ‘a date in the period October 711 to January 712’.
1. Tāriq  
   VII/VIII.92 to I-III.93.  
   IV-VI.711 to X.711-I.712.

2. Mūsā  
   I-III.93 to X-XII.95 (?)  
   X.711-I.712 to VI-IX.714 (?)

   overlapping with

3. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz  
   IV-VI.94 to I-VII.97.  
   I-III.713 to IX.715-III.716.

4. Ayyūb  
   c. one month in the period I-VII.97 (IX.715-IV.716).

5. Al-Ḥurr  
   II-VIII.97 to I-III.100.  
   X.715-IV.716 to VIII-X.718.

6. Al-Samḥ  
   I-III.100 to XII.102.  
   VIII-X.718 to VI.721.

7. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān  
   XII.102 to II.103.  
   VI.721 to VII/VIII.721.

8. ʿAnbasa  
   II.103 to VIII.107.  
   VII/VIII.721 to XII.725/I.726.

9. ʿUdhra  
   VIII.107 to X.107.  
   XII.725/I.726 to II/III.726.

10. Yaḥyā  
    X.107 to III.110.  
    II/III.726 to VI/VII.728.

11. Ḥudhayfa  
    III.110 to VIII.110.  
    VI/VII.728 to XI/XII.728.

12. ʿUthmān  
    VIII.110 to I.111.  
    XI/XII.728 to IV/V.729.

13. Al-Haytham  
    I.111 to XII.111.  
    IV/V.729 to II/III.730.

14. Muḥammad  
    XII.111 to II.112.  
    II/III.730 to III/IV.730.

15. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān _iterum_  
    II.112 to VIII/IX.114.  
    III/IV.730 to X.732.

16. ʿAbd al-Malik  
    IX.114 to X-XII.117.  
    X/XI.732 to X.735-I.736.

17. ʿUqba  
    X-XII.117 to II.123.  
    X.735-I.736 to XII.740/I.741.

18. ʿAbd al-Malik _iterum_  
    II.123 to XI.124.  
    XII.740/I.741 to IX/X.742.

19. Baldj  
    XI.124 to X.125.  
    IX/X.742 to VII/VIII.743.

20. Thaʿlaba  
    X.125 to III/IV.126.  
    VII/VIII.743 to XII.743-II.744.

21. Abū l-Khaṭṭār  
    III/IV.126 to VII-XII.128.  
    XII.743-II.744 to IV-IX.746.

22. Thawāba  
    VII-XII.128 to VII-XII.129.
Interregnum

23. Yusuf

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APPENDIX

Tabulation of variants concerning the dates of the governors of Al-Andalus

The following lists are by no means intended to be exhaustive; they are meant to be representative and illustrative. The chief interest is centred on the earlier sources, but several later compilers have had to be included because of their use of such sources.

For convenience of tabulation the names of Islamic authors have been brutally abbreviated; generally, the final component of the usual form of a name is used, regardless of sense (e.g., Ḥakam = Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam). Any difficulty of recognition can be resolved by consulting the footnote to which reference is provided at the first appearance of each author’s name.

A brief word is perhaps in order with regard to my somewhat sceptical attitude toward the historiography of the period, which is in sharp contrast with the noble panorama of great Hispano-Arabic historians conjured up in the voluminous and valued writings of Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. In the first place, great, and even good, historians have frequently been neither great nor good chronologists. Secondly, the great Hispano-Arabic historians tend to be non-extant, which makes them hard to criticize and easy to romanticize. It seems more rational to hold that the considerable amount of material that survives, some of it good or competent, some mediocre, some wretched, none of it ‘great’ (on this subject even the great Ibn Khaldūn is relatively feeble), is built on, and is representative of, what has been lost.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Տարիք</td>
<td>Chr. 754&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; Habib&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td>Defeated Rudericus in 6 Walīd (X.91-X.92). Ordered to invade as of 21.V.711. Invaded in VII.92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Հայեան&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded on a Saturday in VIII.92. Rudericus slain 5.X.92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fayyāq&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt; Dabbi&lt;sup&gt;77&lt;/sup&gt; Khaib&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt; Maqqari&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded on 8.VII.92. Invaded on Monday 5.VII.92, or in VIII.92, or in IX.92. Was 3 years 4 months in Spain. Invaded on 5.VII.92 or a Saturday in VIII.92 = ‘August’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Մուսա</td>
<td>Chr. 754 Crón. prof.&lt;sup&gt;61&lt;/sup&gt; Habib</td>
<td>1 year 3 months 1 year 3 months 2 years 1 month</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded in Era 749/750. Returned to Syria in 10 Walīd (X.95-VI.96). Started for Spain in VII.93. Invaded in IX.93. Left after IX.93. Was near Qayrawān in XII.95. (Another version: Invaded in V.93). Invaded in VII.93. Left Spain after x months of 95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Հակամ&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded on a Thursday in II.93. Left after x months of 94.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td>1 year 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>Started for Spain in VII.93. Started for Spain in 1.93.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rāzi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded in IX.93. Recalled in 95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faraḍī&lt;sup&gt;162&lt;/sup&gt; Akhbar M.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; Հայեան&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt; Fayyāq</td>
<td>3 years with son</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded in IX.93. Recalled in 95. Invaded in IX.93.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwâl155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Spain in 94.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabbî</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Spain in XII.94.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Idhârî16</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded in IX.93.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭîb</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years with son</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invaded in I. or VII. or IX.93. Left in 94 or XII.95.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqari</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. 'Abd al-'Azîz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>94 to 97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crôn. prof.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habîb</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥakam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Râzî</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 10 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasis'93</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qûṭiya95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95 to end of 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbâr M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95 to end of 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyâd</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years with Mûsâ</td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed on 1.VII.97.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faṭîh13</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed at end of 97, or in 98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athîr24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed in 2nd year as governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭîb</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years with Mûsâ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalîdûn24</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

4. Ayyûb

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crôn. prof.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Râzî</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months 20 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbâr M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After interregnum of x months (?)

Ruled from start of 99 to Sulaymân's death (II.99).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hayyān</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatḥ</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿIdhārī</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaḍūn</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Al-Ḥurr</strong></td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>almost 3 years</td>
<td>97 to –</td>
<td>After interregnum of 2 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crón. prof.</td>
<td>2 years 10 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAbīb</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿQutaybā'</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāzī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿRasīs'</td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td>1 year 7 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatḥ</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad²⁸</td>
<td>2 years 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwāl</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>to IX.100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿIdhārī</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>99 (sic) to IX.100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td>1 year 7 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaḍūn</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Al-Samḥ</strong></td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>a bit less than 3 years</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crón. prof.</td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chr. moiss.²⁹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(variant, 3 years)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Took Narbo in 9th year from Saracen invasion of Spain: Battle of Toulouse 3 months later in same year.

Arrived in XII.97.
<table>
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<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ann. laur.</em>.105</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Habib</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eudo expelled Saracens in 721.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years 6 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Akbrar M.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayyân</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td>IX.100 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyâd</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 7 months</td>
<td>IX.100 to 9.XII.102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fath</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 4 months</td>
<td>IX.100 to 102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dabbâ</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed in 103.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhâmmad</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>Killed on 8.XII.102.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwâl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athir</td>
<td><em>'Idhâri</em></td>
<td>2 years 4 months, or 2 years 8 months, or 3 years</td>
<td>IX.100 to 9.XII.102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Khašib'</td>
<td>2 years 7 months</td>
<td>IX.100 to 102</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Khalâdün</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>start of 100 to 102</td>
<td>Killed 8.XII.102.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Maqqâri</em></td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td>IX.100 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <em>'Abd al-Rahmân</em></td>
<td><em>Chr. 754</em></td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td></td>
<td>Variant, 1 year (error for 1 month).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cr. 754</em></td>
<td>1 month</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td>2 years 7 months</td>
<td>9.XII.102 to II.103</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Fath</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>XII.102 to II.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>'Idhâri</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Maqqâri</em></td>
<td>1 year 8 months, or 2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>(confusion over 1st and 2nd governorships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. <em>'Anbâsa</em></td>
<td><em>Chr. 754</em></td>
<td>4 years 6 months</td>
<td>103 (Era 759) to -</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Habib</td>
<td>4 years 5 months</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td>2 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>II.103 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>II.103 to 107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayyân</td>
<td>4 years 5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>to VIII.107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyâd</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td>4 years 7 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td>4 years 5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwâl</td>
<td>4 years 4 or 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athîr</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Idhâri</td>
<td>4 years 5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>II.103 to VIII.107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭîb</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Khałdûn</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqâri</td>
<td>4 years 4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>II.103 to VIII.107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. 'Udhra

| Chr. 754       | (interim)     |                          |                        |                                                                               |
| Crôn. prof.    | 1 year 1 month |                          |                        |                                                                               |
| 'Rasis'        | 2 months 7 days?|                          |                        |                                                                               |
| 'Idhâri         | 2 months      |                          |                        |                                                                               |

10. Yahya

<p>| Chr. 754       | almost 3 years | 107 (Era 763) to -       |                        | (variant, 1 year 6 months)                                                    |
| Crôn. prof.    | 2 years 6 months|                          |                        | (figure given for 'Udraca' in Crôn. geral 1344).                            |
| Habîb          | 2 years 6 months|                          |                        |                                                                               |
| 'Qutayba'      | 1 year 3 months|                          |                        |                                                                               |
| 'Rasis'        | 2 years 7 months?|                         |                        |                                                                               |
| Hayyân          | (cf. Bashkuwâl)|                          |                        |                                                                               |
| Fayyâd          | 1 year 6 months |                          |                        |                                                                               |
| Fath            | 2 years 10 months|                         | X.107 to -              |                                                                               |
| Muḥammad        | 2 years 6 months|                          | X.107 to -              |                                                                               |
| Bashkuwâl       | 1 year 6 months |                          | XI.107 to III.(sic)110  |                                                                               |
| Athîr           | 2 years 6 months |                          |                        |                                                                               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>`Idhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td>X.107 (or end of 109 [sic]) to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khājīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td>end of 107 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 6 months</td>
<td>X.107 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ḥudhayfa</td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>111 (Era 766)</td>
<td>6 Hishām (VIII.110-VIII.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crūn. prof.</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥabīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasīs'</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months 13 days</td>
<td></td>
<td>('treze' in Portuguese version misinterpreted as '3' in Castilian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>I.111 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwāl</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>III.110 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>III.110 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>`Idhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>110 to –, or I.111 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khājīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110 to –</td>
<td>Replaced in the year of his governorship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>III.110 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ʿUthmān</td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>4 months (interim)</td>
<td>112 (Era 767)</td>
<td>7 Hishām (VIII.111-VIII.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crūn. prof.</td>
<td>4 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥabīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwāl</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>VIII.110 to –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athir</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>to end of 110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Idhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 or 6 months</td>
<td>VIII.110 to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>(corrects Fayyād)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalḍūn</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqarī</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>VIII.110 to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Al-Haytham

| Chr. | 754 | 10 months   | 112 (Era 767) | 7 Hishām     |
| Crón. prof. | 10 months |            |               |               |
| Ḥabīb |       | 4 months    |               |               |
| ‘Qutayba’ |     | 1 year 2 months |             |               |
| Fayyād |       | 4 months    |               |               |
| Fath  |       | 2 years (?) | I.112 to 114  |               |
| Muḥammad |     | 5 months   |               |               |
| Bashkuwāl | 2 years 4 months, or 2 years x days | I.111 to – |               |
| Athir |         | 10 months, x days | I.111 to XII.111 |               |
| ‘Idhārī |       | 10 months, or 1 year 2 months, or 2 years x days | I.111 to –, or I.112 to 114 |               |
| Khaṭīb |         | 6 months    |               |               |
| Khalḍūn |       | 2 years    | I.111 to 113  |               |
| Maqqarī | (the same as Bashkuwāl) | |               |               |

14. Muḥammad

<p>| Chr. | 754 | 1 month (x days) | 112 (Era 767) | 7 Hishām |
| Crón. prof. | 1 month | | | |
| ‘Rasis’ |       | 2 months         |               |           |
| Bashkuwāl |       | 2 months         |               |           |
| Athir    |         | 2 months         | XII.111 to II.112 |               |
| ‘Idhārī  |         | 2 months         |               |           |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
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<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>113 to −</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqarī</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. ʿAbd al-Rahmān</td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>113 (Era 769) −</td>
<td>9 Hishām (VIII.113-VIII.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iterum</td>
<td>Crón. prof.</td>
<td>1 year 10 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿHabīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿHakām</td>
<td>Ann. s. Amandī</td>
<td>to IX.114</td>
<td></td>
<td>(says Yaḥyā and Layth date death in 115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poitiers battle on a Saturday in X.732.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿHayyān</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 6 months</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 7 months</td>
<td>to IX.114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 8 months</td>
<td>II.114 to IX.115</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>II.112 to IX.114</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ʿIdhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>113 to 115,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>or II.112 to IX.114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khafīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 7 months</td>
<td>113 to IX.114</td>
<td>(confusion over 1st and 2nd governorships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 8 months</td>
<td>to IX.114,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqarī</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 8 months,</td>
<td>or to 115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>or 2 years 8 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. ʿAbd al-Malik</td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>almost 4 years</td>
<td>116 to 119 (Era 772 to 775)</td>
<td>12 to 15 Hishām (VIII.116-VIII.120)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wāqīdī</td>
<td>4 years</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ʿHabīb</td>
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<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿHakām</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX.114 to −</td>
<td></td>
<td>(says Yaḥyā and Layth date appointment to 115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crón. prof.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>(variant, 1 year 1 month)</td>
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<td>'Qutayba'</td>
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<td>4 years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>X.115 to X.116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 years 2 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fātih</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bashkuwāl</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 or 4 years</td>
<td>IX.114 to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʾIdhārī</td>
<td></td>
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<td>IX/X.114 to X.116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khaḍūn</td>
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<td>2 years</td>
<td>to IX.116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maqqarī</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 or 4 years</td>
<td>IX.114 to IX.116</td>
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<td>Chr. 754</td>
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<td>5 years (completed)</td>
<td>119 to 124</td>
<td>15 to 20  Hishām (VIII.119-IV.125)</td>
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<td>(Era 775 to 780)</td>
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<td>Ḥabīb</td>
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<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crn. prof.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 years 5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Qutayba'</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 3 months</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāzī</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 years 4 months</td>
<td>to II.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rasis'</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qūfiya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110 to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x years</td>
<td>110 to 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td>X.116 to 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fātih</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td>X.116 to 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkuwāl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117 to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>117 to -</td>
<td>117 more exact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʾIdhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td>X.116 to 121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months</td>
<td>IX.116 to 121, or 117 to -</td>
<td>'Came in 117'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>116 or 117 to</td>
<td>121 or II.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years 2 months, or 6 years 4 months</td>
<td>124 (Era 780)</td>
<td>20 Hishām (VIII.124-IV.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>Crām. prof. Ḥakam</td>
<td>1 year 1 month</td>
<td>Was governor when Kūltūm in Ifrīqiya (IX.123-XII.123) (says Yaḥyā and Layth date death 1 month [i.e., 1 year?] before death of Baldj who died in 125).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>II.123 to 123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāzī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121 to 123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fāyād</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 1 month</td>
<td>end of XII.121 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 10 months</td>
<td>II.123 to start of XI.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121, or 122 to -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Idhārī</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year 1 month</td>
<td>121 to 124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121 to XI.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldūn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqārī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td></td>
<td>124 (Era 780) to -</td>
<td>20 Hishām Baldj still fighting at end of year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Habīb</td>
<td>11 months</td>
<td>(cites Yaḥyā and Layth) Baldj sent to Ifrīqiya in VI.123.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to 125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ḥakam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rāzī</td>
<td>c. 1 year</td>
<td>to 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbar M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyad</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>123 to X.124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td>11 months</td>
<td>XI.123 to X.124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad</td>
<td>11 months</td>
<td>XI.123 to X.124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athir</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>XI.123 to 124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Idhāri</td>
<td>6 or 11 months</td>
<td>XI.123 to 124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khajib</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldun</td>
<td>c. 1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqari</td>
<td>11 months</td>
<td>to X.124</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

20. Tha’labah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Habib</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbar M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyad</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>to VII.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athir</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>X.124 to VII.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Idhāri</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khajib</td>
<td>10 months, or 2 years</td>
<td>to VII.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldun</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqari</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

21. Abū l-Khaṭṭār

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Period of rule</th>
<th>Dates of rule</th>
<th>Other details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Habib</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāzī</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128 (Era 782 to 784)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 128 (Era 782 to 784)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came to Spain in 1 Walid u (IV.125-IV.126).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(variant, 1 month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossed from Tunis in I.125.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faraḍī</td>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td>4 years 9 months</td>
<td>to 128</td>
<td>Appointed under Walīd II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥayyān</td>
<td>4 years 6 months</td>
<td>to 128</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appointed under Walīd II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyāḍ</td>
<td>2 years 8 months</td>
<td>VII.125 to –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Friday in VII.125 to VII.127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>VII.125 to –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td>2 years, or 2 years</td>
<td>I.125 to –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍIdhārī</td>
<td>2 years, or 3 years</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṭīb</td>
<td>2 years 6 months</td>
<td>125 to 128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalḍūn</td>
<td>4 years 9 months</td>
<td>125 to 128</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crossed from Tunis in I.125.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqṣārī</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>VII.125 to VII.127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chr. 754</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>128 (Era 784) to –</td>
<td></td>
<td>(variant, 1 year 2 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥabīb</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crūm. pros.</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Qutayba’</td>
<td>1 year 1 month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faraḍī</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhbār M.</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>to 129</td>
<td></td>
<td>(must be figure for Yūsuf)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyāḍ</td>
<td>9 years 11 months</td>
<td>VII.127 to 128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fath</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confirmed in appointment at end of VII.127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāshkuwal</td>
<td>c. 1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dābbī</td>
<td>c. 1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athīr</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>127 to –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍIdhārī</td>
<td>1 or 2 years</td>
<td>to VIII.128, or 128 to –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Period of rule</td>
<td>Dates of rule</td>
<td>Other details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaşib</td>
<td>2 years 2 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabdün</td>
<td>x years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqqari</td>
<td>c. 1 year, or 2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Khatib 2 years 2 months
Khaled 4 years
Maqar c. 1 year, or 2 years

23. Yusuf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chr. 754</th>
<th>start of 130 to – (Era 785 to –)</th>
<th>In his 7th year in 136 (Era 792 begun).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 years 9 months</td>
<td>to 10.XII.138</td>
<td>('7 years 9 months' in text, emended from Muhammad)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crón. prof.
'Outayba’
Akhbār M.
Rāzī
‘Rasis’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hayyan</th>
<th>9 years 9 months</th>
<th>IV.129 to 10.XII.138</th>
<th>(see 22. Thawāba)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fayyād</td>
<td>9 years 11 months</td>
<td>start of XII.128 to 10.XII.138</td>
<td>After 4 months’ interregnum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fath

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muḥammad</th>
<th>9 years 9 months</th>
<th>129 to –</th>
<th>After 4 months’ interregnum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athir</td>
<td>9 or 10 years</td>
<td>129/130 to 138, or II.129 to –</td>
<td>After 4 months’ interregnum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khaṣib</th>
<th>9 years 11 months</th>
<th>IV.129 to 10.XII.138</th>
<th>Acceded after 4 months’ interregnum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maqqari</td>
<td>9 years 9 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

University of Toronto.
G. V. SUMNER

NOTE

J. N. Hillgarth

Graham Vincent Sumner, who died on 18 April 1982, was born on 28 September 1924 in England and educated at Manchester Grammar School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Before joining the Department of Classics at University College, University of Toronto, in 1964, he had taught at Rhodes University in South Africa and at the Universities of New South Wales and Canterbury. He was Chairman of the Department in Toronto from 1968 to 1973 and Associate Chairman (Graduate) from 1976 to 1979. His many articles concern especially Roman republican history, prosopography and chronology. Several of these articles were devoted to Roman Spain. In recent years he had also become interested in the history and historiography of Spain in the seventh and eighth centuries. After his premature death Mrs. Sumner entrusted me with a number of folders containing collations of manuscripts (made during visits to Spain) and translations of chronicles of this period, notably the eighth-century Continuaciones of John of Biclar and Isidore of Seville, which are usually cited from Mommsen’s editions in volume 11 of the Auctores antiquissimi (Chronica minora 2), published in 1894. These materials have been deposited in the archives of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and can be consulted there. Professor Sumner was especially interested in producing a new critical edition of the Continuatio isidoriana hispana, otherwise known as the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754. He had carefully examined the two recent editions, that of Juan Gil in his Corpus scriptorum muzarabicorum (1973) and that of José E. López Pereira (1980), and considered neither of them to be satisfactory. Unfortunately, his own edition lacks the final touches which only its editor could give and it would be difficult to publish the text as it stands.

Professor Sumner’s work on the Mozarabic Chronicle resulted in several short and one long articles. In ‘El perdido codice Alcobacense y la Cronica Mozarabe de 754’, Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 177 (1980) 343-46, he corrected an identification made by Mommsen between a lost manuscript of Alcobaca (known to us from sixteenth-century references) and some surviving fragments. In ‘José Pellicer y la Cronica Mozárabe de 754’, Emerita 49 (1981) 61-64, he showed that two late manuscripts of the Chronicle (saec. xvii or xviii in.), Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 2239 and 51, were mere apographs and did not deserve any independent credit. A third article, translated by Dr. Luis Vázquez de Parga, was published posthumously; ‘La Cronica Mozárabe de 754 y la localización de la victoria bereber sobre el ejercito de Kultum’, in the Boletín already cited, 180 (1983) 351-54, uses the work to determine (as against Arabic sources) the site of a battle of 741.

The article published here was the most substantial written by Professor Sumner on this subject. It was submitted by him to the Anuario de estudios medievales in 1974. The long years during which this periodical was dormant (Sumner believed it to be dead) made a decision to withdraw the article necessary. Despite the time that has passed since
it was written, the article has not been superseded by other publications. The only objection that might be raised is that while Professor Sumner prefers the Latin *Chronicle of 754* to the Arabic sources, he uses the latter at times to correct the *Chronicle*. This might appear methodologically inconsistent. However, the fact is that the *Chronicle*, despite its authority, does not give us a complete chronology. It has lacunae and is sometimes – for instance, on the accession-date of ʿAbd al-Malik in 114/732 – demonstrably in error (as is shown above). It is, therefore, necessary to compare it with and correct it by the Arabic sources. This, it seems to me, Professor Sumner does with great discrimination. I can discover no other recent treatment of the subject, certainly none that can rival the care and thoroughness applied by Sumner to this new field (for him), the same qualities that appear in his studies of earlier Roman history.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*
TWO OLD ENGLISH LISTS OF SERFS*

David A. E. Pelteret

The English agrarian social hierarchy and the patterns of landholding to which it is related were already complex by the time of Domesday Book. Since the documentation before this period is both limited and selective in nature – almost all the sources are land charters, relating to lordship over estates rather than the rights and obligations of those living on these estates – it might appear from Domesday Book that the manorial system had simply sprung up overnight in England. Closer examination of the sources is revealing that this is far from being the case. Behind Domesday Book itself is being perceived a mass of earlier documentation upon which the Domesday Commissioners depended;¹ studies of the composition of manors and their discrete estates are suggesting that these are ancient in origin;² and when the written sources are used in combination with archaeological evidence, there is even a hint that there was some continuity from Roman times.³ But all this concerns land usage: we must probe further into the written sources if we wish

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¹ I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Alexander R. Rumble for commenting on an earlier draft of this article and to Ms. Jane Davie of the University of Toronto's Cartographic Office for drawing the maps. The texts from ms. Cotton Tiberius B.v, vol. 1, and ms. A.3.5 (= Maidstone, Kent County Archives Office ms. DRc/R1) are printed with the permission of the British Library Board and the Dean and Chapter of Rochester Cathedral respectively.


to understand anything at all about the Anglo-Saxon peasantry. Because there is a dearth of informative written evidence, we cannot afford to overlook any of it, however insignificant it might appear at first glance.

This article will examine two such pieces of evidence: a list of persons with ties to the Ely Abbey estate of Hatfield in Hertfordshire, dating from the end of the tenth century, and another list of persons associated with the Rochester Cathedral estate of Wouldham in Kent, from the mid-eleventh century. The Hatfield list, in London, British Library ms. Cotton Tiberius B.v, vol. 1, fol. 76v, was printed in the nineteenth-century collections of Anglo-Saxon legal documents edited by Kemble, Thorpe and Earle; Thorpe also provided a translation. Since these works are all out of print and since the Wouldham list appears only in the facsimile of the Textus Roffensis (Rochester, Cathedral Library A.3.5 and now lodged at Maidstone, Kent County Archives Office as ms. DRc/R1) published in the Early English Manuscripts in Facsimile series, it needs no apology to present an edition of both texts together with a translation and commentary.


The relationship of this text to the original manuscript to which it belonged has been fully described by Neil R. Ker in his Catalogue of Manuscripts Containing Anglo-Saxon (Oxford, 1957), no. 22, pp. 35 f., and only a summary of his conclusions need be presented here. In Ker’s view, the Hatfield list was entered c. 1000 on the lower blank verso of the last leaf of a gospel-book which was probably of Ely provenance. A part of the upper section of the same leaf is now Cambridge University Library ms. Kk.1.24. The leaf was once one of the final quire of four. Ms. Tiberius B.v, vol. 1, fol. 74r-v, recording a grant of land at Potton, Bedfordshire, and the regulations of a guild of thegns at Cambridge, may represent another leaf of this quire. The entering of legal documents in gospel-books is a well-attested Anglo-Saxon diplomatic practice. The intent and reasons for this could well bear closer scrutiny. The custom seems to be

4 For a general analysis of the evidence on Anglo-Saxon agrarian social structure, see Herbert P. R. Finberg’s contribution in The Agrarian History of England 1/2.383-525.
7 Hereafter cited as Ker, Catalogue.
8 Ker, Catalogue, p. 557, s.v. Records, lists the gospel-books in which legal documents are to be found. On the possible origins of the custom, see Pierre Chaplais, ‘Who Introduced Charters
particularly associated with Anglo-Saxon diplomatic manumissions and quittances, presumably because those concerned were not in a position to preserve their own records.\(^9\) (Two extant records of quittances actually concern *geburas*, i.e., persons with the same status as those mentioned in the Hatfield list.\(^{10}\)) The Hatfield list, therefore, probably was entered in a gospel-book because that was the place where traditionally documents concerning such persons were recorded.

\[\text{Text}^{11}\]

\[+\text{Dudda. was gebur into Hæðsfelda 7 he hæfde þreo dohtor. An hatte Deorwyn. oðer Deorswyd. þridde Golde. 7 Wullaf on Hæðsfelda hæfð Deorwyne to wife. 7 Ælfiætætæ Tæcingawyrde hæfð Deorswyðæ to wife. 7 Ealhstan Ælfstanæs broðar hæfð GolDan to wife. Hwita hatte wæs beócere into Hæðsfelda. 7 Tate hatte his dohtor wæs Wulfsiges modor scyttan. 7 Lulle hatte Wulfsiges sweostar Hehstan hæfð to wife on Wealadene. Wifus 7 Dunne 7 Seoloce syndan inbyrde to Hæðsfelda. Duding hatte Wifuse sunu sit on Wealadene. 7 Ceolmund hatte Dunnan sunu sit eac on Wealadene. 7 Æðeleah hatte Seolecan sunu sit eac on Wealadene. 7 Tate hatte Cenwaldes sweostor Mæg hæfð to wife on Weligun. 7 Eadelm Hereðryde sunu hæfð Tatan dohtor}\]

1 Part of cross no longer visible. 10 *Weligun: i* very rubbed.


9 A list of extant manumissions is supplied by Max Förster in Raymond W. Chambers, Max Förster and Robin H. Flower, *The Exeter Book of Old English Poetry* (London, 1933), p. 45 and nn. 3-7, supplemented by the addition of several more manuscripts in his *Der Flussname Themse und seine Sippe. Studien zur Anglistierung keltischer Eigennamen und zur Lautchronologie des Altbritischen* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Abt. 1; Munich, 1941), p. 794 and n. 3.


11 The punctuation of the manuscript has been retained but place- and personal names have been capitalized and conventional word division has been employed in preference to the manuscript spacing. OE *wynn* is reproduced as *w*. In the translation and elsewhere in the article personal names have been normalized to an early West-Saxon form (except for well-known names such as Edgar and Æthelwold) to facilitate references to onomastic works.
to wife: - Waerlaf hatte Wærstanes fæder wæs riht aet to Hæðefelda Heold da
grégan swyn: + Brada hatte wæs gebur to Hæðefelda. 7 Hwite hatte þæs
Bradan wif wæs gebeorð dohtor to Hæðefelda. Seo Hwite wæs Wærstanes' 7
Wærðryðæ. 7 Wynburge pridda modor 7 s < e > Wærstan sit æt Wadtune hæfð
Winnes sweostor to wife 7 Wine hæfð Wærðryðæ to wife 7 Dunne æt on
Wadtune wæs inbyrde to Hæðefelda. 7 Deorwyn hatte hire dohtor hæfð
Cynewald on Munddene to wife 7 Deornæ hadde hire broðar bið mid
cynewalde. 7 Dudde hadde Wifuse dohtor sit æt Wilmundeslea. Cynelm hatte
Cenwaldes fæder wæs gebur into Hæðefelda. 7 Manna hatte Cenwaldes sunu sit
æt Wadtune under Eadwolde: + Buhe hatte wæs Dryhtlafes moddrige Wæs
af <a> ren ut of Hæðefelda into Eslingadene. 7 Æpelwyn 7 Eadugu 7 Æpelgyð
heo wæran ðreo gesweostrea. 7 Tilewine 7 Duda waeron ealle þære Buge bearne.
7 Ealhstan Tiliwine sunu 7 Wulfsige Eaduge sunu 7 Ceolom Æpelgyðæ sunu 7
Ceolstan 7 Manwine. Þæs cyn com of Felda Deorulf Cyneburhæ sunu 7 his twa
sweostar 7 Cynric æt Clæfring is heora eam. Þæs men synd Tatan magas æt
Hæðefelda ðæs gebures: -

Translation

+ Dudda was a gebur belonging to Hatfield. And he had three daughters. One was
called Deorwyn, a second Deorswith, a third Golde. And Wulflaf at Hatfield has
Deorwyn as wife and Ælfstan at Datchworth has Deorswith as wife and Ealhstan,
Ælfstan's brother, has Golde as wife. Hwita was a beekeeper belonging to Hatfield.
Tate, his daughter, was mother of Wulfsige, [the] archer. And Lulle, Wulfsige's sister,
Heahstan has as wife at Walden. Wifhusu and Dunne and Seoloce are
nativi of Hatfield. Duding, son of Wifhusu, resides at Walden. And Ceolmund, son of Dunne, also resides
at Walden. And Æthelheah, son of Seoloce, also resides at Walden. Tate, Cyneweald's sister.
Mæg has as wife at Welwyn and Ealdhelm, son of Herethryth, has Tate's
daughter as wife. Waerlaf, Wærstan's father, was lawfully possessed by Hatfield. He
kept the grey pigs.

+ Brada was a gebur belonging to Hatfield. And Hwite, wife of that Brada, was
daughter of a gebur belonging to Hatfield. That Hwite was great-grandmother of
Wærstan and Wærthryth and Wynburg. And that Wærstan residing at Watton has
Wine's sister as wife. And Wine has Wærthryth as wife. And Dunne who resided at
Watton was a nativus of Hatfield. And Deorwyn, her daughter, Cyneweald at Munden
has as wife. And Deornoth, her brother, lives with Cyneweald. And Dudde, daughter of
Wifhusu, resided at Wymondley. Cynehelm, Cyneweald's father, was a gebur belong-
ing to Hatfield. And Manna, Cyneweald's son, resides at Watton under Eadweald.

+ Buge was Dryhtlaf's aunt. She left Hatfield for Essendon. And Æthelwyn and
Eadugu and Æthelgyth, who were three sisters, and Tiliwine and Dudda were all
children of that Buge. And Ealhstan [is] Tiliwine’s son and Wulfsige Eadugu’s son and Ceolhelm Æthelgyth’s son and Ceolstan and Manwine. This family came from Hatfield: Deorwulf, Cyneburh’s son, and his two sisters, and Cyneric at Clavering is their uncle. These persons are kinsmen of the gebur Tata at Hatfield.

Though the document does not explicitly state that all the persons mentioned are geburas, it seems reasonable to assume that they all held this status. I have described the socio-economic and legal position of the gebur elsewhere, and it will suffice to give only an outline of the main features of the status here. He was granted land (usually thirty acres), equipment, and livestock by an overlord in return for fairly heavy renders and services. This property reverted to the overlord on the death of the gebur. He was probably still a freeman within the meaning of the term as used in the Anglo-Saxon law codes, but evidence from the middle of the tenth century shows that he could not break the contractual relationship with his lord by simply leaving the land without his lord’s

12 For a review of the evidence on the gebur (I avoid the Modern English cognate ‘boor’ because of its negative connotations), see David A. E. Pelteret, ‘The Coliberti of Domesday Book’, Studies in Medieval Culture 12 (1978) 43-54. On p. 49 of the latter article I state that gebur first appears in the eighth-century Épinal Glossary. It is used, of course, in Ine 6.3: ‘Gif donnre on gafolgeldan huse oðde on gebures gefeohhte, CXX scill. to wite geselle 7 þam gebure VI scill.’ (If, however, he fights in the house of a taxpayer or of a gebur, he shall pay 120 shillings as a fine, and 6 shillings to the gebur). (Text in Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, ed. Felix Liebermann, 3 vols. [Halle, 1903-16], 1.92; translation in The Laws of the Earliest English Kings, ed. Frederick L. Attenborough [Cambridge, 1922], p. 39.) The word gebur has cognates in several Germanic languages (OHG gibur, OFris bur, Olcel buri) and it could have existed in early Old English, but I am not entirely convinced that it was part of the original wording of the law: oðde gebur has the appearance of a gloss that could have slipped into the Alfredian recension, leading to a replacement by it in the same clause of a second use of gafolgelda. (It must be remembered that the earliest manuscripts of the laws of Ine date from the tenth century.) Gebur does not appear elsewhere in Ine’s laws, whereas gafolgelda is used again in Ine 23.3. Dr. Paul Hyams has pointed out to me that the paper by C. van der Kieft, ‘Les “Colliberti” et l’évolution du servage dans la France centrale et occidentale (x–xii siècle), Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis (= Revue d’histoire du droit) 32 (1964) 369-70, which I cited with approval, has been criticized by J. Balon in ‘Le statut juridique des Colliberts du Val de Loire’, Revue bénédictine 77 (1967) 298-324; pace M. Balon and Dr. Hyams, I still prefer the synthesis of Dr. van der Kieft. Since the appearance of my paper, Hiroshi Hayashi has published ‘Gafolgelda and Gebur in Ine 6.3’, Hoshei-shi-kenkyû Journal of the Japanese Legal History Association) 26 (1976) 4-8 (English) and 45-85 (Japanese). He independently reaches some conclusions that are similar to those reached earlier by Dorothy Whitelock in English Historical Documents c. 500-1042, 2nd edition (English Historical Documents 1; London, 1979), p. 399 n. 4: Ine 6.3 does not include the whole of the ceorl class but specifically those whose independent status had declined and whose rights to peace in the house had become obscure and needed reinforcement, a valid interpretation in my view. He seems, however, to regard the gafolgelda and gebur as distinct in some way, rather than regarding the words as synonyms at the time of the extant recension, which seems the simplest postulate. (I wish to thank Mr. Ken Mizumoto for providing me with a substantial abstract of this paper.)
permission.\textsuperscript{13} In terms of the estate on which he lived, therefore, he was not a freeman in that he did not have freedom of movement, and had only the use rather than the ownership of the immoveables and moveables that his lord supplied him. He was, in short, a serf.

What has been described is the legal theory that can be legitimately deduced from the extant evidence. Reality was inevitably rather different. Clearly it was assumed that the economic status of the gebur would not change and that he would remain settled in one place. The Hatfield list shows that this was far from being the case. J. Ambrose Rafúš has already proved that in the High Middle Ages the peasant's world was not limited to the horizons visible from his humble cot, as is popularly believed.\textsuperscript{14} The Hatfield document reveals that the peasant mobility attested in the thirteenth-century court rolls was no new social phenomenon but one that had existed at least as far back as the tenth century. As will be seen later, this mobility indeed provides the very raisson d'\textit{être} for the document.

No less than seventeen persons are recorded as having left Hatfield.\textsuperscript{15} Of these Buge (f) and Deorwulf and his two sisters moved to Essendon, the name of a parish adjacent to Hatfield, and Tate (f) went to Welwyn, just north of Hatfield. Deorswith (f) and Golde (f), two sisters, married brothers, one of whom (and presumably the other as well) lived at Datchworth, on the eastern side of Welwyn parish. A brother and sister, Wærstan and Wærhryth (f), also married siblings from Datchworth's neighbouring parish, Watton-at-Stone. Northwest of Hatfield (either St. Paul's Walden, nearly four miles at its nearest point from Hatfield, or King's Walden, six miles away) Lulle (f) from Hatfield was married to Heahstan. Three other males descended from Hatfield geburas were to be found there. Moving yet further afield, Deorwyn (f) was married to Cyneweald at Munden (either Great or Little Munden, at least seven miles to the northeast), while her brother was also resident there with Cyneweald, and Dudde (f) was to be found at Wymondley (either Great or Little, at least eight miles away). Even further removed was the uncle of Deorwulf and his sisters, who lived at Clavering in Essex, a good seventeen miles away from Hatfield at its nearest point. These mileages understate the distance moved since they are map readings, measuring the distance as the crow flies between the two nearest boundary points of Hatfield and the other parish, rather than the actual road mileage between estates. At first glance this seems a surprising degree of mobility. A close examination of the medieval topography, however, reveals

\textsuperscript{13} above, n. 10; Pelteret, 'The \textit{Coliberti}', 48.

\textsuperscript{14} J. Ambrose Rafúš, \textit{Tenure and Mobility: Studies in the Social History of the Mediaeval English Village} (Studies and Texts 8; Toronto, 1964), chaps. 6-8.

\textsuperscript{15} For the geographic basis of the discussion that follows, see Map 1 and Table 1.
MAP 1: Hertfordshire
Table 1

The names of those serfs associated in the document with the estate at Hatfield but who are recorded as residing elsewhere are italicized. A dagger indicates that the person is deceased.

Datchworth
(1) See (3) and (10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deorwyn f. =</td>
<td>Wulflaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Wulfstan</td>
<td>(Hatfield)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deorswith f.</td>
<td>= Ælfræd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Ælfstan</td>
<td>(Datchworth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ealhstan =</td>
<td>Godstæn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golde f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Dudda

Welwyn
(6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mæg = Tate f.</td>
<td>(Welwyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Hælfræd</td>
<td>(Welwyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Hælfræd</td>
<td>(Welwyn)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Warlaf
(7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>= Hælfræd</td>
<td>(Welwyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Hælfræd</td>
<td>(Welwyn)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Warlaf
(7)

†Warlaf
(riht æht to Hæþælæd)
WATTON
(8)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{Gebur} \\
\text{(to Hæðfelda)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{Brada} = \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{Hwite f.} \\
\text{(gebur to Hæðfelda)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
X \\
Y
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Wærstan} = A \\
\text{Wine} = \text{Wæthryth f.} \\
\text{Wynburg f.}
\end{array} \]

MUNDEN
(9)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{Dunne f.} \\
\text{(Watton)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{inbyrde to Hæðfelda}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Deornoth} \\
\text{(in Munden with Cyneweald)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Deorwyn f. = Cyneweald (Munden)}
\end{array} \]

WYMONDLEY
(10) See (3) above

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Wifhusu f.}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Dudde f.} \\
\text{(Wymondley)}
\end{array} \]

WATTON
(11) Cf. (6)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{Cynehelm} \\
\text{(gebur into Hæðfelda)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Cenweald}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Manna} \\
\text{(Watton; under Eadwold)}
\end{array} \]

ESSENDON
(12)

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{X}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Buge f.} \\
\text{(of Hæðfelda into Eslingadene)}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Dryhtlaf} \\
\text{Æthelwyn f.} \\
\text{Eadugu f.} \\
\text{Æthelgyth f.} \\
\text{Tiliwine} \\
\text{Duda}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{WulfSige}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Ealhstan}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Ceolhelm}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Ceolstan}
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Manwine}
\end{array} \]
that there were likely to be fewer impediments to movement in this region than
in, say, the Kentish weald.\footnote{16} Hertfordshire was criss-crossed by a number of
Roman roads that radiated out from London and St. Albans, the former Roman
town of Verulamium.\footnote{17} (The frequent mention of a \textit{stræt}, ‘a metalled road’, in
the Anglo-Saxon land charters may well refer to Roman roads still in use in the
period.)\footnote{18} The Roman road from London to Stevenage actually passed along the
edge of the manor of Hatfield and thence on through to near Welwyn. There it
was crossed by the road from Verulamium that went via Braughing to Worsted
Lodge in Cambridgeshire.\footnote{19} This latter route (Margary Route 21a and b) skirted
Datchworth and Watton-at-Stone and acted as the boundary at the southeastern
corner of the ecclesiastical parish of Great Munden. Clavering was only two
and a half miles from this road; if one walked directly to it, one would join the
road about seven miles from its terminus at Great Chesterford. Both the
parishes of Little Wymondley and St. Paul’s Walden are bounded on the east by
Margary Route 221 which ultimately joins Margary Route 213, a road that ran
along the southern edge of the manor of Hatfield. King’s Walden at its most
eastern tip reached Margary Route 210, which similarly connected with Mar-

\footnote{16} K. P. Witney, \textit{The Jutish Forest: A Study of the Weald of Kent from 450 to 1380 A.D.}
map 7b.
\footnote{18} On the association of the word \textit{stræt} with roads of Roman origin in the West Midlands, see
Della Hooke, \textit{Anglo-Saxon Landscapes of the West Midlands: The Charter Evidence} (British
translation of the word, see my paper, ‘The Roads of Anglo-Saxon England’, \textit{Wiltshire
Archaeological and Natural History Magazine} 79 (1984) 155-63 at p. 160, where I also discuss
some of the sources of evidence on Anglo-Saxon roads. It is to be hoped that by the time David
(Oxford-Toronto-Buffalo, 1981), sufficient work will have been done on charter boundaries and
other sources for him to be able to provide more detailed maps of the roads of Anglo-Saxon
Britain. Christopher Taylor has a brief chapter on the subject in his \textit{Roads and Tracks of Britain}
(London, 1979), pp. 84-110.
\footnote{19} Margary, \textit{Roman Roads}, pp. 201 (Route 220), 198-200 (Routes 21a and b). A more detailed
analysis is provided by The Viatores, \textit{Roman Roads in the South-East Midlands} (London, 1964),
pp. 185-201 (Route 220) and 79-92 (Route 21a).
From Clavering to Hatfield was thus just over twenty-three miles, a journey that would take less than two days to make on a reasonable road. From Hatfield to Welwyn was about six miles, to Datchworth seven, to Watton-at-Stone nine and to Great Munden twelve. From Hatfield to Little Wymondley was sixteen miles, to St. Paul’s Walden eleven and a half, and to King’s Walden just over twelve miles.

The possible continued use of Roman roads might explain how these peasants were able to move round but it does not explain why they did so. There seem to be three possible answers, all of which gain some support from this document and from external sources. The first is that marriage dictated removal from one area to another; the second that assarting and extended cultivation required additional labour, which encouraged peasants to move of their own volition; the third that changing manpower requirements led some landlords to encourage their men to go elsewhere and others to seek extra staff for their estates.

As far as marriage is concerned, the opposition of the Church to consanguineous unions is attested in a number of Anglo-Saxon sources. This was probably more frequently honoured in the breach than in the observance since marriage within the sixth degree was proscribed; among the aristocracy it was often just a convenient device to annul a marriage that political considerations rendered imprudent to preserve. But if these regulations were observed strictly at any time, it was in the latter half of the tenth century when the first monastic reformers such as Dunstan and Æthelwold and subsequently the archbishop of York, Wulfstan, encouraged the enforcement of ecclesiastical regulations. Failure to permit mobility among the peasantry under these circumstances would have meant that many would have been forced to remain single. Yet most scholars are agreed that the population of Europe (including England) had started to rise in or by the tenth century, so enforced celibacy seems improbable.

\[20\] Margary, *Roman Roads*, pp. 201-202 (Route 221), 178-79 (Route 213); The Viatores, *Roman Roads*, pp. 93-99 (Route 221), 165-79 (Route 213), 73-79 (Route 210).

\[21\] On Anglo-Saxon marriage customs and the Church’s attitude towards them, see Dorothy Whitelock, *The Beginnings of English Society* (Pelican History of England 2; Harmondsworth, 1952), pp. 149-52.


The Hatfield list suggests that marriage was the reason for the removal of some of the descendants of Hatfield *geburas* to other parts of the country. Seven of those who left Hatfield (Deorswith [f], Lulle [f], Tate [f], Wærstan, Waerstan, Waerthrith [f], and probably Dunne [f] and Buge [f]) are directly or indirectly recorded as married to persons elsewhere and it is reasonable to deduce that marriage was the cause of their departure from the estate. Deorswith's sister married her husband's brother; since Deorswith moved to Datchworth, it is probable that her sister moved there as well. Significant, there is but a single male among this group (and he and his sister married siblings). Considered from an anthropological point of view, the number of women migrating suggests that a patrilocal kinship system obtained among the peasantry, though the example of Wærstan above and of Deornoth, who is discussed in the next paragraph, shows that the system was not rigid. Patrilocal kinship is well suited to a farming community.  

Marriage will not account for all the departures from Hatfield. There is, for instance, no record of the marital status of Duding, Ceolmund and Æthelheah at Walden; of Deornoth at Munden; of Dudde (f) at Wymondley; of Manna at Watton; or of Deorwulf and his two sisters at Essendon. Of these, Deornoth is recorded as living at Munden with his brother-in-law, Cyanewald, and Manna is reported as being at Watton 'under' Eadweald. The most plausible explanation for this is that they moved in order to provide the necessary labour to extend the arable: this would explain why a whole kin group, Deorwulf and his two sisters, took themselves off to Essendon. Evidence from other sources shows that this is at least a justifiable, if speculative, interpretation. For an indication that serfs themselves had men who worked for them, one has to turn to what is admittedly a rather late source, the *Liber Niger* of Peterborough Abbey, compiled between 1116 and 1125. Among the various categories of workers on Peterborough's estates were some called *undersetes*, an English word not otherwise attested in the sources. It is clear that these men worked 'under' *villani* on the estates. Since the *geburas* normally engaged in mixed farming on their thirty acres of land, the need for additional helpers is not surprising.

That some of these persons decided to move, not just to work with or under someone else, but also because they had the opportunity quite literally to break new ground, is also a real possibility. There are two sources that suggest that this is what some *geburas* did. The first provides rather tenuous evidence. In

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24 For the terminology, see Robin Fox, *Kinship and Marriage: An Anthropological Perspective* (Harmondsworth, 1967), pp. 81-82 (Case 3) and 84-85.

one of the versions of an alleged Abingdon charter, there is mention of Welford 'mid heora geburatumum', which is glossed 'id est cum appendiciis suis'.26 The charter (the body of which is in Latin) would, if genuine, date from 821, but was considered by Stenton to be spurious.27 Yet it seems to be based on early material for it mentions a number of place-names that have since been lost. N. P. Brooks considers it to be the work of a pre-Conquest rather than a post-Conquest forger who was possibly drawing on a ninth-century charter of immunity. If he is correct, the reference to Welford then suggests that it dates from after the tenth-century reform and should probably be ascribed, like other pancartae forged for Anglo-Saxon reformed monasteries, to the end of the tenth or the beginning of the eleventh century.28 But it does indicate that geburas were living as a group at some point on appendicii, which suggests that these were perhaps outlying lands that had been allotted to them to develop. More direct evidence that this happened occurs in Domesday Book, where it is mentioned that there were thirty acres of land that had been worked 'in firma regis' by a colibertus 'in the forest' in Hampshire. This was clearly an assart which happened to receive mention in Domesday Book because the lordship of the land had come into dispute.29

Overlords as well as serfs could promote mobility. It is apparent that in the tenth century landowners were showing considerable flexibility in their use of land and labour. This seems to have included the release of increasingly large numbers of slaves and the working of the demesne by tenant farmers.30 An


28 On its authenticity, see Gelling, The Early Charters, pp. 26-27. I owe this reference and the suggestion of the date to the (unnamed) referee of this paper.


30 David A. E. Pelteret, Late Anglo-Saxon Slavery: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Various Forms of Evidence (Diss. Toronto, 1976), p. 197 and Table 4, 'Slaves freed in the Wills'; on geburas working the demesne, see Pelteret, 'The Coliberti', 47-48.
owner might not always have wished to retain all the men resident on his
estate. Expanding population, improved technology or changing land-use
patterns could lead to his having a superfluity of manpower whom he might be
only too glad to see move elsewhere. The manor of Hatfield was noted for
being well wooded. Though Domesday Book reveals an increase in the arable
immediately after the Conquest, the abbey of Ely in the late tenth century may
have felt that it was in its interests to retain its woodland for both its timber and
its pannage. If the numbers living on the estate increased and there was to be no
increase in the arable, departures from the manor would have been the only
feasible way of releasing the population pressure.

Landlords could also have reason to increase their manpower, especially if
they set about reorganizing their holdings. It is interesting to note that of the
settlements mentioned in the list, manors at Clavering and Great Wymondley
were owned by Sveinn of Essex in 1066, at Essendon and St. Paul's Walden by
St. Albans Abbey, and at Datchworth and Watton-at-Stone by St. Peter's
Abbey, Westminster.31 Unfortunately, we cannot trace the sources of Sveinn's
estates back to the tenth century but we must at least allow for the possibility
that they were acquired by one person or institution in that century or earlier.32
St. Albans seems to have acquired St. Paul's Walden at the end of the ninth
century and Essendon probably in the tenth.33 Westminster was granted both of
its estates by King Edgar (959-975).34 Æthelgifu's will, which dates from c. 990,
grants half of an estate at Munden to Welwyn 'minster' after the death of the
legatee, thus also establishing a link between properties in these two places. The
acquisition of several estates may well have acted as an incentive to a dynamic
overlord to seek labourers to develop them as a group.35

31 Domesday Book 2.466 (Clavering), 1.1416 (Great Wymondley), 135b (St. Paul's Walden),
fol. 90r, records the gift of a manor at Essendon to St. Albans, but nothing further is recorded
about the monastery's having any such holding there. Essendon is not mentioned in Domesday
Book.
(2nd edition), and J. Horace Round, 'The Domesday Survey' in The Victoria History of the
County of Essex (Victoria History of the Counties of England [hereafter cited as VCH]; London,
1903), 1.345-46, both discuss Sveinn.
33 The grant of Walden (which might, however, be Abbot's Walden) is no. 220 in Sawyer,
Charters. See further, VCH Hertfordshire 2.405. The probable date of the Essendon grant is that
suggested by Eleanor J. B. Reid in VCH Hertfordshire 3.459.
34 The charter granting Westminster its lands is spurious (Sawyer, ibid., no. 774), but the
traditions it embodies may be genuine. See Florence E. Harmer, Anglo-Saxon Writs
(Manchester, 1952), pp. 337-39, and Barbara Harvey, Westminster Abbey and Its Estates in the
35 The Will of Æthelgifu: A Tenth Century Anglo-Saxon Manuscript, ed. Dorothy Whitelock
et al. (Roxburghe Club; Oxford, 1968), pp. 8 and 9, lines 19-24, and p. 67.
As for family size, one must allow for the fact that the list is incomplete because it is primarily concerned with the living descendants of Hatfield serfs who had moved elsewhere. Those who remained at Hatfield and their descendants in collateral lines are thus not likely to be mentioned. And among serfs who had moved, there may be some recorded who were not yet of an age to produce children. There are thirteen family groups that are listed. It is possible that this number should be reduced to eight. The name Wifhusu appears three times; there is a daughter called Dudde and also a son named Duding. The last name is a patronymic. The list also records a Dudda who had three (named) daughters. It is highly probable that Wifhusu was Dudda’s wife. It was perhaps Dudda’s second marriage, which would explain why the three daughters are mentioned separately from Dudde and Duding. If this is so, stemmata 1, 3, and 10 should be merged. The name Wærstan also appears twice (stemmata 7 and 8) and may refer to the same person. The possibility must also be entertained that Cenweald/Cynweald refers to one person (stemmata 6, 9, and 11, and see Appendix 1, 1.C.1 below), and the common name-elements Tate (f), Cyne- and Deor- may even indicate that stemma 13 should be linked with 6 and 9. Of these family groups a single offspring in the latest generation is recorded for Dunne, Seoloce, Tate, Wæralf, Cynweald (stemma 11), Eadugu, and Tiliwine. In the case of the penultimate generation listed, Hwite the beekeeper, Cynehelm, and Herethryth are the only children recorded, and only a single child is recorded in the three generations preceding the father of Wærstan, Wærthryth, and Wynburg. Because of the qualifications mentioned, these are probably highly misleading indicators of fertility. Tate, possibly Wifhusu, the unnamed parent of Tate and Cynweald (stemma 6), Dunne, the grandparents of Dryhtlaf and Æthelwyn and of Deorwulf all had at least two children. Four of these had one son and one daughter. Dudda had three daughters (and possibly another daughter and a son); the grandchild of Hwite and Cyneburh both had a son and two daughters; Buge had no less than five children, three daughters and two sons, and one of her children had three offspring, all sons.

The same principles of name-giving employed by the aristocracy seem to have been followed by the geburas. The use of alliteration and the employment of the same first or second element for siblings with dithematic names were widespread among the Germanic-speaking peoples and can be found in this text. Two of the daughters of Dudda were named Deorwyn and Deorswith;
the latter's husband Ælfstan had a brother Ealhstan; Hwite's great-grandchildren were Warstan, Warhyth and Wymburg, where the first two names share the same initial element and the last alliterates with the other two; Dunne's children were called Deornoth and Deorwyn; two of Æthelgyth's children were called Ceolhelm and Ceolstan, while the third, Manwine, had the same first element in his name as his maternal uncle, Tillwine; Cenweald's father was called Cynehelm (see Appendix 1, 1.1 below); and finally, one may assume that Cyneburh's brother was Cyneric of Clavering. The above examples show that alliteration and common elements were used for male and female alike. Initial assonance as a principle in the choice of names is to be seen in three of the names of Buge's five children, Æthelwyn, Eadugu and Æthelgyth. There are quite a few monothematic names: Brada, Buge/Buhte, Dudde (f), Golde (f), Hwita, Hwite (f), Lulle (f), Mæg, Manna, Tate (f) and Wifn(n)e. Until a more reliable onomasticon than Searle's is available, however, it would be unwise to assert that the use of monothematic names is more characteristic of the peasantry than the nobility.

There is one patronymic, Duding; Dudde may have been his sister. Of the names listed, Deorwyn, Dryhtlaf, Dudde, Eadugu, Golde, Mæg, Seoloce, and Wifhusu do not appear to be recorded in any other Anglo-Saxon source.

From the evidence analyzed so far the following conclusions may be drawn. Among the non-slave peasantry there was a fair measure of geographic mobility in spite of customary obligations that would tend to inhibit such movement. It could be in the interests of both the peasantry and their overlords for such mobility to occur. In the case of the peasants, marriage would have provided an incentive to movement and among the more ambitious the possibility of developing assarts and/or the more intensive farming of land with the aid of kinsmen would have made departure from an existing estate attractive. The interests of the ambitious would, of course, have coincided with

38 The principles behind the giving of names to Anglo-Saxon women are examined by Henry B. Woolf in 'The Naming of Women in Old English Times', Modern Philology 36 (1938-39) 113-20.

39 Since I wrote the above, Dr. Alexander R. Rumble has kindly sent me his paper, 'The Status of Written Sources in English Onomastics', Nomina 8 (1984) 41-56, where on p. 50 he also notes the alliteration and common elements in the names in this text. He includes in his list Buge and her daughter Eadugu, whose names share a common syllable. So far as I know, no one has investigated whether the use of common syllables was employed in the giving of names within a kin group. See Appendix 2 for an analysis of the names and n. 99 below for references to monographs on Anglo-Saxon onomastics. For current research on Anglo-Saxon names, see the Forschungsberichte of Herbert Voitl, 'Die englische Personennamenkunde: ein Forschungsbericht', Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen 199 (1963) 158-67 and 200 (1964) 108-18, 436-50, and 'Die englischen Personennamen: der Fortgang ihrer Erforschung in den letzten zwölf Jahren', ibid. 213 (1976) 47-60, and the journal Nomina.
innovative landlords who might have wanted the arable extended. On the other hand, there would also have been overlords who in reorganizing the use of manpower on their estates found themselves with a surplus of people; it would have been to their advantage to encourage the latter to leave (while attempting to retain their rights in them by prudently keeping a record of where they moved to). No statistically valid conclusions can be drawn about family size. A large number of single children are recorded in the latest generation but that might be a factor of the age of the parents. A number of families had at least two children, and one had as many as five, well above the replacement level of the population. As for the principles of name-giving, the peasantry show no discernible difference from the aristocratic levels of Anglo-Saxon society.

In order to deduce further evidence from this text, it is necessary to understand the purpose of this document and the significance of its contents. Here we must turn to an examination of the history of the estate at Bishop’s Hatfield.

Hatfield was, as has already been mentioned, in a wooded area in the south of Hertfordshire. The Liber Eliensis explains that King Edgar granted Ely Abbey forty hides of land there because its timber could be used for building the monastic church and satisfying other needs of its monks. Food for the monastic table was undoubtedly one of these needs. The woods of Hatfield were well suited for providing pannage for pigs, which formed an important part of the estate; the Hatfield list mentions that one of the serfs, Wierstan, kept a herd of grey pigs. King Edgar had received the property from one Ordmaer and his wife Ælthe on their deaths. The abbey held the land without contest during Edgar’s lifetime, but during the period of the anti-monastic reaction following Edgar’s death in 975, Æthelwine (ealdorman of East Anglia from c. 962 to 992 and son of Athelstan ‘Half King’) claimed the property in concert with his brothers. The grounds for this action were that Æthelwine’s...
father had received the land in Hertford in return for his patrimony in Devon but King Edgar had seized it. The monks, realizing that they would be short of wood, made an agreement with Æthelwine to exchange forty-one hides at Hemingford Abbots, Wennington and Yelling in Huntingdonshire in return for the Hatfield estate. This transaction must have taken place between 975, the year of Edgar's death, and 983, when an ealdorman mentioned in the Liber Eliensis chapter on the Hatfield dispute died.

The anti-monastic reaction underlined the importance of keeping careful records if a monastery was to hold on to its property, be it lands or men. The need to keep track of those who were born on its lands and thus had legal ties with the Abbey comes out in another dispute whose details are preserved in the Liber Eliensis. It is perhaps not coincidental that this matter also concerns the Hatfield estate. The story is a complicated one, and it will be necessary to take our leave of Hatfield for a little while in order to understand the issues and the personalities involved.

Ely was one of several monastic houses re-established by St. Æthelwold in the reign of Edgar, and it benefited from the bishop's diligent acquisition of property. One such holding consisted of two streams and a hide of land at Mardlebury, Hertfordshire. This, the Liber Eliensis tells us, was bought for twenty aurei from a certain Ælfweald. The transaction took place in the presence of the citizenry of Cambridge and Ælfweald provided two sureties, presumably to guarantee that he had good title to the land. Bishop Æthelwold must then presumably have made over the land to Ely, though this is not explicitly stated. On the death of Edgar Ælfweald broke this agreement, as so many others did at this time. His excuse was that 'he had been coerced into this [transaction] and that force and rapine had been brought to bear on him'; he was willing to return the money he had received in return for the land.

The abbot of Ely at this time was Brihtnoth, a disciple and appointee of Æthelwold. He was an energetic prelate, who vigorously advanced the interests of his house. Ælfric, the abbot of Eynsham, mentions that 'he enriched it very

44 Based on Domesday Book values, the estates (excluding Wennington, for which no value is recorded) were worth £27/10/- over against the £25 for Hatfield. See Blake, Liber Eliensis, p. 420. Ann Williams has an illuminating discussion of the political circumstances that led to the case's being heard at Slaughter in Gloucestershire in her paper, 'Ælfhere, Ealdorman of Mercia, 956-83', Anglo-Saxon England 10 (1982 for 1981) 164-66.
45 Blake, Liber Eliensis, p. 419.
46 Liber Eliensis 2.10 (pp. 82-84).
48 'dicem se coactum ad hoc fuisse et vim ac rapinam sibi illatum esse' (Liber Eliensis 2.10 [p. 83]).
abundantly with buildings and lands'.

He was not one to let Ælfweald's claim go unchallenged.

The dispute was adjudicated at Hertford, at first sight a surprising location, given that the original transaction had been witnessed by men from Cambridge. The reason for hearing the dispute there becomes evident from Brihtnoth's counterclaim which brings Hatfield back into the story. He declared that Ælfweald's wife and children had been *innati* of Hatfield and that in order for Ælfweald to have them 'free and without claim' the latter had sold the land to the bishop in return for twenty pounds. We note that Brihtnoth did not call Ælfweald's spouse and offspring 'slaves' (*servi*) of Hatfield but *innati*, a precise Latin translation of the Old English *inbyrde*, which occurs in the Hatfield list under examination. The Old English word appears to mean 'those having legal ties with an estate through their birth there'. In the Hatfield list the word is used in association with *gebur*, so it is reasonable to assume that Ælfweald's family held this status.

The freedom that he was alleged to have sought for them through the sale of his land, therefore, was the release from any legal obligation (presumably labour services) that they had incurred through being born on the Hatfield estate. This explains why the case was heard at Hertford: Brihtnoth's case hinged on the alleged willingness of Ælfweald to enter into the transaction, but this in turn depended on his having a motive for the sale. The motive, Brihtnoth evidently argued, lay in Ælfweald's desire to change his wife's status, which was known in Hertford. According to the *Liber Eliensis* account, Ælfweald began to desist on hearing Brihtnoth's plea. We are entitled to a certain measure of scepticism here: after all, the Ely reporter did not want the saintly founder of his institution to appear to have engaged in blackmail in order to acquire the property. It seems unlikely, in fact, that Ælfweald was cowed in the face of this alleged evidence in that the result of the case was that Brihtnoth paid him an additional forty gold *solidi* (i.e., shillings) for the land.

Two representatives of the abbot handed over the money to two sons of

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49 'locum ... affluentissime ditauit edificiis ac terris' (Three Lives of English Saints, ed. Michael Winterbottom [Toronto Medieval Latin Texts 1; Toronto, 1972], p. 24, c. 17, lines 9-10 [fol. 78r]).

50 The word occurs in one other text, a Winchester charter of A.D. 902 (Sawyer, Charters, no. 1285), printed in Florence E. Harmer, Select English Historical Documents of the Ninth and Tenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 29 and 60 (text and translation), where it appears at line 17 in the phrase *pa inberdan menn* in association with *burbasrde* 'boor-born' (line 22). I have argued in Late Anglo-Saxon Slavery, p. 290, that in this context it also refers to *geburas*.

51 This appears to be a measure of weight rather than a monetary unit. Reckoned at 20 shillings to the pound, the payment by Brihtnoth thus amounted to two pounds of gold. Pamela Nightingale in 'The Ora, the Mark, and the Mancus: Weight-Standards and the Coinage in Eleventh-Century England, Part 2', Numismatic Chronicle 144 (1984) 234-48, at p. 235, has argued that the English pound in the tenth century weighed 367.5 g. Brihtnoth's settlement therefore amounted to .735 kg of gold. For shillings of gold, see ibid., pp. 236-37.
Ælfweald, Ælfwine and Æthelmær, in the presence of several leading persons of the shire. It thus looks as if the abbot’s claims were not convincing and that Ælfweald had received rather a raw deal in the original transaction.

The names of Ælfweald’s two sons do not appear in the Hatfield list and the name of their mother is not recorded, so it cannot be argued that this list was used in the dispute as evidence. The existence of the dispute, however, would certainly explain why such a list was compiled. It is apparent that Ælfweald’s wife was no longer at Hatfield at the time of the court case. The abbey’s evident failure to prove that she had originally come from there and had legal ties with the estate had cost them money. Written evidence of her status might have carried weight. Thus a list of others who, like her, had moved elsewhere was a useful insurance policy in the event of another dispute arising in the future – and since the descent of the Hatfield estate itself had been a source of litigation, the wisdom of this is doubly apparent. The controversy over Ælfweald’s land thus provides a motivation for the compilation of the Hatfield list. The legal case must have taken place some time between Edgar’s death in 975 and Brihtnoth’s in 996, presumably nearer the earlier date but after Ely had assured itself of its possession of the Hatfield estate; a date of c. 980 would be plausible. This is not incompatible with Ker’s ascription of the document to the turn of the tenth century, given the imprecision inevitably attendant upon palaeographical dating.52

If it be correct that this document lists persons in whom Ely possessed rights in virtue of the birth of an ancestor on Ely property, the question naturally arises as to whether this right extended to descendants through the male or the female line – or both. A close examination of the stemmata provided in Table 1 shows that such claims must have been made over descendants of both sexes. The first family to be mentioned in the list descended from a male gebur named Dudda and the four families at Walden also had male ancestors who had been attached to Hatfield. On the other hand, the large clan living at Essendon (five siblings with five named children) all descended from a woman called Buge who first settled there (afaren into Eslingadene). This is not out of line with anthropological studies of Germanic society in general and the Anglo-Saxons in particular. Stephen B. Barlau in his study of Germanic kinship terminology has shown that in the historical period Germanic societies have been based primarily on the kindred, an ego-based group bounded usually by a well-defined line of ancestors and collateral relatives.53 Lorraine Lancaster has illustrated how Anglo-Saxon society had a bilateral or cognatic kinship system.

52 Ker, Catalogue, p. 36, no. 22.
(defined by her as [one in which descent from ancestors and affiliation to a set of kinsmen may be traced through both females and males]). The practice in Anglo-Saxon society of giving children names with elements derived from males or females related to either parent supports this. The contradictory evidence on the legal status of the descendants of mixed marriages between slaves and free persons also suggests that neither sex was preferred over the other in matters of descent. The *Confessionale Pseudo-Egberti*, an English vernacular penitential derived from Continental sources and extant in a version from the third quarter of the tenth century, states that the offspring of a slave woman remained a slave even if his free father liberated the wife. On the other hand, the *Leges Henrici Primi*, a compilation completed probably between 1116 and 1118 but based on Anglo-Saxon sources, lays down that slaves by birth acquired their status from their fathers. In this it accords with the eighth-century *Poenitentiale Theodori*, which is also of Anglo-Saxon origin. The sources give no indication of how disputes between two parties claiming rights in the same person were resolved.

We should note that the Hatfield list is presented not from the point of view of the peasantry concerned but from that of a ruling group. That Anglo-Saxon society was in general based on a cognatic kinship system thus worked in favour of the subjugation of the peasantry into serfdom, since claims potentially could be made by an overlord on the descendants of both males and females holding gebur status. It should also be observed that in tracing back one of these groups to a pridde modor, the abbey of Ely was not transgressing the bounds of

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55 Cf. above, pp. 484-85, especially Manwine (stemma 12).
58 Ibid., pp. 242-43, c. 77.
Anglo-Saxon kinship terminology, which extended to the fifte modor and the sixta feader (great-great-great-great-grandfather).  

Since geburas were not slaves (peowas), they were technically free men in terms of the tribal laws. The existence of controls over those who were supposedly free naturally poses the question as to when such restrictions started to be imposed. The Hatfield list is able to provide an approximate terminus ante quem. In the case of the siblings Wærstan, Wærthryth and Wynburg (stemma 8), Ely claimed rights in the family through their association with Hatfield back over five generations. Since two members of the latest generation were married, it is obvious that the personal restrictions characteristic of a manorial economy were already evident in the latter part of the ninth century at the latest, even if it is assumed that there were as many as four generations to a century at this period.

Should the Hatfields list be seen as exceptional? Hardly. With the accumulation of land that had started in the ninth century and expanded considerably in the time of the monastic reforms under Edgar, there must have been a large number of administrative records made by prudent and well-organized landowners. Since most were of an ephemeral nature, it was inevitable that the majority would fall victim to the vagaries of history and not survive. Yet a few early lists of peasants have been preserved. The best examples come from after the Conquest, as might be expected: witness the lists of names with the respective dues owing in British Library ms. Cotton Vespasian B.xxviii, an Evesham Abbey cartulary of the late twelfth or early thirteenth century but containing earlier documents. Two late ninth-century records suggest that lists were of wide provenance and served varied purposes. The first claims to record an act of A.D. 880 that involved the transfer of land to the Oxfordshire church of Pyrton. Preceding the bounds the document states: ‘These were the names of the men who were granted in writing from Bensington to Pyrton in the diocese of Worcester with their family and that progeny which descends from them, for an everlasting possession: Ealhmund, Tidwulf, Tidheah, Lull, Lull, Eaduulf.’


Davis, Medieval Cartularies, p. 44, no. 381.

‘Pis earon þara manna noman þe gewritene earon from Bynsincgtune to Readanoran in þ biscopprice to Uueorgerna cestre mid heara teame 7 mid þy tudre þe from him cume a on ece yrfewardenyssse. Alhmund. Tidulf. Tidheh. Lull. Lull. Eaduulf’ (Birch, Cartularium saxonicum
records the lease by the bishop of Worcester to an ecclesiastical community of land in Gloucestershire 'with the men attached to it whose names have been written a little below'. The ephemeral nature of such records is underlined in the latter document since the promised list is not forthcoming in the extant text. The contents of these two lists are not irrelevant to our examination of the Hatfield document. They mention 'men', not 'slaves', yet refer to them in possessory terms. There is no reason to believe that these men were slaves, any more than the *hominès* mentioned by twelfth-century landlords were. These two lists are found in documents dealing with the transfer of land; clearly possession of that land bestowed rights in the persons living there. The 'men' concerned were thus essentially serfs. Their ambiguous status placed the overlord in a potentially weak position: they could always move or deny that the overlord possessed any rights in them. Prudence, therefore, dictated that the names of these persons should be recorded. The existence of these two ninth-century lists lends support in all respects to our interpretation of the Hatfield document.

2. Rochester, Cathedral Library A.3.5, fol. 162r-v

The Textus Roffensis is a composite volume. The documents to be examined are found in the latter part, which is a cartulary of Rochester Cathedral, written, if one can judge from a list of the archbishops of Canterbury that appears in it, sometime after 1122. The list in question appears on fol. 162r-v. The preceding documents are of no relevance, but the list is followed by a rather unusual quittance-document. This contains the name of one of the persons mentioned in the list, which proves to be germane to its interpretation. The quittance-document has previously been edited but the list has been published only in facsimile form. Ker records the list of serfs in his *Catalogue* but does not mention the quittance-document. Because there is an evident relationship between the two texts, both documents are appended.


64 'cum hominibus ad illam pertinentibus quarum [sic] Nomina pau<lis>p<er> inferius scripta sunt' (Birch, *Cartularium saxonicum* 2.198, lines 1-2 [Sawyer, *Charters*, no. 1415]).

65 Ker, *Catalogue*, p. 446, no. 373a.38 and p. 447.

66 Kemble, *Codex diplomaticus* 4.305, no. 975 (text); Thorpe, *Diplomatarium*, p. 644 (text and translation); Sawyer, *Textus Roffensis* (cited above, p. 471 and n. 6).

67 Ker, *Catalogue*, p. 446, no. 373b.


Texts

+ These were the ēhtemen at Wuldeham and their offspring. These persons were sent there from Aylesford: Tottel and Eadwig, his brother, and their offspring and Tottel’s sister and her child, and his sister’s daughter and her two children. These came from the south from Kingston: Æthelflasd and her child. And from Aylesford: Sigeburh and her child, and Garwig and his wife, and Boia and his wife, and Guthhelm and his wife and their offspring. And these came from Chalk: Bunel and his wife, and Hidda and his wife, and Nothbeald and his wife and their offspring. Then Ælfstan, Ælfeheah’s father, bought the land from King Eadmund together with all the things which were there as an eternal possession, for 120 mancuses of gold and thirty pounds.

+ Here is published in this document that Æthelsige at Wuldeham has lent for Bishop Sigeweard’s lifetime his daughter and her daughter from Tottel’s kin, and has placed other persons in there, in the presence of the burgesses at Rochester, and all the companions of the bishop.

Translations

+ These were the Æhtemen at Wouldham and their offspring. These persons were sent there from Aylesford: Tottel and Eadwig, his brother, and their offspring and Tottel’s sister and her child, and his sister’s daughter and her two children. These came from the south from Kingston: Æthelflasd and her child. And from Aylesford: Sigeburh and her child, and Garwig and his wife, and Boia and his wife, and Guthhelm and his wife and their offspring. And these came from Chalk: Bunel and his wife, and Hidda and his wife, and Nothbeald and his wife and their offspring. Then Ælfstan, Ælfeheah’s father, bought the land from King Eadmund together with all the things which were there as an eternal possession, for 120 mancuses of gold and thirty pounds.

+ Here is published in this document that Æthelsige at Wouldham has lent for Bishop Sigeweard’s lifetime his daughter and her daughter from Tottel’s kin, and has placed other persons in there, in the presence of the burgesses at Rochester, and all the companions of the bishop.

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68 For textual conventions, see n. 11 above.

69 I have taken ‘cild’ to be singular and ‘ofteam’ to indicate two children. The reference to ‘twa cild’ in line 3 suggests that the first is a correct assumption; that ‘ofteam’ refers, however, only to two children is probably far too conservative. I have taken ‘heora ofteam’ in line 5 to refer only to the children of Guthhelm and his wife, and the same phrase in line 7 to indicate those of Nothbald and his spouse, whereas the phrase may well embrace the children of other couples mentioned in lines 4-6.

70 If Pamela Nightingale is correct in her view that the gold mancus weighed just over 4.5 g, this payment then amounted to over half a kilo of gold and 11 kgs of silver. See Nightingale, ‘The Ora, the Mark, and the Mancus’, 237.
The Wouldham list can be seen to consist of two unrelated parts. The first and major portion names a number of *æhtemen* and gives their geographic origins. The second part, starting with the words ‘*pa gebohte*’, records a land transaction involving the Wouldham estate. The latter clearly has no connection with the former: the syntax indicates that ‘*pa*’ must be translated as ‘then’ rather than ‘when’, indicating that this sentence has no syntactic connection with the list that precedes it. The scribe of the Textus Roffensis seems to have recognized that there was a break here as he has partly rubricated the thorn in the word ‘*pa*’. In addition to these syntactic and textual indications that an early document was being drawn on here, one might also note that the *mancus* of gold, a regular weight measure in the tenth century, does not appear in charters and wills after c. 1020. It will be convenient to examine this reference to the land transaction first, then examine the quittance-document, and finally return to the list itself.

It is fortunate that this fragment of the history of the Wouldham estate can be placed in context by means of a vernacular document (now London, British Library Cotton Charter VIII.20) that relates the history of the estate from the time when it was first granted by Æthelberht II of Kent (748-762) to the time of Archbishop Dunstan (964-988). The charter describes how the estate came into the hands of St. Andrew’s, Rochester. One Ælfheah leased the estate first to his brother, then to his brother’s wife, and then to the latter’s son, Ælfheah’s nephew, Eadric. On Eadric’s death, Ælfheah leased it to Eadric’s widow, but when Ælfheah fell ill he made a will in the presence of Archbishop Dunstan in which he bequeathed Wouldham to St. Andrew’s. But Eadric’s widow had remarried and her husband, Leofsunu, took possession of the estate and was ousted only after Dunstan had brought a legal action against him. Copies of Eadric’s testament were held by his widow, Christ Church, Canterbury, and St. Andrew’s, Rochester, and this written evidence was used by Dunstan in the process of proving title to the property.

None of these three copies survives but a close examination of the Cotton charter and the final sentence in the Wouldham list reveals that there are striking verbal parallels between them. The relevant portion of the charter reads (with common phrases italicized) as follows: ‘*da gebohte* hit Ælfstan Heahstaninc *æt* ðæm cince mid hundwelfstigan mancesan goldes. 7 drittigan pundan. 7 ðat him sealde mæst eal Ælfheh his sunu. after Eadmunde cincge ða

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72 Nightingale, ‘The Ora, the Mark, and the Mancus’, 238.
gebocode hit Eadred cine Elfstane on ece yrfe.' In spite of the words and phrases that they share, neither document could have been dependent on the other. The Textus Roffensis record, for instance, preserves a common legal phrase not found in the charter, 'mid eallum dam pe aaron stod'. The charter, on the other hand, preserves Ælfsstan's patronymic, 'Heahstaninc', whereas the Wouldham list refers to Ælfsstan as 'Ælfhes fæder'. The shared phraseology, nevertheless, suggests that they were derived from a common source, and the reference to the patronymic in one instance and to Ælfsheah's father in the other points to a solution of the problem.

Lying behind these two records must have been not merely the three copies of Ælfsheah’s testament but also the charter in which King Eadred confirmed King Eadmund’s earlier grant to Ælfsstan. The reference to Ælfsstan 'Heahstaninc' suggests that the writer of the Cotton charter drew on the latter in compiling his history of the Wouldham estate. On the other hand, the Textus Roffensis document was quite possibly drawing on the St. Andrew’s copy of Ælfsheah’s will. This may have included a summary account of Ælfsstan’s purchase of the land which would have been recounted in Eadred’s confirmation, but of course it would have been reported from Ælfsheah’s point of view. In other words, it would have referred to Ælfsstan as ‘min fæder’ or something of the like, which the writer of the Roffensis document simply transformed into the third person ‘Ælfhes fæder’. This would explain how both the extant documents have phrases and words in common, yet employ a slightly different word order and contain additions peculiar to themselves. If this explanation is correct, we have imbedded in the Textus Roffensis account a fragment of one of the three lost copies of Ælfsheah’s will.

This Wouldham estate must have been important to the Cathedral in the eleventh century. The bishopric had been ravaged by Æthelred in 98674 and the Vikings had subsequently routed a Kentish force there in 999.75 Since the Cathedral apparently never underwent the monastic revival that a church like Ely had experienced in the tenth century, the absence of evidence for its history in the early eleventh century is probably an indication of its poverty. This was certainly the case when Bishop Sigeweard died. The incumbent of the see from 1058 to 1075, he left on his death but four secular canons reduced to begging

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75 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 999 (mss. C, D and E): Two of the Saxon Chronicles 1.131 (text); Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. Whitelock et al., p. 84 (translation).
for their food. This weakness in the Cathedral finances needs to be remembered when we examine the second document. It records that a woman and her daughter were ‘lent’ for the duration of Sigeweard’s lifetime from Tottel’s kin at Wouldham and attests their replacement by others. A Tottel appears in the Wouldham list, and the uniqueness of the name makes it almost certain that the same person is being referred to. On this assumption, since the Wouldham list states that those mentioned (including Tottel and his relatives) are *æhtemen*, one can reasonably postulate that the woman and her daughter who were ‘lent’ from that kin group held the same status. This will be important in assessing the nature of the second document. Before this can be done, however, it is obviously necessary to investigate quite what the word *æhtemann* denoted in Old English.

The first element of the word is derived ultimately from the verb *agan* ‘to own’, from which a feminine substantive *æht* developed. *Æht* frequently glosses or is glossed by the Latin word *possessio*; usually it refers to moveable possessions. Twice it is used unambiguously of humans as possessions. The distinction between the two examples is instructive and indeed vital to our understanding of the range of meaning of the word *æhtemann*. The *Poenitentiale Pseudo-Egberti*, which, as mentioned earlier, is ascribed to the latter half of the tenth century, states in book 2, clause 3: ‘Be þam men þe his þeowan ofslyð for þyðæ butan his hundredes gewitnesse. — Gif hwyle man his æht ofsleðh, 7 he nane gewitnesse næbbe þæt he forworht sy, butan he hirie for his hatheortnesse 7 for his gymeleaste ofslyðh, fæste II ger’ (‘Concerning the man who kills his slave for theft without its being witnessed by the Hundred. If any man slays his æht, and he has no witness that he be guilty, except that he slew him because of his anger and carelessness, let him fast for two years’). The context clearly shows that the man’s possession is a person, and so *æht* is here being used in a secondary sense of ‘slave’. This is proved by the corresponding section of Halitgar’s *Penitential* on which the *Poenitentiale Pseudo-Egberti* was based: ‘De his qui servos suos extra judicem necant...: Si quis servum proprium sine conscientia judicis occiderit, excommunicationem vel poenitentiam biennii reatum sanguinis emundabit.’ The second instance is

77 On the name, see Appendix 2.
80 ibid., p. 17.
also from the latter part of the tenth century: it is to be found in the Hatfield document just analyzed above. In line 11 we are told, ‘Wærłaf ... wæs riht æht to Hæðfelda...’ It is evident that the Hatfield text deals with *geburas* – and *geburas* were not slaves, as has been demonstrated, but were persons legally bound to the land. Significantly, Waerlaf is declared to be ‘æht to Hæðfelda’. He was thus not a slave with a legal bond to a person or institution, but a serf with a legal bond to an estate, a ‘possession of Hatfield’. By the late tenth century, the idea of possession with regard to persons was undergoing a change. This state of flux is reflected in these two uses of *æht*.

The compound *æhtemann* is not very common in Old English texts, though some examples of personal names from the late twelfth century onwards that point to a lost Old English doublet *æhtmann* suggest that the word was less rare than the extant texts would indicate.\(^{81}\) The genitival form of the first element points to its original meaning as being ‘a person associated with or belonging to (someone’s) property’. The word occurs three times in the works of Ælfric, whose writings date from the thirty years before his death in c. 1020; once in the anonymous tract on the personnel and management of a manorial estate known as *Rectitudines singularum personarum*, which probably dates from sometime in the fifty years before the Conquest;\(^{82}\) and in the Wouldham list. The compound thus starts to appear at a time when the manor was beginning to take the forms it would have in the post-Conquest centuries and when the legal ties to the land over men who were formerly freemen in terms of the tribal laws of the Anglo-Saxons were tightening.

In Ælfric’s homily on Saints Alexander, Eventius and Theodolus, the word is synonymous with ‘slave’: ‘He wearð ðæ gefullod æt ðæm foresædan papan mid wife and mid cildum and mid gesibbum mannum and mid æhtemannum, ealles twelv hundred manna and fifti, ðæ he gefroode ealle and mid æhtum gegodode on ðæm halgan Eastordæge’ (‘He was then baptized by the aforementioned pope with his wife and children and relatives and æhtemenn, twelve hundred and fifty persons all told, all of whom he freed and endowed with their possessions on that holy Easter day’). The Latin source, *Acta Alexandri papae* 1.1, indicates that Ælfric deemed *æhtemann* to be a suitable word to represent the Latin *servus*: ‘... et Praefectum Urbis quoque, Herment, cum uxore et sorore et filiis, baptizaret, cum mille ducentis quinquaquinta servis suis, uxoribus quoque et

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\(^{81}\) Olof von Feilitzen, ‘Some Unrecorded Old and Middle English Personal Names’, *Namn och Bygd* 33 (1945) 72, s.v. *Æhtmann*.

\(^{82}\) Dorothy Bethurum has suggested in her paper ‘Episcopal Magnificence in the Eleventh Century’, in *Studies in Old English Literature in Honor of Arthur G. Brodeur*, ed. Stanley B. Greenfield (Eugene, Ore., 1963), pp. 162-70, that the *Rectitudines* originated in the circle of Archbishop Wulfstan of York and probably had reference to the estates of the See of Worcester, which Wulfstan held in plurality with his archdiocesan see of York.
filiis eorum, quos omnes in die sancto Paschae prius fecit fieri ingenuos, et ita
baptizari: quibus postea etiam multa ... dona concessit.83

Ælfric also uses the word in his account of the Passion of St. Sebastian: ‘Da
wearð gefullod féder and sunu mid heora innhyrede and heora æhtemannum,
ægðres hades menn, ma þonne an ðusend’ (‘Then were baptized father and son,
with their household servants, and æhtemen, persons of either sex, more than a
thousand’).84 Ælfric’s source, the Passio ascribed to St. Ambrose, reads: ‘... 
susceptit Chromatius sacri baptismatis novitatem; et cum eodem ex familia ejus
promiscui sexus mille quadrigentae animae, quos omnes prius manumissionis
gratia a servitutis nodo exsolvit, et donis optimis instruxit, dicens hoc: Illi qui
Deum incipit habere patrem, servi hominis non debent esse.’85 Ælfric has
paraphrased this passage: familia has been accurately transformed into
innhyrede but æhtemannum is not to be found in the Latin. One can only
assume that Ælfric felt that the phrase ‘manumissionis gratia a servitutis nodo’
(and possibly Chromatius’ comment that follows) needed some word with
stronger overtones of servitude than innhyred possessed. This word was
æhtemann, which here too must mean ‘a slave’.

In Ælfric’s Treatise on the Old and New Testament, he provides the following
definition: ‘Laboratores sind þe us bigleofan tliiað, yrðlingas 7 æhtemen to þam
anum betæhte’ (‘Laboratores are those who labour to feed us, husbandmen and
æhtemen dedicated to that end alone’).86 Here it is possible to interpret æhtemen
as ‘slaves’, since slaves hold that status in order to provide free labour for their
lord. But it is possible that Ælfric is using and in this sentence in its very
common function in Old English of linking two virtual synonyms, in which
case æhtemann could be interpreted as ‘husbandman’. It is probably safest to
interpret it here as ‘bondsman’, which does not indicate whether a person is tied
to another person or to an estate.

In the Rectitudines, æhtemann appears in clause 9.1: ‘Eallum æhtemannum
gebyred Midwinters feorm 7 Eastorfeorm, sulhæcer 7 hærsthandful toeacan
heora nydrihte’ (‘All æhtemen ought to have food at Christmas and Easter, a

83 For the Latin and Old English texts, see The Homilies of Ælfric: A Supplementary Collection
84 Ælfric’s Lives of Saints 5.307-309, ed. Walter W. Skeat (EETS OS 76, 82; London, 1881-
85, rpt. in 1 vol., 1966), pp. 136 (text) and 137 (translation). I have adopted the reading æhta from
Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ms. 198 rather than that which is found in London, British
Library ms. Cotton Julius E.vii, which reads æhta.
85 Acta sanctorum, Jan. 2.629-42 (20 January) at p. 639 c. 63, rpt in PL 17.1111-50 at
col. 1140. See further, J. H. Ott, Über die Quellen der Heiligenleben in Aelfrics Lives of Saints I
86 The Old English Version of the Heptateuch; Ælfric’s Treatise on the Old and New Testament
and His Preface to Genesis, ed. S. J. Crawford (EETS OS 160; London, 1922, rpt. 1969), p. 71,
lines 1208-1209 (text).
strip of land for ploughing and a “harvest-handful” besides their dues’). This immediately follows two clauses on the feeding of male and female slaves, so it is logical to assume that for the compiler of this document the *æhteman* was a slave. This is confirmed by clause 7 of the same text: ‘Be æhteswan. Æhteswan, de inhe[or]de halit, gebyrde stefearh 7 his gewirce, ðonne he ð[pl]ic behworfen hæðo, 7 elles da gerihtu, de ðeowman men to gebyrıað’ (‘Concerning an æhteswan. An æhteswan, who keeps the demesne herd, ought to have a young pig kept in a sty, and his perquisites when he has prepared the bacon and also the dues that belong to a slave’). This clause follows one discussing the *deowsxvan* ‘slave swineherd’ and *deowbeocere* ‘slave beekeeper’, and the writer obviously considers the *æhteswan* to have the status of a slave as ‘de deowan men to gebyrıað indicates. Such an *æhteswan* had two important characteristics: first, he did not possess any property, unlike the *gafolswan*, who paid *gafol* or rent for the right to keep his pigs on the estate; second, he was associated completely with the lord’s demesne since his was the task of keeping the demesne herd (*innheord*). The prefix *æhte-* was appropriate for those associated entirely with the lord’s demesne, since their economic position was so weak that they could be viewed as essentially their lord’s ‘possession’. For the compiler of the *Rectitudines*, such persons could only be slaves; he did not know of the *famulus* or day-labourer, who was to be an important part of the manorial economy in the twelfth century.

What these uses indicate is that the word *æhteman* was used of those employed as labourers in the manorial economy and in particular, it would seem, the demesne. Since in the tenth and early eleventh century such persons were usually slaves, the word was used on occasion as a virtual synonym for *peow* or ‘slave’. But this association with the legal status of a slave would have disappeared as lords began to view all those on their estates as their possessions and as the number of persons on the demesne that held the status of slaves declined. This is what I suggest has happened by the time the word is used in the Wouldham list. As will be seen, the meaning that best fits the evidence of the two texts is ‘serf’. Domesday Book provides the clearest corroboration for this being the correct interpretation. That survey lists only six slaves but thirty-four *villani* and *bordarii* at Wouldham in 1086. The *Textus Roffensis* list indicates the existence of at least eighteen adults and a further eleven children. Unless there had been a radical change in the manpower of the estate in the
relatively few intervening years, the *æhtemen* are more likely to have fallen into the latter two Domesday Book categories.

That the *æhtemen* were serfs rather than slaves is in keeping with the wording of the second document. Though the diplomatic form of the record resembles that of a manumission-document reporting the freeing of slaves, a close examination of the wording shows that it does not attest a change in legal status but simply records that those concerned received permission temporarily to remove themselves from the kin group—and presumably thus also their persons or their labour from the manorial estate—on condition that they were replaced by other persons. It is difficult to understand how or why slaves could do this, but it is quite explicable that an overlord who possessed rights in a person’s labour, rather than in the person himself, should sanction such a transaction, since he would be losing nothing by it.

The second Textus Roffensis document should thus be seen as a record of a temporary quittance from Rochester’s estate at Wouldham. So that the act should not be forgotten, the burgesses of the town as well as the ecclesiastical community at Rochester (‘ealle þæs biscoipes geferan’) were present and the act was also recorded, most probably in a gospel-book originally, where almost all the other extant Anglo-Saxon quittance- and manumission-documents are to be found.

Another general deduction one can make is that the list was compiled in order to corroborate the quittance-document by providing written evidence of the status of Tottel and others like him *vis-à-vis* Wouldham. The compiler evidently decided, however, to make the list more extensive by naming other peasants who had migrated *to* Wouldham (unlike the Ely one which lists mainly those who had departed for elsewhere). None of the estates from which they came appears to have been owned by St. Andrew’s. They were thus not slaves belonging to the church who had been relocated. It would seem probable that they were instead persons who had been recruited onto the estate to develop it. Since Wouldham had earlier been subject to litigation and the Cathedral was in a shaky financial condition, it is readily understandable that the church should want to compile a list of all those in whom it had acquired rights, especially when some of these wanted to move out of its control again. Given the Cathedral’s poverty, the act and the consequent written records are thus readily explicable: those wishing to leave the estate were permitted only to do so for a temporary period; they had to be replaced by others; the transaction was witnessed by the burgesses of Rochester; and records were made of the legal proceedings themselves and of all those of like status who had moved onto

90 For editions of such documents, see n. 9 above.
the estate from elsewhere so that the Cathedral could retain its claims over its work force.

The list accords with the Hatfield document in suggesting that there was a high degree of geographic mobility among the peasantry. The largest group to arrive at Wouldham, which included Tottel's clan, came from Aylesford, just off the Roman road that runs south from Rochester past Maidstone (see Map 2).\footnote{Margary, Roman Roads, pp. 44-47, Route 13.} Aylesford was some five miles from Wouldham. A number of others came from Chalk, about seven miles from Wouldham and five miles from Rochester on Watling Street, the Roman road termed by Margary 'the most important thoroughfare in Roman Britain' that ran from Dover via Canterbury and Rochester to London.\footnote{ibid., p. 42. On Watling Street, see ibid., pp. 35-36 (Route 1a), pp. 42-44 (Route 1b) and 51-52 (Route 1c).} Æthelflæd and her child, however, came from much farther afield: they were from Kingston. This is just off the Dover-to-Can-

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textbf{From Aylesford} \\
\textbf{(1)}
\hline
Tottel & Eadwig & Sister \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textbf{Child(ren)} & Daughter & Child(ren) \\
\hline
\textbf{Child} & \textbf{Child} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textbf{South from Kingston} \\
\textbf{(2)}
\hline
Æthelflæd & \\
\hline
\textbf{Child(ren)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textbf{From Aylesford} \\
\textbf{(3)}
\hline
Sigeburh & \\
\hline
\textbf{Child(ren)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Garwig} = Wife \\
\textbf{Boia} = Wife \\
\textbf{Guthelm} = Wife \\
\textbf{Child(ren)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\hline
\textbf{From Chalk} \\
\textbf{(7)}
\hline
Bunel = Wife \\
\hline
\textbf{Child(ren)} \\
\textbf{Hidda} = Wife \\
\textbf{Nothbald} = Wife \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
terbury leg of Watling Street. Access to Rochester was thus not difficult from there, but they would have had to travel some thirty-one miles to get to the city and then go on another couple of miles to reach Wouldham. This high mobility among the womenfolk is another point of similarity with the Hatfield document, as is the importance of kinship ties.

It would be a mistake, however, to confuse geographic with social mobility. In terms of the latter, these two lists, composed nearly a century apart, point to very different social phenomena. The Hatfield document is an assertion that flies in the face of reality: Ely claimed suzerainty over persons who were in fact living elsewhere. In their new locations these peasants do not appear to have been living under institutional control: indeed, as we have seen, some had migrated to live with other family members. In them we might see the ceorlas discussed by F. M. Stenton who had the potential to thrive. Their social designation of gebur, which in origin meant someone who 'dwelt' on the land, was thus an accurate one. The Wouldham documents, on the other hand, are the written proof of a reality: whatever their station in life had been before, the persons listed who had moved to Wouldham had lost the right to move away without permission and some kind of compensation to their institutional overlord. And so truly they were ahtemen, 'owned persons'. These documents may thus be seen as supporting evidence for W. G. Runciman's view that there was increasing social mobility in England between the early eighth and the mid-eleventh centuries (especially in the post-Alfredian period) and that the Normans restricted social mobility, particularly among peasants.

* * *

The chance survival of these seemingly mundane estate documents from late Anglo-Saxon and early Norman England provides us with some of the clearest insights into the nature of the servile peasantry of the period. We might have

93 ibid., pp. 35-36, Route 1a.
94 For an analysis of the concept and the related idea of 'social distance', see W. G. Runciman, 'Accelerating Social Mobility: The Case of Anglo-Saxon England', Past & Present 104 (August 1984) 1-30, at pp. 4 and 6 respectively.
97 Runciman, 'Accelerating Social Mobility', 4 and 23-26.
assumed some of these features but it is nice to be able to verify them. Kinship
ties and onomastic practices seem to have been the same among the peasantry
as they were among the aristocracy. The ties of serfdom were being asserted in
the late tenth century, as Domesday Book proves them to have been in the
eleventh. In a patrilocal society, women tend to be the mobile ones; this was so
with the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy but it was also the case with the peasantry.

Where the documents are most valuable is in showing that the peasantry
were capable of a fair degree of geographic mobility. The Anglo-Saxons were
well-known as great travellers, especially as missionaries, pilgrims and
traders. These documents show that it was not only the middle and upper
levels of the society who explored unfamiliar territory. But travel can bring its
hazards as well as its opportunities, and we may suspect that those who moved
to an institutional estate were fated to have fewer freedoms than those who
managed to move away from its controls.

Appendix 1

The Language of the Texts

1. The Hatfield List

The language of the text is basically literary West-Saxon with some late linguistic
features, most notably one instance of shortening of a long vowel with graphic

98 W. J. Moore, The Saxon Pilgrims to Rome and the Schola Saxonum (Doct. es Lettres Diss.
Fribourg; Fribourg, 1937); Wilhelm Levison, England and the Continent in the Eighth Century

99 Abbreviations used in Appendices 1 and 2: (a) linguistic: acc. = accusative; dat. = dative;
eKt. = early Kentish; e/IOE = early/late Old English; e/lW-S = early/late West-Saxon; fem./
f. = feminine; gen. = genitive; Gmc = Germanic; indic. = indicative; lNorth. = late Northum-

brian; masc./m. = masculine; Merc. = Mercian; neut./n. = neuter; nom. = nominative; ODan.
= Old Danish; OHG = Old High German; OSw. = Old Swedish; OWScand. = Old West Scan-
dinavian; pl. = plural; pron. = pronoun; sg. = singular; (b) texts and monographs: BCS
= Cartularium saxonicum, ed. Walter de G. Birch, 3 vols. and index (London, 1885-99);
Boehler = Maria Boehler, Die altenglischen Frauennamen (Germanische Studien 98; Berlin,
1930); Bosworth-Toller = An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary Based on the Manuscript Collections of the
Toller (Oxford, 1921). Enlarged Addenda and Corrigenda to the Supplement, ed. Alistair
Campbell (Oxford, 1972); Campbell = Alistair Campbell, Old English Grammar (Oxford, 1959);
Clark Hall = A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary for the Use of Students, ed. John R. Clark Hall,
4th edition, with a Supplement by Herbert D. Meritt (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Colman, N &
Q = Fran Colman, 'The Name Element ædel- and Related Problems', Notes and Queries N.S. 28
(1981) 295-301; Ekwall, ELPN = Eilert Ekwall, Early London Personal Names (Skrifter utgivna
av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund 43; Lund, 1947); Forssner = Thorvald
Forssner, Continental-Germanic Personal Names in England in Old and Middle English Times
(Diss. Uppsala; Uppsala, 1916); Hallander, SN = Lars-Gunnar Hallander, 'Old English Dryht and
consonant doubling (moddrige 20),\textsuperscript{100} which is usually dated to the mid-eleventh century. The form \textit{Cenwaldes} (gen.) 9, 19 (2×) (W-S Cyne-) is characteristic of Kentish.

A. Accuracy of the Text

1. The single letter s 14 for the demonstrative adjective \textit{se} is probably a scribal error.

B. Syntax

1. Parataxis in a name + \textit{hatte} (Mitchell 1.616-17, ¶¶ 1473, 1475): \textit{Hwita hatte wees}, etc., 4, 5 (2×), 7, 8 (2×), 9, 11, 12 (2×), 16, 17, 18 (2×). In line 1 \textit{hatte} is used regularly with its passive meaning (see Mitchell 1.230, ¶ 600 [1] and 1.305, ¶ 746).

2. Non-expression of a personal pron. subject (Mitchell 1.627-34, ¶¶ 1503-16, especially 1513): \textit{he} is omitted before \textit{heold} in line 11. That this is not due to haplography caused by successive h’s in the original (\textit{Hœdfelda [He] heold}) is proved by the repetition of the same syntactic pattern in line 20, where \textit{heo} is omitted before \textit{wees afaren ut}.\textsuperscript{101} It should be noted, however, that the pointing of the manuscript does not support my use of capital letters in \textit{Heold} 11 and \textit{Wees} 20. It is possible, therefore, that these words form part of a \textit{double} parataxis following the use of a name and so should be included in the previous paragraph. (Mitchell 1.616-17, ¶¶ 1473-75 does not note any examples of double parataxis in a naming construction).


\textsuperscript{100} Unless otherwise stated, all substantives cited in Appendices 1 and 2 are in the nom. case.

\textsuperscript{101} The omission of the personal pron. is discussed by Ashley Crandell Amos, \textit{Linguistic Means of Determining the Dates of Old English Literary Texts} (Medieval Academy Books 90; Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 132-35, where she concludes that it offers no criterion for dating a text.
C. Orthography

1. The presence of the form *Cenwaldes* (gen.) 9, 19 (2 ×), characteristic of Kent, beside *Cynewalde* 17, 18, suggests that the various *Cyn(e)*-forms of names may represent conservative orthographic practice rather than pronunciation. But see Appendix 2 s.v. *Cyneweald*.


3. The form *Winnes* 15 (beside *Wine* 15) can perhaps best be described as graphic confusion with the word *wynn*.


D. Phonology

I (a) Variants not dialectally specific.


3. *i* > *e* in unaccented syllables (Campbell ¶ 369): *Tilewine* 22 (beside *Tiliwine* [gen.] 23).

4. Simplification of a double consonant (Campbell ¶ 457): *Duding* 7, *Duda* 22 (beside *Dudda* 1, *Dude* f. 18). This may be influenced by a strong (graphic) form *Dud*.


I (b) Variants specific to West-Saxon.

1. -*wyrd* < -*word* by i-mutation (Smith, *EPNE* 2.274, s.v. *word* [5]); *Tæccingawyrde* (dat.) 3.

2. Dat. pl. -*un* in nouns and adjectives appears fairly frequently in eW-S as -*un* (Campbell ¶ 378), *Weligun* 10.

II. Late West-Saxon features.

1. Smoothing (Campbell ¶ 312): *Hehstan* 6. This is not evidenced in *Ædeleah* 8 because *-ea-* appears in an unaccented syllable.


3. Shortening of a long vowel before a consonant group with graphic consonant doubling to indicate length (Campbell ¶ 329 [1] and p. 135 n. 1): *moddrige* 20 (W-S *môdridge*). This spelling and the quantitative vowel change it denotes is usually dated to the mid-eleventh century.

4. Late shortening of *ō* to *a* (Campbell ¶ 356 [4] and [5]): *Deornad* 17.
5. Unaccented o confused with e (Campbell ¶ 379): Seolecan (gen.) 9 (beside Seoloce 6). This is usually considered to be an eleventh-century change.

6. Loss of a consonant in a group of three unlike consonants (Campbell ¶ 477 [6]): Wullaf 2.


8. Extension of masc./fem. nom./acc. pl. -e to neut. nom./acc. pl. form of adjectives (Campbell ¶ 541): ealle 22.

III. Features common to Late West-Saxon and the Kentish Glosses (tenth century).

1. Confusion of -a for -o/-u (Campbell ¶ 377): sweostar 6, brodar 17, sweostar (nom. pl.) 25, (beside dohtor 1, 5, 10, 13, 16, 18, sweostar 9, sweostor [acc.] 15, modor 14).

2. -an for -on in past indic. pl. (Campbell ¶ 377): syndan 7, waeran 22 (beside waeran 22).


2. The Wouldham List and Quittance-Document

The language of these texts is basically literary West-Saxon. Certain late West-Saxon and Kentish features are evident, as might be expected.

A. Syntax

1. Concord (Mitchell 1.130-31, ¶¶ 324-25): in line 1, neut. sing. nom. pis is followed by a pl. verb waeran, which takes its number from the plural complement.

2. Fem. acc. pl. opra is followed by masc. acc. pl. man in line 12. Here man in the sense of ‘a human being of either sex’ may be interpreted as having a natural gender and thus considered to be fem. since (apparently) women are being referred to. Possible, but less likely, is the use of a as an equivalent graph for because of the development of a schwa vowel in unaccented syllables (Campbell ¶ 379).

B. Orthography

1. Because all front vowels except i appear in Kt. as y, æ, and y are sometimes used as equivalent graphs for e in Kt. texts (Campbell ¶ 288). Inverted spellings are to be found in man (acc. pl.) 12 (W-S menn), perinn 12 (W-S perinn), gewitnesse (dat. sg.) 12 (W-S gewitnesse).

C. Phonology

1. Absence of breaking in the second element of OE unaccented syllables with retraction of æ (< Gmc a) before l/r and a consonant > a, later > o (Campbell ¶ 338): Noobald 6, Stwordes (gen.) 11.
2. *eOE* loss of unaccented -i- (Campbell ¶ 348); Sibburh 4, *Ægelis* 10, Siwordes (gen.) 11.

3. Loss of a medial vowel after a short syllable (Campbell ¶ 389): biscoes (gen.) 11. That this is not a scribal error is clear from several examples of the dat. form biscope that appear in Wulfstan texts in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ms. 201.102

4. Simplification of consonants in low-stressed demonstratives (Campbell ¶ 457): *pisum* (dat.) 10 (normally *pisium*).

5. Gemination of consonants (sporadic in *OE*; see Campbell p. 183 n. 4): *daegge* (dat.) 11 (W-S *dæge*).

6. Assimilation of a liquid and a following consonant (Campbell ¶ 484): *Hidda* 6. This is only valid if *Hidda* is indeed from *hild* f. 'war, combat' (see Appendix 2, s.v. *Hidda* below). Such assimilation was sporadic in *OE*.

7. Endingless locative in place-names in -ham (Campbell ¶ 572): into Wuldaham 1, on Wuldeham 10.

8. Variation of -er, -or, -ur in final syllables of nouns of relationship (Campbell ¶ 629): suster 3, suster (gen.) 3, dohtor 11 (2 ×) (beside dohtor 3, brodor 2).

II. Late West-Saxon features.

1. Combinative back umlaut of W-S *swiostor* (found only once in the *OE* Orosius p. 69 line 5) to 1W-S *swustor* (Campbell p. 89 n. 3); suster 3, suster (gen.) 3. This change may not be particularly late but in extant W-S texts forms in *u* are late.

2. Shortening of a long vowel with compensatory consonantal gemination (Campbell ¶ 287): *prittigan* (dat.) 9.103

3. *ea* > *ē* before *χ* (Campbell ¶ 312); *Ælfehes* (gen.) 7.

4. *y* > *i* in some areas by isolative change (Campbell ¶ 317); *Cincestune* (dat.) 4, *cince* (dat.) 7.


6. Coalescence of unaccented back *a* and *u* with unaccented *e* (Campbell ¶ 379): *mancesan* (dat. pl.) 8, *Wuldeham* (dat.) 10 (beside *Wuldaham* [dat.] 1).


9. Variation of *dar* for *dær* (Campbell ¶ 678): *daron* 8.

10. *w* is lost before *u* when medial after a consonant: suster 3, suster (gen.) 3. This is usually considered to be a Middle English sound change.105


103 This is evidenced in other dialects besides 1W-S.

104 *Cung* appears in Ru1 and the phenomenon is also to be found in INorth.

III. Features common to Late West-Saxon and the Kentish Glosses (tenth century).

1. $St$- > Si in eKt and 1W-S (Campbell ¶ 267): Stwordes (gen.) 11.\textsuperscript{106}

2. Confusion of unaccented back vowels o/u and a in unaccented syllables, e.g., in past indic. pl. (Campbell ¶ 377): coman 3 (eW-S conon).

3. Unvoicing of West Gmc j [y] to h [x] (Campbell ¶ 446): burhwara (gen. pl.) 12 (eW-S burg-).

4. Loss of a consonant in a group of three (Campbell ¶¶ 476-77): Ælfehes (gen.) 7.

IV. Kentish features.

1. Absence of diphthongization of front vowels after palatals (Campbell ¶ 187): Hrouecestre (dat.) 12 (W-S ceastre).\textsuperscript{107}

2. $\tilde{a}$ ($< i$-mutation of $\tilde{a}$) > Kt. ē (Campbell ¶ 288): gelened 10 (W-S gelænæd).

3. In KG many nouns end in -inc for W-S -ing (Campbell ¶ 450): ofsprINC 1, Cincestune (dat.) 4, cince (dat.) 7.

4. KG have fem. gen. sg. hiore beside hire, hiora (Campbell ¶ 703): hiore 11 (beside hire 3 [2×], 4 [2×]).

5. KG have masc. dat. sg. ðam for W-S ðæm (Campbell ¶ 708): ðam 8.

6. Loss of $n$ before $h$, common in Kentish place-names consisting of a personal name (normally in the gen. sg.) followed by -hám: Wuldaham (dat.) 1, Wuldeham (dat.) 10 (cf. [Appendix] 2.C.II.6 above).\textsuperscript{108}

APPENDIX 2

1. THE NAMES OF THE HATFIELD LIST


\textsuperscript{106} Si- is not present as an element in KG but does appear in eKt.; KG do, however, have the forms wIllung ‘sorcery’, wi ‘way’ and hIsa ‘sound, rumour, report, reputation’, and both -ig- and -i- are to be found in unaccented syllables: Campbell ¶ 267.

\textsuperscript{107} This also applies in Merc. except for Ru¹.

\textsuperscript{108} On this change see Eilert Ekwall, Studies on English Place- and Personal Names (Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund 1930-31 1; Lund, 1931), pp. 20-30 and cf. Smith, EPNE 1.229, s.v. hám (4) (b) (xi).

\textsuperscript{109} Modern English glosses to OE words are mostly drawn from von Feilitzen, PNDB.
BRADA m. Brada 12; Bradan (gen.) 13. OE brād ‘broad’. Searle 112-13; Redin 73.
BUGE f. Buige 20; Bug (gen.) 22. Searle 119; Boehler 213-14. This is more likely to be the fem. form of OE Buga than the ODan. byname Buggi, OSw. Bugge (on which forms, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 210-11). Cf. Redin 74, who connects Buga with OE bugan ‘to bow’, boga m. ‘bow’. SCBI 28, 20 lists Buga s.v. Boga, Boia, which I feel is erroneous.
CEOLHELM m. Ceolem 23. Searle 130. On the first element, OE ceol m. ‘keel, ship’, see Redin 5, Boehler 43-44, von Feilitzen, PNDB 214; on the second element, probably OE helm m. ‘protection, defence; helmet; protector’, see Boehler 84-85 and von Feilitzen, PNDB 288, who lists as a variant -(l)m in the Domesday Book form Ailm < Æidelhelm, and cf. Boehler 84-85.
CYNEWEALD m. Cynewald 17; Cenwaldes (gen.) 9, 19 (2 ×); Cynewalde (dat.) 18. Searle 158; SCBI 28, 25. Cen- may, however, represent OE cēne ‘keen, fierce, bold, brave, warlike’ (Bosworth-Toller). See Boehler 45 s.v. Coen- and Searle 140.
DEOWYN[f] Deorwyn 2; Deorwyn (acc.) 16; Deorwynne (acc.) 3. Searle 166 and Boehler 52 cite only the two women from this text.
DRÝHTLAF m. Dryhtlafes (gen.) 20. Searle 169 cites only this example. On the first element, OE dryht ‘multitude, army, company, body of retainers’ (Clark Hall), see Hallander, SN; on the second element, OE *lāf m., probably meaning ‘survivor, son’, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 307.
DUDA m. Dudad 1; Duda 22. Searle 170; SCBI 28, 27. Redin 63 compares Doð[a]
TWO OLD ENGLISH LISTS OF SERFS (HATFIELD)

(Redin 62-63) and relates it to *Dudd(l)* (Redin 16), a name of unknown etymology, possibly a lall-name. See also von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 223-25 s.v. *Dodd(a)*.

**Dudd(e) f.: Dudde** 18. Searle 170; Redin 126, who refers to *Dudd(l)* (Redin 16); Bohler 216.


**Dunne f.: Dunne** 6, 15; *Duman* (gen.) 8. Searle 172; Bohler 217. Redin 122 relates it to *Dunn*, probably OE *dun* 'dun, dingy brown, dark-coloured' (Redin 12-13); for examples of the strong form *Dun(n)*, see also SCBI 28, 27.


**Eadugu m.: Eadugu** 21; *Eaduge* (gen.) 23. Searle 189 cites only this example. Redin 41 derives it from OE *eadig* 'wealthy, happy'.


**Golde f.: Golde** 2; *Goldan* (acc.) 4. Searle 266; Redin 114; Bohler 21; cf. also Bohler 80. On the root element, OE *gold* n. 'gold', see von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 273. For the masc. equivalent, see Redin 49, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 273, Ekwall, *ELPN* 44.

**Heahstan m.: Hehstan** 6. Searle 283-84; SCBI 28, 45. On the first element, OE *heah* 'high', see Redin 50, Bohler 81-82, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 287.

**Heredryd f.: Heredryde** (gen.) 10. Searle 294; Bohler 86. On the first element, OE *here* m. 'troop, army', see Redin 155, Bohler 85, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 290; on the second element, OE *dryd* f. 'might, power, force', see Bohler 167-68, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 397.

**Hwita m.: Hwita** 4. Searle 310; SCBI 28, 47. OE *hwit* 'white'. Redin 50 mentions that this is also used as a byname.

**Lulie f.: Lulle** 5. Searle 341; Redin 117, who interprets the masc. strong form as a lall-name (Redin 31-32); Bohler 225. For the strong masc. form, see also SCBI 28, 57 and the document containing the names of persons of servile status cited above, p. 491 and n. 63.

**Mëg m.: Mëg** 10. Searle 344 and Redin 8 cite this as the only example. OE *mëg* m. 'male kinsman' (Redin). Redin 8 n. 1 states: 'It is not quite certain whether this is a name or not. Cf. Thorpe p. 650.' I am satisfied, however, that it is a name; cf. Ekwall, *ELPN* 141 s.v. *Brother* and Redin 41 s.v. *Swuster*. For *Mëg-* as a first element, see Bohler 97-98.

**Manwine m.: Manwine** 24. Searle 349; SCBI 28, 59. On the first element, OE *man(n)* m. 'man', see Redin 8, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 324; on the second element, OE *wine* m. 'friend, protector, lord', see Redin 10, von Feilitzen, *PNDB* 415.

**Seoloce f.: Seoloce** 7; *Seolecan* (gen.) 9. Searle 415 and Bohler 228 cite only this example. Redin 117 refers to *Seolca*, which s.v., p. 158, he lists under 'Unintelli-
gible Diminutive Names'. Boehler, however, derives it from OE seolh m. 'scaal', with the addition of the diminutive suffix -oc < -uc, which is possible. I would prefer, however, to interpret it as a fem. weak form of seol(oc) m. 'silk'. For other examples of Seolca, see SCBI 28, 65, and as the first element in a masc. name, see Boehler, loc. cit.

Tate f.: Tate 5; Tate (acc.) 9; Taian (gen.) 10, 25. Searle 441; Redin 114; Boehler 230-31. Redin refers to Tata, and s.v., pp. 54-55, lists examples. He links the latter with OHG zeltz 'dear, beloved', OWS. scand. teltr 'glad, cheerful' (Bosworth-Toller). For other examples of Tata, see SCBI 28, 71.

Tilwine m.: Tilewine 22; Tiliwine (gen.) 23. Searle 454; SCBI 28, 73 s.v. Tilwine. On the first element, OE til 'good' (Redin), see Redin 124-25 s.v. Tili(k) and cf. Redin 55 s.v. Tila.


Wærstán m.: Wærstæn 14; Wærstanes (gen.) 11, 13. Searle 475; SCBI 28, 75.

Wædryd f.: Wædryde (acc.) 15; Wædryde (gen.) 14. Searle 475; Boehler 124.

Wifhusu f.: Wifhus 6; Wifuse (gen.) 7, 18. On the first element, OE wif 'woman, wife', see Boehler 154-55 and cf. von Feilitzen, PNDB 412. Von Feilitzen, NoB 33 (1945) 91, records s.v. Wifrun the only other name in which wif appears as a first element. On the second element, though KCD IV, 31, no. 741 (Sawyer 961; A.D. 1024) lists a Winhus minister, which form Redin considers to be, 'perhaps, only due to the etymological fancy of some scribe', and the prefix Huse- appears in Husebald (see SCBI 28, 47 s.v. Hysebeald), the genitival form Wifuse points to a fem. o-stem noun *husu 'daughter, young woman', equivalent to OE hyse m. 'son, young man, warrior' (on the latter, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 297). The nom. Wifus is difficult to explain: it may simply be a scribal slip or, more likely, the conversion of an unfamiliar name element into the more common word, hūs n. 'house'. I suspect that the same name appears in the curious form Pifus (a slave in Dorset) in a careless late tenth- or early eleventh-century copy of a will of c. 950 printed in Whitelock 12, line 4 (Sawyer 1539), with P for wynn. This is the only fem. form *husu that I have been able to trace.

Wine m.: Wine 15; Winnes (gen.) 15. Searle 499-500; Redin 9-10; von Feilitzen, PNDB 415; SCBI 28, 77-78.

Wulflaf m.: Wullaf 2. Searle 584; SCBI 28, 79. On Wulf- as a first element, see Boehler 132.

Wulfsige m.: Wulfsige 23; Wulfsiges (gen.) 5, 6. Searle 517-18; von Feilitzen, PNDB 424-25; Ekwall, ELPN 71; SCBI 28, 81. On the second element, OE siege m. 'victory', see Redin 54, von Feilitzen, PNDB 360 and cf. Boehler 114.

Wyn(n)burg f.: Wynburge (gen.) 14. Searle 523.

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Ælfhēah m.: Ælfheah (gen.) 7. Searle 10-11; von Feilitzen, PNDB 174; Ekwall, ELPN 7; von Feilitzen, WEMA 155 s.v. Elfegus; SCBI 28, 2.
ÆLFSTAN
Ælfric
ÆLFRIC: 7. Searle 21-23; von Feilitzen, PNDB 180-81; Ekwall, ELPN 10; von Feilitzen, WEMA 148 s.v. Aelstanus; SCBI 28, 4-5. Cf. ÆLFSTAN above.


ÆBELSIGE m.: Áegelsi 10. Searle 50-51; von Feilitzen, PNDB 187-88; Ekwall, ELPN 16; von Feilitzen, WEMA 147 s.v. Ailsi and cf. WEMA 155 s.v. Elsi; SCBI 28, 10. On the form of the first element Ægel-, see Colman, N & Q and cf. Ekwall, ELPN 13-14, von Feilitzen, WEMA 147 s.v. Aliflet.

BÖI m.: Böia 5. Searle 110; Forssner 51-52, 282 and 286 s.v. Maneboia; Redin 73; von Feilitzen, PNDB 205; SCBI 28, 20.10


ÉADMUND m.: Éadmunde (dat.) 7. Searle 183-84; von Feilitzen, PNDB 233; Ekwall, ELPN 27-29; von Feilitzen, WEMA 155; SCBI 28, 28-29.

ÉADVIG m.: Éadwig 2. Searle 191; von Feilitzen, PNDB 238; Ekwall, ELPN 33; von Feilitzen, WEMA 155; SCBI 28, 31. On the second element, OE *wig m. ‘(?) warrior’, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 412.

GÅRVIG m.: Garwig 5. SCBI 28, 37. On the first element, OE gär m. ‘spear’, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 258.

GÖDHelm m.: Guðhelm 5. Searle 273. On the first element, OE guð f. ‘combat, battle, war’, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 278.

HIDDA 6. Searle 296. Redin 67 derives this from OE hild f. ‘war, combat’, on which see von Feilitzen, PNDB 291. Boehler 87 also derives the element Hid- from hild.


SIG(e)BURG f.: Sigbursth 4. Searle 418; Boehler 114. On the first element, OE sige m. ‘victory’, see Redin 54, Boehler 114, von Feilitzen, PNDB 360 and cf. Wulf sigu.

SIGEWEARD m.: Siwordes (gen.) 11. Searle 423; von Feilitzen, PNDB 361-62; Ekwall, ELPN 62; von Feilitzen, WEMA 172; SCBI 28, 67. On the second element, OE weard m. ‘keeper, watchman, protector; lord, king’, see von Feilitzen, PNDB 410.

TOTTELM: Totel 2; Tottacles (gen.) 2, 11. Searle 459 and Redin 140 cite this as the only example. Redin lists it under ‘Unintelligible Diminutives’ and links it with Tot(â), s.v. 70-71, and the latter perhaps with Tutta, s.v. 111. Cf. SCBI 28, 74 s.v. Tota. The form appears as an initial element in Tottelbed; see von Feilitzen, WEMA 174.

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A NEW SOURCE FOR PERKIN WARBECK'S INVASION OF 1497

Lorraine C. Attreed

New information about Perkin Warbeck's bid for the English throne is contained in an unpublished letter recently sold to a private collector (transcript follows below). Written in September 1497 by Henry vii to Edward Courtenay, earl of Devon, the document illustrates the king's deep concern over the pretender. It describes the strategy Henry wished Courtenay to use to defeat the rebel forces, lately landed in Cornwall and believed to be planning an attack on the city of Exeter. Throughout the 1490s, Henry had maintained a studied nonchalance in the face of Warbeck's threat and European support of the youth who pretended to be Edward iv's only surviving heir. In reality, Henry considered the threat a real one, able to be crushed only by the declaration of full-scale war that had disastrous economic and political consequences. As the number of battlefronts increased, he proceeded to plan his defence along lines both traditional and innovative. The year before the invasion, and to an even greater extent in 1497, he established a system of posts to improve the lines of communication throughout the country. He also relied upon more traditional lines of patronage, between Crown and nobility, and between nobility and town. The letter of September 1497 thus provides new details of Henry's

1 The letter is now in the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Harry Spiro of New York City. I am grateful to them for allowing me to study the document. A summary of the communication was included by H. H. Drake in his edition Hasted's History of Kent, part 1: The Hundred of Blackheath (London, 1886), p. xiv. Since the 1490s, the letter appears to have resided in the Boconnoc residence of the Courtenays before its sale by Christie's in February 1983.

2 The story of Perkin Warbeck and his bid for Henry's throne is a familiar one and need not be repeated here. See, for example, J. Gairdner, History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third, to Which Is Added the Story of Perkin Warbeck, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1898), for the basic narrative as well as research into Warbeck's Tournai origins. Particularly helpful for sources are F. Madden, 'Documents Relating to Perkin Warbeck, with Remarks on His History', Archaeologia 27 (1838) 153-210, and J. E. Cussans, 'Notes on the Perkin Warbeck Insurrection', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 1st Ser., 1 (1875) 61-77. For modern narrative and analysis, see M. V. C. Alexander, The First of the Tudors. A Study of Henry vii and His Reign (Totowa, N.J., 1980), pp. 97-119.
defence and the ways in which the king planned to crush a threat that had plagued him for too many years.

Dated 16 September 1497, the letter states that the king is aware that Courtenay has raised men against Warbeck and those west country rebels who now followed him. News of the earl’s movements came from commissioners in the west, who had been appointed earlier that year to investigate rebellion and insurrection. Courtenay and his men, mustered outside Okehampton, decided to withdraw into the city of Exeter twenty miles to the east. Ignorant of the true size of Warbeck’s forces, the men agreed that it was better to defend the most important borough in the west country than to attack the rebels and perhaps suffer a defeat. The king agreed with the plan, and particularly urged Courtenay’s forces to protect the city.

Courtenay was a natural choice for the role of west country champion. For over 200 years his family had been the largest landholders and most influential figures in county justice and politics. Their position and connections had been recognized by the city of Exeter, whose officials sought Courtenay patronage in return for gifts of food and wine. The worst vicissitudes a comital family could suffer during the fifteenth century afflicted the Courtenays but did not destroy their power irrevocably. Although the fourteenth-century earls of Devon were wealthy and well-connected at court, the balance of power shifted during the following century. One earl went blind, another endured a long and powerless minority, and all members suffered the effects of the rise of a rival family, the Bonvilles. Adherence to the Lancastrian cause cost the Courtenays the earldom in 1461, and power passed to a cousin, Sir Hugh of Boconnoc. This family member in turn lost favour, as did his heir Edward when the latter joined Buckingham’s rebellion in 1483. Suffering attainder and forfeiture, Edward joined Henry Tudor in Brittany. He returned to England with him in 1485, received his knighthood after Bosworth, and married his son to a daughter of Edward iv. Most importantly, he was restored to the earldom in October of that year. By 1497 Edward Courtenay was a considerable force in the west, not least because of Henry’s memory of shared exile and a family tradition of influence over the city of Exeter.

Despite Courtenay’s power, however, Henry could not depend on the earl alone. The king particularly urged him to join the forces commanded by Lord

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3 Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1494-1509, pp. 115, 118, 145.
Chamberlain Giles Daubeney, until recently leader of the vanguard against Scotland but now recalled to fight the western rebels at Blackheath and complete the campaign in the west against Perkin’s forces. Joining Daubeney were Richard Beauchamp Lord St. Amand and Sir John Cheney, the king’s loyal servants and military commanders. Although Courtenay and Daubeney were to be in contact, the earl was specifically advised not to abandon Exeter.

In his letter Henry provides details of the strategy he wished Devon to employ against the rebels. The king argued that if Warbeck moved forward and passed the city, Courtenay’s men should follow the rebels and move in on them from behind. The earl therefore was instructed to take a few men and attack Warbeck’s rear guard, keeping the rebel forces together by harassment on all sides and preventing food supplies from reaching them. The rebels were to be kept in a state of constant watchfulness and apprehension, exhausted by Devon’s feints calculated to break their spirit. Most important, they would be trapped between two armies, for Daubeney’s forces would be before them while Courtenay attacked from the rear. To this end, Henry urged Devon to write to the chamberlain and keep him advised of all movements and threats. Only full coordination of the two armies could hope to break Warbeck’s power.

Henry was prepared to spend money in order to achieve his ends. Wages for Courtenay’s troops were disbursed by Richard Empson, financial overseer of the commissions established in the west country earlier in 1497. Empson was an appropriate choice for paymaster: a council member and speaker of the House of Commons, he served as legal officer of the Duchy of Lancaster and gained notoriety for the zeal with which he collected the king’s debts. Such energy cost him his life early in Henry viii’s reign, but to the first Tudor Empson was ‘a vigorous, competent, and ruthless administrator’ well-suited to oversee a campaign Henry took so seriously.\(^5\)

Propaganda and communications played an important role in the campaign, particularly when they were used to advertise the monetary reward Henry established for Warbeck’s capture. After the pretender’s abortive but threatening landing on the Kent coast in July 1495, and following the warm welcome James iv of Scotland gave the Yorkist party that same month, Henry established a national circuit of posts to make communication more rapid and reliable.\(^6\) Posts lying between Courtenay’s base at Exeter and Henry’s Woodstock command center would have carried the letter of September 1497 and two

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5 Alexander, *The First of the Tudors*, pp. 36, 64, 73, 137, 201-204.

6 London, Public Record Office E 101/414/6, fol. 40r (27 July 1496). For mention of posts and their upkeep for the rest of 1496, see fol. 42r (9 August), 54v (29 November), 55v (11-16 December), 56v (31 December). For details and expenses of the seven posts lying between Exeter and Bodmin, and the twenty-four posts lying northwards to the troubled Scottish border, see E 101/414/16, fol. 1v, 2v, 3v.
replies, all written within forty-eight hours and transported at truly remarkable pace. Equally important to Henry were placards distributed in the west denouncing Warbeck and advertising the reward the king would pay for Perkin to be captured alive. In the letter to Courtenay, Henry urges the earl to renew or call increased attention to the placards already established in the area. He reaffirms his intention to keep the promises they make, so that any individual who acted on the signs' message would benefit as fully as Henry himself. The 'benefit' is not described further, but it probably refers to the reward of 1000 marks offered to the Irish and to a Spanish mariner earlier that summer for Perkin's capture. Moreover, Henry ordered proclamations be made in western ports, reminding subjects that 'the reward and benefit specified in our said placardes' was still valid if they prevented the pretender's escape by sea.

Henry's desire for Warbeck to be taken alive is mentioned several times in the letter. Trapping him between two armies was to be done in such a way that left Perkin no opportunity to escape. Warbeck's wife, who had accompanied him from Scotland, was ordered to be removed from St. Michael's Mount in St. Buryan parish, Cornwall and either kept safely or sent to Henry. Special attention was to be paid to the ships that brought the couple to England. They were to be captured, burned, or their bottoms damaged ('bougé') and made unseaworthy to prevent the pretender's escape, 'ffor it is the chief thing we desire to haue hym broughte vnto vs a lyve.'

Henry left Courtenay with two final instructions. He reminded the nobleman to cooperate with the commission established in the west and directed by Sir William Hatcliff. Under-treasurer in Ireland a few years previously and clerk of accounts in the royal household, Hatcliff helped convey and distribute money for troop wages. Finally, Henry hoped Courtenay would show special concern for the civic officials of Exeter, not only safeguarding their city but respecting their opinion in the matter.

Henry's postal service achieved prompt delivery of the letter, but probably not before Warbeck's first attack. The rebel forces were so strong and crafty that the king's plan almost failed. Warbeck's forces marched on Exeter, arriving 17 September in the early afternoon. Arrayed around the castle and the north and east gates, they called upon Courtenay to surrender the city. Undeterred by the earl's refusal, Perkin laid siege, setting fire to the gates. As a Milanese
eyewitness later reported, the citizens increased the blaze to prevent entry, dug ditches inside the gates, fired guns from the walls, and repelled attacks made with ladders. The next morning, the rebels renewed attack. They managed to enter via the east gate and make for the castle, so surprising the earl of Devon that he was wounded as he came out of his lodgings. By late morning of 18 September, the rebels retreated from Exeter and headed for Cullompton over ten miles to the north. Courtenay took the opportunity to send the second of two replies to Henry’s letter of the 16th. The earlier missive does not survive, but in the latter the earl regrets that his men are too weary to chase and defeat the rebels as they retreat north. Courtenay assured the king that only Perkin’s forces suffered fatal injuries, but the news must have been small comfort to a monarch who had specifically stated his desire for the capture of the pretender alive.

The plan was not a total failure. Warbeck’s men reached Taunton by 20 September, only to learn the frightening news that Daubeney’s forces were at Glastonbury, about twenty miles away. Although it was not the coordinated trap Henry planned with Courtenay, the news of the chamberlain’s proximity as well as the approach of a fleet under Lord Willoughby de Broke meant Warbeck was cornered. On the night of 21-22 September, the pretender and a few supporters rode out of camp to the Hampshire coast in hopes of fleeing to the continent. With the ports blocked, the rebels took sanctuary in Beaulieu Abbey, but realizing the hopelessness of their position they surrendered to the king’s mercy within a few days. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that anyone received the reward Henry had promised on the placards.

Taken in chains back to Exeter to confront the king and his own Scottish wife, Warbeck suffered a punishment at first more humiliating than penal. Desirous of continuing his show of indifference towards the pretender’s challenge, especially after a suspiciously fierce campaign, Henry had little choice but to deny Warbeck and the west country a martyr’s death. Only in 1499 after a few years’ imprisonment and participation in a dangerous conspiracy plot did Warbeck lose his life.

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11 Original Letters 1.36-37.

12 Gairdner, Richard the Third, pp. 327-28.
Perkin Warbeck, the Yorkists, and Warbeck's foreign connections combined to pose a serious threat to Henry's throne. Francis Bacon, never trustworthy on details, was psychologically accurate when he described the situation as 'one of the longest playes of that kind that hath been in memorie, and might perhaps have had another end, if [Perkin] had not met with a King both wise, stout, and fortunate'. Despite these attributes, Henry was almost overwhelmed by the pretender's forces. The king in association with one of the realm's leading nobles planned a trap that was neat and economical, but which was almost sprung by the surprising strength of Warbeck's army. For all the placards and the rewards promised on them, no one prevented Perkin from slipping away once more, planning to fight another day. Only Henry's trust in the earl of Devon was not betrayed. Calling upon a relationship with the city of Exeter that had existed for over two centuries, Courtenay rallied the citizens and held the borough for the king. As the letter of 16 September reveals, the preservation of Exeter and the capture of Warbeck were of equal importance to the king, and in the end he was not disappointed.

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The editor of the letter has tried to preserve its form and appearance as far as possible. The original paragraphing and capitalization have been retained, and indication made (by a slash) of the ends of manuscript lines. The letter has been lightly punctuated in modern form (with commas and full stops) so its sense is not obscured by long and confusing sentence structure. In many instances a superscript line appears over part of a word; often this mark refers to a missing consonant which must be supplied, while at other times no such addition is needed to understand the word and the line has then been taken as a flourish and ignored.

**

By the king

HR

Right trusty and right welbeloued cousin and trusty and right welbeloued We grete you well/ And by writing lately commen vnto vs from oure great commissioners in thoes parties we haue wel/ vndrestande ho we on Wednesday last ye made youre mustres besides the towne of Okehampton/ and there toke counseill and sad aduis amonges yourselfes what was best for you to doo against/ Perkyn andoure Rebelles his adherentes. Wherupon aftre long debating and reasonyng of the/ matier It was thought in conclusion bettre and

13 Madden, 'Documents', 191.
moore sure way for you to drawe into our Citie/ of Excestre for the defens and sauf keping therof to oure vse than by way of bataill with the said/ Perkyn to sette the tryall therof vpon an vnlikelihode.

We thanke you that ye of youre wisedoms haue taken soo wise a direction, ffor moore acceptable/ it is vnto vs to haue oure said Citie surely kept to oure behoof than that any mysaduenture or/ distrusse shulde haue happened vnto you. And soo sithens ye haue taken that wey as to resorte/ vnto oure said Citie, We praye you Cousin that for any oure former writing vnto you that ye/ shulde drawe you vnto our Chambrelain notwithstanding ye kepe yourself with the othre noble/ men of thoes parties in oure said Citie for the suretie therof as it is abouesaid.

And in caas the said Perkyn comme forward and be onyis athisside our said Citie and haue the same/ at his bak, Then we praye you that leving always a good company of sure folkes in that our/ Citie soo as it maye be always in a good suretie, ye take with you all the nobles of your said company/ with theire retynnewes to folowe and for to be at the bakkes of oure said rebelles and traitours and to/ sende out befor you a certain nombre of wel horsed men to ride the said Perkyn and his company/ for to kepe theym toguydre that they stragle not, And to kepe also vitailles from theym on bothe/ sides their way. And over that to kepe theym watching and waking by mean of scryes and/ nere approches as thoes horsemen maye wel and wisely doo without any their great daungier in/ that behalue.

And soo by the mean therof oure said Chambrelain being beforne theym and ye behinde theym/ shal encombre the said Perkyn and oure traitours that they shalbe half discomfited without/ any stroke or perill. And therfor Cousin We praye you inoure affectuous wise and all thoes noble/ men with you to folowe oure mynde in this behalf. And if the said traitours geve bak or flee, that/ Perkyn escape you not in any wise, ffor it is the chief thing we desire to haue hym broughte/ vnto vs lyve.

And we for our part shalbe with Goddes leve over and besides the puis- saunce of SouthWales, Glouceste/-shire, Wiltshire, Somersetshire, Hampshire and Dorsetshire being with our Chambrelain with the/ Lord Seyntmond and with Sir John Cheyne suche an armee royall of people soo furnisshed with/ artilleryes and ordenaunces for the felde asshalbe hable to defende any prince Christien with Goddes/ favour.

And asto youre wages we haue sent money onwarde with Richard Empson oon of oure counseill/ and shal furnishe you from tyme to tyme as the caas shal require.

And over this we wol ye write vnto oure Chambrelain suche thinges as shalbe occurrent with you/ from tyme to tyme, ffor we haue commaunded hym to doo in like wise vnto you to thentent ye/ maye the moore assuredly
annoye Perkyn and ourse saide Rebelles by joynyng you togyders when/ the
cas shall soo require.

Furthremore we thinke it good that ye cause ourse placcardes whiche haue
been proclamed to be/ newly and often remembred for the taking of the said
Perkyn whiche as it is thought vnto vs/ shal by som maner of practik of wit or
pollecye take good effect if it be wisely and secretely/ ordred. For we be and
shalbe stil in the same mynde to perfourme alwayes that is conteyned/ in the
said placcardes, any thing doon sithens the date therof notwithstanding soo that
they that/ wolbe partyners of the benefait therof doo in deede for thentent of the
same.

And where as we see wel that oure Citie of Excestre shalbe kept for vs and
for oure vse by your/ being there, We ascertayne you that We therwith be right
glad and pleased eftsones to your especial/ thankes.

In any thing that our said Commissioners orelles ourse servant William
Hattecliff shal haue to doo in thes/ parties be it for conveyaunce of money or
othewise, We praye you to geve vnto them youre/ especial favour and
assistance, Wherin ye shal ministre vnto vs right good and singulier pleasour.

Item it is thought vnto vs that ye shulde in anywise doo the wife of Perkyn
being in Sainct/ Buryans to be taken by see or by land out therof and to be
sauly kept in ward or sent vnto vs, / And that also the shippes that passed
Perkyn be they at Sainct Ives, Pensance or in othre/ places shulde eithre be
taken, bouged or elles brent. Herunto We praye you to haue an/ especial
regard, ffor it is the thing we haue greatly at hert.

Item our mynd is that open proclamacions be made in all our poortes of
thoes west parties according/ to theffect of the said placardes, that whosoeuer
take Perkyn in fleyng or going bakward by see/ or by land to haue the reward
and benefit specified in our said placardes.

Finally We praye you that vnto the Mair and Citezins of our Citie of Excestre
in all theire/ reasonable suytes to you and requestes especially in suche as
touche the defens and saufgard/ of theym and of the same our Citie, ye geve all
the favour, strength and assistance that ye/ can or maye from tyme to tyme as
the cas shall require. Yeven vndre our signet at oure Manoir/ of Wodestok the
xvj day of Septembre at viij of the clok in the nyght.

(Endorsement, verso:)

To oure Right trusty and right welbeloued cousin/ Theryl of Devonshire,
and to oure trusty and/ right welbeloued the othre noble men assembled/ to
serue vs in his company.

(Paper, 270 × 420 mm., seal missing)

Harvard University.
Rutilius Namatianus, a Gaul of high distinction who attained in A.D. 414 the dignity of praefectus urbi, had to leave Rome unexpectedly in order to return to Gaul. Bidding a touching and justly famous farewell to the eternal city, Rutilius set sail late in the year, around the end of September, at an inclement season for navigation. Though he left somewhat precipitately, Rutilius seemed to have been in no great hurry to reach home, for he stopped on the way to visit friends and relatives and to pay homage to worthy sights. The impressions of this journey from Rome to Gaul along the western coast of Italy were recorded by Rutilius in a poem that consists of two books. The first one contains 644 lines but the second book ends abruptly after 68 lines as the sight of Luna and the Apennines emerged. The apparently unfinished state of the poem gave rise to various conjectures such as Rutilius' untimely death, his possible decision to discontinue the composition and the loss of the rest of the manuscript.

None of these conjectures could be confirmed or refuted until 1973 when Mirella Ferrari discovered and published two fragments which clearly belong to the second, now lost, part of the poem. Her discovery led to a lively debate concerning the meaning of the fragments and their contribution to such basic 'Rutilian problems' as the date of the poem and the route Rutilius had chosen after Luna. Surprisingly, this important discovery and its implications have

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2 De reditu suo 1.37 ff.


4 A. Bartalucci, E. Castorina, E. Cecchini, I. Lana, and V. Tandoi, 'Il nuovo Rutilio Namaziano', Mediaeval Studies 27 (1975) 3-26; F. Della Corte, 'Rutilio Namaziano ad Albingaunum',

RUTILIUS NAMATIANUS AND THE RETURN TO GAUL

had no echo outside Italy. Yet its significance should not be underrated. For in addition to bringing to light portions of the lost second book of De reditu suo, thereby confirming the view that Rutilius did continue to write beyond what we have had up to 1973, the new fragments also contribute to our knowledge of contemporary reactions to the aftermath of the barbarian invasions of Italy and Gaul between A.D. 401 and 415.

The purpose of this article is to offer a reading of the manuscript which I had a chance to peruse in February 1985 in Turin and to examine some major problems relating to each of the fragments.\(^5\)

**Fragment A**

... jmultus satiat ... pan ... ]es ... ]itata Ceres ... ]ae mos est frumenta reponi ... ]eros horrea tuta Notos ... ] hiberna Ligustica miles ... m]edium lanea terga suem ... ]o dives propala ministrat ... ]enditur aere focus ... ]li pretio promptaria bacchum ... ]uit gratus odore cadus ... ] praesentia Marcellini ... nilhil dulcius esse potest ... p]rotector saepe tribunus ... ]uit nuper honore comes ... ]lo custode fuerunt ... ]i praedos sagatus ... ]itat mercator avarum ... ]tant monstra minora car ... ]s aditanda calumnia li[tes ... ]fragiis [ ... ]fragiis ... ]fragiis [ ... ]fragiis [ ...

19 calumnia lites Ferrari, sed ea lectio mihi dubia videtur

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\(^5\) My thanks to the staff of the manuscript room at the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, Turin for their kind assistance. The shelf mark of the manuscript is F IV 25. References in the apparatus are to the edition of Ferrari (‘Spigolature bobbiesi’, 29-30) and to the version of Tandoi (‘Il nuovo Rutilio Namaziano’, 4).
Translation

... it is a custom to store the corn in granaries safe from the (rain) bringing south wind...
The soldier, in the Ligurian winter quarters ... the fleecy backs...
The innkeeper (in the inn where) the hearth stretches ... serves wine at a (low) price from the cellar ... the pleasantly smelling wine-jar...
The presence of Marcellinus, than which nothing can be sweeter. A defender, often a tribune, and recently an honorary count ... under whose protection they were (safe from) the brigand with the military cloak ... the merchant ... lesser monsters ... malicious accusations causing trouble...

**Fragment B**

... Rocks (piled up) to make ramparts ... the crane lifts ... Let (the world) cease to marvel at the citadels and the stones which followed the music of Amphion ... Neptune’s Troy ... labors ... praised in vain...

The consul Constantius gave the new city (his name), hospitality and help; he, who (donned) the consular robes (instead) of the breast-plate. (Constantius), the one salvation
of the Latin name (shines forth), unbeaten by any amount of responsibility. The honors of war (no longer call him). Let the honor, now repeated, return.

(It had not been) my lot (to have poetic) utterance to tell of these great achievements ... to return a mean (reward) for such merits, (meaner) than that which ... to discharge... ...

He received from hostile...

THE RUTILIAN ITINERARY IN LIGHT OF FRAGMENT A

In spite of its condition, the general sense of the passage can be recovered to an extent. Rutilius reached a place with substantial granaries (*horrea*, A 4), winter quarters for some army unit (*hiberna Ligustica*, A 5), a pleasant inn with an attractive innkeeper (A 7-10) and, above all, a personal and dear friend. It was the presence of Marcellinus, as Rutilius stated, which made his stay so remarkable for *nihil dulcius esse potest* (A 12). According to the information in the fragment, Marcellinus had been a *protector*, *tribunus* and a *comes* (A 13-14), somewhat vague words with which Rutilius intended to sum up the military career of his friend, in the course of which Marcellinus had to confront an unnamed armed bandit (*praedo sagatus*, A 16). It is to be feared that at this stage the identity of Marcellinus is beyond recovery but not so, perhaps, that of the place described and the bandit mentioned.

At the end of what is now the second book of *De reditu suo*, Rutilius described his approach to a soil rich in marble at the feet of the Apennines (2.63-68). It seems clear that he had in mind the region of the famous quarries of the Carraran marble and, more specifically, the city of Luna on the coast, one stage after Pisa. The place mentioned in fragment A, then, is bound to be somewhere after Luna, along the road to Gaul, Rutilius' final aim. With the mention of Ligurian winter quarters (A 5), the place in question has to be in the region of Liguria in northwest Italy. But is it on the coast or inland? The problem of the location of Rutilius' visit in fragment A is connected with another problem, the mode of travel beyond Luna. If Rutilius continued to sail along the Italian and then the Gallic coast, as he had done before, then one has to look for a place not far from the seashore. If, however, the mode of travelling changed, then one can look further inland. It is not to be forgotten, at this point, that the whole journey had been undertaken late in the year, around the end of September, and that though Rutilius initially preferred setting sail to the hazards...

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4 On Marcellinus see Ferrari, ibid., 28, who made him *comes domesticorum*; for a different interpretation of Marcellinus' career, see Bartalucci, 'Il nuovo Rutilio Namaziano', 6. They both ignored the words *honore comes* (A 14) which might have implied that Marcellinus' office of count carried no real responsibilities but was merely an honorary title conferred upon retirement.
of the road, by the time he left Luna the sea had become a *mare clausum* for safe navigation.\(^7\)

With few exceptions, the scholars who worked on the fragments assumed that Rutilius continued his journey by sea and that the place in question was, in all likelihood, Genua.\(^8\) Tandoi even restored A 3 as *Illic, ut Gen\(j\)ua mos est frumenta reponi*, and Della Corte, though he allowed Rutilius brief excursions inland, supported this assumption.\(^9\) Using Rutilius' information about *horrea* in the unnamed place of fragment A, Lamboglia looked for a location with attested *horrea publica*, not necessarily on the coast, assuming that Rutilius continued by land. His choice fell on Aquae Statiellae, a resort with warm springs, *horrea* mentioned in the Peutinger Tables and not very far from the imperial capital of Milan.\(^10\) This relative proximity to the palace and the emperor necessitated, according to Lamboglia, the presence of a military commander such as Marcellinus.

Neither the choice of Genua nor that of Aquae Statiellae, however, accounts for all the bits of information included in the first fragment. More seriously, they ignore crucial indications. Of all the meagre clues that Rutilius supplied in the fragment, that of military winter quarters appears the most significant. The place in Liguria, then, housed a military unit and had also granaries as a source of supplies for the army stationed there. In addition, we know that Rutilius' friend, Marcellinus, had to deal with an armed robber (A 16) who, presumably, posed a grave threat to the safety of the area at some point. Given all these clues and the possible location of the fragment within the general framework of the second book, there is one place which answers all the above-mentioned requirements.

According to the *Notitia dignitatum*, a source contemporary with Rutilius which includes information about the array of the Roman army in the west under Honorius (A.D. 395-423), there was a single military unit stationed in Liguria, namely, that of the Sarmatians whose commander held the rank of a *praefectus*.\(^11\) This unit was stationed at Pollentia, which could have been reached both from the coast through Vada Sabatia, the next stop after Genua, and from Aquae Statiellae. Moreover, Pollentia alone tallies well with the presence of a *praedo sagatus* who menaced the area sometime in the past. For

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\(^7\) Lamboglia, ‘Albenga’, 33. The *mare clausum* season started on 11 November and lasted until 10 March.

\(^8\) Lana, ‘Il nuovo Rutilio Namaziano’, 11 opted for a location between Fréjus and Antibes, which he identified as *ad horrea*; Ferrari, ‘Spigolature bobbiesi’, 27 opted for Milan, which would have taken Rutilius a fair distance away from the coastal road and well inland.


\(^10\) Lamboglia, ‘Albenga’, 34.

\(^11\) O. Seeck, ed., *Notitia dignitatum* 42.63 (Berlin, 1876), listing units in Italia mediterranea.
Pollentia was the famous battlefield in A.D. 402 between the Roman army under Stilicho and the Visigoths under Alaric. The choice of an epitaph (sagatus) which evoked a military cloak as well as taking up arms could have hardly been a coincidence. Alaric, before he became king of the Visigoths in A.D. 395, served in the Roman army where he had probably gained valuable experience. The outcome of the battle of Pollentia, according to Claudian, the court poet, was a huge success; Rutilius and other contemporaries held a different opinion, clearly reflected in their enmity towards Stilicho.\(^1\) In the second book of *De reditu suo*, Rutilius devoted a long and hostile passage to an attack on the proditor arcani ... imperii (2.42), as he called Stilicho.\(^2\) This vehement invective stands in clear contrast to the praises heaped upon Stilicho’s successor in office, the general Constantius, later the emperor Constantius III (A.D. 421). Given Rutilius’ tendency to make frequent stops on his way to visit people and places, a visit, if not a brief stay, to the well-known grounds of Pollentia is not surprising. The bitter memories of the battle there evoked an outburst of anti-Stilichonian feelings at the beginning of the second book.

**Rutilius and Constantius III in Light of Fragment B**

Three themes are interwoven into the nineteen lines of the second fragment. The first is that of a city whose walls compared favorably with two of the most notable walls of antiquity, those of Thebes and Troy. The subject of the other part of the fragment is Constantius, consul, general and an emperor for several months in A.D. 421. Lastly the poet himself comes into the picture with a modest assertion of his unworthiness to voice the praises of so great a personality as Constantius.

Ferrari identified the unnamed place under construction in the opening lines of fragment B as Albenga, a city on the Ligurian coast.\(^3\) Following her, other scholars supported her assumption, centering their arguments in favor of that identification on a detailed comparison between Rutilius’ words and those of a surviving inscription from Albenga.\(^4\) That inscription had been originally

\(^1\) Claudian, *De bello gothico* 635 ff.; cf. the verdict of Orosius, *Historia adversus paganos* 7.37.2: ‘Taceo de Alarico rege cum Gothis suis saepe uicto, saepe concluso semperque dimisso.’

\(^2\) *De reditu suo* 2.41-60.

\(^3\) Ferrari, ‘Spigolature bobbiesi’, 28.

\(^4\) Della Corte and Lamboglia devoted the greater part of their articles to these comparisons. The inscription is *CIL* 5.7781:

  Constanti virtus · studium & victoria nomen
dum recipit Gallos & constituit Ligures
moenibus ipse locum dixit · duxitque recenti
fundamenta solo luraque parta dedit
dated to the middle of the fourth century and associated with the emperor Constantius II. Later, however, opinion shifted in favor of a date in the fifth century and Constantius III, the one mentioned by Rutilius.\(^{16}\)

In the first line of the second fragment Rutilius described a place with rocks around it piled for protection to make a rampart (*consurgunt in propugnacula rupes*). If those rocks were natural rather than man-made protection, the topography of Albenga poses problems.\(^{17}\) If, on the other hand, Rutilius merely used the words to describe a solid and impressive structure, the description given in \(B\) can fit virtually any number of places. Lines 4-6 then recalled the well-known walls of Troy and Thebes, the work of gods and heroes, which served as a byword for strength, power and authority. They compared, however, unfavorably with the building project witnessed by Rutilius which, unlike its mythical predecessors, was destined to last forever. The inscription, on the other hand, speaks of several building projects in Albenga while the fragment, as it stands, speaks of walls alone. Allowing for the greatest poetic licence, moreover, it is hardly likely that the walls of the relatively unimportant Albenga would compare favorably with the most notable walls of antiquity.

In support of the identification of Albenga as the unnamed city of the second fragment, Della Corte, Cecchini and Lamboglia further brought up what they claimed were ‘Rutilian echoes’ in the inscription.\(^{18}\) They even concluded that the similarities between the two are so striking that the composer of the verse inscription was no other but Rutilius himself. Some of the parallels, however, adduced between the inscription and Rutilius’ poem are confined either to incidental words or to fairly common expressions. Thus *dum* followed by a phrase purporting to denote some everlasting achievement appears in both cases; there is hardly a doubt that Rutilius had borrowed his from Claudian.\(^{19}\) For *itura dare* of the inscription one may well compare \(B\) 8 *hospitium con-

\(^{16}\) Della Corte, ‘Rutilio Namaziano’, 98 n. 12 (the editor of the *CIL* opted for Constantius II rather than Constantius III).

\(^{17}\) Della Corte, ibid., 94.

\(^{18}\) Della Corte, ibid., 98-103; Lamboglia, ‘Albenga’, 35-38; Cecchini as cited by Ferrari, ‘Spigolature bobbiesi’, 29 n. 1.

\(^{19}\) *CIL* 5.7781 has been compared with *De reditu suo* 1.65-66 ‘dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris / urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat’ and 1.138 ‘dum stabunt terrae, dum polus astra feret’. Cf. this, however, with Claudian, *In Rufinum* 2.527 ‘dum rotat astra polus'.
siliumque dedit, where the idea is the same; but the expression *iura dare* is commonly employed to denote a person with judicial functions.\textsuperscript{20} The Rutilian ‘echoes’ of the inscription are utterly commonplace and cannot substantiate any argument in favor of Albenga.\textsuperscript{21}

Perhaps some light can be shed on the problem if it is looked at from a different angle. The focal point of the second fragment is a panegyric on Constantius. As has been frequently observed, this passage stands in complete and deliberate contrast to the invective against Stilicho at the beginning of book 2 of *De reditu suo*. The invective itself is preceded by a passage which sings the praises of Italy (2.17-40), the *domina rerum*, and is highly reminiscent of the one which Rutilius devoted to the city of Rome, the *regina mundi*, in the first book (1.47-164). It is not unreasonable to infer that the encomium on Constantius in the second fragment had been likewise preceded by a passage devoted to a province other than Italy and/or to an important city there connected with Constantius. The most likely candidate in view of Rutilius’ origin and the final aim of his journey is Gaul and, more specifically, the Gallic capital of Arles.

Such an assumption finds support in an analysis of the structure of yet another part of Rutilius’ poem. In the first book of *De reditu suo*, before the long passage which Rutilius devoted to Rome, he contrasted the glory of the eternal city with the sore state of his homeland, Gaul. There only torn fields and misery awaited his return, the result of years of barbarian invasions and devastations (1.19-22). Significantly, the panegyric on Rome ended with a recital of Rome’s past victories, expressing the pious hope that, like all the enemies of Rome in the past, the Goths as well would be utterly annihilated: ‘Ergo age, sacrilegae tandem cadat hostia gentis: / submittant trepidi perfidia colla Getae’ (1.141-142). The progression of thought is quite clear. First, Gaul, where the situation left an ample scope for works of reconstruction; then, Rome, Rome’s past victories and her projected final victory over the Goths. These were the same Goths whom Stilicho failed to check (2.47-51), but whom Constantius managed to drive away from Gaul in A.D. 415.

Rutilius called Stilicho, dead since A.D. 408, a betrayer of the Empire’s secret (2.42 *proditor arcani ... imperii*); the same Stilicho whom Claudian saw as the defender of the *arcum regni* (*De bello gothico* 104). Both poets were speaking

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\textsuperscript{20} Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carmina* 5.562: ‘Qui dictat modo iura Getis’.

\textsuperscript{21} In his letter to me of 3 April 1985, Professor Tandoi likewise rejected the comparisons between Rutilius and the Albengan inscription. His objections were based mainly on stylistic grounds since ‘la tecnica di costruzione dell’esametro per enumeratio asindetica mi sembra aliena da Rutilio, mentre le affinità di linguaggio celebrativo possono spiegarsi con l’interdipendenza da frasario della propaganda imperiale’.
of the same occasion, the battle of Pollentia. Years later, Constantius starved the Visigoths in Spain into submission and the tribute paid to him in fragment B stands in deliberate contrast to the low opinion which Rutilius had of Stilicho. The victims of Stilicho's negligence had been Italy and Gaul, and the saviour of the latter was Constantius.

All these analogies point to the probability of a similar structure in the case of the second fragment. The panegyric in Constantius' honor had been, in all likelihood, prefaced by a passage devoted to Gaul and to Arles, a city recently connected with the most notable military achievements of Constantius in his campaigns against the Visigoths. Such a reconstruction, rather than the choice of a relatively unimportant Italian city, makes more sense both within the context of the whole poem and its historical background.

At the beginning of the fifth century Arles inherited the position of Trier as the capital of the Gallic provinces. The city was easily accessible both by sea and by land, and its importance is attested, among the rest, by the place assigned to it in Ausonius' catalogue of the most notable urban centers in the Empire. Arles served as the Gallic headquarters for Constantius as he launched his campaigns against the Visigoths in southwest Gaul. His close involvement in the affairs of Arles is evident both from his intervention in the religious life of the city and his sponsorship of the renewal of the provincial assemblies of the Gauls to be convened annually in Arles (A.D. 418). To a Gallic audience, moreover, and to a Gallic poet, there was still another link between Constantius and Arles, the bond of a namesake. Twice in its history, Arles was renamed after a Constantine or a Constantius. In A.D. 327 the city received the name Constantina when Constantine celebrated his decennalia there, and in A.D. 353 Constantius renamed the city Constantia. A third occasion of the same sort could have taken place when Constantius was in Arles in the second decade of the fifth century and B 7-8 ('novae consul Constantius ur[i] / nomen et hospi[tium] consiliumque dedit') could have indicated just such a possibility. Arles, then, rather than Albenga, is the most suitable candidate to have been juxtaposed with the 'sole saviour of the Romans' (B 10).

A reconsideration of the vexed question of the date of De reditu suo can also throw light on the unnamed location of the second fragment. There has been a

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22 Ordo urbiu[n] nobilium 10.
23 Olympiodorus, frag. 26; Orosius, Historia adversus paganos 7.43.1.
24 Prosper, Epitoma chronicon 1247 and Chronica gallica A. CCCCLII 75 (ad 452) (both in MGH AA 9 [Berlin, 1892]). The edict concerning the establishment of the provincial assembly in Arles was published in G. Haenel, ed., Corpus legum ab imperatoribus Romanis ante Justinianum latarum (Leipzig, 1857; rpt. Aalen, 1965), no. 1171, where the name of Constantius is mentioned in the most flattering terms.
long discussion about the date of Rutilius’ voyage and the composition of the poem. The scope of the conjectures is rather narrow, between A.D. 415 and A.D. 417, but none of these three years has gained universal acceptance. In the past, calculations relied on complicated astrological analyses and the tracing of literary allusions such as the use of Seneca via Augustine’s ‘civitas dei’. The second fragment of Rutilius supplies us with valuable clues to the precise date of the poem. In the first place, the general feeling of optimism, noted already in the first book of De reditu suo and evident in the lines of fragment B, could have been generated only after a definite and tangible achievement of the government. A vision such as the one projected in the first book for an ordo renascendi (1.140), paralleled by the building project witnessed by Rutilius in B 1-6, was hardly a product of the years A.D. 415-416, when the Visigoths were entrenched in Gaul and other barbarians were ruining Spain. The reference in B 19 to something which Constantius had received from the enemy seems to allude to submission, and could have made sense only after A.D. 416, when the Roman government concluded a foedus with the Visigoths, which made the latter allies and used them to wipe out other barbarians.

A curious document from Spain which dates to the exact same period, and most likely to A.D. 418, echoes the optimistic note of Rutilius and reflects the general atmosphere of future hopes that prevailed in the wake of the aftermath of the barbarian invasions. It is a letter from the emperor Honorius to the soldiers in Spain which not only grants them additional salary but also projects the possibility of future discharge from service. Again, such an address is hardly conceivable before the alliance with the Visigoths in A.D. 416.

It has also been assumed that Rutilius left Rome, quite reluctantly, since his presence was required in Gaul towards A.D. 418, in order to assist the government’s efforts in that province. More specifically, he was going to participate in the first provincial assembly since the beginning of the invasions, an assembly which symbolised national revival. He would hardly have left Rome in a hurried manner if the journey took place in A.D. 415 or A.D. 416.

The most important clues relating to the date of De reditu suo are two lines in the second fragment, the seventh and the fourteenth. In B 7 Rutilius calls

27 Cameron, ibid.
Constantius 'consul', a fact which brings us to either A.D. 414 or A.D. 417, the first and the second consulates of Constantius respectively. B 14 looks forward to a repetition of this honor ('r]edeat iam geminatus homo[s']), though the matter is not entirely simple. For the words *iam* and *geminatus* could be taken to mean 'let the honor be now repeated', bringing us to a date after A.D. 414 but before A.D. 417, or as 'let the honor, already repeated, return'. This last interpretation supports the year A.D. 417 as the date of the journey, and, in view of the preceding arguments, this is the year of *De reditu suo* as well.

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