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TO
TERENCE PATRICK McLAUGHLIN
EDITOR 1962-1970
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TERENCE PATRICK McLAUGHLIN

1903-1970

TERENCE Patrick McLaughlin, editor of *Mediaeval Studies* since 1962, died last summer shortly after the appearance of Volume 32. He was replaced in October by J. R. O'Donnell who took over responsibility for the present volume.

Terence Patrick McLaughlin was born 30 April 1903 in St. Andrews West, Ontario, and died in St. Joseph's Hospital, Toronto, 15 September 1970. He spent his life in the serious pursuit of academic and religious ideals. A high quality of intellect together with persevering industry were the chief endowments which contributed to his success.

McLaughlin left Cornwall Collegiate Institute in 1922 with an Edward Blake scholarship to enter St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto; there, in 1926, he received his B. A. and the Mercier Gold Medal. At this point he decided to enter the novitiate of the Congregation of St. Basil to begin studies for the priesthood and the religious life; he was ordained priest 17 August 1930. Along with the programme of theological studies McLaughlin found time to attend the Ontario College of Education to receive his High School teachers' certificate in 1928.

Immediately after ordination Father McLaughlin began his doctoral programme in the history of Canon Law at the University of Strasbourg, where he had the good fortune to find that the late Gabriel Le Bras was willing to undertake the direction of his work. In 1935 he received the degree of *Juris Canonicī Doctor*. From his extensive research in the history of law McLaughlin became convinced that, for a proper understanding of medieval society, Canon Law and the various civil systems had to be studied together.

The autumn of 1935 Father McLaughlin became professor of the history of Canon Law at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies and continued this work until his retirement in 1968. But McLaughlin was a man of many talents; because of these he was appointed president of St. Michael's College, 1940-1946, and, 1952-1960, procurator to the Holy See. After the second world war, he spent six months of each year in Rome, a city he knew and loved well and to which he introduced many a scholar.

As editor of *Mediaeval Studies* (1962-1970) McLaughlin maintained the basic policies of the journal: publication of unedited material, a balanced
selection from various disciplines, and the exclusion of book reviews. He was personally responsible for the indexing of the entire series and for advancing the dates of publication from the end to the middle of the year. His untimely death prevented publication of the several thousand pages of his transcription and collation of the manuscripts of the *Summa decretorum* of Huguccio of Pisa and the *Summa super decretum Gratiani* of Simon of Bsignano.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF T. P. McLAUGHLIN


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Several addresses on various topics relating to academic and religious life.
Edward the Confessor and Robert the Pious:  
11th Century Kingship and Biography

JOEL T. ROSENTHAL

The Life of Robert the Pious, king of France, written by the monk Helgaud,1 and the Life of Edward the Confessor, by the anonymous monk of Westminster,2 are two 11th century royal biographies usually dismissed as jejune pieces of medieval writing. There is no reason why the modern reader need enjoy these works. Nor need he sympathize with their aims, nor with the viewpoints of the two authors. But in our haste to dismiss these biographies we run the risk of overlooking their value, which hinges on two important concepts. One is that royal biographies can be a valuable source for the study of medieval kingship in the institutional sense. To read the works solely for biographical data is to miss half their value. The other point is that kingship, like many another medieval institution or concept, underwent a profound and permanent change around the turn of the 12th century. These particular works were written immediately before this transformation. They thus became anachronisms within a short period after their creation. And this, which we may term an historical or literary accident, is what has caused them to be taken so lightly, as much as their inherent defects as history or biography.

Medieval Christian kingship was a distinct and peculiar institution, made up of a specific blend of ingredients: heroic and Germanic tribal leadership, quasi-sacerdotal powers, rituals and mystical secrets, vestiges of Roman imperium, Old Testament monarchical counterparts, etc. The institution, as well as the kings, has been well studied.3 Scholars have combed the ideas

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1 Helgaud: *Epitoma Vitae Regis Roberto Pii*, édité, traduit et annoté par Robert-Henri Bautier et Gillette Labory, “Sources d’histoire médiévale” (Paris, 1965). This edition supercedes previous ones, which are discussed, pp. 50-52. This edition is referred to below as *VR*.
2 *Vita Eadwardi Regis, qui apud Westmonasterium requiescit: S. Bertini monacho ascripto*, edited and translated, Frank Barlow (London, 1962), referred to below as *VE*. It was previously edited by H. R. Luard, “Rolls Series,” (London, 1858). *VE*, pp. LXXIX-LXXXII, for a discussion of the manuscript and its previous editors. The controversies as to the date, purpose, and originality of the *VE* have been the main focus of scholarly attention. Barlow discusses the issues raised by M. Bloch, E. S. Henningham, and R. W. Southern, in the introduction to *VE*, passim.
3 The bibliography is vast, and constantly growing. A few basic works are Fritz Kern: *Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages*, tr., S. B. Chamises (Oxford, 1957); E. H. Kantorowicz: *The King’s Two
of the political philosophers and lawyers, writing anywhere between the 4th century and the Council of Trent, for the light they shed on a set of problems that have become familiar and almost standard. This body of writings has been exhaustively covered. So, to a lesser extent, have been documents that bear on constitutional history. We are not as prone to use them abstractly, but they have some value. They expose the ideas of those other than the professional intelligentsia about the critical political questions which vexed and often rent medieval society.

Royal biographies, however, are not usually considered, generically, as a source for the study of monarchy. This is unfortunate, for they can shed their light as well. If we include king-centered histories, the genre of royal biography makes its appearance at the very beginning of the middle ages, with Eusebius' work on Constantine, and it runs with some vigor through the 15th and 16th centuries. Royal biographies continue to attract readers today, in college courses and through paperback editions. But we have little general treatment of them, despite the fact that they are not rare birds. There is no "literary sociology" of royal lives. Something can be done in this direction, and specific individuals can be related to the genus with considerable profit.

One distinctive aspect of royal biographies makes them of special value: the medieval emphasis on the role or function of the hero. To the medieval writer, the office as well as the man himself was of interest. The hero was measured against an ideal figure, his perfect if imaginary counterpart. Modern biographies tend to over-estimate the importance and impact of their central figure. Medieval bias was as likely to lead to a distorted view of the office or role of the protagonist as of his individual prowess. Men were made in God's image, to exalt his handiwork through their great deeds. So also were human offices and institutions. Great deeds were accomplished by the providential coincidence of worthy men in worthy positions. In accepting this interpretation, secular biographies were greatly influenced by the conventions of hagiography. The innumerable saints' lives had a fairly standard literary form: a brief life, an account of the translation of the saint's body, and some substantial descriptions of miracles, performed both in life and after death. All the lives written in this tradition served as pleadings in a special cause.² Hagiography was concerned with transcendental rather than "historical" truth. But too so were most other medieval

Bodies (Princeton, 1957); Jean-François Lemarignier, 'Autour de la Royauté Française du ixè au xixe siècle', Bibliothèque de L'Ecole des Chartes, 112 (1955) 5-36.

writings, and the better works in secular categories sought to inform and instruct as well as to amuse.

The authors of royal biographies were aware of the conventions of hagiography. But despite obvious parallels, their works do form a distinct genre. They were rarely as laudatory as the hagiographers. Though clerics by profession, at least until Joinville wrote on St. Louis in the early 14th century, they were frequently men with some experience in worldly affairs, and they often go out of their way to tell us of this. Most were contemporaries or near-contemporaries of their subjects, and many wrote from personal knowledge. If not professional historians, they usually displayed some degree of what we acknowledge as historical mindedness. Their products had a dual purpose: to portray the king as a man and as a ruler — the life and the reign. What has been said for one such work is pretty much true for all: “It must have been clear to Asser from the first, that to show the full greatness of his hero he would have to deal with his res gestae as well as with his vita et conversatio. These elements make up the composition of every vita of a secular man, and how to combine them and weld them into a whole has been a major difficulty of biographers since Greek times.”

The lives of Robert and of Edward both fall well short of these standards. The reason for this does not lie in the external conditions surrounding authorship. Both monks knew their subjects, their courts, and the major events of their reigns. Both had had considerable personal contact with their king, as they tell us. But they both fail to strike a balance between vita and res gestae. Nor do they, in treating the vita, strike a similar balance between the public man and the private man. They seemingly fail to grasp the major political problems of each reign. At first glance they offer little positive reflection on the development or secular use of royal power. Part of the problem simply lies in the fact that neither author is a first rate writer. But some of the difficulty lies in the fact that the standards for medieval kingship changed enormously a short while after these works had been written. This made the two biographies irrelevant to the major issues of subsequent Christian kingship. In western Europe kings and their governments began to change within a generation or two of the death of Robert

6 VR, 122. Helgaud was sent to the king as an envoy. The reference: Helgaudus, quem iste princeps Dei affectu diligebat paterno... may refer to his Abbot Albericus’ affection, rather than the king’s. VE, passim. The Author of the VE does tell us on several occasions that he was not a personal witness: 61: “Nam sicut bonis et idoneis viris contestificantibus comperimus...”, and, at the dramatic deathbed scene, his “Auditis his qui aderant, ipsa...” p. 76, would seem to indicate that he learned what happened from others.
and Edward, who may be considered as left-over representatives of tribal Christian kingship, in contrast to the national or bureaucratic monarchy which was to come. Certainly our historical imagination places Edward the Confessor in a much earlier world than William the Conqueror, and Robert the Pious belongs to the shadowy days of the last French Carolingians and the dukes of France, rather than to the high medieval scene of his own grandson, Louis VI, and the emperors of the late 11th century.

The life of Robert the Pious was written in the fourth decade of the 11th century by Helgaud, a monk of Fleury. It treats only some selected aspects of the life of the second Capetian king. Robert had been associated on the throne with his father, Hugh Capet, in 987, the year of Hugh's own election. After participating in his father's actions he was accepted as king in his own right, with surprisingly little opposition, when Hugh died in 996. He ruled until his death in 1031, when he was succeeded by his son Henry, already co-opted on the throne. Robert's years were spent in an endless succession of campaigns and struggles, with purpose but little pattern. The wars with the barons and the church make dreary reading, and if we seek to show that the king pursued certain policies, we must admit that he himself rarely did so without interruption.

Robert was not the stuff around which heroic literature is written. His first task was to preserve the throne for his family, and he did this. He also helped build the intangible props on which Capetian monarchy rested in part. He had some small success in extending the royal domain, and he brought more ecclesiastical land, personnel, and institutions under his direct control. He was well educated and had some rapport with such intelligentsia as were to be found in court circles. Students of the period have given him mixed marks; he was not the non-entity the last Carolingians were, but he worked sporadically, and had a limited ambition toward larger goals. Nor did he understand how to keep away from unnecessary trouble. But if he had few major and permanent triumphs, he was lucky and skillful enough to avoid many irretrievable blunders. He survived and he passed the crown on to a legitimate son of full age and sound mind.

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8 Fawtier, op. cit., 16, "In the circumstances Robert's achievement was by no means without value."
The anonymous life of Edward was written within a decade of his death in 1066. Born in England in 1002, he went to Normandy in 1013 when the Danes overran England. His mother returned to marry Canute, but Edward remained on the continent until invited back in 1041. He became king in 1042 and spent his reign hunting, governing, playing the earls off against one another, and occasionally being shunted from power, particularly by Earl Godwin, his father-in-law, and Godwin's sons. His marriage with Edith did not bring a legacy of continuous harmony with her mighty family, and their quarrels were virtually synonymous with the problems of the realm.

Edward is familiar to us for his role in the prologue to the Conquest. The real man, however, was different from either the old figure pictured in the Bayeux Tapestry or in the legends later cultivated for the campaign which culminated in official canonization. Like Robert, Edward was hardly a great king; many of the res gestae of his day were beyond his control. But it has been well argued that he was more than the feeble figure of legend, and that much of his insouciance is not unexpected from one who grew up in such utter loneliness, personal and political. His main concern was probably to die on the throne, and he presents some interesting comparisons with Charles II, to whom he bears no superficial resemblance. Who would rule England after his death was not Edward's main concern. That this question has preoccupied most historians has kept us from looking at the events of the day through his eyes, and through those of his sympathizers.

Neither royal biography fits the neat pattern of the dual purpose secular vita. Both are so indifferent to many of the political events of the reign, both are so personally adulatory, that their recent editors have termed them "quasi-hagiographic." Each portrays its hero as that crowned monk the

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9 There is no modern scholarly biography of Edward, despite the relative wealth of sources. His life and reign are treated in E. A. Freeman, History of the Norman Conquest of England, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1877), vol. II.
11 Freeman, op. cit., II, 522-23.
12 Frank Barlow, Edward the Confessor and the Norman Conquest "Historical Association, Hastings and Bexhill Branch," 1966. This is a splendid bit of debunking. Barlow here draws together views touched on in several of his writings, and he points out that Edward had little interest in William except in so far as it was sometimes advantageous to offer him the throne (p. 11). Barlow characterizes Edward: "A man of whims, a man possibly of cruel humor... If Edward in his later years saw that all his nephews were aspiring to succeed him, what more amusing than to play them off against each other" (pp. 14-15).
13 VE, p. xxix, and VR, p. 21. The editor of VE, however, points out that the work is a "rudimentary and perhaps slightly hesitant saint's life," and that the author was too close to his subject
Church was constantly searching for. If other medieval biographers of kings were tempted in this direction, why did only these two succumb completely? Why did these two kings lend themselves to such myopic treatment, when others imposed their accomplishments, their res gestae, upon even the most admiring ecclesiastical biographers? The fault lies partly in the authors, partly in the men depicted, and in some measure in the picture the 11th century had of its kings. But we must not be too ready to label the peculiarities of the works’ faults. The weaknesses of the lives are an indication of how differently the authors went about their work than other biographers. Those very points which separate these lives from other royal biographies provide an opening for understanding how and why they are peculiar. We must go from our original condemnation of these sources to a search for the causes of their atypicality. This in turn provides an insight into the nature of 11th century monarchy, as represented by these kings and as seen by their biographers.

Helgaud’s life of Robert is really an account of his private life and, as presented, this is almost exclusively his religious life. This work is less a history of the reign than any other medieval royal life. It begins with a pious prologue and a description of the king. Then Helgaud details his mercies, humility, piety, ecclesiastical foundations and benefactions, miracles and cures, charities, etc. All is told in anecdotal fashion, with no more sense of chronology than of secular causation. There is even a justification of a marital record which included three wives, an excommunication for incestuous adultery, vicious family quarrels, and the plotting of wife against husband and son against father. Robert emerges unscathed from both the discreditable and the incredible. Fawtier charitably reminds us that “Helgaud’s is not a wholly reliable portrait, for he was drawing the king in his last years when, married to an unbecarable wife, he sought consolation in his faith, and looked forward to a world where Constance could no longer trouble him. A biographer has a natural tendency to forget that his hero passes by stages through youth, early manhood, and the prime of life to old age... The young prince... and the mature Robert who became sole king at twenty-seven were different men from the ageing ruler whom Helgaud describes.”

Others have concurred with Fawtier’s caveat, though sometimes a bit more acridly.  

14 Fawtier: op. cit., 15.
15 R. Vaughan, reviewing the VR in the American Historical Review, 72 (1966), 146. It is “little more than a collection of trivial anecdotes and other banalities... The ruler who had set fire to a monastery that impeded his conquests and whose marital adventures earned him an excommunication, is presented to us as a saint, while his role in history is misunderstood and ignored.”

to enter more fully into the conventions of hagiography. The editors of VR quite properly assess Helgaud’s Robert as “un véritable saint laïque”.

14 Fawtier: op. cit., 15.
15 R. Vaughan, reviewing the VR in the American Historical Review, 72 (1966), 146. It is “little more than a collection of trivial anecdotes and other banalities... The ruler who had set fire to a monastery that impeded his conquests and whose marital adventures earned him an excommunication, is presented to us as a saint, while his role in history is misunderstood and ignored.”
It is bad enough that Helgaud presents a picture which defies belief. It is more damning that he hardly helps us to reconstruct the major events of Robert's long reign. The life abounds in pious stories, almost to the total exclusion of political narrative. We learn that Robert was of good height, with straight hair and a mouth well made for the kiss of peace.\textsuperscript{16} He prayed continuously. His education was magnificent. Anecdotes are introduced to prove his mercy and humility.\textsuperscript{17} He lived on earth as though he were in heaven. His pleasure lay in the collection and veneration of relics rather than in concerns of the flesh. His deeds and words exemplified the ways of God to man. He cured the sick and blind with his touch; the origins of thaumaturgic kingship in France are to be found here.\textsuperscript{18} He carried on his father's concern for extensive benefaction to the church, particularly to Helgaud's abbey at Fleury.\textsuperscript{19} He gave alms all the time, and in staggering quantities. Though other virtues remain for exposition, Helgaud tells us that he blushes to cover fully all of Robert's saintly attributes, so long and circumstantial is the full list.\textsuperscript{20} The king governed, with wise counsel, in the best tradition of Old Testament kingship. His blessed life was an indication of his inner happiness, and after the traditional eclipse to proclaim his death, he passed to his well-earned rest.\textsuperscript{21}

To all this we are tempted to say Amen. It is fulsome and trivial. It might seem that the only interest the work offers lies in the fact that its subject was a crowned king. But this qualification is vital. Apart from his intellectual and literary shortcomings, what excuse can there be for a biographer, with extensive personal knowledge of his subject, who tells us so little about "the real" Robert?\textsuperscript{22} While it is true that gratitude for the king's

\textsuperscript{16} VR, 58: "oculi humiles, narese prorsus et patule, os suave et dulce ad dandum sancte pacis osulum..." In 997 Gerbert of Aurillac, Robert's former tutor who became Sylvester II said: "My mind dwells on the illustrious features of my Lord Robert, on his happy face and our accustomed consolations." \textit{The Letters of Gerbert}, ed. and tr., H. P. Lattin, (New York, 1961), 284.

\textsuperscript{17} VR variously refers to Robert as "pater patriae" (p. 112); "perfecto viro" and "Dei amicus" (p. 68): "post Deum specialis gloria regum" (p. 102).

\textsuperscript{18} VR, 76, 126. Marc Bloch: \textit{Les Rois Thaumaturges} (Paris, 1923), 36-40; VE, 43.

\textsuperscript{19} For the relations between Robert and his father and the Church, v. F. Lot: \textit{Etudes sur le règne de Hugues Capet et la fin du Xe siècle}, 31-157. These Capetians not only saw the political advantages in good relations with the Church, but they had a strong streak of piety, subject to personal definition and dispensation, typical of the great nobility.

\textsuperscript{20} VR, 92: "Verum quia opposit se nostre narracio quorumdam perversae mentis intentio qui omne bonum quo ipsi nequeunt assequi allis invidere et malignitatis calcaneo...".

\textsuperscript{21} VR, 132, 134.

\textsuperscript{22} An indication of the slight connection between the \textit{VR} and King Robert's deeds is provided by the "index nominum" of the edition. Apart from Robert himself, the index of ten pages lists only 13 secular figures, six of whom are close relatives, one an emperor, and six French nobles. There are scores of saints and bishops and dozens of abbots.
munificence to Fleury was one motive for the biography, the legitimate desire to repay a debt cannot pass as an explanation for the problems of the life. To overlook the faults of a royal donor is natural. To overlook the events of his reign, when writing his biography, is not. The recent editors tell us that Helgaud presents Robert’s life in the context of “la lecture édifiante,” rather than of a rounded story. It would be for others to deal with Robert’s military triumphs and secular deeds. Helgaud assures us that it was not lack of such feats, nor his ignorance of what had passed, that accounts for their absence. Rather, it was a difference of purpose.

That purpose, to oversimplify, was to accentuate what would be to the king’s credit, and to deemphasize, by omission, the other side of the story. But Robert’s reign was not all discredit able. Helgaud would have been excused had he merely edited, as Otto of Freising did for Frederick Barbarossa. Instead, he hardly told the story at all. Certainly, when we recall the many seamy episodes of Robert’s life we can understand the need for some caution. But entirely diverting the biography from the res gestae — through an emphasis on the sanctity, the miraculous cures, the participation in church services (through hymn singing, etc.), the erudition, etc. — Helgaud was doing his bit for his king and the dynasty. The older concept of king-worthiness still lived in this early medieval monarchy. Any line which produced as holy a man as Robert II, according to Helgaud’s presentation, obviously had a strong claim, ipso facto, to the throne. So did any individual king with such impressive, albeit unpolitical credentials.

No simple elaboration of Robert II’s secular triumphs, no matter how well edited and hyperbolically presented, could have carried the weight to match this appeal to a higher set of standards, the saintly ones. The holy king was always more impressive, by the standards of the mid-11th century, than the real king. The former was something no other layman could aspire to, regardless of wealth or power. So royal biography was here written as propaganda of the most pregnant sort. It exalted the man, the office, and the dynasty. It did not merely reflect past events. It sought to shape their meaning. By extension, it was meant to have a strong influence upon the future of the monarchy and the realm. In this light, Helgaud, may still stand as a bad writer, but his work takes on an entirely new scope.

Of course there remains another truth about Robert’s reign. Helgaud’s

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23 VR, 35-36. What we have may have been begun as an exercise, written for Helgaud’s fellow monks, and then expanded to its present form.


emphasis upon the hagiographic, understandable though it is, represents an almost total, if tacit, neglect of the mundane doings which consumed the king’s days. If Helgaud exalts Robert by exaggerating his private virtues beyond all meaning, in another sense he denigrates him by ignoring his public life. Other royal biographers dealt with “real events” and still managed to present quasi-heroic figures. Their victories were obvious enough. When secular triumphs abounded, other virtues and glories were not as necessary to the picture of the Christian hero-king. Helgaud’s complete emphasis upon the hagiographic and theocratic aspects of Robert’s kingship drives us to a logical reaction. We remember the secular truths in our effort to balance the tale: Robert’s lack of coherent policy, his tendency to operate in reaction to the thrusts of others, his sordid and unhappy personal life, with its political ramifications, his sporadic and brutish wars against both lay and spiritual vassals, his failure to balance the emperors’ international prestige, etc.

For a narrative history Helgaud is almost useless. His work has no chronological order. This is in keeping with the edifying traditions of hagiography. Only a few genuine secular issues are mentioned. Of the discreditable incidents which occupied the king, only Robert’s marital career is even alluded to at any length. Hugh Capet had arranged Robert’s first marriage for political reasons. The son deserted his bride, saying she was too old, and married Bertha. She was the widow of Eudo of Blois, the mother of five children, and related to Robert within forbidden degrees. For her he braved censure and excommunication, but her unwonted barrenness eventually led him to marriage with Constance of Arles, a grand-daughter of the last French Carolingian, Louis V. She bore Robert the necessary heir, but made his domestic life unfit for pleasure or profit. Her complicity in the murder of a close friend of Robert, and her incitement of their eldest son to rebellion, after he had been associated on the throne, understandably embittered the king. And yet it is hard to be too sympathetic.

Apart from the personal suffering Robert caused, what can be said for a king, who with a precarious grip on the throne, found time and energy for such an exciting sex life? In an age when kings were expected to marry for advantage, not adventure, Helgaud must have been hard pressed to extricate Robert from these scandals. Only Queen Constance is mentioned by name. She appears as a minor paragon. Robert’s behavior, without

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26 She is not mentioned by name in FR, but on p. 92 Helgaud refers to those envious creatures who profess an “excessus humanitus” and claim that Robert’s marriage with Bertha would keep him from heaven.

27 FR, 108: “Constancia nobilis regina...”
being systematically treated, is excused. Did not King David marry in violation of human and divine law, and then make his peace with God and lead Israel to new glories? The excommunications, levied by various synods, are pointedly ignored.

Most of the other warts are completely removed from the picture. Helgaud pays no attention to the king’s chronic inability to hold the nobles within his grasp. The lack of effective royal judicial machinery may have escaped the ken of a monastic biographer, jealous though monasteries were of their own franchises and courts. Robert’s support of Count Eudo of Chartres was a minor disaster, for it was the prop on which Eudo’s independence of Robert was built. Helgaud says nothing about this. More than once the king burned and pillaged religious institutions which blocked his path during a campaign. Again the biographer is silent. These are but examples of the issues which a secular biographer might have touched upon. Helgaud chose to avoid them.

The author’s faults are of omission and commission. His credulity about miracles is not a major drawback, given the judgements of his day. But should we be so charitable towards a failure to follow the balanced lead of Einhard’s work, or of Asser’s (if he knew it), or “The Astronomer’s” work on Louis the Pious. But the man Robert and the nature of the kingship he represented made it possible for Helgaud, intent on exaltation and praise, to write in such a peculiar fashion. Helgaud had very serious goals for his king and the role he was assigned in the sober game of Christian politics. These ends must be kept in mind. What has generally passed as simply a piece of bad history should be seen as an awkward but highly competent work, written in the only framework which gave its author a chance of succeeding by the light of his own standards.

The Vita Edwardi can be profitably compared with the Vita Roberti. In two distinct parts, it is definitely of more value for the res gestae of the reign. The first part is an uneven and selective story of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom through Edward’s reign. Dedicated to Queen Edith, Edward’s wife and Godwin’s daughter, part one covers the roles played by Godwin’s family as well as by the king. The theme is that the king’s piety and goodness, plus the aid of Godwin and family, produced national prosperity, whereas the quarrel between some of the Godwinsons worked to undermine and then destroy the kingdom itself in 1066. It is a neat and self-contained bit of moral history. The second part was devoted to Edward and was written after the Conquest. It is concerned with the king’s religious life, and is an almost straight piece of hagiography. This theme was a safer one now.

28 VR, 94, 96.
Of little historical value, part two was a fertile source for the hagiographic \textit{vitae} of Edward written in the 12th century with his canonization in mind. "The only unity (between the two parts) was the author's desire to please the Queen," who is uncritically praised in both.\textsuperscript{29} The interest for us lies in the fact that the two discordant pieces are linked, and that the second was passed off as a meaningful life of an 11th century man, not quite a layman but in a semi-secular role.

As secular writing the first part of the \textit{Vita Edwardi} is immeasurably superior to Helgaud's life. It is "an historical essay," rather than a series of moralistic and pious episodes.\textsuperscript{30} Its author works chronologically. He indicates a strong sense of the nature and value of historical explanation, at least in mundane matters. He conveys a vigorous picture of court life, of councils and assemblies, and of Edward's special interest in the foundation of Westminster Abbey. The people are real and their concerns comprehensible by the standards of this world. Most of the major personalities of public life enter, and many are well shaded figures, for good or evil. The author has strong personal opinions and prejudices, in contrast to Helgaud's lack of interest in the secular figures who filled Robert's world. If his philosophy of history and sense of drama require villains as well as heroes, he provides himself with an ample stock from which to draw. Archbishop Stigand, the unruly rulers of Wales and Scotland, the quarrelsome members of Godwin's own family, and treacherous counsellors are all denounced for the havoc they cause.\textsuperscript{31}

The second part of the work is totally different. Now in the realm of hagiography, we get Edward's life from the miracles which presaged his birth through those he performed posthumously. We learn that "King Edward of happy memory was chosen by God before the day of his birth, and consequently was consecrated to the kingdom less by men than... by heaven."\textsuperscript{32} If Robert resembled David in his ability to rise after a bad marriage, Edward was a Solomon, in that his peace and wisdom came after the wars of Canute.\textsuperscript{33} There is more in this vein, quite detached from the franker tone of part one. There the king had been criticized when he fell from grace:

\textsuperscript{29} At least Edith was praised with more reason than was Constance of France: \textit{VE}, pp. xvii, xxiv, p. 4: "Altera pars hominis, species eadem probitatis, altius ingenium, consiliumque eitum." See p. 46 for her common interests with Edward, particularly in ecclesiastical benefactions.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{VE}, p. xv-xviii, xx-xxiv. An evaluation of the \textit{VE} depends in part on how important we judge Edward, rather than Edith, to have been to the author's purpose.

\textsuperscript{31} By making corrupt churchmen responsible for the evils which befall the kingdom, the author removes some of the onus from Queen Edith's brothers: \textit{VE}, pp. lxiii-iv.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{VE}, 60.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{VE}, 3: "Aurea mox Anglis... ut post bella David pax succedens Salomonis..."
"he began to neglect useful advice" and he unwisely drove Godwin from his side, and even sent the queen away for a while. In the second part Edward's holiness was proof against all errors. His triumphs came by virtue of his meekness, alms-giving, hospitality, tranquility of spirit, and zeal for the Church — not through arms or power. He was reluctant to believe in his own miraculous powers, though he was generous in the use of his special gifts. He passed on to paradise, "having been revealed as a saint while still living in the world." If the real Edward bore but limited resemblance to the real Robert of France, the ideal figures in the biographies are remarkably similar. And the two together, as presented by their biographers, are markedly different from the heroes of other royal lives.

The *Vita Edwardi* is no more a balanced secular life of Edward than Helgaud's work was of Robert. The first part is a history of the reign, with the king as a central figure for literary purposes more than for political. It is true that we have some personal views of the king. Depending on the reader's point of view, these can be seen as hagiographic or simply as unflattering. Edward is depicted as a very old man, often enfeebled by the daily exigencies of kingship. He sometimes seems either simple or senile. But the hagiographer turned these horrendous political liabilities into proper virtues. So he also turned the political tragedy of a childless royal marriage into the incredible and presumably flattering tale of a celibate union, preceding and heralding the king's later miracle-workings. But regardless of how these points are interpreted, there is no escape from the fact that no other royal biography devotes so much space and sympathy to figures other than the king. In other works of this genre, very few people besides the hero emerge as more than names and agents. This is not so here.

We have seen that Helgaud's shortcomings were, in reality, part of an attempt to salvage his king. The same is true for Edward's biographer, as it is for Edward's life and reign. A king who had to share his power while

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34 *VE*, 18-23, passim.

35 *VE*, 81: "Revelatum vero, ut supra texuimus, sanctum adhuc viventem in mundo, ad eius quoque tumbam propitia deitas his signis revelat sanctum vivere secum in celo..."

36 *VE*, 12, for a physical description. The author of the *VE* glories in the other-worldly appearance of Edward, while Helgaud rejoices that anyone as handsome and virile looking as Robert could have been so pious — two roads leading to the same destination.

37 *VE*, pp. ixxv-lxxix, on the celibate marriage. Freeman; *op. cit.*, II, 534-544: "When we come to examine the evidence (for the story of the celibacy) we shall find that this is one of those cases in which each later writer knows more than the writers before him" (538-39). The real question is why Edward never tried to end the barren marriage. His contemporaries found weak excuses and risked ecclesiastical censure, but they did abandon childless queens. *Raison d'état* would have been sufficient to force even Godwin and his sons to accept such a repudiation. Edward's lack of dynastic feeling was peculiar, and provides a neglected key to his character.
enthroned appropriately might share space and sympathy in his own biography. As a king, Edward lacked an autonomous base of power, and he was rarely independent of his earls. He might juggle diplomatic and domestic events for his own advantage, for he was a shrewd man, but he always had to face the possibility of being shunted aside. Therefore his biographer also turned to a realm where none could match the king. In his saintly role Edward stood alone — his political shortcomings were not so important when one thought of him as God’s chosen. So each of these royal biographies assays to steer the reader to the sacred aspects of kingship, for here neither man could have a secular rival. And in doing this the authors implicitly steer us to the basic secular problem of each reign, i.e., the king’s inability to take and hold the initiative in political matters. The argument from silence is most eloquent. Each author accepts one harsh truth, but he glosses over it with a different, higher truth about his king.

In conclusion, what do we learn about the institution of medieval kingship from these lives? Biographies of monarchs are not usually culled for insight along this line. Modern scholars have mostly turned to political philosophy or legal writings to reconstruct what the age thought about its primary political institution. But much can be found if it is sought: royal biographies tell us a great deal about the institution, as well as about individuals. The writers worked within a conceptual framework which wedded the man to his office. Medieval kings tend to get the biographies and biographers they merited. Charlemagne was treated in a pseudo-imperial vita. Barbarossa’s life is heavily decked with the concepts of the rediscovered imperial glory, as well as with the scholarship of the new learning. These are adulatory and yet balanced lives. But the biographers of Robert and Edward did their job as well. They wrote in the context of a smaller kingship, more feudal than the great Carolingian empire, more parochial than the Hohenstaufen. The monarchy exemplified by Robert and Edward was not yet transformed by the great current of change which swept over the ideas and institutions of western Europe within a half century of their deaths.

Had they been written half a century later the vitae would have been very different. As it is, we see the early Capetian and the late Anglo-Saxon

38 VE, 30-33.
40 Even so distinguish a book as E. Kantorowicz’ The King’s Two Bodies fails to use the biographies. An exception is H. Fichtenau: The Carolingian Empire trans. P. Munz (Oxford, 1957). In this work Thegan’s Vitae Ludovici Imperatoris, the “Astronomer’s” Life of Louis the Pious, and Notker’s fabulous biography of Charlemagne are all used to advantage.
monarchy at a time when they were only beginning to become aware of the inadequacy of their old supports. Half a century later, the first glimpses of bureaucratized monarchy would have been indicated with all it offered by way of royal independence and isolation from ones military peers. Half a century later each king would have been able to use, to exploit the trappings of theocratic monarchy without the smothering embrace of the Church. We cannot imagine two such kings as Edward and Robert ruling after 1100.

The two biographies make clear that Robert and Edward were no longer tribal kings or folk chieftains, in ex officio contact with an old divinity of kin group or people. And yet they had not found new ways to power. As neither king found the solution to his dilemmas, so neither biographer found a way to present a case both accurate and convincing. The problems of the two monarchies were real. The two vitae, for all their faults, were written to deal with genuine political issues. They work from the assumption that a new monarchy was going to be constructed on a hagiological model. By hindsight we can see that they misjudged the future. But Professor Southern reminds us that “this union of supernatural powers in a temporal ruler, so contrary to the political temper of Western Europe as we know it, is one of the might-have-beens of history. There were many forces working against it, but it did not seem so remote a possibility in the time of Gregory VII.”

We read these two biographies with more sympathy when we remember that their peculiarities reflect the quandaries of 11th century monarchy, rather than simple literary inadequacy.

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‘Cause of Necessity’ in Aquinas’ *Tertia Via*

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I

The *tertia via* listed by St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologiae* for proving the existence of God continues to be puzzling. Along with other difficult points in its procedure, the insertion of a "cause of necessity" for one class of necessary beings seems to complicate the argument and open distinctive ways of interpretation. Yet this notion is an integral part of the background against which the final conclusion is drawn: "Therefore it is necessary to posit something that is necessary of itself, not having a cause of necessity from some other source, but which is the cause of necessity to the others; and this all men call God".¹ The conclusion of the argument is precisely the positing of a cause of necessity for whatever other necessary things there may be.

The importance and timeliness of a correct understanding of this argument in the *Summa Theologiae* should be obvious enough today. After some three decades of sharp and searching controversy on the ontological argument for God’s existence, interest has recently been turning to what Kant has called the "cosmological argument".² By this was meant immediately the reasoning from the contingency of the world, in the sense of the basic outline of all the proofs in the traditional natural theology (Kant, *KRV*, B 632-633). Since the *tertia via* of Aquinas argues from the contingency in the things of the visible world to a first necessary being, may it not be classed straightway under the cosmological argument and be brought into the current discussion about it?

Some hesitations arise, however, when the *tertia via* is gauged in this setting. A cosmological argument should, from the general pattern, reason from a contingent being or contingent beings to a necessary being. Once the necessary being has been reached, its task should be completed. Such is not the case in the *tertia via*. It arrives at a necessary being or necessary

¹ Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis alliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis alliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum. *ST*, I, 2, 3c.
beings, and still has to inquire about the cause of their necessity. Not precisely a necessary being, but the cause of necessity for all other necessary beings, is its terminus. This consideration seems enough to alert an historian of philosophy to a possible deep-seated difference between the notion of the cosmological argument that is in vogue today and the spirit of the *tertia via*. The problem accordingly deserves some careful investigation.

The investigation will have to take account of the different concepts of necessity and the way the necessity is caused. Category mistakes in confusing the necessity of propositions with necessity in things have to be avoided. What functions in the argument is a necessity found in things, regardless of what propositions men may make about them. Logical necessity, understood as necessary relations between propositions, is accordingly not at stake. Is the necessity meant here, then, to be found in the way a real essence necessarily contains its own notes and necessarily grounds the properties that follow upon it? In this way human nature is necessarily rational and sensitive, and grounds the abilities to reason and to decide. Insofar as the essence is their necessary source, it may readily be looked upon as the cause of necessity in their regard.

Or is the “cause of necessity” in this case something existential rather than a necessitating feature in the order of essence? The possibility of an existential or voluntaristic interpretation cannot be ruled out *a priori* when one considers the background against which Aquinas was writing. He was well aware of the passage in Plato’s *Timaeus* (41AB) in which the demiurge proclaimed to the gods that though generated they were by his will indissoluble. The bond in his so willing was greater and more dominant than the condition given them by their birth. The possibility, then, that a thing could be necessarily existent on account of the decision of its maker, even though it itself is perishable on the ground of its own essence, has to be taken into consideration. In this case the introduction of the notion “cause of necessity” will have an important bearing on the interpretation of the *tertia via* vis-à-vis the cosmological argument constructed and demolished by Kant. Under Kant’s analysis the cosmological argument turned out to be but a version of the ontological. Though claiming to start in experience, it abandoned experience after the first step and argued from mere concepts (*KRV*, B 634-635). This or any other reduction of the cosmological to the ontological argument obviously will not hold in regard to the *tertia via* if the necessity in question comes not from the exigencies of concepts or natures but from the will of an external efficient cause. On the other hand,

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3 *... Plato, qui de corporibus caelestibus Deum loquentem inductit in hunc modum: Natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia: ... Aquinas, CG, I, 20, Ad hoc.*
the difficulties are just as obvious. What philosophical means are available for knowing the will of the maker? Further, if pushed to the extreme, will not this view exclude all serious functions of essences in things and even ultimately, with Descartes, make all necessary truth depend on the will of God?

Further difficulties arise from the nature of Aquinas' own involvement in the *tertia via*. The argument occurs in a professedly theological work, the *Summa Theologiae*. In the method of sacred theology the existence of God is obviously presupposed from the start, since the basic principles of the science are accepted on his word. The ways for demonstrating his existence are brought under a consideration of the divine essence, as though the real question at issue was the relation of God's existence to his essence: "Primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent... Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit" (*ST*, I, 2, init.). In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, the ways of demonstration are expressly introduced as arguments that have been drawn up by other thinkers; "procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt" (*CG*, I, 13, init.). There is no reason to doubt that the same status is accorded them in the *Summa Theologiae*, since its procedure at this stage parallels in general lines the treatment given in the *Contra Gentiles*.

One point, however, might prima facie cause some hesitation in admitting the parallelism for the case of the *tertia via*. In the *Contra Gentiles* this argument is not listed under the ways for demonstrating God's existence. Rather, it occurs two chapters later as a proof for the divine eternity. It exhibits the same general structure as the *tertia via* in the *Summa Theologiae*, as far as the intermediate conclusion that a first necessary being has to be posited: "Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per se ipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est" (*CG*, I, 15). It then proceeds to draw the further conclusion that the divine eternity follows from this necessity.

Because the argument here goes on to an ulterior conclusion it need not be rejected as a proof for the existence of God. Rather, it requires for its validity the demonstration that it contains of the divine existence. Only by proving that God is necessarily existent, according to the method followed in the *tertia via*, does it demonstrate the divine eternity. Parallel

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4 "Do not be afraid, I ask you, to affirm as certain and publish everywhere that it is God who has established these laws in nature just as a king establishes laws in his kingdom". Descartes, *Correspondance, à Mersenne*, 15 avril 1630; *AT*, I, 145.13-16. Cf. à Mersenne, 27 mai 1630 (pp.151-152); à l'Abbe Picot, 2 mai 1644 (IV, 118-119).
cases are easy to find in Aquinas. For instance, in the commentary on the *Sentences* the argument from motion, listed in first place among the different ways in the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Contra Gentiles*, is not brought under any of Dionysius' three "ways of reaching God from creatures" (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, div. l. a partis; ed. Mandonnet, I, 88-89), but is given as a preliminary argument for the divine immutability: "Ergo oportet devenire ad primum motorem, qui movet et nullo modo movetur; et hic est Deus. Ergo est omnino immutabilis" (d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, Contra; p. 211). The argument reaches the primary movent with all the cogency of the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae* and the first two ways of the *Contra Gentiles*. The fact that it goes on to draw a further conclusion does not at all keep it from being the same argument used in the two *Summas* as a way of demonstrating God's existence. Likewise, the reasoning in the *De Ente et Essentia* to prove the entitative composition of creatures uses the argument from efficient causality to reach God: "Patet ergo quod intelligencia est forma et esse et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hec est causa prima que Deus est" (*De Ente*, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 35.16-19). The purpose of a further inference does not infringe upon its cogency as a proof of the divine existence. For its own purpose it has to arrive at the nature of existence. But to reach the nature of existence, in the metaphysical procedure of Aquinas, is to prove the existence of God.5

The way of arguing in the *tertia via*, then, is found in the *Contra Gentiles* outside the list of arguments by which others, namely both philosophers and Catholic teachers, have proven that God exists. It is no longer expressly placed in a list of the reasons used by others. It is rather offered as an argument by Aquinas in his own name, regardless of source.

This twofold status indicated for the argument from contingency need not at all be disconcerting. Rather, the importance of the twofold relation, namely to himself and to the reasoning of others, is emphasized in regard to the interpretation and understanding of the argument as used by St. Thomas. The ways listed by him for proving the existence of God, even though taken from other thinkers, are quite obviously accepted by him as valid. They may not be understood by him in exactly the same way as they were in their original context. The argument from motion, for instance,

5 Since existence is not grasped in the conceptualization of any nature, its nature is not known till one has worked out the conclusion that in a single instance it subsists in itself as existence only. But that is to have proven the existence of God. According to Aristotle's (*Metaph.*, A 5, 1013a34-36) basic sense of the necessary, namely "what cannot be otherwise", God could be called a necessary being because he is his own existence. But this existential meaning is not included in Aristotle's list. For Aristotle, however, necessity and eternity were convertible (*De Gen. et corr.* II 11, 337b35).
is elsewhere characterized by him, speaking in his own name, as most efficacious for proving the existence of the first principle. It is the argument used in his own procedure in the Compendium Theologiae (c. 3). But it is not understood in its Aristotelian sense in which it involves the eternity of cosmic motion and the animate nature of the heavenly bodies. Likewise the way of efficient causality, though expressly attributed to Aristotle, is understood in a way that finds efficient causality in separate substance. It is an argument used frequently by Aquinas in his own name in the commentary on the Sentences. The same openness to new interpretation can be shown for the arguments from the grades of being and from the teleology of the cosmos. It should accordingly be looked for in the argument from the contingency of observable things. The express rejection of the Anselmian argument, and the omission of arguments from the consensus of peoples or instinctive human knowledge and moral tendencies, suffice to show that the arguments given by philosophers and Catholic teachers are not placed indiscriminately in the list.

This manner of dealing with arguments constructed by other thinkers suggests that the structure of the demonstration in each case has to be examined in the writer from which it was taken. The argument from mo-

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6 In VIII Phys., lect. 1, Angeli-Pirotta no. 1991. A discussion of the way the skeletal argument is revivified by Aquinas may be found in my article “The Starting Point of the Prima Vie”, Franciscan Studies 5 (1967) 249-284.

7 See C.G., I, 13, Praedictos; In VIII Phys., lect. 1, no. 1991; In XII Metaph., lect. 5, Cathala nos. 2496-2499.

8 C.G., I, 13, Procedit. The Aristotelian separate substance is regarded by Aquinas as an agent cause: quod non solum sit aliqua substantia semper movens et agens, sed etiam quod eius substantia sit actus — In XII Metaph., lect. 5, no. 2494.

9 In his own way Aquinas explains the first reason given by Peter Lombard for knowledge of God: Prima ergo ratio sumitur per viam causalitatis, et formatur sic. Omne quod habet esse ex nihilum, oportet quod sit ab aliquo a quo esse suum fluere... Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno primo, et hoc est Deus — in I Sent., d. 3, div. lae partis textus; ed. Mandonnet, I, 88. This consideration was regarded as basic for all three ways given in Dionysius: Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab aliter. Unde secundum hoc ducitur in causam a qua est — ibid. The conside-ration likewise underlies the Thomistic doctrine of participation as participation of existence rather than of form; e.g., Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur quod omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est — ST, I, 44, 1c.

10 The quarta via cites Aristotle, but concludes to a cause of existence (causa esse). The argument from the directing of things to a purpose is taken (C.G., I, 13, Ad hoc) from John Damascene (De Fid. Orth., I, 3; PG, 94, 795D) and Averroes, who explains its denial as a denial of efficient causality: “ex quo sequitur ipsum negare agens: generans enim non generat, nisi propter aliquid, et simillimae movens movet propter aliquid” (In II Phys., text 75 (Venice, 1562), fol. 75v2, L). Aquinas (ST, I, 2, 3, ad 2m) understands the argument in the framework of the first and third viae.
tion, for instance, clearly has its structure in the Aristotelian treatises. The new meaning infused into the structure, however, will be from Aquinas' own thought. It is a new meaning that will conclude in the *prima via* to a unique immobile mover, instead of to a possible fifty-five. Correspondingly in the *tertia via* the background from which the structure may have been taken will have to be probed in its alien sources. The meaning breathed into it, however, will need to be studied in the preceding works of Aquinas himself. From this double standpoint one will be able to gauge what the argument owes to its alien structure and what it owes to the original thinking of its new proponent.

In Aquinas himself the version of the argument in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* lies behind the *tertia via* of the *Summa Theologiae*. Probably between them is a basic discussion of possibility and necessity in the *De Potentia* (V, 3), in which Arabic sources are used as a framework. Still further back are enlightening reflections in the commentary on the *Sentences*. These will have to be investigated for Aquinas' own thought. The role played by the framework in which the Arabians had placed the discussion of contingency and necessity will require examination, with their Aristotelian background and the possibility of other influences. Only then will one be in a position to assess the structure of the demonstration and the meaning given to the argument in the writings of Aquinas.

II

The version of the argument in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 15, Amplius) commences with the observation that some things in the world have the possibility to be or not to be. This openness to both being and not-being requires that if they have being, they have it from a cause. Of themselves, they could just as well not exist. Infinite regress in efficient causes had just been shown through Aristotelian reasoning to be inadmissible. Accordingly something that is a necessary being has to be posited:

Omne autem quod est possibile esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. Sed in causis non est procedendum in infinitum, ut supra probatum est per rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet ponere aliquid quod sit necesse esse (*CG*, I, 15, Amplius).

The force of the argument is that the perishable things in the observable world are of themselves as equally open to existence as to non-existence. They do not determine themselves to existence. This determination has to come from a cause. What kind of a cause? The text does not specify. But there need not be the least doubt that here an efficient cause is meant.
'CAUSE OF NECESSITY' IN AQUINAS' "TERNIA VIA"

Everywhere for Aquinas a cause that gives existence is an efficient cause, or at least requires efficient causality to achieve its effect. Further, the backward reference to the impossibility of an infinite series is concerned expressly with efficient causes: "Procedit autem Philosophus alia via in II Metaphys., ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus" (CG, I, 13, Procedit). Also the use of the verb *approprietur* for the bestowal of existence indicates influence of the Latin Avicennian text in its notion of agent causality.

What the argument has proven, then, is that where there are contingent things there is some necessary being as their efficient cause. The argument goes on to show that ultimately there is a cause that does not have its necessity from anything else:

Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde; vel non, sed est per seipsum necessarium. Non est autem procedere in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis aliunde. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est (CG, I, 15, Amplius).

The caused necessary things, as is clear elsewhere in Aquinas and has been stressed in some modern articles, include angels, spiritual souls, and celestial bodies. In virtue of the impossibility of infinite regress, these caused things require a first cause, a cause that is accordingly necessary not through any other cause but by reason of itself. Again, the thinking of Aquinas is clearly enough in terms of efficient causality. The backward reference is to same passage already cited, in which "a first efficient cause" was reached (CG, I, 13, Procedit). The force of the reasoning lies in the bestowal of existence through efficient causality. If there are contingent

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11 Aquinas frequently uses the Aristotelian formula "forma dat esse", in the sense that the form specifies the existence and is accordingly its cause in the order of formal causality, orienting the thing to existence only and not to non-existence. But the exercise of this function presupposes efficient causality: "esse per se consequitur formam creaturarum, supposito tamen influxu Dei; ... Unde potest ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus celestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum" — ST, I, 104, 1, ad 1m.

things, there is a necessary efficient cause that is making them be; and if that cause is made to be necessary by something else, there is ultimately a first efficient cause that is thereby necessary without undergoing the influence of any efficient causality itself. The notion of necessity seems bound quite closely with efficient causality. As efficient causality is the bestowal of existence, the notion indicated for necessity in this context would seem to bear upon existence. The first efficient cause is existence, and is thereby necessary in virtue of itself. By it existence is caused in some other things in a way that cannot be otherwise. This would seem to be the meaning of the text if necessity retains its Aristotelian sense of what cannot be otherwise.

But is not something more than efficient causality involved in the argument? The bestowal of existence would seem to be the same, as far as the force of the reasoning is concerned, whether the caused beings are contingent or necessary. Accordingly it would be superfluous to make the notions of contingency and necessity suggest a new way for proving God's existence. The *Contra Gentiles*, aside from any reasons from its historical background, would be right in not listing this way among those by which philosophers and Christian teachers had proved it. But why, then, would the *tertia via* have been admitted into the *Summa Theologiae*? Who would be the philosophers who had used it, and does it involve something more than the efficient causality of the *secunda via*? "Cause of necessity" seems a different notion from "cause of existence". Do the sources of the notion offer any explanation of the difference?

In both the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Contra Gentiles* the argument is presented in terms of possibility. The relevant meanings of possibility are outlined briefly in the *De Potentia*, V, 3c: "Dicendum quod in rebus a Deo factis dicitur aliquid esse possibile dupliciter. *Uno modo* per potentiam a-gentis tantum... *Alio modo* per potentiam quae est in rebus factis; sicut possibile est corpus compositum corrupti". The instance given for the first type of possibility is the possibility of the world before it was created. For it to be created was possible. But the possibility did not lie in any creature, since as yet no creature existed. The possibility lay solely in the power of God, who was able to bring the world into existence. From this reasoning, one may conclude that the distinction is between a type of possibility on the one hand that is located in an efficient cause different from the thing called possible, and on the other hand a type of possibility that is found within that thing itself.

The latter type of possibility is then discussed against a twofold Arabian background. The question centers on whether things already in existence have in themselves any possibility for non-existence. The first view given is that of Avicenna:
‘CAUSE OF NECESSITY’ IN AQUINAS “TERTIA VIA” 29

Avicenna namque posuit, quod quaelibet res praeter Deum habebat in se possibilitatem ad esse et non esse. Cum enim esse sit praeter essentiam cuiuslibet rei creatae, ipsa natura rei creatae per se considerata, possibilitis est ad esse; necessitatem vero essendi non habet nisi ab alio, cuius natura est suum esse, et per consequens est per se necesse esse, et hoc Deus est.\(^\text{13}\)

What is meant by possibility within the thing itself for existence, becomes clear enough from this description. The essence of a creature is its nature considered as a potentiality for being, while the being is over and above the essence.\(^\text{14}\) Considered just in itself, then, the nature of a created thing is something that is able to be, but of itself it does not have that being. Any necessity of being that may be found in it will accordingly have to come from something else whose nature is its own being. In consequence this latter is in virtue of its own self necessary being — *per se necesse esse*. It is identified with God.

This throws considerable light on the terminology of the argument drawn up in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 15, Amplius). The possibility for existence and non-existence in perishable things is their natures or essences. The reason, namely that existence is over and above their essences, holds for all created things. Where a created thing has necessary existence, it has this necessity of existence not from itself but from a being that is necessary in virtue of the identity of existence with essence. In this view no ground for necessary being

\(^{13}\) *De Pot.*, V, 3c. The necessity of existing holds here for all created existents, though “a certain ambiguity in this regard” in both Alfarabi and Avicenna is noted by E. Fackenheim, “The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides,” *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, 16 (1947), 40, n. 4. On the view that the two Arabian thinkers were attempting to harmonize the necessary emanation in Neoplatonism with the Modern theology of creation, and on Averroes’ charge that this actually happened with them, see Fackenheim, 42-52.

\(^{14}\) “Tamen nature nomen hoc modo sumpte uidetur significare essentiam rei... set essentia dicitur secundum quod prae eam et in ea ens habit esse” — Aquinas, *De Ente*, c. I, p. 4.10-16. Cf. “esse preter formam” — c. IV, p. 35.1. For Aquinas there is likewise a sense in which contingent things have a purely existential necessity, in the way that it is necessary for Socrates to be seated while he is seated. See *De Pot.*, V, 4c. Aristotle, *Cat.*, I, 12, 281b9-12, stresses on the other hand the formal or essentialist aspect — to say that a man standing is not standing is false but not impossible. Alfarabi, *Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, tr. Muhsin Mahdi (New York, 1962), 83, could understand the Aristotelian division of propositions as into necessary, possible, and existential.
is located within the creature itself. At the same time, however, the Aristotelian eternity or necessity of the heavens and their immaterial movements is safeguarded within the framework of accepted theological doctrine.

Likewise the meaning of “cause of necessity”, as used in the tercia via and in the corresponding argument in the Contra Gentiles, begins to emerge. The context is that of existence. The nature of any created thing, considered just in itself, does not involve existence. Of itself, accordingly, it is something possible. Whatever necessity of existing it may have, it will have from the being that is itself existence. To have necessity of existing from something else means that the necessity is caused by the other being.

In the Avicennian view, then, the causality is efficient. The being that is necessary in virtue of itself efficiently causes whatever necessity any other beings may have. In the framework of Avicenna’s terminology the situation becomes clear enough. In the eighth treatise of his Metaphysics he was showing that in every series of causes there is a first principle that is one and separate from all, and that alone is necessary being (nescesse esse) and is that from which every existent thing has the source of its existence. After reaching the first efficient cause, the first cause absolutely, he proceeds without further ado to deal with the first cause under the designation of nescesse esse. The divisions of things in general into the possible and the necessary, and the necessary in virtue of itself and the necessary in virtue of something else, were accepted by him as basic. The remote background may without too much hesitation be seen in book lambda of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in which the first principle is reached from the starting point of perishable substances and established as eternal and incapable of being otherwise than it is. It is accordingly declared to exist “of necessity”, for one of the senses of necessity is that just mentioned, namely where a thing is not capable of being otherwise but has to be in one way only. On such a first principle, for Aristotle, depend the heavens (imperishable) and the world of nature (perishable, composed of matter and form).

15 Primum... ut ostendamus quod causae omnibus modis finitae sunt: et quod in unoquoque ordine earum est principium primum: et quod principium omnium illorum est unum: et quod est discretum ab omnibus quae sunt: ipsum solum ens nescesse esse: et quod ab ipso est principium sui esse omnis quod est. Metaph., VIII, 1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 97r-2-v1 (A).

16 Metaph., VIII, 3-4. Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), 211, notes that the Latin translation of Avicenna spread the formula causa agens for the cause of existence, while the Latin translation of Al-Ghazali popularized the formula causa efficiens. Both formulas were used as equivalent by Christian writers in the thirteenth century.

17 See above, n. 13.

18 Aristotle, Metaph., A 6-7, 1071b3-1072b14. Comparison of the formulas used shows that the type of necessity listed at 1072b13 is the type attributed to separate substance at b8, “that which
In this Aristotelian passage may be found the elements of Avicenna's general framework, though the special emphasis with him on the unicity of the first principle and the location of the necessity in the relation of existence to essence spring clearly enough from interest in the revealed doctrine of creation.

The Avicennian background for introducing the notion of a "cause of necessity" into the proof for God's existence is accordingly straightforward and verifiable in detail. It locates the cause of necessity outside creatures and solely in their first efficient cause. On the other hand, a reason within creatures is found in the doctrine of Averroes:

Commentator vero contrarium ponit, scilicet quod quaedam res creatae sunt in quarn natura non est possibilitas ad non esse, quia quod in sua natura habet possibilitatem ad non esse, non potest ab extrinseco acquirere sempiternitatem, ut scilicet sit per naturam suam sempiternum. Et haec quidem posito videtur esse rationabilior. Potentia enim ad esse et non esse non convenit aliquid nisi ratione materiae, quae est pura potentia.

In this continuation of the article in De Potentia, Aquinas regards the view that locates within the creature the lack of possibility for non-existence as the "more reasonable" of the two. Lack of possibility for non-existence is dealt with in terms of eternal duration, sempiternity. But a thing cannot be naturally sempiternal if it has within itself the possibility of non-existence. This calls for an examination of the principle by which a thing has potentiality for existence or non-existence, namely its matter.

cannot be otherwise". This basic sense is not understood existentially by Aristotle — see supra, n. 5. The thrust is not on the existing but on the "one way only".

On the Koranic background in "Everything goes to destruction except His Face" (Sura XXVIII, 88), see Fackenheim, art. cit. 51-52. Regarding existence as an accident for Avicenna in creatures, see F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, 4 (1958), 1-16. R. L. Franklin, "Necessary Being," The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 35 (1957), 99, notes that the theist's model for the dependence is "the way in which a man may influence matters by an act of will." But the model seems also to include intellection and other conscious acts that need not be free. It allows the efficient causality to be a necessary emanation as well as a free creation.

De Pot., V, 3c. Accordingly in this context, as A. Forest, "Comptes-Rendus," Bulletin Thomiste, 4 (1927), 147, notes, to say that spiritual substances have no potentiality for non-existence does not entail that it is impossible for them not to exist, where the latter clause is understood in the sense of logical impossibility.

For Aristotle, matter coincided with potentiality, as form did with actuality. Aquinas extends potentiality and actuality to spiritual substances but not as matter and form in any univocal sense: Ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma que est intelligencia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita inuenitur potentia et actus in intelligencis, non tamen forma et materia nisi equiuoce — De Ente, c. IV; p. 35.21-25. Cf. In I Sent., d.8, q. 5, a. 2, Solut. (I, 229); In II Sent., d.3, q. 1, a. 2, Solut. (II, 88).
Strictly speaking, the potentiality of matter is to form, and not at all directly to non-existence. Only through its potentiality to other forms is matter a tendency to non-existence under the form that presently actuates it:

Materia etiam, cum non possit esse sine forma, non potest esse in potentia ad non esse, nisi quatenus existens sub una forma, est in potentia ad aliam formam (De Pot., V, 3c).

Accordingly the role played by matter allows a twofold intrinsic lack of possibility in a creature for non-existence. Either there is no matter in its constitution, as in spiritual forms, or the possibility of the matter is exhausted by its present form, as in the heavenly bodies. In the first case the form subsists in its own being, and can no more be separated from its being than from itself.\textsuperscript{22} In the second case there is no contrariety of forms to initiate any process of corruption or perishing.\textsuperscript{23} The result is that only things with matter subject to contrariety have in their own nature possibility for non-existence. All other things have \textit{naturally} "necessitas essendi", with no possibility for non-existence in their nature (ibid.).

"Necessitas essendi", a term used regularly in the Latin Avicenna, is in this way regarded against the background of Averroes as the opposite of possibility for non-existence. If possibility for non-existence is taken away from a thing, the thing's existence has thereby the character of necessity. The thing can consequently be regarded as a necessary being,\textsuperscript{24} and not a possible one. The reason for the necessity is located in the created thing's nature in these cases, and not just, as with Avicenna, in the divine causality.

This view, for which the background mentioned is the doctrine of Averroes, finds accordingly in the creature itself the cause of necessity for exis-

\textsuperscript{22} De Pot., V, 3c; ST, I, 75, 6c.

\textsuperscript{23} Because the only motion observable to the ancients in the celestial bodies was the circular, which has no contraries, the traditional view expressed by Aristotle in De Caelo, I 2-5, 268 a1 ff., left these bodies unalterable and accordingly imperishable. They were in consequence included among necessary beings. P. Brown, art. cit., pp. 80 and 88, adds primary matter on account of its imperishability. But for Aquinas primary matter just in itself — the viewpoint from which it is imperishable — does not subsist and cannot have any kind of being: Est etiam quaedam creatura quae non habet esse in se, sed tantum in alio, sicut materia prima, sicut forma quaelibet, sicut universale; non enim est esse alicujus, nisi particularis subsistentis in natura — In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, Solut.; I, 227. Similarly the species do not subsist as such. An attempt to bring them under necessary things that have a cause of their necessity may be seen in A. Dondeyne, "De Tertia Via S. Thomae," Collationes Brugenses, 30 (1930), 196-197.

\textsuperscript{24} Sunt enim quaedam in rebus creatis quae simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse. CG, II, 30, Licet. Aquinas however seems to avoid express application of the term "ens necessarium" to creatures, even though he has no hesitation in using the adjective of the term \textit{res}; Nihil igitur prohibit res quaedam divina voluntate productas necessarias esse — ibid., Item.
tence. The cause is the creature’s nature, when the nature is either form alone or form that exhausts the potentiality of the matter. But this does not mean that the necessity for existence escapes divine causality, since the nature itself is caused by God:

Nec tamen per hoc removetur quin necessitas essendi sit eis a Deo, quia unum necessarium alterius causa esse potest, ut dicitur in V Metaphysic. Ipsius enim naturae creatae cui competit semipiternitas, causa est Deus (De Pot., V, 3c).

Necessity of existing, understood in this passage as sempiternity, has to be caused by God in a way that is not merely the bestowal of being. It pertains to the created nature itself. The cause of the created nature is thereby the cause of the sempiternity not only by giving it existence but by fashioning it in such a way that it requires perpetual existence.

The theme of the part played by nature is rounded out in the article of the De Potentia by noting that even in things that have the possibility of non-existence the matter is permanent and in it the form of the thing that perishes is reduced to a potential state. In all nature, therefore, there is no potentiality by which anything could tend towards nothingness. This seems meant to emphasize that the natural tendency of all things is towards existence, and that there should be no surprise in finding that in natures where there is no tendency to any other substantial existence the existence should be naturally permanent and in that sense necessary.

Having in this way established a cause of necessary existence in created natures, the article of the De Potentia returns to the causality exercised by the power of God. Anything that in itself is impossible, for instance something that involves a contradiction, may be called impossible for God. From this viewpoint non-existence is not impossible for creatures, since none have existed from all eternity. Because a creature is not its own existence, there is no logical contradiction in predicating non-existence of it. In that sense there is no creature whatever of which one may now say its non-existence is impossible. Likewise there is no intrinsic necessity compelling the divine power to keep anything in existence, nor are creatures necessary in order to ensure divine goodness and happiness. Only on the supposition of his own plan to keep things perpetually in existence can their being be regarded as necessary:

Relinquitur ergo quod non est impossibile Deum res ad non esse reducere; cum non sit necessarium cum rebus esse praebere, nisi ex suppositione suae ordinationis et praescientiae, quia sic ordinavit et praescivit, ut res in perpe-
tuum in esse teneret (ibid.).

Does not this throw the whole question back to the position just ascribed to Avicenna? In the last analysis, the sempiternity of any creature depends upon the divine causality that keeps it in existence. Even though its nature should call for perpetual existence, it could be reduced to non-existence by the divine will. Does its sempiternity then depend just on the divine will, as Plato described the immortality of the gods in relation to the will of the demiurge, or does a further dependence upon an established order and foreknowledge allow also the creature’s nature to play its role in causing perpetuity of existence?

The answer is not spelled out in this article of the *De Potentia*. It seems left implied in the notion of divine foreknowledge and providence. It is apparently left to follow from the understanding that the divine plan respects the natures of things and requires that existence be imparted according to the exigencies of these natures. The reasoning proceeds as though the natures of the heavenly bodies and of spiritual subsistents can be the cause of perpetuity for the existence of these things, even though the natures themselves are caused by God and the bestowal of their existence depends upon his free will. In the reply to one of the arguments, the necessity caused in them by the divine will is in fact termed absolute:

...licet creaturae incorruptibiles ex Dei voluntate dependeant, quae potest esse praebere et non praebere; consequuntur tamen ex divina voluntate absolutam necessitatem essendi, in quantum in tali natura causatur, in qua non sit possibilitas ad non esse; tali enim sunt cuncta creata, qualia Deus esse ea voluit, ut dicit Hilarius in libro *De Synodus* (*De Pot.*, V, 3, ad 12m).

What Aquinas presupposes in this article, apparently, is a framework in which imperishable creatures have in themselves absolute necessity in regard to their existence, yet have that existence in dependence upon a will that is free to continue imparting it or to withdraw it. The absolute necessity is acquired from the divine will, yet is absolute because these creatures are caused by God in a nature that has no possibility for non-existence. But the reason they have that nature is that God willed it to be such. Is there circularity in this reasoning, or does the earlier thinking of Aquinas provide a framework in which it proves to be consistent?

III

In this as in most of the important questions in Aquinas, the basis of his philosophical thought may be looked for in the commentary on the *Sentences*. There it is often worked out in vivid detail and with a welcome freshness that in the later works gradually gives way to more mature and settled terminology or established discussion. For instance, at the philosophical root of an issue that has been crucial in the topic just considered
lies the radical distinction between simple apprehension and judgment. Through the first, conceptualization, things are known from the standpoint of their natures. Through the second, they are apprehended from the viewpoint of their existence. The Arabian background for the way these two different acts of intellection were related respectively to nature and to existence, and the character of judgment as an act of apprehension as well as of composition, emerge most clearly in the early terminology used in the commentary on the Sentences. The vital bearing of these considerations on the tenet that existence is known as an actuality over and above the content of a thing’s nature should be readily apparent. From that tenet the reasoning to subsistent existence and the real distinction between nature and existence in creatures took place, as well as to the total dependence of creatures on the first cause, and their consequent possibility in that respect.

In regard to the way the nature and existence of creatures are respectively related to their first cause, the Prologue of the commentary on the Sentences outlines a special type of “analogy”:

... aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ante descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur (In I Sent., Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 10).

A creature, according to this text, receives both its existence and its aspect (ratio) of a being from the creator. Both are involved in the relation to its maker that goes under the designation “analogy” for Aquinas. The creature has its existence from its creator, as is shown in the commentary by arguments among which that from Avicenna has the most prominent place. But it also has from its creator the aspect that characterizes it as a being, just as it has the characteristic and existence of wisdom or any other quality from the creator as the ultimate source. Only insofar as it imitates the first being may a creature be called a being.


27 De Ente, c. IV; pp. 34.4-35.21. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, Solut.; I, 229-230.

28 This two-term relation is not made clear by the present-day use of the English word “analogy.” On the problem, see my article “Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being,” Mediaeval Studies, 24 (1962), 303-322.

29 See In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 94. Ibid., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut.; I, 222. In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 87.
The language of imitation throws the problem into the framework of exemplar causality. The first efficient cause, according to this doctrine of analogy, by imparting existence makes creatures imitations of itself. Yet the imitation takes place according to different aspects, such as being or wisdom. The first cause functions as a form after which the effects are fashioned. The exemplar causality is spelled out clearly:

Unde ipse est exemplaris forma rerum, non tantum quantum ad ea quae sunt in sapientia sua, scilicet secundum rationes ideales, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt in natura sua, scilicet attributa. Quidam autem dicunt, quod ista attributa non differunt nisi penes connotata in creaturis: quod non potest esse: tum quia causa non habet aliquod ab effectu, sed e converso (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 63).

Here the first efficient cause is presented as a form according to which all other things are modeled. In this way it produces effects similar to itself, though in the fashion that Aquinas calls “analogous”: “cum secundum formam suam producat effectus similes, non univoce, sed analogice; sicut a sua sapientia derivatur omnis sapientia” (ibid.). But this exemplar form is regarded as containing both aspects that are attributes and aspects that are ideas. These latter are the forms of created things:

... ita etiam formae materiales habent duplex esse, ut dicit Commentator in XI Metaph.: unum in actu secundum quod in rebus sunt; et alium in potentia activa secundum quod sunt in motoribus orbium, ut ipse ponit, et praecipue in primo motore, loco cuius nos in Deo dicimus. Unde spud omnes philosophos communer dicitur quod omnia sunt in mente Dei, sicut artificiata in mente artificis; et ideo formas rerum in Deo existentes ideas dicimus, quae sunt sicut formae operativae (In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 839).

The notion of divine ideas for all created things is accordingly accepted by Aquinas as a position common to all philosophers, and is interpreted by him as a doctrine of “operative forms”. This means that the divine power, in imparting existence, is operating in accordance with these forms. The basic exemplar for the products, however, remains the divine esse: “... si essentia sua exemplar omnium rerum ponatur: quia, sic intuendo essentiam suam, omnia producit” (ibid., ad 2m; p. 840). This is carefully explained:

Unde cum hoc nomen ‘idea’ nomen essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum... et ex hoc sunt plures rationes ideales, secundum quod Deus intelligit essentiam suam ut imitabilem per hunc veler illum modum” (ibid., a. 2, Solut.; p. 842).

The divine activity is in this way understood as imparting existence in a manner that is fashioned or guided by exemplar causality. Here as
elsewhere in the commentary on the Sentences the two phases are kept together, and there is no thought of ever separating them. Existence is bestowed upon a creature in the way that the creature imitates the divine essence. This ability to imitate the divine essence comes however from the divine essence itself, because the divine essence can be imitated in the particular way. The cause does not depend upon the effect, but vice versa. In both orders, that of existence and that of essence, the divine causality will remain supreme.

What consequences will this view have for the problem of possibility and necessary existence? Its tenets would indicate that existence is bestowed in the way required by the essence of the created thing, even though that essence depends ultimately upon the exemplar causality of the divine essence for its exigencies. If an essence such as a spiritual form exhibits absolute necessity, it will have the cause of this necessity in God:

Necessarium autem absolute dicitur quod est necessarium per id quod in essentia sua est; sive illud sit ipsa essentia, sicut in simplicibus; sive, sicut in compositis, illud principium sit materia, sicut dicimus, hominem morti est necessarium; sive forma, sicut dicimus, hominem esse rationalem est necessarium. Hoc autem absolute necessarium est duplex. Quoddam enim est quod habet necessitatem et esse ab alio, sicut in omnibus quae causam habent: quoddam autem est cuius necessitas non dependet ab alio, sed ipsum et causa necessitatis in omnibus necessariis, sicut Deus (In I Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 166).

Here the notion "cause of necessity" emerges from a discussion of the basic Aristotelian divisions of the necessary. The range given the concept of necessity is accordingly broad and is located firmly in the tradition that goes back to the Stagirite. But the influence of the Arabian developments is apparent in the coupling of existence and necessity in a context in which a cause of necessity is sought for some absolutely necessary things. This is located in the necessity of the first cause: "necessitas primae causae quae non dependet ab alio, sed ipsa potius est causa necessitatis in omnibus aliis" (ibid., p. 167).

The framework accordingly of a "cause of necessity" is not regarded as an ad hoc device for the construction of an argument to prove God's

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30 E.g.: ... cum creatura exemplariter procedat ab ipso Deo sicut a causa quoddammodo simili per analogiam ex creaturis potest in Deum deveniri tribus illis modis — In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, Solut. (I, 96 — the reason for all three ways is that a creature has existence from something else, p. 88); nominat Deum per esse inventum in creaturis, quod exemplariter deductum est ab ipso — d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 (p. 196); a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat — a. 2, Solut. (p. 198); rationem causae exemplaris et effectivae tantum in Deo — a. 3, Solut. (p. 200); per modum efficientis exemplaris — d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, Solut. (p. 898). Cf. d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, Solut. (pp. 491-492); d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, Solut. (p. 535).
existence. It is introduced in the discussion of a Trinitarian problem, and is seen as extending to all types of necessity including logical necessity that is based on form. It follows the Aristotelian text in distinguishing between things that are necessary in virtue of themselves and others that are necessary by reason of something else: "Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, but themselves are the source of necessity in other things". The preoccupation with existence in connection with necessity, and the funneling of the final division towards a single cause of the necessity in all other necessary things, indicate a metaphysical background that is no longer Greek. As with the Arabs, the division of being into the necessary and the possible or contingent is accepted as basic by Aquinas: "Necessarium enim et possibile dividunt ens. Si igitur Pater non genuit Filium necessitate, genuit ipsum contingenter vel possibiliter" (In I Sent., d.6, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1, I, 165). In the context of this discussion, then, contingency and possibility show no appreciable distinction from each other in their contrast to necessity. They are not taken as subcontraries.

With the terminology and divisions and background of the topic determined in the early thinking of Aquinas, one may now proceed to his discussion of possibility and the opposed necessity in the commentary on the Sentences. The discussion takes place in regard to the mutability of creatures, an Augustinian theme with an Aristotelian parallel. The introduction to the reasoning comes from the Aristotelian connection of movement with potentiality:

... motus, quocumque modo dicatur, sequitur potentiam. Cum igitur omnis creatura habeat aliquid de potentia, quia solus Deus est purus actus, oportet omnes creaturas mutabiles esse, et solum Deum immutabilem (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 2, Solut.; I, 213).

The notion of passive potency, which in Aristotle was synonymous and coextensive with that of matter, is in this way extended to all creatures including immaterial ones. With pure actuality limited to one instance only, God, the notion of passive potentiality now includes all possibility, and is immediately taken up under the designation of possibility. Every creature, because its existence is from another, according to Avicenna's reasoning "quantum est in se, est possibile, et ista possibilitas dicit dependentiam ad id a quo est" (ibid.). Upon this dependence or possibility there follows a mutability that consists in the possibility of annihilation (vertibi-

31 Aristotle, *Metaph.*, A 5, 1015b9-11; Oxford tr. The Greek text uses the word *aióa* 'cause': "the cause of their being necessary".
32 See above, n. 13.
litas in nihil). But here there is no mutability in the strict sense of the notion, since there is no substrate that changes. Another reason may be added:

Alia ratio est, quia nihil dicitur possibile cuius contrarium est necessarium, vel quod non potest esse, nisi impossibili posito. Esse autem creaturae omnino deficere non potest, nisi retrahatur inde fluxus divinae voluntatis in creaturis, et hoc est impossibile ex immutabilitate divinae bonitatis, et contrarium necessarium (ibid.; p. 214).

The wording is strong. Any withdrawal of the divine will in regard to the bestowal of existence is impossible. The word “impossible” is used three times in these few lines to characterize the notion. Its contrary, namely the continued bestowal of existence to which the creature’s essence is a potency, is in consequence necessary. Since its contrary is necessary, it cannot be described as “possible”. The reason lies in the immutability of the divine goodness.

What does this mean? On the one hand, from a metaphysical viewpoint every creature in virtue of its own essence is a possible, because it is a potency in respect of the being it receives from something else. On the other hand, its annihilation is impossible, because the condition required for annihilation is impossible. The condition would be a change in the divine will. But the change is precluded by the immutability of the divine goodness.

All this makes a consistent picture. The annihilation of a creature is logically possible, since its existence is from one relevant viewpoint accidental to its nature. The annihilation is impossible, however, from the viewpoint of the divine will and its unchangeable goodness. As with Plato’s demiurge, the will of the maker is dominant. As with Avicenna, all creatures have their being and necessity from their first cause. But the immutable goodness of the maker here enters the question. As with Averroes, the natures of things are respected. Essence is the potentiality for existence, and where it requires permanent existence it is given existence in just that fashion. Where the essence has a principle that tends towards different existence, existence is bestowed accordingly. In all nature, consequently, there is no direct tendency to non-existence. The divine goodness respects this condition, and annihilation becomes impossible. These views on annihilation explain clearly enough how Aquinas could say in the De Potentia (V, 3, ad 12m) that imperishable creatures acquire from the divine will an “absolute necessity of existing”.

IV

Do these considerations from the earlier works of Aquinas clarify sufficiently the notion “cause of necessity” as used in the tertia via of the Summa Theologiae? They certainly explain the historical genesis of the terminology
and the overall framework of the argument. Its starting point, the presence of generable and destructible things in the world, is Aristotelian in terminology but is at once thrown into the Arabian background of possibility for existence instead of being left just in the context of potentiality for form: “Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quaedam inveniuntur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse” (ST, I, 2, 3c). The text then offers a difficulty. The Leontine edition gives the meaning “it is impossible for all things that are of this nature to exist always”. What seems to be the better reading, however, runs “But it is impossible for all existing things to be of this kind” — “Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse”. With this reading the time factor: does not take on any more significance than it has in the Aristotelian background, in which motion has always existed. Aristotle could in the context speak of the supposition that potentiality existed before actuality: “But if this is so, nothing that is need be; for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist”. The time adverbs in the tertia via seem merely to take up the Aristotelian formulation:

... quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum (ST, I, 2, 3c).

This reasoning holds equally in the supposition of a beginning of these things in time as in that of their existence from eternity. If everything was perishable in nature, there would have been nothing that was deter-


35 Metaph., A6,1071b25-26; Oxford tr. In Aristotle the verb έσται is in the future to signify “need be.” In Maixomides, with whom the argument is drawn up in the same general lines as in Aquinas, the verb (remanebit) in Latin translation is likewise in the future: “Quod si ita fuerit, nihil remanebit: ergo nec dator esse, et sequitur quod nihil esset omnino” — text in René Arnou, De Quinque Viis Senti Thomae (Rome, 1932), 80. Aquinas, however, uses the past tense, fuit. This wording has lent itself to the interpretation of the argument as envisaging possible things first: existing and then all finally perishing in the infinite course of past time. See P. Brown, art. cit., 86-87. This is open to mathematical objections. But with Aquinas, there does not seem to be any recourse to a calculus. The argument rather is open to the interpretation that there never would have been any existents to balance one against another in terms of their recurring possibility. Cf.: “Aussi bien, ne voyons-nous pas que S. Thomas ait pensé à la disparition des êtres en acte; il nous semble, au contraire, qu’il envisage plutôt leur non-apparition. Du moins nous croyons pourvoir interpréter sans peine dans ce sens le texte en litige” — L. Chambat, “La ‘Tertia Via’ dans Saint Thomas et Aristote,” Revue Thomiste, 32 (1927), 335.
mined to existence. In that case there would have been a time in which nothing existed. The “aliquando nihil fuit in rebus” cannot with Aquinas, for whom time follows upon motion and existence, mean that there was an absolute time without: any things. Rather, it parallels the way he can speak of the possibility of the world before it existed, even though time is dependent upon mobile being,36 or the way Aristotle (loc. cit., 1071b24) after saying that without time there can be no before or after (b8-9) can speak counterfactually of potentiality existing before anything was actual.37 Aristotle is concerned with motion, Aquinas with existence. Aristotle’s objective is to show that the eternal motion in changeable things requires for its explanation other and eternally unchangeable beings. Without these entirely actual beings, the potentiality in changeable things would never have been actualized and there would not be anything at all. The objective of Aquinas is to show that without necessary being nothing would now exist. In corresponding fashion a case may be made that here he is in no way envisaging a situation in which contingent things had existed and then for lack of continued support by necessary being finally passed out of existence. Rather his meaning is that without necessary being the contingent things would never have come into existence at any time.38 In this light the thrust of the reasoning is the same as that in formulation of the Contra Gentiles (I, 15, Amplius): “Omne autem quod est possibilis esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se acuælisset se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ci appetit esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa”.

The problem for Aquinas, accordingly, is the bestowal of existence upon things that do not have existence in virtue of their own essence. The remote


37 Hippocrates G. Apostel, Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Bloomington and London, 1966), 399, n. 13, takes the “before” to mean priority “in existence (or in nature, or in substance),” as though priority in time were not included. Yet priority in time is included by Aristotle in his discussion of the impossibility in the counterfactual hypothesis, and he shows that though potentiality can be prior in an individual to actuality, in an overall sense actuality has to be prior in the order of time (Metaph., Θ 8, 1049b11-1050a3).

38 For this way of understanding the text, and for its verbal resemblances with the Aristotelian passage, see Chambat, art. cit., 335-337. But Aristotle, Caed. I 12, 281a28-30, would support Maimonides.
background is the Aristotelian requirement of eternally actual things to explain the successive actualizing of perishable things in the eternity of cosmic motion. Since for Aquinas the ultimate actuality of anything is existence rather than form, the change to the existential framework is understandable. The influence of the “third philosophical speculation” of Maimonides, with the tenet that if all the individuals of a species are perishable the species itself is likewise perishable, may have played its own role in having Aquinas include the argument in the Summa Theologiae among the standard ways to prove that God exists. However, no source is mentioned in the tertia via. Placed nowhere else among the formal lists of arguments directed to this purpose, it can hardly help but reflect some concern.

39 “Now it is indubitable, as you know, that what is possible with regard to a species must necessarily come about” — Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, II, 1; tr. Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), 247. This obviously enough envisages a situation in which things already existent would have perished: “Now if all of them have undergone corruption, it would be impossible that anything exists, for there would remain no one who would bring anything into existence” — ibid. Maimonides (ibid.) expressly takes over this “third philosophic speculation” from Aristotle, though realizing that its purpose is different with the Stagirite. However, as Arnou, op. cit., 79, n. 2, observes, Maimonides took the construction of the argument as a proof for the existence of God from Avicenna. Cf. Avicennian formulations in Arnou, 59-71. The formulation of the tertia via of Aquinas follows closely enough that of Maimonides, even to the point of giving perhaps most readers the impression that he like Maimonides is envisaging a hypothetical situation in which things existed and then all perished. P. Gény remarks: “Celle de Maimonide présente de telles ressemblances avec la troisième voie de la Somme, que celle-ci paraît bien n’en être qu’un résumé” — “A Propos des Preuves Thomistes de l’Existence de Dieu,” Revue de Philosophie, 31 (1924), 587. On the other hand Chambat, art. cit., 334-335, rejects the influence of Maimonides because of the different viewpoint in the situations envisaged by the two thinkers as just noted, and observes that Aquinas makes no use of the principal part of Maimonides’ reasoning in the passage, namely that what is possible for the species comes about necessarily. The latter notion, however, might be difficult to see in the Latin translation included by Arnou (80) in the source material for Aquinas’ five ways: “possibile autem in genere necessario est.”

Chambat has no hesitation, though, in allowing (337, n. 1) the Aristotelian background for Maimonides’ phraseology in this matter. There is general agreement then that Aristotle’s argument for the eternity of the world is the ultimate source of the reasoning. With Avicenna the argument was placed in the Arabic framework of the possible, the necessary through a cause, and) the necessary in virtue of itself. In the Metaphysics Compendium, I, 2, 2, 1 (tr. Carame, pp. 91-100) the argument is used to prove the existence of uncaused necessary being. In the Avicennian texts available to Aquinas this orientation was not so express. Accordingly the Avicennian structure, as found in the Contra Gentiles — “Celle d’Avicenne, reprise par Dominique Gundissalvi, est acceptée et traduite presque littéralement par saint Thomas au Contra Gentiles, I, 15,” Gény, art. cit., 586-587 — need not be included among the arguments by which philosophers had proven the existence of God. It could be used rather for demonstrating that God was eternal. Where Maimonides was the immediate source, as in the formulation in the tertia via of the Summa Theologiae, the argument was ready to be included in the ways of proving that God exists, ways that had already been used by others.
at the time of the *Summa Theologiae* with the immediate creation and conservation of all finite things by a unique first cause. For Aristotle a plurality of necessary beings could account for the actuality of perishable things, for an Arab the necessary finite causes could bestow on them their existence.\textsuperscript{40} The argument had to be structured to show that even when these eternal and necessary beings had been reached it had still to proceed towards establishing why they themselves existed necessarily.\textsuperscript{41} Since their essences are not existence, they also have to have their existence from something else. But since their essences contain no principle that would make them perishable, they can never as far as their essences are concerned lose their existence. The divine goodness requires that existence be imparted according to the way the creatures imitate the divine essence. All these components add up to the notion that the first efficient cause is the cause of necessity for all other necessary beings.

V

"Cause of necessity" in the *tertia via*, then, has facets in both the existential and essential orders. It includes both efficient and exemplar causality. Beyond doubt it is concerned with the imparting of existence. But it is also preoccupied with the bestowal of existence in the way the essences of the different types of creatures demand. For Aquinas there are finite essences that possess existence necessarily, once it has been bestowed upon them. These are the angels, human souls, and celestial bodies. In the basic Aristotelian reasoning that arrived at separate substances, finite necessary beings would be sufficient to account for the eternity of cosmic motion. To the existence of finite necessary beings Aquinas could have no objection. If the Aristotelian framework was to be accepted for the demonstration of God's existence, it would in consequence have to be structured in a way that went beyond finite necessary beings to a unique first cause. This first

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\textsuperscript{40} Existence of the material forms in the active power of the movens for the celestial bodies is presented as the doctrine of Averroes by Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, Solut.; I, 839. Sources for the doctrine of mediate creation are listed in the Ottawa edition of the *Summa Theologiae*, I, 45, 5, I, 288a36. For Aquinas the celestial bodies remained intermediate causes of generation: sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem — *ST*, I, 104, 1c.

\textsuperscript{41} L. Charlier, "Les Cinq Voies de Saint Thomas," in *L'Existence de Dieu*, ed. Collège Dominicain de Théologie à La Sarte-Huy (Tournai, 1961), 207: "Dire qu'ils ont une cause de leur nécessité, c'est reconnaitre qu'ils ne sont pas éternels au sens fort du mot". Aquinas, it is true, requires real identity of essence and existence for his own notion of eternity, of which eviernity is a participation, but he recognizes that the traditional teachers (*doctores*) hardly give notice to any distinction between the two types of duration — *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 64.
cause had to be the cause not only of the existence of these creatures, as in the secunda via, but also the cause why their existence was necessary or sempiternal. The exemplar causality of the first cause met this further requirement. No: only the existence of the created world, but also the necessity found in it, can provide a way of demonstrating the existence of God.

One may readily admit, then, that against the Arabian background the basic Aristotelian argument for reaching separate substance required the presentation given in the tercia via of Aquinas. A quite different question is whether the framework of the tercia via has any relevance in the modern setting. Surely no one today would after establishing the contingency of the observable world attempt to account for it by angels or imperishable heavens or spiritual souls. The direct character of the path from things that have existence contingently to a single necessary being seems accepted by both advocates and adversaries of the cosmological argument.42

From the viewpoint of demonstrating the existence of God, which is the one real concern of the argument, the foregoing objection is well taken. The probative force of the argument lies in the consideration that no nature except the unique subsistent existence contains being as one of its essential notes. Whether the existence of a creature is temporal or eternal, it requires subsistent being as its efficient cause. Necessary being is not a starting point for the demonstration, and is not required as an intermediate stage. Subsistent existence, reached without the intermediary of necessary beings, can at once be established as necessary and eternal because of the identity in it of essence with existence. But that is a consequence, not a stage of the argument. The force of the proof itself lies in the bestowal of existence upon contingent things, and is complete when the first cause of existence is reached. From the start it proceeds in the order of existence, and not in the order of merely logical necessity. It cannot be reduced to the ontological argument.

In another way, however, the tercia via does have relevance for modern thinking. The Platonic dominance of the mere will of the demiurge over the natures with which things are endowed, the Avicennian stand of allowing no necessity at all to spring from the natures of created things, the Cartesian dependence of even the eternal truths on the divine will, all exhibit a voluntarism that ill accords with any appeal of God to modern man. "The cause is in my will", alone and blunt, is no more conciliatory or attractive in real life than in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (II, 3, 71). In its

42 On contemporary encounter with the notion "necessary being" in this context, see for example J. Hick, "God as Necessary Being," Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), 725-734; T. Penelhum, "Divine Necessity," Mind, 69 (1960), 175-186.
jejune outlines, as in the secunda via, the argument from the bestowal of existence brings to the fore only the power of the first cause. The tertia via, proceeding as it does through the different types of essences, shows in a fuller and more satisfactory way how the existence is imparted. It is imparted not arbitrarily or despotically, but as the natures of the various things require, and out of an infinite goodness that ensures the immutability of the divine will in this way of providing for creatures.

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Guthlac A: an Interpretation
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By virtue of its subject matter, the Old English poem Guthlac A is rightly classified as hagiography along with Elene, Juliana, Andreas, The Fates of the Apostles, and Guthlac B. Scholars have long recognized, however, that this classification is not wholly satisfactory, for the poem is not at all a typical member of the genre.1 Unlike Felix’s Latin life of Saint Guthlac, it does not fit neatly into the tradition of the ascetic’s life which grew out of Evagrius’ translation of Athanasius’ life of Saint Anthony.2 And while Guthlac’s verbal encounters with the demons reflect the debates in the passions of the martyrs,3 the poem is not simply an ascetic’s life modified by the related traditions of the passion. Guthlac A is concerned with only a portion of the saint’s career and could at best be considered as an expansion of one element of a typical life. But the difference is more fundamental than this, for in place of narrative and eulogy, the standard ingredients of the saint’s life, the poem gives us interpretation and explicit didacticism.

Professor Laurence K. Shook has recently pointed out a second group of writings to which the poem is heavily indebted: apocryphal apocalyptic literature.4 While the subject matter shows frequent affinities with the Vision of St. Paul and similar works, the prevalence of interpretive and didactic material separates the poem from this tradition as much as it separates it from saints’ lives, for apocalyptic literature tends to be predominantly descriptive, providing vivid and detailed images both of the beauties of heaven and of the horrors of hell. There are no such descriptions in Guthlac A; information on extra-terrestrial places and beings is austerely unembellished and rigorously subordinated to thematic issues.


2 Kurtz, art. cit., discusses at length the relationships between Felix’s life and Evagrius’ Latin translation of the life of St. Anthony; see especially pp. 103-127, 140-142. The non-Antonian qualities of Guthlac A are discussed on pp. 144-146. Shook, “Prologue,” p. 10, also mentions the non-Antonian qualities of the poem.


4 “Prologue,” 299-304.
These differences from saints' lives and from apocalyptic literature serve to direct attention to the poem's ideological content, yet this aspect of the work has not been adequately studied. Until recently Guthlac A was not considered worthy of much attention as a literary work, although the issues of its authorship, relationship to Guthlac B, indebtedness to Felix's Latin life, and unity were explored. Within the present decade, Professor Shook has effectively challenged the consensus on the poem's literary inferiority and has argued convincingly for its artistic and theological respectability. In two articles, he has demonstrated the skill with which the supernatural elements and the motif of the barrow are used to provide the poem with a structure and has established the poet's extensive knowledge of medieval teachings on the supernatural world. His vindication does not, however, extend to an analysis of thematic concerns. What little he says on this subject is much less illuminating than are his discussions of the poem's structure and of the erudition of its author. His characterisation of the work as "a kind of theological treatise on angels," is misleading, for the poet is far more concerned with ethical teachings than with facts about demons and angels. His listing of other issues discussed in the poem creates an impression of thematic disunity. Professor Stanley B. Greenfield perpetuates this impression with a similar listing in his discussion of Guthlac A in A Critical History of Old English Literature and adds that the poem's presentation of the struggle between good and evil" is relatively "elemental and unsophisticated." The latter opinion becomes a definite criticism in Professor Rosemary Woolf's chapter on saints' lives in E. G. Stanley's Continuations and Beginnings.

The present study will investigate the poet's thematic approach to his materials and to the literary conventions to which he is indebted. It will show that the poem differs in theme as well as in form from saints' lives and from apocalyptic literature. Both the ascetic's life and apocalyptic writings emphasize God's austerity and the difficulty in mastering evil. Guthlac A, in contrast, implicitly challenges these emphases and replaces them with positive arguments for confidence in God's help in this life and for the expectation of heaven in the next. The passions of the martyrs celebrate the martyr's triumph over physical suffering and death; the physical challenges
which confront Guthlac in the poem, on the other hand, are far less significant than the spiritual challenges which they come to symbolize. The poem’s ethical teachings, although hardly profound, are less simplistic than has been supposed and are presented within a coherent thematic structure. The adaptation of traditional material in support of these teachings is, moreover, both skillful and boldly original.

I

Guthlac’s two temptations provide the clearest evidence of the poet’s thematic intent and the most telling indication of his approach to literary conventions. It will be recalled that after a series of verbal encounters with the saint, the demons are given permission to subject him to more rigorous trials. They tempt him first by carrying him up in the air to show him the corruption in the monasteries and then by taking him to the gates of hell. In each temptation, conventions associated with emphasis on the dreadfulness of God’s justice and on the difficulty of avoiding the snares of evil are used to support affirmations of hope and of the reasons for confidence, and warnings against the dangers of despair.

Guthlac’s vision of the monasteries reflects two conventional approaches to monastic worldliness. The first, particularly prevalent in Anglo-Saxon times, is direct criticism of monastic corruption accompanied by appeals for reform. A reader of Alcuin’s letters, for example, soon finds that Alcuin and the poet’s demons say much the same thing about monasteries and say them in much the same way. The second approach takes a variety of forms, but is a common motif in hagiographic narratives. A monk or ascetic is exposed to the world with the result that he either renews his dedication or is drawn back into the world only to be ensnared in its sins or, at best, to suffer a decline in spiritual power. The closest parallel to the

11 See, for example, Ep. 19, 20, 21, 42 (Albini, Epistolae, ed. E. Duemmler, MGH: Epist. IV [Berlin, 1895]). Ep. 114, although it concerns the secular rather than the regular clergy, is in the same vein. The poet’s list of monastic ills in lines 417-419a is especially reminiscent of Alcuin as is the particular concern with young monks.
12 St. Gregory and St. Martin, both recalled from seclusion to assume ecclesiastical duties, are reported to have experienced a reduction in spiritual power: On Gregory, see Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, II, i; Charles Plummer, ed., Venarabilis Bedae: Opera Historica (Oxford, 1896), I, 74. On Martin, see Sulpicius Severus’ Dialogues, II, iv; C. Halm, ed., Sulpicii Severi libri qui supersunt, CSEL, I (Vienna, 1866), 184. For a few of the many examples of episodes presenting the desire to return to the world as a temptation, see the following: Jerome, Life of St. Malchus, ch. 3 (PL 23, 56-57); Gregory of Tours’ accounts of Secondellus and of St. Senoch in Liber vitae patrum,
poem I have found in an incident described by Gregory of Tours in his Miraculorum libri iii. Through the machinations of the devil, St. Patroclus is tempted to return to the world and to devote his life to good works. In answer to his prayer an angel provides a column from which he may view the sins of the world. The angel reminds him that to return to the world is to risk perishing along with it and directs him to continue his present way of life. The saint obeys. Usually, the exposure to the world is less spectacular than in this story and is seen as a temptation to be resisted rather than as an educational experience benignly administered. Whatever the form of the episodes, the moral implications remain the same. For an ascetic the appropriate response is to recognize the dangers of the world and to commit himself the more forcefully to a life separate from them.

For Guthlac, however, recognition of the sins of the world is not a salutary incentive to virtue, but a temptation to despair for others. The demons carry the saint up in the air and show him the corruption in the monasteries in the hope that the sight will convince him of the domination of evil (412-420). Guthlac overcomes the temptation by affirming the good in this world and by placing the bad in a proper perspective. Thus he tells his tormentors that the trip aloft itself has afforded him a glimpse of the light of the heavens ("Was me sweges leocht / torht ontyned, beah ic torn druge." [486b-487]) and says that the demons cannot hide from him the knowledge of good monks, although they have shown him only the bad (492b-493a). The young monks, moreover, are merely acting as one expects the young to act; they will acquire the virtues of age in due time:

"God scop geoguðe ond gumena dream; ne magun þa ætheryl in þam ærcstan blade geberan, ac hy blissiað woruldæ wynnum, oddet wintra rim gegoð in þa geoguðe, þet se gast lufað osyn auf ætwist yldran hades, ðe gemete monige geond middangcard þeowiað in þeawum." (495-502a)

In the conventional evidence of worldliness presented to him, the saint sees a manifestation of the expected and divinely sanctioned order of things.

X, 2, and XV, 2 (Bruno Krusch, ed., MGH Scriptorum Rerum Merovingicarum, I (Hannover, 1885), 707, 722); Sulpicius Severus’ story of a nameless young man in Dialogues, I, xxii (C. Halm, ed. cit., 174-175).

13 Liber vitae patrum, IX, 2; Bruno Krusch, ed. cit. 704.

14 The edition of the poem used throughout this article is that in George Philip Krapp and Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie, edd., The Exeter Book, The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records, 3 (New York, 1936), 49-72.
The visit to hell differs from tradition in much the same way, but the great frequency with which this motif occurs in medieval literature makes the difference more striking. In the *Dialogues*, Gregory states that the purpose of the visits is to impress on the visitor and on those who learn of his experience the urgency of seeking salvation by warning them of the consequences of failing to do so. Gregory is speaking of actual visits made by those who die and are returned to life, but what he says, also applies to accounts of hell in apocalyptic writings and to descriptions of hell in general. In the poem, the traditional warning becomes a temptation to despair for personal salvation. At the gate of hell, the demons remind the saint of his past sins and claim that God has delivered him into their hands to be cast into hell (569-573, 579-589). It would be entirely appropriate for the saint to express horror over his sins, resolve to mend his ways, or make a desperate plea for God’s mercy. He does none of these; instead his reply to the demons (592-684a) emphasizes a willing obedience to God which rests on confidence in Him and a joyous awareness of His goodness and love. Guthlac speaks of his gratitude for God’s gifts to men and angels and of his certainty of eternal reward; he points out that the demons are wretched indeed by comparison, for they can neither take pleasure in this world nor look forward to any good in the next. The excerpt quoted below in which Guthlac describes his spiritual condition and compares it to that of the demons is representative.

"Ic geþafian sceal
ægþwar calles  his anne dom,
ond him geornlice  gæstgemyndum
wille widerferh  wesan underþyded,
hyran holdlice  minum hælende
þeawum ond gëpyncðum,  ond him þoncian
ealra þara gieðena  þe god gescop
englum ærst  ond eorðwarum;
ond ic blëtsige  bliðe mode
lifes leohfruman,  ond him lof singe
þurh gedeþne dom  díaiges ond nihtes,
herge in heortan  heofonricæ weard.
þæt eow æfre ne bið  ufan alyfed
leofæs lissum,  þæt ge lof motan
dryhtne secgan,  ac ge deaðe sceolon
weallendne wean  wope besingan,
heaf in helle,  naþes herenisse
halge habban  heofoncyninges."  (600b-617)

15 IV, 36, 39; Migne, PL, 77, 381-384, 389-393.
The departures from tradition in the two temptations are too radical and too conspicuous to be accidental. In their efforts to drive Guthlac to despair for the world and for himself, the demons stress the very topics which give the conventional presentations of worldliness and of visits to hell their admonitory force. The saint’s responses are the antithesis of those usually called for: instead of shrinking from sin, he exalts in God’s love for man, and instead of fearing hell, he is confident of salvation. Felix’s Latin life of Saint Guthlac provides a precedent for the unusual treatment of the visit to hell, for here, as in Guthlac A, the demons take the saint to the gate of hell and threaten him with damnation.\(^{16}\) The poet undoubtedly knew the legend, although probably not from Felix,\(^{17}\) but his development of it and his addition of the parallel episode of the vision of monastic corruption go far beyond the suggestions afforded by the story alone. They indicate a dissatisfaction with the didactic approach associated with two popular subjects. The poet evidently found this approach conducive to despair and accordingly sought to provide an alternative which would replace it and, at the same time, answer the dangers inherent in it.

II

It can readily be seen that the presentation of this alternative didactic approach is the central purpose not only of the temptations but of the poem as a whole. We may note, first of all, that the temptations occupy more than a third of the poem and that they constitute the climax of the narrative. Guthlac’s victory over them marks the final defeat of the demons and the fulfillment of the task of winning the barrow for God; it is signalled by the dramatic arrival of Saint Bartholomew and by the transformation of the barrow into an earthly paradise where the saint awaits his entry into heaven itself. The architectonics support the emphasis of the plot, for the motif of the journey links the temptations to the accounts of the ascent of the righteous soul at the beginning and end of the work and sets them apart as acts

\(^{16}\) Chapter xxxi; Bertram Colgrave, ed., *Felix’s Life of Saint Guthlac* (Cambridge, Eng., 1956), 104-106.

\(^{17}\) The poet’s knowledge of Felix’s life is still in dispute. Gordon Hall Gerould, “The Old English Poems on St. Guthlac and Their Latin Source,” *MLN*, 32 (1917), 77-86, has convinced some that the poem is indebted to the Latin life; among these are Shook (“Burial Mound,” p. 2, note 4), Wolpers (op. cit. [above, note 1], p. 112, note 4), and Charles Kennedy (The Earliest English Poetry [London, 1943], p. 251). Kurtz (op. cit. [note 1, above], p. 143) and Greenfield (op. cit. [note 8, above], p. 120), however, regard the problem as unresolved. C. Schaar (Critical Studies in the Gawain Group [Lund, 1949], 39-41) considers the two works to be independent of each other; I have recently completed an article in support of this view.
in a cosmic drama: the saint prevails over temptations offered by this world and by hell and finally inherits the bliss of paradise.\textsuperscript{18} The prominence given to the temptations is inherent in the thematic structure as well; the confrontation between the temptations to despair and the affirmations of God's love for man and of the promise of eternal life is the poem's ideological center. The poet builds up to it skillfully, introducing the two positive themes early and opposing them to challenges which logically culminate in the temptation to despair. Once the temptations are overcome, the two themes are given final and emphatic expression at the conclusion of the poem. The outline below will facilitate the more detailed analysis of the thematic structure which follows.

I. Introduction (lines 1-92)
(a) A righteous soul on the way to heaven, 1-29. (b) The many ways to salvation, 30-37a. (c) The approach of the end of the world, 37b-59.
(d) The nature of the unrighteous and of the righteous, 60-80. (e) The ascetic, 81-92.

II. Exposition (lines 93-232)
(a) Guthlac's conversion and defense of the barrow, 93-153a. (b) Guthlac's virtues, 153b-183. (c) The demons' manner of attack and Guthlac's steadfastness, 184-232.

III. Debates (lines 233-403)
(a) First verbal encounter between Guthlac and the demons, 233-327. (b) Guthlac's way of life, 328-368.\textsuperscript{19} (c) Second verbal encounter, 369-403.

IV. Temptations (lines 404-733a)
(a) View of monastic corruption, 404-515a. (b) Visit to hell, 557-684a. Rescue by St. Bartholomew, 684b-733a.

V. Fruits of victory (lines 733b-818)
(a) Transformation of the barrow, 733b-748a. The significance of the transformation, 748b-780. (b) The ascent of Guthlac's soul to heaven, 781-789. The rewards of righteousness, 790-818.

The introductory first section consists of an apparently haphazard sequence of didactic passages, none of which touches directly on Guthlac. It offers special problems and can be considered more profitably after the rest of the poem has been discussed than here. The second section is, as one would expect, less directly concerned with thematic issues than are the

\textsuperscript{18} Shook discusses the parallel between the journeys at the beginning and end of the poem and the manner in which the apocryphal traditions link both to the journey to hell, "Prologue," 296, 298.

\textsuperscript{19} A folio is missing between lines 368 and 369. See Krapp and Dobbie, \textit{op. cit.} (above, note 14), p. lxxiv, note 2. The break interrupts a reflective speech by the saint on the need to respond to the guidance of the Holy Spirit with obedience and faith. The text resumes in the midst of a challenging reply to the demons.
sections which follow it. Although its primary function is to provide preliminary information, however, this section lays the foundations for the thematic development. The theme of God’s love for man, for example, receives implicit emphasis from the many references to the role God has played in the saint’s career. Thus we learn that God put an end to Guthlac’s youthful lusts (110b-113), settled the conflict between the angel and the demon over his future (133-135), revealed the barrow to Guthlac and taught him to love it (147b, 136b-1401), provided the saint with strength, wisdom, and angelic assistance (105b-107, 160b-163a, 172b-173a, 184-185a, 189b-190a, 202b-203a), and set a limit to the demons’ power (226-228a). The theme of the promise of eternal life is expressed through the presentation of Guthlac’s spiritual orientation. The saint’s desire for eternal life and his confidence that he can attain it lie back of his willing obedience to God’s will and his total lack of concern with worldly values. The connection is made clear at the beginning of the section when the poet announces that he will tell

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{hu Guothlac his} & \quad \text{in godes willan} \\
\text{mod gerehte,} & \quad \text{man eall forseah,} \\
\text{corólæ æpelu,} & \quad \text{upp gemunde} \\
\text{ham in heofonum.} & \quad (95-98a)
\end{align*}
\]

It is expressed again in the angel’s arguments to the youthful saint (119-126) and is implied in a direct reference to Guthlac’s heavenly hopes (170-172a). The expository section contributes to the thematic development not only through the narrative emphasis, but also through the introduction of motifs which are later repeated and drawn into the thematic locus. The remark that God caused the sinful lusts of Guthlac’s youth to abate (110b-113) is paralleled by the lines quoted earlier from the saint’s speech on the wayward young monks in the first temptation (495-502a). The wretched state of the demons, depicted briefly in reference to their motive in wanting the barrow (220-225), is later used to support by contrast both the positive themes (478-480, 505-512, 612-618, 623-684a). The demons’ claim that the saint is guilty of pride (208) and their threat of physical violence (191b-197a), mentioned by the poet, are heard from the demons themselves in the next section (269-270, 280-291). Later Guthlac turns the charge of pride against the demons (661-662) and shows that they themselves are the recipients of endless physical and spiritual misery (e.g., 623-628).

In the third section, the themes of God’s love for man and of the promise of eternal life are emphasized more strongly than in the preceding section. The poet continues to make them implicit in his narrative by references to God’s assistance and to the saint’s spiritual orientation, but now Guthlac himself speaks of his confidence in God’s help and in a heavenly reward.
The poet, moreover, concludes the section with a didactic passage in which he says that God protects all the righteous just as he protected Guthlac (396b-398a). The most significant thematic development in this section, however, is the opposition, established through the verbal encounters, between the two positive themes and the arguments used by the demons. In the verbal encounters, the demons’ technique takes shape as an attack on the saint’s confidence in himself and in God, and the saint’s affirmations emerge as the means of victory. The demons argue that Guthlac cannot possibly hold out on his own at the barrow and that he has no legitimate reason to expect God’s help (266-277); they threaten him with massive military attack should he fail to be persuaded (284b-291). Guthlac’s assurance that God will provide for him frees him from uncertainties about his capacity to survive in the barrow as well as from the worries that accompany worldly concerns:

“Ic eom dryhtnes þeow,  
he mec þurh engel oft afrefreð.  
Fordon mec longeþas lýt gegretað,  
sorge sealðun, nu mec sawelcund  
hyrde bihealdæð. Is min hyht mid god,  
ne ic me corðwelan owiht sinne,  
ne me mid mode micles gyrne,  
ac me dogra gehwam dryhten sendeð  
þurh monnes hond mine þearfe.” (314a-322)

His expectation of a reward in heaven enables him to accept with equanimity the physical hardships threatened and perpetrated by the demons, for it places the demons’ power in an area which is ultimately unimportant; the spiritual is all that really matters and it is not subject to the demons’ control:

“Ðeah min ban ond blod bu tu geweorþen  
eorþan to eacan, min se eca deþel  
in gefean fareð, þær he fægran  
botles brucreð.” (380-383a)

Guthlac’s victory is implicit in his spiritual immunity to the demons’ attacks, for the barrow, as the saint tells his tormentors, will be defended by spiritual rather than physical weapons. With a punning allusion to his own name, he asserts that he intends to offer Christ a more precious gift (lac) than martial combat.²⁰

²⁰ Although only the second component of the saint’s name actually appears, the first (mudu) is certainly suggested in lines 302b-305. The interpretation of the name as “battle-offering” rather than as the historically more accurate “battle-play” is discussed in W. F. Bolton, “The Background and Meaning of Guthlac,” JEGP, 61 (1962), 595-603. On a probable pun in line 182, see Fred G. Robinson, “The Significance of Names in Old English Literature,” Anglia, 86 (1968), 46.
"No ic eow sweord ongean
mid gebolgne hond  oðberan þence,
worulde wæpen,  ne sceal þes wong gode
þurh blodgyte  gebuen weorðan,
ac ic minum Criste  cweman þence
leofran lace." (302b-307a)

Debate remains the chief vehicle for thematic exposition in the fourth section and is reinforced as before by the narrative and by explicit didactic comments. The demons’ challenges are given a new dimension, however, when they assume the symbolically suggestive form of the two journeys; and they move appropriately away from the particulars of the saint’s situation toward greater universality. In the third section, the demons address themselves directly to Guthlac’s determination to remain at the barrow. The saint’s situation typifies in a general way that of any man confronted with his own inability to contend with unfavorable material conditions, and his speeches reflect the attitudes and beliefs appropriate to the confrontation. The universal implications of the situation are very general, however, and are not emphasized. When the demons’ efforts to undermine the saint’s confidence take the form of temptations to despair, Guthlac faces challenges with specific and immediately obvious universal significance. Any man can be tempted to despair for the world by considering its shortcomings and for himself by contemplating hell and the power of evil.

The positive themes undergo a similar development toward greater universality. Prior to the temptation section, what is said of God’s love for man and of the promise of eternal life is closely linked to the narrative and to the portrait of the saint. God’s assistance to Guthlac carries the encouraging message of His love and of His readiness to help all who seek to serve Him. Guthlac’s confidence in heaven argues for a like confidence and with it for obedience to God and for recognition of the triviality of the transient. The generalized nature of the temptations and their symbolic form serve to dissociate the themes from the particulars of Guthlac’s character and experiences. Both temptations are interpreted as denials of God’s goodness to mankind and are answered by asserting God’s love not only for Guthlac but for others as well. As we have already seen, Guthlac finds evidence of this love in the ordering of human life and in God’s gifts to the created order (495-502a, 600b-611). The poet reinforces the thematic generalizing by including a didactic passage discussing the saving work of Christ as a manifestation of God’s love for humanity (521-529). The theme of the promise of eternal life remains more closely associated with the figure of the saint, for Guthlac answers the demons’ claim that he is damned by asserting his confidence in his own salvation (e.g., 592-598, 645-652, 680b-684). The saint’s insistent comparisons between himself and the demons (505-512,
600-685) implicitly support the broadly relevant aspects of both positive themes, however, for the demons' thorough-going alienation from God serves in a negative way to make man's situation and prospects look bright. The demons, by rejecting the creation and asserting equality with God (629-631, 661-665a), have become permanently unable to praise God, to approach him through prayer, or to respond to his goodness in any way; their condition will never improve (e.g., 612-617, 632-636). Man is no such wretched exile; he can enjoy the good things of this life and gain salvation as well, assured that his efforts to be virtuous will be seen by God and will earn him God's protection on earth and the reward of heaven.

With the arrival of Saint Bartholomew and the return to the barrow, the poet comes back to the particulars of the saint's career. Guthlac has met and mastered what, for the poet, was the major challenge of his life, and the universal implications of his triumph have been expressed. Two consequences of the victory remain to be presented and commented upon before the conclusion of the poem. These are, of course, the transformation of the barrow and the saint's final journey to heaven. In the explanations which follow them, these episodes are shown to be emblematic of the two central themes. The transformation of the barrow is a manifestation of God's love. God performed the miracle in order to strengthen the faith of the weak by providing visible evidence, and in so doing He has demonstrated the love He bears for all creation and His desire that men should avail themselves of His gifts:

Eall þæs geodon in ussera
tida timan. Forþon þæs tweogan ne þearf
ænig ofer eorðan æelda cynnes,
ac swile god wyrceð gæsta lifes
to trumnaðe, þy læs þa tydron mod
þa gewitnesse wædan þurfe,
þonne hy in gesiðe soþes brucad.
Swa se æmlintiga ealle gesceafte
lufad under lyfte in lichoman,
monna mægðe geond middangeard.
Wile se waldend þæt we wisdom a
snytttrum swelgen, þæt his soð fore us
on his giefena gyld gengo weordæ,
da he us to are ond to ondgiæte
syleð ond sendeð, sawlum ryndeð
liþe lifwegas leohte geræhte. (753-768)

The didactic passage which follows the account of the ascent of Guthlac's soul holds out the promise of heaven to the righteous and enumerates the virtues through which it may be attained.
Swa soðfiestra  sawla motun
in ecne earad  up gestigan
rodera rice,  þa be ræfnad her
wordum cnd weorcum  wuldorcyninges
lare longsume,  on hyra lifes tid
earniað on corðan  ecan lifes,
hames in heahþu...  (790-796a)

From the expository second section on, then, the poem is so ordered as to give prominence to the themes of God’s love for man and of the promise of eternal life and to present these themes as an answer to the dangers of despair. The thematic relevance of the opening 92 lines is less easily discerned. It is impossible, in the first place, to speak of this introductory section as a coherent whole. The five subdivisions indicated in the outline above constitute five separate passages. While there is nothing inherently illogical about the sequence, the absence of transitions leaves the thematic intent in doubt. The structural connections between the first division and the body of the poem have been demonstrated by Professor Shook;\(^{21}\) the thematic relevance is clear from the subject matter. The fifth division is concerned with ascetics and leads smoothly into the expository section. Apart from the thematic and structural appropriateness of these two passages, however, and possibly a few minor thematic parallels elsewhere, the only striking similarity between the introduction and the rest of the poem is the unusually positive approach. The first 29 lines concern the heavenly reward which awaits those who obey God’s will. The apocalyptic overtones lead one to expect a parallel description of the fate of the disobedient;\(^{22}\) but here and elsewhere the poet concerns himself with the rewards of virtue and is silent about the consequences of sin for men — although not for demons. What follows is a passage affirming the accessibility of salvation; it may be won in many ways and without necessarily giving up the joys of this life. A few warning notes are sounded in the long passage on the approach of doom, which concludes with a reference to God’s knowledge of the widespread decline in obedience to His law (56-58) and with the somber reminder: *He fea findæð, fea hæð gecorene* (59). The warnings, however, are subordinated to the persuasive appeal to common sense which dominates the passage. It is useless, the poet argues, to look to this aging and ever worsening world for relief (37b-53a); God, moreover, sees those who obey

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21 In “Prologue,” *op. cit* (above, note 3). Shook identifies the soul specifically as Guthlac’s (pp. 296-297). As Greenfield remarks, however, a general sense seems intended, *op. cit.* (above, note 8), p. 120, note 18.

22 Shook believes that this expectation is fulfilled later in the poem by the account of the visit to hell, “Prologue,” p. 302.
(54b-55) as well as those who do not. The brief portrait of the unrighteous man emphasizes the foolishness of putting earthly before heavenly values. The righteous man has more sense and exhibits it, not by being a paragon of all the virtues, but by reasonable generosity with his property (76-79). God, the poet assures us, sees his virtues (80b). Asceticism is not presented as an ideal to which everyone should aspire, for the ascetics, who are described last, are carefully set apart as a special class among the righteous who have opted for an unusually arduous way of life. The introduction, then, as a whole makes the rewards of virtue appear attractive and attainable. Its mildness and encouraging tone are at least congenial with what follows. This general thematic congeniality is not sufficient to provide artistic justification either for the presence of the introduction in the poem or for its disjointed quality. The internal evidence supports Professor Woolf's statement that this section of the poem may be "an accretion, the stages of which it is no longer possible to distinguish." *23

III

Despite the problems raised by the introductory section, it is evident that the poet approached the task of writing a vernacular poem on Saint Guthlac with a high sense of moral responsibility and with thorough mastery of this subject and of his medium. The departures from the formal and thematic conventions of saints' lives and apocryphal apocalyptic literature can now be seen as indications of a deliberate and successful reworking of materials to bring them into harmony with a clearly conceived purpose. Before proceeding to discuss further the poet's adaptation of literary conventions, however, we must extend our investigation beyond the identification of the poet's thematic intent and consider briefly the broader aspects of his didactic approach.

The poem is first and foremost a vehicle for moral instruction. The reader is never permitted to become involved in the story, to engage even briefly in Coleridge's "willing suspension of disbelief". He is consistently directed to consider instead the moral significance of what he reads. Thus,

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*23 Op. cit. (above, note 3), p. 56. Professor Woolf is especially concerned with lines 1-29, but she extends her remarks to include lines 30-107 as well. The opening 29 lines used to be considered as the conclusion of Christ III, the preceding poem in the Exeter Book. In "Prologue," Shook argues against this view on the basis of the thematic and structural relevance of the lines to Guthlac A and of the appearance of apocryphal motifs both in these lines and in the body of the poem. The metrics (see John C. Pope, The Rhythm of Beowulf, rev. ed. [New Haven, 1966], 101) and the appropriateness of the lines to Christ III leave room for doubt about their authenticity as part of Guthlac A however fitting they may be as a prologue.
the schematic narrative functions as a symbolic support for the themes and claims minimal attention for itself. The descriptions are general and are reduced to the bare essentials, with the result that they fail to arouse interest or to create clear impressions. The speeches are undramatic; Guthlac’s replies to the demons, for example, regularly sound like exhortations to the audience. Although the poet has martialed all these elements in support of his didactic purpose, he is still not content to let his materials speak for themselves, for he begins and ends his poem with didactic passages, and interrupts it frequently to point the moral. In the debate and temptation sections, four such interruptions occur in just over 200 lines.24 In contrast to the intellectual sophistication revealed in the poet’s command of the theology of angels and demons is the extreme simplicity of its moral teachings. The presentation of despair offers neither complexity nor depth, and the same may be said for the themes of God’s love for man and of the promise of eternal life. The poet merely expresses a few basic Christian ideas, using repetition and changing contexts for emphasis and variety, and encouraging acceptance by insistence on the universal applicability and on the persuasively positive implications of his teachings. The virtues which are stressed both in the portrait of the saint and independently of it reflect the same preference for simple, fundamental, and positive themes. The poet focusses on concern for others, generosity with one’s goods, recognition of the superiority of spiritual to earthly values, and other “everyday virtues” urged in medieval didactic writings (e.g., 150-169, 790-818). These virtues are seen as manifestations of faith and of obedience to God, but more conspicuously as the means of gaining eternal life.

We have already observed at the beginning of this article that the poem’s overt and obtrusive didacticism sets it apart from saints’ lives and from apocalyptic writings.25 In the poem, the figure of the saint as hero and as

24 Lines 344-348, 396-398a, 526-529, 554b-556.

exemplar of Christian virtues becomes less important than the significance of his experiences. Explicit exposition of this significance through the saint's speeches and through the poet's commentary takes precedence over the implicit didacticism characteristic of saints' lives and replaces the emphasis of apocalyptic writings on presenting vivid images of the supernatural.

The poet's insistence on positive and widely relevant themes entails departures from the thematic bias both of the ascetics' and martyrs' lives, the two hagiographic types to which he is most indebted, and of apocalyptic writings. Ascetics' lives, by their very nature, celebrate an extreme rejection of this life. The saint lives in isolation from his fellow man and seeks to eradicate all temporal concerns in order to perfect himself in the service of God. Spiritual joy and a heavenly reward are won through austere and unremitting self-denial and through intensive and exclusive cultivation of personal holiness. Ascetics' lives of the Evagrian type were written to portray models and to present instruction for other ascetics. Their relevance to a wider audience is limited. The ascetic's way of life sets him apart from other men and his search for perfection tends to emphasize the hazards of life in the world, the difficulty of satisfying God, and the many obstacles which must be encountered and surmounted by those who seek His favor. Both the limited relevance and the thematic emphases of this hagiographic tradition are uncongenial to the poet's purpose. Guthlac is an ascetic and is duly praised for his successful efforts to repudiate worldly values and for the purity of his dedication to God. (e.g., 162b-167a, 334b-343). The poet succeeds, however, in making his hero's experiences relevant and in associating them with positive themes. Thus, he provides almost no information on Guthlac's austerities or on any habits peculiar to asceticism; instead he stresses attributes which could appropriately be urged on any Christian audience and repeatedly calls attention to the relevance of his material in his comments and in the thinly veiled didacticism of the saint's speeches. The poem, moreover, does not interpret Guthlac's career as an ascetic's search for perfection. Guthlac's special task is to protect the barrow from the demons, and the poet concentrates on this, taking full advantage of the symbolic potential of his narrative to develop themes of universal import. The relevance of Guthlac's career is not limited to the universality of its moral implications, for the saint's achievements include immediate contributions to the world around him. He has served his fellow man both directly through teaching (160b-163a) and prayers (331-334a) and indirectly through his reputation (174b-175a, 753-759). The potentially discouraging moral austerity of ascetics' lives is avoided through the poet's insistence on God's love for man and on the promise of eternal life and through his implicit assurances that the rewards of virtue are within reach of all. By making an overly negative view of the world, an excessive concentration on
one's own sins, temptations to despair, moreover, the poet has built into his poem a solid defense against the hazards of moral austerity in general.

As Professor Woolf has recently remarked Guthlac A has much in common with the passions of the martyrs. The demons, like the persecutors of the martyrs, subject their victim to physical suffering and threaten him with more if he does not capitulate. Like the martyrs, the saint replies in lengthy and heavily didactic speeches which serve at once as an indication of his spiritual strength and as a vehicle for moral instruction. Guthlac is praised for his courage and steadfastness in withstanding the onslaughts of the demons and is even referred to as a martyr (514). The demons' physical challenges, however, are subordinated to their efforts to undermine Guthlac's confidence and to drive him to despair; and the saint's victory is over spiritual rather than physical forces. Medieval literature grants the title of martyr to those who strive constantly to serve God as well as to those who literally die for their faith. The similarities between the poem and the passions ennoble Guthlac by associating him with actual martyrs and by giving him a solid claim to share the title, but Guthlac's martyrdom is figurative, and thus more directly relevant to the poet's audience. The poem goes beyond the accepted extension of the meaning of the term "martyr" to a thorough-going adaptation of the formal and thematic elements of the time-honored tradition of the passion in support of universally meaningful themes.

The poet departs further from apocryphal apocalyptic writings both in his themes and in his method of presenting them than he does from either of the two types of saints' lives discussed above. Apocryphal writings purporting to record revelations about the nature of the afterlife enjoyed great popularity in the poet's time. Their tendency to exploit fantastic and grotesque description for its own sake and to indulge in esoteric details frequently remove these works from the realm of serious, religious literature. Although their prime purpose often seems to have been to cater to a taste for the marvellous, however, their ostensible moral purpose is to remind people of God's judgment. Since they generally impress the mind and imagination far more with the lot of the damned than with that of the saved, this moral emphasis is largely negative — a warning against sin. The poet, as Professor Shook has shown, is indebted to these writings for knowledge of

26 See above, note 3.
27 H. Delahaye, Sanctus (Brussels, 1927), 109-114, traces the development of the figurative sense of the word.
29 Some of the apocrypha, the Vision of St. Paul among them, met with strong disapproval. See. Silverstein, pp. 3-14, passim, and Ogilvy, pp. 66-74, passim. Among the English authors to express objections are Bede, Aldhelm, and Ælfric.
angels and demons and has borrowed from them some important motifs for his narrative.  

No trace of a taste for the fantastic remains, however, or of the emphasis on the grim future in store for the sinful. The poet concerns himself with the moral implications of the supernatural for man in this life rather than with the supernatural for its own sake. He limits himself to those implications which are in keeping with the positive thematic orientation of the poem. As we have seen, however, he finds support for his themes not only in heaven and the angels, as one would expect, but also in hell and the demons.

Although Guthlac A is not a sermon, its didactic approach puts it in a tradition of popular preaching and suggests that the poet had the needs of an unsophisticated audience in mind. Medieval writings on the popular sermon stress the advisability of a gentle and persuasive approach and of simple, fundamental teachings and warn against excessive complexity and severity. Alcuin, for example, expresses these standards in his letters and they are implied in what Bede tells us about Aidan in the Third Book of his Ecclesiastical History. The poem includes only simple teachings relevant to a popular audience. It suppresses thematic elements which might induce despair by setting up unattainable standards of virtue, by instilling terror of God, or by emphasizing man’s frailty and vulnerability to evil; it rigorously insists on the positive themes of the availability of God’s help and of the reward which awaits the righteous.

It is not surprising that an Old English poet should have taken a didactic approach considered appropriate for a popular audience. What is striking about Guthlac A is the combination of this approach with materials traditionally so foreign to it. We will probably never know what prompted the poet to use literary conventions in such an unusual way. Perhaps the poem as a whole, like the account of the temptations at its climax, constitutes a deliberate effort to bring popular topics of religious literature into harmony with the aims of didactic literature as the poet conceived them. The poet may simply have tried to make his teachings palatable by associating them with popular topics. Again, the legend of the saint’s visit to hell may have suggested a convenient approach not only to the temptations but to other aspects of Guthlac’s career as well. Whatever the explanation, the poet’s skilled and resourceful adaptation of literary conventions reveals the intellectual competence and originality which lie back of what at first appears to be a thoroughly primitive work of art.

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30 See note 4, above.

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in MS Cambridge University Library li. III. 8

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Numerous as are the sermon collections and homiletic handbooks of the late medieval period, specific information regarding the language and form of sermons as they were actually delivered is not always available. A note to a fifteenth-century copy of Lakmann’s sermons clarifies the problem. The scribe, Andreas Soteflesch, in an addendum to a sermon on the Passion, points out that Lakmann preached in the vernacular but that Soteflesch translated what he said into Latin—"ego audiens eum, quae vulgariter expressit, ego latine pueriliter sic conscripsī." Many examples of similar changes introduced into sermons originally delivered could be cited. Much of our knowledge of Vincent Ferrer’s sermons is based on transcriptions made from short-hand notes taken by his followers while he preached. Tauler’s sermons as they now exist rest upon such transcriptions and Edmund Rich’s reworking and interpolation of material he had once preached resulted in Le Merure de Seinte Êglise, a work of great beauty but certainly not a prime example of a delivered sermon. In other instances — the Pseudo-Augustine Sermones ad fratres in eremo serve as a good example — sermons which exist are purely literary creations, having little or no relation to delivered homiletic material.

Particularly relevant information on the shape and language of the preached sermon is available in the form of extensive notes, written by the preacher himself, never reworked and intended by him only as a guide for

3 See Adolf Korn, Tauler als Redner (Münster in Westfalen, 1928), 2.
delivery. A fine selection of such notes for the study of late medieval English preaching exists among the sermons of MS University Library Cambridge II. III. 8 (hereafter designated as C). The manuscript is a highly significant collection of sermons, sermon-notes, exempla and other homiletic aids offering valuable insights into the social and spiritual climate of late fourteenth-century England and providing excellent sources for the study not only of the vernacular and bilingual sermon but of the popular poetic and gnomic literature of the period as well. It was the social concern of many of the sermons, a concern closely related to that of Piers Plowman, which first attracted G. R. Owst to the manuscript. He considered the contents the work of Thomas Wimborne, the famous Paul's Cross preacher of 1388, which enhanced its value for him, and he quoted often from it in both his Preaching in Medieval England and Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England. C also served Ch. Petit-Dutaillis in his study of the revolt of 1381.

C is a paper volume of 174 folios measuring 19 cm. × 18 1/2 cm., written in double columns from ff. 1v-33v and across the page throughout the remainder. The signatures are in Arabic numerals. The collation is as follows: 1-412, 5-810, 9-1112, 128, 13-1412, 15-1610. Significant changes in the character of the hand can be noted at ff. 18a, 31a, 37a, 49a, 60v, 101r, 106c, 126a, 134a and 167v. The script of the hands beginning at 1a and 126r is the same and is closely related to the scripts of the hands beginning at 37a, 49r, 60v and 134a. All the hands with the exception of that of the index on ff. 1v-2r (a later hand) are c. 1400.

The contents of C are in Latin but many of the thought transitions, major statements and narrative passages in the exempla are given added emphasis by the introduction of English words, phrases, proverbs and poems. Anglo-Norman material is at times included. The first forty folios contain four anonymous treatises on the Ten Commandments (ff. 1r-36r), the first of which contains exempla specifically intended for use in England with several couplets in English and Anglo-Norman and an ars predicandi (ff.

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6 For the most accurate edition of this sermon see Nancy H. Owen, “Thomas Wimborne’s Sermon: ‘Redde racionem villicacionis tue’,” Medieval Studies, 28 (1966), 176-197. All relevant information on the author’s life has been gathered by the same author in “Thomas Wimborne”, MS, 24 (1962), 377-381.


9 The foliation of C has been done by four scribes, the first and third of whom used Roman numerals. Although there is some confusion in the numeration from f. 100 to f. cxx, foliation has not been done for the purposes of this article and all references are as they appear in the manuscript.
The rest of the manuscript is made up of fifty-six sermons, numerous exempla, suggestions for sermon introductions and other thematic aids. Well over half of the sermons are in the bilingual form.

With only two exceptions the sermons of C are anonymous. One, Panem de celo prestisti eis... (ff. 66r-71r), is by the Franciscan Lawrence Bretoun (fl. 1330). A second, Redde rationem villicacionis tue (ff. 140r-144v), is a Latin version of the Paul’s Cross sermon of Thomas Wimbledon (fl. 1388); and there is a strong possibility that several other sermons in C may be attributed to him as well. The only other Latin version of Wimbledon’s sermon, in MS Caius College Cambridge 334 (hereafter cited as Ca), is clearly a translation of the English version, although the Caius manuscript is related to C in other ways. Both contain a copy of the sermon Penitenciam agite (C, ff. 50r-51r; Ca, 3v-5v) and a sermon Quomodo stabit regnum? in Ca (ff. 1r-2r) may be based on one with the same theme in C (ff. 147a-150v). Many of the sermons in Ca are bilingual. At several points in C sermons refer to each other, indicating that they were written by the same person, but the bulk of the material is clearly not by one man, as Owst thought. Dating is likewise problematic, although those sermons which can be dated from internal evidence are, with the exception of Bretoun’s, from the period between 1388 and 1408. As might be expected, C was probably intended as an enlarged ars predicandi. Not only does it include one such ars, but a choice of prothèmes is offered at several places, and rubrics are often intended solely for preachers.

The bilingual form of the sermons may be accounted for in various ways. It was natural, as noted above, to translate and preserve vernacular

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14 The clearest indication of translation is the treatment of the couplet based on Lamentations 5: 15 which closes the English version. Ca merely quotes the passage from the Vulgate but the translator of the version in the Caius manuscript turns the English quatrain into Latin.

15 See Petit-Dutaillis, 385.
sermons in Latin, and one can easily understand such a translator retaining the original form of his sermon at many places so as not to damage the force of a vernacular poem or proverb. Such seems to have been the origin of Bretoun's sermon, the incipit of which reads "intellectus verborum que primo dixi in latino est iste" (f. 66r), although both the "verba" to which he refers and the "intellectus" are in Latin. In addition, Latin phrases throughout the sermon are regularly glossed in English.

No evidence of translation, however, has been forthcoming in a study of the other sermons of C. Some of them may have been originally delivered in the bilingual form and so preserved, particularly those which use English merely to emphasise a point and are ad clerum, but those whose divisions are based on English phrases in the Latin syntax do not seem to have been intended for such delivery, even though their Latin is pure, showing no signs of an earlier English text, and they now and again quote Latin verse. A number of sermons in C were more carefully edited than others before the collection was brought together, but even in those which were seemingly unedited the Latin is pure.

Although a closer examination of the sermons would have to be made to determine which are the result of complete or partial translation or which may possibly have been delivered as bilingual sermons and so preserved, a preliminary study of about two-thirds of those in the bilingual form and of samplings of the rest has suggested a third possibility. The form may be the result of a preacher's preliminary draft. It is natural to suppose that such a draft would have been composed in Latin, thereby explaining the pure form, but that the writer, intending his words for an English audience, continually had it in mind and entered vernacular phrases as they came to him. In an expanded ars predicandi such as C the inclusion of such drafts is especially fitting. In almost all cases the vernacular is so closely related to the whole sermon that the possibility of the bilingual form resulting from the work of an English editor is highly unlikely.

Of greater interest than the origins of the sermons, however, is the use to which the vernacular material in them is put. There are some two hundred places in C where groups of English words appear. In some cases clear reference is made to the use of "lingua materna" although the vernacular material is missing. Proverbs are continually introduced by "vulgariter dictur." That such proverbs were normally intended for delivery in the vernacular is clear from the words of one preacher, who although he quotes an adage in its popular Latin form — "Dum calor est et pulchra dies formica laborat" (f. 65r) — introduces it as "illud proverbium vulgare."

One quarter of the vernacular material in C is composed of isolated words or short phrases, either part of the Latin syntax or entered as glosses to a previous Latin expression. Attacking the vice of gluttony, that vice so often attacked in medieval sermons, a preacher writes, "Simper isaciopd[47] plus expendit ista hora quam lucratus est in ebdomoda diues" (f. 81r). Such vices, the author goes on to note, are dangerous to all men. The various aspects of a ship, the symbol of man's life, are then allegorized — contricio cordis pur seyl, confessio ventus, penitencia oryn[48] — and the moral drawn. If men allow themselves to be heavily buffeted by the storms of the devil they will wander about blindly with no hope of reaching port "et sic nauis vadit altowreach."[49]

Examples might easily be multiplied. A voracious noble is described as wandering about the land stalkingly — "vadit stalkynlich"[50] (f. 42v) — adding even greater burdens to the poor man's lot; a glutinous peasant returning from a feast and questioned on his state of life "rusticano modo respondens dicit: ich am staffol[51]" (f. 84r). Christ, another preacher tells us, gave man a remembrance of himself in the Eucharist "ad suum departyng quod debemus cogitare de eo quando ipse were iwentr awaye" (f. 80v).

In the great majority of places, however, even in those cases where only short phrases appear, it is the lyric impulse which is responsible for the introduction of the vernacular material. Thus, for example, sermons are often divided by means of rhyming English phrases, a practice common enough throughout the history of both the Latin and vernacular sermon,[52] but in several sermons in C resulting in compositions which merit consideration more as complete lyrics than mere rhyming lists. Such a lyric, for example, occurs in the division of a sermon on Matthew 25: 34, *Venite benedicti Patris mei* (ff. 161r-164r). The theme clearly indicates to him, the preacher says, what God is.

In hys bey[n]g he [is] god in personis tre,
In hys doy[n]g he is curteys and fre,
And in hys thechyng[e] per may no trewar be. (161v)[53]

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17 'Dressed in sackcloth.' The earliest recorded use of the past participle of 'sackcloth', listed in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is 1641.
18 'Oars' (Old English dr). *OED* does not record a weak plural.
19 'On to the rocks' (OE al + OE to + Old French werech). The adverb is not recorded by the *Middle English Dictionary*.
20 'With strutting gait' (OE staewung). *OED* lists first occurrence of the adverb in 1891.
21 'Quite full' (OE sta + OE ful).
23 See Rosell Hope Robbins and John L. Cutler, edd., *Supplement to the Index of Middle English Verse* (Lexington, Kent., 1965), 1493.5. Only in C, not previously printed. For other similar
In like manner an important part of the sermon *Memorare testamentum altissimi* (ff. 71v-74r) is based on an exemplum which tells the story of a father who, nearing death, calls his sons to him and presents them each personally with his inheritance.

... Quid[am] erat pater qui habebat septem filios et condens testamentum suum vocavit primum dicens ei: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per legem et iusticiam. Secundo dixit: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per bellum et fortitudinem. Tercio dixit: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per scientiam et sensum. Quarto dixit: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per dona et munificencia. Quinto dixit: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per fauorem et amicitiam. Sexto dixit: Tibi lego totum24 in quo mihi obligaris. Septimo dixit: Tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris per pactum et empicionem. In anglico sic:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{wy}t\text{3 lawe and wy}t\text{3 r}i\text{3te}, \\
\text{wy}p\text{ stren}g\text{3e} and \text{wy}p\text{ my}3t\text{e}, \\
\text{wy}t\text{3 wy}t\text{ and wy}t\text{3 wys}dou\text{um}, \\
\text{wy}3p\text{ largesse and wy}p\text{ fredom,} \\
\text{wy}p\text{ fauor of contre} \\
\text{al} \text{pat} \text{pou ho}3\text{est me} \\
\text{and pat pou my}3\text{t byen pe.} \quad (f. 71v)25
\end{align*}
\]

The preacher then divides a portion of his text according to the poem he has created out of the exemplum, comparing the father to Christ who has left a testament for his spiritual children. They too are to work according to law, right, wisdom and graciousness.

A lyric too results from the division of a sermon on the theme *Panem nostrum cotidianum da nobis hodie* (ff. 82v-84r).

Ex hijs quinque verbis sciemus qualifier debemus accedere ad panem.
he ha3t a swete song loudе icried,
he ha3t a trewe tonge wel itried,
he ha3t a lit3 lesson for lerd27 and lewed,28
he ha3t wisemennes redelles stylliche29 ischewed,
he ha3t pe redles wel irekened to make pe wel ipewed,30 (f. 82v)31

examples in C see Pfändor, 50, Carleton Brown and Rosell Hope Robbins, edd., *The Index of Middle English Verse* (New York, 1943) and Supplement, 3355, Index, 1478, 3292 and Supplement, 2811.8, 3246.5. Similar lyrics occur as well throughout C at 94r, 100r, 112r, cxviiij, 137r, and 159r but have not been previously recorded.
24 MS: tibi lego quicquid acquirere poteris totum in quo corrected.
25 Index 4193. Only in C, not previously printed.
26 The “verba” are those in I Cor. 14: 26, of which the English in an expansion. Cf. I Cor. 14: 19.
27 ‘Learned’ (OE læran).
28 ‘Ignorant’ (OE läwoode).
29 MS: stylliche corrected.
30 ‘Virtuous’ (OE þeow).
31 Index 1134. Only in C, not previously printed.
VERNALIC MATERIAL FOR PREACHING

It is the lyric impulse as well which influences the incorporation of many vernacular proverbs. Thus a preacher, particularly fond of proverbs, rhymes the answer of Apollo to a man who lives his life seeking physical joys alone.

... Cum totus homo resolutus fuerit in dimidium dimidius non durabit diu. Anglice sic:

Wanne holman is turned into halfman
\( \text{\`ame com\`e de\`s faste,} \)
\( \text{\`an schal naut}^{32} \text{ longe laste.} \) (f. 84r)

The same preacher bases a major section of the remaining portion of his sermon on another proverb he has rhymed.

... Olim inoleuit: tale proverbiurn in vulgo: Candide cutis color pessimus eo quod facilius vergat in nigritudinem. Anglice sic:

\( \text{\`e wyte skyn h\`a\`e a sori lak} \)
\( \text{for nou hit is wyte and nou hit is blak.} \) (f. 84v)

At several places riddle-like constructions appear. In one exemplum the story is told of a great sea beast who will not allow anyone to pass unless a riddle can be answered. It was not until the advent of Christ that a proper answer could be given. The question presented to passers-by read as follows:

ho her hys fot set opene \( \text{\`e seewa\`a[e]}^{35} \)
\( \text{bote hys schou wete [not], ared}^{36} \text{ me pys sa\`e.} \) (f. 73v)

Another preacher finds the best description of the soul to be paradoxical. His list of paradoxes results in a short lyric which he expounds throughout the remaining portion of his sermon.

... M\`i\`o inquid essenciam ipsius anime quia mercator est et non dispedit, orator est et non litigat et cetera. Anglice:

\( \text{hi\`a\`e is a marchaund and spende\`a\`e nouth,} \)
\( \text{hi\`a\`e is a mo\`e\`er}^{38} \text{ and spekket nouth,} \)
\( \text{hi\`a\`e is a wayte}^{39} \text{ and wake\`a\`e nouth,} \)
\( \text{hi\`a\`e is a massage and walke\`a\`e nouth,} \)
\( \text{hi\`a\`e is a mercer and begge\`a\`e nouth,} \)

32 'Nothing' (OE nā + OE wīht).
33 Supplement 4056.3. Only in C, not previously printed.
34 The lines are not listed in either Index or Supplement.
35 'Sea wave' (OE sēwmēg).
36 'Explain, tell' (OE erēdan).
37 The lines are not listed in either Index or Supplement.
38 'Speaker' (OE mōtian).
39 'Watcher' (Anglo Norman *wātow).
40 'Buy' (OE byegan).
Favourite passages of Scripture are rhymed in numerous instances. A
congregation is assured by its pastor that the Lord will hear their prayers.

... Quando orabas cum lacrimis ego optuli oracionem tuam coram Domino.
Psalmus: Exaudi Domine oracionem meam auribus, percipe lacrimas meas.\(^42\)

lord wyth pine eres
\(\text{þ}ou\) heire mine teres. \((f. 93v)^{43}\)

A short treatise on the Passion is introduced as follows:

\textit{Ipse vulneratus est propter iniquitates nostras et suo liuore sanati sumus.} Ys. 53.\(^{44}\)
Crist ys wounded for oure wikkednesse,
And we buþ ful heled of oure siknesse \((f. cxjv)^{45}\)

and a sermon on I Thessalonians 5: 18 begins with the couplet:

þis is þe wylle þat god is inne
þat 3e be cleene of dedlyche synne. \((f. 100r)^{46}\)

Translations from Scripture, too, provide the thrust of an addendum to
a sermon on the theme \textit{Penitenciam agite} \((ff. 50r-51r)\). The addendum tells
the story of an incestuous but penitent courtesan whose grave supported
the growth of a blossom in the middle of winter. News of the marvel was
taken to the bishop who came immediately to the area.

... Accessit\(^47\) ad florem et circumspiciens in eum inventit scriptum in foliis
litteris aureis hunc versum Psalmi: \textit{Benedictus Deus qui non amouit oracionem meam
et misericordiam suam a me.} Anglice:
yblessed be god ofer alle þyne
þat haþt yherud my praynge,
And to is mercy me haueȝt ytake,
Wel outhe ic þanne ȝoye make.\(^48\)

Et circumfodiens radicem invenerunt de medio cordis processisse et cor
diuisum in vtraque parte radicis habentem aureis litteris scriptum in prima
parte sic: \textit{Conueristi planctum meum in gaudium et in alia parte: Circumdedisti me
leticia}\(^50\) Domine, Isu Christe.

\(^{41}\) \textit{Index} 1625. Only in C, not previously printed.
\(^{42}\) Ps. 39: 13.
\(^{43}\) Not listec in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\(^{44}\) Isa. 53: 5.
\(^{45}\) \textit{Supplement} 607.8. Only in C, not previously printed.
\(^{46}\) Not listec in either the \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\(^{47}\) Ms: accessis corrected.
\(^{48}\) Ps. 65: 20.
\(^{49}\) \textit{Index} 1406. Only in C, not previously printed.
\(^{50}\) Ps. 29: 12.
'ytur[n]e[d] ize ioye is al my wo,
þou hast wrapped me wyet blisse foreueremo. (f. 51v)\(^{51}\)

Should so great a sin as the harlot’s be forgiven, the congregation is assured the blot of their own minor sins will be wiped clean immediately upon confession and an act of satisfaction. An exemplum is also formed around IV Esdras 16: 6-7, the sermon’s translation of which reads as follows:

ho may þe ly[ow]un fle þat by þe wode went,
ho may þe [fyr] queche in þe drye stre\(^{52}\) ytent,
Oþer þe archer for to letten\(^{53}\) þat steileche\(^{54}\)
ad\(^{55}\) ybent. (f. 72r)\(^{56}\)

In several cases the relationship between lyric and Biblical passage is more tenuous, the poetic composition being merely inspired by the latter. A preacher on the theme *Luna mutatur* (ff. 83v-85v), for example, mindful both of his theme and of Matthew 15: 14 as well, perhaps, writes:

Yif þe blyude wile haue is bone
crist is þe sunne and marie þe mone,
þe sunne þe mone spredhec here lych,
þe sunne by daye, þe mone by nyth. (f. 84r)\(^{57}\)

and again:

þe mone chaunge3 his shap,
þe mone changes his\(^{58}\) heu,
þe mone chaunge3 his ap,\(^{59}\)
þe mones fast\(^{60}\) his cuere newe. (f. 84r)\(^{61}\)

In another sermon, by the same author, the preacher is inspired by the throne scene in Revelation 7 and builds upon it.

... Nam vidit tronum et sedentem super tronum et varia multa obsequia in apocalypsi que exprimi poterunt in vulgari:

some men ofreneden hym boistes\(^{62}\) of riche spicerie,
some men maden hem bysi aboute here marchandie,

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\(^{51}\) *Supplement*, p. 199. No entry number is given. Only in C, not previously printed.

\(^{52}\) 'Straw' (OE *stræw*).

\(^{53}\) 'Hinder' (OE *lettan*).

\(^{54}\) 'Stiffly, resolutely' (OE *stif + OE gelic*).

\(^{55}\) 'Had' (OE *habban*).

\(^{56}\) *Supplement* 4094.8. Only in C, not previously printed.

\(^{57}\) Not listed in either Index or Supplement.

\(^{58}\) MS: changes is his.

\(^{59}\) 'Fortune' (Old Norse *hap*).

\(^{60}\) MS: pas with p lengthened.

\(^{61}\) Not listed in either Index or Supplement.

\(^{62}\) 'Boxes' (OF *boiste*).
some men comen and souten\(^{63}\) hym fro ferre londe,
wyth wyte cloyes on here body and palmes on here honde,\(^{64}\)
some men harpeden and maden ado,
some men daunceden and songen þarto. \(^{\text{f. 85}\text{v}}\)^{65}

Similar lyrics, either translations from the Scripture or owing their inspiration to a passage of Scripture, form a major part of the small selection of material from C previously edited,\(^{66}\) but are not representative of the total amount of Middle English poetry in the manuscript. A small amount of purely secular verse is found, used by the preachers to buttress whatever theme they were concerned with at the time. Thus Bretoun, centering part of his sermon as he does on the evils of women, writes,

... Ecce quod dicit vnus de talibus mulieribus:
bytwene a þousend men mony on y koupe reyme\(^{67}\)
to wom my consel y hurste schowe,
bote bytwene al wemman neuer on koupe y cleyme\(^{68}\)
wam wold myn herte knowe.
Forwy þourch ere semblaut þat þey kon make,
mony þai\(^{69}\) makes to myslyke,
þerow wonder none þow\(^{70}\) take
of cunde it komes hem to byswyke. \(^{\text{f. 68}\text{v}}\)^{71}

Another preacher, the equal of Bretoun as a mysogynist, parallels the wayward Christian to the unfaithful beloved in what must have been a popular song of the day. Unfortunately, so certain was he of the popularity of the piece that he offers only a few tantalizing lines.

Mi lorde leman is liche þe mone
for hire loue chaunge3 alto some. \(^{\text{f. 84}\text{v}}\)^{72}

Several lyrics are translations of Latin hymns or liturgical selections. The verse \textit{Vagit infans inter arta}\(^{73}\) has inspired the following lines:

\(^{63}\) 'Sought' (OE \textit{secan}).
\(^{64}\) Cf. Apoc. 7: 9.
\(^{65}\) Not listed in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\(^{66}\) For a full list of lyrics from C which have been previously printed see \textit{Index} and \textit{Supplement} 445, 1301, 3355, 3397, 3901, 4263, \textit{Index} 1311, 3863, 3390, 3699, \textit{Supplement} 1265.5, 3246.5 and Ovst, \textit{Literature and Pulpit}, 43.
\(^{67}\) 'Count' (OE \textit{rinan}).
\(^{68}\) MS: clene.
\(^{69}\) MS: þan.
\(^{70}\) MS: þow.
\(^{71}\) \textit{Index} and \textit{Supplement} 514. See also Francis Lee Utley, ed., \textit{The Crooked Rib} (Columbus, Chio, 1944), 37a.
\(^{72}\) Not listed in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\(^{73}\) F. Leo, ed., \textit{Venati Fortunati Opera Poetica, MGH, Auct. Antiq.} (Berlin, 1881), IV, 28.
Another preacher is responsible for versions of the *Gloria, laus* and the *Te Deum*, here printed in their context.

...Et iuenio, karissimi, quod quando Christus venit Ierosolimam versus passionem suam, toward his passion, puere Jerusalem exierunt obuiam ei et honorabunt cum multum valde quia in via vbi venit equitans super asinum proierunt ramos et stroweden flores and spradden here close es et cantabant cantus... et dixerunt sic: *Gloria, laus et cetera.*

> Ioye *and* blisse wytytouen endyne,  
> to pe lord crist heuene kynge,  
> þou art comen on godes name,  
> for vs to suffren wo *and* schame.

Ioye *and* blisse et cetera.

þou art oure hele and oure pynynge,  
þou art oure loue and oure longyne,  
þou art oure ioye and oure wilynge,  
þou art issu lord oure alle ðyne.

Wytte mouthe, wyty herte we blesscet pe,  
mythful / god issu iblessed þou be.  
Ioye and blisse et cetera.  
(f. 90r)

**... et ideo religiosi qui fuerunt Hodie cum Christo rege nostro laddem hym abaute, duxerunt illum circumquaque per vicos ciuitatis... Fecerunt sicut prius dixi: Sic igitur honorabittur.***

A lord crist of heuene blisse þou art kynge,  
þou art pe faderes son of heuene  
wythouten endyne,  
of a mayde þou teke oure kende *and* were ybore  
for man to deye þat þoru is senne was forlore.

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74 *MS*: ibownde.
75 ‘Rags’ (OE clīt).
76 ‘Loins’ (OE lenden).
77 Not listed in either *Index* or *Supplement*.
79 Legg, 96.
81 Esth. 6: 9.
82 *Index* 10. Only in C, not previously printed.
Sic igitur honorabitus et cetera qui est Christus rex celi quoniam pro sapiencia of gret selfe nos debemus eum honorare quia ipse sapiencia patris.

[Latin text follows]

The popular theme of Christ addressing the sinner from the cross has served as the theme for a Latin poem and an English version of it, both of which are entered as an addendum to a sermon *Per proprium sanguinem intriuit semel in sancta* (ff. 78v-80r).

Vide homo quod pro te pacior,
ad te clam o, pro te morior,
Vide penas quibus afficior,
vide clausa quibus confodi o,
Cum sit tans dolor exterior,
interius est planctus grauior,
Cum te tam ingratum experior. 88

O man stond in byhold
vat ic for þe pyl e. 87
Fet and myne hondyn
wilt naylis me gumne þ borye. 89
So þe ic loude grede90
þat for þe schal depth þolye.
Nis þar noun of þogu
þat me wylle borwe. 91
Wyhtme and wyhtoute
my body is fol of sorwe,
Ac alpermest hyt greueþ me
þat ic vnkende schal fynde þe.  (f. 80r) 92

The same theme has inspired the preacher of the sermon *Memorare testamentum altissimi* who depicts Christ’s body on the Cross as a book on which

---

83 ‘Please’ (OE ecēnan).
84 *MS*: worouth corrected.
85 The lines clearly belong to the poem beginning “A lord cris...” although *Index* 10 mentions only the existence of a quatrains. The second stanza is not listed separately, however.
86 See Hans Walter, ed., *Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der Versenansänge Mittellateinischer Dichtungen* (Göttingen, 1959), 20302 for manuscript locations of these lines. C is not listed among them.
87 ‘Suffer’ (OE þolian).
88 ‘Begin’ (OE ginnan).
89 ‘Pierce’ (OE borian).
90 ‘Cry’ (OE grēdan).
91 ‘Obtain release of, obtain by pleading’ (OE hrigan).
92 *Index* 2502 lists no other occurrences of this particular version. For other versions see Brown, *Religious Lyrics XIV*, 3, 88, 158. The version in C has not been previously printed.
his address to sinful man is written, a theme which repeats itself several times in C. On his right hand the following quatrain is written:

Man byhold hou nou wyzt my hond
y aue ybrokef þe fendes bond,
And hou ualþe62 fleind ðe fond,
Nou aue y brouzt ðe into þy lond. (f. 72v)64

and on his left:

þyn heritage 3ef þou wolt wynne
wyþt pyne and wo þou most bygynne,
passen þou most by my lyft syde
yef þou wilnost65 wyzt me to ryde. (f. 73r)66

The motif has shown its influence in other sermons in C. A sinful woman finds no mercy among men and fears to approach the just wrath of a righteous God. In desperation she prays to the child Jesus and finds mercy. Her answer comes, but again the preacher must have felt the lyric was well—known and provides only the incipit.

Child i was and child i am
and ever wil be for sinful man. (f. 93r)67

The celebration of the Eucharist also provides an opportunity to present Christ speaking to the sinful man he has come to save. The same author, who wrote the versions of the Gloria, laus and the Te Deum, tells the story of a lord who gives his beloved one half of a brooch on his departure, on which is written the words

ay bitwene þou loken on me
and þenc on hym þat yaf þe me,
hou i am broken for þy sake
and neuere ne tac þou oþer make. (f. 90r)68

The incident puts the preacher in mind of the broken body of Christ. Christ too, he points out, has left such a token in the form of the Eucharist, which, on the night before he was slain he established as a memorial of his

64 Index 2046. Only in C, not previously printed.
65 ‘Desire’ (OE wilwean).
67 Not listed in either Index or Supplement.
68 Index 457. Only in C, not previously printed.
love. The discussion is followed by a free rendering of some of the words at the Last Supper.

\[
tak þis in mynde of me
and wanne ich am ago
þou þene on me. \ (f. 90v)\)
\]

It is in exempla that the greatest amount of vernacular material in C is found. A wealthy man, one preacher writes, ordered a shield for himself on which was depicted a peacock, kite and crow to indicate his prowess. Under the three birds the following lines were printed:

\[
For i am dughti of dede,
woso will me knowe,
be þe kyte he may se,
þe pecock and þe crowe. \ (f. 42r)\)
\]

The birds depict other things besides beauty and strength, the reader is assured, and the preacher goes on with the help of Bartholomaeus Anglicus to indicate the various ways in which the rich defraud and rob the poor and destroy the Kingdom.

The evils of the day are often lamented in C. In an addendum the story is told of a certain William and Molde, a man and wife, whose marriage and resulting actions clearly depict the trials and torments of the times.

Quondam\footnote{Not listed in either Index or Supplement.} fuit in Anglia quidam homo qui vocabatur William Wordlessame et iste desponsuit Molde Mechemysautere\footnote{Supplement 825.5 lists no other occurrences of the quatrain. It has previously been printed only in A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge (Cambridge 1856-1857), 3, 442.} et iste dum vixit multas leges condidit, ... id est malas condiciones et specialiter tria, scilicet calliditatem in placitando, vsuram in accomodando, minas et molestiam in inpetrando; quonemtise\footnote{MS: Quendam.} in playdinge, oker\footnote{The names are later interpreted: “Wordlesschame, id est mundiale coniucione... Mold Mechemysautere et id est penam perpetuam possidebit.”} in lenyng, manasse\footnote{‘Clevernessa’ (OF covint).} in purchassinge. Set nota quod playdinge semper habet euel endynge... Nunc enim

worst is best,
strengthe is akaste
\[a[n][d\] proue\footnote{‘Usury’ (ON őkr).} is pyne,
lyst is nyst\footnote{‘Threatening’ (OF monase).}
and flyst is fyyst\footnote{‘Advantage’ (OF prou).}
and ded is aslawe. \ (f. 62r)\)
A second addendum expands upon the theme, warning that the days of a certain French seneschal have come again.

Rex Francie habuit vnum senescalum nomine Macarium\(^8\) qui pro per-
dicione iudicatus fuit ad suspensium et ad alia tormenta. Ille Macharius erat
valde sapiens et ante mortem suam multa protulit et inter cetera dixit ista :

\begin{align*}
\text{manhed and mercy ïs lond hauet} & \text{3 ichacked hout}, \\
\text{fallynge and falsnesse bet} & \text{3 hope gay and stout,}^9 \\
\text{treuþe is toned to tresoun and law is vnderlout.}^{10}
\end{align*}

Et causa potest esse ista quia homo vertitur in mathildam,\(^{11}\) vigencia in non
vigenciam, voluntates sunt leges, fatui sunt comites.

\begin{align*}
\text{Man is mold,}^{12} \\
\text{þi þryȝte}^{13} & \text{ is ysolde,} \\
\text{wyl is lawe} & \\
\text{and fol felawe.}^{14}
\end{align*}

Primo dico quod homo convertitur in mathildam,\(^{15}\) id est in mulierem.
In antiquitate dicitum fuit quod mulieres fuerunt mutabiles, sed modo potest
dici quod homines sunt mutabiliiores. (f. 63r)

The end will come for all, rich and poor, the sermons of C continually
assure their readers, but their concern is usually with emphasising what
the end will mean for the wealthy rather than for the poor. Yet another
sermon addendum epitomizes the difficulty for the rich. What they have
striven for all their lives and gained, they cannot retain.

Fuit quidam diues et sapiens qui fecit sibi sepulchrum fieri et in hunc modum
depingi fecit tres executores circumstare sepulchrum et inter eos sacculum
thesauri ipsius mortui. Et primum executorem fecit protendere dextram ad
socios et sinistrum ad thesaurum et dicere sociis sic anglice:

\begin{align*}
\text{We ben executors to þe dede} \\
\text{of þis tresor wat is our rede}^{16}
\end{align*}

Et secundus anglice sic:

drawe to þe and y to me,
þe dede mak[t]h no strengþe of mone.

---

\(^8\) MS: matarium.
\(^9\) ‘Proud’ (ON stoltr).
\(^10\) ‘Subjected’ (OE underāten). Listed in Index and Supplement 2005. They occur also in MS Advocates Library b. 44.2. but have not previously been printed.
\(^11\) MS: machildam.
\(^12\) MS: is in mold corrected.
\(^13\) ‘Strength’ (OE þryþ).
\(^14\) Not listed in either Index or Supplement.
\(^15\) MS: machyldam.
\(^16\) MS: orrede.
Et tercium fecit dicere anglice sic:
Maket þou glade at heueri mel\(^{17}\)
for þe dede ssal quitti\(^{18}\) heueri del.\(^{19}\)
Et quarto ipsetem dixit in vno circulo aureo circa
faciem suam anglice sic:
al was opres\(^{20}\) þat i here ouhte
and now is opres and hi na nothȝte. (f. 74\(v\))\(^{21}\)

Nor will the wealthy and powerful lament only the loss of possessions.
The body of verse in C, like the body of Middle English verse in general,
has abundant examples of lyric laments over a life of sin.

... Quidam in Anglia in quodam cimierio pro funere sepelliendo profunde
foderunt et inuenerunt cuissdam hominis a diu sepulti corpus intimatum et...
ad caput eius posita... inscripta. Anglice:
Allas, alas si haut,\(^{22}\) si bas,\(^{23}\)
so lenger y leued, so werchs y was;
 alas, alas ibrochc ihec am in perelles pas,
 alas, alas þe game is ilore for lak of as.\(^{24}\) (f. 88\(r\))\(^{25}\)

Another laments.

Alas to wham schal y now take,
to wham schal y my mone make,
for heuene and er þe me haþ forsake? (f. 108\(r\))\(^{26}\)

A sermenc on the theme, Heu, heu, heu (ff. 86\(v\)-89\(v\)) opens by universalizing
the lament, weeping for the state of sinful mankind symbolized by a broken
compass.

Alas her is ifalle a reuful cas,
a poync was bylokyn in a compas;
 þe poync þat was þarin biloken,
al þe compas haþ tobroken. (f. 86\(r\))\(^{27}\)

The compass, the preacher suggests, is the protection of God; the point is
man obeying the Ten Commandments. When he breaks these the whole
circle is destroyed and he is given over to the control of the devil.

\(^{17}\) 'Moment' (OE mǣl).
\(^{18}\) 'Requite' (OF quitter).
\(^{19}\) 'Part' (OE ðǣl).
\(^{20}\) MS: opres.
\(^{21}\) Index 3863 lists the various manuscripts of the Fasciculus Morum in which these verses occur.
C is not listed.
\(^{22}\) 'High' (OF).
\(^{23}\) 'Low' (OF).
\(^{24}\) 'Ace' (OF as).
\(^{25}\) Index 141. Only in C, not previously printed.
\(^{26}\) Cf. Supplement 158.8, 158.9. Neither the Index nor Supplement list these specific lines.
\(^{27}\) Not listed in either Index or Supplement.
The cry of defeat is never allowed to stand unqualified, however. Immediately following this discussion, the preacher goes on to hold forth the Christian hope for freedom from sin, albeit he begins rather pessimistically.

... Heu, heu, heu potest enim dicere cum in peccato fuerit detentus.
Heu ad terram sum prostratus,
heu in carcere sum artatus,
heu ab hostibus sum vallatus,
heu ab amicis sum abdicatus,
heu a bonis omnibus sum nudatus,
heu quam male sum fraudatus.

Anglice:

Alas i am cast adown,
Alas i am in hard presoun,
Alas i am bigilet so.


3if þou be icast adoun,
aris vp and tak þe beth,
3if þou be in hard prison,
put þiself vpon þe quest,
3if þou be biseth with þi fou,
cri loude after help,
3if þu frend haue noun,
be aboute to maken þi pees,
3if þi god be al agoun
sek after fort þu hit fynde,
3if þeu be bigylet so,
anoþer time be beth iwar. (f. 86r)²¹

A similar moral is implicit in an exemplum entered as an addendum to a sermon on penitence.

Legitur quod quidam volens transire ad locum pacis et quietis posuit pedem supra pontem sub qua currebat brachium maris et cum pertransisset vidit ante

²⁸ MS: abductus.
²⁹ MS: a bonis omnibus omnibus.
³⁰ Not listed in either Index or Supplement.
³¹ Not listed in either Index or Supplement.
se draconem horribilem cuius horrore diuertit se et statim vidit retro se leonem rugientem et cum videret subitus mare, ante se draconem, post se leonem ingenuit et clamuit:

Sors maris, ira fere,
dolor anguis, agunt miserere.
dred of pis gryslich lyon
and gyle of pys felle\textsuperscript{32} dragoun
and peryl of pis se
make\textsuperscript{3} me crie mercy.\textsuperscript{33}

Post quam iste homo postulabat misericordiam Dei vidit hominem qui in dextra manu tenebat coronam, in sinistra gladium qui dixit sibi: Sperne, resiste, tere do\textsuperscript{lun}, sed tamen si ferieris, [morieris].

fic, forsake \textit{and} wytstond
\textit{and ihc} þe take þis crowne in hond,
bote þe do [not] as ihc saye
wyth þis swerd þou salt deye.\textsuperscript{34}

Iste homo volens transire ad locum pacis est quilibet viator... Reperit mare, id est mundum; leonem, [id est diabolum]; draconem, id est carnem. Homo tenens in manu dextra coronam... est Christus. (f. 61v).

This demand for spiritual warfare and renewal is particularly well summed up in poetic form in a brief but well-written sermon warning of the last days:

Warey\textsuperscript{35} þyself als a þef doȝ,
say þou sotȝ \textit{and} noȝynge oȝer,
wyth wil þy sennes tellen and leten,
neure after þerin to slepen,
schewen þi sennes holliche;
to hauen forȝifnesse trist stedefasliche. (f. 92r)\textsuperscript{36}

The remaining themes of the vernacular portions of C are few. Only two passages deal specifically with prayer. One, a quatrains, is introduced as a "commune dictum".

Wo hath hon herynde\textsuperscript{37} forthe sende\textsuperscript{38}
þer hymselph ne may wende,

\textsuperscript{32} ‘Cruel’ (OE \textit{fel}).
\textsuperscript{33} Not listed in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\textsuperscript{34} Not listed in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘Curse.’ Cf. Sanford Brown Meech, ed., \textit{The Book of Margery Kempe, Early English Text Society, Original Series} 212 (London, 1940), ‘warijd,’ 229, 436. \textit{MS}: Werey with first ‘e’ deleted, seemingly with the intention of correcting it to ‘a.’
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Index} 4240. Only in C, not previously printed.
\textsuperscript{37} ‘Petition, prayer’ (OE \textit{wende}).
A leef and lowynd y rede þat he take
so þat is herende neuere be forsake. (unnumbered folio following f. 100)\textsuperscript{38}

The second, a prayer-like passage, is addressed to "lacrima humilis".

þou est\textsuperscript{40} mylde,
þyn is þe\textsuperscript{41} myth of þe kyngriche of heuene,
þou doute\textsuperscript{42} nouth þe dreðful dom of þe last day,
þou makest þi fomen þe foule fendes of helle stonde fulstille,
þu deres\textsuperscript{43} more þe deuel þan doþ þe hote feyer of helle,
þe may lette\textsuperscript{44} ang[cl]ene ne\textsuperscript{45} creature to come to for god
boldelyche here,
þou biddist þi bone \emph{and} passeth nouth withoute spedyngge.\textsuperscript{46}
(f. 93\textsuperscript{r})\textsuperscript{47}

Two exempla in particular deserve attention. One, an allegory of Christ
as Lover-Knight, exists in numerous versions, all of which can be traced
ultimately back through many medieval writers to the fathers of the Egyptian
desert. The form which is found in C is very likely based on the version in
the Latin \textit{Gesta Romanorum}, although English material has been added and
other minor changes made. A transcription follows.

Quidam imperator habuit filiam pulcherimam set patri contraria fuit per
inobedienciam. Iatus pater noluit eam morari in palacio suo set sibi castrum
secit in desertu. Venerunt tres tiranni ad expugnandam puellam set primo
miserunt litteras ad eam vt sponte veniret ad eos aut ei persecutionem magnam
inferrent. Quia omnes isti vellent eam in concubinam habere vnosquisque
misit ei epistolam in qua epistola aliquod donum ei promiserunt. Primus sic
promisit: Propter tuam pulchritudinem promitto tibi mundi gloriam.

\begin{quote}
3yf þou comest to me
wordlich blisse i
t byhote þe.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Secundus: Propter tuam pulchritudinem tibi promitto carnium voluptatem.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Fleshich loust i
t behote þe
forwy þat my leman be.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{MS}: synde.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Supplement} 4091.6. Only in C, not previously printed.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{MS}: ter.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{MS}: se þe corrected.
\textsuperscript{42} 'Fear' (OF douter).
\textsuperscript{43} 'Injure' (OE derian).
\textsuperscript{44} 'Hinder' (OE lettan).
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{MS}: non.
\textsuperscript{46} 'Success, prospering' (OE spédan).
\textsuperscript{47} Not properly a lyric; not listed in either \textit{Index} or \textit{Supplement}.  
Tercius scripsit et promisit: Propter tuam pulchritudinem promitto tibi diuicias set durent quam diu durare possunt.

\[ \textit{ihc behote ye richesse hance}^{48} \textit{and play}, \]
\[ \textit{bote leste wyle ye leste may}. \]

Hoc audiens puella supra modum doluit... Fuit quidam miles gracious qui optulit se pugnaturum pro ea contra tyrannos si post victoriam consentire vellet vt eam duceret in vxorem dicens sic per epistola:

\[ \textit{ihc wille for } \textit{py loue ye bateyle take} \]
\[ \textit{and } \textit{yf nede be dye for } \textit{py sake}^{49} \ldots \]

Whenerunt ecciam eum in manibus et pedibus... Puella audiens talia noua... dixit sic: Ecce quo amore diligor quod miles amore occiditur. Pro amore tunc morier quia ipse amore nunc morietur.

\[ \text{for my loue he hys nou aslawe,} \]
\[ \text{to wynne my loue he was wel fawe;}^{50} \]
\[ \text{for ys loue and for ys sake} \]
\[ \text{wol ihc now deye } \text{pat was my make}.^{51} \]

Quando vero imperator audiuisset quod tantus amor fuisset inter eos misit subtilios medicos. (f. 61r)^{52}

Seldom do the preachers of the sermons in C lack a sense of humour. Tales of foolish rustics, self-willed women and human foibles are often entertainingly introduced. One such story tells of an adulterous woman and her three roosters and merits complete transcription. The exemplum follows the one on Christ the Lover-knight in C and is clearly based on a similar story in the English version of the \textit{Gesta Romanorum}. It is important to remember however, that the version in C is a complete reworking of the one in the \textit{Gesta}, in which no nationalities for the roosters are mentioned, the maid does not play a major role and foreign languages are not used. The moral drawn is, as well, quite different.

\[ \text{Fertur quondam fuisses dominam in cantu et precipue gallorum multum delectatam ita quod prouidit sibi de tribus terris tres gallos, vnum de Anglia, alium de Francia et tercium de Ytalia. Habuit ecciam ista domina ancillam que vocabatur damoycele verite. Contingit quod ista domina alium dilexit quam proprium maritum qui in absencia mariti solet pernoctare cum domina set ad gallicantum emitti. Et ipso cum domina quadravit nocte ex[c]unte incepit gallus anglicus cantare et dixit:} \]

\[ ^{48} \text{‘Reward’ (OF } \text{textit{hanse}).} \]
\[ ^{49} \text{\textit{Index} 1428. Only in C, not previously printed.} \]
\[ ^{50} \text{‘Joyful’ (OE } \text{textit{feger}).} \]
\[ ^{51} \text{\textit{Index} 835. Only in C, not previously printed.} \]
\[ ^{52} \text{Cf. Herman Oesterley, ed., } \textit{Gesta Romanorum} (Berlin, 1871), 376-377. \]
per ys on in pys hous
pat dçb worgye to oure spouse.\textsuperscript{53}

Et quesiuit domina quid gallus cantauerat et domicella veritas dixit:
\textsuperscript{54}
\begin{itemize}
  \item be cok seip in ys song
  \item pat to by lord pou dest gret worgne.
\end{itemize}

Et illum precepit domina occidi. Et paulo post cantauit gallus Francie:

\begin{itemize}
  \item pur dire verite
  \item nostre frere est tuwe.
\end{itemize}

Et domina quesiuit quid diceret et domicella respondit:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Sete cok dist en sou chaunsoun,
  \item ke per verite mort est sou corpeynoun.
\end{itemize}

Et hunc iussit occidi. Et potest dici sic anglice:

\begin{itemize}
  \item be cok seyp in is sawe
  \item pat for sôb slawe ys hys felawe.
\end{itemize}

vel

\begin{itemize}
  \item be cok seyp for sôb sawe
  \item slawe is his felawe.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{itemize}

Tercius gallus Italie cantauit et dixit:

\begin{itemize}
  \item ky vult viuere in pache,
  \item aude, vide, tache,\textsuperscript{56}
\end{itemize}

id est, si v[c]is viuere in pace, audi, vide, tace.

Et domina quesiuit a domicella quid diceret et respondit:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Herke and see and hold þe stille,
  \item and in þis word þou hast by wylle.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{itemize}

Moraliter, domina anima que contempto Deo vero sponso admittit advlterum, id est diabolum per peccatum; domicella que vocatur veritas est racio vel consciencia; primus gallus Christus; secundus apostoli; tercius predicatoros moderni et prelati qui dicunt sicud dixit tercius gallus, id est magnos permittunt facere quod volunt set in simplices si modicum delinquant gemiunt et eos excomant. (f. 61v)\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{53} Not listed in either Index or Supplement.

\textsuperscript{54} See Supplement 3322.3 for list of manuscripts of the English translation of the Gesta Romanorum in which this couplet occurs. C is not listed.

\textsuperscript{55} See Supplement 2238.5 which lists other occurrences of this couplet in the English translation of the Gesta Romanorum. C is not listed.

\textsuperscript{56} MS: pace... tace corrected.

\textsuperscript{57} Index and Supplement 3081 list various manuscripts of the Fasciculus Morum and the English translation of the Gesta Romanorum in which this couplet occurs. C is not listed.

The roosters' nationalities have not occurred by chance, similar touches of chauvinism being found at various points throughout C.

Examples of the bilingual sermon form exist in all the major European languages of the medieval period\(^{59}\) and the themes their vernacular sections emphasise are, like those stressed by the English passages of C, often commonplaces of the homiletic literature of the day. Nevertheless, the insights they offer into the practice of preaching in the vernacular makes it unfortunate that relatively little attention has been given them. Not only do they offer abundant examples of verse selections worthy of study in their own right but, like C, along with the great body of sermons remaining in complete vernacular versions, illustrate once again the wide and deep familiarity of the laity with Scripture and popular devotional verse to which preachers could appeal.

The "De potentiiis animae" of Walter Burley

M. JEAN KITCHEL

The following text is the shortest of three psychological studies produced by the English scholar-diplomat Walter Burley (ca. 1275-ca. 1345).\(^1\) There are forty MS copies of the text De potentiiis animae of which I am aware, and of these I have examined twenty from among the copies now in English libraries and in the Vatican.\(^2\)

A text of the comparative brevity of Burley's De potentiiis animae does not warrant a definitive critical edition utilizing such a large body of MSS, nor do I find that its philosophical importance is sufficient to impose such a demand. Therefore, when selecting the MSS to be used in making this edition, I decided that unless all the known MSS were examined to establish stemmata, there was no reason to work from more than the minimum number needed to establish a workable text — a text which would represent something very like, if not exactly, what someone of his successors read as the work of Walter Burley. For this limited purpose, I found three to be an adequate number of copies with which to work.

When choosing which MSS to use, the decision factors are, of course, more complex. Neither the geographical distribution nor the apparent temporal distribution of the copies examined offers clear-cut evidence upon which to base a selection, for the MSS are a rather homogeneous group. The three copies which I have used — Oxford, All Souls College 85, Lambeth Palace 74, and Vat. lat. 2146 — share apparent English origins and are of close temporal proximity.

All Souls College 85 will hereafter be designated by the siglum 'A'. It contains, among others, six texts by Walter Burley, of which only De potentiiis animae is identified as his; the remaining five I have identified by incipits. De potentiiis animae is the second item, appearing on folios 87 to 95. The MS is on parchment, some of it very fine, and the first folio, recto, displays an

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\(^1\) The other, an Expositio super Aristotelis libros de anima, is significantly longer and appears to be Burley's more thorough examination of Aristotle's psychology. It is my intention to publish an edition of this text, along with my commentary, in the near future.

\(^2\) The twenty MSS which I have not personally identified and examined were primarily brought to my attention in correspondences kindly made available to me by Prof. Ludwig Bieler of University College, Dublin. Also, because some of the MSS which I have identified are catalogued as anonymous or under false attribution to Robert Grosseteste, I do not claim definitely to have located all copies of the text which may be in catalogued collections.
initial nicely decorated with a shield of red, white, blue, ochre, and black. The script generally is crowded, but it is not unclear. The copy can be dated by a scribal colophon found on fo. 184: “Finitus est iste liber anno Domini m.cccc.xxvij in crastina sancti Barnabe apostoli, anno regis Henrici sexti, per manus Aelberti Geldrop nacione Brabancie, ad laudem Dei virginisque Marie, Katherine, Barbare atque sancti Kenelme martiris gloriosi”. A. D. 1428 was in fact the sixth regnal year of England’s King Henry VI, indicating that the origin of the copy is English despite the Brabantine nationality of the scribe.\(^3\)

**Lambeth Palace 74** will hereafter be designated by the *siglum* ‘L’. *Notabilia de potentiss animae* is item eleven in the MS, appearing on folios 190\(^{a}\) to 194\(^{b}\); it is one of ten texts by Walter Burley in the volume. The copy is on parchment in what James describes as a “clear, rather dull hand”, and it is more readily legible than A. Several folios have vertical creases in the parchment which obscure some letters of the text of *De potentiss animae*. The MS can be dated by a colophon appearing on fo. 194v: “Explicit tractatus Burley de potentis animae. Iste liber erat scriptus anno domini 1397 die 15 mensis septembri”. This places *L* some thirty-seven years earlier than A. *De potentiss animae* seems to have had greater care taken with it than other texts in the MS, and it has been heavily corrected in a later, perhaps fifteenth-century, hand. In its five folios approximately seventy-five to eighty corrections are counted.\(^4\)

**Vat. lat. 2146** will hereafter be designated by the *siglum* ‘V’. This MS is composed entirely of Burley works, containing eleven items; one of these is a “*Notabilia varia*” which includes fourteen shorter examples of Burley. The *Tractatus de potentii animae* is the last of the eleven major items, appearing on folios 252\(^{v}\) to 256\(^{v}\). The MS is on parchment with margins carefully decorated in the style of the late fourteenth century. The hand is a not untypical English hand of the fourteenth century: fractured, but open and even, without unusual contraction. The copy can be dated by a colophon appearing on fo. IIIv: “Iste liber constat mihi Johann Chontareno de Venetiis in quo sunt opera magistri Walteri de Burley angiici super multos libros logicales cum alis multis tractatibus. Scriptus et legatus in oxonia 1397 die 15 mensis septembri”. Thus, *V* falls between *L* and A, less than a decade after the former, and some thirty-one years before the latter.\(^5\)

Comparison of these three copies shows clearly that each has its own textual merits. For this reason, it cannot be claimed that the copy upon which an edition would be based would in every instance be that with the prefer-

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\(^3\) Fo. 87 is numbered 88 on the margin, and has only faintly been corrected. Cf. Coxe’s catalogue of All Souls MSS.

\(^4\) This foliation includes a folio numbered 190A. Cf. James’ catalogue of Lambeth Palace MSS.

\(^5\) Cf. Maier’s catalogue for Vat. lat. 2118-2192.
able reading. However, of these three MSS, \( L \) seems to me to be the most consistent in its accuracy, a fact due in large part to the heavy corrections already described. Both \( A \) and \( V \) are accurate enough as they stand, but each omits more of the text of \( L \) than does \( L \) of either of their texts. Neither \( A \) nor \( V \) shows indication of any major correcting, though some does appear in \( A \). For these reasons, I have used \( L \), the earliest of the three copies, as the basis for the edition which appears below.

The fact that both \( A \) and \( V \) on occasion suggest readings preferable to ones in \( L \) presents the grave temptation to emend \( L \) and bring it into conformity with the best reading in every instance. While this would provide a more polished text, it would provide nothing like a text used by a mediaeval reader of the writings of Walter Burley; and this latter is what we seek. Therefore, I have resisted the temptation to pick and choose among my three sources, and in the text which appears below I defend \( L \) as it stands unless emendation is absolutely required to get any sense at all from the reading.

The variations between \( L \) and the other two MSS are, for the most part, not very significant. For this printing I have suppressed all but those which strike me as particularly interesting or illuminating. Nor is any notation included of the scribal corrections and internal divisions which occur within the MSS of the text. Wherever it has been necessary for me to provide for a significant scribal error or omission in \( L \), pointed brackets have been used to indicate my editorial intervention. I am also responsible for the division of the text into the major sections indicated by Roman numerals, though these mark places in the text at which Burley's words indicate a shift to a new major theme. The smaller paragraph divisions have all been determined by myself, and do not coincide with those of the MS except by chance. The Arabic numeration of these paragraphs is also mine, an editorial device to facilitate references to the text. Similarly, the division and punctuation of sentences are mine. All of these divisions have been made in an effort to make the text more lucid to the modern reader, and for the same reason spelling has been normalized.

Titles to which Burley refers have been italicized, and references made to the notes where quotations have been identified according to the best available standard editions of these titles. Because Burley's quotations are often not verbatim in their correspondence to standard editions, they have not been set off within the text. However, for comparison, a precise indication of the standard text will be found in the notes wherever it seems especially valuable to the reader.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) I should like to acknowledge the constructive advice of Profs. Anton Pegis and Edward A. Synan of the Pontifical Institute, Toronto, and Ludwig Bicler of University College, Dublin, during the revision of my thesis edition of this text for this publication. Prof. Synan was especially helpful in locating some difficult references. Errors which persist are, of course, my sole responsibility.
NOTABILIA DE POTENTIIS ANIMAE

1 Ut dicit Philosophus, secundo De anima,\(^7\) potentiarum animae quibusdam animatis insunt omnes potentialia, quibusdam aliaque, quibusdam una sola. Potentialia animae in genere sunt quinque, scilicet potentia vegetativa, sensitiva, intellectiva, et appetitiva, et potentia secundum locum motiva.

I

2 Omnes istae potentialiae insunt animalibus perfectis quibusdam, ut hominibus. Et quaedam istarum potentiarum insunt quibusdam animalibus ita quod non omnis, ut animalibus brutis perfectis insunt omnes istae potentialia praeter intellecivam potentiam. Et quibusdam animatis inest solum una potentiarum illarum, sicut plantis, quae est potentia vegetativa.

3 Isteae potentialiae jam dictae sunt potentialiae naturales et sunt in secunda specie qualitatis.\(^8\)

4 Sufficiencia illarum potentiarum potest accipi sic: sicut enim dicit Philosophus,\(^9\) potentialia distinguuntur per actus et actus per objecta, et hoc est intelligendum quod nos et non simpliciter. Nos enim cognoscimus potentialias per actus et actus per objecta.

5 Nunc autem objectum actus alicujus potentialiae est corpus animae unum et hujusmodi est objectum potentialiae vegetativa. Potentialia enim vegetativa non exercet suam operationem nisi circa corpus animae unum.

6 Et objectum actus potentialiae est ens sensibile, et tale est objectum potentialiae sensitiae.

7 Et alicud objectum alicujus potentialiae est ens in sua communitate, et tale objectum est objectum potentialiae intellectivae. Potentialia enim intellectiva potest apprehendere omne ens. Sed sicut in naturalibus ad formam naturaliter impressam consequitur appetitus naturalis ut ad formam gravis consequitur appetitus ad essendum \(^{10}\) deorsum, sic ad formam apprehensam per sensum vel intellectum consequitur quaedam inclination.

8 Ideo praeter istas tres potentias praedictas oportet ponere quartam potentiam, scilicet potentiam appetitivam ratione cujus ad apprehensionem consequitur inclination in bonum: apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum. Objectum hujusmodi potentiae est ens inquantum bonum. Adhuc ad talem inclinationem consequitur motus, sicut in naturalibus ad inclinationem gravis deorsum consequitur motus deorsum.

9 Et ideo oportet ponere quintam potentiam quae dicit esse potentia motiva per quam potentiam animal movetur ad bonum apprehensum ut desideratum. Objectum hujus potentialiae est ens inquantum est terminus desiderii. Et sic patet qualiter quinque sunt generae potentiarum animae.

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\(^{7}\) Aristoteles, De an, II, 3; 414a28-30.

\(^{8}\) Aristoteles, Cat. VIII; 9a13-27.

\(^{9}\) Aristoteles, De an, II, 4; 415a16-21.

\(^{10}\) A reads descendendum, using the same construction.
II


11 Potentia autem appetitiva non constituit quinimum gradum quia appetitus semper sequitur sensum, nam in quocumque reperitur sensum in eodem reperitur appetitus et e verso. Loquendo de appetitu, sciendum quod est una potentia animae, et ideo potentia appetitiva non constituit diversum gradum vivendi a potentia sensitiva.

III

12 Sed etsi quattuor sint gradus vivendi, tamen non sunt nisi tres animae in genere, scilicet anima vegetativa, anima sensitiva, et anima intellectiva. Et hoc quia anima ex qua est forma substantialis dat modum essendi.

13 Nunc autem in viventibus re (190r\textsuperscript{a-b}) peritur triplex modus essendi. Aliquis est modus essendi materialis, et aliquis immaterialis totaliter, et aliquis medio modo se habens.


15 Anima sensitiva dat modum essendi <medio modo>.\textsuperscript{11} Species enim in virtute sensitiva est immaterialis. Exsistit tamen modo materiali quia representat rem secundum quod existit sub conditionibus materialibus.

16 Sed anima intellectiva dat modum essendi immaterialiter. Species enim existens in intellectu existit sine materia et sine conditionibus materiae.

17 Sic igitur patet ex praecibitis quod tres sunt animae secundum genus, et quinque genera potentiarum animae, et quattuor modi vivendi.

IV

18 Sed circa potentiam vegetativam sciendum quod tres sunt potentiae specialis contentae sub potentia vegetativa, scilicet potentia generativa, augmentativa, et nutritiva. Cujus ratio est quoniam potentia vegetativa non habet esse nisi in corpore vivo et ad tale corpus triplex est potentia necessaria: una per quam sibi acquiritur esse et illa est potentia generativa; alia per quam sibi acquiritur quantitas perfecta et illa est potentia augmentativa; et tertia per quam conservatur in esse et in quantitate perfecta et illa est potentia nutritiva. Et sic sunt tres potentiae contentae sub potentia vegetativa.


\textsuperscript{11} Immateriam \textit{L}; \textit{add} inter modum essendi materialem et immaterialem \textit{A}, \textit{V}.
20 Sciendum etiam quod omnes potentiae animae vegetativae sunt potentiae activae, et potentia activa habet duplex objectum. Uno modo objectum potentiae activae est illud circa quod operatur secundum viam generationis. Et sic materia domus est objectum artis aedificatoriae quae est in mente aedificatoris. Alinum est objectum quod scilicet intenditur tamquam finis a potentia tali vel ab habente talem potentiam. Et sic domus est objectum artis aedificatoriae.
21 Loquendo de objecto primo modo, sic alimentum est objectum animae vegetativae quantum ad omnes suas potentias. Sed diversimode est objectum diversarum potentiarum quia inquantum est in potentia ad totum animal generandum, sic est objectum potentiae generativa; et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam rei alendae, sic est potentiae nutritivae objectum. Sed inquantum est potens augmentare illud cui additur, sic est objectum potentiae augmentativa.
22 Sed loquendo de objecto secundo modo, quod scilicet finaliter intenditur a tali potentia, sic objectum animae vegetativae est corpus animatum perfectum quantum ad omnes potentias suas.

V

23 Circa potentiam sensitivam scicndum quod cum potentiae distinguuntur per objecta, ut dicit Philosophus, primo est determinandum de sensibilibus quae sunt objecta sensuum. Et scicndum quod triplex est sensibile, scilicet sensibile proprium, sensibile commune, et sensibile secundum accident.
24 Sensibile proprium est quod non contingit altero sensu sentire et circa quod non contingit sensum errare. Isto modo color est objectum potentiae visivae quia color non percipitur ab aliqo sensu nisi a visu et circa colorum non contingit visum errare, sicut postea videbitur.
25 Sensibilia communia sunt quinque: motus, quies, numerus, figura, et magnitudo (190r²-190v²). Et propter hoc dicuntur sensibilia communia quia percipiuntur a diversis sensibus, sicut patet: magnitudo potest percipi a visu et a tactu, et similiter motus. Ista tamen non dicuntur sensibilia communia quia percipiuntur a quolibet sensu, sed figura et magnitudo percipiuntur solum a visu et tactu.
26 Sensibile per accidentia dicitur ut Darri filius, et propter hoc dicitur sensibile per accidentia quia conjungitur sensihli per se et non percipitur nisi ex hoc quod sensibile per se sentitur.
27 Sciendum quod sensibile proprium et sensibile commune sunt per se sensibilia. Unde Philosophus distinguuit sensibile primo in duo membra, scilicet in sensibile per se et sensibile per accidentia. Et postea distinguat sensibile per se in sensibile commune et sensibile proprium.

VI

28 Circa ista sensibilia est dubitatio primo circa sensibile proprium. Videatur enim quod circa sensibile proprium contingit sensum errare quia visus judicat aliquod quod

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12 Aristotle, De an. II, 6; 418a7 sqq. and cf. n. 7 supra.
13 *add nam secundum Commentatorem hic motus, quies, et numerus percipiuntur a quolibet sensu A; add nam secundum Commentatorem motus et quies non percipiuntur ab olfactu, sed numerus quobilb sensu V.*
15 Aristotle, De an. II, 6; 418a8-10.
est unius coloris esse alterius coloris. Judicat enim solem esse alterius\textsuperscript{18} coloris in mane et in meridie, cum tamen non sit ita.

29 Dicendum quod nullus sensus decipitur circa suum primum objectum. Primum objectum visus est visible in sua communitate secundum quod se extendit ad omnia visibilia in totum. Unde primum objectum actu potentiae est objectum ei adaequatum sic quod nihil continetur sub isto objecto quin posset percipi ab illa potentia, et omne quod percipitur a tali potentia continetur sub isto objecto adaequato. Sic enim visible est primum objectum visus quia omne visible potest percipi a visu, et nihil potest percipi a visu nisi visible. Et circa tale objectum non contingit potentiam errare. Unde visus non judicat aliquid esse visible nisi illud sit visible; circa tamen contentum sub isto objecto contingit potentiam errare. Et hoc contingit tribus de causis: vel propter indispositionem organi, vel propter indispositionem medi, vel circa indispositiones objecti.

30 Exemplum primi: Sic enim gustus septicitan\textsuperscript{17} decipitur circa sapore quia enim lingua septicitans abundat humore cholerico. Ideo septicitans omnia judicat esse amara. Et hoc accidit propter indispositionem organi gustus.

31 Exemplum secundi: Propter enim indispositionem medi, visus judicat solem alterius coloris esse manet et in meridie. Judicat enim solem esse mane coloris rubei, et hoc quia manecium est indistinct et vaporosum.\textsuperscript{16}

32 Exemplum tertii: Circa conditiones objecti contingit sensum errare. Sic enim visus judicat solem esse unius pedis tantum cum tamen sol sit major tota terra.

33 Unde breviter circa objectum adaequatum potentiae sensitivae non contingit sensum errare; circa tamen contenta sub objecto adaequato contingit errare propter causas praedictas; sed hoc est per accidentes et non per se.

VII

34 Circa sensibilia communia est dubitatio utrum sint per se sensibilia. Ad illam dubitationem respondit Commentator\textsuperscript{19} dicens quod sensibilia communia sunt per se sensibilia quia sunt subjecta sensibilium proprion. Haec est una causa, secundum eum. Alia causa est, secundum eum, quia sensibilia communia per se sentiuntur a sensu communis.

35 Sed contra illas causas arguitur: Prima causa non valet quia sic ignis esset per se sensibilis cum sit substantia sui coloris,\textsuperscript{59} qui est sensibile proprium, et substantia esset per se sensibilis, quod falsum est. (190va-b) Nec valet secunda causa quia ab eisdem immutatur communis sensus a quibus immutatur sensus proprion, quia omnes immutationes sensuum proprion terminantur ad sensum communem. Siigit sensibilia communia sentiuntur a sensu communis, cum per se sentiuntur, tunc per se a sensibus proprion sentiuntur.

36 Dicendum quod causae assignatae Commentatoris\textsuperscript{22} quare sensibilia communia sunt sensibilia per se bonae sunt. Prima bona est quia secundum Philosophum, se-

\textsuperscript{16} add et alterius et alterius L.

\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle, De an. II, 10; 422b5-10.

\textsuperscript{18} V omits this entire example.

\textsuperscript{19} Averroes, De an. II, 4; (Venice, 1574), v. 6, 1-2; f. 83vE, t.c. 65.

\textsuperscript{20} Sit substantia caloris A.

\textsuperscript{21} Averroes, De an. II, 5; ed. cit., V. 6, 1-2, ff. 119r-121r, t.c. 133-134.
cundo De anima, actio non est solius formae nec solius materiae sed per se et primo est totius ccmensit. Dicit enim quod nos sanamur sanitate et etiam corpore. Cum igitur sensibilia communia sint subjecta sensibilium propriorum et ita sunt quasi materiae sensibilium propriorum, composite ex sensibili communi et ex sensibili proprio primo immutat sensum. Et tam sensibile commune quam sensibile proprium per se immutat sensum.

Similiter causa secunda est bona quoniam illud quod inest speciei ratioe sui generis inest ei per se eti non primo; sed id quod inest speciei rationedifferentiae specificae inest ei per se et primo. Unde sensibile inest homini sed sed non primo quia inest sibi ratione animalis; sed visibile inest homini per se et primo quia inest sibi ratione differentiae specificae. Nunc autem sensus proprii percipiunt sensibilia communia ratione sui generis ut ratione sensus in commune. Visus enim percipit magnitudinem non inquantum visus, sed inquantum est sensus. Et ideo a sensibus propriis sensibilia communia percipiuntur per se sed non primo.

Ad objecta dicendum ad primum quod aliiquid est subjectum sensibilis proprii vel inquantum sensibile proprium est unum ens vel inquantum sensibile proprium est immutativum sensus. Illud quod primo modo est subjectum sensibilis proprii non oporet per se sentiri; sed illud quod est subjectum sensibilis proprii secundo modo est per se sensibile. Primo modo est ignis subjectum caloris, et secundo modo est magnitudo subjectum calorum. Si enim calor poneretur in igne sine magnitudine non sentiretur; sed si calor esset in magnitudine absque omni alio subjecto adhuc posset sentiri.

Ad secundum patet per praedicta. Adhuc est dubium an sensibilia omnium imprimant suas species proprias in sensum vel solum sentiuntur per species sensibilium propriorum. Et dicendum quod sensibilia communia imprimant suas proprias species in sensus quoniam magnitudo potest esse ita magnitudine quod non potest percipi a visu secundum se totam. Et hoc quia oculus tunc non recipit speciem totius magnitudinis sed solum speciem alius partis illius magnitudinis. Et illam partem videt cujus speciem recipit. Unde in dextra parte recipitur species partis dextrae magnitudinis, et in sinistra, species sinistrae partis magnitudinis.

Sciendum tamen quod sensibilia communia non imprimunt suas species in sensus nisi per virtutem sensibilium propriorum. Unde etsi poneretur magnitudo sine calore et sine aliis sensibilibus propriis, a nullo sensu potest magnitudo percipi. Et ideo sensibilia communia per se agunt in sensus sed non primo. Sed sensibilia propria agunt in sensus per se et primo.

VIII

41 Dicto de sensibilibus in genere, dicendum est de ipsis sensibus in specie. Sciendum igitur quod quidam sunt sensus exteriore, quidam interiores. Sed primo est dicendum de exterioribus.

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22 Aristotle, De an. II, 2; 414a7.
23 This sentence is repeated in the lower margin of L, with visible reading visibilia.
24 add solum sentiuntur per se species sensibilium propriorum vel solum sentiuntur per species sensuum propriorum. Dicendum quod sensibilia communia imprimunt suas proprias species in sensum quam magnitudo potest esse ita magnitudine quod V.
42 Sensus exteroiores sunt quinque: gustus, olfactoria, auditus, visus, tactus. Sciendum quod omnis sensus exterior est virtus passiva, et quod sentire est pati et non agere. Si enim sensus esset virtus activa, semper (190v6-190Ar6) ageret in se et sentiret, sicut si in ligno esset virtus activa ad comburendum, lignum combureret se.

43 Sed sciendum quod aliqua potentia dicitur esse passiva tribus modis: uno modo quando aliquod abjicitur ab eo quod est sibi conveniens secundum naturam, et sic patitur aqua cum calefacitur et ignis cum infrigidatur. Alio modo dicitur aliquod pati quando aliquod abjicitur ab eo sive sit ei conveniens secundum naturam sive non; et sic homo dicitur pati cum sanatur. Tertio modo dicitur aliquod pati quando nihil ab eo abjicitur sed potentia ejus in actum redicitur; et isto tertio modo sensus patitur a sensibili et intellectus ab intelligibili. Sicut enim quando tabula rasa25 recepta picturam nihil abjicitur a tabula, sic quando sensus recept speciem sensibiлем, vel intellectus, speciem intelligibilem, nihil abjicitur a sensu vel ab intellectu, et hujusmodi. Passio quae est sine abjectione dicitur esse salus et perfectio.

IX

44 In determinando de istis sensibus primo est dicendum de organis, secundo de objectis, tertio de mediis. Circa primum sciendum quod in quolibet organo sensus dominatur aliquod elementum. Et hujus ratio est quia quodlibet organum sensus est corpus mixtum; sed in quolibet corpore mixto dominatur aliquod elementum, quia sic vult Commentator, primo De caelo, commento septimo:26 si esset aliquod corpus mixtum in quo nullum elementum esset per praedominativum, illud corpus non haberet locum naturalem in universo sed staret in quocumque loco poneretur, nec quaseret magis unum locum quam alium et esset ingenerabile et incorruptibile. Ideo in quolibet organo sensus est aliquod elementum per praedominativum.

45 Sed quod elementum sit per praedominativum in organo sensus hic potest intelligi dupliciter vel simpliciter et absolute vel quod operationem aliquam. Primo modo in quolibet organo sensus dominatur terra vel aqua quia organum cujuscumque sensus, si esset sursum, descenderet. In aliquidus tamen organis dominantur alia elementa quoad operationes aliquas. Et isto secundo modo illud elementum dicitur magis dominari quod magis disponit organum ad talem operationem; et isto modo est videndum quae elementa in quibus organis dominantur.

46 Sciendum quod in organo visus dominatur aqua, cujus ratio est quia ad hoc quod fit visus oportet speciem rei visibilis multiplicari usque ad virtutem visivam. Nunc autem virtus visiva non est in superficie oculi sed interius in nervo optico ubi nervi oculi concurrunt in unum.

47 Quod virtus visiva non sit in superficie oculi probat Philosophus,27 nam vulnerati justa tempora amittunt visum. Et Commentator dicit28 quod quidam laesus in nervo optico claros habuit oculos, sed nihil vidit; quod non esset si virtus visiva esset in superficie oculi. Ex quo igitur virtus visiva est interius.

48 Oportet quod pupilla oculi sit naturae diaph<ae>nae,29 aliter non posset deferre speciem ad virtutem visivam; sed pupilla non est naturae igneae; igitur oportet quod

26 Averroes, De caelo I, 7; ed. cit., v. 5, f. 6r6 infra F-6v6 I, t.c. 7.
27 Aristoteles, De sensu II; 1386b9.
28 Averroes, De sensu (Paraphrasis); ed. cit., v. 6, 2; f. 13vM.
29 Appears as diaphonus throughout the MSS in contexts which demand diaphonus.
sit naturae aqueae vel aeriae. Sed ut dicit Philosophus, melius est quod sit aquae naturae quam aeriae propert duo tamen, quia aqua melius potest servari (190Ar. 1b) quam aer. Aer enim facilius diffunditur quam aqua; tamen quia aqua est spissior quam aer, ideo melius potest conservare species. Sed natura semper facit illud quod melius est; ideo melius est quod pupilla sit naturae aqueae quam aeriae. Hoc etiam patet per signum quia si oculis corrupatur, nos videmus quod aqua decurrit; quod non esset nisi oculus esset naturae aqueae.

49 In organo auditus dominatur aer quia illud dominatur in organo auditus quod magis disponit ad susceptionem sui objecti. Objectum autem auditus est corpus sonorum, et corpora aerea sunt magis sonora quam alia corpora ut argentum et aes quam plumbum et alia quae sunt naturae aqueae. Et ideo cum aer magis disponat organum auditus ad susceptionem sui objecti, rationabile est quod in organo auditus dominetur aer. Et ideo dicitur quod in aure est aer inclusus qui est connaturalis auri.

50 In organo olfactus, secundum quod olfactus est in actu, dominatur ignis; sed secundum quod olfactus est in potentia, in ejus organo dominatur aqua. Cujus ratio est quia passum in fine assimilatur agenti et in principio est ei dissimile et in potentia ad formam agentis. Sed objectum olfactus debet esse calidum et siccum. Nos videmus enim quod flores in aestate et calido tempore magis odorant quam in aliis temporibus. Quaadem etiam non odorant nisi quando calefient sicut patet de sulphure et aliis. Ideo organum olfactus secundum quod <est in> actu immutetur ab objecto debet esse calidum et siccum. Sed secundum quod est in potentia ut immutetur ab objecto cum illud quod est in potentia ut immutetur ab aliquo, debeat esse tale in potentia quale est illud alius in actu. Sic organum olfactus debet esse frigidum et humidum. Et ideo organum olfactus secundum quod est in actu cum sit calidum et siccum, in eo dominatur ignis; sed secundum quod est in potentia cum sit frigidum et humidum, sic in eo dominatur aqua. Et ideo organum olfactus est situatum justa cerebrum quia cerebrum maxime est frigidum et humidum.

51 Sed sciendum quod sub alia ratione dominatur aqua in organo visus et sub alia in organo olfactus, quia in organo visus dominatur aqua inquantum est perspicua sed in organo olfactus inquantum est in potentia calida.

52 In organo tactus et gustus dominatur terra, cujus ratio est nam tactus est receptivus diversarum contrarietatum, et ideo oportet omnem organum sit medio modo complexionatum. Nunc inter omnia elementa, qualitates terrae sunt minime activae. Et ideo ad hoc quod organum tactus sit medio modo complexionatum, oportet quod in eo dominetur terra. Et quia gustus est quidam tactus, ideo similiter in organo gustus dominatur terra.

53 Organum tactus situatur circa cor, nam, ut dictum est, in organo tactus dominatur terra quae naturaliter est frigida. Sed cor est membrum calidum. Ideo ut per calidatatem cordis mitigetur frigiditas terrae quae est in organo tactus, organum tactus ponatur circa cor. Et quia cor est (190Ar. 2b-190Av. 8) membrum calidum et cerebrum membrum frigidum, ideo cor et cerebrum sunt ex opposito situata ut per frigiditatem cerebrorum mitigetur caliditas cordis, et per calidatatem cordis mitigetur frigiditas cerebrorum. Et ideo illi qui habent parva capita in proportione ad alia membra sunt impetuosii, quia calori cordis non sufficienter obtentur per frigiditatem cerebrorum. Et illi qui habent magna capita in proportione ad alia membra sunt pigri et somnolenti, quia calori cordis nimis obfuscatur et debilitatur per frigiditatem cerebrorum.

30 Aristotle, De sensu II; 438a13-20.
54 Dicto de organis, dicendum est de objectis et primo de objecto visus. Sciemnon quod secundum quosdam color est primum objectum visus quia nihil videtur aliquo modo nisi participet rationem colorum. Et secundum alios lumen est primum objectum visus et non color, et hoc quia lumen potest videri sine colore sed color non potest videri sine lumen.

55 Dicendum est tamen quod loquendo de primo objecto secundum quod est quando objectum appropinquatum est adaequatum potentiae visivae, sic visibile est primum objectum visus quia nihil potest videri nisi visibile, et omne visibile potest videri. Et secundum istud, nec color nec lux est primum objectum visus. Si tamen quaeratur quod istorum, color vel lux, primo immutat visum, dicendum quod neutrum istorum principalius alio immutat visum. Coloratum tamen principalius immutat visum quam aliquod istorum, cujus ratio est quoniam objectum debet esse proportionatum potentiae.

56 Sed illud cui attribuitur actus videndi non est solum potentia visiva nec solum organum corporeum, sed aggregatum ex potentia visiva et organo corporeo. Et ideo ejus objectum debet esse unum aggregatum, cujusmodi est coloratum, et non color vel lux, ita quod sicut aggregatum ex virtute visiva et organo corporeo principalius videt ratione tamen virtutis visivae, sic aggregatum ex colore\textsuperscript{32} et objecto coloris primo agit in visum ratione tamen coloris.

57 Sed tunc est dubium, cum coloratum, ut dictum est, principaliter agat in visum, quare ad hoc quod fiat visio requiritur lumen: utrum quod sit propter objectum vel propter medium. Ad istam dubitationem dicitur committere quod lumen requiritur propter medium et non propter objectum quia, ut dicunt, objectum de se est sufficiens ad multiplicandum suum speciem quia, per Commentatorem,\textsuperscript{31} hic est secundus modus dicendi per se “color est visibils”. Et ideo lumen non requiritur ut tribuat aliquam formam objecto, sed solum requiritur propter medium ut scilicet disponat medium ad recipiendum et deferendum speciem objecti quoniam medium tenebrosum non est dispositum ad recipiendum speciem coloris vel colorati.

58 Istud tamen non apparat verum quoniam existens in tenebris potest videre coloratum existens in lumine et inter videns et coloratum sit magna pars medii tenebrosa, quod non esset nisi medium tenebrosum posset recipere speciem visibilis. Ideo melius dicendum videtur quod ad hoc quod fiat visio requiritur lumen tamquam una partialis causa ad inferendum speciem (190Av a-b) colorati in organum visus ita quod coloratum et lumen simul speciem visibilis imprimunt in visum tamquam duae partiales causae.

59 Neutrum tamen istorum tribuit aliquis alteri, et quod sic sit apparat quia ad hoc quod coloratum videatur sufficit quod illud medium sit illuminatum circa illud. Videmus enim quod existens in tenebris potest videre coloratum existens in lumine et non potest videre coloratum existens in parte medii tenebrosa quae est inter existens in lumine et videntem. Hoc non esset nisi ista duo simul, scilicet coloratum et lumen simul, imprimenter speciem colorati in visum.

\textsuperscript{31} Corpore L.

\textsuperscript{32} Averroes, De an., II, 4, 3; ed. cit., v. 6, 1-2, ff. 84r-85v D, but especially 84v DE; t.c. 66-67.
60 Viso qualiter color videtur, nunc est videndum quid est color et ex quibus compo
ponitur. Dicendum est igitur secundum Philosophum quod color est extremitas perspici in corpore terminato. Et scindium quod perspicuitas, ut dicit Philosophus, est una qualitas communis aeri et aquae et culibet quod natum est recipere lumen. Unde perspiciatas est una dispositio ratione cujus aliquid est natum recipere lumen. Nunc autem aliquid est natum recipere lumen in superficie tantum, et aliquid in superficie et in profundio.

61 Istitud quod recipit lumen in superficie tantum dicitur esse perspicuum termini
natum, et hujusmodi sunt corpora solida cujusmodi sunt lapis et lignum et hujusmodi. Propert hoc enim talia dicuntur perspiciua terminata quia bene terminantur terminis propriis. Sed istud quod recipit lumen in superficie et in profundo dicitur esse perspiciu num non terminatam quia tale non bene terminantur terminis propriis, et hujusmodi sunt aer et aqua et consimilia. Est igitur color extremitas perspicui et non sic in clin ligendo quod color sit extremitas perspicui sed sic quod color sit in extremitate perspicii corporis terminati.

62 Intellectum tamen quod color non solum habet esse in extremitate corporis terminati, sed etiam in profundo quia tamen color non percipitur nisi secundum quod habet esse in extremitate corporis, ut nos hic loquimur de corpore secundum quod percipitur a potentia visiva. Ideo magis dicimus quod color est illud quod habet esse in extremitate corporis terminati quam quod sit illud quod habet esse in profundo corporis terminati.

63 Circum compositionem coloris est dubitatio: dicitur enim communiter quod color componeitur ex lumine et ex perspicuo; ex lumine tamquam ex formali, et ex perspicuo tamquam ex materiali. Contra istud tamen arguitur sic: Lumen nihil est contrarium quia nihil opponitur lumini nisi tenebra; sed tenebra non opponitur lumini contrarie sed solum privativa; lumini igitur nihil est contrarium. Sed colorato secundum speciem est aliquid contrarium quoniam albedini contrariatur nigredo. Igitur lumen non est formale principium coloris. Propterea lumen et color sunt qualitates diversae secundum speciem; igitur unum non cadit in compositionem alterius. Similiter perspicuum est substantia et color accidentes; igitur perspicuum non est pars materialis coloris.

64 Ad istam dubitationem dicendum quod color non componeitur ex lumine et perspicuo sic quod utrumque illorum sit de essentia coloris. Color enim est forma simplex et ideo non habet materiam ex qua sit, sed solum habet (190Avb-191ra) in qua sit. Unde secundum quod dicit Albertus, libro suo De sensu et sensato, tractatu secundo, capitolo primo, lumen est tota substantia coloris. Est enim color lux obumbrata in perspicuo corporis terminato. Unde sic ponit generationem albedinis quod cum perspicuum corporis terminati est valde clarum, tunc participatio luminis in

33 Aristote, De sensu III; 439b11-14; cf. De an II, 7; 418a29-418b4.
34 Aristote, De an. II, 7; 418b7-12; cf. De sensu III; 439a21-30.
35 Albertus Magnus, De sensu tr. II, cap. 1; ed. A. Borghnet, v. 9, p. 39 a.... lumen est color perspicui secundum actum facti, quando color accipitur: quia lumen secundum veritatem est actus colorum in eo quod colores sunt: et ideo est natura formalis eorum, et cum propria potentia in qua habet fiet hic actus, fit perspicuum, necesse est quod omnis color sit participatio luminis in tali vel tali perspicuo.
tali perspicuo est albedo; sed si non fuerit clarum, tunc participatio luminis in tali perspicuo est nigredo. Et ideo dicit quod illud quod in corporibus non terminatis est lumen et tenebra, illud idem in corporibus terminatis est albedo et nigredo. Ad hoc adducit quaedam signa. Videmus enim quod illa quae apparent vehementer alba in lumine solis, apparent pallida\textsuperscript{36} in lumine lunae. Etiam in eclipsi lunae, illa quae prius apparent vehementer alba, pallescunt. Hoc non esset nisi quia propter absentiam luminis dimensioneretur albedo. Et sic ut videtur lumen est tota substantia coloris vel ad minus lumen cadit in compositione coloris.

65 Idem vult Commentator in De sensu et sensato,\textsuperscript{37} qui dicit quod colores sunt ex commixtione luminis cum corporibus diaphanis. Et dicit quod lux non tantum est necessaria in induxione coloris ad visum sed in esse eorum. Et sic, sicut medii colores sunt viliores albo et negro cum sunt ex cis, sic quilibet color est vilior lumc cum sit ex ea. Secundum igitur hoc est dicendum quod lux sive lumen cadit in compositione coloris vel quod est tota substantia coloris.

66 Unde ad hoc quod color videatur duplex lumen requiritur, scilicet lumen intrinsecum ad hoc quod color in esse constitutur, et lumen extrinsecum ad hoc quod color per speciem videatur. Sed illud lumen ex quo color in esse constituitur est lumen elementare ut lumen ignem. Sed lumen extrinsecum per quod color videtur, aliud est lumen elementare, aliud est lumen <s>u<per>eaeltestis corporis.

67 Circa colores medii sciemund quod colores medi compoonuntur ex coloribus extremalibus. In coloribus enim mediis sunt colores extremi adinvicem conjuncti. Sed sciemund quod in rebus invenitur mixtio duplex: unum genus mixtionis reperitur in rebus in quibus contingit accipere minimum sicut in hominibus et in equis et in omnibus ex homogenis, et talis mixtio sit per juxtapositionem. Dicimus enim quod homines sunt admixti cum equis, non quia partes hominis ingrediantur partes equi, sed quia homines ponuntur juxta equos; et ideo modo dicimus et grana hordei sunt mixta cum granis frumenti et in tali mixtione non quaelibet pars mixtij est mixta.

68 Aliud quoque genus mixtionis est in illis in quibus non est accipere minimum ut in homogenis sicut in aqua et in vino. In tali mixtione commiscitur totum cum toto sic quod quaelibet pars mixtij est mixta. Et ideo modo commiscinentur colores extremi adinvicem ad hoc quod generetur color medius. Colores tamen non miscuntur adinvicem nisi ex hoc quod corpora colorata commiscenentur adinvicem. Unde ex commixtione corporum sequitur commixtio colorum, et secundum quod in commiscendo colores extremos potest esse diversa et diversa proportio illorum colorum adinvicem. Potest enim album excedere nigrum in proportione dupla vel tripla vel (191r\textsuperscript{a-b}) e converso. Secundum hoc variatur colores medii. Istud totum dicit Philosophilus in De sensu et sensato.\textsuperscript{38}

69 Ad argumenta superius facta,\textsuperscript{39} quae probant quod lumen non cadit in compositione coloris, dicendum ad primum, sicut dicit Albertus,\textsuperscript{40} quod formae in albedine est lumen, et materiale, perspicuum. Sic formae in negredine est tenebhra, et materiale, opacum. Sed lumen et tenebhra sunt privativa opposita, et perspicuum et opacum sunt contrarie opposita. Et ideo album et nigrum, quantum ad formalia in cis, opponuntur privativa; sed quantum ad materialia in cis, opponuntur contrarie. Et ideo

\textsuperscript{36} add et L.
\textsuperscript{37} Averroes, De sensu (Paraphrasis); ed. cit., v. 6, 2; f. 14r=B-14r\textsuperscript{b}D.
\textsuperscript{38} Aristote, De sensu III; 439b20-440b25.
\textsuperscript{39} Cf. paragraph 63 supra.
\textsuperscript{40} Albertus Magnus, De sensu tr. II, cap. 2; ed. cit., v. 9, pp. 42a-47b.
dicit quod album et nigrum magis opponuntur privative quam contrarie. Sed illud non apparet verum quoniam nigrum habet actionem realem, quoniam nigrum congregat visum; quod non esset si nigrum principaliter importaret privationem albi. Ideo potest dici quod lumen, secundum esse quod habet in corpore non terminato, sibi nihil est contrarium, lumini tamen, secundum esse quod habet in corpore terminato, est aliquid contrarium.

70 Ad aliud quod lumen et color non sunt qualitates diversae secundum speciem quia non differunt nisi secundum suspicionem: Sed illud idem secundum speciem quod dicitur lumen in corpore non terminato, dicitur color in corpore terminato. Ad aliud patet quoniam perspicuum non est de essentia coloris, sed solum est subjectum in quo color habet fieri.

71 Scindum quod differentia est inter lumen et lucem quia lux dicitur secundum esse quod habet in corpore lucido, sed lumen dicitur secundum esse quod habet in medio. Unde lumen dicitur species lucis. Scindum etiam quod nec lux nec color nec lumen nec coloratum est primum objectum adaequatum potentiae visivae, sed visibile. Principalis tamen objectum inter ista est coloratum, sed nec lumen nec lux, cujus ratio est quia objectum debet proportionari potentiae et ejus organo. Sed objectum41 virtutis visivae est quid terminatum,42 sed nec lux nec lumen de sua natura est terminatum. Unde nec lux nec lumen videtur nisi secundum quod habet rationem rei terminatae. Stella enim, quae est corpus lucidum, est a nobis bene visibile quia lux quae est in stella est terminata per densum. Est enim stella densior pars sui orbis. Similiter, si lumen non terminaretur ad aliquid, non videbatur, ut si radius solis intraret domum et ex alia parte exiret per foramen directe oppositum, ille radius non videbatur; et ideo lumen non videtur nisi secundum quod habet rationem terminati. Cum igitur lumen de se non habet rationem terminati, lumen non est de se visibile; sed lumen secundum quod habet rationem terminati, sic accedit ad rationem colorum. Et ideo color magis est visibile quam lumen quia lumen non est visibile nisi secundum quod accedit ad rationem colorum. Sed ad hoc color non es: proprium objectum visus, sed 'coloratum magis quia objectum debet proportionari potentiae; sed illud cui attribuitur actus videndi est compositum ex virtute visiva et organo corporeo, et ideo ejus objectum debet esse quoddam compositum, cujusmodi est coloratum. Coloratum enim est compositum ex colore et ex subjecto colorum.

XII

72 Circa sensibilia innominata cujus sunt squamae piscium, quercus (191r6-191v*) putrida, et hujusmodi, scindenum quod talia videntur in lumine per colorem eorum et in tenebris videntur per eorum lucem. Sed tunc est dubium quae sit causa hujus. 73 Ad quod dicendum quod in mixtis non est lux nisi per naturam ignis, inter enim quattuor corpora elementaria solum ignis est lucidus. Circa compositionem mixti est intelligendum quod in mixto aggregatur et fortificatur virtus ignis fortificativa et augmentativa. Coloris est enim caliditas propria qualitas activa ignis; et ideo in aliquo corpore mixto lux majus abundat quam in alio, et hoc propter naturam ignis. Et secundum hoc ibi dupliciter contingit fieri ut corpora lucida videantur in tenebris: uno modo via putrefactionis, alio modo via generationis naturalis.

41 Organum L.
42 Interminatum L.
74 Via putrefactionis per hunc modum: Cum enim putrefactio habet fieri, ut dicit Philosophus, quarto Metho-orum,43 per abstractionem calidi naturalis a profundo corporis ad exteriora, tunc cum corpus putrefacit, totus calor interior tendit ad superficiem superiorem. Calor autem exterius tendens ducit secum humidum, unde omnia putrefacta sicca sunt interius, exterius vero humida. Sic igitur calor totaliter cum humidō extrahatur exterius ad superficiem per virtutem et naturam caloris exterioris; et sic multiplicatur virtus ignis exterior, et sic per virtutem ignis ibi multiplicatur natura lucis. Husidus autem cum de se sit rete<ν> tivum fortiter retinet naturam lucis multiplicatam ex augmentatione caloris et virtutis ignis propter quod talia corpora putrefacita cum veniant ad tam dispositionem per putrefactionem.

75 Natura lucis exterius in superficie multiplicativa est sui extra se, et propter hoc propria luce videtur in tenebris. Per hanc viam videtur in tenebris quercus putrida, et spinales medullae piscium extractione humidī medullaris cum calore exterius cum lucent. Et hoc patet per signum quia si putrefactio compleatur, ut calidum penitus a superficie et non lucent, ita quercus putrida lucens in aliquo tempore putrefactionis, completa putrefactione non lucet.

76 Propter vero similium modum quaedam corpora lucent ex augmentatione caloris in generatione, sicut patet in quibusdam animalibus habitantibus in locis frigidis, ut in aqua. Natura exterius in superficie generat quadam compactionem per frigidum et siccum terrestre fortiter comprimendo calidum ignem et humidum aqueum; in qua compressio, cum aggregatur calidum, fortificatur virtus, et sic ibi multiplicatur natura ignis. Et per hunc modum squamae piscium, cum sint munimentum exterior in piscibus, habent fortasse operationem modo jam dicto ad defendendum calidum interius in piscibus a frigiditate exteriori, ex qua operatione in ipsis augeetur natura lucis; et per hanc viam squamae piscium lucent in tenebris et similiter capita serpentum, et quidam vermiculi isto modo lucent de nocte sicut scintillī ignis.

77 Hoc viso, scindendum quod talia corpora lucent in tenebris medium illuminando. Medium autem illuminatum a lumine talium corporum, propter debilitatem luminis, movet visum ad percipientiam talia corpora. (191v5) Talia corpora lucent in tenebris sub sua luce tantum. Quoniam autem fuerit lumen exterius multiplicatum in medio, tamen lux istorum corporum in medio multiplicata sit debilis valde. Lux exterior in medio penitus confundit lumem istorum corporum ita quod destruit ejus apparentiam, propter quod talia corpora in lumine exteriori videntur per eorum colorem et non per eorum lucem.

XIII

78 Dicto de visibili, dicendum est de sono qui est objectum auditus, et primo de ejus generatione. Scintendum igitur quod ad generationem soni trīa requiruntur, sīlicit percūtiens, percussum, et aer medius in quo fit percussio. Requiritur etiam ex parte corporis quod illa qua percūtiuntur adinvicem sint dura, levia, et lata, quia ad hoc quod causetur sonus oportet quod aer mutus a percussione redundat ad aliqquod obstaculum, et corpora mollia de facili cedunt pelleti et ideo non bene sonant ut patet de lana et spongea. Et propter hoc requiritur quod corpus percussum sit durum, potens aerem retundere; et propter idem requiritur quod corpora sint lata, aliter aer non resiliet et ideo acus acui objecta non causat magnum sonum.

43 Aristote, De meteorologicorum IV; Averrois Summa, ed. cit., v. 5; f. 463v5 H.
Sequitur etiam quod corpora sint levia quia oportet quod aer maneat in sua integritate ita quod percutiatur antequam dividatur, quod non continget si corpus percussum esset asperum, quia asperum est cuius una pars superminus alteri. Ex parte aeris requiritur quod ictus percussit ens praeventit fracturam aeris. Unde si aliquid tarde movetur, non causabit sonum quia divisio aeris praecessit ictum ejus; si tamen velociter moveatur, sonum causabit. Unde licet aer non sit corpus durum, ita tamen velociter potest aliquid movere in aere quod sonum causabit, ut patet de virga velociter mota in aere.

79 Ulterius scindendum quod ad generationem soni per se requiritur fractura aeris. Percutiens et percussum magis requiretur per accidentem, ut in fissura ligni causat<ur> sonus, ubi nec est percutiens nec percussum, sed tamen ibi causatur sonus quia per fissionem dividitur partes aeris. Ad hoc scindendum quod sonus est subjective in aere, sed non in quacunque parte aeris, sed in aere qui est inter percutiens et percussum; quia sonus causatur per fracturam aeris et per motum aliquem factum in aere. Cum igitur ille motus sit in aere subjective, sonus est in aere subjective. Sonus tamen non est ille motus quia surdus potest pericere illum motum et tamen non percipit sonum. Sed sonus est una passio causata ex motu et est in aere sicut subjecto.

80 Scindendum est etiam quod in aere nos habemus quemdam aarem connaturalem et quamdiu ille aer salvatur, potest homo audire. Unde in aqua potest homo audire si aqua non ingredieretur ad ustum aereum. Et quod sit talis aer in aere patet, nam si ponitur manus super aereum, aer qui est in aere habens quemdam motum proprium, propert manum appositam facit multas reflectiones, multas percussiones (191v-192r④) propter quas videtur aereum sonare sicut esset cornu, propter quod manifestum est quod in aere est talis aer habens motum proprium.

XIV

81 Postquam dictum est de sono, dicendum est de sapore et odore, et primo de sapore eo quod est nobis manifestior quam odor. Et cum sapor sit activus, videndum est in quo s.t subjective.

82 Scindendum est igitur quod subjectum saporis est duplex, scilicet propinquum et remotum. Similiter, humidum est duplex, scilicet simplex et mixtum. Dico tunc quod humidum simplex est primum subjectum et radicale saporis. Aqua enim est in potestia receptiva omnium saporum, et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus.④ Aqua vult esse receptiva omnium saporum.

83 Si autem loquamur de subjecto propinquo saporum, sic humidum simplex non est subjectum saporum sed humidum mixtum cum sicco. Et hoc quia, sicut vult Philosophus,⑤ sapor est qualitas consequens mixtionem humidum cum sicco per alterationem factam a calido digerente et commiscente humidum cum sicco. Nihil nisi consequens mixtionem qualitatum primarum est in subjecto qualitatum primarum, quia tunc non consequeretur commixtionem earum; ideo humidum simplex non est proprium subjectum saporum et proximum, sed humidum commixtum cum sicco. Et ideo dicit Philosophus⑥ quod nullum elementorum habet saperem vel odorem quia

44 Aristotle, De an. II, 10; 422a11 sqq.; cf. De sensu IV; 441a3-9.
45 Aristotle, De an. II, 10; 422b1-10; cf. De sensu IV; 441b17-23; Plato A.
46 Aristotle, De sensu IV and V; 441b24-26 and 443a9-20; Plato A.
nullum eorum habet humidum commixtum cum sicco, sed quodlibet vel habet humidum sine sicco vel siccum sine humidio. Hoc etiam patet quia sapor est passio nutritmenti, sed nutrimentum est humidum commixtum cum sicco quomiam ex eisdem sumus et nutrimum. Sed licet humidum commixtum cum sicco sit proximum subjectum saporis, humidum tamen est magis subjectum quam siccum; hujus signum est quia sicca, si ponentur super linguam non sapiunt, sed cum humectentur, tunc sapiunt. 84 Sed si humidum commixtum cum sicco sit proximum subjectum saporum, non tamen ubicumque est humidum admixtum cum sicco, est sapor; quia sic quodlibet mixtum esset saporosum, et sic in quolibet tali mixto possemus periciper saporem, quod est falsum. Cujuus ratio est quia, ad hoc quod mixtio humidii cum sicco faciat saporem, oporet quod sit calidum digerens. In aliquibus autem corporibus est tanta privatio calidi ita quod humidum in ipsis non potest digeri a calido. Hujusmodi enim corpora remanent insaporabilia, sicut patet de auro et de aliiis corporibus quae multum habent de terrestritate in quibus est tanta privatio calidi quod humidum in ipsis non digeri potest a calido. 85 Sciemendum etiam quod duae sunt species extremae saporis, scilicet dulcedo et amaritudo, et species medias componuntur ex extremis. Et secundum quod potest esse diversa proportio saporum extremorum, secundum hoc variantur saporis mediis.

XV

86 Dicto de sapore, dicendum est de odore, et sciemendum quod subjectum propinquum odoris est corpus mixtum. Unde corpora simplicia non sint odorabilia (192r3b) nec saporabilia; nec etiam quaedam corpora mixta odorant, sicut aurum propter vehementem terrestritatem, nec aqua propter defectum ejsdem. 87 Subjectum odorum remotum est siccum sicut est saporis humidum. Et hujus ratio est quia tale est sensibile in actu, quale est organum in potentia. Sed organum olfactus est frigidum et humidum actualiter, cum sit situatum juxta cerebrum, et ideo est in potentia siccum et calidum quia quod est in actu sub uno contrario, est in potentia ad reliquum. Et ideo objectum olfactus est actualiter calidum et siccum. 88 Unde breviter illud est subjectum saporis et odoris, sed sub diversa ratione, nam corpus mixtum est subjectum saporum ratione humidii passi a sicco, et corpus mixtum est subjectum odoris ratione sicci.59

XVI

89 Objectum tactus est tangibile quod est commune ad calidum, frigidum, et humidum et siccum, quae sunt qualitates primae, et etiam ad alias qualitates secundas compositas, quae sunt curum et molle. Sed de ipsis est determinandum in libro De generatione51 et libro Metheorum.52 Sciemendum quod sensus tactus, cum participat diversas

47 om. magis... saporosum (paragraph 84) V.
48 et (?).
49 Idem A, V.
50 Quia quod est in actu sub uno contrariorium est in potentia ad reliquum. Ideo objectum olfactus est actualiter humidum et siccum. V.
51 Aristole, De gen. et cor. II, 2; 323b18-33. Burley may also refer to his own work of this title.
52 Aristole, De meteorologicorum IV; Averrois Summa, ed. cit., v. 5; ff. 460v8-E.461v8. Burley may also refer to his own work of this title.
contrarietates, non est unus sensus nisi secundum genus; sed habet sub se diversas species, unam quam participat calidum et frigidum, et aliam secundum quam participat humicum et siccum.

XVII

90 Dicto de objectis, dicendum est de mediis. Sciem dum est quod quilibet sensus immutatur per medium, et hoc probat Commentator sic: Sensibile est movens-non-motum; sensus est motum-non-movens. Sed inter movens-non-motum et motum-non-movens oportet ponere movens-et-motum medium, et illud dicitur esse medium in sensatione. Medium enim moverut ab objecto et medium movet sensum, et sic medium est movens-et-motum; sensibile non est motum ab aliquo nec sensus est movens.


92 Albertus assignat aliam causam hujus dicti, et est quod nullum corporum potest immediate agere in incorporeum. Si igitur sensibile esset immediate coniunctum sensui cum sensus in se sit virtus incorporea, ab ipso sensibili non patetur nisi materialiter, sicut planta patiuntur a calido et a frigido.

93 Themistius aliam rationem ponit, et est quod natura in opere suo semper procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum. Embryo enim in matrice prius est animal quam homo. Sic in proportio est ordo determinatus quod a re corporali et materiali ad spirituali re quod fiat transitus per medium inter utrumque. Unde species in medio spiritualius habet esse quam in objecto, et materialius quam in organo, et ideo species in medio se habet medio modo inter esse spirituali et materiale.

94 Sciem dum quod speciem habere spiritualius esse est ipsam habere esse (192r-192v) debilis. Unde quanto est species spiritualior, tanto imperfectius representat illud cujus est species.

XVIII

95 Sciem dum quod medium in videndo est aer et aqua et omne tale in quo color potest suam speciem multiplicare. Cujusmodi sunt corpora diaph"ae" na in quo medio recipitur species visibilis, et est extensa per totum medium ab objecto usque ad visum. Nec est tamen una species in medio sed infinitae quorum quaelibet est extensa quia nisi species esset extensa in medio, non esset simulidem objecti quod est extensam.

58 Averroes, De an. II, 4, 1; ed. cit., v. 6, 1-2; f. 76v DE, t.c. 51.
54 Albertus Magnus, De sensu tr. III, cap. 2; ed. cit., v. 9, pp. 79a-82b.
56 Themistius, De an. Liber 4; Verbeke, p. 179, ll.21-29. materia enim nulla potest discernere speciem quae generatur in ea... species autem est sensus et ratio primi sensitivi; potentia enim ipsius est et forma. Et subiecto quidem idem sensus et sensitivum, sicut omnis forma est cum eo quod suscipit eam; esse autem est alterum organi et potentiae: organum quidem enim magnitudine quae-dam et corpus est, potentia autem est ratio et species illius... Cf. Aristotle, De gen. animalium II, 3; 736a33-736b2.
96 Sciendum etiam quod visibile multiplicat suam speciem subito et non successive, sicut lux multiplicat se subito. Cujus causa est quoniam successio non est in multiplicatione alicuius formae nisi sit propter aliquod prohibens vel propter resistentiam alicuius contrariori. Sed lumen non habet contrarium; nihil enim opponitur lumini nisi tenebra, sed tenebra non opponitur lumini contrarie sed privative. Unde quaelifet pars medii est aequaliter disposita ad suspiciendum lumen, quod est species lucis; ideo praesente luce quaelifet pars medii illuminatur.

XIX

97 Similiter medium in audiendo est aer vel aqua. Objectum tamen auditus multiplicat se in medio successive et non subito, cujus signum est quia si aliquis videat alium percutere a remotis cum instrumento, videbit ipsum deprimere instrumentum et iterum elevare antequam sonum audiat. Hoc non esset nisi sonus cum successione et cum motu ad aurem perveniret. Non tamen semper est necesse quod sonus multiplicatur cum motu usque aurem, quia ponatur quod aliquis in fortissimo vento moveat campanam. Manifestum est quod contra motum venti audietur sonus illius usque ad alicuam distantiam.

98 Si igitur sonus ille multiplicatur cum motu, sequitur quod ille aer motus moveretur sub contrariis motibus, vel quod motus venti cederet motui aeris cum sono. Et ideo videtur quod usque ad alicuam distantiam necesse est aerem moveri, et quod ultra aerem motum sonus potest suam speciem multiplicare. Unde non est dicendum quod semper sit necesse aerem ad tantam distantiam moveri ad quantam sonus suam speciem multiplicat.

99 Per hoc patet quoc in aliqua parte medii habet sonus esse reale, et in alia parte, intentionale. Nam in illa parte medii ubi est fractura aeris per concussionem corporum, habet sonus esse reale; sed in parte medii post fractionem aeris, habet sonus esse intentionale. Et in illa parte medii in qua sonus habet esse intentionale, multiplicat se subito; sed in illa parte medii in qua habet esse reale, multiplicat se successive.

XX

100 Odor percipitur in aere et in aqua; et in alia parte medii habet odor esse reale, et in alia parte, esse intentionale. Nam in alia parte medii odor multiplicat se cum fumali evaporatione, et in illa habet odor esse reale, et multiplicatur ibi successive quia multiplicat se cum motu locali fumalis evaporationis. Sed tamen odor non semper multiplicat se cum fumali evaporatione, quia si sic, cum aliquod corpus odorabile multiplicaret suum odorem (192vᵃᵇ) ad aliquam distantiam magnum ad quam non posset se multiplicare, et si resolveretur in ignem, si illud multiplicet odorem per fumalem evaporationem: per tantam distantiam, corrumpetur totaliter et propter hoc esset aliquod corpus rarius igne.

56 Aliquod L.
57 Philosophus enim probat A.
58 Intelligibile L.
59 Sequitur quod A.
60 Praeter L.
XXI

101 Sciemund quod visus, auditus, et olfactus sentiunt per media extrinsecas, sed gustus et tactus sentiunt per media conjuncta. Unde medium sensus tactus est caro. Ideo animal potest sentire calidum et frigidum mediante quacumque parte carnis. Medium in gustu est lingua.

XXII

102 Dicto de sensibus exterioribus, dicendum est de sensibus interioribus. Unde secundum Avicennam, Sexto Naturalium, quinque sunt sensus interiores, sic incipit sensus communis, virtus imaginativa, fantastica, aestimativa, et memorativa. Isti sensus sic distinguuntur: Sensus communis non solum cognoscit omnia objecta sensuum particularium, sed etiam cognoscit differentias objectorum diversorum sensuum particularium. Unde per sensum communem cognoscimus diversitatem interim amarum et dulce, et hoc nullus sensus particularis potest percipere.

103 Sciemund quod duo sunt actus sensus communis: unus est cognoscere diversitates inter objecta diversorum sensuum particularium, et alius est cognoscere actus sensuum particularium. Unde per sensum communem percipit se quidem videre et non per visum. Iste sensus communis ponitur in anteriori parte cerebri ubi concurrunt nervi sensitivi sicut in quodam centro, qui locus medullosus est et humidos, secundum Albertum.

104 Et sciemund quod sensus communis non potest in actus suos nisi per sensus proprios quia, ut dicit Avicenna, sensus communis non percipit nisi ex hoc quod sensus proprii redeunt ad ipsum cum sui lucis.

105 Post istum sensum est virtus imaginativa, quaee non solum potest quod potest sensus communis sed etiam retinere potest quia possimus imaginari res in absentia, quod non eset nisi imaginatio retinere speciem in absentia rei. Etiam potest plus quam sensus communis, quia sensus communis non retinet speciem in absentia rei vel, si retinet, parum retinet.

106 Post imaginatoniem est virtus fantastica, quaee non solum recipit quod facit sensus communis, nec solum retinet quod facit virtus in imaginatio, sed componit unam rem cum aliis re ut, quia videmus montem et videmus aurum, habemus per fantastiam nostram quod possimus componere montem aurem. Nos enim componimus et dividimus tam fantasmas quam intentiones rerum. Facimus enim hominem cum duobus capita, et virtus per quam hoc facimus est virtus fantastica.

107 Quarta virtus est aestimativa, quaee non solum recipit species sensibilium, sed etiam intentiones non sensatas. Cujusmodi sunt amicitia, inamicitia, quae dicunt

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61 Lincolnesam A.
62 Avicenna, De an. I, 5 (Venice, 1508), f. 5r³c-5r³b E.
63 Albertus Magnus, Isagoge in libros de anima, cap. 14; ed. cit., v. 5, p. 517. Sensus ergo communis est vis animae sensibilis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per scipsam omnes formas quae imprimitur quinque sensibus et redduntur. Hae autem virtus est centrum omnium sensuum particularium a qua derivantur ut rami. Cf. Liber de anima tr. IV, cap. 11; ed. cit., v. 5, p. 310: ... omnes particulas nervorum quia ad organa propriorum sensuum diriguntur, et concav... diriguntur ad anteriorem cerebri partem, quae medietas quaedam est...
64 Avicenna, De an. I, 5 and IV, 1; ed. cit., ff. 5r³ D and 17r³ A-17v³.
quasdam intentiones ultra species sensibiles ut ovis, videns lupum, statim apprehendit eum esse nocivum et inimicum sua naturae non quia horreat colorem aut figuram lupi, sed praeceptor colorem et figuram aestimat ovis in lupo aliquid ulterius puta inimicitiam. (192vB-193rA)

Unde ista virtus in homine vocatur collativa intentionum particularium; ideo vocatur ratio particularis per quam dijudicatur quid sit convenientis, quid disconvenientis. Sed in aliis animalibus, licet non sit proprie collatio, est tamen aliquid per modum collationis. De hac virtute dicit Avicenna quod est apprehensiva intentionum quae per sensum non apprehenduntur, et ideo recipit species non sensatas. Et Al gazel dicit quod virtus aestimativa est virtus apprehendens de sensato quod non est sensatum, sicut ovis inimicitias lupi. Hoc enim non sit per oculum, sed per aliam virtutem quae est hujusmodi in brutis quod intellectus est in hominibus. Nam sicut alius cognoscit aliquid per intellectum quod non cognoscit per sensum, licet non cognoscat nisi accipiendo a sensu, ita aestimativa cognoscit licet modo inferiori.

108 Quinta virtus est memorativa, quae est thesaurus tam specierum quam intentionum. In ea enim retinentur et species formarum sensibilium et etiam intentionum. 68


110 Commentator ponit tantum quattuor sensus interiores, scilicet sensum communem, fantasticum, aestimativum, et memorativum. Unde imaginativam et fantasticam ponit unum sensum. Et quod illae quattuor virtutes debeant esse in animali perfecto, declaratur sic per Philosophum, tertio De anima: Natura non deficit in necessariis nec abundat in superfluis; ideo oportet quod tot operationes esse in animali quod sunt sibi necessariae, aliter natura deficeret in necessariis. Nunc autem non solum <est> necessarium animali perfecto quod recipiat species sensibiles in praesentia eorum, sed etiam quod retineat in absentia sensibilium. Cum enim nutrimentum sit necessarium omni animali, et illud non semper est praesens, necesse est animali perfecto quod sibi insit species nutrimenti convenientis in absentia nutrimenti, quia nisi in animali remanerent species sensibilium, in absentia eorum non moveretur animal ad aliquod distans ad quaeendum nutrimentum. Cujus contra-
rium videmus in animalibus perfectis, moventur enim ad quaerendum nutrimentum ad quod non possunt pertingere per visum.

111 Igitur necessarium est animali retinere species sensibilium in absentia eorum. Sed per eandem virtutem non potest animal recipere species sensibilium et omnes conservare, ut probat Avicenna,\textsuperscript{75} quia corpora quae sunt bene receptiva sunt male retentiva. Recipere enim et conservare in corporibus reducuntur ad diversa principia, nam humidum bene recipit et male retinet, siccum autem et contrario. Et ideo cum virtutes sensitivae sunt virtutes corporales et habeant esse in organis corporis, oportet quod sit alia virtus quae bene recipit et alia quae bene retinet.

112 Ad primam operationem, (193r-a-b) quae est recipere, deserviunt sensus exteriores cum sensu communi; ad secundam, virtus fantastica cum memorativa. Unde sensus exteriore cum sensu communi recipiunt species formarum sensibilium, et virtus fantastica illas conservat; sed virtus aestimativa recipit species intentionum non sensatarum, et virtus memorativa illas retinet, et etiam species formarum sensibilium. Hoc est quod vult Avicenna, \textit{Sexto Naturalium},\textsuperscript{76} qui dicit quod virtutes interiores aut sunt virtutes quarum actus sunt circa species formarum sensibilium, aut quarum actus sunt circa intentiones non sensatas. Si primo modo, aut ut recipiens et sic est sensus communis, aut ut conservans et sic est virtus fantastica; si secundo modo, hoc potest esse dupliciter, aut ut recipiens et sic est aestimativa, aut ut conservans et sic est memorativa.

113 Scendium est, secundum Avicennam, \textit{Sexto Naturalium}, parte quarta,\textsuperscript{77} quod licet omnis sensus sit suspexitivus specierum sine materia, et ita in virtute sensitiva videatur esse quodammodo abstractio, tamen in diversis hoc est diversissimus. Nam sensus exteriore sic recipiunt species sensibilis sine materia quia materia formae quae sentientur non est in tali sensu nisi per modum quo cere recipit formam annuli aurei sine auro. Isto modo formae sensibilium recipiuntur in virtute sensitiva. Sed tamen sensus exterior, semper dum habet speciem informamet ipsum, requirot formam cujus est species esse in materia exteriori actualiter. Et illud idem requirot sensus communis.

Et ideo dicit Avicenna\textsuperscript{78} quod haec abstractio est imperfecta. Sed imaginatio, per hoc quod habet speciem rei sine materia, non requirit formam cujus est species esse in materiam extra, dum species est in imaginatio, sed sive res sit praens sicve absens vel totaliter destructa, potest imaginatio in suam operationem per illam speciem.

114 Ideo cicitur quod illa imaginatio habet formam sub perfectione abstractione quam sensus exterior, cum ista tamen abstractione stat alligatio et concomitantia accidentium. Imaginatio enim nihil imaginatur nisi sub quantitate determinata et qualitatis determinatis, et talia appellantur appendicia materiae, secundum Avicennam.\textsuperscript{79} Et ideo, licet hujusmodi sit abstractio a materia, non tamen ab appendix materiae.

\textsuperscript{75} Avicenna, \textit{De an.} IV, 1; \textit{ed. cit.}, f. 17v<sup>a</sup> supra B.

\textsuperscript{76} Avicenna, \textit{De an.} IV, 1; \textit{ed. cit.}, f. 17v<sup>a</sup>. ... restat ergo ut hoc fiat in sensu interiore. Impossibile est autem hoc fieri nisi in principio sensuum interiorum, per quod imperat virtus existimativa et vult propagare quod est in thesaurum. Licet fiat in vigilante etiam, in quo cum firmiter fiunt stabilitate sensata crunt quasi praeentate, et haec virtus est que vocatur sensus communis, quae est centrum commune omnium sensuum, ... sed retinere ea quae haec apprehendit est illius virtutis quae vocatur imaginatio.

\textsuperscript{77} Avicenna, \textit{De an.} II, 2 and III, 8; \textit{ed. cit.}, ff. 6v<sup>b</sup> A and 16r<sup>b</sup> B.

\textsuperscript{78} Avicenna, \textit{De an.} III, 8; \textit{ed. cit.}, f. 16r<sup>b</sup> B.

\textsuperscript{79} Avicenna, \textit{De an.} II, 2; \textit{ed. cit.}, f. 6v<sup>a</sup>A.
115 Sed virtus aestimativa habet adhuc majorem abstractionem, quia recipit intentiones non sensatas ut amicitiam, inamicitiam, bonitatem, et malitiam, quae non quantum\textsuperscript{80} ex se sunt formae materiales; accepit tamen eas esse in materia. Sed tamen in ista virtute non est totalis et perfecta abstractio formae a materia et ab appendicidis materiae, quia non apprehendet tales formas nisi sub singularitate et subesse hic-et-nunc, quae sunt conditiones materiae. Sed haec virtus non retinet; ideo requiritur virtus memorativa, et in illa est major abstractio quam in aestimativa, quia aestimativa non percipit aliquid nisi per rationem praesentis, sed memorativa percipit per rationem praeteritae. Unde objectum prim\textsuperscript{<um>} memoriae est praeteritum inquantum praeteritum, et ideo in memorativa est major abstractio quam in aliqua alia virtute sensitiva.

116 Circa virtutem memorativam est dubium an memoria sit solum praeteritorum, et an sit omnium praeteritorum cognitiva. Et est sciemendum quod non omnis cognition praeteritae est memoria. Scio enim mundum (193b\textsuperscript{1b}-193c\textsuperscript{a}) fuisse, et me fuisset natum; non tamen recordor. Respectu enim illorum non habeo memoriam; sed ad memoriae requiritur quod cognoscens praeteritum pro tunc circa ipsum habuit hic aliquem actum, et ideo recordatio est cognitione praeteritae inquantum pro tunc circa ipsum habuit recordans aliquem actum. Et ex hoc patet quod memoria non est respectu omnium praeteritorum cognitum.

117 Aliud est sciemendum quod memoria est respectu duplicis objecti, scilicet respectu proximae et respectu objecti remoti. Objectum proximum memoriae est actus praeteritus ipsius recordantis, sed objectum remotum est objectum illius actus. Verbi gratia: Recordor quod vidi heri Johannem\textsuperscript{81} hic existenter. Objectum proximum illius recordationis est actus videndi quem habui heri circa Johannem, sed objectum remotum est Johannes circa quem habui actum. Quod igitur dicitur quod memoria solum est praeteritae et actus praesentiae, quod est in intelligendum sic, quod memoria solum est praeteritae respectu objecti proximi; potest tamen esse praesentiae tamquam respectu objecti remoti quoniam aliquis potest esse memor sui. 

118 Adhuc est sciemendum quod ad memoriam requiritur quod recordans percipiat tempus intercetum recordationis et tempus cognitionis rei de qua habetur memoria. Si enim non percipiat tempus, medium non est memoria, ut patet de dormientibus in Sardis.\textsuperscript{82} Ipsius enim non <recordati sunt> illa quae prius fecerunt, quia tempus medium non perceperunt. Et ideo dicit Philosophus\textsuperscript{83} quod memoria non inest animalibus nisi percepientibus tempus.

119 Adhuc est dubitatio si praeter istas quinque virtutes interiores oporteat ponere aliam, quia reminiscencia est aliqua virtus a memoria, quod patet dupliciter quia aliter in quocumque esset memoria, in codem esset reminiscencia; quod falsum est quoniam memoria inest omnibus animalibus perfectis, sed reminiscencia solum inest hominibus, ut dicit Philosophus.\textsuperscript{84} Similiter, illae sunt diversae potentiae quae requirunt diversas dispositiones corporales; sed memoria et reminiscencia requirunt diversas

\textsuperscript{80} add est L.

\textsuperscript{81} A uses homo throughout this example.

\textsuperscript{82} Aristotle, \textit{Phys.} IV, 218b23.

\textsuperscript{83} Aristotle, \textit{De mem. et remin.} I; 449b24-29.

\textsuperscript{84} Aristotle, \textit{De mem. et remin.} I and II; 450a15 and 453a6-9.
dispositiones corporales quia, per Philosophum,\textsuperscript{85} alii sunt bene reminiscibiles et alii bene memorabiles. Tardi enim maxime sunt bene memorabiles, sed alii qui sunt velocis ingenii sunt bene reminiscibiles. Igitur, et cetera.

120 Contrarium tamen apparat quoniam idem est objectum memoriae et reminisc entiae, quia praeteritum inquantum praeteritum est objectum utriusque. Ad istud potest dici quod memoria et reminiscencia \textit{sunt diversae potentiae quia memoria est objecta recordatio sed reminiscencia.}\textsuperscript{86} est quaedam inquisitio, tamen successive procedendo ab aliquo retento in memoria ad cognitionem illius quod quaeritur. Verbi gratia: ut si sciam quod vidi aliquid \textit{heri,}\textsuperscript{87} et nesci \textit{am} quid; ex hoc quod in memoria retinetur cognitio actus, procedendo ad inquirendum cognitionem objecti per reminiscientiam. Unde Commentator in \textit{De memoria} dicit\textsuperscript{88} quod memoria est quaedam memoratio subito facta, sed reminiscencia est inquisitio facta per memoriam. Et ideo ad reminiscientiam requiritur oblivio, sed non ad memoriam.

121 Ad argumentum cum dicitur quod idem est objectum utriusque, dicitur quod non quia praeteritum est objectum memoriae sub ratione qua ejus species est in memoria conservata, sed praeteritum est objectum reminiscientiae sub ratione qua est a memoria clapsum et postea inquisitio per reminiscientiam ex cognitione (153v\textsuperscript{a-b}) alicuius retenti in memoria. Et ideo alius praeteritum est objectum unius et alius.

122 Aliter dicitur quod in memoria et reminiscencia sunt eaedem virtutes et solum variantur accidentaliter, quia memoria est ut est terminus motus, et reminiscencia sicut motus ad terminum. Nunc per ea \textit{dem} virtutem movetur aliquid ad locum aliquam et conservatur in illo loco, sicut patet per ea \textit{dem} virtutem movetur grave ad locum deorsum et conservatur in loco deorsum. Sic ex parte ista, cum per memoriam species retinetur, per reminiscientiam acquiritur, erunt eadem virtus memoria et reminiscencia. Rationes factae solum probant quod memoria et reminiscientia variantur accidentaliter.

XXIII

123 Sequitur de potentia intellectiva quae dividitur in duas potentias, scilicet in potentiam activam et in potentiam passivam. Intellectus agens est potentia activa, et intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva.

124 Quod in parte intellectiva sit ponere potentiam passivam manifestum est, quia quilibet in se ipso experitur et aliquando intelliget et aliquando non intelligit. Sed in eo quod aliquando est in potentia et aliquando in actu oportet ponere potentiam passivam quae sit receptiva talis actus. Sed cunibet potentia passivae correspondent potentia activa, aliter frustra penetratur potentia passiva. Huic igitur potentiae passivae correspondent aliquod activum, reducens ipsum de potentia ad actum. Illud activum quod reducit intellectum possibilem de potentia ad actum non est aliqua res materialis, quia res materiales sunt solum in potentia intelligibles. Et ideo\textsuperscript{89} oportet ponere aliquid alius activum, et illud activum non est separatum ab anima nostra sicut quidam antiqui dixerunt quod intelligentia separata est agens.

\textsuperscript{85} Aristotle, \textit{De mem. et remin.} II; 433a9-23.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{om. L.}

\textsuperscript{87} Haberl \textit{L.}

\textsuperscript{88} Averroes, \textit{De mem. (Paraphrasis); ed. cit.,} v. 6, 2; f. 21r\textsuperscript{a} A-21r\textsuperscript{b} D.

\textsuperscript{89} On MS crease \textit{L.}
cognitionis in animabus nostris. Sicut oportet dicere activum esse alicuius ipsius animae, cuius probatio est, nam in potestate nostra\(^{90}\) est intelligere cum volumus post-quam habuerimus species intelligibiles, sicut quilibet in se ipso experitur, sed si illud activum ducens\(^{92}\) intellectum nostrum de potentia ad actum esset separatum ab anima nostra, non esset in potestate nostra intelligere cum volumus. Sicut patet in simili, quoniam praesentibus visibilibus eo quod lumen solis <est>\(^ {92} a\) nobis separatum, non est in potestate nostra videre cum volumus quia non possimus habere praesentiam luminis cum volumus. Unde si lumen requisitum ad actum videndi non esset separatum a virtute visiva, tunc in potestate nostra esset videre cum volumus, et esset ponere visum agentem. Et sic patet necessitas quare oportet quod intellectus agens sit potentia animae nostrae, et haec est ratio Themistii.\(^ {93}\)

125 Hoc viso, videndum est qualis sit actio intellectus agentis, et sciendum, secundum Philosophum,\(^ {94}\) quod intellectus agens comparatur lumini et comparatur arti. Et per hoc intelligit Philosophus quod intellectus agens habet duplicem habitudinem, unam ad intellectum possibilem et aliam ad fantasmat. In hoc quod intellectus agens est sicut ars ad materiam denotatur ejus habitudo in comparatione ad intellectum possibilem; sed in hoc quod se habet sicut lumen ad colores denotatur ejus habitudo ad fantasmat. Commentator dicit\(^ {95}\) quod non se habet totaliter sicut ars ad materiam, quia ars totaliter imprimit formam absque hoc quod aliquote reperiatur in materia; sed intellectus agens non totaliter imprimit formam in intellectum possibilem, quia sic non indigeneremus sensi vel imaginacione ad hoc quod intelligeremus. Dicit etiam Commentator\(^ {96}\) quod intellectus agens facit intentiones imaginatas (193v\(^ {b}\)-194r\(^ {a}\)) quae sunt in potentia intelligibiles esse actu intellectas; et dicit quod abstrahere nihil aliud est quam faciere intentiones imaginatas esse actu intellectas postquam fuerunt in potentia intellectae; et intelligere, secundum eum, non est aliud quam recipere hujusmodi intentiones.

126 Ex istis breviter possumus videre qualis sit actio intellectus agentis. Quoniam intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis, et quaelibet species existens in virtute fantastica representat objectum materialiter et sub conditionibus materialibus, ideo species existens in virtute fantastica de se non potest gignere speciem in intellectu possibili, sicut nec coloratum existens in tenebris potest movere visum. Et ideo sicut ad hoc quod coloratum gignat speciem suam in visum requiritur lumen solis vel aliiactus corporis lucidi, sic ad hoc quod species existens in virtute fantastica gignat speciem in intellectu possibili requiritur quoddam lumen spirituale, et illud est lumen intellectus agentis. Unde imaginandum est quod accidentia et conditiones materiales rei sunt veluti tenebrae obnubilantes ipsam quidditatem. Et ideo, sicut lumen exteriur requiritur ad movendum tenebram ad hoc quod color videatur, sic intellectus agens

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\(^{90}\) On MS crease L.

\(^{91}\) Duceret L.

\(^{92}\) Reading with A, V.

\(^{93}\) Themistius, De an. Liber 6; ed. cit., p. 225, ll. 5-19. Et sicut lumen potentia visui et potentia coloribus adveniens actu quidem visum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu producens potentiam intellectum non solam ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilis actu intelligibilis ipsi instituit... propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando volumus...

\(^{94}\) Aristotle, De an. III, 5; 430a10-17.

\(^{95}\) Averroes, De an. III, 1, 3; ed. cit., v. 6, 1-2; f. 161r C, t.c. 18.

\(^{96}\) Averroes, De an. III, 1, 3; ed. cit., v. 6, 1-2; f. 161r infra C-161v D, t.c. 18.
requiritur ad removendum conditiones materiales a quidditate ad hoc quod quidditas intelligatur. Et ideo actio intellectus agentis non est nisi illuminatio.

127 Scienendum tamen quod intellectus agens non agit in fantasma ibi terminando actionem suam, quia quantumcumque fantasma esset illuminatum, cum fantasma habeat esse in virtute materiali, numquam posset ex se signere speciem in intellectum possit. Sed illa duo simul, scilicet intellectus agens et fantasma, imprimunt speciem in intellectum possibilem tamquam duo partialia agentia; sed intellectus agens est agens principale, et fantasma, agens instrumentale.

128 Sed dubium est an intellectus agens agat in fantasma, aliquod attribuendo fantasmati, et potest dici quod intellectus agens nihil attribuit fantasmati. Unde duo partialia agentia possunt concurrere ad effectum producendum;\(^{97}\) Uno modo sicut causae ordinatae, sic quod unum aliquam virtutem ab alio recipiat ad hoc quod agat, et sic sol et pater concurrunt ad productionem filii; pater enim aliquam virtutem recipit a sole ad hoc quod agat. Alio modo possunt causae subordinatae concurrere ad\(^{98}\) effectum, sic quod neutrum ab alio aliquam virtutem recipiat, et sic pater et mater concurrunt ad productionem filii; pater enim est causa principalior quam mater; neutrum tamen aliquam virtutem recipit ab alio. Tertio modo aliquis concurreat ad effectum producendum tamquam causae coaequae ıta quod neutrum recipit aliquid ab alio, et sic duo homines concurrunt ad tractum navis.

129 Intellectus agens et fantasma imprimunt speciem in intellectu possibili modo medio, scilicet tamquam duae causae partiales quorum una est principalior alia, et neutra recipit aliquam virtutem ab alia.

130 Unde scienendum quod lumen nullam formam tribuit colori ad hoc quod color videatur, sed illa duo simul, scilicet color et lumen, imprimunt speciem in visum ut prius dictum est. Sic intellectus agens nihil tribuit fantasmati, sed ista duo simul imprimunt speciem in intellectum possibilem.

131 Sed tunc est dubium in quid igitur agit intellectus agens. Non enim videtur (1944\(^{98}\)) quod agat nisi in intellectum possibilem, et sic videtur quod actio ejus sit transiens. Et dicendum quod actio intellectus agentis est duplex. Habet enim unam actionem immanentem et aliam transcendentem. Actio immanens ejus est lucere, et ista actio est perpetua quia non est ponere lucem nisi luceat. Actio ejus transiens est abstrahere, et hoc est idem quod facere intellectiones imaginatas quae sunt in potentia intelligibiles actu intellectas. Et hoc est idem quod imprimere speciem in intellectum possibilem, et haec actio non est perpetua. Sic enim ignis habet duplicem actionem, scilicet calere et calfacere; calere est actio immanens et calfacere est actio transiens.\(^{99}\)

132 Scienendum quod abstrahere est cognoscere aliquid vel facere aliquid cognitum absque illo cui tamen est in esse conjunctum. Sic enim visus abstrahit albedinem a dulcedine, quia percipit albedinem in lacte non percipiendo dulcedinem cui tamen albedo est in esse conjuncta. Et ideo intellectus agens dicitur abstrahens quia per intellectum agentem potest intellectus possibilis cognoscere essentiam rei absque hoc quod cognoscat conditiones materiales quibus essentia est in esse conjuncta; et haec est abstractio intellectus agentis.

\(^{97}\) *add* tripliciter *A, V.*

\(^{98}\) *Ad concurrere L.*

\(^{99}\) *Add* Et sic sol habet duplicem actionem. Sol enim in se ipso lucet et etiam illuminat medium. Lucere est actus immanens, et illuminare est actio transiens. *A, V.*
133 Intellectus possibilis a philosophis appellatur intellectus materialis, et Commentator, tertio De anima,\(^1\) definit intellectum materialem dicens sic: intellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia ad omnes intentiones formarum universalium materialium, et non est in actu aliquod entium antequam intelligat ipsum. Et ponit differentiam inter istum intellectum et \(<\text{materiam primam}>\),\(^2\) et est duplex differentia quoniam intellectus possibilis recipit formas universales, sed materia prima non recipit formas nisi singulares. Alia differentia est quod intellectus possibilis intelligit formas quas recipit, sed materia non cognoscit formas quas recipit. De intellectu possibilis dicit Philosophus\(^3\) quod in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est depictum quoniam tabula rasa in qua nihil depingitur est in potentia ad recipiendum quacumque picturam absque aliqua abjectione; nihil enim abjectur a tabula ex hoc quod pictura in tabula recipitur. Eodem modo intellectus possibilis in principio est in potentia ad recipiendum species omnium rerum intelligibilium absque abjectione alicujus ab intellectu possibili. Et ideo bene comparatur intellectus possibilis tabulae in qua nihil est depictum.

134 Dicit etiam Philosophus\(^4\) quod intellectus possibilis est quodam modo omnia intelligibilia, et hoc est sic intelligendum, non quod sit de virtute sermonis vera, sed hoc dicit quod intellectus possibilis recipit species omnium intelligibilium. Objectum intellectus possibilis quod est ei adaequatum est ens in sua maxima communitate. Illud enim est objectum alicujus potentiae quod est maxime notum eidem potentiae; nunc autem intellectui possibili confusa sunt magis nota; ideo quod est maxime confusa est maxime notum; cujusmodi est ens in sua communitate, et hoc vult Avicenna.\(^5\) Unde ens est objectum adaequatum intellectui possibili quia omne ens potest intelligi ab intellectu possibili et solum ens.

135 Isto tamen videtur falsum quia, per Philosophum\(^6\), sensus est singularium et intellectus, universalium. Intellectus autem non intelligit singulare, et sic non omne ens est intelligibile ab intellectu.

136 Ad istud dicendum quod sensus cognoscit singulare appropriate, et ibi est appropriatio a parte sensus, quia sensus cognoscit singulare et nihil nisi (194r\(^b\)-194v\(^a\)) singulare.\(^7\) Sed intellectus cognoscit universale propriae, et ibi est appropriatio a parte universalis. Intellectus enim sic cognoscit universale, quod universale non cognoscitur nisi ab intellectu. Unde quod dicitur quod sensus est singularium et intellectus universalium. Hoc debet intelligi appropriate modo quo dictum est.

XXIV

137 Aliis nominibus nominatur intellectus a philosophis; dicitur enim intellectus formalis et intellectus adoptus, intellectus in effectu et intellectus in potentia, et intellectus assimilatus. Sed ista non sunt diversae potentiae intellectivae.

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1 Averroes, De an. III, 1; ed. cit., v. 6, 1-2; f. 139r\(^a\) infra A-B, t.c. 5.
2 Materialem primam \(L\); \(L\) is illegibly corrected.
3 Aristotele, De an. III, 4; 429b30-430a9.
4 Aristotele, De an. III, 4; 429a19-29.
5 Avicenna, Metaphysicae I, 2; ed. cit., f. 6v\(^a\)-\(^b\).
6 Aristotele, De an. II, 5; 417b21-23.
7 Et sic est appropriatio a parte sensus \(L\).
138 Intellectus formalis dicitur lumen intellectus agentis quia sicut lumen exterius est forma diaphēni, sic lumen intellectus agentis est forma intellectus possibilis. Intellectus adeptus dicitur intellectus possibilis cum adeptus fuerit cognitionem multarum rerum, ut cum intellectus possibilis sit bene habitudinis. Intellectus in effectu dicitur intellectus actualiter considerans. Intellectus in potentia dicitur intellectus secundum quod est in potentia ad considerandum vel ad scientiam inquirendum. Intellectus assimilatus intellectus possibilis habens perfectam cognitionem primum causam quia ad ejus similitudinem creatus est intellectus; et ideo cum ejus cognitionem habeat, assimilatur ei qui est origo omnis cognitionis.

139 Scendium quod per intellectum possibilem possimus intelligere duo: vel potentiam passivam animae vel essentiam animae habentem talem potentiam. Accipiendo intellectum possibilem primo modo, sic non est dicendum quod intellectus possibilis intelligit, sed melius est dicere quod homo vel anima intelligit mediante intellectum possibilis; sed accipiendo intellectum possibilem secundo modo, sic potest dici quod intellectus possibilis intelligit.

XXV

140 Sequitur de potentias residuis: Circa potentiam appetitivam, potentia appetitiva dividitur in appetitum intellectivum et in appetitum sensitivum. Et appetitus sensitivus dividitur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Unde sicut in naturalibus ad formam naturaliter impressam sequitur quaedam inclination, ut ad formam gravis sequitur inclination ad essendum deorsum, sic ad formam apprehensam per sensum vel intellectum consequitur inclination; et inclination sequens ad apprehensionem per intellectum dicitur appetitus intellectus, et inclination sequens ad formam apprehensam per sensum dicitur appetitus sensitivus, et illae dividuntur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem.

141 Per concupiscibilem animal probequitur conveniens sui naturae et fugit discoveniens. Per irascibilem resistit corruptivis et impedientibus ipsum ne possit probequiri bonum desideratum. Leo enim per virtutem concupiscibilem quaerit sibi cibum conveniensem, et si aliquod animal vellet impedire eum ab hoc, per virtutem irascibilem resisterit ei. Unde sicut in naturalibus videmus quod ignis per unam virtutem ascendit sursum ut per levitatem quaerendo locum conveniensem sibi, et per aliam virtutem, ut per calidatem, resistit impedientibus ignem ne ascendat com brendo talia, sic per virtutem concupiscibilem animal probequisit bonum desideratum, et per irascibilem resistit corruptivis et impedientibus.

142 Et scendium quod sicut ignis per eamdem virtutem recedit a loco deorsum quia sibi discoveniens locus et quaerit locum qui est sibi conveniens, sic per eamdem virtutem (194a30b) animal probequirit conveniens et fugit discoveniens. Et ideo virtus irascibilis et virtus concupiscibilis non distinguuntur per hoc quod per unam istarum animal probequirit conveniens et per aliam fugit discoveniens, sed utraque istarum virtutum habet suam propriam prosecutionem et suam propriam fugam. 143 De potentia motiva dicit Avicenna, prima parte Sexti Naturalium, capitulo quintoe, quod potentia motiva est duplex, quia aut est movens quia imperat motui aut est movens quia efficitur motum. Potentia appetitiva dicitur esse motiva primo modo, sed potentia motiva quae est potentia distincta ab appetitiva dicitur esse motiva

8 Avicenna, De an. I, 5; ed. cit., f. 4v infra B. Sed motiva est duobus modis: quid autem est movens, ideo quod imperat motui; aut est movens, ideo quia est efficitum motum.
secundo modo. Et iste modus, secundum Avicennam, est vis infusa nervis et musculis trahens cordas et ligamenta conjuncta membris versus principium, aut relaxans et extendens in longum et convertens cordas et ligamenta, et converso contra principium cum trahimus; servit irascibili cum fugitur quod molestat; cum autem relaxat, servit concupiscibili quia appetitur quod delectat, et sic secundum istud possimus dicere quod potentia motiva dividitur in duo membra sicut et appetitus sensitivus. Deo laus.

Explicit tractatus Burley De potentiss animae.

Iste liber erat scriptus anno Domini m⁰cc⁰xc⁰.

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9 Avicenna, De an. I, 5; ed. cit., f. 4v infra B. Sed vis motiva secundum quod est efficiens est vis infusa nervis et musculis, contrahas chordas et ligamenta conjuncta membris versus principium aut relaxans et extendens in longum, et convertens chordas et ligamenta everso contra principium.

10 On MS crease L.
Wolbero of Cologne (d. 1167):
A Zenith of Musical Imagery

DAVID S. CHAMBERLAIN

The Latin commentary on the *Canticum canticorum* by the Benedictine abbot Wolbero of Cologne is little known to students of medieval music, literature, or iconography, and yet it is a most remarkable *tour de force* of musical imagery, quite likely the most varied and elaborate collection in western medieval literature.\(^1\) It makes a useful addition to our knowledge of the profound way that musical thought and imagery penetrated other aspects of medieval culture, a knowledge gained from scholars in many fields, for instance De Bruyne in aesthetics, Carpenter in education, Robertson and Kaske in narrative poetry, Steger in iconography, and numerous musicologists, of course, in lyric poetry.\(^2\) Wolbero is an illustration of this penetration chiefly into exegesis and devotion, but his work also offers important implications for musical imagery in manuscript illuminations and in poetry. And he certainly offers a rich source for those historians of medieval music who may wish to sketch this metaphoric aspect of their subject, as Reese and others have done in the past.\(^3\)

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1 Wolbero Abbas S. Pantaleonis Colonensis (1147-1167), *Commentaria in Canticum canticorum*, PL 195, 1005-1278. References to Wolbero will show columns and sections only (e.g. 1277A); the *Patrologia* will be abbreviated PL.


Wolbero does not make use of all traditions of musical metaphor, although undoubtedly he knew them all. He does not name the *mundana musica* of spheres, elements, and seasons that came to the Middle Ages mainly from Boethius but also from Chalcidius,Macrobius, and Martianus Capella, and he does not speak of the rhythms ("numerii") modulated throughout material and immaterial being that Augustine passed on to medieval thought. He also does not include theological ideas of *divina musica*, especially the Trinity and its exemplars, that were developed most lucidly by Jacobus of Liége. He alludes often to the "vox" and "canticum" of saints and angels (*coelestis musica*), but does not offer, of course, as systematic or varied a picture as Dante does in the *Paradiso*. Nevertheless, he does apply the language of music to moral and spiritual things more extensively than all other writers, even those famous commentators on *Psalms* and *Canticles* who are known for their musical language, Augustine, Bernard, Peter Lombard and others.

As an exegete, he is strongly traditional. He firmly supports the literal or historical, as he calls it, sense of Scripture, whenever charity and reason justify it, but in treating the amorous love of *Canticles* he interprets all passages either "moraliiter," as they apply to the individual soul, or "allegoriciter" as they apply to the whole Church. Throughout, therefore, the bridegroom is the Lord and the bride the faithful soul or the Church. His musical imagery appears mainly in prefaces and epilogue, but it also recurs often in the commentary itself with a simple "cantat," "vox," or "concordia," or...
occasionally with a whole page, like that on the “diatessaron” of sixty queens and eighty concubines. Also, it is usually quite general rather than technically precise, as we see with words like *modus*, *species*, and *depositio*. Like most exegetes, he borrows freely without acknowledgement, but in musical terms he is far more original than most. He is valuable to us, however, not for any specific originality, I think, but for epitomizing a long intellectual and artistic tradition of metaphor. We will treat this epitome under four main heads: the exegete himself; the *Canticum* he expounds; the non-musical words and phrases in his text; and the musical words and phrases.

Wolbero thinks of every exegete, teacher, and preacher as a “cantor” and “psaltes” who should be skilled and learned in mixing the useful and delightful (“utile dulci”), as Flaccus requires. He should either calm the passionate mind by the “sweetness of singing,” as David did Saul’s fury (*I Kings* 16,23), or arouse the sluggish in love of God by the “secret power of song” just as the “psaltes” did the spirit of Elisaeus (*IV Kings* 3,15). Wolbero’s own intention is to “sing” (expound) the *Song of Songs* according to his own “measure” (pro modulo nostro) or “mode of song” (modum cantionis) in order to give something sweet and profitable to the “interior ears” of the sisters who have asked him to be their “psaltes”. He is also an instrumentalist whose “fingers of the mind” are ruled by the Holy Spirit, and the fourth part of his exegesis is like a final note (finalem...chordam) in which he may “cadence” (deponare) the full “consonance of the promised tetrachord,” that is, of salvation. And the true teacher of all who seek the “knowledge of singing rightly and well” is the “preceptor” and “novus praeceptor,” Christ.

But Wolbero is above all humble, and he piously believes that he cannot “sing” adequately this “most excellent song,” although he may be able to give advice for singing (cantandi consilium) or produce a “carmen dissonum et quasi discoloratum” which some truly “peritus artifex” may recompose

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10 1212C-1215C, to be discussed.
11 1128D; 1105B.
12 1127C-1128C.
13 1007C.
14 1244D.
15 1005B.
16 1246B: Extremam ergo partem quasi finalem hujus Cantici chordam Spiritu sancto digitos mentitis regente tangere incipiam et in ea totam promissi tetrachordi consonantiam, Domino adjuvante, deponam.
17 1271D: Ecce, dilectae sorores, ut potuimus vobiscantarivimus, et quantum ille noster summus praeceptor donavit, sub cujus disciplina omnes sunt qui recte et bene canendi scientiam quaerunt; and 1273C: Porro exemplo ipsius Domini... monemur suavis obedientiae cantare canticum; ad vocem quoque ejusdem novi praeceptoris qui dicit: *Poenitentiam agite*... (*Matt.* IV).
with "proprium, perpurum et integrum colorem." He fears that the mode of his singing (mea inchoatae cantionis modum) will not profit his sisters because he does not properly know the quality of tones and rhythms (proprietatem vocum et modorum), like the "citharoedus" in Horace who always "blunders on the same string" (Ars poet. 356). In other words, to vary his eloquence is to vary the mode of his song. Others have been more skillful. Orpheus tamed tigers and lions with his song, but this is only a figure (per similitudinem) for educating bestial men with eloquence; and Amphion’s moving of stones by the "sound of the lyre" (sono testudinis) was really to compose the harsh manners of men with "sweet reason." In contrast, predictably, the "sweet song" of mythological Sirens is the "foolish persuasions of evil spirits."

Wolbero regards all Scripture, not only Psalms and Song of Songs, as musical, thus drawing on a tradition brilliantly summarized by de Lubac. All Scripture, Wolbero says, is a superb "concordia" of two parts "symmetrically joined." With more originality, he says that the Old Testament "sings first" in figure what is "going to happen," and the New "sings after" in truth what "has happened." Likewise, the four Gospels make a "consonantia," like a "suavis concertus diatessaron symphoniae," of four voices. And the gospels themselves are the "instrumentum" by which men learn to sing the "canticum novum" of holiness.

The Song of Songs itself Wolbero treats vividly in musical terms simply because it is called a song. It is the "song of songs" because most excellent of all, like the "Holy of holies" and "Sabbath of sabbaths." Like all song, it has great power (vis), but it has "more excellently and sublimely" than others the power to carry the mind to God. This song is also a "mode" or "step" in philosophy. It "sings" rational philosophy or theology, and right-

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18 1108A; 1129B.
19 1129AB.
20 1129A: Ferunt saeculares litterae, quod quidam Orpheus cantu suo lenierit tigrides et leones, per similitudinem scilicet, eo quod bestiales et silvestres hominum mores rationabili orationis suae sententia edomuerit.
21 1274D.
23 1227C, 1228AB.
24 1191C: ... Vetus et Novum resonare Testamentum, uno exhibendum in figura praecinentemente, altero jam exhibitum in veritate decantante.
25 1215C.
26 1245B.
27 1011B.
28 1244D.
ly comes as the third work of Solomon after *Proverbs*, or moral philosophy, and *Ecclesiastes*, or natural philosophy, because this is the order in which to study them. Its song includes, therefore, nearly all the “sacraments of Christ and the Church” from Nativity to Ascension and baptism to virtues. It is also the last step in man’s spiritual ascent, the others being six other songs from the Old Testament, and the whole seven embodying the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. To grow spiritually, then, is to sing these songs (cantare, concinerre, decantare), and at last to have perfect charity is to sing the *Song of Songs*.

But Wolboro also applies more elaborate musical metaphor to his text. It is a “cantabile... epithalamium” of bride and groom, a “genus cantionis,” the “harmoniam” of perfect charity, the “felix concordia” of rest in Christ. It intones (intonat) mysteries with a prerogative of “spiritualis harmonia,” and the saints will “sing in the ears of the Lord” this song, that is, will know Him forever. Its four parts are “chordae” or “decantationes,” and the recurring verses that divide them are either “percantationes” or “final notes.” The four parts themselves have different “modulatio,” such as the “morosius et prolixius” of Part III, and the last part is like a “finalem... chordam” concluding the “totam promissi tetrachordi consonantiam.”

29 1013A: In *Ecclesiastes* nempne de naturali rerum statu disputat; in *Proverbiis* de morum honestate perorat; in *Canticis cantionum* de rationabili divinorumque mysteriorum dispositione decantat. His enim tribus modis quasi quibusdam gradibus mentis profectus ductur. This is an old tradition, but Wolboro deviates (with St. Bernard) in putting *Ecclesiastes* before *Proverbs*. See Origen, *Commentary on “Song of Songs”*, trans. R. P. Lawson, *Ancient Christian Writers* 26, 45-46; Gregory, *CC* 144, 13; *Glossa ord.*, PL 113, 1127; Honorius Augustodunensis, PL 172, 348C; Philippe de Harveng, PL 203, 186C-187B; Bernard, PL 183, 785C.

30 1015G.

31 1011B: Septem quippe cantica in divina reperiantur pagina, quorum decantatorum causae, mystice nobis quasi per quodam gradum indicant animae profectus, qui reguntur per gratiam septiformis Spiritus. The other songs are those of Moses (*Ex.* 15), the Well or second song of Moses (*Num.* 21), Deuteronomy or third song of Moses (*Deut.* 32), Debbora (*Jud.* 5), David (*II K.* 29), and Isaiah (*Is.* 5). This also is a familiar tradition, starting with Origen.

32 1011A, 1012B; 1278A, 1276D.

33 1005B, 1010D, 1011A.

34 1015A: ... Omnis canticis perfectius et sublimius quasi quodam privilegio spiritualis harmoniae insignitus mystica intonat. Nam si subtilius consideres omnia fere Christi et Ecclesiae sacramenta in eo decantari intelliges.

35 1272G.

36 1015D, 1246B (see note 16).

37 1127B, 1244C (see note 38). The dividing verse is “Adiuro vos filiae Jerusalem, per capreas cervosque camorum/ne susciteitis neque evigilare faciatis dilectam, quoadusque ipsa velit” (*Cant.* II.7, III.5, VIII.8) (1115D).

38 1244C: Vos autem, dilectissimae sorores, quas aliquantulum morosius et prolixius pars Cantici hujus sua modulatione tenuit, istam quasi extremam in depositione vocem attendite... See also note 16.
Finally, the parts are four in number to signify the four Gospels, or the cardinal virtues, or, best, the “quadratura” of charity, which is, again, the *Canticum canticorum* itself.\(^{39}\) Or, to love God “with all one’s mind, soul, and power” is “to sing the *Song of Songs*.\(^{40}\)

Several kinds of material that are not literally musical are developed by Wolbero with musical imagery, most of it found in other exegetes, but nowhere so abundantly. The body and soul of man are joined or blended by music (“musica coaptatione”), Wolbero says, in his only clear borrowing from Boethius’ *De musica*.\(^{41}\) Surprisingly, he does not mention explicitly other Boethian music although he catalogues at length the four elements, seasons, andhumors; the powers of soul and reason; and the virtues, all of which are the material of *musica mundana* and *humana* in Boethius or in Hugh of St. Victor, who amplified Boethius most precisely.\(^{42}\) In other passages, the subjection of flesh to spirit is “concordia” and “harmonia,” and also “pulchre canere et recte modulari.”\(^{43}\) Here there is no “dissonantia” because “tam concorditer succinit caro spiritui ut perfectam constrain harmoniam spiritualis cantici.”\(^{44}\) Again, this “concentus” of soul and body is sweeter than any other, and it is certainly “to sing the new song.”\(^{45}\) It is also a “concordia” that sounds “with sweet modulation,” or a “vox” that “delectabiliter sonat,” in the ears of the Lord, and it is also the *Canticum canticorum*, the sweetest song that mortal man can sing.\(^{46}\)

Certain passages of praise are like playing on instruments. When the bride offers ten praises of her beloved (*Cant. 5.10-15*), she sings on a ten-string psalterium (quasi in decachordo decantat psalterio) which signifies both the decalogue and the gospel.\(^{47}\) With the “ear of the heart” we hear the chief matter of the “harmonia” that she intends to “modulari” on this “deca-

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\(^{39}\) 1015D-1016A.

\(^{40}\) 1245BC, 1269CD.

\(^{41}\) 1215A: Etenim cum tota animae corporisque nostri compago musica coaptatione conjuncta sit [*De musica*, I.i, ed. Friedlein, p. 186.3], perspicuum est... ad componendos vel ad commovendos... animos multum valuisse vim musicae harmoniae.

\(^{42}\) Didascalion: *De studia legendi*, II. xii, ed. C. H. Buttimer (Washington, 1939), 32-33. For Wolbero’s catalogues, 122D-1224C.

\(^{43}\) 1245A. See note 45.

\(^{44}\) 1103D.

\(^{45}\) 1245A: Si ergo istam aliquantulum expertae estis, dicat vobis concordia et harmonia carnis et spiritus quos invicem sibi non adversari, est pulchre canere et recte modulari. Si ancilla servit liberae, hoc est, si caro consentit rationi, non est melior, neque suavior concentus, qui summae placeat Divinitati, hoc nempe est cantare *canticum novum* et hujusmodi laus est in *Ecclesia sanctorum* (*Psal. CXLIX*).

\(^{46}\) 1246A; 1269CD.

\(^{47}\) 1191B.
chordo,” the beauties of chastity and martyrdom. When the groom sings ten praises in reply (Cant. 7.1-6), as if on ten strings “in one resonating spiritual decachordum” he complements the bride most fitly. She beginning on the higher strings (praising his head) and he beginning on the lower strings (praising her steps) together produce a “modum gratissimae melodiae.” More strikingly, the bride’s eighth praise of the groom (Cant. 5.15), of his golden feet, resounds like the “eighth string” of her “psaltery” or like the “symphony of diapason” since it repeats the first praise, of his golden head. Again, when the groom praises the bride four times (Cant. 6.9), it is the estimable “modulatio” and “symphonia” of “diatessaron,” signifying either sacraments, gospels, or cardinal virtues, all as if with their “four notes.” And finally, when the poet repeats the same phrase eight verses apart, it is a “modulatio octo partibus” or “symphonia diapason” because the final note (vox) is the same as the first, and also a “canticus certe suavis” and a “modus octochordus” in which each string is remarkably disposed by fit theory (proprio theoremate).

Wolberero exercises “musica speculatio” in a more bizarre way with the sixty queens and eighty concubines of the Church. After his general interpretation, he thinks it right with songs such as Canticum also to speculate about “moces of singing” (modos canendi) since the power of consonances (musicae harmoniae) deeply affects the soul and the whole aim of this song is to arouse souls to love the heavenly groom. All beautiful arrangement (concinna dispositio) depends on the proportions of numbers, and the proportion of eighty to sixty, he says, is the arithmetical ratio of “epitrita” or “sesquiteria” (4/3) and also the musical “consonantia” of “diatessaron,”

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48 1191CD.
49 1234C: Notandum autem quod pulchre respondet dilectus dilectae hujusmodi laudis praeconio decem paribus quasi decem chordis, uno resonans spiritualiter decachordo, quod in superiores decachordia, quod in laude sponsa sponsa decantaverat, decenter opponitur, ut illud a superioribus, istud ab inferioribus modum gratissimae melodiae imponat.
50 1199BD: Octavo loco quasi octavam tangit chordam decachordi psalterii attenta spectatrix dilecti, veluti symphoniam illam diapason reddens, cui pr proprium est eamdem habere vocem octavam quam primam. Nam, cum supra [5.10] prima chorda sonuerit caput dilecti aurum esse optimum, nunc dicit erura super bases aereas posita, ut sit eadem vox gravis et acuta, resonans supremum et infimum delecti aureum ornamentum.
51 1216B.
52 The phrase is... terribilis ut castrorum acies ordinata (Cant. VI.3 and 9), which recurs seven verses apart in the Vulgate itself and Wolbero’s commentary.
53 1208CD.
54 1215A.
55 The “sexaginta reginae” are the “perfecti” in the Church, the “octoginta concubinae” the “minus perfecti,” and the “adolescentulae” the “imperfecti” (1242C-1243D).
56 1214D-1215A.
so-called from its four notes, embracing two and one-half tones. 57 And this “symphonia” signifies how the whole Church, spread through the four parts of the world in three degrees of fidelity (4/3), 58 is moved to holy religion by the four voices of the New Testament. 59

Much more vividly than the Church as a whole, however, every state of virtue or piety is a kind of music. To please God “in heart, word, and deed” is a “threefold instrument” of “singing rightly and well.” 60 If we sing only with the mouth, all “species of song” will be worthless before God; if we sing only in “heart and deed” we can please God; but to have the highest dignity of singing we must use all three. 61 Again, the voice of man that calls to God by “praying, singing, preaching, and desiring” is a “fourpart harmony of singers,” like “beautiful diatessaron.” 62 Indeed, all virtue is a sonorous clamoring to God, a “resounding note of the interior man,” a “string” in the “most sweet song of holy life,” 63 or a “harmonia” that makes men “accord” (consonare). 64 Likewise, the lives of different orders of Christians are song. The married (conjugati), living in “tribulation of flesh,” sing the “canticum laudis”; the widowed (viduae), freed from that tribulation, sing the “canticum laetitiae”; and the virgins, never having known that tribulation, alone can sing the “canticum novum,” although if “stultas virgines,” that is, virgins in body only, not in mind, they cannot sing. 65 And all the saints are musical instruments (organis) used by the Lord. 66

The most elaborate metaphors, however, appear with those well-known musical phrases that Wolbero borrows from other books of scripture. St. Paul’s exhortation to “psalm in spirit” (I Cor. 14.15) is to speak spiritual words from memory and carry them out in deeds, and to “psalm in mind” is to understand their vital sense; and these are the same as “to sing in word and deed” and “in heart,” respectively. 67 Here, then, are three degrees of

57 1215B. I have transliterated Wolbero’s Greek for the consonances.
58 Again, the perfect, less perfect, and imperfect.
59 1215C.
60 1271D: Sed quia bene et recte canendi scientia tripli ci constat instrumento, videlicet corde, ore, et opere, convincor peritus non esse cantor.
61 1271D-1272D.
62 1269B.
63 1268B.
64 1103C.
65 1103D: “His enim gratiarum distributionibus, quasi quibusdam diversis vocibus constituitur tota modulatio, cantici Domini, cantici illius dulcissimi, quae canit virtutum fidibus, vita honesta, sancta, Deo placens et perfecta.”
66 1151C.
67 1006B-1007A.
68 1203D.
69 1272D.
abstraction in Wolbero’s metaphor. To *speak* spiritual words, or preach, is not *literally* to sing, but it is similar in being sonorous and modulated; to *do* good deeds is a second degree of abstraction, very unlike literal song but still visible and corporeal; and to *understand* is a third degree of abstraction, wholly invisible and fully spiritual. It corresponds to St. Paul’s other famous figurative exhortation, to sing “in psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles.” Wolbero does not cite this passage, but certainly he would have interpreted it much as others do, as singing “more in the soul than voice,” as “good works, praise, and joy.”

The scriptural entreaty to sing “*in songs of the lips and on citharas,*” (Eccli. 39.19) is to praise God with both *voice* and *life.* Only then do lips and cithara truly harmonize. The *cithara* itself is the *mind* of the just man; and its *strings,* made from the viscera of dead animals and stretched with differing length and tension, are the *mortification* of vices in his mind. They castigate the senses so that the “*concordia*” of flesh and spirit may sound (deprimat) with “*dulci modulatione*” in the ears of the Lord. The different notes of the cithara are the different “modes” needed in putting down vices of pride, luxury, anger, and avarice, and in these modes the mind resounds (personat) with beautiful “*harmonia*” to its God both the *canticum novum* and the *canticum canticorum.*

A better-known musical phrase from Scripture is *canticum Domini* (Ps. 136.4), and Wolbero interprets it in the tradition of Augustine. One form of this song is verbal, Wolbero says, all that we write or speak with “*concordi modulatione*” of meaning and words according to the “modus” of ecclesiastical doctrine; and it is also all the Old and New Testament, which we “sing” well when we “preach” it with full faith. This verbal “canticum

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70 *Ephesians* 5.18-20: ... *Implemini Spiritu sancto loquentes vobismetipsis in psalmis et hymnis et canticis spiritualibus, cantantes et psallentes in cordibus vestris Domino...* Nearly the same words in *Colossians* 3.16.


72 1245D-1246A: *Quid enim est cantare in canticis laborior et citharis?* ... *Quid ergo in cithara, nisi mens justi potest designari, in qua ex mortuorum animalium visceribus factae extenduntur chordae, quia in ea vitiorum mortificationes... praequentur, quibus ita sensus suos inter se exteriorique castigat, ut in auribus Domini Sabaoth dulci modulatione carnis et Spiritus concordiam deprimat. Diversitas autem quaedam vocum ibi quodammodo denotatur, quandiu alio modo mortificatio superbiae, alio modo luxuriae, alio iracundiae atque alio avaritiae agitur, recte pulcherrima quadam harmonia mens Domino Deo suo *canticum novum,* imo *Canticum canticorum,* delectabilius personare videtur.*

73 *Enarrationes in psal.,* CC 40, 1970-1973, where Augustine identifies it with the “*canticum Sion*” and “*canticum Jerusalem;*” *Glosa ordinaria,* PL 113, 1057C.

74 1103A: *Canticum Domini* est quidquid secundum ecclesiasticae doctrinae vel sanctionis modum
Domini” can be sung in a foreign land (in terra aliena) as in Psalm 136, that is, during our pilgrimage in this world, but another and higher “canticum Domini” cannot. This one is fully spiritual, the song of the interior man, “modulated” by the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit as if through “seven tones.” For this voice of the interior man “sounds in one way through the spirit of wisdom, in another through the spirit of understanding” and differently through each of the other five gifts of the spirit. The whole melody (modulatio) of this “most sweet song” is sung on the “strings of the virtues” by a holy and virtuous life, and it cannot be sung “in terra aliena” because that is “the state of sin.”

Wolberro’s imagery reaches a climax, however, when he treats the canticum novum in the epilogue of his commentary. The “new song” is the “venerable command” of the New Testament; it is also to “put off the old man and put on the new,” and to sing its “modulatio” to be just and holy. It is the “song of peace, joy, life, justice, salvation, and utility,” that the new man Christ sang first (praecinuit), and it is the “sweet song of obedience” of those who do penance, following his urging. Its name implies an “old song,” Wolbero says, and he develops elaborately this metaphor that is well-known in Augustine, Peter Lombard, and other commentators on Psalms, if not in Scripture itself. The old song was sung by the “old man” Adam and it is as “contrary” to the new as dying to living. It is the “pride, disobedience, and excuse” that Adam bellowed (reclamit) against

concordi modulatione sensuum et verborum componimus, scribimus et dicimus. Canticum Domini est tota Veteris et Novi Testamenti pagina, quam bene decantemus quando hanc recta et plena fide annuntiamus, nunc rerum gestarum seriem, nunc ipsarum rerum significationem in Domini exponentes laudem.

75 1103BC.
76 1103C: Verum ut altius alicud consideremus, est et aliiud canticum Domini, quod non est possibile in terra aliena cantare. Quodnam vero est illud? Nimimum quod modulatur Spiritus sanctus sua septiformi gratia, quasi per septem vocem discrimina; quia aliter resonat vox illa interioris hominis per spiritum sapientiae, aliter per spiritum intellectus, aliter per spiritum consili atque aliter per spiritum fortitudinis; alio vero modo per spiritum scientiae at alio per spiritum pietatis, alio quoque per spiritum Domini (Isa. xi).

77 See note 65.
78 See note 65.
79 In Scripture, the canticum novum appears eleven times: Judith 16.2, 15; Ps. 32.3, 39.4, 95.1, 97.1, 143.9, 149.1, Isaiah 42.10, and Apos. 5.9, 14.3.
80 1245AB.
81 1279C.
82 Enarrationes in Ps., CC 39, 1343, 1372, CC 40, 2078; Peter Lombard, Comm. in Ps., PL 191, 327B, 889C, etc.; Glossa ordinaria, PL 113, 1077, etc. The phrase “old song” does not appear in Scripture.
his maker, and it is a tearful tragedy (flebilem tragoediam) that other men sing imitating Adam.\textsuperscript{83} It is a "song full of grief" whose "mode" ought to be changed so that we sing to God a "salubrem... melodiam" in the "genus of four modes," that is in "compunction, confession, satisfaction, and perseverance," and daily end our song (deponamus) on the "final notes" of these four, that is "thought, word, deed, and habit."\textsuperscript{84} Again, the metaphor changed slightly, the "finals" of each song (thought, word, deed and habit) take their progression (depositio) according to the "species" of each, musical or elegiac.\textsuperscript{85} The progression of the new song is "sweet and musical" because it is the "rational motion of a mind singing beautifully and well, always tending toward a good end in thinking, talking, acting, and persevering."\textsuperscript{86} But the progression of the old song is "elegiac, mournful and harsh" because it is made by an "irrational and unequal motion of mind."\textsuperscript{87} The mode (modus) of the new song "begins in the breath (spiritus) of humility and obedience" and ends in the joy of beatitude "with the highest and most joyous note (sonus) of innocent or penitent hearts."\textsuperscript{88} But the mode of the old song begins with the "breath of pride and disobedience" and ends in hell with the "lowest and most miserable note of impenitent hearts."\textsuperscript{89}

Finally, the art shops (officinae) where the instruments of the new song are made, and where we may learn this song, and by the habit of singing finally arrive at the song of songs itself, are the religious orders of "married,

\textsuperscript{83} 1273AB.
\textsuperscript{84} 1273D: ... Haec est gravissima... vox, inquam, veteris et dolore pleni cantici, quin potius converso modo ejusmodi cantici et in novum mutato, laboriosam quidem quantum ad corpus sed salubrem quantum ad animum spiritus contribulati melodiam, quatuor modorum genere, hoc est compunctione, confessione, satisfaccione, perseverantia Deo concinamur; et in quatuor ipsorum modorum finalis videlicet cogitationem, locutionem, actionem et consuetudinem quotidie deponamus.
\textsuperscript{85} 1273D-1274A: Si quidem utrisque cantici, hoc est veteris et novi, isti sunt finales, cogitatio, locutio, actio, et consuetudo, et secundum praecedens speciem modi depositionem suscipiunt; sive et elegiacum quantum ad vetus, sive suavem et musicam quantum ad novum.
\textsuperscript{86} 1274A: Musica nempe depositio est, quae fit rationabile vocum sive tonorum, conjunctione, dispositione, tenore, et hanc magis, imo semper suscipit novum canticum; propter rationabilem motum mentis, bene et pulchre canentis, et ad bonum finem cogitando, loquendo, agendo, consuecendo semper tendentis.
\textsuperscript{87} 1274A: E contra elegiaca haec est tristis et misera depositio est, quae fit irrationali et inaequali motu mentis; et quia confusa est hujusmodi cantionis species, insuavem et immittem depositionis generat qualitatem.
\textsuperscript{88} 1274C: Et iste est novi cantici modus, qui a spiritu humiliatis et obedientiae inchoans, in aeternae beatitudinis gaudium altissimo et laetissimo cordis innocentis sive poenitentis sunt ulterior deponit vocem.
\textsuperscript{89} 1274B: Et hic est veteris cantici modus, quia a spiritu superbiae et inobedientiae inchoans, in aeternae damnationis barathrum, gravissimo et miserrimo cordis impoententis sono extremam deponit vocem.
widowed, and virginal.”

Here, the seven different notes (septem vocum differentiae) that always resound in the new song are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the eight species of mode (octo modorum species) deriving from these notes are the eight beatitudes, and the song as a whole is the grace of God that makes all holiness possible. Finally, by means of this song and their “citharas of God” (mortification of flesh) the faithful will find God’s ways “songful” in their exile (Cantabiles vobis sint justificationes Domino in loco peregrinationis vestrae [Ps. 118.54]) so that when they leave the “Egypt of this world” for the “land of promise,” then with “all sweetness” they may sing forever not only the “new song” but also the “song of songs.”

Wolbero’s commentary leaves no doubt that in exegetical and contemplative tradition, and we may add pastoral tradition, all aspects of musical activity are figures or metaphors for moral or religious activity, and conversely, that nearly all imaginable moral and religious qualities can be signified by musical imagery. The preacher is a “cantor”; the whole Bible, the New Testament, his own exegesis is “cantus,” “harmonia,” “melodia,” or “musica.” More significantly, all virtues are “sounds,” “notes,” “songs,” “melodies,” “harmonies,” “instruments,” even “diatessaron” or specific consonances; and, preeminently, clarity, the virtue of virtues, is the “canticum novum,” the “canticum Domini,” the “canticum canticorum,” while pride and other sins are the “canticum vetus,” the “elegiac mode,” the canticum diaboli. He mentions only one musical instrument, the cithara, but in calling it “mortification of sins,” he typifies both secular and monastic traditions, in which the psalterium is inner devotion to God; the tuba, preaching or tribulation (a “lengthening out”) in charity; the tympana, control of lust. Wolbero is thoroughly typical in substance, though his concentration and elaboration are unusual, and his imagery is by no means mainly monastic, as we know from secular commentaries such as the Psalter Gloss of Peter

90 1274D-1275A.

91 1276C: Igitur in his tabernaculis Domini, novum illud semper resonat canticum quod cantant horum tabernaculorum habitatores septem vocum differentiis, regente canticum Spiritu sancto sua septiformi gratia, videlicet sapientia et intellectu... Porro ex his septem vocum differentiis diversae sunt beatituidines quasi octo modorum species.

92 1276D.

93 1276D-1278A. Here, as elsewhere, then, in Wolbero the “song of songs” is a figure mainly for the final caritas of heaven and the “new song” a figure mainly for caritas on earth, but each does occasionally also signify the other.

94 Psalterium: Augustine, Enarrationes, CC 38, 251-252; Alanus de Insulis, Distinctiones, PL 210, 914B; Lombard, Comm. in Psal., PL 191, 327A; Tuba: Aug., En., CC 39, 1374-13758; Pseudo-Rabanus, Allegoriae, PL 112, 1069AB; Alanus, Distinct., PL 210, 981C; Pseudo-Hugh of St. Victor, Miscellanea, PL 177, 676D; Tympana: Rabanus Maurus, De univcrslo, PL 111, 499C; Alanus, Distinct., PL 210, 984B; Pseudo-Rabanus, Allegoriae, PL 112, 1967A.
Lombard and the *Glossa ordinaria*. Neither classical nor later literature has a tradition of musical imagery and connotation at all comparable, despite Plato’s well-known passages.\(^9^5\) Such a tradition ought to make us more alert for moral and religious implications when we find musical images and allusions in medieval secular literature and in manuscript illumination, whether these details be dancers, instrumentalists, singers, kinds of song, or scriptural phrases such as the “old song.”

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\(^9^5\) *Republic*, 412A, 443DE; *Phaedo* 61A; *Laches* 188D: where virtue is variously figured as music or harmony.
The Constitutional Law
of the College of Cardinals:
Hostiensis to Joannes Andreae

JOHN A. WATT

I. — Hostiensis

Unlike the modern Codex, the medieval Corpus Iuris Canonicorum contained no title De sanctae Romanae ecclesiae cardinalibus. Hence this topic had no established place in canonist commentary to make it subject to some regular scrutiny by anyone who taught canon law or wrote about it. This gap did not mean however that canonists ignored the matter completely, but it does mean that their comments were spasmodic, to be discovered in scattered, somewhat unsystematized form. There were of course certain contexts which attracted comment on the cardinalate. The College of Cardinals had made its way in the world, so to say, through its position as the body which elected the pope. Hence it was the electoral law which tended to act as the focussing agent. Gratian had made Nicholas II's electoral decree of 1059 In nomine Domini, D. 23 c. 1 and allocated D. 79 to other problems connected with papal election and vacancy. In the Decretales it was the Third Lateran Council's electoral canon Licet de vitanda logically placed in the title De electione et electi potestate which attracted attention. But there were numerous other places where decretists might choose to say something about the cardinalate — D. 40 c. 6 the famous Si papa concerning the judgment of an heretical pope was a favourite place. Also relevant were any canons which treated of the papal power to decide

1 Canons 230-41.
4 I.6.6.
controverted matters of faith or to issue universal laws. In the Decretales the conventional formula, constantly recurring, that a decision had been made de fratrum nostrorum consilio, was a standing temptation to speculate on its precise meaning and thence to consider the constitutional relationship of pope and cardinals and how the supreme authority was or should be apportioned between them. Thus there had accumulated, perhaps somewhat haphazardly, over a period of a century or so, a stock of canonist argumentation to which any canonist was heir, who might wish to treat more thoroughly of problems concerning the College.

Nevertheless the major decretalists of the decades round mid-thirteenth century took no special interest in the College. Neither did Hostiensis in his Summa which had already been written when he became a cardinal in 1262. In his Apparatus or Lectura however, completed shortly before his death in 1271, there is to be discovered the most detailed analysis of the cardinalate that had yet appeared, one destined to be of great influence on the legal tradition of the future.

It is not difficult to suggest reasons why Hostiensis should discover an interest in the College of Cardinals between the composition of his Summa and of his Apparatus. No doubt his interest had been enhanced through becoming a member of the College. No doubt too the increased attention he gave to the cardinalate was due to that very thoroughness which characterized the way Hostiensis went about his task of expounding the Decretals. Hostiensis was unquestionably one of the most prolific of thirteenth century writers about the theory and practice of papal monarchy and the status of the College of Cardinals formed a natural part of his study of papal authority. But there can be little doubt too that events themselves had disposed him to undertake a more rigorous examination of a number of problems concerning the College. At the time of his death (25 Oct. 1271), the apostolic see had just emerged from a vacancy of nearly three years.

It was not the first time within living memory that vacancy had been intolerably protracted. Such crises inevitably made questions about the government of the Church during vacancies, and of the necessity for electoral reform, very real ones. Further, they brought the College into disrepute. Hostiensis said specifically that he felt it necessary to defend it against those critics (unfortunately not named) who he said were seeking

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to reduce its authority to virtually nothing. What Hostiensis wrote about
the cardinalate was informed throughout by close contact with actualities,
like so many of his other juridical analyses.

Hostiensis was no more systematic about the presentation of his contribu-
tion to this vein of canonist thought than had been his predecessors.
The first task must therefore be to search through the Apparatus and assem-
bble all the relevant material and the second, to classify it. There are some
fourteen glosses in the Apparatus which treat directly of the College. It
seems reasonable to divide them into three main types.

Firstly there are a number of quite conventional thoughts about the
nature of the College and the cardinalate, significant for the historian as
the ordinary stock commonplace of papal practice and of canonist theory.
Second comes a group of four particular problems. One concerning the
disciplining of errant cardinals, was suggested by a decretal on the alleged
deposition of a cardinal for non-residence in his titular church. A second,
about whether the College was in law really a collegium, arose from contem-
porary criticism. Also of strictly contemporary origin were the two further
problems: possible remedies for an electoral deadlock and the power of the
College during vacancy. The final class comprises material relevant to the
general question of what constituted, for Hostiensis, the constitutional rela-
tionship of pope and cardinals. Was his view 'monarchic' or 'oligarchic'?

'Today', said Hostiensis, 'the Roman Church holds that there is no
dignity higher than the cardinalate'. This is because of its special position
in relation to the papacy. The cardinals get their name from this special
relationship; as the pope is the cardo of all the churches, so those who assist
him in his responsibility for the universal Church are cardinales. As the
Roman senate was said to be a part of the emperor's body so was the College
of Cardinals part of the pope's body. The pope was their special head, they
his especial members. He should love them as himself while their obligation
to obey him is stricter than anyone else's. The College is a senate of especial
advisers and assistants and without its counsel he ought to do little or no-
thing. These unexceptionable generalities had for the most part long been
common property. They are not in themselves in any way a curtailment of
papal power. For evidence that it is possible to define the College of
Cardinals as a senatus and to dignify the cardinals as the especial advisers and
assistants of the pope without any oligarchic implications, one need look no
further than c. 230 of the modern Codex Iuris Canonici.]

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8 Assembled in the Appendix to this article.
9 'S. R. E. Cardinales Senatum Romani Pontificis constituunt eidemque in regenda Ecclesia
praecipui consiliarii et adiutores assistunt'.
An especial mark of the cardinals’ superiority over other ecclesiastical dignitaries was in their exemption from the jurisdiction of anyone save the pope and their brother cardinals. In 1352 the College as a whole tried to establish the principle that the pope could not legally depose a cardinal without the consent of the College.\textsuperscript{10} Could the great weight of Hostiensis’s authority be claimed for this view? It could certainly be found in the Apparatus, but not as his own view.\textsuperscript{11} It was customary, said Hostiensis, for the pope to consult the cardinals before excommunicating one of them. But some people, he continued, went on further to argue that this consultation was of necessity, that he could not excommunicate without the consent of the other cardinals. Hostiensis, following the glossa ordinaria,\textsuperscript{12} did not believe this. Such penalties were a matter for the plenitude of power which belonged to the pope alone and Hostiensis was not attempting to limit it.\textsuperscript{13}

Hostiensis envisaged three possible solutions to the problem of how to resolve an electoral deadlock.\textsuperscript{14} One possibility was the introduction of additional clergy to assist the College to come to a decision. This he rejected on the grounds that law and usage reserved election to the cardinals alone and this principle should be adhered to. Another possibility, which had been suggested nearly a century earlier by Huguccio, was for the cardinals themselves to create sufficient new cardinals to break the impasse. This might be justified on a general principle, quod in maiori conceditur licitum esse videtur et in minori; if the cardinals can make the higher dignity, a pope, it would seem they must be able to make a lesser one. But this proposition raised large questions about the power of the cardinals during vacancy. These Hostiensis was to tackle elsewhere. For the moment he


\textsuperscript{11} Appendix, no. 6. Pierre d’Ailly was in error in asserting: ‘Unde Hostiensis et post eum quidam canoniste tenuerunt quod in casu quo deposistio cardinals immineret facienda, generale concilium foret congregandum’. Tractatus de materia concilii generalis, ed. F. Oakley in Appendix III of his The Political Thought of Pierre d’Ailly (Yale, 1964) 328. The Colonna cardinals had held this opinion, cf. n. 13 below.

\textsuperscript{12} 3.4.2. s.t. ab omnibus.

\textsuperscript{13} The Colonna cardinals, deposed by Boniface VIII, were to vehemently oppose this view on the grounds that the cardinals could not fulfil their proper function if ‘sub colore plenitudinis potestatis’ they could be easily silenced and claimed that cardinals could only be deposed in a council, H. Denife, “Die Denkschriften der Colonna gegen Bonifaz VIII und der Cardinale gegen die Colonna”, Arch. Lit. Kirchengesch. 5 (1889) 322.

\textsuperscript{14} Appendix, no 3.
was content to reject Huguccio's opinion with an analogy of a type Hostiensis used quite commonly. A cathedral chapter had the power to create a bishop but it was forbidden in law to create a rector. Hostiensis was thus driven back to the first possibility he had put forward; that a type of legalized violence should be used to coerce the cardinals into early agreement. The suggestion that the secular arm should be invoked to place the cardinals in close confinement until they agreed was no new one in canonist thought. At least two of the early decretalists, Alanus Anglicus and Tacred, had canvassed this solution and so too had the glossa ordinaria.\textsuperscript{15} These jurists apparently saw only one serious legal objection: it gave the secular power authority over the spiritual power. But as Hostiensis pointed out, there was nothing objectionable in the principle that the secular power could supplement the shortcomings of the ecclesiastical power, providing this were done de licencia ecclesiæ. Hence he strongly recommended the adoption of the conclave principle, paternity of which idea he ascribed to Tacred, and added as a rather draconian touch of his own, that the cardinals should if need be, be starved into agreement.

When the pope dies where does his sovereignty lie, who has plenitude of power? Hostiensis's answer to his own question prompted the most detailed of his disquisitions on the cardinalate.\textsuperscript{16} It must be admitted that his discussion of this question was not altogether free of ambiguities and loose-ends. But his general position is clear enough. He posited the axiom that the Roman Church never dies (‘Romana ecclesia censetur ecclesia que nunquam moritur’), and argued that in a vacancy the College was the surviving part of it and concluded that therefore the plenitude of power must reside with the College. But did the College have the power in the same way as the pope or, in other words, could the College exercise the same jurisdiction as the pope did when he was alive? Hostiensis was clear that it could not: ‘I believe’ he said, ‘that the cardinals have no authority to concern themselves with those cases specially reserved to the


\textsuperscript{16} Appendix, no. 13.
pope’. Hostiensis tried to solve his dilemma with a distinction. A decre-
tal of Innocent III concerned with infant baptism had spoken of one school
of theological opinion which held that the virtues were infused in an infant
by its baptism quo ad habitum but not until it reached adult age, quo ad usum.17
Hostiensis tried to put this phraseology at the service of his present problem:
the cardinals might be said to have the plenitude of power during vacancy
habitum but not usu. It was not perhaps a very clarificatory distinction in
the new context.

Hostiensis was however more convincing when he treated of the prob-
lem in its particular applications; what, if anything, of papal jurisdiction
might the cardinals exercise in practice during vacancy?

Hostiensis found that certain governmental processes continued during
vacancy. The office of penitentiary did not fall vacant on the death of a
pope nor did a papal legateship lapse. The cardinals acted in the pope’s
place when prelates-elect came to the curia for the prescribed canonical
confirmation. But he was particularly concerned with establishing that
the College had the authority to act in cases of ‘great, evident and imminent
necessity’. He argued that the cardinals did in practice exercise such
a power and that what was established custom should in this context be
accepted as a reliable guide to what should be the law, particularly when
the law already allowed such a power to collegiate bodies of lesser status.
This pragmatic argument was supported by a theological one argued with
a wealth of scriptural quotation. Christ’s promise to be with the Church
all days was not less applicable when the apostolic see was vacant. The
College was the visible evidence that God did not intend to leave his Church
without a shepherd. Under the headship of Christ the Roman Church
lived on in the College of Cardinals.

Thus Hostiensis’s final position about the authority of the cardinals
during vacancy was that while certain routine functions were continued
by them they had no power of jurisdiction in cases needing the pope’s per-
sonal action. They did, however, have a discretionary power to act in emer-
gency situations.

An insistent theme constantly recurring in Hostiensis’s analysis of the
position of the College of Cardinals was that it shared in papal government.
It judged and ordered the whole world with him; it shared his responsi-
bility for the common welfare of the whole Church; it formed one body with
him for the tota sollicitudo of Christendom. What was the precise nature of
this sharing? What was Hostiensis’s view of the constitutional relationship

17 ‘... nonnullis dicentibus dimitti peccatum et virtutes infundi habentibus illas quo ad usum
donec perueniant ad etatem adultam’, 3.42.3.
of pope and cardinals? Was his view 'oligarchic' or 'monarchic'? Did Hostiensis believe that the pope was under legal obligation to share his sovereignty with the cardinals?

There is one gloss of Hostiensis which might suggest that the answer to this last question is affirmative and modern commentators have read it in this oligarchic sense. This key passage needs very careful reading.

In one of the most important of his decretals about papal authority, *Per venerabilem*, Innocent III had cited St. Paul in support of the principle of *plenitudo potestatis*: 'Do you not know that we are to judge angels? How much more matters pertaining to this life'. Hostiensis, reading *judicabitis* for *judicabimus* in the Pauline text, saw here support for the principle of a sharing of power between pope and cardinals:

> It is not said 'thou wilt judge' in the singular form but 'you will judge' in the plural, so that not only the pope but also the cardinals should be included in the expression of the plenitude of power.

And again, in a later gloss on the word *judicabitis*:

> That is to say, thou the pope and you the cardinals. The cardinals therefore share (*participant*) in the plenitude of power.

These are apparently oligarchic principles. But when studied in the context firstly, of the gloss as a whole and secondly, in the whole perspective of Hostiensis's thought, their force is much modified.

The gloss was on the words 'our brothers' in Innocent III's sentence 'The priests of the Levitical race are our brothers who, according to Levitical law, act as our coadjutors in the discharge of the priestly office'. Hostiensis commented:

> 'Our brothers' refers therefore to all the bishops who are called to a share of the pastoral charge. Yet it is the cardinals on whose advice (*consilium*) he acts who are his regular helpers. Thus 'our brothers' is to be understood of them in a particular sense and of the bishops, in a general sense. Between the cardinals and the pope there exists a union of such closeness that it is fitting (*debeat*) that each should take counsel (*communicare*) with the other about everything. Just as there is a greater degree of mutuality between a bishop and his chapter than between the bishop and the other churches of his diocese, so the bond between the pope and the college of the Roman Church is much closer and more excellent than that between any other patriarch and his chapter. Yet that patriarch ought (*debet*) not to settle difficult matters without the advice of his brothers. Since this is so, then it is the more fitting (*debeat*) for the pope to ask for the counsels of his brothers, for a judgment is the firmer for being

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18 Appendix, no. 8; specifically the words: 'cardinales includerentur etiam in expressione plenitudinis potestatis'.

sought from many. Hence it is said here that they are his coadjutors in the
discharge of the priestly office; they are called cardinales from cardo, as if ru-
ers of the world with the pope. Hence it is not said ‘thou wilt judge’ in the
singular form but ‘you will judge’ in the plural, so that not only the pope but
also the cardinals should be included in the expression of the plenitude of
power.

There is no word here to say that it was obligatory on the pope to share
his power. His language must be noted carefully. What the pope looked
for from the cardinals was consilium not consensus. When he spoke of other
prelates consulting their brethren, by using the verb debere, he was saying
that a patriarch was under obligation to consult his brothers. He was ac-
tually repeating what the law said about the necessity for a prelate to
consult his chapter.\footnote{Cf. Glossa ordinaria, nota ad 3.10.4: ‘Item
prelatus negotia ecclesie sue de consilio fratrum suorum facere debet, et
precipe huiusmodi specialia (scil. institutiones et desituationes); aliter
enim factura non tenet’.} But when he applied this principle by analogy to the
papacy the word debet became decet. What was obligatory for the one was
merely appropriate or fitting for the other. This is altogether consistent
with Hostiensis’s usual way of discussing possible limitations of papal power:
‘it is fitting that the pope should not use the plenitude of power too often’;\footnote{Apparatus 1.21.2 s.v. dispensare non licet.}
‘it is fitting that he should rarely depart from the established law’.\footnote{Apparatus 3.8.8 s.v. qui secundum plenitudinem potestatis. This text and that cited in the
preceding note are published in my article mentioned in n. 7 above.}
Hoc enim decet nos, licet non astringat was his consistent maxim.\footnote{Loc. cit.}
In addition to these considerations one very significant text must be taken into considera-
tion. Hostiensis stated categorically in an emphatically personal way
that he confessed unhesitatingly that he believed the plenitude of power
was the pope’s alone, that he did not intend to say anything against this
view and referred his readers to two contexts where he had formulated very
forceful statements of papal personal sovereignty.\footnote{‘Quicquid
tamen dicitur, hoc de plano fatoeor quod in solum papam plenitudo
residet potestatis, supra de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), contra scribere non intendo, ut patet in eo quod notatur
infra, de conce. preben. Proposuit (3.8.4)’. The two glosses cited are published art. cit. 180-1,
183-4.} I do not think there
can be any doubt whatsoever that this is his definitive view. It is perfectly
consistent with what he had to say about the desirability and fittingness or
decentia of the pope consulting the cardinals. Whatever flirtations he made
or might seem to have made with oligarchic opinions must be read in its
light.

There is one final feature of Hostiensis’s analysis of cardinalitial power
which calls for comment. Several times Hostiensis used the relationship
of bishop and cathedral chapter to clarify and illustrate what he was saying about the relationship of pope and cardinals. This was of course an obvious analogy to make. The procedure for papal elections had been to an extent based on that of capitular election; both college of cardinals and cathedral chapters were faced with some problems of similar type during vacancy; both bodies were expected to assist their head, at least to the extent of giving counsel. Was there any wider significance in this analogy? There was a title in the Decreta of rubricated De his quae fiunt a prelato sine consensu capituli.25 Did the analogy apply here for it to be argued that there were in fact things that the pope could not do without consent of his ‘chapter’?

The problem of the rights of chapters against their bishops formed a difficult section of canonist theory. The whole issue was governed so much by local custom which varied very considerably even within the same country, that it was far from easy to establish what were the norms of the matter. Hostiensis had already done much, in his Summa, to reduce this complicated issue to something like order.26

At the basis of the systematization he accomplished, lay an important but simple distinction. Hostiensis noted that it was common for the words consensus and consilium to be used at least sometimes interchangeably.27 But he thought this was wrong and that there was a sharp distinction between them. The former was obligatory in the sense that an action done without consensus was invalid. The latter, though eminently desirable, was not binding on the superior.28 Thus Hostiensis could go on to distinguish between matters where consensus was required and matters where consilium should be sought. In the former category were all those matters — concerning benefices, property, fiscal obligations, capitular revenues and so forth — which pertained to the chapter in its own right. Into the second category fell pretty well everything else in diocesan government which did not touch the status of the chapter itself.29 Hostiensis painstakingly

25 3.10.
27 ‘Alii dicunt quod consilium requiritur, id est consensus: et his verbis consilio et consensu promiscue utuntur et secundum ipsos nulla est differentia inter consensum et consilium... ed. cit., col. 802.
28 ‘Sed quod est differentia inter consensus et consilium? Respondeo, ubi consensus requiritur, non valet quod agitur, nisi consensus habeatur... si vero expectetur, potest sequi consilium si vult qui ipsam requirit: si non vult, non habet ncesses.’ ed. cit., col. 801.
29 ‘Ideo regulariter in omnibus clericorum negotiis et ecclesiariis debet canonicerorum consilium requirere, ut cum ei peragat et pertractet et que statuende fuerint, statuat, errata corrigat, deformata reformet, evellenda dissipet et evellat, infra eodem, Quanto (3.10.5), et maxime in his que tangunt ipsos, infra eodem c. fin. (3.10.10)’ ed. cit., cols. 801-2.
listed the individual occasions when a bishop should take the advice of his chapter and the list fills a column of a printed folio volume. He phrased his conclusion in the words of Solomon as advice to a bishop or to any ecclesiastical superior: ‘Do thou nothing without counsel and thou shalt not repent when thou hast done’ (Eccles. 32: 24). Putting the matter briefly, he ended, using an aphorism he also applied to the papacy: a prelate should do little or nothing (parum aut nihil) without the advice of his brothers.

Examining all that Hostiensis had to say about the participation of the cardinals in papal government with this distinction between consilium and consensus which Hostiensis had made so carefully, no context can be found where he spoke of the need of any cardinalitial consensus for any papal act. Of course, as has been seen, he insisted on the fittingness of a pope, no less than a bishop, taking consilium before he acted. The conclusion is inescapable. There were strict limits to the degree to which Hostiensis considered the bishop-chapter relationship transferable to the pope-cardinals relationship. His view of papal authority cannot be explained satisfactorily in terms of any alleged ‘normal rules of corporation law’.

It is time to offer some conclusions. As so often, the negatives come the easiest. All those interpretations which in one shape or another present Hostiensis as a protagonist of some view of the supreme ecclesiastical power less monarchical than aristocratic seem to me erroneous. Hostiensis did not postulate that the consent of the College of Cardinals was a necessary precondition of papal decisions. He had no intention of reducing the pope to the position of primus inter pares according to some alleged corporation theory. Of course he had a high opinion of the importance of the College but it was not different in kind from that professed by the popes of his age themselves. His view of the College did no injury to the personal authority of the pope. Nor did it do any injury to the authority of bishops, as some later writers were to do, in claiming Apostolic origins for the cardinalate. If later writers were to foist paternity of cardinalitial oligarchic theories on to Hostiensis, they had misread him.

What then was the significance of Hostiensis’s contribution to the stock of thinking about the College of Cardinals? If it was perhaps modest, it was nevertheless real enough. Hostiensis was already dead when Gregory X in 1274 undertook the reform of the papal electoral system and the juristic discussion which must have gone into the framing of the canon Ubi periculum which promulgated the new procedure remains unknown. It is therefore impossible to say how far Hostiensis influenced that canon. But it can be

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30 VI° 1.6.3. Hostiensis was firmly of the opinion that just such a new constitution was needed, cf. Appendix, no. 3.
said that *Ubi periculum* gave official form to two ideas for which Hostiensis had argued especially forcefully: the concilium principle and the principle that during papal vacancies the cardinals had the power to act in emergency situations.\(^{31}\)

More measurable than his influence on actual legislation was his influence on later canonist theory. The mark of his thought is strong on fourteenth century commentary. In particular, Cardinal Jean Lemoine, Guido de Baysio and Joannes Andreae made his analysis of the vacancy problem the basis of their own thinking on the matter. Very striking was the debt owed by Joannes Andreae to Hostiensis. The bulk of the glosses Hostiensis wrote on the cardinale in his *Apparatus* passed almost unchanged into the *Novella* on the *Decretales* of Joannes Andreae, his most important book and one of the great reference books for canonists. Thereby the voice of Hostiensis was certain to be heard for as long as men continued to turn to the great medieval jurists for authoritative guidance. His significance then lies less in the evolution of some abstract heterodox ecclesiology than in the discussion and solution in the service of papal monarchy of the particularities of juristic problems as they were encountered in practice.

II. — FROM "UBI PERICULUM" TO "NE ROMANI"

The period between the death of Hostiensis (1271) and the promulgation of *Liber Sextus* (1298) was as eventful as any in the life of the College of Cardinals before the Great Schism and Conciliar Movement. At the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, Gregory X found his cardinals, or some of them, doing their best to block his projected reform of the electoral system and was forced to counter-lobby among the Fathers of the Council to achieve his end.\(^{32}\) Even though *Ubi periculum* was promulgated with the support of a General Council, its future was by no means secure and at least one more protracted vacancy had to be endured before its procedures were accepted as standard practice.\(^{33}\) In 1289, Nicholas IV issued the impor-

\(^{31}\) 'Idem quoque cardinales accelerandae provisioni sic vacant attentius, quod se nequaquam de alio negotio intromittat, nisi forsan necessitas adeo urgens incideret, quod eos oporteret de terra ipsius ecclesiae defendenda, vel eius parte aliquam providere, vel nisi aliquod tam grande et tam evidens periculum immineret, quod omnibus et singulis cardinalibus praesentibus concorditer videretur illi celeriter occurrerandam' *Ubi periculum* § 1.

\(^{32}\) *Brevis nota earum quae in secundo concilio Lugdunensi acta sunt*, Mansi 24 cols. 66-67.

\(^{33}\) The *glosa ordinaria* to *Ubi periculum* was to carry the comment: 'Sumit tamen ista constitutio potius vigorem ex renouatione Celestini quinti, et hac approbatione et conservatione Bonifici, quam ex primea constitutio Gregorii... VI* 1.6.3. s.v. concili*. On this constitution generally, cf. H. Holstein in H. Wolter and H. Holstein, *Lyon I et Lyon II* (*Histoire des conciles œcuméniques*) (Paris, 1966) 184, 197-201.
tant constitution *Coelestis altitudo* in favour of the cardinals, systematizing and regularizing their rights in the different sources of income of the Roman Church. In 1294, Celestine V brought his anxious tenure of the Apostolic See to an end by abdication. The legal formalities of this unprecedented event were conducted in closest association with the College and the formal act of cession itself was performed and accepted *coram collegio*. In 1297, Cardinals James and Peter Colonna, having professed their belief that a pope was not free to abdicate and that Boniface VIII had not been canonically elected, were solemnly excommunicated and expelled from the College. Their bitter polemic in their own defence included a number of claims which were unambiguously oligarchic. They asserted that cardinals might be tried only in general council and that from the very beginnings of the Church they had been instituted as joint rulers and judges with the pope, charged to resist him should he abuse the plentitude of power. They were established, it was claimed, *non ut consiliarii voluntarii sed necessarii potius*: counsellors whose consent the pope was obliged to seek.

The law governing ecclesiastical institutions reflects their history and something of these events was mirrored, though perhaps somewhat darkly, in canonical science. The publication of the Sext in 1298 was the most important event in the history of canon law since 1234. After the promulgation of the Gregorian *Decretales* important legislation continued to appear, not least in two general councils, and was naturally brought into use in the schools and courts. The Sext was designed to meet a long and strongly felt need that the various collections of post-Gregorian laws should be replaced by a definitive new codification. Appearing after two decades of incident in the history of the College of Cardinals, it contained several items very relevant to any analysis of the nature and authority of that institution.

Three laws were of first importance. *Ubi periculum* had important things to say about the authority of the College in times of vacancy. Boniface VIII’s *Quoriam aliqui* defined *de consilio et assensu fratrum suorum* that a pope was free to abdicate. His *Ad succidendos* passed sentence on the Colonnas and expressly forbade the cardinals to lift that sentence during vacancy. In addition, a further decretal of Boniface VIII was a penal code against any

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34 *Magnum Bullarium*, III fos. 52-53.
36 L. Möhler, *Die Kardinalle Jacob und Peter Colonna* (Paderborn, 1914).
37 Denifle, “Die Denkschriften der Colonna” 522. Cf. also: “Porro cum in quibuslibet arduis peragendis, maxime in alienationibus rerum ecclesie, etiam verus pontifex cardinalium consilia petere et sequi consensus nichilominus consueverit et etiam teneatur...” *ibid.* 521.
38 VIo 1.6.3 § 1.
39 VIo 1.7.1.
40 VIo 5.3.1.
who maltreated or threatened cardinals. Finally there was a generous scattering of references to decisions being taken with the consilium of the cardinals, while a decretal of Nicholas III spoke of them as those qui sibi in executione officii sacerdotalis coadiutores assistunt. All in all, for the commentators coming to expound this new collection there was some interesting new material on the question of cardinalitial authority awaiting their scrutiny.

It would be very generally conceded that in tracing the evolution of cardinalitial theory the name of Cardinal Jean Lemoine is a significant one. Yet no agreement has been reached on the precise nature of his contribution. Interpretations of his views on the cardinals' powers have oscillated. Sägmüller read him as one of the most passionate champions of the right of the College of Cardinals to a joint share in the government of the Church, an advocate of a constitutional papacy. Finke, pointing out that Lemoine was also a passionate champion of papal sovereignty, thought that to extract a theory of a constitutional papacy from the brief, ambiguous and incomplete treatment of the whole subject of the cardinalate was to go too far. For him Jean Lemoine was but an upholder of the position the cardinals had already achieved. Scholz has contrived to give the impression of agreeing with both these authors. While stating his broad agreement with Finke, he nevertheless bracketed Lemoine with the rebel Colonna cardinals in maintaining that the pope was bound to consult the cardinals in any exercise of the plentudo potestatis and made him a leading figure in his chapter, 'Die oligarchische Opposition im Kardinalskolleg'. Jean Rivièrè followed Finke in refusing to see any sort of interpretation of the papacy as a constitutional monarchy in the 'quelques phrases incidentes' where the Cardinal upheld the rights of the College. More recently, however, the pendulum has swung back towards Sägmüller's view. Brian Tierney has presented a new intellectual portrait of Lemoine as the author of a 'manifesto' in favour of an enhanced authority for the cardinals, propounding views which were 'really novel', very extreme and sharply at variance with the opinions of most other contemporary canonists. In his view, Jean Lemoine made the pope, 'simply an agent of the cardinals'.

41 VI 5.9.5.
42 VI 1.6.17.
43 J. B. Sägmüller, Die Thätigkeit und Stellung der Kardinäle bis Papst Bonifaz VIII (Freiburg, 1896) esp. 222-27. For criticism of this author's handling of canonist sources concerning the cardinalate, Tierney, Foundations 186.
44 H. Finke, Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII (Münster, 1902) 136.
Lemoine wrote about the cardinals in no more than three quite short glosses and they treated of only two issues, the significance of the formula *de fratrum nostrorum consilio* and the authority of the College, *sede vacante*. Judged in comparison with Hostiensis, his examination of these problems was no great juristic feat either in breadth or depth. But it is nevertheless of very special interest. For he discussed them in terms of problems which had in fact arisen in the course of his personal experience as a member of the College. His analysis must be seen as an attempt to theorize from actual cases. He wrote, as he made abundantly clear, of what he knew had happened.

His disquisition on the precise juristic value of the formula *de fratrum nostrorum consilio* sprang directly from two papal decisions he had witnessed.

The first case had arisen in the aftermath of the abdication of Celestine V. During his pontificate (said Lemoine) he had appointed many abbots, bishops and high ecclesiastical dignitaries without taking the advice of his cardinals. This procedure being called in question before his successor Boniface VIII, Jean Lemoine had in consistory offered it as his opinion (which he had obviously learned from Hostiensis) that it would be fitting if the pope did not ignore what popes had ordered should be observed by others. There were canons which ordered bishops and other superiors not to act, at least in major matters, without the advice of their brothers, otherwise what was done was invalid. I know, said Lemoine, that the collations in question were invalidated on the particular grounds that it was the practice for major business to be discussed and decided with the advice of the cardinals, which had not been the case here.

Jean Lemoine had experience also of a second and similar case. Benedict XI suspended certain constitutions which Boniface VIII had promulgated for towns in the March, not because of any intrinsic defect but because they had been issued without the advice of the cardinals.\(^{48}\)

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48 'Quero, an hec (*seil. 'de fratrum nostrum consilio') sint uerba voluntatis, congruenacie, decencie vel necessitatis? Scio quod celestinus papa quintus multas abbatias, episcopatas et superiores dignitates contulit sine fratrum consilio, et coram successore fuit iste articulus in dubium reuocatus, et dixi tunc, decet ut quod papa mandat in suo canone ab aliis obseruari, illud non negligat; mandat enim quod episcopi, abbates et superiores, saltam in ardua suarum ecclesiuarum ordinent de consilio fratrum suorum alias non neneat quod agitur, supra de his que fiant a prelatis sine sensu capituli, Noutit et c. seq. (3.10.4.5.), et supra de iudici. Cum deputati (2.1.16). Et scio quod dicte collationes fuerunt cassate, preseritum quia ceterum cardinalium erat in hac possessione quia ardua negociarum erant de eorum consilio tractanda et terminanda; et in multis iuribus dictur 'de fratrum nostrorum consilio', et licet princeps sit solutus legisbus, tamen secundum legis ipsum vivere decet, C. de legi. 1. Digna (Code 1.17.4), ff. de legatis iii l. Ex imperfecto (Dign. 32. 1.23), inst. quib. mod. testa. infriment. in fine (Inst. 2.17.§8), et optime habetur, ix. d. Iustum (D. 9 c. 2), xii. q. ii. Non liceat, (C. 12 q. 2 c. 20), et 'patere legem, quam tu ipse tuleris' supra,
In the light of these two decisions it is not surprising that Jean Lemoine and other canonists should ask questions about the nature of consilium. These popes seemed to be saying, if Jean had his facts right, that it was the equivalent of consensus. At any rate these decisions did not fit easily into the orthodox doctrine of consilium as propounded by Hostiensis. Lemoine asked therefore whether the taking of consilium was a matter of will (voluntas), of agreement (congruentia), of propriety (decentia) or of necessity (necessitas). His solution was ambiguous in that he did not at the end of his gloss indicate which of these four he had established. In discussing Boniface’s decision he leant heavily towards decentia; ‘though the prince is not bound by the laws, it is proper (decet) that he should live according to them’. Yet in discussing Benedict’s decision he seemed to show a preference for necessitas, though it would be thin evidence on which to place an ‘oligarchic’ interpretation; ‘For defect in the person performing the action or in the prescribed form (in modo necessario) makes the action useless’.

It was again a practical situation actually encountered in the College itself which led Lemoine to his second discussion of an aspect of the College’s power.49 He stated that ‘in the election of a pope’ he had witnessed the College of Cardinals absolve electors from excommunication ad cautelam, in order to avoid the possible occurrence of an impediment to election. The particular circumstances he had in mind remain obscure. The construction of his sentence seems to imply very clearly that it was electors of popes i.e. cardinals he had in mind. The only traceable excommunicated cardinals at this time were the Colonnas and if he was referring to them the absolution must have been to allow them to take part in the election of Benedict XI. But in deposing and excommunicating the Colonnas, Boniface

de constitu. Cum omnes (1.2.6), et omnem indecenciam in principe, qui est omnium director, dico impossibilem saltem moris de quo notatur infra, de reg. iur. Nemo (VI* 5.13.6). A benedicto papa xi. statuta que dedit marchianis bonifacius pape absque consilio fratrum, quia ardua tangebant, fuerunt suspensa, licet multa iusta fuissent in dictis statuis contenta. Nam defectus in persona facetiens vel in modo necessario reddit factum inutilii, supra de constit. Ecclesia (1.2.10), ff. de rebus eorum... 1. Magis § si et aliumem (Dig. 27.9.5. § 14).’ Apparatus VI* 5.2.4 (ed. Paris, 1535) collated with Pembroke College Cambridge MS 165.

49 ‘Dicitur eciam absolucio ista dari eligentibus ne impedimentum elecioni future detur, supra de exceptio. c. Apostolice (2.25.9). Et hec vidi fieri in eleccione summi pontificis per honorabilem cetum cardinalem, penes quem plenitudo potestatis sede vacante resideret, de hoc notatur lxxix. dist. Nullus pontifex (D. 79 c. 7) et hostiensis notat supra de penis c. Cum ex eo (5.38.14). Sed contra, supra hoc libro de scisma c. 1 (VI* 5.3.1). Solucion: in papa est principalis, in collegio subsidiaria vel dic ibi specialiter est sub tractum, absurium enim est quod capitula ecclesiarum cathedralium, quorum prelati in solicitudinis partem sunt vocati, haberent in illa parte solicitudinis, supra hoc libro maiori et obedient. c. 1 (VI* 1.17.1), et cetus cardinalium in tota sollicitudine non haberet.’ Apparatus VI* 5.11.2 ed. cit., ms. cit.
VIII had expressly forbidden any lifting of penalties during a papal vacancy. If it were the Colonnas that Jean was speaking of, the problem was to find a justification for the action of the College. But omitting the Colonnas from the picture altogether, there was still a practical problem: was the reservation made by Boniface VIII a general rule forbidding the College to absolve from excommunication during vacancy or was it a special case, applicable only in the Colonna sentences? Putting it another way, was Boniface saying that the College did have such a power of absolution *sede vacante* unless there was, as in the case at issue, a specific inhibition?

He was quite clear that in general terms, the College did have power to remit excommunication *sede vacante*. A decretal of Boniface VIII promulgated in *Liber Sextus* allowed this right to cathedral chapters. It was absurd therefore, thought Lemoine, to grant the power to a lesser college and withhold it from the College of Cardinals. But in discussing Boniface's particular instruction concerning the Colonnas, once again there are signs of indecision.

In one gloss he argued that just as a bishop could not licitly deprive his chapter of its legitimate administration, so a pope might not deprive the College of one of its lawful administrative powers. Yet in another gloss, referring also to this particular issue, he seemed to allow that in a special case the pope could withhold this power. For, like Hostiensis, he recognized that though the plenitude of power resided in some sense in the College during vacancy, the College did not have the plenitude in the same way as the pope had it. Like Hostiensis, Lemoine tried to express the principle that the power did reside while yet in a different way with a distinction. He distinguished between the plenitude of power in *papa principalis* and *in collegio subsidiaria*. It is perhaps no more successful than Hostiensis's distinction. But it does affirm the point he was making; that the pope could inhibit the cardinals from exercising a power in vacancy that ordinarily they did have.

Thus Jean Lemoine's analysis of cardinalitial authority scarcely rose above the particularities of the two problems with which he was concerned. His treatment was fragmentary and inconclusive. To read into it any novel or radical general theory of church government is an unwarrantable forcing of the texts. All in all, due allowance made for some ambiguity and hesitance in exposition, Lemoine had not parted company from Hostiensis and the principle that though the established convention of consulting the

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50 VI* 1.17.1.

51 'Et papa sic si habet ad collegium cardinalium sicut alter episcopus respectu sui collegii, cum ergo alter episcopus non possit tollere administrationem legitimam sui capituli nec pape licebit.' *Apparatus VI* 5.3.1. *s.v. collegium, ed. cit., ms. cit.*
cardinals should be strictly observed as a matter of *decentia*, the plenitude of power was personal to the pope.\textsuperscript{52}

The *Rosarium super Decretum* of Guido de Baysio the Archdeacon is one of the classics of medieval canonistics. But it is disappointingly brief about the cardinalate, reflecting the relative lack of interest in the topic characteristic of Gratian and the decretists. It is also ineffectual, for though some of the problems were raised, none of them was discussed and solved in any very convincing way. The Archdeacon did not discuss the question of the constitutional relationship of pope and cardinals, though he had raised it in a half-hearted rebuttal of an earlier decretist view that general legislation for the universal Church needed the participation of the cardinals.\textsuperscript{53} He disagreed with Huguccio’s view that the College might depose a pope for heresy, without probing further into the rôle of the cardinals in emergency situations.\textsuperscript{54} He disagreed too with Huguccio’s opinion that the College had the power to create cardinals during a vacancy,\textsuperscript{55} though he shelved the general question of power *sede vacante* by referring his reader to Hostiensis’s discussion of it.\textsuperscript{56} All this did not amount to any major discussion of the subject of the cardinalate. At least it showed that the Archdeacon was no enthusiast for cardinalitial claims.

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. e.g. ‘Nota quod papa sententiam suam non supposuit correctioni vel emendationi de consilio concilii seu aliorum, sed sue dumaxat emendationi reservavit, sed dicit quod super emendationem sententie sue consilium concilii quereret et hec requisitio non est necessitatis sed solemnitatem tantum. Quia papa sine concilio posset procedere ad sententiam cum habeat plenitudinem potestatis, i.e., Decretus (C. 2 1 6 c. 11), infra de penit. et remiss. Cum ex eo (5.38.14) in fine. Et papa dat robur consiliis non econtra, supra de elec. Significasti (1.6.4)’ *op. cit.* 2.14.2 ed. cit., *ms. cit.* The context of this gloss is Innocent IV’s sentence of deposition passed on Emperor Frederick II at the Council of Lyons in 1245 and Lemoine was here reflecting and expanding Innocent’s own gloss.

\textsuperscript{53} ‘Dicit Laurentius quod generalem legem universalis statut ecclesie condere non potest papa sine cardinalibus sed particularum sic, ar. xi. di. Catholica (D. 11c. 8); sed videtur quod solus papa possit condere canones, ar. xxvi di. Constantinus, pales est (D. 96 c. 14), licet sit argumentum contra, C. de le. si imperialis et l. “Humanum”’. *Rosarium C. 25 q. 1 c. 6 s.v. sunt quidam* (ed. 1495).

\textsuperscript{54} ‘Scias tamen quod Huguccio scripsit 73 dist. In sinodo, quod cardinales possunt deponere papam propter heresim. Sed hoc iure aliquo non probatur, et ideo non recedo ab eo quod plane dictum in pre. § huic etiam ver. adhuc.’ *Apparatus VI* 5.4.5 (ed. Venice, 1577).

\textsuperscript{55} ‘... nam secundum eum (Huguccio), cardinales possunt creare papam quare non potius cardinalem, et idem sentit hostiensis, ar. pro eo ex. qui f. sint le. Per venerabilem (4.17.13), sed certe secundum guliemum durantium hec ratio non procedit, nam capitulum creat episcopum, non tamen potest creare rectorem, ut extra ne se vacan. Illa (3.9.2)’ *Rosarium D.79 c. 4 s.v. cardinalis*. The Archdeacon misrepresents Hostiensis who had quoted Huguccio’s opinion without accepting it. Durantis had taken his view from Hostiensis, Appendix no. 3.

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Sed si de hac materia vis plenam habere materiam, videas quod notat hostiensis ex. de pe. et re. Cum ex eo (5.38.14); § ult., ubi disputat de potentia cardinalium vacante sede.’ *op. cit.* D. 79 c. 7.
In his Apparatus on the Sext, however, he expressed his views much more positively and forcefully. Whether the change was due to becoming more closely involved with the College on his translation to an important post in the curia or simply because the Sext stimulated his interest in a way that the Decretum had not or through dissatisfaction with the way Jean Lemoine had handled the problem must remain a matter for conjecture. But no clarity is wanting in the Apparatus as to where he stood concerning the relationship of pope and cardinals.

He employed the conventional formulae deriving from Roman law which Hostiensis had used to describe the dignity and function of the College. It was a part of the pope’s body, forming his senate. The cardinals were his coadiutores in executione sacerdotalis officii; this terminology was now known to the law, since its use, after Innocent III, by Nicholas III in a decretal in the Sext. Like both Hostiensis and Jean Lemoine, the Archdeacon did not embark on an excursus about the cardinalate in se, but discussed it à propos of particular problems.

The first of these was by now an old one but, as the Archdeacon testified that he had often heard it discussed in the curia, it was obviously not yet a settled one. It concerned the meaning of the phrase, ‘de fratum nostrorum consilio’. But for the Archdeacon there was little problem here. No pope was under obligation to seek consilium. This would be to contravene many canons which had made the personal sovereignty of the pope clear. But he should use the advice of his brothers, particularly in the more serious matters, the more especially since popes had instructed lesser prelates to do so. As Isidore had said (Jean Lemoine had also given prominence to the same text), it is just for a prince to comply with his own laws. The other problem which the Archdeacon discussed was a new facet of another much discussed but as yet not completely solved problem: that of

57 ‘Potest tamen dici domini cardinales sunt vere patricii, scripti in diademat principis, insti. qui. mo. ius. pa. po. sol. § filiusuf. (Inst. 1.12.4) et pars eius corporis sunt eidem in consistorio assistentes 6 q. 1 § verum et 1. si quis eum (G. 6 q. 1 IV Pars c. 22). C. Ad 1. Iul. ma. Quisquis (G. 9.8.8). Possunt etiam dici senatores, ad hoc 96 di. Constantinus, palea est (D. 96 c.14).’ Apparatus VI* 1.15.1 s.v. in fratibus.

58 See note 61.

59 ‘Seipus vidi in curia quier quid operentur ista verba “de fratum nostrorum consilio”. Dici potest quod sunt ad bonam ordinationem pape qui habet uti consilio potissime fratum, unde in multis iuribus antiquis et nouis dicitur “habito fratum nostrorum consilio”. Sed non quantum ad necessitatem, ut patet 14 q. 4 Nemini (recte C. 17 q. 4 c. 30), ad idem 9 q. 3 Nemo, et capitula ibi sequentes usque ad § ult. (C. 9 q. 3 c. 13-21), 56 di. Apostolica, cum dubius capitulis ibidem sequentibus (D.56 c. 12-14). Sed potissime in magnis negociis tali debet uti consilio, cum alios inferioris velit ia facere, ut infra de his que fi. a pre. Novit (3.10.4), ad hoc 68 di. c. i. ver. e: quod (not identified), unde dicit Isidorus “iustum est principem legibus obtenter Cuia”, 8 dist. Iustum, palea est (D. 9 c. 2).’ Apparatus VI* 1.168 s.v. consilio.
the powers of the College during vacancy. It is well known that Gregory X’s new electoral decree *Ubi periculum* was only passed after opposition from the cardinals and that it remained unpopular with them. Could they repeal this constitution during a vacancy or change any part of it? We may be sure that this question too was a live one at the time when the Archdeacon was writing about it.\(^{60}\) Not long afterwards Clement V was to legislate on this very point. The Archdeacon was quite confident that they could not alter a papal law during vacancy. He could not remember, he said, ever having read that the cardinals succeeded during vacancy to the place of the vicar of Christ.\(^{61}\) The College might be a senate but the senate did not have power to rescind an imperial law.\(^{62}\) In the absence of any express permission to the contrary, the cardinals must observe *Ubi periculum* in virtue of that unique papal authority to which they were not heirs during vacancy of the apostolic see.

In 1311 Clement V issued the constitution *Ne Romani* to complement, supplement, and clarify *Ubi periculum*. The Pope’s declared purpose in promulgating it reveals that the Archdeacon’s lengthy discussion as to whether the cardinals during vacancy had the power of repealing or modifying *Ubi periculum* was no mere academic exercise but the reflexion of the persistence of opinion within the College hostile to this canon. He declared in quite unambiguous terms that the cardinals had no such right: *lex superioris per inferiorem tolli non potest*. He went on to lay down a principle that endured to the twentieth century, even to the very words in which it was expressed: the cardinals had no power to exercise in vacancy what pertained to the pope in his lifetime, unless they had been specifically permitted to exercise it.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{60}\) ‘Quero an istam constitutionem possint tollere, vel in aliqua sua parte renuntiare ipsi domini cardinales?’ The gloss is too long to reproduce in *toto*: the argument is based on the forcefully-expressed premise: ‘Dominorum autem cardinalem potestia est ab homine, nam quicquid possunt habent a papa, et ideo non debent presumere quod eis non videntur esse concessa, ut 25 q. 2. Amaputato (C. 25 c. 11).’ Aparatus VI 1.6.3. s. v. et idonea. Ockham was to agree: ‘Illa autem ecclesia romana quae est subjecta papa, nullum privilegium habet nisi a papa: quod papa potest quando sibi placet auferre...’ *Dialogus* Ia 5c 24 (ed. Geldst) 493.

\(^{61}\) The Archdeacon replied to his query (previous note): ‘Credo quod non. Cardinales sunt apostolici coadjutores in executione officii et etiam consultores recti et intrepidti, infra eodem, Fundamenta (VI 1.6.17) § Decet namque... nec unquam memini me legisse quod sucedant in loco apostolici, qui est vicarius Christi,...’ loc. cit.

\(^{62}\) ‘... licet senatus possit legem condere, non tamen legem imperialem tollere potest, cum sit minor. Concludi potest quod “decreatum religioso ac necessario factum, observetur a nobis”, ut dicit Cypriani, 88 dt. c. ult. (D. 88 c. 14)’ loc. cit.

\(^{63}\) *Ne Romani* (Clem. 1.3.4): ‘... reprobamus, irritum nihilominus et inane decerentes, quicquid potestatis aut iurisdictionis, ad Romanum, dum vivit, Pontificem pertinens, (nisi quatenus in
No information is available about the work of the jurists who drafted *Ne Romani*. But its principles sprang naturally from the work of the leading commentators whose views have been considered so far. Hostiensis would have approved of Clement V’s reinforcement of the provision that the lay power be permitted to police the cardinals into conclave if they were seeking to abandon the election. His opinion about the power of the College *sede vacante* to act in cases of great urgency had already been adopted in *Ubi periculum*. *Ne Romani* specified other principles that he had enunciated: withholding of any power of action in cases reserved to the pope personally, the continuity of the office of penitentiary, power to complete the business of prelates-elect and others canonically required to present themselves at the apostolic see. The conformity of *Ne Romani* and the Archdeacon’s teaching was in the matter of whether the cardinals could alter the law governing elections during vacancy. Continuity with Jean Lemoine’s work is to be seen in that provision of *Ne Romani* which allowed excommunicated cardinals to participate in papal elections, in order to avoid future dissension and possible schism.

The theory of the cardinalate evolved in the classical period of medieval canon law was rounded off by *Ne Romani*. Thereafter, though the subject continued to be discussed, there was not much of any great substance to be added. It remained for later writers to ponder the principles of law enshrined in *Ubi periculum* and *Ne Romani* in the light of the work of Hostiensis, the Archdeacon and Jean Lemoine.

### III. — THE PERIOD OF JOHN XXII AND IOANNES ANDREAE

Jesselin de Cassagnes (otherwise Zenzelinus de Cassanis) completed in 1325 an authoritative *Apparatus* on the *Extravagantes* of John XXII.\(^4^4\) This small collection did not contain any great wealth of material concerning the cardinalate. Nevertheless this canonist found quite a bit to say on the subject, possibly because he was dedicating his work to a cardinal patron, and what he wrote constitutes, for the historian, the next stage in the evolution of canonist thought on the topic.

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Of course much of what he said was by now far from new. The etymology of the word *cardinalis*, the description of the College as a *senatus*, a part of the pope's body and of the cardinals as *patricii* were stock articles of the canonist vocabulary. Familiar also in substance, though not without some originality in the expression was his emphasis on the need for deliberation before decisions were taken.

One very characteristic feature of earlier canonist writing was notably absent; *Ne Romani* had obviously made it unnecessary to prolong further discussion of jurisdiction *sede vacante*. One feature was quite new — a list, of nine entries, of the special privileges enjoyed by cardinals. New also was Jesselin's discussion of whether cardinals of recent creation, that is to say, created at Avignon, could rightly be described as cardinals of the Roman Church. Neither of these features was of first importance in analysing cardinalitial power. More interesting was his recording of the opinion of some that the episcopal dignity was greater than that of the cardinalate.

The most significant thing that Jesselin had to say was his emphatic rejection of any notion that the pope was under obligation to seek the *consilium* of the cardinals. The *Apparatus* as a whole is characterized by a marked insistence on papal sovereignty, not, it must be noticed, the sovereignty of the 'Roman Church' or the 'Apostolic See' but of the pope personally. It is he to whom pertains the *declaratio* of disputed articles of faith. No

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65 3.1 s.v. cardinalibus (ed. Paris 1561) col. 38.
71 ‘... licet per aliquos dici consueuerit quod episcopalis dignitas sit maior quam dignitas cardinalis.’ 5.1 s.v. *alia superiores* col. 70.
one may hold him to account. He personally is solus princeps ecclesie, sole holder of the plenitude of power. In view of these declarations it is not surprising that there is no trace of oligarchic thinking in his concept of the relationship of pope and cardinals: ‘The pope uses the advice of the cardinals as he wishes, not because he is bound of necessity to seek such advice’.

Since Jesselin’s Apparatus achieved the status of glossa ordinaria it may be confidently assumed that these views were acceptable as representative of canonist opinion and were influential on its future formation. To complete this sketch of the evolution of canonist thought about the cardinalate it remains to examine a more influential writer of the highest calibre, Joannes Andraec.

With his death in 1348, some two centuries after the appearance of the Decretum, it is customary for historians of canon law to see the completion of the classical period of medieval canon law. In the major works of his mature years, particularly the Novella on the Decretales, on which he worked throughout most of his academic life, and its completion with the Novella on the Sext, was the culmination of that period. For these works were not merely the product of an outstanding juridical mind. They were also something of a canonist encyclopaedia, storing an immense array of glosses quarried with huge erudition from scores of sources to supplement the glossae ordinariae.

There is an astonishing amount of Hostiensis’s Apparatus to be found in

73 ‘... licet inferiores prelati iura unius ecclesie in a liam sine certa solemnitate transferrere non possunt, extra. de re. eccles. non alie. c. 1 (4.13.1) papa tamen gaudens plenitudine potestatis, i.i.q. vii c. Decreto (2 q. 6c. 11). Extra de usu pal. c. Ad honorem (1.8.4), ix. q. ult. c. Cuncta per mundum et c. Fer principale (9 q. 3c. 18, 21). Hoc facere potest, nec est qui audeat dicere, domine cur ita facis de poe. dist. iii § Persona, cum in iis que de iure sunt positio, possit pro libito super his dispensare, extra de concess. preben. c. Proposuit (3.8.4).’ 4.2 s.v. continetur expresse col. 64.
This was well-established canonist doctrine and terminology.
74 1.1 s.v. plenitudine col. 10.
75 ‘Unde ceteri episcopi quo ad que sunt de efficacia consecrationis vel ordinis, tanta gaudent potestate quam gaudet papa, licet quo ad alia episcopi sibi pares non possint dici, cum dican tur vocati in partem sollicitudinis: ipse vero solus in plenitudinem potestatis, ii. q. vi. Decreto et c. seq. (2. q. 6. c. [1.12]), extra de usu pal. c. Ad honorem (1.8.4)’ 5.1 s.v. coepiscoporum col. 65. Again, there was nothing new about this gloss.

76 ‘De ipsorum consilio. siclicet cardinalium, quorum consilio papa utitur, quia vult, ut hic vides; non autem ad hoc de necessitate tenetur, ut notatur extra de re iudicata, Ad apostolice lib. vi (VI). 2.14.4. Cf. Jean Lemoine’s gloss on this canon of Innocent IV, above n. 52); vocatus si num est in plenitudinem potestatis ii.q.vi c. Decreto (2 q. 6c. 11), extra. de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.3.4)’ 3.1 s.v. de ipsorum consilio cols. 43-4.

77 On the man and his work see now S. Kuttner, Johannis Andraec. In quinque decretalium libros novella commentaria (Turin, 1963) Introduction v-xiv.
the *Novella* on the *Gregoriana*. The precise amount of Joannes Andreae’s debt to Hostiensis as a dominant shaping influence has not been examined by any modern critic of his work. It is certain that it was the most important single ingredient in his view of the papal power in both its ecclesiastical and political aspects.

It was no less significant in his analysis of the status of the cardinalate. His opinion was based directly and almost exclusively on Hostiensis. Some of the glosses in which Hostiensis set out his views are to be found in the *Novella* substantially unchanged.\(^{78}\) Another is there but very considerably shortened.\(^{79}\) Another, that concerning the need to introduce the conclave principle into papal elections, was now redundant and therefore omitted. Most of the points contained in the remaining glosses are to be found in the others which were included.\(^{80}\) Joannes Andreae was a skilful editor.

There were of course fewer commentators on whom to draw for material on *Liber Sextus*. No one canonist dominates his *Novella* on the Sext as Hostiensis does the other *Novella*. In any case, Joannes Andreae was one of the earliest commentators on the Sext and with his *Apparatus* accepted as its *glossa ordinaria*, he was already its most authoritative interpreter even before he wrote this second work on the same collection.

However he had very little to say on the cardinalate as such in this book. What he did say of a general nature concerning the constitutional relationship of pope and cardinals he said *à propos* of Jean Lemoine’s comments about the invalidation of Celestine V’s appointments by Boniface VIII, allegedly because they had been made without consultation with the cardinals. This explanation of the invalidation astonished Joannes Andreae and he found it difficult to believe that this had really been Boniface’s reason. He could easily accept, however, that Jean Lemoine was right when he said that it was an established convention that grave matters should be examined and settled with the advice of the cardinals. He accepted too the principle that it was fitting that the pope should not ignore a precept enjoined by

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\(^{78}\) I.e. nos. 5, 7, 9-12 of the Appendix below.

\(^{79}\) No. 8. Joannes has compressed Hostiensis’ long gloss into two sentences — the first is the same as Hostiensis’ opening sentence. The second: ‘specialiter tamen hoc uidetur de cardinalibus intelligendum quibus deecet papa omnia communicare.’

\(^{80}\) Or, as with the important problem of whether the College succeeded to papal jurisdiction in a vacancy, the reader is referred to the *Apparatus ad Librum Sextum*. In this work (5.3.1 s.n. *sede vacante*) Joannes Andreae discussed the question according to the arguments of Hostiensis, basically agreed with him and added references to the relevant legislation issued since Hostiensis wrote. In the later work, he was content to add to his reference to the *Apparatus* discussion, the comment that the problem ‘est hodie expeditum per clementinam, de schism. Ne Romani (1.3.2) in prin. (*Nov. Greg.* 5.38.14 s.n. *plenitudinem obtinet potestatis*).
canon law on lesser prelates, namely that they ought to consult their brethren; though the prince is absolute (legibus solutus) he yet should (debet) live according to the law. 81

In this latter, well-known Romanist maxim, used in one form or another by Hostiensis, Jean Lemoine, Guide de Baysio and Joannes Andreae, lay the basic principle which for canonists governed the relationship of pope and cardinals. The pope was sovereign, he should exercise his sovereignty with decentia. An important part of this governmental virtue was consultation with his advisers and assistants who shared with him the day to day burden of Church government. But decentia was not necessitas; this consultation was not legally necessary. For the pope to choose to ignore his brethren might be imprudent but it was not a violation of the law of the Church. The canonist tradition from Hostiensis to Joannes Andreae was in general agreement that papal government was monarchic and not oligarchic. A difference of emphasis may be discerned between on the one hand, Hostiensis and Jean Lemoine and on the other, Guido de Baysio and Jesselin de Cassagnes. The former were not inclined to minimize the importance of the institution in which they served. They emphasized therefore everything that enhanced its dignity — its intimate connexion with the papacy, its participation de facto in the major decision-making processes of the Roman Church, the customary observance of the convention by which they were consulted on major matters. They made as much of its status as they could short of making cardinalial consilium a consensus and therefore legally obligatory. The two latter canonists did not disagree with any of this but were very much more emphatic in making it clear that the collaboration of the College was not necessary to validate any papal act nor did it succeed to the primacy during vacancy. Between these differences of emphasis, Joannes Andreae,

81 'Dicit hic Ioannes Monachus quod cetus cardinalium est in hac questione quod ardua negotia ipsius consilio tractentur et terminentur et decet quod papa non negligent quod suo canone mandat per suas subditos observari irritans contra factum, de his q. fi. a pre. Novit et c. Quanto (3.10.4, 5), licet principes solutus sit legibus, decet cum secundum leges vivere C. de leg. Digna vox et pati legem etc., de const. Cum omnès (1.2.6) dicit enim quod omnis indecentia a principe, qui director est omnium est impossibilis saltem moris de qua impossibilitate remittit infra de re. iu. Nemo (VI 5.13.6). Narrat ipse quod quia Celestius multas abbatias, episcopatus et superiores dignitates contulerat sine consilio fratrum, coram successorem fut satis de hoc tractatum et quod supra dicta sunt allegata et propter illum oppositionem collegii dicit collationes fuisset casatas. Hoc ultimum admiror et difficulter credo Bonifaci id fecisse nisi forsas non expeditos id est, quorum literate adhuc erant in cancellaria. Item ipse Ioannes Monachus posuit additionem in qua dixit per Benedictum papam XI fuisset suspensa quod Bonifacius absque fratrum consilio dederat Marchioni, quia tangebant ardua, licet multa valde iusta essent ills dicens quod defectus in persona factentis vel in modo necessario factum reddit inutilem....' Novella in Sextum (ed. Venice, 1581) 5.2.4 s.s. consilio fo. 136v.
faithful follower of Hostiensis, inclined to the former. But whatever the
difference in emphasis or in detail, the canonist tradition had evolved
in general agreement, a coherent doctrine on the cardinalate and its inter-
relationship with the pope. It produced two major demonstrations. First,
that it was possible to maintain that the College ruled the Church as a
substitute for papal government during vacancy without conceding that
the College succeeded in any particular to that sovereignty conceded to the
pope personally. Second, that it was possible to maintain that the College
was a senate holding an especial advisory and coadjutory position without
giving this body authority to limit papal power. It was in short, not a theory
of curial constitutionalism. That is my main conclusion here. The cano-
nist tradition in the period under consideration did not harbour within
itself such an ecclesiological aberration as the oligarchic theory. We must
look elsewhere for the genesis and development of that theory.

APPENDIX

Texts from the Apparatus of Hostiensis concerning the College of Cardinals
(EDIT. Paris, 1512 and Venice, 1581)

1. 1.5.3 s.v. ecclesie generali

Et nota hic quod cardinale communem impendunt sollicitudinem pro statu ecclesie
generalis sicut et papa, quod dic ut notatur supra in salutatione prohemi s.v. scrurus.

2. 1.6.6 s.v. inter cardinales

Ad quos solos hodie de consuetudine iam obtenta spectat electio summi pontificis,
excluso imperatore et eius nuncius, quamvis olim fuerit seclus obtentum, ut patet lxiii.
dist. § Verum et c. preced. et sequen. Et primo episcopi cardinales inter se super
hoc tractare debent, deinde alios cardinales ad eligendum admittere, xxiii. dist.
In nomine domini (D. 23 c.1). Quid si nullus episcoporum superest nisi unus ?
Respondeo, admittere alios et tractare cum eis, arg. in eo quod legitur et notatur infra
codem Ne pro defectu § fi. Hodie tamen pro regoratiosa episcopis non seruatur
immo sunt de consuetudine omnes pares, et eliguntur de triplici ordine scrutatores,
vel compromittitur pro:it placet, seruata tamen prioritate sua culibet in sedibus et
votis perscrutandis. Quid si de omnibus cardinalibus non supersunt nisi duo ?
Respondeo, eligent ipsi, supra codem c.i. Sed nunquid unus de duobus potest alium col-
legam suum eligere ? Sic, dummodo electus non habuit originem a seipso, ut patet in
eo quod legitur et notatur, infra codem Cum in iure. Quid si unus tantum superest?
Respondeo, eligat alium, nam seipsum non potest, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur infra
domini. Per nostras (3.38.26). Quid si nullus superest ? Hoc nunquam accidet
Dico propicio. Dicit tamen cleris romanus quia ad ipsum spectat, pro quo facito
torii. In nomine domini, et sic etiam potest intelligi lxix. di. c.i. et c. Si quis
ex episcopis et Si quis pecunia (D. 79 c. 1, 5, 9). Alii dicunt quod concilium esset
congregandum et per ipsum universalis ecclesie proudendum, ar. lxv. dist. cii.
et iii. et in eo quod legitur et notatur infra de tempo. ordin. Si archiepiscopus §
fi. (1.11.6), et clerus et populus romanus debent concilium conuocare, argumentum
optimum lv. dist. Si forte (D. 65 c. 9). Solutio, etsi hoc secundum sit forsan iustius, primum tamen videtur leius et commodius, quia periculum est in mora, arg. Supra codem cap. nn. i, infra codem Non pro defectu (1.6.41) et adde quod notatur infra de renun. Nisi cum pridem (1.9.10) § propter maliciam.

3. 1.6.6 s.v. nullatenus assumatur

Quid ergo si due partes nullo modo consentiunt? Innocetur brachium seculare, ut plerumque fieri consuevit. Ar. ad hoc, xvii. di. Nec licuit (D. 17 c. 4), xxii. q. v. De liguribus (C. 23 q. 5 c. 43), et ponuntur in conclusi donec concordent sicut fuit factum ut furtur in electione domini Honorii iii. apud perustium, secundum Tancredum. Vel vocentur religiosi et clerici cum eisdem, bxix. di. § i et c. seq. (D. 79 dict. Grat., c. 1). Nam et episcopi, cleris uniuerius et senatus et populus ad hoc sunt vocandi, bxiii. di. Quia sancta (D. 63, c. 28); sed illud abiit in desuetudinem, bxiii. di. § Verum et c. seq. (D. 63 dict. Grat., c. 29), et hec constitutio solis cardinalibus hoc reseruat cui standum est, ut notatur supra § i super verbo, a duabus partibus. Sed nuaquid cardinalis possunt alios creare cardinales cum quibus concordarent? Sic, cum enim possint creare papam quod plus est, multo fortius cardinales quod minus est, sicut notat Huguccio, bxix. di. Nullus (D. 79 c. 7) et facit pro ipso, infra qui fil. sint le. c. Per venerabilem (4.17.13); non tamen hoc semper sequitur. Ar. Ecce enim capitiunum creat episcopum et tamen non possunt creare rectorem, quod minus est, sede vacante, infra ne se. va. Ila (3.9.2). Recurre ergo ad glossam Tancredi ut ponuntur in conclusi, xxiii. q. v. De liguribus (C. 23 q. 5 c. 43) in fine, et eis cibaria subtrahantur quosque concordauerint, sicut fit tota die, ar. v.q.v. Non omnis (C. 5 q. 5 c. 2) et xxiii. q. iii. Nimium sunt iniquiti (C. 23 q. 4 c. 37).... Sunt etiam casus in quibus laici iurisdictionem habent in clericos, puta quando deest alius qui iusticiam recludat, ut legitur et notatur secundum Johannem, xxiii. q. v. Principes (C. 23 q. 5 c. 20), hi et alii causis, infra de senten. excomm. Ut fame § fi. (5.39.35). Nota hodie tamen: quod nec pro defectu etiam iusticiæ alius clericus ad seculare iurisdictionem trahi debet, ut infra de iudi. Qualiter (2.1.17), nec inimius etiam in loco aliquo sit inquitur, infra de senten. excomm. Nuper (5.39.29), nisi ad requisitionem ecclesiæ hoc fiat, infra de iudi. Cum non ab homine (2.1.10), infra de re. eccle. non alie. c. fi. in prim. (3.13.12), infra de cleri. excomm. ca. ii. in fine. (5.27.2). Quare satis est euidens quod per constitutionem novam esset circa hoc prouidendum.

4. 1.24.2 s.v. cardinalium

i. ecclesiam principaliter regentium... sic dicti a cardine, quia sicut cardine regitur ostium, ita per istos regi debet officium ecclesie; inde dicti sunt cardinales quia per eos regitur totus mundus, inde papa cardo omnium ecclesiarii appellatur, xxv. q.i. § His ita (C. 25 q. 1 II Pars § 1)...

5. 2.24.4 s.v. Romane

Per hoc verbum nolunt intelligere cardinales quod et ad eos fidelitatis promissio extendatur, quia papa et ipsi romanam ecclesiam constituant, arg. infra de ver. sig. Cum clerici (5.40.19), et pars corporis domini pape sunt C. ad legem. iul. maiesta. et argu. infra de hiis que fi. a prela. Nouit et c. Quanto (3.10.4, 5).

6. 3.4.2 s.v. In synodo

Nota hic in ammotence cardinalis synodum congregatam, et super ea totius synodi concessum fuisse habitum, immo ipsa synodus depositionem fecit ut infra sequitur
secundum dominum nostrum (Innoccencium) quod dicit papa per se non potest ipsum deponere, sed et plures testes requiruntur ad eum conungeendum, quam si de alici ageretur et factid ad hoc clericorum romane ecclesie priuilegium speciale, vel ut improbitas inuidiose seu maliciose impetrantium refrenetur, ii. q. iii. Presul et c. Nullam et s. seq. Nec mirum (C. 2 q. 4 c. 2, 3). Cum enim hec in inferioribus subditis diligenter observanda sint quamuis minoribus, diligentius tamen in prelatis, quamquam maioribus infra de accu. Qualiter ii s. i. in prin. (5.2.24), extra. domini nostri de sentent. exco. Quia periculonum [(= VI° 5.11.4)]. Diligentissime igitur in cardinalibus tanquam maximis qui et precipua prerogatia letantur, extra domini nostri de offi. lega. Officii s. i. ubi de hoc [(= VI° 1.15.1)]. Sunt enim cardinales pars corporis domini pape qui super omnes est nec ab aliis iudicatur, ix. q. iii. Aliorum et c. seq. (C. 9 q. 3 c. 14, 15), sed et cum eo orbem iudicant et disponunt, unde et satis equum est quod sicut sunt participes laboris, sic et aliquid sentiant priuilegii singularis ar. C. ad 1. iul. maius. Quisquis (C. 9.8.5) vii. q. i. s. verum 1. si quis cum militibus (C. 6 q. 1 Pars IVa) et in dicta extra. Officii [(= VI° 1.15.1)] et supra de prescrip. Cum non liceat in prin. (2.26.12) cum suis consistandis. Inde est quod papa non consuevit, nec etiam potest secundum quosdam, aliquem de cardinalibus excommunicare vel ei aliquod preceptum facere sine aliorum suorum fratum consilio et consensu, ad quod spectat ar. quod legitur et notatur supra de offi. ordi. Irrefragabili s. excessus (1.31.13) et intra de excess. prela. c. i. Sed et dicunt quod cardinales non incurrunt aliquid sententiam canonis vel aliam generalem, nisi in canone vel sententia de ipsis specialis mentio habeatur, ar. in eo quod legitur et notatur, extra. domini nostri de sen. exco. Quia periculonum ([(= VI° 5.11.4)] et quia cum in specie non faceret hoc papa ut pres- missum est, nec in genere hoc facere velle intelligentur, ar.in eo quod legitur et notatur supra de offi. lega. Quod post translationem (1.30.4), exemplum de canone, xxii. di. In nomine domini (D. 23 c. 1) et supra de elec. c. Licet de vitanda discordia (1.6.6) ubi de hoc. Alii vero contrarium tenent. Quicquid tamen dicitur, hoc de plano fa- tor quod in solum papam plenitudo resider potestatis, supra de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4), contra scribere non intendo ut patet in eo quod notatur infra de conces. preben. Prospuit (3.8.4).

7. 3.5.19 s. v. episcopi Prenestinensis

sed et maiores cardinalis, inquantum est pars corporis generalis vicarii iuesi christi, vi. q. i. Verum s. i. quis cum militibus. Unde et habent tales quodam prerogatiam pre alis, ut notatur extra. domini nostri de of. leg. Officii [(= VI° 1.15.1)] et supra de offi. leg. Excommunicatis (1.30.9) ... Hoc tamen hodie tenet romana ecclesie quod nulla sit in dignitas cardinalatu, cum ipsis cardinale una cum pape omnes iudicent, nec iudicari possint ab alio quam a papa et collegis suis. Argui. ix. q. iii. Nemo (C. 9 q. 3 c. 13) et capitulis sequentibus. Ar. tamen contra in eo quod legitur et notatur supra de cleri. non resi. c. ii. (3.4.2) et adde quod notatur infra qui fil. sint leg. Per venerabilem s. rationibus v. sunt autem (4.17.13) et supra de elec. Ecclesia. ii. rn. i. s. v. cardinalem (1.6.57).

8. 4.17.13 s. v. fratres nostri

ergo omnes episcopi, infra de crimi. fal. Quam graui (5.20.6) qui et vocati sunt in partem sollicitudinis, supra de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4). Cardinalis tamen continue ei assistunt de quorum consilio procedit, supra de postula. prela. Bone i. (1.5.4), supra de elect. In genesi, in fine et c. Ecclesia. ii. (1.6.55, 57) in fine, et de ipsis hoc specialiter est intelligentum, sed de alius generaliter. Inter cardinales quippe et papam tanta est unio ut sibi adnuicium omnis communicare decent, sicut
enim inter episcopum et capitulum suum maior est communio quam inter eundem episcopum et ceteras ecclesias sue dyoesis, ut supra, de testamen. Requisisti § secur autem est (3.26.15), sic multo magis et multo excellentius maior est unio inter papam et collegium romane ecclesiae quam etiam inter aliquem alium patriarcham et capitulum suum, quod dico ut notatur infra, de privile. Antiqua rn. i. (3.33.23) et tamen patriarcha sine consilio fratrum non debet ardua expedire, ut patet in his que leguntur et notantur supra, de his que sunt a prela. Novit (3.10.4) et c. Quanto (C. 5). Multum fortius ergo decet papam consilia fratrum suorum requiere, nam et firmius est iudicium quod a pluribus queritur, xx. dist. De quibus (D. 20 c. 3)ideo c. dicitur hic quod in executione sacerdotalis officii sibi coadiutores existunt. Unde et dici sunt cardinale a cardine quasi cum papa mundum regentes, ut et notatur supra, de offi. archipresby. ca. ii, circa principium (1.24.2). Unde et dictum est non ‘iudicabitis’ in singulari, sed ‘iudicabitis’ in plurali, ut non solum papa sed et cardinale includerentur etiam in expressione plenitudinis potestatis, infra co. para. v. fi., de quo tamen dic ut plene notatur infra, de peniten. Cum ex eo (5.38.14) § fi.

9. id. s.v. iudicabitis

scilicet, tu papa et cardinale. Participant ergo cardinale plenitudinis potestatis, ut et notatur supra co. par. ver. sunt autem.

10. 5.6.17 s.v. sancte Romane ecclesia

Nota contra illos qui dicunt quod cardinale non habent ius capituli siue collegii, sed potius iure singularem censentur tanquam homines a diversis mundi partibus singulariter vocati et in singulis ecclesiis sibi commissis intitulati, licet et dyaconi non dicantur habere titulum, ut in precedent glossa. Unde nec habent archam communem nec syndicum nec simulia que universitas habere consuevit siue collegium, quod cuiuscunque universitas nomen l. i (D. 3.4.1) et notatur infra de excus. prela. Dilecta (5.31.14). Et inter hec duo iura scilicet universitas et singularitas magna differentia est, ut patet in eo quo notatur supra de const. Cum omnes rn. i (1.2.6). Sed errant eudenter qui talia autumnant presumendo. Nam et de facto ista est quod antea fuerant cardinales, quam eis aliquis titulus assignetur, et hae consideratione habita cardinale dicuntur simpliciter nulla alia ecclesia expressa, xxiii. di. In nomine domini (D. 23 c. 1) et lxxix. di. Oportebat et c. seq. (D. 79 c. 3, 4). Cuius ergo ecclesie dicentur tunc temporis cardinale? Utique non alterius quam romane cuius et semper cardinale sunt, ut hic expresse dicitur, et extravag. domini nostri de re iudi. Sacrosanctas § et ut ad presens v. perpetrauit, ad idem lxxix. di. Si quis ex episcopis (D. 79 c. 5). Sed et archam communem habent quo ad seruitia commania, et camerarium speciale loco sindici qui et oblata equaliter diuidit inter cos. Sunt et simul congregati, et ad tractatus communis totius mundi expediendos communit conveniunt tota die, et similiter eis eligendi habent quod ex iure congregationis non singularitatis competit, ut patet in eo quo legitur et notatur supra de elec. c. i.e.c. Licet et c. Quia propter (1.6.1, 6, 42). Quinimmo et sacrum collegium vulgariter et communiter nominatur. Unde et tale habendum est ar. ff. de fiul. l. i. r. rum. i et no. supra de sponsa. Ex litteris (4.1.7). Nam et nomina debent esse consona rebus, ut patet in eo quo legitur et notatur supra de preben. Cum secundum apostolum (3.5.16). Et in iure dicitur ecclesie romane gremium, xxiii. di. In nomine domini, circa medium ibi ‘eligatur autem de ipsis ecclesie gremio’. Estque summum et excellens collegium super omnia alia unitum adeo cum papa, quod cum ipso unum et idem est, ut patet in eo quo legitur et notatur infra de priui. Antiqua m. i,
11. 5.31.8 s.v. ita

Sed nec papa hunc vel alios casus sibi specialiter reseruatos, ut in premissis casibus, consueuit expedire sine consilio fratrum suorum, id est cardinalem, nec istud potest facere de potestate ordinaria, ar. supra de his que fiunt a prelatis, Novit (3.10.4), licet secus sit de absoluta, de conces. pre. Proposuit (3.8.4).

12. 5.33.23 s.v. sibi fidelitatis et obedientie iuramento

Scilicet Romano pontifici omnes immediate pape subjectos prestare pape obedientiam. Subjectos vero mediate, non a primo dicto excipit diaconos et presbyteros cardinales, qui etsi subsint immediate, tamen sibi non prestant obedientiam. A secundo dicto excipit confirmatos, vel consecratos per papam, qui etsi subsint mediate, illam prestant, et de huc dixi de ec. ed. c. fi. (3.48.6). Queritur autem que sit ratio quare presbyteri et diaconi cardinale non faciunt pape obedientiam; respondeo, ut ostendatur quod licet papa sit generale caput universalis ecclesie et singuli fideles eius membra generalia, est tamen speciale caput cardinale, et ipsis eius specialia membra respectu aliorum: quod corpus adeo debet esse unitum, et quod ab his specialibus membris papa fidelitatem vel obedientiam non exigit, sicut nec a seipso, oportet enim ut sit inter dantem et recipientem differentia, de inst. c. fi. (3.7.7) cum concordantia; ad hoc supra, de his que fiunt a prelai. Nuit (3.10.4); de rescrip. cum non liceat (2.26.12). Ab aliis ergo recipiat papa iuramentum ut ab extraneis, a cardinalibus vero non recipit, tanquam sibi inuisceratis, unde ob hoc dicuntur mitti de ipsius latere, de of. leg. c. penultimum (1.30.9) per que patet quod cardinales ad obedientiam pape plus aliis se reputare debent astrictos, et papa cardinales diligere, ut seipsum. Sed nunquid episcopi cardinales qui iurant sunt exclusi ab hac unitate et charitate? dicas quod non, sed iurant tanquam ceteri episopii, non tanquam cardinales. Et per hoc arguritur quod parum vel nihil debet papa facere sine consilio fratrum suorum...

13. 5.38.14 s.v. plenitudinem obtinet potestatis

Alii vero vocati sunt in partem solicitudinis, supra de usu pal. Ad honorem (1.8.4). Sed pone papam mortuum, quero penes quem resideret huc potestas? Resp. utique penes romanam ecclesiam que mori non potest, xii. q. ii Liberti (C. 12 q. 2 c. 45) nec unquam potest esse nulla, xxxiii. q. i. Pudenda, ad finem (C. 24 q. 1 c. 33); dormitat tamen exercitium donec caput creetur cui competit, argumentum optimum, C. de cura. fur. 1. pe. ad finem (C. 5.70.6), sic et multoties habet quis jurisdictioem, sed non exercitium, ut patet supra de rescriptis Pastoralis § fi. (1.3.14). Sed nonnund collegium cardinalium habet jurisdictioem pape et etiam exercitium ipsius? Huguccio et Johannes (Teutonicus) notant de hoc, lxxix. di. Nullus. ii. (D. 79 c. 7) sicut placet. Sed tu teneas quod sic, saltem in his in quibus de grandi necessitate euidenti et iminenti prouideri oportet, tum quia alia inferiora collegia hoc habent, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur supra de ma. et obed. His que etc. et c. Cum olim (1.33.11, 14), tum et quia sic utuntur cardinales, ar. supra de elec. Venerabilem § obiectioni v. quod autem et sequen. (1.6.34) et de transl. epi. Quanto mm. i. ad finem, et in eo quod legitur et notatur supra de of. ord. Irrefragabili § excelsus, et de fo.
compe. Cum contingat (2.2.13) nam et beata consuctudo est attenda in talibus, xvii. di. Multis, ad finem (D. 17 c. 5) tum et quia alius iudex non superest, supra de elect. Licet et xxiii. di. In nomine domini ibi 'quia sedes apostolica', in quo casu multa conceduntur quia alias non concedentur, ut patet supra eodem capitulo in principio et C. et decur. 1. Generaliter li. x, ff. de his q. in curia. cre. Ait pretor (D. 42.8.1) § nec debitorum, ff. de of. proconsul. Meminisse (D. 1.16.10), in autem, de administra. § illud autem, coll. vii. (Nov. 95 c. 1 § 2) et ut diff. iudi. § in ciuitatibus coll. vii. (Nov. 86 c. 7) tum quia necessitas legem non habet, de reg. iur. Quod non est licitum (5.4.14), tum quia verissimile est quod filio dei placeat hic intellectus, ne ecclesi- sium videatur reliquiae sine pastore, extra. domini nostri de homic. Pro humano [=VI 5.4.1], non obstat quod aliqui dicunt quod cardinales sunt sine capite, quia hoc non est verum, immo habent caput ecclesie proprie et generale, scilicet Christum, Col. (1.18): 'Et ipse est caput corporis ecclesie qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis: ut sit in omnibus ipse primatum tenens'. Ephe. (1.22-3): 'et ipsum dedit caput supra omnem ecclesiam qui est corpus ipsius', unde et cardinalibus satis proprie congruit illud Ephe. iii (Eph. 4.15): 'crescamus in illo per omnia qui caput nostrum Christus', dicens eis Math. ult. (28.20): 'Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi', quod dicit non solum instituta ecclesia sed etiam et vacante: sed et valde est absurdam sentire quod illa ecclesia capite careat quare caput est aliarum, ii. q. vii. Beati (C. 2 q. 7 c. 37), immo etiam nec est longe ab heresi, xxii. di. c. i. et ii. (D. 22 c. 1, 2), super quo vide quod legitur et notatur supra de sacra. unc. c. unico § hoc unguento v. caput (1.15.1) et de elec. Significasti, ir. fine (1.6.4) aliquoquin esset res monstruosa, super quo vide quod legitur et notatur supra de of. or. Quoniam in plerisque (1.31.14), nec obstat quod hoc non sit specialiter iure expressum, ut patet ff. de legibus, Non possunt (D. 1.3.12) et xx. di. De quibus (D. 20 c. 3) et supra de sepulturis, Certificari (3.28.9) et in eo quod notatur infra eadem glossa v. sed et in iure et seq. Sed nec obstat quod non sit sedes apostolica sine papa, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur infra ti. i. quod de his, in fine et ar. vii. q. i. Scire debes (C. 7 q. 1 c. 7). Item non obstat quod dicunt aliqui ex hoc posse scisma et scandalum et vacationem sedis diutinam suscipit, quia hoc posset esse verum si indistincte concedetur. Sed potest restringi hoc ad necessaria vel utilia ecclesia seu rei publice quibus omnino est prouidendum, ut patet vii. q. i. Scias (C. 7 q. 1 c. 35) et supra de elec. In causis, in fine (1.6.30) cum suis concordantes; caueant ergo ne nimis laxent habenas, ar. in eo quod legitur et notatur ff. de of. proconsul. Nec quicum quas § ubi decretum et § ubi de plano, et sequentibus (D. 1.16.9 §§ 1, 3 et seq) et adde quod notatur supra de priuili. Antiqua nn. 1. Sed et in iure expresse lege quattuor, quorum duo vacante sede ad officium cardinalium spectat, duo vero ad postestatem corundem. Ad officium spectat primo ut corpus mortui sepeliant ante quem de electione tractent, lxix. di. Nullius. ii. (D. 79 c. 7). Secundo quod canonice futurum eligant, supra de elec. Licet (1.6.6). Ad postestates vero ut delinquentes anathematizent, lxix. di. Si quis pecunia (D. 79 c. 9), per quod patet quod potestas ipsorum eminens est et excelsas, tum quia anathema imurc est episcopalis, xvi. q. ii. Visis (C. 16 q. 2 c. 1) tum quia maior est pena quod sit in ecclesia dei, xxiiii. q. iii. Corripiantur, in principio (C. 24 q. 3 c. 17). Unde et si maiorem penam possunt ex potestate ordinaria infligere, ergo et minorum, ar. supra qui filii sint le. Per venerabilem nn. i (4.17. 13) et de decimis, Ex parte. iii. (3.30.27). Spectatet et ad postestatem secundum scilicet quod episcopi cardinales proculdubio vicem metropolitani obtinent, xxiii. di. In nomine demini (D. 23 c. 1) nec potest hoc restringi ad consecrationem de qua ibi sequitur, immo generaliter loquitur et ex genere speciem infert ut ibi probatur ex vi littere, et exponi opertet metropolitani, id est, pape, quia nec alius posset esse meteo-
politanus romane ecclesie ut et ibi colligi potest, ergo illam potestatem illam iurisdictionem habere videntur per totam christianitatem quam et papa, nam et ipsa metropolitana est, ut patet in eo quod legitur et notatur supra, de of. vicar. Tuam, nec queras in omnibus ius expressum quia multa suppleantur, quod dic ut legitur et notatur supra, de celebr. mis. Cum marthe § 1 (3.41.6). Sed potest dici quod potestatis plenitudinem habitu tamen habent in quantum scilicet romana censetur ecclesia que nunquam moritur, etiam si unus tantum cardinalis sit superstes, ivv. di. Si forte (D. 65 c. 9) et non usu, sicut supra, de baptismo, Maiores § i. v. fi. (3.42.3). Iurisdictionis vero potestatem habent in exercitio, sicut est superius prelibatum, saluis fors san his que ratione excellentiae dignitatis et eminentiae ac prerogatiue summi pontificis sed tantum apostolice reseruantur, supra de transl. epi. c. i. (1.7.1) et de of. lega. Quod translationem (1.30.4) de quibus notatur supra, de exc. prela. Sicut unire (5.31.8). Finaliter te concedere oportet quod ad minus illam iurisdictionem habet collegium quam et legatus apostolice sedis, que nec mortuo papa expirat, quod dico ut notatur supra, de restit. in inte. Tum ex literis rn. i. (1.41.5) quia nec duraret nisi collegium sedes apostolice censetur, non enim gerit vices parietum sed potius personarum ut patet, xcvii. di. c. fi. (D. 93 c. 26) et xcviii. di. c. fi. (D. 94 c. 3) et supra de of. del. Sane quia (1.29.1) et ex. domini nostri de of. vica. Romana § fi. [= VI° 1.13.1] et adde quod notatur supra qui filii sint le. Per venerabilem § rationibus v. sunt autem sacerdotes, et v. fi. Hec scribo ad confutandos illos qui potestatem cardinalium quasi omnino adhinihe videntur, non ut eorum auctoritatem excellentem intendam precise limitare vel aliqibus certis regulis alligare nam et unius tantum cardinals dignitas est precellens, ex. domini nostri de of. lega. Officii § fi. [= VI° 1.15.1] est tamen contra cardinales id quod notatur supra, ne se va. c. i. § attendentes, super verbo ‘exaudire’.

14. 5.39.26 s.v. Romanam ecclesiam

Id est, papam, quia ubi papa ibi romae et romana ecclesia, vii. q. i. Scire (C. 7 q. 1 c. 7) vel ideo hoc dicit ut det intelligere quod per mortem pape non vacat officium penitentiarie, nec iurisdiction romane ecclesie, ar. in eo quod legitur et notatur supra de hereti. Ad abolendum § i (5.7.9) et de maio. et obed. Cum olim (1.33.14) et ex. d. n. de homicid. Pro humani § i [= VI° 5.4.1]: quamvis putuo quod cardinales non habeant se intromittere de casibus qui romano pontifici specialiter reseruantur, de quibus notatur supra de exc. prela. Sicut unire (5.31.8). Sed nec expedit quod iurisdictionis exercitium nimis diu occupando detineant vel extendant...

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Henry of Ghent and the new way to God (III)
ANTON C. PEGIS

I

FROM the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas to the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum of Henry of Ghent is a short distance in time but a rather long journey in ideas. St. Thomas lived at a time when the reception of Aristotle into Christian thought was still going on, and his Summa Contra Gentiles is a monument to such an assimilation. To read Henry of Ghent, however, is to be aware not only of Aristotle's shortcomings as a philosopher, but also of the deficiencies of those theologians who had used Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics in giving a Christian account of God and the world. Multum restat, wrote Henry of Ghent in reply to an objector, inter opinionem Aristotelis philosphi de primo principio et fidem catholicam quae institutur ipsi praeae veritati, a qua plurres philosophi deviaverunt. In this opposition to Aristotle, Henry is concerned to fight, not against incidental errors, but against philosophical principles wherever these are opposed to the truth of faith. Henry believed that the right Christian tactic against Aristotle consisted in disarming his principles before doing battle against his philosophy.1

With Henry of Ghent, the day of the reception of Aristotle is over, and the quarrel with his principles, which means the foundations of the Aristotelian world, is the first order of business for the theologian. We now see Aristotle, not as a philosophical witness to the truth, but as a pagan polytheist whose metaphysics posed some grave dangers for Christian theology. St. Thomas had been aware of Aristotle's errors and shortcomings, and he too had separated himself from Aristotle at the level of principles. But, as can be seen from the commentary on the first book of the De Caelo, St. Thomas had no particular fear of the divinized and eternal world of Aristotle. He simply pointed out that Aristotle arrived at his own conclusions on the premise that the world originated by generation, whereas the Christian view was that the world came into existence by the action of a creating God who was master of all being.2 Clearly, St. Thomas thought

1 Henry of Ghent, Summa Questionum Ordinariarum, A. 25, q. 3 (Paris, 1520), fol. 156r (V).

that to put Aristotle’s eternal world in its place as a generated world, which had nothing to do with the created world of Christianity, was to disarm it and its author at the level of principles. But this was not enough for Henry of Ghent, who was, if not afraid of the world of Aristotle, at least haunted by the desire to be free of it.

The change in intellectual attitude between St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent is nowhere more remarkable than in their respective ways to God and in their respective attitudes toward Aristotle on those ways. As we have seen, Henry’s decision to follow Avicenna in proving the existence of God was dominated by his fear of the dangerous limitations in the theology of Aristotle. And since this fear applied to Aristotle’s method as well as to his doctrine, it raised this question: what was the proper method to follow in order to make sure that, in proving God, one had indeed reached the supreme being of Christian teaching? This search for God in his uniqueness defines the attitude of Henry of Ghent toward Aristotle, his world and his conception of God. This same search also defines Henry’s diagnosis of the serious limitations of all empirical proofs of God and the reasons for these limitations. Finally, Henry’s purely formal way to God, at once free of Aristotle’s physical world and poised with such independence within creation, is motivated throughout by the conviction that in this way lies the absolute road to the incommunicable God.

*Summa*, Article 25, contains the main elements of Henry’s own proof of God. He had prepared the way for this effort in Articles 22 and 24. In the former, he had digested *a posteriori* and empirical proofs of God, which he acknowledged to be true (q. 4). But, following Avicenna, he had also sought an *a priori* proof, on the ground that such a proof would do something that *a posteriori* proofs could not do: by concluding that *deus est esse* it would reach God in his uniqueness, whereas *a posteriori* proofs, proceeding empirically from the *esse creaturae* to the *esse dei* and concluding that *deus est*, could reach a God who was in some way beyond the universe and nothing more (A. 22, q. 5). Henry deferred the exposition of the new (and Avicennian) proof to Article 25, dealing with the problem of the oneness of God. But since he was quite willing to admit that the world of bodies was the only one that men knew, Henry had necessarily to come to terms with the empiricism implicit in such an admission and with the doctrine of abstraction that Aristotle had built on it.

Henry did come to terms with the problem of the empirical origins of our

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concepts in *Summa*, Article 24, qqs. 6-7. There he allowed that the *physicus* and the *metaphysicus* both proved the existence of God, but did so by different means and with different results. The *physicus* considers sensible substances in their physical motion and proves from this that *deus est*. The *metaphysicus* considers sensible substances as beings and as substances, by following the analogical highway of perfections common to God and creatures and leading to God as a supreme form. The *physicus* says that *deus est* because bodies in motion lead him to a prime mover. But the *metaphysicus* is not so limited, at least as Henry of Ghent sees him. For, in addition to empirically derived concepts functioning as Aristotelian universals in the world of sensible bodies, Henry, following Avicenna, visualizes a second order of absolute concepts derived by the process of freeing the essences contained in universals from all relations to existence either in the mind or in the world. Equinity is only equinity, Avicenna had said, by which he meant more than that it was not necessarily one or many, existing in the mind or in reality; he meant that these conditions were positively excluded from essences.

Thinking of transcendentals in this Avicennian way, Henry proceeded to show how *ens* and *bonum*, for example, as applying to God and creatures, could be probed absolutely, reveal within themselves a distinction between the absolute being and good as set off from creaturely beings and goods, and lead progressively to the recognition of the transcendence, eminence and subsistence of the absolute good. This absolute journey to God within *ens*, *bonum* or any other transcendental was possible for Henry of Ghent because, as he explains (Article 24, q. 7), he could not have the notion of any being or any truth except in the light of the first being and the first truth. These are impressed on his mind, as Augustine had said. Thus, with the help of Avicenna's method of absolutizing essences, Henry of Ghent was able to break out of Aristotelian abstractions, while building on them, and rejoin the world of St. Augustine. He was able, in other words, to begin as an Aristotelian empiricist and, with the help of Avicenna, return to the Augustinian world of illumination. This is a new kind of Augustinianism, however, when compared with that of St. Bonaventure. As is clear from the opening Article of the *Summa*, Henry had prepared the way for this new doctrine by accepting the Aristotelian world of nature as a genuine source of truth on the condition of recognizing that it was a creaturely and limited truth:

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it was not that unconditioned truth of creatures that only the divine exemplars could give.7

II

Divided into three questions, Article 25 is concerned de unitate dei taken as such. It begins by asking whether God is one (q. 1),8 and, answering the question affirmatively, it goes on to raise a more difficult issue: is there only one God (q. 2)? This time, though not unexpected, the affirmative answer contains an examination of the theology of Aristotle that is the real beginning of the problem of God for Henry of Ghent. Aristotle reached one supreme prime mover in Metaphysics XII, c. 7, but he tied the oneness of this mover to the oneness of the world. In other words, Aristotle believed that “one God” and “one world” were mutually coördinated notions, so that the orderly movement of the world both rested on, and also revealed, one God. Here Henry of Ghent saw a difficulty. If the unity of the world argued for the unity of God, so that one world led a posteriori to one God, would not the possibility of many worlds lead to the possibility of many gods? For if the creation of many worlds, whether successive or simultaneous, was not in itself a contradictory idea, then did not Aristotle’s way of reaching God fail because his thesis of one-world-one-God was not proof against the possibility of polytheism?

We are already in q. 3. Henry must naturally answer his own question in the course of q. 3, whose title is not without its historical thrust: utrum sit possibile esse plures deos quam unum. The reply is much more than a belated attack on pagan polytheism and pagan idols. It is, in reality, a searching examination, both historical and doctrinal, of the doctrine of the oneness of God, testing in turn the theologies of Aristotle, Plato and Avicenna, and not resting content until God is proved to be only one because deitas as necessa esse is incommunicable. When Henry of Ghent is finally able to say, with Avicenna, that necessitas essendi non est communicabilis, he is well beyond his fear of the world of Aristotle.

Henry’s extraordinary pursuit of the divine unicity has two distinct but complementary aspects: (a) an effort to do justice to the Aristotelian theology while escaping from the polytheistic dangers hidden within it, and (b) a diagnosis of the limitations of a posteriori proofs of God. For it was more than a simple historical fact that Aristotle’s theology, quite apart from its open polytheism, had a notion of the supreme prime mover that

7 Henry of Ghent, Summa, A. 1, q. 2, foll. 4r-8r (B-M).
8 Henry of Ghent, ibid., A. 25, q. 1, especially foll. 147v-148r (O-E).
was not proof against his possible multiplication. What was ultimately at stake was a question of method. How do you reach God in all his uniqueness? Unity and plurality are everywhere present in the world of matter, and the question is to know whether what we know of unity from bodies and bodily matter can help or hinder us in our search for the one God. As Henry sees it, matter is a hindrance because it introduces us to a notion of form that is a barrier in our effort to reach God. We must therefore transcend not only the physical world of Aristotle but also the influence of matter on form if we expect to find God in the absoluteness of his unity. There are therefore three fundamental issues in Article 25 of Henry’s *Summa*. These are: (a) the exposition and critique of Aristotle’s theology;\(^9\) (b) the critique of our ordinary knowledge, which, by being framed in universal concepts and expressed in a language built on such concepts, limits our notion of form and therefore of being to conditions verifiable in matter;\(^10\) (c) the use of Avicenna to prove God in his uniqueness as *necesse esse*.\(^11\)

### III

To have proved that God is one in his nature does not argue that there is only one God, just as to say that a man is one does not argue that only one man exists. This is the point of transition from q. 1 to q. 2 in Henry’s inquiry. In q. 1 of Article 25 of the *Summa* Henry had proved that God is one in the sense that he is undivided in himself. To say that God exists, that he is a being, is to say that he is one. But this does not prove that only one God exists. Are there, in fact, many gods? This is Henry’s problem in q. 2, arising from the fact that not all the arguments proving the existence of God prove that there is only one God. Henry is thinking of his own digest of proofs in Article 22, q. 4,\(^12\) and he turns to the case of Aristotle to make his point.

The point to be made is itself clear enough. Aristotle’s arguments, in the second book of the *Metaphysics*,\(^13\) reaching a highest term in the genus of efficient causes, as well as in the genus of formal causes, “prove indeed that God exists and thus that he is one, because there is no being that is not one, as the preceding question sets forth, but they do not prove that there is

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\(^9\) Henry of Ghent, *ibid.*, q. 2, foll. 149v-150r (O-Q); q. 3, foll. 153v-154r (E-I); q. 3, ad 1, fol. 156r-v (V-Y).

\(^10\) *Ibid.*, q. 3, fol. 153r-v (B-E).


\(^12\) See *Summa*, A. 22, q. 4, foll. 132v-134r (K-T), and a summary in A. C. Pegis, “A New Way to God: Henry of Ghent,” pp. 235-239.

only one God.” Why not? “Because, along with the fact that these arguments prove that every genus of cause reaches individually its own supreme term, the arguments do not prove that all genera of causes come together in one term and not in several: that would have been God, and indeed only one God.”

The argument in the eighth book of the Physics falls short for the same reason. It reduces all motions and all movers to a prime motion and a prime mover who is God. But a prime mover is not a prime being, or God, for, though he is first in the order of movers, he is not first in the order of efficient causality: the prime mover does not make things to be in their form and substance. The same thing is true in the order of finality. In short, the prime mover remains only a prime mover, a first in the order of moving causes; this is precisely what the natural philosopher, using the data of motion, can reach, as Averroes had held.

Motion proves a prime mover, and nothing more; it does not prove a God who is the first efficient and final cause. In neither the eighth book of the Physics nor the second book of the Metaphysics did Aristotle bring the different orders of causality together. He finally did so in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics where, reducing the agent and the final causes to the formal, he proved the existence of a first principle that was truly God because it was first in all orders of causality and thus was truly one and only one. Now the prime mover of Aristotle, being the universal and pre-containing cause of all the forms and ends of lesser causes, is a single first principle of the universe; and the universe in its internal connections shows forth the unity and perfection of its cause as the supreme beginning and end of its internal unity. Henry of Ghent therefore concludes that there is an a posteriori way to God and that Aristotle finally took it in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics: it is the order and government of the universe, forming a community of being, beginning and ending in its supreme and unique first principle.

This Aristotelian conclusion proves that there is only one supreme first principle and therefore only one God. But there are many things that the conclusion does not say and that Aristotle cannot say. Here begin Henry’s difficulties with Aristotle. For the Aristotelian argumentation, like the Aristotelian supreme being, is tied to the world, and we have only to ask whether there can be several gods to realize how limited the Aristotelian position is. Two points in particular engage the attention of Henry of Ghent. One has to do with the fact that, though Aristotle posits one and only one

14 Henry of Ghent, Summa, A. 25, q. 2, fol. 149v (O).
16 Henry of Ghent, ibid., fol. 149v-150r (P-Q).
supreme first principle, that first principle is not independent of the world; it is so little independent that its oneness rests on the oneness of the world. Is there, therefore, only one Aristotelian first principle — one God — because of the premise that there is only one world? But what if many worlds were possible simply because the idea is not inherently contradictory? Could we then escape saying that there could be many supreme first principles? And can Aristotle's theology escape from such a possibility? Far from escaping, as Henry sees it, Aristotle espouses the possibility. What is wrong with Aristotelianism, therefore, is that its theology is not proof against the possibility of many supreme first principles even at the moment of saying that there is only one. How, then, do we escape from the possibility of many gods? This first consideration leads to a second one. Henry wants to find a method of reaching God that is in principle free of the world and that enables him to say at its term that there can be only one God.

There is a wide gulf between the teaching of Aristotle and the teaching of the Catholic Faith, writes Henry, which rests on the first truth itself, and from which many philosophers have departed. The true teaching of Faith, with which all right reason agrees, "holds that there is one first principle of all things, from which all things have being (esse) not by a necessity of nature but by a free will unattached to any necessity, and to which alone it belongs, as the proper and immediate action, to bring every creature from non-being to being, without any material means or any supporting cause in the production." The first principle governs some creatures through others, though he can do so immediately. Opposed stands the opinion of the Philosopher, described by Henry as holding that, "although all other things have their being from the first principle as from an efficient cause, which means that he gives them their being at their own lower level and by a necessity of nature, this does not mean that he produces anything from absolutely non-being to being: his proper operation is to move the first movable body, to which he is joined by necessity of nature and determinately, and through the motion of the first movable to rule and govern all other things: he cannot produce anything new except through the motion of the first movable. All these things can be established from his own statements in his own writings". Henry notes that Averroes, who was not unaware of Christian, Jewish and Moslem teaching, did not approve of the "moderns" who said that the first substance was prior to the mover of the universe. As he saw it, each and every separate substance was the cause of sensible substance, so that there were no idle separate sub-

17 Ibid., q. 3, ad 1, fol. 156r (V).
stances. Averroes even thought that Plato, whose demiurge in the *Timaeus* created separated substances, instructed them to create the other mortal beings and then rested, was not to be understood literally. Some such literal idea, according to Averroes, must have been at the origin of the teaching in the Jewish law that God rested on the seventh day. The God of Aristotle does not rest. "Hence, just as the Philosopher held that the heavens existed for the sake of its motion, and could not exist unless it moved, so he held that the perfection of God consisted in moving the heavens and that he would not exist, or would be useless and superfluous, unless he moved — just as there is nothing that can exist without that which perfects it in its being".18

Henry of Ghent is not slow to point out how far Aristotle went in binding his supreme prime mover to the heavens that he moved. As the unity of a form is determined by the unity of its matter, and vice versa, so for Aristotle the unity of the first movable is determined by the unity of the first principle moving it. The same applies to the other movable bodies and their movers. As Aristotle says (writes Henry), an eternal motion takes place through an eternal mover, one through one; from which Henry infers that for Aristotle many eternal motions take place through many movers. In other words, Aristotle "held that the unity of the movable followed from the unity of the moving principle, and vice versa, and this applied both to the first mover and his movable and to the lesser movers and their moveables." Were the first heavens one in species and many in number, the prime movers would also be many, and this applies to the lesser movers and moveables as well. The point — Henry’s point — is clear. For Aristotle, if there were numerically many first heavens as there are many men in one species, the moving principle would be one in species and many in number. True, Aristotle had said that the multiplication of the first principle and the first heavens was impossible, so that he was left with one first principle and one first heavens. But, precisely, he had bound the unicity of the first principle to the unicity of the first heavens.19

Henry of Ghent is not at all pleased with the Aristotelian view that God is one because the first heavens is one. We — we Christians — "say, on the contrary, that God is the universal first mover, tied to no movable, nor even to the universe, nor does he in any way depend on it for his being: quite the contrary, and so he has power over a plurality of worlds, by producing many in succession uninterruptedly to infinity (namely, by permit-


ting one to fall into nothingness and then producing another), or by adding another world or other worlds to this one, of which one would not depend on the other, but both on the one God, so that it would not be necessary to reduce many worlds to some unity among themselves but only to the one principle of all of them." A God who can make many worlds that depend solely on him, and whose unity does not depend on them, or indeed on any one world, is finally free of the world of Aristotle. But Henry is not through. Aristotle was wrong to suppose that there could be many individuals in a species — and many worlds — only by division of matter, just as he was wrong to tie together the unicity of the principle and the unicity of the world. "From the unity of God and the fact that there cannot be many gods, it cannot be argued that there cannot be many worlds." What can be done is what Plato did. He proved the unity of the world as a copy from the unity of the divine exemplar. But this was an argument from befittingness, and not necessity, which allowed for the possibility of many copies. For Plato, God did produce one world, and this was fitting, but Plato did not deny (Henry emphasizes) that there could have been many produced worlds.²⁰

Henry of Ghent has now disagreed with Aristotle at the level of principles, and he feels free of Aristotle at the level of the consequences drawn from principles. His own satisfaction with this result is worth reading: Haec igitur est ars nostra contra philosophos in principiis suis eis obsistere in omnibus in quibus veritati fidei contrariantur. Aliter enim in eis quae sunt post principia non possemus eis resistere.²¹ This reply of principle was in answer to the first objector who, assuming with Aristotle that the oneness of God was based on the oneness of the world, and conversely, argued with other philosophers that, since the existence of many worlds was not contradictory, there could be many gods.²² There cannot be many gods, and it now remains for Henry of Ghent to diagnose the philosophical source of the contrary opinion, to transcend Aristotle in the light of his own answer, to acknowledge the superiority of Plato to Aristotle in their conception of God, and to reach his master Avicenna and the Avicennian way to the necessary divine unicity. To ask in Article 25, q. 3 whether possibile est plures deos esse is for Henry of Ghent to prepare the ground on which to stand in defense of the Christian God against the philosophy of Aristotle. As seen by Henry, Aristotle had said, not so much that there was only one supreme first principle (he

²⁰ Ibid. (Y); Plato, Timaeus 30d-31b.
²¹ Henry of Ghent, ibid.
²² Henry of Ghent, ibid., q. 3, obj. 1, fol. 152r (A). For Aristotle, see Metaphysics, XII, 8. 1074a31-38.
did say this), as that there could not be many gods because there could not be many worlds. The divine unicity was therefore conditional, and Henry is driven to escape philosophically as well as historically from the world of Aristotle. That no less than thirteen arguments, drawn almost entirely from St. John Damascene, St. Anselm and Richard of St. Victor, should argue against the possibility of many Gods is not surprising. More significant is Henry's diagnosis of the philosophical origins of the problem and his adoption of the elaborate argumentation of Avicenna proving that God, the necessary being, can be only one (certitudo præmi est ipsi tantum et nulli aliis) because the necessitas essendi is not communicable.

IV

The location of q. 3 as a whole is clear enough from the opening words of the Respondeo. "From the arguments proving simply that God exists, as well as from those proving that he is only one, it does not follow that he must be only one so that it be impossible that there be many gods, except perhaps for the sake of matter." To clarify the situation, including the reservation, Henry points out that, as creatures are understood by theology, an actually existing thing (i.e. a creature) is related to three sources for its constitution. It is an actually existing thing (it has esse in actu simpliciter) as an effect of the first being; it is this categorical kind of being (esse hoc) from its essence seen as a copy derived from the divine reason, so that we can say of it that it is a substance or an accident, a man or a donkey; finally it is this particular thing (esse hoc aliquid) from the subject that determines its nature, when by divine action the essence of the existing thing receives actual existence in that subject. How this happens Henry leaves an open (but disputed) question between the philosophers and the theologians. It is clear, however, that Aristotle is the spokesman for the philosophers, just as it is clear that the philosophers (that is, Aristotle) disagree with the theologians (that is, Henry of Ghent) on the causality explaining the presence of form in an actually existing and particular thing. What is it that makes a form individual (i.e. one and not many, belonging to this subject and not another subject) in an actually existing subject? The philosophers and the theologians agree a great deal of the way in this problem. Looking at the proximate (and not the first) cause, the philosophers and the theologians agree that a thing is actual and one in its essence from its form. An actually existing thing is one in subject, therefore, for the same reason that it is a being. In

23 Henry of Ghent, ibid., in oppositum arg. 1-13, fol. 152r-153r (A).
24 Avicenna, Metaphysics, Tr. VIII, c. 5, fol. 99ra (A).
this sense, Henry of Ghent proved above (q. 1) that God was one subject because he was a being: the substance of each thing belongs to it and to no one else, and it is found in it and not in several other beings. But this does not explain why a thing is only one in subject (as Henry undertook to prove of God in q. 2); still less does it prove that a thing must be and can be only one in subject (as Henry is now about to prove of God in the present q. 3). ²⁵

It is here that the role of matter in Aristotle's thinking, and especially the influence of matter in the Aristotelian conception of the individual, more than distresses Henry of Ghent. In the world of creatures, a form determined to a particular subject is of itself universal, undetermined as to subject and capable of being in many subjects. As Aristotle says, the universal is common; which means that, according to its nature, it belongs to many beings and is common to them. Consider now the problem that arises in Henry's mind. Suppose we say of some actually existing thing that it is only one as a subject, and that its form cannot be multiplied in many subjects. How can we explain this fact philosophically (i.e. according to Aristotle)? Henry of Ghent believes that the reason why any Aristotelian form, which is of itself universal and common, is one in number, is matter. ²⁶ Are there any but forms in matter, then, that are true individuals? The problem lies here. For if, in an actually existing thing, an essence is made individual (a hoc aliquid) in and by a material subject, then is there such a thing as a form that is an individual, and what is an individual being if matter is the reason why a form in a subject is not communicable?

There are two instances that throw light on this question as well as on the Aristotelian position on the question. These are separate substances, which are themselves subsistent as such, and the forms of the heavenly bodies. In both cases it is true that there is no multiplication of individuals under a species. Subsistent forms are both species as forms and individuals as subjects: each form is a species that is one in number. Such subsistent forms are not seen in their community because they are not multiplied: they are each a hoc aliquid, an individual thing. The forms of heavenly bodies are of themselves multiplicable in many subjects, but, since they each contain within one individual body all the matter that they can inform, they are one in subject. Aristotelian heavenly bodies are one to a species by reason of matter, so that the form of a heavenly body is at once one in species and one and unmultiplied in number. Henry's point is, then, that separate forms are not thought of as common because they are singular and subsistent species, while the forms of heavenly bodies, though multiplicable,

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, ibid., q. 3, fol. 158r (B-C).

²⁶ Ibid. (C). On the universal as common, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 13. 1038 b1.
are, each, one and individual (as well as a species) because they inform all their matter. But are separate forms really individuals? They are (each) one because they are subsistent and singular species, but are they individuals and have they lost their community? Are they not universals waiting for multiplication? So, too, the forms of heavenly bodies are one to a species, but if the heavenly bodies were multipliable as men on earth are multiplied, then their heavenly forms would be multiplied. Separate forms and heavenly forms are both species and individuals, and though Henry of Ghent does not here wish to discuss the point as it affects the world of creatures, he is concerned to argue that such a notion of form cannot really express the incommunicable individuality of God.

Three notions now come together in Henry’s mind and command the development of the rest of q. 3 in article 25. There is, first, the conflict between individuality and universality in the Aristotelian notion of form. The only unmultiplicable forms in the world of Aristotle are the separate substances, the galaxy of movers of the heavenly bodies. They are unmultiplicable by reason of their subsistence as species. But exactly how unmultiplicable are they if, as movers in Aristotle’s system of the world, they are each one because the world can be only one? If this question is possible, then so is another one: how supremely unique is Aristotle’s supreme God? Second, there is the problem of reaching God in an a posteriori way from the world of nature. If we prove, on the basis of motion, that God exists, and that he is one and only one, does this mean that there cannot be many gods? Aristotle’s world hangs together and his supreme prime mover stands as unmultiplicable as long as it remains true that the world can be only one. In that case we are forced to ask: does not the unicity of God rest on the unicity of the world? Does following Aristotle in philosophy mean, then, reaching a God who is conditionally one? We come, in this way, to the third point. We clearly need a philosophical method that will reach God as so truly one that he cannot be many. We need, in other words, to turn from Aristotle to Avicenna and his proof of the necessary being in order to seek God in his absolute uniqueness. These three points cover the central aim of Henry of Ghent’s tortuous itinerary through the rest of q. 3.

Since the unicity of God is Henry’s present concern, he does not here examine directly the Aristotelian thesis that in creatures essence and individuality have different causes. He rather assumes it to be true for Aristotle that the reason why a form is one in number is the matter of the subject in which it exists. How can such a view possibly apply to God? In God,

to be a being, the essence that God is and the individual that he is are one and the same thing. God is an individual form, and there is no ground in him for Aristotle’s universals — genus, species, and difference. God is pure being as an individual. He is not one as a genus or species, he is not subject to potentiality, to matter or to accidents. He is an individual in and by his essence, and what he is cannot be communicated as it is in him. To be sure, the divine persons have the one divine nature, but outside God whatever he possesses by nature creatures possess only by participation. That is why the multitude of creatures can be reduced to the divine unity — as the a posteriori arguments for God have shown. Yet — and Aristotle is here a witness for Henry of Ghent — none of these a posteriori arguments prove that, as the form that he is, God cannot be multiplied unless we add the supposition that the world cannot be multiplied.28 This is the sticking point. “The Philosopher would therefore concede that God could be multiplied if it were possible for the world or the first heavens to be multiplied. As he says in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, if there were many heavens, as there are men, the principle governing each one of them would be one in species but many in number”.29 As in fact it is, there is one supreme mover moving, with an eternal and single motion, one highest heavens and one world.

The world is thus not a proper basis from which to reach the true divine unity, and Henry of Ghent emphasizes this point by detailing the errors of Aristotle’s way of reaching God. It is certainly possible to prove from motion that there exists some immaterial and separate substance, eternal and immovable in nature, as Aristotle did; but, having done so, the same Aristotle went on in the Metaphysics to determine the number of movers on the basis of the number of eternal motions. In the result, as Henry takes pleasure in pointing out, Aristotle attributes to the other movers the same properties that he had attributed to the first mover. We know the result: there are forty-seven or fifty-five prime movers, and Henry of Ghent is ready to comment: “Without any doubt, therefore, Aristotle posited many gods existing by nature of themselves; he reduced all of them to one first God, not as to one from whom the others had being after non-being, but as to one that preceded them in the dignity of his rank and as the principle of motion”.30 His motion was the source of their motion, and this according to an order, so that, while he ruled immediately over the first heavens, he rules mediately over the other movers and their heavens. But all the movers

28 Ibid. (C-E).
29 Ibid., fol. 153v (E); Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 8. 1074a31-38.
30 Henry of Ghent, ibid., fol. 154r (H). For Aristotle’s movers, see Metaphysics, XII, 8. 1073a.3 ff.
worked together, so that the supreme mover could not act through motion except through the lower movers. And this is the consequence for Aristotle's supreme God: "As a result, the highest God, according to him [Aristotle], is nothing but a certain intelligence nobler and of a higher grade than the rest, but not placed infinitely above the rest." Each of the remaining Aristotelian movers is an intelligence of infinite power and substance, "although the mover higher than they would hold the first rank of action in moving the rest, and exercizing causality on them by his motion." All the movers are in motion together, moving their respective heavenly bodies and thereby causing the continuation of generation here on earth. Henry's point is clear: "Aristotle, therefore, did not hold that the supreme God was any more removed from the others than a leader in a state is removed from the citizens, or a general of an army is removed from his fellow soldiers according to rank and class of service".31

Plato's God was somewhat more than a political ruler or a general. Plato, says Henry, though much better of God and more in agreement with Faith. In the Timaeus, Plato did call the intelligences under the supreme God gods, but he held not only that the supreme God was alone eternal but also that the other gods took their origin from him: he conserved them in being and it was always in his power to reduce them to nothing if he so willed, and the same was true of the whole world. The reason why Plato's supreme God brought other beings into existence was that, being perfectly good and unenvious, he wished other beings to share in his beatitude according to their capacity. Addressing the lesser gods, the supreme God told them that he was their maker and father and that they existed because he was stronger than their composite and dissoluble nature. On this Henry comments: "Plato therefore held that by nature there was only one God; however, by a certain participation in immortality and by adoption, he called the intellectual substances, which were nearer to God than the rest, gods." The plural gods does not bother Henry, since he remembers that it is used in Scripture. He can therefore conclude by locating Plato above Aristotle because Plato's "true and natural God is only one in number, whereas the rest are his creatures. On this point Plato thought more truly than did Aristotle: quod Plato verius quam Aristoteles sentiebat".32

But we can go higher than Plato. It was Avicenna who taught the unity of God when he said that there could be only one necessary being and that there could not be another like the first. And not only did Avicenna say it,
he proved it by a most efficacious argument. Avicenna did this is the first tractate of his *Metaphysics*, though Henry also refers to the eighth tractate.\textsuperscript{33}

V

Before he reached the proof of the unicity of the necessary being in Tr. I, c. 8, Avicenna had said in c. 6 that “the necessary” (*necesse*), along with “being” (*ens*) and “something” (*res*), was a basic and undervided notion of the mind. He had identified it with *vehementiam essendi* (which we might venture to translate as “the actuality of being”), and had argued that it was more knowable than the “possible” and the impossible” because *esse vero notius est quam non esse: esse enim cognoscitur per se*.\textsuperscript{34} Thus identifying *necesse* with actual existence, Avicenna then proved in c. 7, that of existing things (*ea quae cadunt sub esse*) some are of themselves possible, while there is a being that is of itself necessary — *necesse esse per se*. Avicenna’s argument was that the *necesse esse per se* is uncaused, it is necessary in all ways, it is unequaled in its *esse* and incomparable.\textsuperscript{35} After this proof Avicenna was now ready to show that *necesse esse debet esse una essentia*, which he did at length in c. 8. This is the demonstration with which Henry begins his own account of the oneness of God.

There cannot be many necessary beings, Henry repeats after Avicenna, since the necessary being must be only one essence. Let there be two independent necessary beings, differing only because “this one is not that one.” In that case, one must differ from the other by something added to its essence and to its character as a necessary being which the other does not have. Is this added element necessary or not to the necessity in being that each necessary being has? If yes, then they do not differ by it; if not, then the *necessitas essendi*, which characterizes both, is common to them as a genus and species, which the added difference affects in the one but not in the other. But that difference cannot be an intrinsic accident, since, if its effect is to make each a necessary being, we would be saying both that they agree and that they differ in that accident; nor can it be an extrinsic accident, for then either they would not differ in the necessity of being (which is the assumed hypothesis to be explained) or they would differ, in which case the *necessitas essendi* would not be intrinsic to either one, i.e. neither would have *necessitas essendi* as its intrinsic nature. Now, *ipsum necesse esse id quod est necesse esse in sua singularitate debet habere per se et non per aliud*. Nor can the

\textsuperscript{33} Henry of Ghent, *ibid*.

\textsuperscript{34} Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, Tr. I, c. 6, foll. 72rb (A), 73ra (C).

\textsuperscript{35} Avicenna, *ibid.*, c. 7, fol. 73rab.
distinction of the two necessary beings be a difference added to the presumed genus (the hypothetical genus of necessary being), for necessitas essendi, being common, would not be made two as necessity. Animal does not depend on rational in order to be animal, but for the determination of a species under it. But the problem posed is to explain necessary being as two in necessity. If the difference is intrinsic, the twoness disappears, and it cannot be extrinsic or necessitas essendi in the necessary being would turn out to be what by definition it is not, namely, caused by another and not through itself. Finally, the difference between two necessary beings cannot be the difference between two individuals in a species. Two singulars in a species, having the same essence, are divided by their accidents or by their matter. There can be no division by accidents, as we have already shown, nor by matter, since there is none present in the necessary being. The hypothesis of two necessary beings is eliminated, therefore, because every effort to account for their twoness in necessity leads us back to one unique necessary being. To say that necessitas essendi belongs by appropriation to the necessary being is to say that there cannot be two, and that there is not a second like the first. The singularity of the necessary being is unique and incomunicable, solitary and uncaused in its per se necessity. Let us conclude with Avicenna as rephrased by Henry of Ghent: "The necessary being is one, but not as species under a genus, and it is one, but not as individual under a species; it is rather a notion that by its name signifies that reality alone in whose being (esse) nothing communicates with it, and, what is more, cannot communicate with it, as has been shown".36

What have we proved? In Avicenna's language, we have proved that necessitas essendi non est nisi uni tantum.37 Three supporting arguments are now added by Henry to this major result from Avicenna's eighth tractate. Avicenna proves, and Henry repeats, that the essence of the first being belongs to the first being alone. He is one, the individual essence that he is, which is necesse esse, and this cannot be multiplied. Being in essence necesse esse, the first being cannot be multiplied because no source of multiplication, as verified in creatures, applies to him.38 For the same reason, being absolutely incomposite, the necessary being cannot contain any difference by which to be distinguished from a supposed second one.39 All efforts to see the necessary being — the being whose individual essence is necessity —

36 Henry of Ghent, ibid., q. 3, fol. 154v-155r (L-N); Avicenna, ibid., c. 8, fol. 74ra.
37 Avicenna, ibid.
38 Henry of Ghent, ibid., fol. 155rv (O-P); Avicenna, Metaphysics, Tr. VIII, c. 5, fol. 99rv (AB); c. 4, fol. 99ra (A).
39 Henry of Ghent, ibid., fol. 155v (Q).
as more than one fail, and Henry, not without a sense of triumph, concludes that, since the essence of the necessary being is (and has not, in any sense, received) its necessity, as distinguished from creaturely essences, which need to be determined and also made actual, he has reached his main point. He can now say, following Avicenna and the truth of the matter, that in necessitate essendi non est communicatio. No other being shares in the necessity of the first being. In other words, "we cannot posit another god sharing with him in the nature of deity, which also means that there cannot be another one: non est ponere alium deum communicantem ei in natura deitatis, ita quod nec est possibile esse alium".40

With this conclusion Henry of Ghent has reached his own journey's end, and he is now free to take the full measure of Aristotle, as indeed he does in the reply to the first objection that we have seen. In the Avicennian notion of the divine essence seen as necessa esse Henry has found a view of the divine unicity that is in principle free of the sources of multiplicity that affect forms in the world of creatures. The a priori Avicennian way to God has therefore enabled Henry not only to throw off the historical limitations — and implications — of Aristotle's system of the world, but also to follow a way to God that does not rest on form as it is conditioned by the world of matter.

VI

Writing at the very end of the sixteenth century, Francis Suarez reached the problem of the existence of God in the twenty-ninth of his Metaphysical Disputations.41 How he saw the problem of a proof of God, and especially how he opened his discussion, is at least as important as the doctrinal position that he adopted. Dividing the twenty-ninth disputation into three sections, Suarez devoted the first section to this question: utrum esse quodam ens increatum ratione physica vel metaphysica demonstrari possit. The question arises because, as Suarez pointed out, there were four different opinions on the means to be used in proving the existence of God. There was the view of Averroes, who said that only a physical means could be used and therefore that the natural philosopher proved the existence of God. At the opposite extreme was the view of Avicenna, according to whom the proof of God was to be found in metaphysics, and was thus grounded in a metaphysical means. In between Averroes and Avicenna there were two possible posi-

40 Ibid., fol. 156r (S-T); Avicenna, Metaphysics, Tr. I, c. 8, fol. 74ra.
tions (Suarez has no proper candidates for them), namely, a third that said
that natural philosophy and metaphysics both proved the existence of God
and did so independently of one another, and a fourth that said that the
proof of the existence of God needed the joint effort of natural philosophy
and metaphysics for its full development. Duns Scotus is the most eminent
thinker in the Avicennian tradition mentioned by Suarez, who also believes
that St. Thomas might be interpreted as belonging to the fourth group.
Suarez himself follows the metaphysical way of Avicenna, and he says that,
while the second and the fourth ways are both true (though the fourth
needs interpretation), the first and the third way are absolute falsas.42

The issue that Suarez has made into a sort of doctrinal schema began as
a purely historical problem at the end of the thirteenth century. St. Thomas
never asked Suarez’ question and if he belongs in the fourth group of think-
ers it is by the interpretation of others. We can agree that St. Thomas’
proofs of God are mixed, that is, they use data to be found in nature and
reach God as the cause of such data before seeing him in his absoluteness
as the first principle.43 Nor did St. Thomas, who had read both Avicenna
and Averroes, choose to make an open issue of their differences. Henry
of Ghent saw things differently. For him, Averroes’ quarrel with Avicenna,
and his own quarrel with the physical Aristotelianism of Averroes, are no
simple academic questions. What Suarez was to present as the outline of a
problem was for Henry of Ghent nothing less than a struggle between the
philosophy of Aristotle, hardened into an anti-Christian form by Averroes,
and the Christian view of God and the world. As Giles of Rome pointed out,
it was Averroes who made Aristotle an opponent of the Christian faith.44
Of Averroes Henry of Ghent is willing to say: “sicut Commentator ille haerea-
ticus Averroes...”;45 but if Henry deals harshly with Aristotle himself, and
he does, it is on the score of his doctrine and at a time when Christian theo-
logy is on the defensive.

It cannot be said that Henry of Ghent is unfair or captious toward the
Teaching of Aristotle — the historical Aristotle, not the idealized Philosopher

42 Ibid., Section 1, # 14, 41, ed. cit., pp. 22-23, 33.
43 I have tried to present St. Thomas’ method in proving the existence of God in “Four Medieval
44 Giles of Rome writes: “Commentator autem omnes errores Philosophi asseruit, immo cum
majoiri pertinacia et magis ironice locutus est contra ponentes mundum incepisse quam Philosophus
fecerit. Immo sine comparatione plus est ipse arguendus quam Philosophus, quia magis directe
fidem nostram impugnavit ostendens esse falsam cui non potest subesse falsitas, eo quod inimitur
primae veritati” (Errores Philosophorum, c. 4, ed. Joseph Koch (Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press,
1944), pp. 14, 16.
45 Henry of Ghent, Summa, A. 7, q. 13, fol. 62v (S).
of St. Thomas. Between himself and the historical Aristotle Henry of Ghent deliberately created and established a metaphysical doctrine that was free of the Aristotelian world and of the need to rest a proof of God in the world. The distance between Henry of Ghent and Aristotle could not be greater. In proving the existence of God Henry aimed, above all, to be sure that his God was incommunicably one. He turned to Aristotle, and what did he find? He found a philosophy in which, though the supreme prime mover was one in number, and could be only one, this was true only on the condition that the world itself was necessarily one. Multiply the world, beginning with the first heavens, and what happens to the oneness of Aristotle’s supreme God? And the reason for this state of affairs is not far to seek. All forms in the world of Aristotle are of themselves common, and this is true even when it is also true that, when they subsist outside matter (as the prime movers do) they are each both a species and one in number. As Henry sees it, there is no form in the world of Aristotle that is of itself one incommunicable individual. The world of matter is always there to anchor and limit the oneness of the separate forms.

The quarrel of Henry with Aristotle is, therefore, one of principle. Even if we set aside the proofs of the first principle in Physics VIII and Metaphysics II, and rest Aristotle’s case on Metaphysics XII, c. 7, Henry is not convinced. He concedes, as we have seen, that this text is a genuine a posteriori proof of the one God; it is based on the unity of the world seen as a causal order proceeding from God and returning to him. There is one and only one supreme prime mover in such a world, and indeed there cannot be many. But this is true by reason of the world, not by reason of Aristotle’s supreme God. To repeat, that supreme God cannot be multiplied, but this is so because the world is one and unmultipliable; it is not so because, as a supreme form, God is incommunicable in his divinity. And this is exactly what Henry wants, namely, a God who is solely one by reason of the form that he is. If God is reached by means of form as found in — or related to — the world of matter, his unicity will not be seen by reason of itself and he will not be grasped as an incommunicably individual form.

The line of demarcation between a posteriori and a priori proofs runs through this last point. A posteriori proofs can prove from the world that there can be only one God, but since they do not do so on the ground of the form that God is, they do not prove that God must be one and only one in virtue of himself. To reach the one God in all his necessary uniqueness Henry needs a method that will uncover for him a God who is one, but not by contraction or determination, a God, therefore, who is absolutely one in the inner individuality of his essence. To arrive at his method, Henry must add to Aristotelianism a Platonic way of escape from the limitations of matter. In the world of Aristotle, matter is the source of the individuation of form,
and universals, which are expressive of the forms of things, are genera or species, that is, essences in a state of indetermination. How can such Aristotelian forms be individuals — without reference to individuation by matter? They cannot, so Henry thinks, because, in principle, they never lose their intrinsic community even as singular subsistent species.

What Henry of Ghent had to find was a notion of form that could be a true individual. And since the mark of such a form was, for Henry, internal to the form itself, he had also to find a method of designating the radical uniqueness of the form that was this unique God. Henry of Ghent had therefore to find a method and a doctrine. The method was Avicenna's teaching that essences can be seen in an absolute way; the doctrine was the application of this teaching to the transcendentals. To see being in terms of necessity and possibility, and to work out the dialectic of reaching the \textit{necesse esse per se} entirely within the order of essences and without once descending to the world of things, is to proceed to God with \textit{a priori} security. This is what Avicenna taught Henry of Ghent to do, and this is what Henry of Ghent carried out against Aristotle, against his physical world and his empirical view of knowledge, and especially against those universals that have been the trademark of the Aristotelian way of knowing the world and its causes.

If, in historical terms, its anti-Aristotelianism is the most distinctive aspect of Henry of Ghent's way to God, in doctrinal terms the most noticeable mark of the same way is the inclusion of its unique term as part of the proof. There is, and can be, one and only one being that of its own essence is \textit{necesse esse}. Henry needs the designation of this uniqueness as the road sign that he has indeed arrived at God — and not at some Aristotelian substitute. Why, we wonder, does Henry of Ghent display such an anxiety to make sure that he has reached the true and unique God? Is it only the fear of Aristotle, especially the Aristotle of Averroes, whom it became increasingly natural after 1270 for theologians to fear? And why was it that St. Thomas Aquinas, with whom we have so often compared Henry of Ghent, had no fear of Aristotle as an enemy of the Christian Faith, nor any visible anxiety to make sure that his itinerary reached the true God?

Even if these questions have no ready answer, some aspects of the theologies of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent are clear enough. St. Thomas did not think that assimilating the philosophy of Aristotle in the thirteenth century meant a confrontation with the historical Philosopher and his historical teaching. No such problem existed if only because Aristotle had been dead for over fifteen centuries when St. Thomas was teaching. What did "assimilating" Aristotle, then, mean except finding a living role for his philosophy to play in the human organization and expression of Christian thought? Such a living role involved no meeting with an ancient
thinker, save possibly for the followers of Averroes who, identifying philosophy with Aristotle, created the monster of an Aristotle speaking for philosophy century after century from his ancient grave. Such was not the Aristotle of St. Thomas, but such was the Aristotle that Henry of Ghent feared. We can see, here and there, the historical Aristotle in the pages of St. Thomas, but his Philosopher is mainly and deliberately a theological creation — a spokesman for the philosophy that St. Thomas needed and used in his theology. The Aristotle of St. Thomas is already a philosophical pilgrim to the Christian Faith: this is the role that his creator gave him, just as this was a theologian’s answer to the old instruction of Gregory IX to correct Aristotle and then to receive him. By contrast, the Aristotle of Henry of Ghent remains an alien philosophical voice.

Yet their attitudes toward Aristotle explain only part of the differences in temper and doctrine between St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent. St. Thomas is more concerned to assimilate the truths of his opponents — Averroes, for example — even at the price of not always or immediately mentioning their errors. Henry of Ghent needs to arm himself with the truth, and to have an appropriate philosophical ally, before he can face Aristotle; and even then he feels compelled by the needs of truth to demolish the world of Aristotle in its very roots. St. Thomas was conservative in the sense of wishing to assimilate all truth, Henry of Ghent was conservative in the sense of fighting for the truth against error.

Beyond all the differences of age and temper between St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent, however, there lies a purely doctrinal one. St Thomas never transformed an Aristotelian prime mover into a Christian supreme being, nor did he show any anxiety about such doctrines as the divine unity or the divine infinity. Identifying the supreme being as the highest object of human thought, St. Thomas knew from the world that deus est and then he went on to discover that the divine est was a perfect act, the essence of the act of being. The divine goodness, infinity and unity followed for St. Thomas from the perfection of God as ipsum esse subsistens. There cannot be many Gods because Deus comprehendit in se totam perfectionem essendi.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 3. — The controlling text in Sum. Theol., I, qq. 2-11 (and beyond) is q. 3, a. 4, proving that God, as the first being and the first cause, is his own esse. On this basis, St. Thomas then proves that God, as the most actual being, contains the perfections of all things, which means that, as ipsum esse subsistens, God is all-perfect in the sense that nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei esse (q. 4, a. 2). God, therefore, is alone good by his essence because that essence is alone suum esse (q. 6, a. 3). Moreover, God is infinite because he is ipsum esse subsistens (q. 7, a. 1), and he is one and unmultipliable because, not only is he his nature, but he also contains totam perfectionem essendi (q. 11, a. 3). The same doctrine of q. 3, a. 4, be in noted, also commands the origin and the meaning of the idea of creation (q. 44, a. 1).
From this moment on, the unique and incommunicable place of God in being ceases to be a problem for St. Thomas; if he has a problem, it is to remain faithful to the transcendence of such a God. By contrast, the God of Henry of Ghent is a supreme form rather than, in St. Thomas’ sense, a supreme being: to be one God because he is supremely is not a noticeably significant proposition for Henry of Ghent. St. Thomas has a metaphysics in which ens is so named from an actus essendi, whereas in the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent ens is a form, and God as the supreme form needs an identification — unity or infinity — to mark his supremacy. That God is supremely and is therefore one, does not satisfy Henry of Ghent; he wants to say: God is supreme because he is uniquely one. The historian can only wonder whether God as a supreme form is not metaphysically nearer to the supreme prime mover of Aristotle than is St. Thomas’ supreme actuality, just as he must wonder whether St. Thomas, for all his Aristotelianism, is not metaphysically more removed from Aristotle than Henry of Ghent. St. Thomas’ God was one and incommunicable as infinite actuality, Henry’s God needed the internal designation of necessity as the guarantee of his primacy. Indeed, if as a theologian Henry did not see the point of saying that God was one because he was infinite act, he had necessarily to resort to some special designation for God in order to mark and identify his uniqueness. This is what Henry of Ghent did in following, not a way from things, but an a priori highway calculated to point to God’s uniqueness as necesse esse.

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The Malmesbury Medallions and Twelfth Century Typology

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Art historians have usually described medieval cycles of Old Testament subjects as either historical or typological. This distinction gains support from the way the form of medieval biblical cycles appears to commit them to one mode or the other: predominantly historical works like the Sainte-Chapelle windows with their hundreds of scenes encompassing the whole of Old Testament history present subjects in chronological order until the story is completed or space runs out, and typological works like the windows once intact in the choir of Canterbury Cathedral cluster Old Testament subjects without regard to chronology around New Testament events in order to emphasize unities shared outside of time. Thus, an authority like Montague Rhodes James could confidently divide his definitive "Illustration of the Old Testament" along these lines: "Illustration of the Old Testament was of two kinds. The purpose of the first was simply to set forth the events: that of the other was to show the relation of the Old Testament to the New. We may call them respectively the historical and the typical method." 71 Emile Mâle in L'Art Religieux de XIIIe Siècle en France similarly classifies Old Testament cycles as historical or symbolical. 3 Nevertheless, examples of cycles of mixed historical and typological concern do occur, especially in the early middle ages, but throughout the remainder of the period as well. 4 While apparently historical in form, the twelfth century carved medallions of the south porch of Malmesbury Abbey represent such a mixture of concerns. 4

1 Introduction to A Book of Old Testament Illustrations of the Middle of the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1927).
The 25 Old Testament and 13 New Testament subjects of the Malmesbury south porch vousoirs (as opposed to those of the jambs, which treat non-biblical subjects) are chronologically ordered, running from left to right beginning with the inner arch, progressing through the middle arch, and ending with the outer arch. Because of the progressive enlargement of the three arches the subjects of the inner arch are closest to the viewer's eye and he is obviously expected to begin there, moving to the middle and outer arches in their turn. Beginning, then, at the left side of the innermost arch, the viewer sees the following subjects:

1. creation of Adam
2. creation of Eve
3. the prohibition
4. the fall
5. and 6. God rebukes Adam and Eve
6. the expulsion
7. angel provides Adam with spade, Eve with distaff
8. Eve spins, Adam delves
9. birth of Cain? (woman with child on knee; man at right addresses her)
10. death of Cain? (man with staff at left; uncertain shape in center; boy on right — probably death of Cain at hands of Lamech).

Continuing from the left side of the middle arch are the following subjects:

12. God's command to Noah
13. Noah building the ark
14. in the ark
15. sacrifice of Isaac
16. Abraham and the ram
17. God showing the stars to Abraham? (nimbed figure at left pointing at mass on upper right; seated headless figure with staff on right)
18. Moses and the burning bush
19. Moses striking the rock
20. Moses receives the Law
21. Samson slaying the lion
22. Samson carrying the gates of Gaza
23. Samson and the columns of the temple
24. David slaying the bear
25. David and Goliath

has in fact viewed the Malmesbury cycle as such a mixture of historical and typological motives, though his observations are set out in very general terms: "Almost certainly there is a typological relationship between the scenes: thus the story of the Fall is matched by scenes of salvation, the Ark, Abraham and the Angels, Moses, the heroism of Samson and David, of which the life of Christ is the fulfilment: and within the main statement there are more detailed comparisons, Moses striking the Rock with the Last Supper, Samson and the gates of Gaza with Christ rising from the Tomb" (p. 209). For reasons which will become clear in the course of this article, I disagree with the conception of a series of planned typological relations between the Old Testament and New Testament sections of the cycle.
Continuing from the left side of the outer arch are the following New Testament subjects:

26. the annunciation  
27. the nativity  
28. the annunciation to the three shepherds? (lower parts of three figures; from drapery, all appear to be looking to the right)  
29. the three magi with gifts  
30. the presentation at the temple  
31. baptism of Christ? (figure on left may be pouring; space for figures in middle, on right; possible font in front center)  
32. entry into Jerusalem  
33. last supper  
34. crucifixion  
35. entombment  
36. resurrection  
37. ascension  
38. pentecost

The form of the cycle is obviously linear or historical, and its chronological movement is never violated in order to permit special juxtapositions of the sort which characterized such explicitly typological works as the Canterbury Cathedral windows. This form is consistent with the finding of K. J. Galbraith that the medallions stand in the generally historical tradition of the Cottonian Genesis and, more particularly, of the illustrations of Aelfric’s Anglo-Saxon paraphrase of the Pentateuch and Joshua (Cotton MS Claudius E. IV). On the other hand, the Malmesbury medallions show a degree of selectivity which sets them apart from these and other historical works with which they are most closely associated. The Aelfric manuscript is illustrated with over 400 subjects ending with Joshua’s burial of the bones of Joseph while the Malmesbury Old Testament carvings number only 25, of which ten (including the five concluding subjects from Samson and David) have no counterparts in the Aelfric manuscript. The question of how the planners of the medallions or of lost intermediate sources selected their subjects from the range of possibility represented by such works as the Aelfric manuscript remains unanswered.


The inclusion of the first seven Malmesbury subjects, running from the creation of Adam through the expulsion, can be explained in several ways. All seven subjects have parallels in the Aelfric manuscript. Even if no parallels existed, the presence of the first seven Malmesbury subjects would still fulfill the important expository motive of making sense of the redemption by showing its necessity. Such diverse artistic and literary works as the St. Albans Psalter, the Sainte-Geneviève Passion Play, and Arnould Greban's *Mystère de la Passion* all include Old Testament prefaces of similar scope, and Greban presumably speaks for all the planners of such cycles when he says that he included the creation as an essential foundation for what comes after ("uego mistere en quoy se fonde/ tout ce qui depend en apprêts" — p. 6). On the other hand, Greban moves directly from the fall to subjects from the New Testament, omitting scenes from the patriarchs lest they distract attention from the matter at hand ("qui nos tendroit trop/ a ce que nous avons a faire" — p. 24), while the Malmesbury cycle continues beyond the fall into such apparently optional scenes as those of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Samson, and David. Miss Galbraith suggests that the rationale of these scenes is the depiction of "incidents from the lives of five of the righteous men of the Old Testament" (p. 44), but why these five men and why these scenes from their lives? Some instinct for historical completion may well be at work here, but I know of no source to account for it and no historical scheme to explain it. Whatever historical considerations prompted the extension of the Malmesbury cycle into scenes from Noah through David, though, the choice of the individual subjects of this section was probably influenced by twelfth-century conceptions of Old Testament typology. I base this conclusion partly on evidence outside the cycle, and I realize that such evidence must be used with caution. After all, almost every scene in the Old Testa-

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8 Schemes of the ages of the world, as expounded by Augustine (*Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, Bk. XII, sec. viii; PL 42, 257), Gregory (*Breviarium ad Usum Insignis Ecclesie Eboracensis*, The Publications of the Surtees Society, 71: I [Edinburgh, 1880], col. 235), and others, offer a precedent for a treatment of Old Testament subjects at once historical and selective. But despite the flexibility of such schemes (the number of ages could range from three to eight), none accords well with the design of the Malmesbury cycle. Although Noah, Abraham, Moses, and David all appear in one or another of the schemes, the subjects from Samson are completely anomalous. For background on the ages of the world and their possible use as an organizing principle of the Middle English mystery cycles, see Adeline M. Jenney, "A Further Word as to the Origin of the Old Testament Plays," *MP*, 13 (1915), 59-64 and Kolve, *The Play Called Corpus Christi*, 88-100.
ment was interpreted typologically at one time or another in such works as Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* and *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, Isidore’s *Allegoriae quaedam Scripturae Sacrae*, the *Glossa Ordinaria*, and the Victorine *Allegoriae in Vetus Testamentum*. Anyone seeking to establish typological influence in a particular work must not simply ask himself whether a subject was ever known as a type, but whether it was known as a type in a particular place at a particular time. Fortunately, a remarkably large and reliable body of evidence remains to aid decisions about which types might have been known in Malmesbury in the late twelfth century. These materials fall into three general categories. The first is a manuscript entitled *Pictor in Carmine*, a popular twelfth century collection of 138 New Testament subjects and 508 associated types explicitly designed to provide inspiration for artistic representation. The second consists of two manuscripts describing the related typological inscriptions accompanying the twelfth century paintings formerly in the choir at Peterborough and the inscriptions accompanying the early thirteenth century windows of the choir of Canterbury Cathedral. The third consists of a late twelfth or early thirteenth century Worcester manuscript which probably records the verses on biblical types and antitypes which accompanied paintings formerly in the chapter house at Worcester, the related typological illustrations of Eton MS 177, and the related subjects and inscriptions of the twelfth century Warwick, Malmesbury, and Balfour (or Kennet) ciboria. In order to get some impression of the popularity of each of the Malmesbury Old Testament subjects as a type, I have compared it with the list of subjects of one inclusive

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9 Ed. M. R. James, *Archaeologia*, 94 (1951), 141-166. James finds numerous parallels in subject matter (though not in the wording of accompanying inscriptions) between *Pictor* and the contemporary cycles of Peterborough and Canterbury (p. 148), though I am not convinced by his evidence that the cycles are at all closely related.


13 Published in M. Chamot, *English Medieval Enamels* (London, 1930). The subjects of the three ciboria overlap but do not entirely agree. All of the inscriptions are, however, to be found among the verses of the Worcester MS. While the relationship of the three ciboria to the Eton MS is not so close, their designs are noticeably similar to those of the Eton MS. The Worcester MS, the Eton MS, and the three ciboria are clearly descended from a common ancestor, though intermediate sources have surely in some cases been lost.
work in each of these three categories: *Pictor in Carmine*, the Canterbury inscriptions, the verses from the Worcester manuscript.

The first eleven Malmesbury subjects (ranging from the creation of Adam through the death of Cain) had little contemporary currency as types. Only three appear at all in the three typological works I have singled out for comparison: the creation of Adam appears in *Pictor* as a type of the nativity; the creation of Eve appears in *Pictor* as a type of the perforation of Christ's side; the fall appears in *Pictor* and among the Canterbury inscriptions as a type of the temptations of Christ. Furthermore, the narrative interest of each of the three subjects appears to overshadow any significance it might have had as a type. Although the fall is named twice as a type of the temptation of Christ, its more general implications as a necessary prelude to redemption far overshadow any anticipation of the temptation. This lack of interest in typology among the first eleven subjects should, however, come as no surprise. I have already argued that similar groupings of subjects are commonly presented in non-typological works as a minimal historical preface to New Testament events. In fact, even the pointedly typological Eton MS 177 begins with a similar historical preface, treating the story of Genesis through the death of Abel before moving on to a series of New Testament antitypes flanked by Old Testament types.

The next nine subjects (God's command to Noah through Moses receives the Law) had more circulation as types. God's command to Noah and Noah building the ark do not appear in any of the typological works to which I have referred, but both are in a sense subordinate to the scene of Noah and his family in the ark, which appears among the Canterbury and Worcester inscriptions as a type of the baptism of Christ. Similarly, Abraham and the ram and God showing the stars to Abraham do not appear in any of the typological works, but the sacrifice of Isaac appears in *Pictor* and the Worcester MS as a type of the crucifixion. All three of the Moses subjects were generally known as types. Moses and the burning bush appears in *Pictor* as a type of the incarnation, among the Canterbury inscriptions as a type of the annunciation, and among the Worcester inscriptions as a type of the nativity — all different antitypes but all obviously related. Moses striking the rock appears in *Pictor* as a type of the perforation of Christ's side. Moses receives the Law appears in *Pictor* and among the Canterbury inscriptions as a type of the Sermon on the Mount, though the scene was also generally accorded a very broad typological significance, with the Old Law itself and the entire world of the Old Law seen as promise and the New Law and the world of the New Law seen as fulfillment of the promise. As Adam of St. Victor declares,
Lex est umbra futurorum,
Christus finis promissorum,
Qui consummat omnia.14

Each of the remaining five subjects (from Samson and David) had widely recognized typological significance. Samson slaying the lion appears among the Canterbury and Worcester inscriptions as a type of the harrowing of hell. Samson carrying the gates of Gaza appears in Pictor and among the Canterbury and Worcester inscriptions as a type of the harrowing of hell. Samson and the columns of the temple is an extremely rare subject, but it does appear in Pictor as a type of the crucifixion—both Samson and Christ having prevailed over their enemies in death. David rescuing the lamb from the bear, like Samson slaying the lion, appears among the Canterbury and Worcester inscriptions as a type of the deliverance of the patriarchs from hell. David's victory over Goliath appears in Pictor as a type of both the harrowing of hell and the temptation of Christ and among the Canterbury inscriptions in the latter sense.

The simplest conclusion to be drawn from the frequent occurrence of popular twelfth century types in the later sections of the Malmesbury Old Testament cycle is that the contemporary popularity of certain subjects as types made them particularly eligible for inclusion. The Malmesbury cycle is more selective in subject matter than its known antecedents, and planners of the cycle or lost sources might have favored the most visible subjects when composing the segment running from Noah through David. Contemporary popularity seems especially likely to have had such a determining influence in the cases of subjects of comparatively dim historical significance like Moses striking the rock (as opposed to Moses receives the Law) or the Samson scenes (as opposed to subjects from Solomon or elsewhere which might have taken their place).

More ambitious explanations of the way in which twelfth century typology shaped the Malmesbury cycle should not be ruled out. The effect of so many popular types on an audience accustomed to typology must have been to bind the Old Testament subjects to the New with a series of veiled promises of Christ's victory over Satan. Perhaps the planners of the cycle even deliberately concentrated typological subjects at the end of the Old Testament cycle in order to achieve the transitional effect managed in other cycles with processions of prophets and Jesse trees.15 With these speculations,

14 Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi (Leipzig, 1915), 54, no. 149.
15 All four English mystery cycles move from plays dealing with Moses through processions of prophets to the Annunciation, and the Leutus Coventriae includes a genealogy of Jesse as well. See The Chester Plays, EEETS, ES, 62 (1893) and 115 (1916); the York Plays (Oxford, 1885); The Twayne-
however, the search for a typological explanation for the form of the Malmesbury cycle must end. A look at the cycle as a whole shows that its planner had no interest whatever in establishing a balanced correspondence between Old Testament types and New Testament antitypes. The New Testament segment of the cycle has fewer subjects than the Old Testament segment, and was probably chosen from a different source or at least formed in accordance with a less ambitious plan. Its subjects seem mainly liturgical in origin, centering on the principal commemorations of the liturgical calendar. It ends like the liturgy itself, with pentecost and the descent of the holy spirit rather than the last judgment and the end of time. So slender is the typological connection of the New Testament cycle to the Old that the New Testament cycle even omits the harrowing of hell, the common antitype of four of the five Samson-David subjects. Obviously, typological exegesis alone does not offer a complete understanding of the form of the Malmesbury cycle.

Yet even if the Old Testament subjects of the Malmesbury cycle are not linked to the New Testament subjects by any clear system of typological correspondences, the preponderance of popular types among the Old Testament subjects remains. If not elevated to the status of a formal principle, twelfth century typology was evidently important enough to the planner of an historical cycle to influence its subject matter. Thus, in the case of the Malmesbury cycle, our modern distinction between historical and typological approaches to biblical illustration seems a hindrance to full understanding.

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Iey Plays, EETS, ES, 71 (1897); the Ludus Coventriae, EETS, ES, 120 (1922). This pattern is not confined to English drama. See, for example, Bibl. Nat. MS fr. 904, summarized in L. Petit de Julleville, Les Mystères (Paris, 1880), II 413-415. Other works — such as the liturgy itself, with its identification of Joshua and Christ at the end of the Matins responses for the fourth week of Quadragesima — use typology as a way of effecting the same transition. See the Liber Responsalii, PL, 78, 725 ff., and Brevarium ad Usum Insignis Ecclesie Eboracensis, Sturttes Society, 71: 1, cols. 334-335. In the St. Louis Psalter or MS Lat. 76A of the Bibliothèque de l’Université de Leyde, three Samson subjects identical to those of the Malmesbury cycle may play such a transitional role: they are preceded by scenes of the creation, fall, slaying of Abel, Noah, Abraham, and (an unusual but appropriate subject for the end of the narrative section of an Old Testament cycle) Joseph sold by his brothers into captivity, and followed by New Testament scenes beginning with the annunciation and ending with Christ in glory. See M. Omont, Miniatures du Psautier de S. Louis, in Codices Graeci et Latini, Supplementum II (Leyden, 1902).
“Liber de dulia et latria”

of

Master Michael, Papal Notary

NICHOLAS M. HARING S.A.C.

The Liber de dulia et latria written by the papal notary, Master Michael, is preserved in MS Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1721, f. 29-31. The small volume which is described as “manuscrit de 33 feuillets tirant sur la gothique, à longues lignes, avec titres et initiales” was written in the early 13th century and includes the De miseria humanae conditionis (f. 2-29) of Cardinal Lotario, later Pope Innocent III (1198-1216). It belonged to the Bouhier collection where its pressmark was E. 96. The introduction reads: “Incipit prologus libri magistri Michaelis, notarii domini pape, de dulia et latria. Reuerendo patri et domino Albino, Albanensi episcopo, domini pape uicario, Michael, notarius domini pape, hoc compendium salutare”.

Since the last signature of Cardinal Albinus to whom the short tract is dedicated occurs in a letter dated 12 July 1196 it is assumed that Albinus died in 1196 or 1197. He had become bishop of Albano in the early summer of 1189. Hence Master Michael must have written his Liber de dulia et latria between 1189 and 1196/7. We shall see that this period can be narrowed down to ca. 1190.

In his study of the papal legates in France from 1130 to 1198 W. Janssen states that in December 1195 a certain Master Michael presided over a synod held at Montpellier attended by all the bishops of the diocese of Narbonne. Janssen suggests that this Master Michael was a canon of the cathedral chapter of Maguelone whose name, as he notes, occurs in a char-

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4 He was ursius pope since 1187/8. P. F. Kehr, Italia pontificia 4 (Berlin, 1909) 10, nos. 5-6.
5 Die päpstlichen Legaten in Frankreich vom Schisma Anatlets II. bis zum Tode Coelestius III. (1130-1198), in: Kölner historische Studien 6 (Cologne, 1961) 148.
6 Ibid.: “Magister Michael, der vielleicht mit einem gleichnamigen Kanoniker von Maguelone identisch ist”.

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ter issued about 1196. It lists a Master Michael among the witnesses though it does not clearly indicate whether he was a member of the chapter. The list of witnesses is headed by “Guy, provost of Maguelone”, also known as Guy de Ventadour (1191-1208). His name is followed by that of the archdeacon Peter of Aigrefeuille. Also named as witness is the Archpriest Peter of Lunel who was one of the canons. Then follow the names of Master Michael and John Roquefeuille. The latter acted as witness among the canons of Maguelone on 29 May 1194.

Although the last two witnesses are not explicitly described as canons of Maguelone, there are other records to show that they were actually members of the cathedral chapter. Thus in October 1192 Bishop William Raymond of Maguelone (1191-1195) issued a charter “drawn up in the presence of Guy, Provost of Maguelone, Archdeacon P(eter) of Aigrefeuille, Archpriest P(eter) of Lunel, Michael, John of Roquefeuille, Ponce of Cournon, Gerald, P. Calvet, canons...” The fact that Michael’s name is again found between the names of P. of Lunel and John of Roquefeuille would seem to indicate that Master Michael and Canon Michael are one and the same person.

In the previous year (June 1191) an agreement between William of Montpellier and Adhemar of Murviel was witnessed among others by “Guy de Ventadour, Prior of Saint-Firmin”, the canons B. of Biaude, Olricus, G.-B. Julian, B(ernard) of Frontignan, Ferrerius, and P. Calvet. Michael’s name does not appear in a charter drawn up in 1193 listing some 34 canons as witnesses. When on 25 November 1194 Celestine III (1191-1198) ratified a transaction made by Bishop William

8 Cf. Gallia christiana 6 (Paris, 1739) 825AE; Cl. Devic and J. Vaisselle, Hist. gén. du Languedoc 8 (Toulouse, 1879) 423; 428; 525.
9 He signed a charter on 8 February 1210 (Gall. christ. 6, 366B) and died as bishop of Béziers on 6 July 1212 (Hist. gén. du Languedoc 8, 260) after attending a synod at Narbonne on 30 April 1212 (Hist. gén. 8, 619).
10 Hist. gén. du Languedoc 8, 423; 428; 526.
11 Ibid., 8, 428.
12 Ibid., 8, 428, no. 86.
13 J. Rouquette and A. Villemagne, Cart. de l’église de Maguelone 1 (Montpellier, 1912) 388, no. 215.
14 Saint Firmin was one of the two parishes of Montpellier.
15 A. Germain, Liber instrumentorum memorialis: Cartulaire des Guiliems de Montpellier (Montpel-lier, 1884-86) 754.
of Maguelone and his provost, he inserted in his letter the text of an agreement reached in November 1192. We learn from the inserted text that controversial issues were settled by Master Andrew, sacristan of Maguelone, and Peter Luciani, jurisconsult, with the assistance of Peter Bertulf, archdeacon of Maguelone, Canon Michael, and Master Guy”. However, these officials did not act as witnesses. It would appear that the sacristan Master Andrew, who acted as mediator in 1192, died before the end of 1193 and that Canon Michael was made master, a title found in the charter dated about 1196. That this Master Michael should have presided over a synod must be considered extremely unlikely.

Another Master Michael may be mentioned in this context. On 23 July 1196 Pope Celestine approved an accord reached in April 1196 between the commander of the Knights Templar of Montpellier and the provost of Maguelone. The archbishop of Arles, Imbert of Aiguières (1190-1202), was called upon to arbitrate. The text of the agreement is of particular interest to us in view of the introduction in which we read: “The said archbishop, assisted by Master Michael, sacristan of Arles, P. Aldebert, advocate of Aix, Master Nicholas Raymund of Montels, Peter Petit... have decided that...”. P. Piolin identifies this Master Michael with Master Michael of Maguelone. But the identification would have to be based on the assumption that the cathedral chapter of Maguelone had two members called Michael, for a canon Michael is named in the same document among the witnesses for Maguelone: “And I, Guy, provost of Maguelone, and I Peter of Aigrefeuille, archdeacon, and I, Michael, and I, W. of Autignac, praise and confirm...”.

The available evidence justifies the conclusion that about the time of the synod of Montpellier (December 1195) there was a Canon Michael in the

16 Hist. gén. 8, 423, no. 82. A Master William is mentioned in the text.
17 J. Rouquette and A. Villemagne, Bullaire de l'église de Maguelone 1 (Montpellier, 1911) 211, no. 130. Master Guy was the Founder of the Knights Hospitalers of the Holy Spirit (1195). He died in Rome in 1208. M. Heimbucher, Die Orden und Kongregationen der kath. Kirche 1 (Paderborn, 1933) 417-419.
18 Bullaire 1, 214, no. 130.
19 The charter of April-November 1193 gives the abbreviation B. for the new sacristan. Hist. gén. 8, 423, no. 82.
20 Cartul. de Maguelone 1, 430, no. 242.
21 Bullaire de Maguelone 1, 222-226, no. 135.
23 Bullaire 1, 223, no. 135.
25 Bullaire 1, 225, no. 1351.
cathedral chapter of Maguelone who was appointed master after April 1196.26 At the same time there was a Master Michael at Arles.27 This Master Michael was Michael of Morèze (Hérault) whose name is found among the canons of Maguelone witnessing charters in November 1182 and on 1 July 1187.28 As late as 16 December 1236, 5 November 1240, and April 1255 a Michael of Morèze was among the archdeacons of Maguelone.29 Master Michael of Arles became archbishop of Arles in 1203 and died in 1217.30 No historian has ever suggested that he presided over the synod of Montpellier.

It may finally be noted that Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) had a scriptor called Master Michael. On 9 December 1252 the pope addressed a letter to him: Magistro Michaeli scriptori nostro, plebano S. Iohannis Vena, et Hugoni capellano...31 This Master Michael and papal scriptor was at that time a parish priest in the vicinity of Pisa and probably no longer active at the papal curia. He had been a procurator (1245-1250) at the Roman curia for Archbishop Vitalis of Pisa (1218-1252), the cathedral chapter, and the entire clergy of the diocese.32 One cannot imagine that this Michael should have been a papal legate in 1195.

The synod of Montpellier in December 1195 was convoked and presided over by a certain Master Michael as papal legate. Its resolutions and decisions ranged over a large variety of such topics as the Truce of God, heresy,

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26 In 1193 (April-November) a Master Michael is recorded among the canons of Maguelone. \textit{Hist. gén. de Languedoc} 8, 423, no. 82. He signed charters in June 1192 (\textit{Cartul. de Maguelone} 1, 385, no. 213) and in November 1193 (\textit{Liber instrumentorum} 90, no. 49). A Master Andrew signed a charter in November 1192 (\textit{Bullaire} 1, 211, no. 130). For the years 1181 and 1189 a Master Stephen is recorded. \textit{Cartul.} 1, 320, no. 175 (27 March 1181); 327, no. 177 (September 1181); 339, no. 199 (1189). During that period (1180-1190) Master Duranus was the bishop's "special notary public". \textit{Cartul.} 1, 361, no. 200; \textit{Liber instrumentorum} 271, no. 137.

27 His name appears also in a decretal of 31 December 1198 (\textit{Bullaire} 1, 253-256, no. 150) in which Innocent III (\textit{Reg. Epp.} I, 507; PL 214, 467C-470A). A. Potthast, \textit{Reg.} 515 approves an agreement reached in April 1197 by Archbishop Imbert. Canon Michael of Maguelone is mentioned in the same document. \textit{Bullaire} 1, 255.

28 \textit{Liber instrumentorum} 241, no. 106: Huius voluntatis... sunt testes... Petrus de Acrofolio, Michael de Morezen, canonici Magalonenses. \textit{Liber instr.} 745, no. 556: Testes sunt... Michael de Moreze, Ugo de Umlis canonici. \textit{Gall. chr.} 1, 565.


30 \textit{Gall. chr.} 1, 565C. P. B. Gams, Series 494.


piracy, the delivery of arms to the Saracens, usury, the study of secular law and physics by clerics, laymen as well as women.\textsuperscript{33} The introduction to the document drawn up by the synod reads: Anno dominice Incarnationis MCXCV mense decembris cum uenerabiles pontifices quorum nomina subscriptur et ali prii ecclesiarum provincie Narbonensis de mandato Magistri Michaelis, uenerabiles Apostolice Sedis legati, apud Montepessulanum pro celebrando concilio per se ipsos et inter nuncios conuenissent, ipsae legatus de assensu omnium uniuersea que sequuntur ita instituit...\textsuperscript{34}

One wonders if the term \textit{venerabilis} might not suggest the venerability of age as well as office. \textit{Étienne Baluze}, the first editor of the document,\textsuperscript{35} makes the suggestion that, acting as a legate of Celestine III, Master Michael may have been on his way to or from Spain. Although W. Janssen\textsuperscript{36} claims that there is no evidence connecting Master Michael with Spain there are good reasons in favour of Baluze who points to a letter of Innocent III to King Sancho I of Portugal.\textsuperscript{37} In this letter, written at St. Peter’s on 24 April 1196, Innocent reminds the king of certain annual tributes promised by his father Alfonso I. Master Michael whom, as the letter tells us, Clement III (1187-1191) had sent to Spain carried a letter to be delivered to the king of Portugal. The reference to Master Michael reads: “Cumque id felicis recordationis Clementi pape predecessori nostro relatum fuisset, magistro Michaeli, uunc ecclesie Romane notario, quem ad partes Hispanie desinaret per suas dedit litteras in mandatis ut te ad solucundum censum annuum monere diligentius et inducere procuraret et, si opus esset, auctoritate fretus apostolica compellere non differret”.\textsuperscript{38}

This delegation took place under Pope Clement III who died in March, 1191. We do not know how long Master Michael stayed in Spain or Portugal. Hence it is possible that he called the synod on his way back from Spain. It is, however, much more likely that Celestine III sent Master Michael from Rome to convoke the synod of Montpellier. At the time of Master Michael’s mission to Spain, as Pope Celestine recalls, he was a notary of the


\textsuperscript{34} Mansi 22, 667D.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Concilia Galliae Narbonensis} (Paris, 1668) 28-38; Mansi 22, 671CD. The manuscript was preserved in Montpellier whose bishop, François de Bosquet (1657-1676), authorized Baluze to publish it.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Die päpstlichen Legaten} 148: “Dagegen spricht freilich, dass er dort nicht die geringste Spur hinterlassen hat”.

\textsuperscript{37} Mansi 22, 671D.

Roman Church. But the synod was called “de mandato Magistri Michaelis, uenerabilis Apostolice Sedis legati”. The legate was so concerned about the political situation in Spain that he granted special privileges to all those who volunteered to go to Spain to combat the Saracens.39

Pope Innocent’s remark that at the time of his mission to Spain and Portugal Master Michael was a notary of the Holy See suggests that at a later date he was given a different office. It is known that all notaries in the chancery of Gregory VIII (21 October to 17 December 1187) were removed from office by his successor Clement III (1187-1191).40 Hence Master Michael must have been appointed by Clement III, but nothing is known of a later promotion. He may have been dead when Innocent wrote (24 April 1198) to King Sancho I, but the wording of the letter does not suggest it. It seems certain, however, that Master Michael did not become a cardinal.41

This same Master Michael must be the author of the short treatise entitled: De dulia et latria. Since it is dedicated to Cardinal Albinus, bishop of Albano and papal vicar, the tract was not addressed to the cardinal before the early summer of 1189, for his consecration took place between 18 May and 6 June 1189, the date of his first signature as bishop of Albano.42 The cardinal’s last known signature is dated 12 July 1196.43

Our Master Michael calls himself notarius domini pape. According to E. Eichmann44 the specification domini pape does not imply a particularly personal and close relationship to the pope. Nor does it denote that the notarius belonged to the papal household to the same degree as, for instance, the camerarius. The title was used to distinguish the pope’s notary from his colleagues in the Emperor’s curia. Accordingly, Master Michael would have been one of some six or seven scriptores employed at the papal chancery.45 This interpretation of the title has been questioned by P. Herde46 who interprets the term in the sense that, at least in the thirteenth century, it designates a papal official obligated to the pope by oath. As a rule, the

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39 Mansi 22, 669A.
43 Jaffe 17416.
46 Beiträge 6.
papal notarius or scriptor was in the entourage of the pope, though it has been noticed that under Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) and his successor Lucius III (1181-1185) three citizens of Orléans are called scriptores domini pape by Stephen, abbot of Sainte-Geneviève.\footnote{47 H. Bresslau, Handbuch 1, 213; Stephen of Tournaï, Epp. 65, 85; 92; PL 211, 356B; 380C; 385B.}

In view of this fact the title notarius domini pape may not necessarily mean that the holder of the title lived in the pope’s entourage. The wording in Pope Innocent’s letter to Sancho (tunc ecclesie Romane notario) seems to imply that the title was attached to the office rather than to the person and that at some date before 24 April 1198 Master Michael ceased being a notarius domini pape.

It is possible to show evidence of Master Michael’s close relationship with Cardinal Albinus. The cardinal is the author of the Gesta pauperis scolaris Albini (MS Vat. Ottob. lat. 3057, f. 1-126) which is considered one of the major sources of the Liber censuum in MS Vat. lat. 8496, a tax book composed in 1192 by the papal chamberlain Censis, later Pope Honorius III.\footnote{48 V. Pfaff, “Der Liber censuum von 1192,” Vierteljahrschr. für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 44 (1957) 78-96; 105-120; 220-242; 324-351.} Accordingly, the date of Master Michael’s treatise can be narrowed down to 1189-1192.

Cardinal Albinus tells us in his Gesta pauperis scolaris that as a student he was too poor to purchase books. But in his eagerness to learn he copied excerpts from various authors on pieces of parchment (f. 1) and many years later decided to order and unite them “in mundo quaternorum” for the benefit of any poor student who could not afford to buy books. The numerous excerpts (f. 2-34v) which follow the introduction are primarily concerned with the question of “cult and adoration”. All patristic texts found in Master Michael’s tract are also found in the cardinal’s Gesta (f. 2-5v).

There is no doubt that the texts are quoted much more accurately by Albinus. Master Michael, for example, wrongly attributes to Augustine a text which Albinus introduces by Idem, referring rightly to Pope Gregory I. Quoting from Pope Gregory’s letter to Serenus of Marseilles Albinus notes that the passage is found “in epistola lxxviii libro xiii”. Master Michael does not mention this. Albinus points out that one excerpt is from “Augustinus de ciuitate dei in libro octauo”. According to Master Michael the text is found “in libro de ciuitate domini”. The passage which Albinus rightly attributes to St. Augustine’s commentary on Psalms (as found in Lombard’s Sentences) is also attributed to Augustine by Master Michael but no reference is made to Augustine’s commentary on the Psalms.
It is obvious that Albinus did not derive his excerpts from Master Michael's tract. At the same time it seems unfair to conclude that Master Michael copied his texts from the cardinal's Gesta, for he states in his introduction: "The other day, during the second half of Holy Week, when I was free from notarial duties I made an effort to gather together in some sort of compendium things that are found in divers places concerning the latria and dulia required at certain times and in certain circumstances. If you, to whom the office of preaching has been assigned, find anything useful in it you may at the opportune time pass the information on to the citizens of Rome and others".

On the basis of this introduction it appears unbelievable that Master Michael should have copied his texts from the cardinal's own Gesta. Hence we may be inclined to assume that he made use of the source used by Cardinal Albinus. But Master Michael's remark that he compiled a sort of compendium of texts found in many places does not support the assumption of a florilegium used by both.

Master Michael's personal contribution to the problem of latria and dulia is not very impressive. Alluding to Is. 17: 7 he begins his tract by saying that man will look to his Maker, he will look no more to the altars, the work of his hands. As Master Michael tells us, there are people who claim that the statues and images of the Saviour and of the Saints are to be adored in the same manner. 49 These people, he warns, should read in the works of Augustine and Ambrose how to proceed in this matter. 50 We then learn that the reason why, as a rule, statues (imagines) are found in the churches is given by Pope Gregory in his letter to Serenus of Marseilles who had destroyed statues (imagines) when he realized that some people adored them. 51 Master Michael holds with Pope Gregory that statues or picture (imaginibus uel picture) must not be destroyed. He advises that they should be placed "in locis venerabilibus" and truly honoured in the fashion described by the poet. 52 This is confirmed by a passage from St. Augustine. 53

Master Michael concludes that if we are not allowed to adore angels and human beings it is hard to understand how some inexperienced clerics and laymen can adore inanimate things that are deprived of reason. 54 They object saying that some liturgical texts read: "We adore your cross, we adore the sign of the cross" and they answer that the word "cross"

49 Liber de dulia 1.
50 Ibid. 2-3.
51 Ibid. 4.
52 Ibid. 6.
53 Ibid. 7.
54 Ibid. 8.
stands for “the crucified one”. Master Michael replies that we should adore God in the same manner as Abraham did who “saw three but adored one”. To learn how to adore “Christ’s flesh” we should read what Augustine says. The texts Master Michael now offers us are found not only in Lombard’s Sentences but also in the cardinal’s Gesta pauperis scolarii.

Master Michael’s short tract is found in MS Troyes 1721, f. 29-31. According to the catalogue the manuscript was written at the end of the 12th century. There are indications that it was written at a slightly later date. It contains the De miseria humane conditionis of Pope Innocent III (f. 2-29) preceded by a list of the chapter headings (1-1v). Master Michael’s treatise ends in line 13 of f. 31 and is followed by a short collection of sentences from Augustine, Fabian, Bede, and others, written by a different hand (f. 31-32). On f. 32v there is a text (21 lines) beginning with Archai triplex. A later hand has added the statement: “In nomine domini Amen. Anno incarnationis eiusdem Millesimo ducentesimo nonag. tercio”. The manuscript probably belonged to the abbey of Clairvaux before it became part of the Bouhier collection.

LISTER MAGISTRI MICHAELIS DE DULIA ET LATRIA

Incipit prologus libri Magistri Michaelis, notarii domini pape, de dulia et latria, Reuendo patri et domino Albino, Albanensi episcopo, domini pape utcario. Michael, notarius domini pape, hoc compendium salutare.

Nuper ab officio notandi uacans in Sacro Triduo Septimane penose quedam de latria et dulia quae tempori et loco necessaria occurrunt (et) in locis multis legi posunt que respersa sub quodam compendio colligere studui et uobis quibus datum est officium predicandi si qua hic utilia uideritis ea tempore opportuno Romanis ciuiibus et alis intimentis. Explicit prologus. Incipit liber [f. 29v]:

1 Inclinabit se homo ad Factorem suum, non ad altaria que fecerunt manus eius. Quidam enim sunt qui imaginem Salvatoris aut Sanctorum indifferenter astruent adorandas.
2 Legant isti in scripturis Augustini et Ambrosii qualler sit eis procedendum in hiis. Ait enim Augustinus in Epistola ad Secund(in)um inclusum: “Scimus quia ymaginem

55 Ibid. 9.
56 Ibid. 10.
57 Ibid. 11-13.
59 The reading multis legi is uncertain.
60 Cf. Gen. 24, 26 and L. 17, 7: in illa die inclinabitur homo ad Factorem suum... et non inclinabitur ad altaria quae fecerunt manus eius.
62 Quia ymaginem: quia tu ymaginem Gregory, Albirius.
Saluatoris non: Saluatoris nostri non Gregory, Albinus.

Ut pro deo aut quasi: ut quasi Gregory.

Dei ut in: dei in Gregory.

Reualescas cum: realescas cuius Gregory, Albinus.

Prosternimus: prosternimur Gregory, Albinus.

Demulcit: emulcat Gregory.

Oration de obitu Theodosii 45–46; PL 16, 1464B: Habeat Helena... Gesta Albin., f. 5v: Ambrosius

instead of habet or habeat Master Michael reads: A beata...

In ligno qui sicut: in ligno scriptus in titulo illum inquam qui sicut Ambrose.


Quosdam ymagines adorare consciens: quosdam ymaginum adoratores aspciens Gregory.

Easdem... proiecit: easdem ecclesiis imagines confregit atque proiecit Gregory.

Ab ecclesiis: ex ecclesiis Albinus.

Equidem: et Albinus.

Zelum... laudamus: zelum te habuisse ne quid manufactum adorari posset laudamus Albinus.

Habetur: adhibetur Gregory.

Illos: illa Gregory.

Eorum: earum Albinus.

Peccaret: peccaret Albinus.

Gregory I, Ep. XI, 10; MGH Ep. 2, 270 (to Serenus of Marseilles). Gesta Albin., f. 5: Idem (= Gregory): Aliud est....
addiscere.\textsuperscript{83} Que magnopere tu\textsuperscript{84} qui inter gentes habitas attendere debuisti\textsuperscript{85} ne dum incaute recto zelo succedebaris\textsuperscript{86} ferocioribus animis scandalum generares. Frangi ergo non debuit quod non adorandum\textsuperscript{87} in ecclesiis sed ad instruendum\textsuperscript{88} solummodo mentes nescientium fuit collatum.\textsuperscript{89} Et quia in locis venerabilibus cepin¬
gi sanctorum ystorias non sine ratione uetustatis\textsuperscript{90} admisit si zelum discretionis condisse sine dubio et ea que intendebas salubriter obtinere et collectum gregem non disperegere sed\textsuperscript{91} congregare potuisti\textsuperscript{92} ut pastoris in te meritum nomen excellenter non culpa incumberet dispersoris”.

6 Nimirum ymages uel picture frangi non debent sed in locis collocari venerabilibus et ut conuenit honorari iuxta illud:\textsuperscript{88}

Effigiem Christi qui transis pronus honora
Non tamen\textsuperscript{84} effigiem sed quem designat adora.
Nec deus est nec homo presens quem cernis ymago
Sed deus est et homo quem sacra figurat ymago
Vt utuo Christo qui mortuus est homo pro te
Vivus et mundo moriaris cur moneo te
Sic tamen o sapiens me quem ut cernes honores
Vt Christum qui te per me saluauit adores
Quod credis sane signum crucis istud honora
Sed cruce confinxum dominum quasi seruus adora.
Nam quociens cernis signum crucis inde meneris
In cruce qui mortem pro te tulit ut memor eris.

7 Ad hec denique sicut Augustinus\textsuperscript{88} ait in libro \textit{De ciuitate domini}: “Nec nos martyribus templam sacerdotia sacra et sacrificia constitutimus quoniam non ipsi sed deos eorum\textsuperscript{89} nobis est deus. Honoramus sanc membras eorum tanquam sanctorum hominum dei qui usque ad mortem corporum suorum pro ueritatem certarunt ut innotescit\textsuperscript{90} uera religio falsis fictisque convicis qui eciam si quid\textsuperscript{90} antea sentiebant timendo

\textsuperscript{83} Addiscere que magnopere: addiscere nam quod legentibus scriptura ... pro lectione pictura est. Quod magnopere... \textit{Gregory}.
\textsuperscript{84} Tu qui: a te qui \textit{Gregory}.
\textsuperscript{85} Attendere debuisti: attendi decuerat \textit{Gregory}.
\textsuperscript{86} Succedebaris: succenderis \textit{Gregory}, \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{87} Non adorandum: non ad adorandum \textit{Gregory}, \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{88} Instruendum: instruendas \textit{Gregory}, \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{89} Collatum: collocatum \textit{Gregory}, \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{90} Uetustatis: uetustas \textit{Gregory}.
\textsuperscript{91} Sed congregare: sed dispersum congregare \textit{Gregory}.
\textsuperscript{92} Potuisti: potius potuisti \textit{Albinus} (potius potueras \textit{Gregory}).
\textsuperscript{93} H. Walter, \textit{Carmina mediæ aevi posterioris latina} 1 (Göttingen, 1959) 265, no. 5256, and vol. 2 (Göttingen, 1963) 876, no. 6982.
\textsuperscript{94} Tamen: tantum \textit{manuascript}.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{De ciuitate dei} VIII, 27; CCL 47, 248. \textit{Gesta Albinus}, f. 5: Augustinus de ciuitate dei in libro viii...\textsuperscript{96}
\textsuperscript{96} Eorum: ipsorum \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{97} Innotescit: innotesceret \textit{Albinus}.
\textsuperscript{98} Quid: qui \textit{Albinus}.
reprimebant. Quis enim⁹⁹ audīuit aliqualibus fidelium stantem sacerdotem ad altare eciam super sanctum martyris corpus ad dei honorem [f. 30v] cultumque constri-ctum⁹ dicere in precibus: "Ofero tibi officium² Petre uel Paule uel Cipriane" cum apud eorum memorias offerant³ deo qui eos et homines et martyres fecit et sanctis suis angelicis⁴ celesti honore sociauit ut celebritate deo uiuo et uero⁵ de illorum uictorii graatis agamus et nos ad imitationem talium coronarum atque palmarum co- dem⁶ uocato in auxiliu ex illorum memorie renouatione adhortemur ? Quecumque igitur adhibentur religiosorum obsequia in martirum locis ornamenta sunt memo- riarum, non sacra uel sacrificia mortuorum".

8 Inclinabit se homo et cetera et illud: Dominum deum tuum adorabis et illi soli serulæ.⁷ Si secundum permisssorum ratione animal, angeli uidelicet et homo, prohibent(ur) adorari quomodo quidam imperiti clericu seu laici res inanimatas et ra- tione carentes adorant ?

9 Opponunt hic alii qui in ecclesia legi: "Crucem tuam adoramus, domine, adoramus crucis signaculum⁸ et similia. Atque respondent: "Adoramus crucem tuam i.e. crucifissum uel crucifissionem tuam et crucis signaculum i.e. Christum in signaculo crucis affixum".

10 Sic autem deum adoret ut Abraam qui tres in personis uidit et unum in deitate adorauit.⁸ Deum autem adorare est ei cum tota mente per humiliatem et deuo- tionem se subterneri et ipsum principium et finem omnis boni credere.

11 Consideret uero quomodo Christi carmen adoret et inspiriet illud Augustini⁹ quod dicitur: "Sciendum quia in Christo terra est i.e. caro que sine inpientate adora- tur. Suscepit enim de terra terram quia caro terra¹⁰ est et de carne Marie carmen accepit. Hec a Verbo dei sine inpientate assumpta adoratur a nobis quia nemo eius carnem manducat nisi prius adoret. Sed qui adorat, non terram intuetur sed illum pocius cuius scabellum est propter quem adorat".

12 Item idem¹¹ in sermone Non turbetur cor uestrum: "Dicunt ertici Filium non natura esse deum sed creaturam.¹² Quibus respondendum est quia¹³ si Filiius non est deus de eius¹⁴ natura sed creatura nec colendus omnino nec ut deus adorandum dicente Aposto- tolo: Coluerunt et servuerunt pocius creature quam Creatori: Sed illi¹⁵ ad hoc replicabunt [f.
31] et dicent: 16 Quid est quod carnem eius quam creaturam esse non negas simul cum divinitate adores 17 et ei non minus quam divinitati deseruis? Ego 18 dominicam carnem imno perfectam in Christo humanitatem ideo adoro quod a divinitate suscepta et deitati est unita ut non alium et alium 19 sed unum eundemque deum et hominem Filium 20 esse confitear”.

13 “Denique si hominem separaueris a deo, illi nunquam credo nec seruo. Velut si quis purpuram uel diadema regale iacens inueniat nuncuid ea conabitis adorare? Cum uero ea rex fuerit indutus periculum mortis incurrit si ea cum rege adorare quis contemperis. Ita etiam in Christo domino humanitatem non solam uel nudam sed divinitati unitam, scilicet unum dei 21 Filium deum uerum et hominem uerum si quis adoraret contemptur eternitatem morietur”.

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16 Dicent: dicitur Albinius.
17 Adores: adoras Albinius.
18 Ego: responsio ego Albinius.
19 Alium et alium sed: alium sed Albinius.
20 Filium: dei filium Albinius.
21 Unum dei Filium: unum Filium Albinius.
The Role of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes

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THE notion of infinity plays a central role in the thought of Francis of Meyronnes.¹ This is hardly surprising in a disciple of Duns Scotus, who gave the concept of infinite being a dominant position in his theology. It was largely owing to him that the topic of infinity assumed such importance not only among his followers but also in other schools of late medieval and early modern thought. Scotus elevated infinity to the position of the most perfect concept we can have of God.² In his view, the concept of infinite being is the object itself of theology, and the ascent of the mind to God culminates in the proof of his infinity.³

Though generally loyal to the principles of his master, Francis of Meyronnes has been found to differ from him in certain important respects, some of which concern infinity.⁴ Thus Scotus taught that existence belongs to the concept of the divine essence, whereas Meyronnes considered it to be an intrinsic mode outside the concept of the essence of God.⁵

¹ For a fuller account of this subject and of the metaphysics of Francis of Meyronnes, see A. P. Caird, The Doctrine of Quiddities and Modes in Francis of Meyronnes, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2 vols. University of Toronto, 1948. For his life and thought, see B. Roth, Franz von Meyronnis, O.F.M. sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott (Wert in Westfalen, 1936).
² See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (Vatican, 1950) 2, p. 215, n. 147. See Meyronnes: "Ille conceptus est perfectissimus de Deo per quem omnes rationes divinae alia excudent; sed huicmodi est infinitas." In Libros Sententiarum I, d. 2, q. 6 (Venice, 1520; reprint, Minerva, 1966), fol. 19 C.
³ For Scotus' doctrine of infinity, see E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), especially pp. 52, 149-215.
⁴ Meyronnes differs from Scotus in denying that the divine ideas are not formally identical and absolutely co-eternal with God, and in attributing to these ideas a 'being of essence' (esse essentiae) with more reality than a simple object of knowledge (esse cognitum). See B. Roth, op. cit., pp. 563-565; E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p. 467.
⁵ "In divinis autem existentia est de conceptu essentiae, et praedictatur in primo modo dicendi per se..." Scotus, Quad. I, q. 1, n. 4, additto (Paris, 1895) 25, p. 10. Gilson comments: "Ce texte est une addition, qui peut n'être pas de la main de Duns Scot lui-même, mais elle rend fidèlement sa pensée." Jean Duns Scot, p. 149, n. 2. For the difference between Scotus and Meyronnes on this point, see E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), pp. 92-95.
Among the divine modes of being Meyronnes places infinity prior in nature to existence. This entails the surprising consequence that existence attaches to the divine essence through the modality of infinity. Existence is posterior in nature to the divine essence and even to the modes of infinity and haecceity or 'thisness'. Infinity appears to be a divine mode of being standing between the divine essence and existence and mediating between them.

What is the rationale behind this remarkable metaphysical analysis of God? We may expect to find the answer in Francis of Meyronnes' concept of infinity and its relation to the divine essence on the one hand, and to the rest of the divine modes on the other. With this in view, we shall examine the meaning of infinity in his doctrine and its proper place among our notions of God. This will lead to his proof of the existence of God and the role played in it by the notion of infinity.

It is hoped that this inquiry will provide information useful for the history of the notion of infinity in the Middle Ages and modern thought. Only in recent years have historians turned their attention to the gradual emergence in the Christian era of the notion of God as infinite being. It was normal for the ancient Greeks to think of the infinite as imperfect; in their view perfect being was limited and finite. Hence it was quite foreign to them to regard the First Principle of the universe or God as infinite in its substance. It was owing to the religious influence of Judaism and Christianity that infinity came to be considered one of the primary characteristics of God. Theologians of the Middle Ages went beyond Greek metaphysics by affirming the perfection of infinite being and ascribing infinity to God; but they, by no means, agreed on the meaning of infinity as a divine attribute. Many regarded it as a negative divine attribute. Only towards the end of the thirteenth century, seemingly through the initiative of Henry of Ghent, was infinity conceived as a positive perfection of God.

The notion of positive infinity was adopted by Scotus and his followers, paving the way for later mediaeval and modern speculation about the infinity of God by men such as Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. We hope to show in the present article that Francis

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8 See below, note 24.
of Meyronnes, writing in the fourteenth century as a disciple of Duns Scotus, had a modest, though significant, role to play in this history.

**The Meaning of Infinity**

Given his penchant for making fourfold divisions, it comes as no surprise that Francis of Meyronnes distinguishes between four opinions about infinity. The first identifies the concept of infinity with that of the divine essence or deity. Those who hold this view, he says, appeal to St. Anselm’s notion of God as that than which a greater cannot be thought. This description of God would not be true if he were not infinite. Hence the deity and infinity must be the same.

To Meyronnes, this appears to be a too facile identification of the divine essence and infinity. Do we not have a definite notion of what we mean by God and yet find it possible to doubt whether he is infinite? If something is formally the same, surely we cannot be both certain and doubtful about it. Moreover, according to Meyronnes we can know the infinity of God by our natural powers but not the proper nature of God. Hence, he concludes, infinity cannot be identical with God’s essence.

According to a second opinion, infinity is an attribute of God, like eternity. As eternity is the ‘extensive quantity’ of God’s duration, so infinity is his ‘intensive quantity’. But in Meyronnes’ view the divine essence can be known as infinite, abstracting from all its attributes. Prior to knowing that essence in any of its attributes we can know it most perfectly as infinite, that is to say with its ‘quantity of perfection’ (secundum quantitatem virtutis). So infinity cannot be a divine attribute.

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10 “... sciendum quod sunt quatuor modi dicendi de infinito. Aliquid enim dicunt quod infinitas idem est quod deitas, et idem est conceptus utiusque. Et hoc probant quia Anselmus dicit quod Deus est quo majus cogitari non potest. Hoc autem sibi non competit nisi ratione infinitatis. Ergo etc.” Meyronnes, *Sent. I*, d. 3, q. 5, 18 E.

11 *Ibid.* F.

12 “Alii dicunt quod est scilicet infinitas quoddam attributum. Sicut enim aeternitas dicit quondam quantitatem extensivam durationis, ita infinitas intensivam; et ideo sicut aeternitas est attributum ita et infinitas... Contra secundum arguo quod non sit attributum. Illud quod intelligitur in essentia, ut abstrahit ab omnibus attributis, non est attributum; sed infinitas est hujusmodi. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris; quia in illo priori in quo intelligitur essentia prior attributis, intelligitur Deus perfectissime. Sed hoc non est nisi secundum quantitatem virtutis. Ergo etc.” *Ibid.* E.-G.

Sometimes Meyronnes calls infinity a divine attribute because it is predicated of the subject ‘God’ as a necessary *passio*; but more properly an attribute is a perfection found in both God and creatures. See *Sent. I*, d. 8, q. 7, 52 Q, 53 A. Eternity is usually listed among the intrinsic modes as the ‘quantity of duration’ of the divine being. See *Sent. I*, d. 9, q. 1, 53 IK.
The third and fourth views of infinity are alike in that they consider infinity to be a negative or privative concept. But this is only partly true according to Meyronnes because it fails to tell the whole story about infinity. Infinity is a negative or privative notion, if we take it in the formal sense of ‘lacking an end’; but its meaning is positive, if understood in its basic and primary sense of indicating the ‘quantity of perfection’ (quantitas virtutis) of the divine essence.\(^{13}\)

If we are to appreciate this all important point in Meyronnes’ conception of infinity, we have to distinguish with him between two different kinds of negative terms. Some express the lack of a perfection, as ignorance for example indicates the lack of knowledge. Other negative terms express the privation of some imperfection, as incorruptible indicates the absence of corruptibility. Both of these terms are negative in form and express a lack of something, but the second is basically positive, for through its negative form it denotes a positive perfection.

This is also true of the term ‘infinite’. At first sight it appears to be entirely negative and indicates a lack of limitation. But on closer examination it is seen to express a positive perfection, namely the ‘quantity of perfection’ of the divine essence. We can compare it to the term ‘incorporeal’, which is negative in form but indicates the positive perfection of spirituality both in God and creatures.\(^{14}\) In God infinity is an unqualified perfection (perfectio simpliciter), not a negation or privation.\(^{15}\) Meyronnes docs

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\(^{13}\) "Alii dicit quod est ratio privativa. Et ratio est quia de quocumque ente affirmatio vel negatio per primum principium. Sed affirmatio finitatis non dicitur de Deo. Ergo negatio finitatis dicitur de Deo. Praeterea, carentia finis dicit aliquid privatum; sed infinitum dicit carentiam finis. Ergo etc... Contra tertium non arguo, quia in parte dicit verum, licet non in toto... Infinitum tamen posset accipi dupliciter: uno modo fundamentaliter et primarie, alio modo formaliter et ultimate. Exemplum primum: duo alia dicuntur similia fundamentaliter et primarie albedine; sed formaliter et ultimate dicuntur similae similitudinisibus. Sic dico de infinitate quod primarie et fundamentaliter dicit quantitatem virtutis; formaliter autem et ultimate dicit carentiam finis." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 5, 18 FF.

\(^{14}\) "... sciendum quod privationes distinguuntur secundum distinctionem positivorum quibus opponuntur. Quaedam enim privationes sunt quae privant perfectionem, sicut ignorantia e: nescientia, et etsa dicit imperfectionem... Aliae autem sunt quae privat imperfectionem, sicut incorruptibilitas, quae corruptionem privat; et istae dicitur perfectionem et ponuntur in Deo, eo quod dicitur immortals et similia." Sent. I, d. 28, q. 1, 86 AB.

"Si dicas: tu supponis quod infinitas dicit negationem, et tamen dicit modum intrinsicum, similem incorporeum, quod est differentia de genere substantiae; dico quod tam infinitas quam incorporeum quantum ad rationes formales eorum dicunt privationes quae vere sunt in Deo suo modo essendi, et dicuntur de Deo. Sed tamam per istas negationes vel privationes bene circuloquimur aliqua positiva, utpote per infinitatem quantitatem virtutis, per incorporeum differentiam spiritualitatis quae est positiva in Deo et creature." Ibid. 86 K.L. See Sent. I, d. 34-35, a. 8, 107 DF.

\(^{15}\) On the fifth level of absolute perfections Meyronnes places the essence of God and its necessary passiones, such as infinity, eternity, and necessity. See Sent. I, d. 34-35, a. 4, 105 PQ.
not suggest that we have an explicit knowledge of the positive foundation of infinity in God, any more than we have such knowledge of the positive basis of negative terms such as ‘incorruptible’ and ‘immaterial’. The positive foundation of the divine infinity remains unknown to us in this life, and this is why the term is formally negative or privative; but this should not blind us to the fact that, fundamentally, it denotes the positive perfection of the quantitas virtualis of the divine essence.  

The extension of the term ‘quantity’ from bodies to the spiritual realm was long in honour among the scholastics. St. Thomas, for example, speaks of quantitas virtualis or quantitas virtutis by analogy with quantitas corporea or quantitas molis. Scripture suggests such an analogy when it speaks of the depth, height, and length of God, though he is not properly a body; he may be said, however, to have ‘virtual quantity’ (quantitas virtualis). For St. Thomas, this is a spiritual ‘greatness’, a kind of ‘quantity’ of perfection, which is identical with a certain form or nature or with some effect of a form, such as being (esse) or operation. God’s quantitas virtutis is his subsistent being (esse subsistens), his possession of esse according to the whole power of being (secundum totam virtutem essendi).  

It is precisely because God possesses being without restriction that St. Thomas conceives of him as infinite. The notion of infinity, for him, is negative, indicating that the divine being is not limited by being received in a subject. In this respect it is unlike the being of a creature, which is finite because limited by the essence in which it is received. Since the divine being is not received in a subject, but is subsistent, it is unlimited and therefore infinite. Thus there is no positive perfection corresponding to the Thomistic notion of infinity. To say that God is infinite adds nothing positive to the notion of God; it merely indicates that God’s being is without limits. The whole positive content of the Thomistic notion of God is ipsum esse.

It is otherwise in the thought of Duns Scotus. He, too, uses the term quantitas virtutis to denote the spiritual greatness of the divine being, but he conceives this greatness as the positive mode of infinity of the divine essence.

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16 See Sent. I, d. 3, q. 5, 18 H.
17 St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, 3, 1, ad 1m; I, 42, 1, ad 1m. See Job. 11, 8-9.
19 St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, 7, 1.
20 “C’est même pourquoi, chez Duns Scot, la notion d’infini acquiert une valeur nouvelle et joue un rôle beaucoup plus important que chez Thomas d’Aquin. Dans les deux doctrines, nous n’avons de l’infini qu’un concept négatif, qui est celui de non-fini, ou de ce dont l’essence exclut
The primary division of quantity, according to Scotus, is into discrete and continuous, continuous quantity being subdivided into permanent and successive. There is no discrete quantity, or number, in God, but there is something in him corresponding to the successive and permanent quantity found in corporeal things. Corresponding to their successive quantity there is in God quantity of duration, properly called eternity. Corresponding to the permanent quantity of bodies (*quantitas molis*) there is in God his *magnitudo virtutis* or *quantitas virtutis*, and this precisely is his infinity. Thus the greatness characteristic of the divine essence is its infinity: *infinitas autem essentiae [divinae] dicitur magnitudo ejus propria.*

For Scotus, then, infinity is the positive intrinsic mode of the divine being, and as such it makes God the unique being that he is. Like the *esse* of St. Thomas, the Scotist infinity “tends to devour the divine essence; it is so co-essential and uniquely proper to him that to name the one is practically the same as naming the other.”

According to Scotus, infinity can be understood in God both as ‘extensive infinity’, as denoting an infinite multitude of perfections, or as ‘intensive infinity’, as indicating an unlimited amount of any divine perfection. The divine essence as such has not only formal, intensive infinity, like all the divine attributes, but also fundamental intensive infinity, as the root of the infinity of these attributes. The intensive infinity of the divine essence indicates the highest perfection or magnitude of perfection.

It is not our present purpose to enter into the question of the historical origins of the notion of infinity as a positive perfection. Suffice it to say that recent research has shown that it was likely Henry of Ghent who first conceived infinity in this way. While granting the negative form of the term, he insists that it indicates something positive in God, namely something whose on-going process never comes to an end or indeed can come to an end. Scotus inherited this positive view of infinity from Henry of
Ghent, interpreting it in the light of his own metaphysics, in which infinity is conceived as one of the intrinsic modes of the divine being.25 Francis of Meyronnes is directly indebted to his master Scotus for this doctrine. For him, as for Scotus, there is an ‘intensive quantity’ distinct from the ‘extensive quantity’ of the dimensions of bodies. This is a quantity of ‘virtual intension’, and it is related to its possessor as its intrinsic mode.26 In the case of creatures this virtual quantity is finiteness, in the case of God it is infinity.

In the next section we shall examine the relation of the intrinsic mode of infinity to the divine essence and its attributes. After that we shall be in a position to understand the relation of infinity to the other divine modes of individuality and existence.

**Infinity and the Divine Essence**

The relationship of infinity to the divine essence must be seen in the light of Meyronnes’ general doctrine of essences and intrinsic modes.

Meyronnes’ world, like that of Scotus, is composed of essences or quiddities and their complements, the intrinsic modes. Everything not contained in the quidditative order finds its place in the modal order. In Meyronnes’ words, “Besides quiddity, there is nothing but a mode.”27 The realm of essences contains formal natures (rationes), each of which can be abstracted from every other by the mind, but at a deeper level they are already abstract or distinct in themselves. The quidditative world is peopled by essences.


26 Meyronnes, *Sent. 4*, d. 12, q. 8, 197 E.

27 “... nihil autem aliud est quidditatem nisi modus.” *Sent. I*, d. 42, q. 4, 121 K. “Sed dico quod ens extra animam dividitum et modum quidditatis.” *Sent. I*, d. 8, q. 5, 50 B.
formally distinct from each other, prior (in nature) to the consideration of the mind.\textsuperscript{28}

In this formal or quidditative realm the addition of one formal item will vary the nature of the thing thus constituted. For example, a difference added to a genus (e.g. ‘rational’ added to ‘animal’) does not vary the formal nature of the genus, but it does formally affect the nature constituted from the genus and difference, namely rational animal. So too, if a surface is colored white, the coming of whiteness does not formally vary the formal nature of the surface, but what is constituted from the union of whiteness and surface is a formal nature or ratio distinct from the mere ratio of surface.

But if the whiteness is merely varied in intensity, a change would take place in the whiteness, though not in the essential order. The whiteness would remain whiteness; only its intensity or modality would be different. In short, addition of modes does not affect essences in themselves. Thus man remains essentially the same whether he is actual or only potential; whether he exists in reality or only in the mind. Only his mode of being is different. Hence Francis of Meyronnes’ general definition of a mode: “That is an intrinsic mode which, on coming to something or departing from it, does not vary its formal ratio.”\textsuperscript{29}

Lying outside the quidditative or essential order, modes themselves do not have an essence or quiddity (\textit{modus non dicit aliquam rationem formalum}).\textsuperscript{30} It is true that modes can be the object of the intellect and can be conceived, but this does not mean that they have a quiddity. What has a quiddity can be conceived by itself (\textit{per se}); modes can only be conceived along with the formal natures whose modes they are. In short, a mode is intelligible, though not in abstraction from the formal ratio of which it is the mode.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Sent. I}, d. 47, q. 3, 134 CD. Meyronnes praises Avicenna for realizing that the abstraction or precision of one quiddity from another is not only the work of the mind but more basically it is already present in the object of knowledge. “Et ideo dicunt alii magis sequentes Avicennam quod illa praecisio non solum est ex parte intellectus, sed ex parte objecti... Unde licet accidentalis abstractio sit per intellectum, abstrahibilis tamen inest sibi ante omne abstractionem intellectus et praecisio quidditativa.” \textit{Ibid.} D. Because Aristotle did not understand this, he was ignorant about abstraction and as a result constructed the worst metaphysics. “Aliter dicitur quod Aristoteles fuit optimus physicus, sed pessimus metaphysicus, quia nescivit abstrahere, et ideo pessimam metaphysican fecit.” \textit{Ibid.} F.

\textsuperscript{29} “Ideo dico quod modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem formalem ejus, vel recedens ab eo non variatur ratio, sicut patet de albedine et ejus gradibus.” \textit{Sent. I}, d. 8, q. 5, 49 E.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Sent. I}, d. 42, q. 4, 120 P.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.} Q.
Why are modes called intrinsic if they do not enter into the quiddity or formal nature of things? Meyronnes replies that this is because they are not totally outside the formal ratio of that of which they are modes. If they were completely outside the formal ratio they would be different formal rationes, but in fact they do not add a new formal ratio to a quiddity. To call them intrinsic simply means “that they are not outside the ratio in such a way as to indicate a formal ratio distinct from that of which they are the modes.”

Since modes in a sense are not contained within quiddities, they can be said to be accidental to them. ‘Accidental’ in this context does not necessarily mean ‘contingent’, though, as we shall see, some modes of creatures are contingent. A mode is ‘accidental’ to a quiddity in the sense that its addition to the quiddity does not affect that quiddity as such; the formal ratio of the quiddity remains the same whether or not the mode is added to it. For example, whether man exists or not, whether he is ‘this’ man or ‘that’ man, does not alter the nature of man qua man.

Hence the divine modes of being can be called ‘accidental’ to the divine essence in the sense explained above. This does not mean that they belong to the divine essence contingently; in fact, they are necessary to that essence. Creatures, for their part, have only one necessary mode, namely finiteness; all their other modes are contingent.

The first and most basic division of intrinsic modes, according to Meyronnes, is into infinity and finiteness, the second into contingency and necessity, the third into act and potency, and the fourth into real being and being of reason (ens rationis). Besides these modes he mentions others; for example, existence, eternity, and individuality or haecceity. Existence can be reduced to actuality, so that Meyronnes does not always distinguish between these modes. The eternity of God is reducible to this infinity, as the duration proper to creatures can be reduced to their finiteness. Individuality or haecceity, however, is an intrinsic mode irreducible to any of the others.

32 “...et ideo quando arguitur de ipsis modis intrinsecis, dico quod non sunt extra rationem sic, quia non dicunt aliquam rationem formalem aliab ab illa cujus sunt modi.” Sent. I, d. 5, q. 1, 34 I. “Secundum dubium est: ex quo non sunt de ratione formalis quidditatis, quare dicuntur modi intrinseci? Dico quod quia non intrant quidditatem aliquam, nec differunt ab illa saltem formali liter sive quidditative. Ideo dicuntur modi intrinseci et non extrinseci.” Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 120 Q.
33 For the meaning of ‘accidental’ in this context, see Sent. I, d. 18, q. 1, 72 C; d. 33, q. 3, 101 L.
34 Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 A.
35 Ibid. BC.
36 He distinguishes between existence and actuality in Quodl. 3, a. 4: “... in Deomodus intrinsecus actualitatis differit a modo intrinseco existentiae, quia existentia communicatur creaturis et non actualitas, ut est in divinis, scilicet pura.” Ms Troyes 995, fol. 160va.
37 Actuality and existence differ from haecceity because in God there is one existence and actua-
It constitutes an individual as such within a specific ratio without varying the formal ratio. Thus Meyronnes' enumeration of the intrinsic modes includes: infinity and its duration, eternity; finiteness and its duration and degree of intensity; contingency; necessity; actuality and existence; potentiality; reality; ens rationis; and individuality or haecceity.

After these preliminary remarks about intrinsic modes and their relation to essences, we come to the specific problem of the relation of infinity to the divine essence. Is the intrinsic mode of infinity included in the formal nature of the deity? This is impossible according to Francis of Meyronnes. Infinity belongs to the modal order; the formal nature of the deity to the quidditative order. Distinct as quiddity and mode, neither is included in the other.

Meyronnes advances several arguments to prove this point. An intrinsic mode is always posterior (in nature) to the quiddity of which it is the mode, and so it cannot be predicated quidditatively of it. It does not form part of the formal ratio of the quiddity, nor does it enter into its definition. As a mode of the divine essence, infinity is subject to these conditions; it cannot enter into the formal ratio of the deity.\(^{38}\)

Does infinity belong to the formal ratio of the divine attributes, such as knowledge? This is just as impossible as that it enter into the formal nature of the deity. As an intrinsic mode, infinity is outside the formal order and hence it cannot be predicated quidditatively of anything. Infinity does not enter into the formal structure of either the divine essence or any of the divine perfections. Suppose that infinity were predicatable formally of the divine intellect. It would follow that it would also be formally predicatable of the human intellect, for these two intellects have the same formal nature. For Meyronnes, perfections common to God and creatures are predicatable of them univocally. In both they have the same formal constitution, so that whatever belongs essentially to the divine intellect belongs essentially to the human intellect as well. Hence, if infinity were a formal constituent of the divine perfections or attributes, such as wisdom or will, it would also enter formally into the essential nature of our intellect, wisdom, will, and so on. Since this is clearly false, it follows that neither can infinity enter the formal quiddity of the deity.\(^{39}\)

\(^{38}\) Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, 19 HI.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
Another argument in support of the same point runs as follows: If infinity were part and parcel of the formal nature of the divine attributes, there would be as many infinities as there are divine attributes since the attributes are formally distinct. There would be an infinite wisdom, infinite will, and so on. Meyronnes argues that this is a useless multiplication of infinities. Just as all the attributes of God are divine through their union with the deity, so they can all be infinite through the one infinity of the divine essence. This reinforces the main conclusion of Meyronnes: infinity does not belong to the formal order, and hence it is not part of the formal nature of God or any of the divine attributes. ⁴⁰

If infinity does not enter into the formal nature of the deity, it is not predicated of it *per se* in the first mode of essential predication. In this mode we predicate of a subject only what belongs to its essence; e.g. rational of man. This does not mean that infinity is predicated of God accidentally (*per accidens*). As we shall presently see, it can be demonstrated that God is necessarily infinite, just as it can be demonstrated that creatures are necessarily finite. Infinity, then, must belong to the deity necessarily, as finiteness necessarily belongs to creatures. Finiteness indeed is a necessary and proper *passio* of creatures, being found wherever they are found and being predicated of them in the second mode of essential predication. In this mode the subject is necessarily present in the predicate; e.g. we predicate ‘capability of laughter’ of man in this way, so that ‘that which is capable of laughter’ necessarily implies man. Thus finiteness in predicated of creatures, ‘the finite’ necessarily implying a creature. In the same way infinity is predicated of God. When we say ‘God is infinite’, the subject ‘God’ is necessarily included in the predicate ‘infinite’. ⁴¹

**The Relation of Infinity to the Other Divine Modes**

The presence of many modes of being in God introduces no confusion in him; order reigns in the deity as it does throughout the universe of Francis of Meyronnes. All the modes are posterior by nature to the divine essence and anterior to the divine attributes. Among the modes, as among the attributes, Francis of Meyronnes finds a natural order, though he does not always describe that order in the same way. In his Commentary on the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 42, Question 4, he arranges the order of the modes as follows: infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity; then, taking

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⁴⁰ "Quarto, quia viderentur frustra poni ibi tot infinitates quot sunt ibi infinita attributa, cum totum possit salvari per unam. Si autem essent idem formaliter, multiplicatis perfectionibus, multiplicaretur infinitas. Ideo dico quod non est nisi una infinitas sicut nec una deitas." *Ibid.* I.

into account an objection to this order, he immediately rearranges it to: existence, necessity, infinity, and haecceity. In Distinction 33, Question 3 we find this order: haecceity, infinity, existence, and reality. In Distinction 13, Question 1 he places infinity ahead of existence and necessity, as he also does in Distinction 4, Question 1. In the Troyes manuscript of the Quodlibets he presents the following order of the divine modes: infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality, necessity and reality.

Is it possible to reconcile these different orderings of the divine modes, or must we conclude that Meyronnes has no firm doctrine on the matter? If we examine them carefully, taking into account his metaphysical principles, we can see that only one of these orders of modes is essential, namely infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality. This places infinity as the mode most closely associated with the divine essence. It alone attaches to the deity without any intermediary; in Meyronnes’ words immediate inst Deitati. All the other modes, including existence, attach to the deity through the mode of infinity.

In Distinction 42, Question 4, Meyronnes compares the intrinsic modes of God and creatures, using as his criterion of comparison the sharing of modes between them. In creatures, he says, the first mode is the one that belongs to them essentially (per se) and is not found in God, namely finiteness. After finiteness come the modes attaching to creatures accidentally (per accidens), but which are also found in God, namely existence and reality. Then come the modes belonging to creatures per accidens but not found in God, such as contingency. Finally there are the modes belonging to creatures per accidens as individuals, i.e. ‘thisness’ (haecceitas). This yields the following order of creaturely modes: finiteness, existence, reality, contingency, and haecceity. The corresponding divine modes are said to be infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity.

At this point in his Commentary on the Sentences Meyronnes does not propose a metaphysical order of the divine modes, considering solely their relationship to the divine essence and to each other. Rather, he organizes the modes of created being taking into account whether they belong to creatures per se or per accidens, and whether or not they are shared by God and creatures. Hence the order of the divine modes corresponding to those of creatures (i.e. infinity, existence, necessity, and haecceity) need not be

42 Sent. I, d. 2, q. 6, 19 B. Here Meyronnes argues that the concept of infinite being is our most perfect concept: because it is most intimate to the most perfect concept, which is that of the deity. The concept of the essence of God is the most perfect, but in our present state we cannot have this concept.

43 Sent. I, d. 42, q. 4, 121 EF.
an essential one. It is controlled by factors other than the abstract consideration of the divine essence and its modes.

If the Persons of the Trinity are taken into account, still another order of the divine modes is possible. According to Meyronnes, the Persons, unlike the divine essence, are not formally infinite, though they are formally existent and necessary. Hence, if we set up the divine modes on the basis of their commonness with creatures, and taking the Trinity into account, infinity will no longer be the first of the divine modes but rather existence. The order of the divine modes will then be: existence, necessity, infinity, and haecceity. It should be clear, however, that this modal order, like the preceding, need not be the proper and essential one, based as it is on factors extrinsic to the divine essence and its modes. In any case, Meyronnes dismisses this modal order as unimportant.\textsuperscript{44}

In Distinction 33, Question 3, once again the order of the divine modes is considered in the context of the Trinity. According to Meyronnes, haecceity is more intrinsic to the Persons of the Trinity than infinity; consequently it should precede infinity. So the modal order here proposed is: haecceity, infinity, existence, and reality.\textsuperscript{45} Once again we are presented with an order of divine modes directly related to the Trinity of Persons and not the divine essence.

In Distinction 13, Question 1, Meyronnes places infinity before existence and necessity as modes of the divine essence. His reason is that even if \textit{per impossibile} the divine essence did not exist, it would still be possible to demonstrate its infinity from the nature of that essence, just as the finitude of a creature can be demonstrated through its formal nature even if the creature did not exist.\textsuperscript{46} This is a clear indication that in the essential order of the modes infinity is to be placed ahead of existence and necessity. The essential priority of infinity to existence is again affirmed in Distinction 14, Question 1.\textsuperscript{47}

In \textit{Quodlibet} 3, a. 7, contained in the unpublished Troyes manuscript (995), Meyronnes draws four conclusions regarding the order of the divine modes. (1) the infinity of God precedes his existence and actuality, (2) the divine infinity precedes haecceity, (3) the divine singularity and haecceity precede

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid. G.}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Sent. I, d. 33, q. 3, 101 I. Adopting the perspective of the relations of the Trinity and not the divine essence, haecceity is more intrinsic to the deity and infinity more extrinsic: "... haecceitas est magis intrinseca, infinitas est extrinseca magis, et per consequens posterior."}

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Sent. I, d. 13, q. 1, 65 CD.}

\textsuperscript{47} "Et dico quod ordines quatuor essentiales sunt in divinis... Quartus inter modos intrinsecos sicut inter infinitatem et existentiam, sicut dictum est generaliter de ordine naturae." \textit{Sent. I, d. 14-16, q. 1, 66 0. See also Sent. I, d. 2, q. 7, 19 G.}
his existence and actuality, (4) the divine necessity is posterior to all these. Posterior to all these modes, which attach to the one divine essence, is the mode of reality, which belongs to the Persons of the Trinity. This text yields the following modal order: infinity, haecceity, existence and actuality, necessity, and reality.\footnote{"Septimus articulus est de istorum modorum ordine in divinis. Ubi ponuntur quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod infinitas Dei praecedet ejus existentiam et actualitatem, quia qualem ordinem habent aliqua quando distinguuntur secundum rem, talem servant quando distinguuntur secundum rationem. Et ideo cum in creatis quantitas virtutis praevenit existentiam, ita erit in divinis, ubi sunt minus distincta. Secunda conclusio, quod infinitas divina praevenit ejus haecceitatem, quia unaqueaque natura prius intelligitur in certo gradu entium collata per suam naturam specificam, quam intelligatur individuada. Tertia conclusio, quod divina singularitas et haecceitas praevet ejus existentiam et actualitatem, quia unaqueaque ratio formalis, ut praecipit ab alia, habet suam haecceitatem intrinsece antequam intelligatur actualiter existens, sicut fuit deductum in creatis. Quarta conclusio, quod divina necessitas est posterior omnibus ipsis, quia esse necessarium praecessit esse, et esse est cum actu, quae sunt posteriora infinitate. Et confirmatur, quia opposita opponuntur in eodem ordine; contingencia autem in creatis est ipsis posterior, ut patuit... realitas est posterior ipsis omnibus." Quodl. 3, a. 7, Ms Troyes 995, fol. 191ra.}

The following table shows the variation in Meyronnes’ listing of the divine modes in the above passages.

- D. 42, q. 4: infinity, existence, necessity, haecceity.
- D. 42, q. 4: existence, necessity, infinity, haecceity.
- D. 33, q. 3: haecceity, infinity, existence, reality.
- D. 13, q. 1: infinity, existence, necessity.
- Quodl. 3, a. 7: infinity, haecceity, existence, necessity, reality.

There appears to be no internal contradiction between these different orders of the divine modes of being. Each is in function of a different perspective of God and his modalities, and it is intelligible in its context.

There is good reason to believe that the essential order of the modes is best represented by Quodlibet 3, a. 7. There infinity is placed first among the modes as closest to the divine essence. This agrees with Meyronnes’ statement, which is perfectly Scotistic, that infinity is immediate to the deity: immediate inest Deitati.\footnote{Seec above, note 42.} This is justified by the correspondence between reality and thought. The order among things distinguished by thought, he contends, corresponds to their order in reality. Following this principle he asserts that the finiteness, or ‘quantity of perfection’, of creatures precedes their existence, and consequently the same will be true in God, in whom there is less distinction between the mode and its subject. The divine haecceity comes after infinity, because every nature is understood to be placed at a definite level of being through its specific
essence prior to its being individualized. Hence in God the mode of infinity is prior to the mode of haecceity. After these two modes come the divine existence and actuality, because a nature is understood to be intrinsically characterized by ‘thisness’ before it is understood to be actually existing. This is so in the case of creatures and it is no less true in the divinity. Necessity is posterior to all these modes because it presupposes existence. In the last place is the mode of reality, for all the other modes attach to the one divine essence, whereas reality belongs to the three Persons of the Trinity, which constitute three realities in the one essence.\textsuperscript{50}

The placing of haecceity after infinity, and both of these modes before existence, was already suggested by Duns Scotus. According to the Subtle Doctor, the divine essence is first in the order of essence. After it in the natural order comes infinity, and then ‘thisness’ or individuality. Scotus even gives Meyronnes his reason for locating infinity before haecceity: it is, Scotus says, as though infinity has to be understood as a mode of the divine entity before we can understand that entity as ‘this’ or individual.\textsuperscript{51}

In short, it is a requirement of thought that compels us to assert the primacy of infinity over haecceity. This same requirement is at the basis of Meyronnes’ order of the modes.

The order of the three modes: infinity, haecceity, and existence, is confirmed by the proofs of the existence and oneness of God which we shall consider in the next section. Each of these modes is demonstrated of God through the medium of infinity. Infinity, therefore, must precede these modes in relation to the divine essence. In demonstrating these modes of God he arranges his proofs in the following order: the existence of God, the oneness or individuality of God, and the infinity of God. Since, according to Meyronnes, we acquire knowledge by going from the less perfect to the more perfect, and from what is posterior in nature to what is prior, the essential order of divine modes should be: infinity, haecceity, and existence. We shall now turn to Meyronnes’ demonstrations of these three modes of the divine essence.

\textsuperscript{50} Quodl. 3, a. 7, ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} "Respondeo, quia quando aliquid est de se esse et non tantum capax ipsius esse, de se est habens quamlibet condicionem necessario requisitam ad esse; ens autem ut convenit Deo — scilicet ens per essentiam — est ipsum esse infinitum et non aliquid cui tantum convenit ipsum esse (ex se est ‘hoc’ et ex se ‘infinitum’), ut quasi per prius intelligitur, aliquo modo, infinitas esse modus entis per essentiam quam ipsum intelligatur esse ‘hoc’; et ideo non oportet quaerere quare ‘hoc’ ens sit infinitum, quasi prius conveniat sibi singularitas quam infinitas." Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3 (Vatican, 1956) 4, p. 227, n. 149. See E. Gilson, \textit{Jean Duns Scot} (Paris, 1932), p. 241, note 1; \textit{Being and Some Philosophers}, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), p. 94.
Proof of the Existence of an Infinite Being

The first point to be noted in considering the existence of God, according to Meyronnes, is that his existence is not self-evident but must be proved. He is aware that St. Anselm has been interpreted to affirm the self-evidence of God's existence. At first sight, the Anselmian notion of God as that than which none greater can be conceived seems to justify this interpretation; for if God's existence were not self-evident we could conceive of a being better known than him, whose existence would be self-evident. But this is not the point to St. Anselm's famous description of God according to Meyronnes. St. Anselm, he remarks perceptively, was trying to prove the existence of God, and what is thought to be provable is not self-evident. Furthermore, what is self-evident cannot be denied, whereas many do deny the existence of God. So his existence must be proved; and if this is true of his existence it is no less true of his infinity.52

Of course, to minds in other states than ours the existence of God would be self-evident. If we had intuitive knowledge of his essence, we would see his existence and no proof of it would be needed; but in the present life we are denied intuitive knowledge of God. Even if we had abstractive knowledge of the divine essence through a likeness (species) distinctly representing the divine essence, its existence would not be self-evident. No quiddity, not even the divine, includes existence in its formal ratio. So the divine essence could be known abstractively without knowing the divine existence. Some kind of proof of God's existence would be necessary for an intellect capable of such knowledge, but it would be different from the proofs we have in our present condition. In this state we lack abstractive knowledge of God's essence under his proper formal ratio; all our knowledge of him is from the formal perspective of being.53

What kind of proof of the existence of God is possible for us? Of the two types of demonstration, propter quid and quia, Meyronnes dismisses the first as inapplicable in the present case. In a demonstration propter quid a definition serves as a middle term; e.g. Man is a rational animal; every rational animal is capable of laughter; therefore... But God is absolutely simple and hence incapable of being defined. There can be no definition of him serving as a middle term through which his existence can be demonstrated. Even if we had abstractive knowledge of the divine essence under its proper formal ratio we could not prove the existence of God by a demonstration.

52 Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, 16 G-I. Anselm indeed speaks of 'proving' (probare) the existence of God. See his Proslogion, prooemium 1 (Seckau, 1938) p. 93.
53 Ibid. 15 Q-16 C.
propter quid, for existence is not included in the divine essence. As we have seen, no mode is contained in an abstract essence, not even that of God. So we could not deduce the existence of God from an abstractive knowledge of his essence.54

Having eliminated a demonstration propter quid of the existence of God, there remains the possibility of a demonstration quia. This would proceed through an inquiry into his existence through his effects, i.e. through creatures. Now two modes of inquiring into God’s existence from his effects are possible, the physical and the metaphysical (modo physico et modo metaphysico). Using the physical mode we can investigate the existence of God through motion. If something is moved, it is moved by another. This either continues on to infinity (which Meyronnes takes to be impossible), or it ends with the existence of a first mover. This way can be made more evident, he says, if ‘created’ is substituted for ‘moved’. For if something is created, it must be created by another, and this process cannot go on to infinity.

Proceeding metaphysically we can inquire into God's existence by way of eminence. Even if nothing is moved or created, we find an order among beings of different natures, and from this it can be shown that there is a first and highest being.

These two ways of investigating the existence of God give us two concepts of him as ‘primary cause’ and ‘primary being’, and once we are in possession of these concepts, Meyronnes assures us, we can demonstrate his existence.55

This statement of Meyronnes comes as a surprise. Has he not already demonstrated the existence of God from creatures? In fact, in his own view he has only presented two traditional ‘ways of inquiring’ into the existence of God. These ways are essential to the demonstration of God’s existence because without them we would not have the concepts needed for that demonstration, but they are not the demonstration itself.

The ‘ways of inquiring’ into the existence of God involve creatures: they are methods by which the mind rises from creatures to God. But, according to Meyronnes, a creature cannot enter into the demonstration itself of God’s existence. Nothing created can be the middle term in this demonstration. The middle term whereby we prove the existence of God must be something in God and really the same as him; nothing really distinct from him can serve to prove anything about him: nihil quod est in creatura est medium ad demonstrandum aliquid de Deo.56 We must demonstrate

54 Sent. I, d. 2, q. 2, 15 I-17 H.
55 Sent. I, d. 2, q. 3, 17 I.
56 Ibid. 17 K.
predicates or properties (*passiones*) of God through other divine properties. Hence no effect of God, or creature, can be the means of demonstrating his existence.

If this is true, we cannot demonstrate God’s existence through his effects; but we can use as a means of demonstration his relation to his effects — not his actual relation to them, for this is contingent on his will to create, but rather his possible relation to them (*habitudo aptitudinalis*), for this is necessary. Whether or not God actually creates, he must have the power to relate himself to creatures. A necessary property (*passio*) of God such as this can be the middle term in demonstrating God’s existence.

According to Meyronnes, a *demonstratio quia* has for its middle term a property (*passio*) of the subject, and through this property a second property is demonstrated of the subject. If the property used as a middle term is prior to the property demonstrated, then it is a *demonstratio quia a priori*; if it is a property that is posterior, it is a *demonstratio quia a posteriori*.

Meyronnes gives the following demonstration *quia a posteriori* of the existence of God: “Every first cause exists; God is the first cause; therefore he exists.” Since causality is a property posterior to the mode of existence, when causality is used as a middle term the demonstration proceeds through a posterior property to one that is prior; hence the demonstration is *a posteriori*.

The following is a demonstration *quia a priori* of God’s existence: “Every infinite being actually exists; God is an infinite being; therefore God actually exists.” As a mode prior to existence, infinity serves as the middle term to demonstrate the existence of God; hence the demonstration is *a priori*.57

The strength of these proofs, in Meyronnes’ view, lies in the fact that they begin with properties that belong to God and are really the same as God; they do not begin with creatures, which are really distinct from him and contingent on his will to create them. Their starting points are the notions of infinite being and first cause, and through these concepts the existence of God is demonstrated. It is true that we arrive at these concepts

57 “Sed est intelligendum quod duplex est demonstratio quia: una a priori et alia a posteriori. Hoc enim est communis omni demonstrationi quia, quod fiat per passionem acceptam pro medio; contingit autem hoc dupliciter. Aliquando enim contingit quod passio posterior est conclusa a priori sicut per medium, et sic est demonstratio quia a priori. Exemplum: Omne ens infinitum existit actualiter; Deus est ens infinitum; ergo etc. Hic enim posterior passio demonstratur per priorem passionem tamquam per medium; infinitas autem est passio prior existentia, sicut patebit 8 dist. Aliquando autem accidit quod passio posterior est medium ad conclusendum priorem, et tunc demonstratio quia est a posteriori. Exemplum: Omnis prima causa existit; Deus est huic-modi; ergo existit. Existentia enim Dei prior est quam causalitas quae cunque. Ideo dicitur demonstratio quia a posteriori.” *Sent.* I, d. 3, q. 4, 17 I-K.
through creatures, but the proofs do not include the means whereby we arrive at the notions that provide the terms of the proofs. Once we possess these notions their actual basis in creatures no longer enters into the picture. Indeed, it makes no difference to the proofs whether creatures actually exist or not; all that is needed for the proofs is the notion of infinite being and first cause.

In both of these proofs infinity plays a central role. This is clear enough in the second proof, which states that God exists because he is infinite. For Meyronnes, infinity in some way must involve existence. If a being is infinite it must also exist. The role of infinity is not so clear in the first proof, which states that God exists because he is the first cause. The notion of a first cause necessarily involves existence. But there is a hidden link in this argument. Causality is an attribute of God, a formal ratio, not an intrinsic mode. The union between the divine essence and a divine attribute can be only through the mode of infinity.\(^{58}\) In other words, God is infinitely wise, good, or the first cause only because his essence is infinite. Hence he can be the first cause only because he is infinite. This, of course, has still to be proved. Thus the proof proceeds from a posterior attribute or passio, namely from causality to infinity, and then to existence.

It is thus imperative for Meyronnes to demonstrate the infinity of God. Before doing so, however, he devotes some attention to the problem of the oneness of God. Can there be several gods, or is there only one?\(^{59}\) This problem, like that of the existence of God, is directly related to his infinity. If God is infinite, Meyronnes argues, there cannot be several gods, for there cannot be several infinities. There can be only one infinite being.

Several arguments based on St. Anselm’s notion of God as that than which none greater can be thought are given to support this, but Meyronnes rejects them as faulty. The first argument contends that if there were several individual gods sharing the same divine nature, a greater than any one of them could be conceived, for we can think of one God who would exhaust the whole perfection of that nature. Since the infinite is that than which none greater can be thought, no one of them would be infinite or God. We must conclude, therefore, that there is one divine individual adequate to the whole specific nature of the divinity, and so there is only one God.

The second argument varies this reasoning a little but the result is the same. Whenever individuals are multiplied within the same specific

\(^{58}\) “Dico quod nulla est ibi (scilicet, in divinis perfectionibus) diversitas simpliciter, cum sint unum identice propter infinitatem, secundum quam haece formalitas est alia.” Sent. I, d. 8, q. 5, 50 N. “... unitas identica convenit attributis solum per infinitatem, quae est modus intrinsecus.” Sent. I, d. 33, q. 3, 101 M.

\(^{59}\) Sent. I, d. 3, q. 4, 17 L.
nature, there is a greater perfection in several of them than in any one. For example, two men possess a greater perfection than just one. Thus two gods would possess a greater perfection than merely one. Consequently if there were several gods having the same nature, no one of them would be that than which none greater can be thought, and hence no one of them would be God. So there is only one God.

The fallacy in these arguments, in Meyronnes' view, is to apply the notions of greater and less, of equal and unequal, to infinite being, when in fact they are valid only for finite beings. We cannot compare the infinite with the finite as though the former were 'greater' than, or 'unequal' to, the latter. The importance of the point Meyronnes is making should not be overlooked. He is saying that the infinite is not the greatest being in a hierarchy, or the first in a great chain of being. Rather, it is an absolutely unique being, incomparable and out of all proportion to finite being. The absolute transcendence of the infinite makes it impossible to describe it accurately as that than which none greater can be thought.60

Meyronnes' own arguments for the oneness of God do not prejudice his absolute uniqueness and transcendence but rather enforce them. They establish that he is not only an individual but most individual or singular (singularissimus). How could God possibly lack individuality, since this is an absolute perfection and his nature is most perfect? Being most actual and perfect, he must have 'thisness' or haecceity.

In creatures haecceity is their ultimate difference, the last positive actuality added to them and constituting them as individuals. Formal differences can be added to natures, as the specific difference 'rational' joined to the genus 'animal' constitutes the nature 'rational animal'. A non-formal difference 'thisness' added to the specific nature of man renders it 'this' individual man. Many individual men are possible because human nature is not of itself one individual but is potential to an infinite number of individuals.

The 'thisness' or individuality of the divine essence must be different from that of creatures. Being most actual and infinite, this essence has an infinite individuality and haecceity. It is not potential to the reception of many individualities but constitutes of itself one individual. It alone is individual of itself (de se haec); and the reason for this is the divine infinity. Suppose there were many gods. Each of their individualities would be most noble and infinite, with the result that the individuality of one would be present in every other. In short, there would be only one individual God.61

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60 Ibid. 17 M-P.
61 Ibid. 17 Q-18 B. For the proof that there can be only one infinity, see q. 7, 19 I.
Ultimately, then, God is one because he is infinite. But how can it be proved that God is infinite? The answer to this question is all-important, for on it hang the answers to the questions whether God exists and is one. As we have seen, his existence and oneness can be proved if his infinity can be demonstrated. This is the vital link in the inquiry into God that must now be supplied.

Meyronnes finds no text in Scripture that says in so many words that God is infinite. The best he can do is to quote from the Psalms: “Great is the Lord, and exceedingly to be praised...” (47, 1). And indeed, it appears to be true that, although Scripture speaks of God’s wisdom as unlimited and his days as without number, it does not contain the simple statement: ‘God in infinite.’

Can the infinity of God be demonstrated by natural reason? Meyronnes believes that it can, but he does not accept uncritically all the reasons that can be advanced in its favor. According to Dionysius, there are four ways of coming to a knowledge of God: the way of efficient causality, final causality, eminence, and negation. Meyronnes examines each of these in turn to see if it may offer an adequate proof of the divine infinity.

Following the way of efficient causality some use four arguments to demonstrate the infinity of God. (1) A finite power cannot move other things over an infinite period of time; but God can do this. (2) Only an infinite cause can produce an infinite number of effects; but this is within God’s power. (3) One who knows more is more perfect than one who knows less; but God can know an infinity of things, showing that he is infinitely perfect. (4) If a cause contains simultaneously an infinite number of effects, it must itself be infinite. This is true of God, though owing to their nature effects cannot be produced simultaneously.

The first two arguments, which have a distinctly Aristotelian background, are rejected by Meyronnes out of hand. They would lead to the

62 Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 I.
63 See E. Gilson, “Theology and the Unity of Knowledge,” p. 39.
64 “... intelligendum est quod Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, et Angelica hierarchia, et in pluribus aliis locis ostendit quatuor modos deveniendi in cognitionem divinorum, scilicet per viam causalitytis effectivae, procedendo in inquisitione causarum donec veniamus ad primum efficiens; secundo per viam causalitytis finalis, codem modo procedendo; tertio per viam eminencias; quarto per viam remotionis, quando ab ante perfectissimo removentur omnes imperfectiones.” Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 K. Meyronnes reads Dionysius as a scholastic, using the language of the scholastics and not that of Dionysius himself.

Compare Scotus’ four ways of proving the infinity of God by efficient causality, intellectuality, final causality, and eminence; Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (Vatican, 1950) 2, p. 189, n. 111.

65 Aristotle shows that the prime unmoved mover has infinite power of moving because it causes eternal movement for an infinite time; see his Physics VIII, 10; Metaphysics XII, 7. Duns Scotus uses
unacceptable conclusion that an intelligence moving the heavens for an infinite time is itself infinite, and that if the sun and other heavenly bodies lasted forever they would be infinite because they could produce an infinite number of effects. The next two arguments, which come from Scotus himself,\textsuperscript{66} cause Meyronnes some concern. He does not see any possibility of denying their probative value, though he does not seem very happy about them. He offers an objection to them but admits that it carries little weight.\textsuperscript{67}

Proofs of the infinity of God based on final causality are unacceptable to Meyronnes. Some argue that the human will has an infinite capacity and is unsatisfied with anything finite. If a finite good is presented to it, the intellect can always propose a greater good which the will then seeks. The will is ordained to an infinite end and it will rest only in the infinite. Again, everything in the universe is ordered to an ultimate end, and since the end is always more perfect than the means, the ultimate end of the whole universe must be more perfect than the universe. The infinite number of things which are ordainable to the end prove that the end itself is infinite.

Neither of these reasons is convincing to Meyronnes. The mere fact that we desire something does not mean that it is to be found in the real world. We often desire impossible things. Similarly the fact that all things are directed to one ultimate end does not prove that the end is infinite. Man is the end of all corporeal nature and to some degree transcends it. The universe, man included, may be directed to a goal that would transcend it but that goal need not be infinite. So the direction of all things to God does not justify the assertion that he is infinite.\textsuperscript{68}

The way of eminence is just as impotent to lead us to an infinite God. Four arguments are given to show that this way leads to the infinite, but Meyronnes rejects them all. The first is based on the disposition of the universe. It is certain to natural reason that the universe is disposed in the best possible way. Now it is better disposed if there is an infinite being than if there is not; hence there must be one. The second argument is based on the nature of infinity as an unqualified perfection. Every absolute perfection is compatible with another absolute perfection. Now infinity is an

\textsuperscript{66} Scotus, \textit{ibid.} pp. 201-205, n. 125-129; pp. 192-197, n. 117-120.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Non apparat via fugiendi iastas instantias, nisi forte opinio illa poneretur quam ponit Augustinus in uno loco, quod scilicet in omni instanti res accipiat novam virtutem producendi a Deo. Et tune leviter possunt solvi instantiae, scilicet quod causae non continent infinita virtualiter, quia novum effectum continet nova virtus.} \textit{Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8, 19 O.}

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.} 19 OP. For Scotus' use of the proof from finality, see \textit{Ordinatio, ibid.} pp. 205-206, n. 130.
absolute perfection; hence it is compatible with the divine nature. But whatever infinity is compatible with must itself be infinite. Therefore the deity is infinite. The third argument continues in the same vein. Finiteness implies limitation and hence imperfection. It cannot, therefore, be included in the deity, for an unqualified perfection admits of no imperfection. The final argument may be summed up as follows: A being whose nature is impossible cannot be more perfect than one whose nature is not. Now if there were an infinite being it would be more perfect than a finite one. Consequently it is not impossible for there to be an infinite being.

Some of these arguments may seem persuasive but when they are presented in the context of the way of eminence they do not necessarily lead to infinite being. This way involves comparison of greater and less perfection, excess and defect; and, as we have seen, Meyronnes does not grant that this leads to a being that is absolutely transcendent and unique. Even though these arguments lead to a supreme being, it would nevertheless be a finite, and not an infinite, being. The second and third arguments contain statements that are true in themselves. The third argument is almost identical with his own demonstration of the divine infinity. It is not with the statements that he is quarreling but with the context in which they are placed. By way of eminence we can arrive at a supreme being in any genus, but this would be something finite. We may even come to something more perfect than all existing things, but it would still be finite.\(^69\)

Only the way of negation remains to be explored as an avenue to the infinite. This way alone meets with Meyronnes' full approval. Following this method we deny of God anything imperfect or unworthy of him, for surely no imperfection can be found in him. Now finiteness is an imperfection, and so we must deny it of him. But to say that God is not finite is equivalent to affirming that he is infinite.

Asked to defend his assumption that God cannot be imperfect, Meyronnes replies that this is something we naturally know. If God were imperfect in some respect, this would violate the perfect order among beings. Much more important to him is the demonstration that finiteness involves imperfection. This he believes he can prove in four ways: 1) The more finite something is, the more limited and imperfect it is. 2) The closer something is to non-being, the more imperfect it is. Now the more limited it is, the closer it is to non-being. Thus limitation or finiteness involves imperfection. 3) The closer natures are to matter, the more imperfect they are. A sign of this is the fact that material forms closer to matter are more imperfect.

\(^{69}\) Ibid. 19 PQ. For Scotus' use of the proof from eminence, see ibid. pp. 206-211, n. 131-139.
among material things. Thus, if the primary being, or God, were finite, it would have a definite distance from, and relationship to, matter. Consequently, it will be imperfect, and this for the sole reason that it is finite. Hence finiteness means imperfection.\footnote{Ibid. 20 AB.}

Among the four ways to God, therefore, only the negative way successfully leads to the divine infinity. This does not mean that the other ways of efficient and final causality and eminence are of no value in our ascent to God. Even though they do not by themselves yield a knowledge of his infinity, they are the necessary starting-points of that knowledge. At first sight they appear to be independent approaches to God, but Meyronnes sees them as an interconnected series of arguments, one starting where the other leaves off. The way of efficient causality comes first; seeing something moved or caused, we reason to a first efficient cause. The way of final causality is based on that of efficiency, for we recognize ends only through the effects of efficient causes. Following this way we come to the existence of a final end. Efficiency and finality in turn serve as the foundation for the way of eminence. Since the end is more noble than the means to the end, we can reason to a most noble being. The negative way carries on from this point. The most noble being must be most eminent, and hence it can admit of no imperfection. Accordingly we must remove from it all imperfection and arrive at the \textit{primum eminens}, the infinite being.\footnote{"Sed quis istorum modorum Dionysii est prior simpliciter? Dicit doctor quod via efficientiae, quia enim videmus aliquid moveri et causari arguimus primum, et in isto fundatur via finis; nunquam enim finis cognosceretur nisi per effectum efficientis. Et in istis fundatur via eminentiae, quia finis necessario nobilior est his quae sunt ad finem, et sic arguimus ipsum esse nobilissimum. Et exinde amovemus ab eo omnem imperfectionem." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 1, 23 O. See Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio}, \textit{ibid.} p. 189, n. 111.}

Unequal in their capacity to lead us to a knowledge of God as infinite being, these four ways also differ in the type of discursive reasoning they employ. Meyronnes distinguishes between two kinds of discursive knowledge, intuitive and abstractive. The former begins with something known intuitively and ends with something whose existence is not intuited. This is the way we reason to the existence of the power of knowing and of the soul itself from the intuitive knowledge of the act of knowing. Abstractive discursive knowledge, as the term indicates, begins with an object known abstractively, that is to say grasped in its nature, abstracting from existence. In this way we reason to the nature of accidents from the notion of substance. In general, abstractive discursive knowledge starts with an object known abstractively or quidditatively and concludes with the essential properties of that object.\footnote{"Circa primum est sciendum quod quadruplex est notitia. Prima est intuitiva, quae scilicet}
Having no direct intuition of the existence of God, and being unable to know him abstractly through a likeness representing his essence, all our knowledge of him comes through a process of reasoning and falls under one of the types of discursive knowledge. The first two ways to God, through efficient and final causality, are instances of intuitive discursive knowledge. They begin with the existence of motion and causes and conclude with the existence of the first mover and final cause. The ways of eminence and negation follow the pattern of abstractive discursive knowledge. Their starting points are the quiddities or sensible species of corporeal substances, and from them we ascend to spiritual substances and finally to the highest or first cause.  

Thus we reach our most perfect knowledge of God as infinite being, and prove that existence is an essential (per se) property of the divine essence — in short, that infinite being exists — through abstractive discursive reasoning. This clearly falls within the competence of metaphysics and not the philosophy of nature. The latter, according to Meyronnes, reaches the existence of God as prime mover, but because its starting point is not a necessary truth but the contingent fact that there is motion in the world, it does not carry us as far as metaphysics in our investigation of God. In his view, the proof of the existence of a prime mover, as found in Aristotle's

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73 "Primo modo a nobis Deus pro statuo isto non cognoscutur, quia ita, ut supra patuit, est notitia intuitiva. Nec secundo modo de communi lege, quia speciem nullam habemus naturaliter nisi a sensibus causatam. A sensibus autem non imprimitur nobis aliqua species quae sic posset Deum representare. Sed tertio <lege quarto> modo, quia per actum cognoscendi arguimus potentiam, et per potentiam arguimus essentiam, et per istam cognoscimus veram existentiam. Et isto modo incipit et procedit illa via, tam efficientia quam finis secundum Dionysium. Quarto <lege tertio> modo etiam cognoscimus, quia per quidditates vel species sensibiles cognoscimus substantiam corporalem et per istam spiritualarem; et sic summam vel primam causam.

Tenent ergo viae Dionysi per istos duos ultimos modos,quia quando aliquod causatum cognoscimus, quaerimus de causa efficiente et finali usque ad primam in utroque genere. Similiter per viam eminentiam,quia videmus has res deficientes, ideo arguimus aliquod indeficientes. Ex ista sequitur via remotionis, quia primum efficiens et ultimus finis eminens est, ideo ab eo removemus omnes imperfectiones." Sent. I, d. 3, q. 1, 23 NO.
eighth book of the *Physics*, is solid enough, but its method is rather argumentative than demonstrative.\(^{24}\) It is metaphysics that inquires into God as the highest and most noble being.\(^{25}\) Using its method, rather than that of physics, we can demonstrate the existence of God as infinite being.

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With the demonstration of the divine infinity we return to the point where we started: the notion of infinity as a positive divine perfection. This notion is at the basis of the demonstration. Having shown that God is the most eminent and perfect being, it is a simple step for Meyronnes to conclude that he is infinite, given his concept of infinity as a positive mode of the divine being. The ‘amount of perfection’ (\textit{quantitas virtutis}) of the most perfect being is bound to be unlimited. Once this has been shown, it is easy for him to demonstrate the existence and individuality of the infinite being, for these are also positive perfections that must be included in it. They are proved to be necessary properties (\textit{passiones}) of the divine essence, belonging to it in the second mode of \textit{per se} predication.

The reader of Francis of Meyronnes cannot fail to be struck by his orderly and systematic thinking. Deeply imbued with Scotus’ fundamental ideas, this ‘Prince of the Scotists’ wants to put all of them in their proper places and delineate clearly their interconnection. Scotus himself was not always as tidy as this; there are ambiguities and uncertainties in his thought which gave his disciples ample room to interpret him in different and even conflicting ways, and thus display their own originality. So it is with the relation of infinity to the divine essence, and the relation of infinity to the other divine modes. Some Scotists, like Claudius Frassen, refuse to see in infinity simply a mode of the divine essence. While granting that Scotus used this language of infinity, Frassen interprets him to mean that infinity is the formal constituent of the divine essence, distinguishing it fundamentally from all creatures.\(^{26}\) Meyronnes is no less certain of the central role of infinity in the deity, but in his view it has this role as an intrinsic mode, not as a formal or essential factor in God. A mode simply does not function in the way Frassen describes infinity; being outside the formal or quidditative order, it cannot be the formal constituent of the divine essence. As an intrinsic mode it is not included in that essence. And if this is true of infini-

\(^{24}\) \textit{Sent.} Prol. q. 16, 10 C.

\(^{25}\) \textit{Ibid.} q. 14, 8 P.

ty, it must also be true of existence, which is not as directly or closely related to the divine essence as infinity. The notion of existence is not contained in that of the divine essence. In saying this, Meyronnes is faithful to his Scotist principles, but he draws a conclusion from them that Scotus himself would not accept.

Meyronnes displays even more originality in his proofs of the existence and infinity of God. Like Scotus, he looks for demonstrations on the level of metaphysics rather than the philosophy of nature: at best the ‘physical method’ of Aristotle plays a secondary and ancillary role in them. There are clear echoes of Scotus in his proofs, but at the crucial moment of demonstrating God’s infinity he does not turn to his master’s proof based on the possibility of infinite being and concluding with its actual existence. His own proof depends upon the notion of infinity as an unqualified perfection and the necessity of attributing all perfections of this nature to God. Following the way of negation, all imperfections must be denied of God, including finiteness. Here, as elsewhere in his metaphysics, Meyronnes is both a Scotist and an original thinker.

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The Formation and Stability of Marriage in Fourteenth-Century England:
Evidence of an Ely Register

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Among the records that survive from Thomas Arundel's reign as bishop of Ely is a register showing the activities of his consistory court from March 1374 to March 1382.* This volume is a rich source of information on the personnel, procedure and efficiency of diocesan administration, as Margaret Aston's recent and excellent study of Arundel makes clear.¹ It is also possible to use the information supplied by this register to penetrate beneath the machinery of ecclesiastical government, which it describes so well, to the lives of the men and women of the diocese, to see to what extent this government served and guided the faithful and, occasionally, demanded their obedience. Considerable light is thrown on several areas where belief stated itself in daily life; one of them, the marriage practices of the time, is to be examined here. The register makes it possible to draw several useful conclusions on the effect of the theory and the canon law of marriage within the diocese of Ely late in the fourteenth century. Occasionally it becomes possible to move beyond the text of the law to see how it was interpreted by court and people and thus to find rare but valuable indications of the way in which this law was influencing the direction of society's development.

The matter that is to be discussed will be better understood if it is located in the broader historical and cultural panorama of which it is but a tiny part. Moral aspects of family life and marriage were matters of serious consideration by Christians from the beginning. Already, in the apostolic age, certain doctrines, and resulting practices were stated. As time went on and broader experience was gained by the Christian community,

* The collection and interpretation of source material for this article was made possible by a Nuffield Foundation Travel Grant.

the consequences of these doctrines were revealed in greater detail. This 
process of examination and explicitation reached a high point in the work 
of canonists and theologians from the twelfth through the fourteenth cen-
turies. By the time that is of interest to this study the Western Church had 
arrived at a general theory and description of the ends and practice of mar-
riage that can be accepted as the background for all that is written here. 
These included an understanding of the purposes and agreement on the 
main qualities of marriage, a set of regulations establishing the capacity of 
the individual and the couple, extremely important notions on consent as 
that which constituted the marital bond, and formalities for the public 
exchange of this consent. Furthermore, the ecclesiastical courts had a high-
ly developed jurisprudence for dealing with questions of law, a less perfect 
set of procedures for dealing with questions of fact and means for the defence 
and support of the valid marriage.

This doctrine of marriage was slowly incorporated in the local law of 
the Western Church among peoples of widely varied traditions. Some of 
these traditions had contributed to the formation of the general law; 
others were more or less seriously threatened by its application. The pro-
cess of adjustment was continuous and sometimes marred by bitter con-
licts. In the long run the most important development was the adoption 
of the consensual theory of marriage by Alexander III and Innocent III 
and the exploitation of its consequences in the following decades. Not only 
was the consent of the spouses necessary for valid marriage, but in time it 
became evident that the consent of no other person was required. However 
much theologians and canonists stressed the importance of the social con-
trols and supports of marriage they had launched a new set of ideas where-
by marriage would be considered from the point of view of the couple rather 
than from that of the extended family. The potential for an individualistic 
view of marriage in these ideas might not have been realized if the situa-
tion had permitted social controls to intervene later and force withdrawal 
from the union. But since the consensual theory was linked with the teach-
ing that a valid marriage was indissoluble, the possibilities were immense. 
It meant that medieval society had developed a theory of matrimony that 
enabled the individual to escape the control of family, feudal lord and even 
the king in a choice of marriage partner. The extent and the rate at which

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2 This is the way the nurse reacted in *Romeo and Juliet* when Romeo had fled and Count Paris 
asked for Juliet's hand. She knew of the marriage of the young couple but she said: "Romeo is 
banished... Then since the case so stands as now it doth / I think it best you married with 
the Count" (Act 3, Scene v, ll. 215, 218-9).

3 A Juliet might not understand the strength of her position. Though her father could have
the understanding of this freedom spread through medieval society, the extent to which the freedom was used, are problems that remain to be answered. But when viewed in secular terms the consequences of this development are seen to be immense. It is true that there has been considerable ebb and flow as now individualism, now a broader social view of marriage have asserted themselves, but the overall tendency has been in the direction of the individual's freedom. It is unlikely that all the consequences of those twelfth-century decisions have yet been realized in the West though a new contest seems to be prepared as hitherto undreamed of social controls begin to appear among us.

Closely related to the development of the consensual theory was the conclusion that the private or clandestine marriage was valid. In part it was the logical if not very wise consequence of the theologian's teaching that the couple gave the sacrament to each other. Perhaps the canonists' tendency to simplify the required formalities of a legal act contributed to its acceptance. It is very likely that a way was prepared for it among different peoples by the survival of customs whereby men and women entered rather lightly into relationships considerably less serious in consequences and durability than Christian marriage. The danger of abuse was obvious; all through the Middle Ages councils, synods and teachers at every level of instruction thundered against it. But it is significant that however severe the penalties against the principals and all others associated with these marriages there was no serious, long-term questioning of the validity of the act. It would be several centuries before the dilemma of the forbidden possibility would be resolved in a way that respected the unique right to consent by the spouses yet guaranteed sufficient publicity to provide a minimum of social control and support of the marriage.

The history of the theology and the general law of marriage in the Middle Ages has been the subject of careful study during the past two generations.

prevented her from living with Romeo, her conscience, the Church and society as a whole would not let her be Paris' wife. Of course she might be too frightened to try to maintain her position. Margery Paston resisted her mother, brothers, chaplain and bishop to preserve her marriage to Richard Calle: The Paston Letters, nos. 607, 617, ed. J. Gairdner (London, 1872-5, Supplement, 1901; rpt. Edinburgh, 1910), II, 347, 363-6.


5 The teaching of English synods on this matter is to be studied in a forthcoming article "Marriage theory and practice in English synodal statutes".

6 See the bibliography assembled by Jean Dauvillier, Le Mariage dans le droit classique de l'Église depuis le Décret de Gratien (1140) jusqu'à la mort de Clément V (1314) (Paris, 1933), 491-540. Cf. Gabriel Le Bras, "Mariage: la doctrine du mariage chez les théologiens et les canonistes depuis l'an
Already much is known of the application of the general law at the provincial and diocesan levels. The publishing of collections of sermons and, most recently, the beginnings of the study and edition of the *Summae confessorum* have made it possible to observe teaching and moral instruction on marriage at the level of pastoral care. There remains the question of the extent of the influence of this teaching in society; one line of investigation contributing towards the answer is provided by the records of the ecclesiastical courts. It is true that these courts dealt with contentious matters and that their records were accordingly limited to those marriages that were in difficulties. However it is possible to compensate for this bias and extract much valuable information: the scholar makes contact not only with the theory and general rules of marriage and with the more practically oriented advice of the moral guide but also with individual men and women, the problems they met in their marriages and the way in which those problems were resolved. Several recent studies have analysed marriage practice as it appears in court records. These analyses have been soundings, closely limited in time and space, but yielding important information on the application of canon law, illustrating those areas where its rules were an easily accepted organization of life as well as other areas where the law met serious opposition. The Ely register provides information on marital practice over an eight year period in one of the smaller dioceses of England.

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The evidence of the register takes on more meaning if an effort is made to sketch the size and quality of the population involved in the activity of the consistory court. The diocese of Ely corresponded almost exactly with the county of Cambridgeshire. Thirteen parishes on the eastern edge of the county north of Newmarket were an exception. They belonged to the deanery of Fordham in the diocese of Norwich. The surviving poll-tax returns

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of 1377 are excellent for Cambridgeshire. They indicate a population of 30,974 persons, fourteen or over, for that year. J. C. Russell, arriving at a figure of about 50 per cent for those below the age of 14, projects a total of 46,461 laymen.\textsuperscript{10} In addition there were 1006 clerics, with a fairly high concentration of them at Cambridge and Ely, the only large centres of population in the county. Russell has carefully estimated the degree of under-enumeration and concludes that the tax of 1377 is nearest of all taxes of that period to a true estimate of population. He limits under-enumeration to 5 per cent. This amount would be offset, perhaps slightly more than offset, by the loss of the 13 parishes in the deanery of Fordham mentioned above. Thus the court, whose register is under study here, dealt with a population of about 47,500 persons. From the point of view of marriage, the actual figure of the poll tax, 30,974, is a useful one since fourteen was the cut-off age for the survey. The figure of 1006 for the clergy is somewhat uncertain, since it is not possible to say how many of them were married. However, the proportion over-all would be small, so a round figure of 31,000 for those married or eligible to marry can be accepted.

Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, the bishop’s consistory was not the only court of the diocese that brought in judgments in marriage disputes. The other tribunal of the bishop, his court of audience, heard cases occasionally and some of them dealt with problems touching matrimony and divorce.\textsuperscript{11} Usually such disputes passed to the official at some stage of the proceedings and thus came to be included in his register. Furthermore, there are a few disputes that, although the bishop carried them through to judgment, are recorded by the official.\textsuperscript{12} But Miss Aston notes one case where the bishop’s exercise of jurisdiction is mentioned by accident:\textsuperscript{13} she concludes that there were probably others of which there is record neither in the register of the official nor in that of the bishop himself. However, even though this did occur from time to time, direct exercise of jurisdiction by Bishop Arundel seems to have been comparatively rare. Thus the number of unreported marriage cases before the court of audience is not likely to have been large.

The court of the official of the archdeacon of Ely, however, is quite ano-

\textsuperscript{10} J. C. Russell, \textit{British Medieval Population} (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1948), 132 ff.

\textsuperscript{11} Aston, \textit{Arundel}, 39-42.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, 41; e.g., \textit{Fisher}, f. 140r. [Note: the name of one of the principals in marginal rubrics indicates each appearance of a suit in the register; throughout this article, cases will be indicated by the rubric — \textit{as Fisher} — with the number of the folio on which the case first appears. Additional references will be included as necessary.]

\textsuperscript{13} Aston, 41; \textit{Gobat}, f. 149v: "\textit{non curat ducere in uxorem Julianam Bigod... prout alias iuravit et cui fuerat adiudicatus per venerabilem patrem et dominum, dominum Thomam...}"
ther matter. Thirteen of the 122 matrimonial suits that appear in the register involved the revision of sentences by this tribunal. From early in the thirteenth century, in England as on the Continent, efforts had been made to withdraw matrimonial jurisdiction from the archdeacon, but it was not until the settlement made in 1401 by Arundel, when he was archbishop of Canterbury, that this ruling was effectively applied at Ely. No records survive for the archdeacon’s court so that it is impossible to know the number or the types of matrimonial cases that came before it. Given the fact that for some at least this jurisdiction had the advantage of proximity, and — as the official of the bishop stated more than once — of a rather impressionistic sense of justice, it may have received many cases. In fact most of the appeals to the consistory from the archdeacon’s court were in marriage disputes. It seems necessary to conclude that these matters appeared frequently before the court of the archdeacon and that some of them have not been reflected in the register; their number must remain unknown.

Finally, there were the jurisdictions exercised by the sacristan of Ely and the chancellor of the University of Cambridge. The court register includes an appeal from the sacristan’s sentence in a matrimonial case and a statement of April 1376 by the official in which the sentence was not only confirmed but the jurisdiction approved. However the number of suits of this sort does not seem to have been significant. Very little is known of the jurisdiction of the chancellor of the university at this time, though it may be presumed to have had no more than incidental interest in matrimonial cases. Thus it can be concluded that, from the point of view of marriage disputes, the consistory had only one serious competitor, namely, the court of the archdeacon. If the records of this latter jurisdiction had survived, it is likely that marriage cases not accounted for otherwise would be found in considerable numbers. Therefore it is necessary to postulate an increase, perhaps a significant increase, in the number of cases of the type that will be studied in what follows.

14 The following suits were appeals from the court of the archdeacon: Grantsden [Gransden], f. 5v; Male, f. 10r; Bunde, f. 1r; Bargon, f. 46v; Wyldeman, f. 61r; Dymes, f. 61r; Neil, f. 62v; Arneld, f. 85v; Worlich, f. 96v; Martin, f. 113v; Tydd, f. 119r; in addition Chilienne, ff. 103r-v was an ex officio investigation of a decree of annulment by the archdeacon’s court, and Sterre, f. 35v, which began as an instance case, involved the quashing of an earlier decision by the same court. Cf. Aston, 98-109, 129-130; the author mentions twelve appeals, 98-99.


16 Aston, 99, n. 2.

17 Clerk, f. 26v; see Aston, 84-5.
The object of investigation, then, is a population of about 31,000 people of marriageable age seen in terms of the most important local court regulating and applying marriage law. One hundred and twenty-two cases, approximately one-quarter of the business that came before the consistory, dealt with inquiries and disputes about the marriage bond. Directly concerned in these cases were 273 persons. The register ignores question of status completely except in one case where the information that the husband was of servile condition was a fact at issue. However, eighteen of the principals are identified as household servants. Artisans, tavern-keepers and clerks are found in considerable numbers. Scores seem to be peasants attached to manors in the countryside. (Until comparison with manorial court rolls has been made it will not be possible to prove this surmise.) If any social group is likely to be under-represented, it is the well-to-do. Such persons had more direct access to the bishop and would likely avail themselves of the advantage. On the other hand, the consequences of this fact should not be over-stressed for there were powerful reasons urging them to see that decisions touching their cases should be enrolled. The provision of processes in cases of appeal, later questions touching validity, legitimacy of children and the transfer of property at the time of marriage all demanded that a written record survive. Thus it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the principals of the marriage suits that appear in the register form a spectrum that, with the possible under-representation of the upper class, accurately reflects non-clerical Cambridgeshire society as a whole.

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Clandestine marriage had long been a problem in the West. In fact, bishops and councils as well as other teachers had been forbidding it for centuries before the period of the Ely register. Beginning late in the twelfth century local attempts to improve the situation were made by supplementing

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18 519 separate items came before the court; this number includes many non-contentious causes, testament executions, interlocutory appeals etc. Brian Woodcock found that about one-third of the cases before the consistory court at Canterbury during the years 1373-4 were matrimonial suits: Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts of the Diocese of Canterbury (London, 1952), 85.

19 Everard, f. 55Bv; "... idem Johannes tempore dictus contractus ante et post fuit et adhuc est servus et nativus et servilis conditionis".

20 E.g. John Wedon's suit of marriage and divorce against Eleanor Francis and Geoffrey Cobbe, her de facto husband. The suit began before Arundel's commissaries in December, 1378 (Wedon, f. 79v), but the bishop summoned the parties and named the commission on September 10: Register of Thomas Arundel, f. 24v, Cambridge, University Library, Ely Diocesan Records G 1. On Geoffrey Cobbe see Aston, 39, 142.

the oft-repeated prohibition by a positive requirement. These arrangements were characterized by a demand that the local priest make a public announcement of a proposed marriage sufficiently in advance so that anyone who saw reason for objecting to the union would have time to do so. This procedure became of general application with canon 51 of IV Lateran Council. The priest was required to announce the marriage and to investigate the couple's freedom from impediment. Detailed implementation of this ruling was worked out in subsequent years on a local basis. In England the reading of the banns on three Sundays or major feasts had been long in use by the period of interest here. This procedure served two broad purposes: it required the friends and neighbours of the couple to examine the past and report any impediment that prevented marriage; it protected the marriage in the future by increasing its publicity. Thus the reading of the banns not only tended to prevent the duplicity to which the couple might be tempted; it also helped them to avoid the dangers of ignorance and the self-deception to which they were prone before marriage and after it.

The implementation of this system is illustrated in detail in the Ely register. Occasionally, objection to a proposed marriage seems to have been made on the spot. The point is illustrated by the following: "In the publication of banns in the chapel of March between John Dany and Alice Lenton of March, in the diocese of Ely, a certain Joan Gibbe, also of March, opposed the banns, making a claim. Because of this, she was cited before us... the Thursday after the feast of St. Hilary [January 15], 1377, in the church of the Holy Trinity in the city of Ely, to propose and show the cause of her claim in legal form. The said day and place she appeared before us personally and proposed as the cause of her claim that she and John had contracted marriage. Therefore she asked that John be judged her husband." In other words, Alice alleged pre-contract with John and, in effect, accused him of attempting bigamy. In such cases, as here, the court proceeded to hear her claim as in an instance suit. At other times, objection to a proposed marriage was delayed. The information conveyed in the banns would spread beyond the circle of hearers to others who might be aware of an impediment. Eventually the pastor would be informed; he was expected to refuse to solemnize the marriage.

23 Thomas of Chobham adds that those who hear the banns should speak against the marriage immediately; afterwards they may not object (146-7); cf. X, iv, 18, 6.
24 Dany gibbe, f. 61v.
25 Contract is expressed: "per verba de presenti mutuum consensum eorum exprimentia, seu per verba de futuro, carnali copula subsecuta". This clause is discussed below, p. 244.
26 E.g., in January, 1375, John Slory and Joan, daughter of John Feltwell, both of Chesterton,
The register includes twelve suits that rose from objections to marriage following the reading of the banns. In six cases, the objectors (two men and four women) claimed pre-contract. Five failed to prove their allegation.\textsuperscript{27} In another case that did not come to sentence in the period of the register, a proposed marriage was met by several objections, including pre-contract of the woman and affinity arising from her sexual union with a man related to her proposed husband within the forbidden degree.\textsuperscript{28} The impediment of affinity appears in four other cases as well. In three of the four, the allegation was proved, so the parties were not allowed to marry.\textsuperscript{29} The same result occurred in a single example of an objection based on the consanguinity of the couple.\textsuperscript{30} Thus it appears from this small sampling that objections to proposed marriages on the basis of an impediment of consanguinity or affinity was more likely to prove effective than those based on a claim of pre-contract. Since claims of the latter type led to suits before the court it is probable that all or nearly all objections based on pre-contract were included in the register. On the other hand, the discovery of impediments of consanguinity and affinity resulting from the publications of the banns may well be under-reported, since it is likely that such revelation sometimes led to a decision to abandon the marriage so that the matter ended without leaving a trace.\textsuperscript{31}

If no objection were raised to a proposed union announced in the banns, the couple solemnized their marriage by an exchange of consuet before the Church (\textit{coram facie ecclesie}). The reading of the banns and this public religious act constituted the duly solemnized marriage; all other unions were clandestine. This distinction between the solemn and the clandestine is a commonplace in the history of the canon law of marriage. However, it is a drastic simplification, one which can easily lead to misunderstanding,

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Sedleere}, f. 47v; \textit{Patashull}, f. 57v; \textit{Dany gibbe}, ff. 61v-62r; \textit{Blofeld}, f. 90r; \textit{Myntemor}, f. 137v.

\textsuperscript{28} The objection was successful in \textit{Fisher}, ff. 82v, 111r.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Andrew}, f. 149v.

\textsuperscript{29} Marriage was forbidden in \textit{Story}, f. 108r; \textit{Page}, f. 113r and \textit{Byleye} [Biley], ff. 135v-137v. It was allowed in \textit{Barbour}, f. 152r. Penance was given to Alice Cok, who seems to have been responsible for the objection. It should be noted that the register usually mentions earlier marriages; there is no indication of this in these affinity cases. Thus there is reason to conclude that the impediment arose from fornication. On the other hand, no penances were assigned.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Stanhard}, f. 95v.

\textsuperscript{31} Thus \textit{Stanhard} could easily have disappeared from view. It came before the court because the couple considered the vicar of Bourn to have refused to solemnize after reading the banns "absque causa rationabili quacumque"; cf. ff. 106r, 130v.
not only of the law, but especially of the social history and the sacramental theology of the time. The term ‘clandestine’ includes a bewildering variety of forms for exchanging consent and rather hard questions have to be asked of the accepted notion of a solemn marriage. As it happens, the opening stages of most of the marriage cases in the Ely register were pleaded orally. Much of the discussion of the way in which couples proceeded to marriage survives there. Thus it is possible to illustrate the various procedures whereby the nuptial bond was established.

At one extreme was the marriage exactly in accord with the demands of canon law and local custom. After financial arrangements had been made by the families concerned, the betrothal took place. This consisted of a promise to marry (per verba de futuro) and often was expressed as a form of words before witnesses. Next the banns were read in the parish church. If no objection to the marriage resulted, or if objections had been dealt with in a satisfactory way, the couple publicly solemnized their union by an exchange of consent (per verba de presenti) at the church door. This would be seen as the moment when the sacrament was given by the couple to each other. The ceremonies before witnesses included the endowment of the bride, her delivery by her father to her husband, and various rituals, including a form of words and the giving of a ring. Finally, the bridal party entered the church for the nuptial mass.

Such was the duly performed marriage. But, given the distinction between requirements for liceity and those for validity, a profound, though not necessarily a visible, change could be introduced into this pattern at any point. Betrothal followed by intercourse became marriage. The contract per verba de presenti could be entered into before the public event at the door of the church whenever the couple chose. However difficult such acts might be to defend or prove in the public forum, they were considered to be valid, and theologians as well as others of informed and refined con-

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32 Note the use of the term in the following: in May, 1376, John, son of Thomas Lister and Margaret, step-daughter of Robert Ballard, were cited "super contractu matrimoniali inter cosdem, ut dicitur, clandestine inito". They replied that they were married "per verba de presenti... non tamen clandestine, sed publice, testibus adhibitis, premessa debita bannorum editione". The court decided for the marriage and ordered it to be solemnized: Lister, f. 47v.

science would insist that they were so. Furthermore, conditions of family consent, financial arrangements, etc. could be inserted in the proceedings and the realization of the condition might not be possible until after the event at the church door. In fact, in one sense the banns themselves became a condition. Thus in seven of the cases mentioned above, where the reading of the banns led to a challenge of the proposed marriage, the notes on the case reveal that the contract per verba de presenti had occurred before the banns were read. In two other cases where the completion of solemnization was delayed after the banns, the cause of delay seems to have been second thoughts on the part of one of the principals. But the development of the suits shows that the court considered the marriages to have been validly contracted already. In the first of these suits, Joan sought to avoid completing the marriage after the banns were read, having discovered that John Everard, with whom she had exchanged consent, was a serf. The formula of consent repeated to the court by Joan is somewhat vague and could be interpreted as a promise per verba de futuro. But John’s description, though it lacks the freshness of Joan’s words, being expressed in the general formula, makes it clear that he considered the contract to have been per verba de presenti. This reading of the text is supported by the fact, that, having satisfied itself that John’s status was known before the exchange of consent, the court declared the couple man and wife, ordering them to solemnize their marriage. In a similar situation though one with different ramifications, William de Potton and Agnes Knotte were said to have exchanged consent before witnesses and to have had intercourse. But after the banns were read, William entered the hospital of St. John, Cambridge, was professed and received the subdiaconate. The court pronounced for their

34 The court’s clear understanding of this fact is illustrated by Stanhurd, f. 95v. The record begins: “Ad nostrum nuper pervenit audium quod Thomas, filius Johannis Stanhurd, et Agnes, filia Johannis Molt de Brunne, matrimonium ad invicem per verba de presenti mutuum consensum corundem exprimentia legitime contraexerunt...” The court judged that the vicar of Bourn acted correctly in refusing to solemnize the marriage and concluded “ideo matrimonium inter vos contractum, si quis initus fuerat, non posse subsistere nec debere” (f. 119v). Also Blaefeld, f. 90r; Slove, f. 108r; Page, f. 118r; Byleye, f. 136v; Mynsemor, f. 137v; Barbou, f. 152v.

35 Everard, f. 55Bv: “Johanna... fatebatur quod contraexerunt sub forma que sequitur et non alio modo; dicitus Johannes quesivit ab eadem sub ista forma: ‘Vis te habere me in virum’; et ipsa respondit ‘Sic’; et quod placuit sibi. Fatetur etiam dicit Johanna quod postea procurarunt hanna edi in facade ecleseie”.

36 John claimed “matrimonium ad invicem per verba de presenti mutuum consensum corundem exprimentia contraexerunt, quem quidem contractum utrique corum in alterius et aliorum fideig-norum presencia fateabantur et recognoverunt et super quibus publica firma dinosicitur laborare” (ibid.).

37 Ff. 58v-59r.
marriage, declaring William’s religious profession and reception of orders to have been invalid.  

From examples such as these — and there are many more — it becomes evident that in some cases the reading of the banns and the solemn exchange of consent before the Church, acts that in sequence and form may have seemed correct realizations of the canon law of marriage, were actually the publicity of an act that, so far as validity was concerned, was already complete.  

There are certain analogies here with transfers of land in the twelfth century, where the ritual attending the preparation and transfer of a charter was but the preparation of an undying memory of a legal act that had occurred some time before.

Although some of the defendants summoned before the Ely consistory showed a rather nonchalant attitude to the banns, the general impression is that when they were used they proved to be an effective weapon against the abuses to which the clandestine union lent itself. For that reason many sought to avoid the banns. This was true not only of the large group that avoided religious ceremonies entirely, but also of some of those who for various reasons chose to exchange consent solemnly before the Church. This effectiveness of the publication of the banns as contrasted with the solemn exchange of consent — an act that proved more amenable of convenient adjustment — is revealed not only in local English law but also in the day-by-day activity of the Ely court.

_Cum inhibitio_, canon 51 of IV Lateran Council, prescribed the publication of a couple’s intent to marry — the procedure that became known as the publication of banns. In this canon, the new provision was situated within the broader context of a general prohibition of clandestine marriage (including the punishment of those who presumed to marry secretly or in spite of objection to the announcement of their intention), the legal status of their children, and the suppression of clergy who disobeyed the ruling of the council. In 1328, _Cum inhibitio_ was cited in a statute of Archbishop Simon Mepham.  

But here all interest was focussed on the banns as the

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38 Pottou Knotte, f. 139r.

39 See Esmein, _Le Mariage en droit canonique_, I, 207-9. Homans, _English Villagers_, 164, cited examples of this form of marriage in the sixteenth century and suggested that it might have been found in thirteenth-century England as well.

40 Loveshild, f. 137v: the couple agreed that they had contracted _de presenti_ and the husband said the banns were read, though the wife denied it; Halfpeny, f. 29r: the couple admitted contract _de presenti_ and intercourse and that "iuraverunt de dictum matrimonium sollemnizando in facie ecclesiae", but four years had elapsed without their doing so; Page, f. 113r: the couple contracted marriage in May, 1377 and objection to the reading of their banns reached the court in March, 1379.

means of avoiding the dangers of clandestine marriage; thus though the Lateran canon was to be explained to the people in the vernacular, what was specified was the reading of the banns and the punishment of priests who took part in marriage contracts not preceded by publication. One further precision was included: marriages were to be celebrated in churches or chapels of parochial right. Otherwise, the priest, whether secular or religious, had to obtain the licence of the bishop. The implication, that those planning marriage were sometimes moving the solemnization of their union away from their parish church became explicit in *Humana concupiscen
tia*, a canon of Archbishop John Stratford’s provincial council of London, 1342. In a remarkable introduction to this canon several interesting reflections were made on the effectiveness of public control of marriage through the banns and on the desirability of solemnization before the Church. It is stated that many persons, seeking the respectability that the solemn act gave their union, but aware of an impediment and of the fact that local publication of their intent would render solemnization impossible, went to a distant place where they were unknown and there married before a priest, without banns and at unsuitable times and seasons. They would then live as man and wife either in the place of marriage or in their original parish. Admitting that court procedures had proved unable to deal with the problem, the council decreed major excommunication, *ipsa
to facto*, of those who proceeded in this manner and of priests who assisted at such unions. The same penalty was applied to any priest who solemnized the marriage of non-parishioners without permission of those charged with their care; this penalty was to be incurred even if the marriage were licit.\(^42\)

Violation of *Humana concupiscentia* was a main point at issue in ten of the marriage cases that came before the Ely consistory. The unworthy motive for solemnization mentioned by the canon is found, though the obstacles it was used to overcome were sometimes quite different: marriages were solemnized in this way in an attempt to override an objection made explicit after the publication of banns or to present the court with a *fuit accompli*, when a marriage was under its scrutiny. One case in the register, that of John Anegold and Joan Andrew, seems to have been exactly as described in the introduction to *Humana concupiscentia*. When summoned, they admitted that, although they were aware of the impediment between them, they left the diocese and in a place where they were unknown, solemnized their marriage without a licence. They were declared excommunicated and, when they sought reconciliation, were assigned penance. The penance was performed.\(^43\) The case of John Slory and Joan, widow of John Feltwell

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\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*, II, 707. Mepham’s rule on marriage in churches of parochial right was repeated.

\(^{43}\) *Anegold*, l. 108v.
began in exactly the same way. However, as the suit developed, it became clear that the banns had been published and that it was only after some time that the vicar of Chesterton learned that there seemed to be an impediment of affinity between them. Acting as *Humana concupiscentia* said they should, the vicar and his chaplain refused to solemnize the marriage. The couple then left the diocese, were married in contravention of the statute and returned home to live as man and wife until summoned by the court. What seems to be involved in this case is less a desire to comply with the requirements of canon law than an attempt to use them to obtain a form of public approval for their marriage that could override the opposition to it that became explicit with the reading of the banns.

A somewhat different purpose may lie behind a series of events involving Hugh Candlesby, registrar of the archdeacon of Ely. When the banns of his marriage to Alice, widow of James le Eyr (alias, James Fisher) were published, Agnes Pateshull objected. Summoned before the court she claimed pre-contract with Hugh and added that he intended to complete the publication of banns in the privacy that an unusual time — vespers of a feast — allowed, and then solemnize his marriage in spite of her claim. Agnes asked the court to inhibit solemnization or any other contract. This was done under pain of major excommunication. Agnes was given her day in court but Hugh denied her claim. She had to admit that there was no proof and the case went against her. In spite of all, Hugh and Alice had gone ahead with their plans, finding an available priest in Hugh's friend, John Grebby, commissary of the archdeacon's official. There are many unanswered problems in this case, but some points can be made. First, Hugh seems to have tried to achieve something close to a proper publication of banns by the adjustment mentioned above. Further, it is likely that he tried to strengthen his position against Agnes by presenting the court with a *fait accompli*, his solemnized union with Alice. As matters developed, this was unnecessary, but there is a hint that Agnes presented a weaker case


45 *Pateshull*, ff. 57v-58r.

46 Here there is an intimation that if Hugh and Alice solemnized their marriage Agnes' position would be weaker. This notion that the fact of solemnization strengthened the case for a marriage occurs frequently. In *Kele*, f. 149v, where William Kele sought the annulment of his marriage to his wife Helen, claiming pre-contract and intercourse with Alice Burgoyne, Helen presented a single defence: "idem Robertus ipsam duxit in facie ecclesie in uxorem secuta debita sollemnitate". The case was not carried further in the register.

47 *Candlesby*, f. 58r; on Hugh, see *Aston*, 77-79, 97, 121-6, 142-3.
than was possible to her, so that the solemnization of the marriage may have been but one of Hugh’s lines of defence.\footnote{Agnes said that she could not prove her marriage to Hugh; the register continues: “iuratisque partibus predictis de malicia et de collusione vitanda; idem dicunt sicut prius” (f. 58r). The oaths \textit{de colomniosa} et \textit{de veritate dicenda} were taken at the usual place in proceedings, after the \textit{litis contestatio}. The oaths \textit{de malicia} and \textit{de collusione} were required during Agnes’ first term after she announced her inability to prove her claim. Hugh had already married Alice by this time. Miss Aston rightly surmised that Hugh’s escapade is to be related to the decision at the synod of May, 1377 to republish \textit{Humana concupiscentia} (p. 76).}

Whatever the motives of this rather sinister man may have been, the attempt to use the fact of solemnization to influence the decision of the court is well illustrated by the troubles of John Draper of Cambridge in the summer of 1375. Agnes Durant and Alice Cakebred launched two suits claiming him as husband on June 6.\footnote{\textit{Cakebred}, f. 48r; \textit{Durant}, f. 48r. The suits coalesced at the moment of sentence; f. 52v.} Agnes claimed contract \textit{de presenti}, which John denied. Alice claimed contract and intercourse; to this John agreed. Alice then went with John to her home parish in the diocese of London and there they solemnized marriage, contravening the statute “\textit{ut sub matrimonii velamine possent carnis copulam perniciosam et illicitam liberius adimplere.”}\footnote{\textit{Draper Cakebred}, f. 53r. In Wilkins \textit{Concilia}, II, 707, the phrase from the introduction to \textit{Humana concupiscentia} is “\textit{ut sub matrimonii contecti velamine possint carnis operam perniciosam et illicitam liberius adimplere}.”} After an interval they returned to Cambridge and lived as husband and wife. They must have enjoyed their new status only a few days for on July 5 they were brought before the official, to whom they confessed what they had done. On July 21 excommunication was pronounced; five days later the court brought in a decision in favour of the marriage of Agnes Durant and John.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Grantsden}, f. 5r and \textit{Bonde}, f. 11r.}

A variation of this abuse of solemnization is found in a few cases where the intervention of the court threatened to enforce a contract of dubious status. Thus early in July, 1375, John Saffrey and Alice, daughter of Richard Molt, were cited \textit{ex officio} about a clandestine marriage of which there was rumour.\footnote{\textit{Soffrey}, f. 27r.} John claimed contract; Alice proved difficult to bring into court and was declared contumacious. Finally after a month, she appeared, promised obedience to the decisions of the consistory and was absolved. October 5 was set as the date of her reply to John’s claim, but in the interval she solemnized marriage with William Martín. Her father seems to have arranged the wedding; he, as well as the couple, was excommunicated.\footnote{They claimed that the case was pending before the archdeacon’s court. John Saffrey’s suit continued for six months but Alice never appeared. The case then disappeared from the register: f. 40v.}

\footnote{\textit{Cakebred}, f. 48r; \textit{Durant}, f. 48r. The suits coalesced at the moment of sentence; f. 52v.}
Another form of this type of case first appears in the register in July, 1380, as an inquiry of Stephan Gobat, why he did not take Juliana Bigod as wife as he had sworn to do after a sentence by the bishop. Gobat replied that he could not marry her because of affinity between them, resulting from Juliana's earlier carnal union with William Attemor, to whom he was related within the forbidden degree. The case took a new turn in March, 1381, when Stephan Pertefeu claimed contract de presenti with Juliana, asking that she be judged his wife. Whether Juliana found some way of winning Gobat's heart is unclear, but on April 5, when the suit next appeared before the court, he withdrew his statement that he was related to Attemor within the forbidden degree and claimed that his marriage to Juliana was prior to her contract with Pertefeu. On May 3 they left Sawston and went to the parish of Westley, where their marriage was solemnized before witnesses. Three weeks later they admitted the fact before the court and were declared excommunicated in virtue of Humana concupiscentia. Finally, on November 12, the court brought in its sentence: the earlier objection of an impediment of affinity was vindicated and Pertefeu was declared Juliana's husband.

Thus the abuse of solemnization went considerably beyond that indicated in the introduction to Humana concupiscentia, occurring not only where the publication of banns would make impediments explicit but especially where the impossibility of marriage had become public knowledge or was under examination by the court. Given the rapid and strict manner with which these ceremonies were dealt by the Ely consistory, it is not easy to see why they were attempted. One fact remains clear, however: though many men and women of that age sought to avoid marriage before the Church, there were more than a few who tried to use the ceremony to avoid the very control of marriage that solemnization was intended to provide.

Complete or partial performance of the formalities required by the Church is characteristic of the marriages discussed thus far. The couples in question may have published their banns and exchanged consent solemnly before the Church in the ordinary course of their courtship, or they may have been driven by circumstances to a solemnization that they would have preferred to avoid. In either case public canonical formalities were executed. Many other suits came before the consistory that revealed marriages in

54 Gobat, f. 143r.
55 Pertefeu, f. 148r.
56 Pertefeu, ff. 149r, 150v, 155v. Neither Juliana nor Gobat were present in court for sentence. A note for execution continued in the register until February, 1382, when an inhibition was received from the court of Canterbury (Gobat, f. 160v). The register ends with the entry for the next consistory so it is not possible to trace the suit further.
which such procedures were completely absent. This is the large and rather complex category of the clandestine marriage. When these unions are examined in the light of the Ely register it is found that, while they did indeed lack the formalities required by canon law, it would be a serious error to conclude that they were performed without ceremony or ritual. In fact, many of them were formal public acts that satisfied the couple that they had entered a contract, assured them of witnesses and made it possible for the marriage to be generally known in the neighbourhood.

In the cases involving clandestine marriages that came before the Ely consistory the contract between the couple was sometimes described with considerable care. The most common type was the contract *per verba de presenti*. The register indicated that about half of these unions were consummated. The betrothal or promise to marry, rendered a binding, permanent union by intercourse, is found less frequently. In about thirty cases an omnibus phrase was used that guaranteed the existence of contract in one form or another: “matrimonium ad invicum per verba de presenti, mutuum consensum eorumdem exprimientia, seu per verba de futuro, carnali copula subsecuta, legitime contraxerunt.” Fourteen of the contracts examined by the court were conditional.

In many cases it can be shown that the clandestine contract was made in a series of acts involving forms of words and ritual actions. A good example is provided in the evidence of Alexander Wrighte and Isabel, daughter of Joan of Wisbech, when they appeared to answer an inquiry about their reputed marriage: “fatebantur quod vir dixit mulieri ista verba, ‘Vis tu esse uxor mea?’ et ipsa respondit quod sic. Et tunc dixit Alexander affidavit dictam Isabellaam quod ipsam duceret in uxorem et strinxerunt manum

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57 E.g., *Lister*, f. 47v: “fatebantur se matrimonium ad invicum contraxisse per verba de presenti”.
58 E.g., *Symond*, f. 28v: “fatentur quod contraxerunt matrimonium ad invicum per verba de presenti; mutuum consensum eorumdem exprimientia, carnali copula subsecuta”.
59 The usual expression as in *Colas*, f. 161r, is “contraxterunt ad invicum per verba de futuro, carnali copula subsecuta”. Cf. *Leicester*, f. 55Ar: “fatebantur quod promiserunt se mutuo se invicem habituros in virum et uxorem et quod postmodum inter eos carnalis copula sepuls intervenit.” The term “ponsalia” occurs occasionally, as in *Sadelere*, f. 47r.
60 *Band*, f. 39r; cf. *Sterre*, f. 35v. A similar clause is often used in reporting the opening stage of *ex officio* suit in the register. Thus in *Saffrey*, f. 27r: “Fama publica referente, ad nostrum pervenit auditum quod Johannes Saffrey de Wynepol et Alicia, filia Ricardi Molt de Wendeye, dioecesis Eliensis, matrimonium ad invicum clandestine contraxerunt per verba de presenti seu per verba de futuro, carnali copula subsecuta, nec curant dictum matrimonium in facie ecclesie, iuxta ritum ecclesie facere solemnizari.” The more common form employed in the register is “[N] citatus super contracta matrimoniali... fama publica referente”; e.g., *Bocher*, f. 11v.
61 Examples are given below, p.246. On the special group of cases where the condition was future intercourse, see below, pp. 234-235.
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in manu, et fatentur quod dictus Alexander dedit eidem Isabelle munera, videlicet, unum flameolum et unum loculum”.

Several moments can be distinguished in the proceedings that are described here. First, there was Alexander’s question of Isabel and her indication of a desire to marry him. Next, Alexander pledged to marry her, probably in a form of words that is omitted; at the same time there was a ritual joining of hands. The third moment involved the endowment of Isabel with a kerchief and a little chest.

Several forms of words are given in the register; with minor variations most of them can be reduced to two types, those stating a promise of marriage and those indicating contract de presenti. The former, the evidence of those all too fragile agreements followed by sexual union, are the most frequently reported in detail. Such are the words “Hic fides mea: habebo te in uxorem et nullam aliam”, that Katherine, daughter of Geoffrey Bugge alleged were said to her by John Rigges. A form of words expressing contract de presenti is found in the evidence that John Page and Margery Chapman gave during the suit that began as a result of their belated publication of bans: “contraxerunt ad invicem matrimonium per ista verba: ‘Accipio te in virum et ad hoc do tibi fidem meam’; et ‘Ego accipio te in uxorem et ad hoc do tibi fidem meam’; et quod posuit dicte Margerie annulum in digito; et postmodum cem carnaliter cognovit”. In some cases it is difficult to decide to what type of contract a form of words belongs. In the Lovechild case, for example, Tilla Taillor’s version of the contract de presenti was explicit: “contraxerunt ad invicem matrimonium per ista verba ‘Ego accipio te in uxorem meam’; et ‘Ego accipio te in virum meum’”. But John Lovechild’s information was less clear: “Johannes fatetur quod ipse dixit eidem Tille ista verba ‘Volo te habere in uxorem’ et quod ipsa consentiit”. Is “Volo” in John’s phrase meant to imply a promise to marry in the future or, as is more likely, does it mean “I want you to be my wife now”? A similar difficulty appears in the ex officio inquiry about the clandestine marriage of John Saffrey and Alice, daughter of Richard Molt. John described the formalities: “contraxerunt per ista, videlicet, verba: ‘Volo te habere in virum’; et ‘Ego volo te habere in uxorem’; et adhuc mutuo dederunt fidem,

62 Wrights, f. 25v.

63 Riggis, f. 8r. Some variations: Fordham, f. 69r: “... fatentur quod promiserunt se invicem ducturos in virum et uxorem sub ista forma ‘Ego volo habere te in virum’, et ‘Ego volo habere te in uxorem’; fatebantur etiam quod postea se invicem carnaliter cognoverunt”; Snow, f. 98v: Agnes claimed “quod ipse Johannes et Agnes matrimonium ad invicem contraxerunt per ista verba ‘Num quam ducam aliam nisi te, nec capellanus […] pro me, et ad hoc do tibi fidem meam, carnali copula subsecuta’”. The meaning of “nec capellanus pro me” is not clear.

64 Page, f. 113r.

65 Lovechild, f. 137v.
tenendo manum in manu”. Here as in the account of the Wrighte case, quoted in the previous paragraph, the form of words and ritual acts are described, but it is not clear whether the joining of hands related to a promise to marry or to a plighting of troth de presenti. This uncertainty must have been fairly widespread where unsophisticated men and women, moved by what desires and pressures, tried to establish a relationship within the categories and the procedures demanded by a custom that in part was the debris of a culture that no longer existed and in part was a ritual statement of a new and vastly different view of marriage.

The form of words used in conditional contracts also maintained the distinction between the promise to marry and the contract de presenti. As the logic of the situation would lead one to expect, conditional contracts de futuro were the more common. Thus in one of the rare cases where family consent was involved, John Borewelle informed the court “quod promisit ipsam Margaretam ducere in uxorem sub ista condicione et forma ‘Volo habere te in uxorem meam si parentes mei consentiant’. Fatetur etiam quod ipsa respondit ‘Volo te habere in virum meum’”. A similar condition appears in the Bradeno case, though this time it was attached to a contract that is called de presenti. Phillip, son of Richard Bradeno, informed the court “quod ipse et prefata Johanna matrimonium ad invicem contra-xerunt per verba de presenti mutuum consensum eorum exprimentia, vide-licet, per ista verba ‘Ego volo habere te in uxorem’; et super hoc posuit

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66 Saffrey, f. 27r.

67 This is illustrated by the questioning of Margery Paston by the bishop of Norwich about her agreement with Richard Calle. The bishop “said that he would understand the words that she had said to him [Calle], whether it made matrimony or not”. The letter continues: “And she rehearsed what she had said, and said if tho words made it not sure she said boldly that she would make it surer ere than she went thence; for she said she thought in her conscience she was bound, whatsoever the words war”. See Norman Davis, ed., The Paston Letters: a Selection in Modern Spelling (London, 1963), 182; in Gairdner’s edition, the letter is no. 617, Vol. II, 364. The court’s activity itself illustrates the difficulty. The Wrighte case entered the register May 24, 1375. The court was to pronounce on the couple’s confession the next day. Though the suit was noted in each case the day after it appeared until after October 25, 1380, it made no further progress. In many cases the present or future meaning of “volo” is clear from the context.


69 Borewel, ff. 73v-74r. Cf. Lyngced, f. 154v: “Volo te ducere in uxorem si bene facias”. In the Lunegdon case, the condition was the bride’s freedom to marry. Two slightly different versions of the form were given; they provide the same information and give reason for thinking that the forms of words were reported carefully. John Luneged said that he contracted with the words: “Si sis libera ab omni viro, volo te habere in uxorem”. In Margaret’s version he said: “Hic fides mea, volo ducere te in uxorem meam et nunquam ducam alienam nisi te, si sis libera ab alii”. John added “quod ipsa nihil respondit”. They had intercourse; but Margaret was not free: Lunegedon, f. 71v.
fidel suam in manus eiusdam Johannis filii Thome de March; et "Ego volo habere te in virum". Joan did not object to the form of words but pointed out that the contract was conditioned by her parents' consent.  

As will be evident from the above quotations, the register contains information on the use of formal actions as well as forms of words in clandestine marriages. The oath or pledge, which in most cases was part of the contract de presenti seems to have included the joining of hands and, in two cases, the pledge was delivered by a third person. In the Page suit the pledging is associated with the gift and reception of a ring. Finally, as in the gift of a kerchief and a coffer by Alexander Wrighte, the ancient ritual that survived in the liturgy as the endowment of the bride at the church door continued to find a place in some clandestine ceremonies.

Descriptions of the contracts establishing clandestine marriages sometimes included information on the circumstances in which the exchange of consent occurred. A good example is provided by the description of proceedings in the Band case where the circumstances of the contract and their consequences are set out in detail: "Thomas et Isabella matrimonium ad invicem per verba de presenti mutuum consensum corundum experimienta, seu per verba de futuro, carnali copula subsecuta, legitime confraterunt, quem quidem contractum uterque corum in alterius et aliorum fide dignorum presencia ex certa scientia fatabatur, recognovit, innovavit et publicavit, super quibus laborat publica vox et fama in villis de Chestreford, Trippe-lawe et locis aliis convicinis". Several important points should be noticed in this text. First, a consensual notion of marriage is apparently involved: it is made clear that both principals were present and that each of them spoke the words of contract, understanding their import. Second, the act was performed in the presence of witnesses. Finally, the fact of the contract between the couple was successfully communicated to their circle of acquaintances.

70 "Johanna... fatabatur contractum matrimoniale inter eos initum sub ista conditione, si parentes illius Johannae consenserint": Bradenho, f. 119v.

71 But the Wrighte case, cited above, n. 62 might have been a contract de futuro. It included an affidavit.

72 In Jan van Eyck's painting in the National Gallery, London (no. 186), the gesture of Giovanni Arnolfini and Jeanne de Chenamy may indicate this moment in a clandestine contract. The place and formality of the scene, the single candle and the presence of third parties support this interpretation of the painting. Cf. Erwin Panofsky, "Jan van Eyck's Arnolfini Portrait", Burlington Magazine, 64 (1934), 117-127.

73 Bradenho, f. 119v, Bradenham, f. 144r. Homans associated the manu media with the betrothal (English Villagers, 161) but both these contracts were specifically stated to be de presenti. Note, however, that they were conditioned contracts.

74 Page, f. 119v.

75 Band, f. 39r; cf. variant form in Sterre, f. 35r.
Enough has been written above to explain the role of the couple in the ritual of the marital contract. However, one clause from the account of the Band marriage requires comment. The words “fatebatur, recognovit, innovavit et publicavit” are redolent of the acts of purchase and donation found in land charters; it would not be unreasonable to suspect that such clauses had become de cursu and that they should not be stressed as an indication of the publicity of the marriage in question. On the other hand, when the clause is examined in the accounts of other contracts, it becomes evident that there is a variety in the verbs chosen, a possible indication of a variety of modes of publicity. Furthermore it can be shown that the notions of repetition, acknowledgement, confirmation and publication are not unfttingly applied to some of the clandestine contracts, for the process is described. The notion of repetition of a contract de futuro appears with pathetic clarity in the case of John Borewelle and Margaret Stistede, discussed above among the conditional contracts. John said that he promised marriage with Margaret if his family (parentes) consented, and that afterwards they had intercourse. Margaret maintained the promise and sexual union but denied the condition. More information became available the following day when John admitted that they had exchanged promises several times and that, on one of these occasions, before seeking the consent of his circle (amicorum), he and Margaret had intercourse. An even more clear demonstration of this point is found in the case of John Webster and Isabel, daughter of John Herberd. The couple informed the consistory that they contracted de presenti and had intercourse on the feast of St. Michael, 1380, and that later they confirmed, published and repeated the contract in the presence of witnesses. Here we find a secret exchange of consent.

"This is clear in the claim of a pre-contract with John Russel launched by Alice, daughter of Robert Borewell. She admitted “se non posse dictum precontractum aliunde quam per confessiones partium probare, quia non interfuerunt testes”. Eighteen months later she began another instance. This time her libellus employed phrases implying exchange of consent before witnesses: “... quem quidem precontractum uterque eorum, videlicet Johannes et Alicia, in alterius et aliorum fideignorum presencia fatebatur et cognovit, publicavit, innovavit etc”. The claim was rejected with costs against her. She appealed. See Borewelle, ff. 67v, 98v, 134r.

"Sterre, f. 35r, reads: “... ex certa scientia fatebatur et cognovit et super quibus etc”.

"Borewelle, f. 74r: “dictus Johannes iterum fatebatur quo diversis vicibus sicut premittitur ad invicem contraxerunt, et dicit quod una vice sic contraxit et ante requisitionem consensus amicorum ipsam Margaretam carnaliter cognovit”. The court found for the marriage and ordered solemnization.

"Webster, f. 149r; “... matrimonium ad invicem contraxerunt per verba de presenti munuum consensum eorumdem exprimentia, carnali copula subsecuta, et dicit quod sic contraxerunt in festo Sancti Michaels, ad. 1380, et ipsum contractum postea innovanunt, publicarunt et recitatarunt ac fataebantur et recognoverunt, utrique, videlicet, in alterius et aliorum presentia, et super premissa laborat publica vox et fama”.

and a later, public repetition of it that is very much like the process illustrated above, where it was shown that the reading of the banns and the ceremony before the Church were sometimes the publishing of a marriage that already existed.

The presence of witnesses was valued by the couple for many reasons, not least of all as proof of the fact that they had exchanged consent. The frequent successful defence of a clandestine marriage before the Ely consistory is clear evidence of the role played by witnesses in this regard. Furthermore, the witnesses were the route whereby knowledge of the union of the couple passed to relatives and neighbours so that their circle considered them to be man and wife. The court itself admitted the cogency of this publica vox et fana; many of the office inquiries came before the court on the basis of such information. Couples used this common opinion about them as an argument for the existence and the validity of the contract they sought to defend. In one case the litigants were careful to point out that public knowledge of their marriage existed before there was any questioning of the contract.

In the Wrighte case, analysed in some detail above, we are told of a form of words, the joining of hands and the endowment of the woman, but there is no mention of witnesses. This may be an example of a fully clandestine contract. The case does not develop further, however, so it is impossible to be certain. In many other cases the exchange of consent was admitted to have been a purely private affair. If both parties admitted the union it was usually accepted by the court. Occasionally a means was found to vindicate such a contract even in face of a denial, but usually such cases ended with the admission by the claimant that contract could not be proved because no witnesses were present.

From the many examples that have been assembled above, it will be evident that clandestine marriages occurred frequently in the area and period under study. Yet it may prove surprising to learn how numerous they were. There were 122 cases dealing with the existence or creation of the marriage bond in the Ely register. Of these, eighty-nine involved a union, real or

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80 As in the Band case cited above, n. 75. On fana as proof of marriage in the common law of the Church, see Esmein, Le Mariage en droit canonique, I, 224-5.

81 Sterre, f. 35r: “ante omnem item in hac parte motam”.

82 E.g., Fordham, f. 69r; but in Borewell, f. 67v, a claim of pre-contract, claimant and defendant admitted consent and sexual union, but the court decided against the marriage. See above, n. 76.

83 In Braunch, f. 132r Joan Braunch claimed contract de presenti and sexual union, while John son of Thomas Delay, denied contract though he admitted intercourse. The parties agreed to the examination of their chaplains even on matter touching the internal forum. Three weeks later they agreed to marry before the Church.

84 E.g., Dany gibbe, ff. 61v-62r: “... quia dixit Johanna dixit se non habere testes ad dictum contractum probandum nec aliunde posse probare quia non interfuerunt testes tempore contractus”.

alleged, that was clandestine. So far as can be seen, seventy of these marriages would not have received religious formalities if they had not been brought before the court. In thirteen cases, the parties proceeded to solemnize either by publication of banns alone or by banns and an exchange of consent coram facie ecclesie after they had already become man and wife by a clandestine union the validity of which was vouched for by the court itself. Finally, there were six cases where formalities were observed in opposition to the statute Humana concupiscencia and which were invalid, whatever the intentions of the couple might have been.  

It should be remembered that many of these cases involved bigamy and that among them a second, a third or even more clandestine unions of all types were alleged and often proved. Fourteen of the cases that came before the courts involved appeals or other matters where the mode of contract was not indicated; seven other cases were inquiries into concubinary relationships where there was no question of contract. Thus eighty-nine of the one hundred and one marriages about which there is relevant information, considerably more than four-fifths, are discovered to have been clandestine unions. As will be shown, the official of Ely made serious efforts to investigate reputed marriages and, if they were free of impediment, to see to their solemnization. However, it should be noted that there is no example where the couple was penalized for failing to arrange their marriage in accord with canon law. They were not required to separate pending solemnization, nor was there special urgency in arranging for it to be done. Usually they were instructed to do so, pro loco et tempore opportunis. On the other hand, contravention of Humana concupiscencia was punished severely: the couple involved, friends who encouraged them and the clergy who assisted were excommunicated. It can usually be shown that the culprits were absolved only when penance was accepted. The solemnization forbidden by the statute was seen as an attempt to give colour of respectability to a union that was known to be impossible. As such it was the perversation of a sacrament and was dealt with accordingly. But when the court turned to deal with a true but clandestine marriage, its at-

85 At least four other weddings contrary to the statute involved couples who had already contracted in private: Greysteda, f. 5r; Droper Cakebred, f. 53r; Wiliberton Frost, ff. 83v-84r; Gobat, f. 143v (to be related to Pertefeu, ff. 148r, 155v). These cases are included among the seventy.

86 See below, pp. 253-254.

87 On February 28, 1377, John Frebern was required to solemnize his marriage with Alice Attepool within three weeks after Easter (March 29). They had been judged husband and wife by the official of Ely, but were not living together: Frebern, f. 64v. In Leicaster, f. 55Av, the couple promised to solemnize within six weeks.

88 E.g., the excommunications of the Candlesky case, ff. 57v-58r, 62v and the Fisher, Wiliberton, Frost group of cases, ff. 82v-83r, 83v-84r, 85v.
titude was different. One has the impression from the register that it was well understand that such unions were worthy of respect. The court insisted that what was lacking be supplied, but it knew that the essential was already present.

Given the large number of clandestine marriages it is not surprising that there were many bigamous unions. Here the word "bigamous" is intended to apply to a marriage involving an individual simultaneously united to two or more spouses, admitted or merely alleged. Sixty-one cases dealt with claims that involved bigamous situations; twenty-two of them were concerned with several claims on the same individuals. As these coalesce into ten decisions by the court, we are dealing with forty-nine cases where a defendant was alleged to be a bigamist or to be on the point of becoming one. Thus considerably more than two-fifths of the marriage suits before the court were concerned with the problem of bigamy.

Certain information on the relation of clandestinity to bigamy can be obtained from an analysis of the place of origin of the principals in the suits. First, it is seen that in the four cases where both marriages were solemnized before the Church, the ceremonies occurred in different dioceses. Second, even in those cases where the unions were clandestine to a greater or lesser degree, bigamists showed a marked tendency to choose their partners in different villages. As can be seen from the accompanying chart, about two-thirds of the bigamous marriages involved persons from different villages, a figure significantly different from the non-bigamous cases, two-thirds of which involved persons from the same villages.

<table>
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<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

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89 The tone of episcopal statutes, conciliar canons and homiletic literature is much more severe.
90 Relationships such as that of the Saffrey case (p. 27r), where John claimed marriage to Alice and she claimed to be wife of William Martín, are included here as well as the more common type where two men claimed the hand of the same woman or two women claimed to be wife of the same man.
91 As in cases where the publication of banns resulted in a claim of pre-contract; e.g., Sadelore, f. 47r.
92 Brodyng, f. 94v (Lincoln and Ely); Wellemar, f. 110v (Norwich and Ely); Bakewylt, f. 138v (Salisbury and Ely); Galiob, f. 138v (Norwich and Ely). The places of origin shown here as well as those indicated in the table which follows reveal a remarkable degree of mobility among the principals involved.
If the private quality of so many marriages increased the possibility of bigamy, it also created a situation in which a person might ‘remember’ an earlier union and, concluding that his present marriage was bigamous, request the court to annul it. The possibility of collusion — and even of self-deception — was considerable here. A particularly blatant example that came to light when a collusive witness behaved stupidly and cast doubts on her earlier activities is described in detail in the register. William Chilterne and Amicia Nene were married before the Church and had lived together for two years when William, “acting” as he was later to confess, “to the injury of Amicia, his wife, from malice towards her that had grown in him,” entered into collusion with Joan Squire. They went before the official of the archdeacon claiming pre-contract and children. The court, scandalously inept or corrupt, or both, annulled the marriage of William and Amicia, declaring William and Joan to be husband and wife. Joan soon went off and married another man. On learning of this, Bishop Arundel ordered the case re-opened. The corruption of the court and William’s crime were revealed and the marriage to Amicia declared valid from the first.

It need hardly be said that the consistory was not always able to expose collusion in this way. It seems, however, to have been very careful to seek objective proof to supplement the evidence of those who claimed pre-contract. Thus when Alice, daughter of Robert Borcwell, claimed an earlier marriage with John Russel, de facto husband of Katherine Selvald, John agreed. But Alice had to admit that “she could not prove the said pre-contract other than by the confession of the parties to the suit since there were no witnesses”; her claim was dismissed. In cases such as this, all three contestants were required to swear that they had not entered into collusion. A similar demand was made where the temptation was not to ‘remember’ an earlier contract but to ‘forget’ it. Thus there are several suits where the court seems to have thought that claimants to pre-contract did not prosecute their case as well as they might: when John Haukyn and Margaret, daughter of John Wrong, claimed that they had married clandestinely, the court objected that there was a rumour of pre-contract between John and Mariot Frost. John denied it, so Mariot was summoned before the court. She said that she was married to John but that there was no way of

93 *Chilterne*, ff. 103r-104r.
94 *Ibid.*, f. 103v: “erga dictam Amiciam uxorem suam molestes gerens ex malicia quam erga eam conceperat”.
95 The suit is discussed in detail with special reference to the archdeacon’s marriage jurisdiction in *Aston*, 104-6.
96 See above, n. 76.
97 *Wrong*, f. 129r.
proving it. The court required her to swear that it was not through malice nor by collusion that she failed to prove her claim and the case was dismissed. In this, as in several other disputes, the register gives the impression that the court felt that evidence did not correspond to fact. The evidence of the principals was respected, but the entry in the register ends with the eloquent phrase “the court leaves them to their consciences”.

The individualistic theory of marriage taught by the Church, coupled with an informal conception of contract that she opposed but considered valid seems to have contributed to a situation in the period of the Ely register where such marriages occurred frequently and under conditions that tended to weaken the bond for the permanence of which the Church had struggled for so long. A zealous bishop would be expected to do all in his power to see that his flock married within the norms of canon law or, failing that, solemnized their marriage when possible. At Ely, his official launched an investigation where a couple was said to be living together or to have contracted marriage without proper solemnization. He acted on information provided by vox publica et fama, at the suggestion of neighbours and, occasionally one would think, at the request of one of the parties who could not easily bring an instance suit before the court. When the couple came before the consistory almost any kind of relationship might be revealed. If they claimed a contract of marriage, though a clandestine one, the court proceeded to investigate their freedom to marry and, if there were no impediment, declared them husband and wife and ordered them to celebrate their marriage before the Church. This procedure was a rapid one, sometimes accomplished in a single day. As was shown above, the public act before the Church was usually left to the convenience of the couple.

The inquiry often revealed an illicit menage. In this situation the couple was asked to separate or, if they were free and willing to do so, to marry. On occasion, if their freedom were evident, they exchanged consent then and there before the court. In other cases where the couple did not intend to marry but where the court feared that they would not separate, a diffe-

98 “Mariota Foot de Trumpton personaliter comparuit: asseruit quod non habet testes ad probandum contractum matrimoniale inter ipsam et prefatum Johannem Haukyn initum, nec alio modo potuit dictum contractum probare. Ideo facta sìde per dictam Mariotam quod non maliciose nec coliusorie orıstit dictum contractum probare, ipsum Johannen ab impetitione dicte Mariote dimittimus, corum consciencis relinquendo.” See Wrong, f. 136v.
99 Bonds, f. 15v; Dany giobe, ff. 61v-62r.
100 Humbelton, f. 35r.
101 Bokesworth, f. 55Ar: “Unde de eorum mutuo consensu et expresso coram nobis iudicialiter prestito, pro matrimonio inter eos sententialiter et diffinitive pronunciamus”.
rent procedure was used. The couple’s decision not to marry was respected but the court required them to make a conditional contract so that further sexual union would *ipso facto* constitute marriage.\(^{102}\) Theirs was a promise *de futuro* from which it was impossible to withdraw except by taking steps to marry another person. An example with rather touching overtones is reported in detail in the register.\(^{103}\) The entry begins with the statement that on March 10, 1376, Thomas Barbo of St. Benedict’s parish, Cambridge, and Joan Seustere, who had been his mistress, were summoned before Thomas of Gloucester, the official’s commissary, for inquiry about a contract of marriage and subsequent intercourse. Joan replied first. She said that they married the Sunday after the feast of the Exaltation of Holy Cross the previous year (September 16, 1375) at the Stourbridge fair, and asked that the court declare Thomas her husband. But Thomas had a different story to tell. He said that before the feast he had decided to dismiss her so he told her that he would have nothing more to do with her. But later, when he learned that she was going away, he was so sad that he wanted to kill himself. “So about the time of the feast of the Exaltation, during the above-mentioned fair at Stourbridge, he came and in tears spoke to Joan as follows: ‘Joan, if you will stay here, I will be true to you’; Joan replied that she wished to stay. Then Thomas said to her, ‘Joan, I give you my word that I wish to have you’, and Joan immediately said, ‘I am content’. Thomas went on to say that afterwards, as before, he had intercourse with Joan. He said however, that it was not and is not his intention to marry her, that he only meant to keep her as his mistress as before.”\(^{104}\) Joan immediately called a witness and was given March 20 to produce others. But the register continues: “However,

\(^{102}\) In England the procedure goes back to a series of constitutions of the middle years of the thirteenth century. The final form seen in action in the Ely register appears at Wells about 1258 and at Winchester a little later. See Powicke and Cheney, *Councils and Synods I*, 598 (Wells, c. 13) and 707 (Winchester, c. 29). In *Pâkerel*, f. 125v and *Rous*, f. 136r the contract is termed *tienta formam constitutionis*. On similar practice at Cerisy in Normandy, see Esmein, *La Mariage en droit canonique*, I, 138 and Levy, “L’officinalité de Paris et les questions familiales à la fin du xive siècle”, *Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras*, 11, 1274, n. 59.

\(^{103}\) Seustere, ff. 39v-40r.

then and there, before us sitting in judgment in court, Thomas and Joan were required to contract marriage in the following form: Thomas said to Joan ‘I accept you as my wife if, from now on, I have carnal knowledge of you’. And Joan at once replied ‘I accept you as my husband if, from now on, you have carnal knowledge of me’.

Then follow date, place, the names of witnesses and an indication of the registrar’s notorial sign.

Joan continued her suit and twenty-five months later the court decided that she was indeed the wife of Thomas. This almost Draconian form of contract was not used lightly; it occurs six times during the eight years of the register. While it may have helped men and women to understand the seriousness of their acts, it was a procedure that was fraught with difficulty. Although further sexual relationship created a permanent marriage bond, it might be impossible to prove its existence in the public forum if one of the parties chose to deny it: in March, 1379 Isabel Pikerel brought Thomas Bacon into court claiming marriage sub forma constitutionis and subsequent sexual union and asked that he be declared her husband. Thomas admitted the conditional contract but denied intercourse and Isabel lost her case. On the other hand, much like the contract de futuro though it was, parties could not withdraw from it: in March, 1380, Adam, servant of John Smith, admitted both the contract and subsequent sexual union with Roisey Rous, but claimed that before intercourse he stated that he did not want her as wife. The court thought otherwise and, having failed to find any canonical impediment, declared them to be married.

There is a certain irony in the fact that the promise per verba de futuro, the most fragile bond in conscience and law, should have been adapted to create this formidable instrument for dealing with concubinage. With

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105 “Et nihilominus dicti Thomas et Johanna tunc ibidem coram nobis in judicio pro tribunalis sedentes, videlicet, die lune proxima ante festum Sancti Gregorii papae, loco quo supra, matrimonium ad invicem contraxerunt sub forma infrascripta, videlicet, prefatus Thomas dixit eodem Johanne ista verba: ‘Hic accipio te in uxorem meam si ex nunc cognoscas me carnaliter’. Et prefata Johanna eodem statim respondit: ‘Hic accipio te in virum meum, si ex nunc cognoscas me carnaliter.” (f. 40r)

106 Seuseter, f. 91v.

107 When John Robinson and Joan, daughter of Geoffrey Morice, came before the court in March, 1373, they admitted that they had practiced fornication for three years, were often convicted by the official and, admitting further sexual activity at their last conviction, were required to contract conditionally before the court: Robynnesson, f. 12v; in Wolron, f. 55Ar, the couple had lived in concubinage for two years before the court used the contract in their case.

108 Pikerel, f. 125v.

109 Roux, f. 136r; the decision of the official’s commissary was appealed and confirmed by the official, f. 155r. In Robynnesson, f. 12v, the couple admitted conditional marriage and to spending two nights together, solus cum sola, nudus cum nuda. Both denied carnal union. They were to hear sentence on their confession the following week but did not appear. Judgment is unknown.
it, the Ely information on the modes by which men and women were united in matrimony is complete. It becomes evident that in addition to the proper canonical marriage there was a spectrum of clandestine unions ranging from those that were close civil parallels of solemnization before the Church, to others that were strictly private exchanges of consent and, beyond them, to those that, stable or ephemeral, were not intended to create a marriage bond. It was the duty of pastor and preacher to instruct the people and instill in them the desire to enter into marriages that were religious, public and stable. Under a bishop like Arundel moral suasion was supported by the steady pressure of a consistory court that examined dubious unions, brought those that were legitimate to the level of formality required by canon law, and tried to end those that were morally or legally impossible.

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The analysis of the different modes whereby men and women of the diocese of Ely formed their marriage bonds necessarily involved many indirect references to disputes with which the consistory dealt. It is now proposed to turn to these disputes, in other words, to examine the register in its own terms as a record of suits that came before the court. Here it is possible to discover the special difficulties of marital practices of the time and investigate the role of the bishop’s official in dealing with them.

When this approach is used, one fact becomes evident immediately: the sponsalia — the mere promise of marriage that assumed such importance in canonical treatises and in the activity of ecclesiastical courts on the Continent — is absent. With two possible exceptions there is no case where the principals of such a contract sought to enforce it or to be freed from it. It is the reading of the banns, and contracts based on

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111 When Agnes Durant and John Draper were summoned to show why they should not be compelled to obey an earlier decision of the court regarding their marriage, Agnes said that before contracting with John she agreed to marry another: “Henricus Walter de Crewell et ipsa, ante omnem contractum inter ipsam et Johannem inimum, fuerant concordes de matrimonio inter eos conrahendo, et post contractum inter ipsos Johannem et Agnetam inimum, etiam post sententiam definitivam in ea parte latam et non ante, predicti Henricus et Agnes matrimonium ad invicem contraxerunt (Draper Durant, ff. 136v, 138r)”. On the bigamy case in which John was judged Agnes’ husband, see above, p. 242. Agnes’ early relationship to Henry seems to have been a simple contract per verba de futuro. Note that this is an office case. Agnes did not seek to use the court to claim freedom from John Draper. The other possibility is Saffrey, f. 27r; it too is an office case. See the discussion of the formula of contract above, p. 245.
betrothal followed by intercourse, or contracts per verba de presenti that are found to be in dispute. It will be recalled that in the analysis of the use of the banns it was shown that twelve cases were brought before the consistory because of objections to proposed marriages and that five of these objections were based on an impediment of affinity, one on an impediment of consanguinity and six on the objector’s assertion that he or she was already married to one of those preparing to solemnize their union. As it happened, this last, the claim of previous contract, was vindicated in only one case, but its high proportion among objections to proposed marriages is an indication of the role it will be found to play in the matrimonial suits brought before the court.

During the eight years covered by the register, sixty instance cases and appeals touching marriage disputes were heard by the consistory. In forty-eight of them the actor asked the court to judge that the defendant was his spouse; in the other twelve he sought a declaration that his marriage was invalid. Judgments favouring the claim of marriage were brought down in eighteen cases. To attain their success claimants had to overcome a variety of objections: four were simple denials of contract by the defendant; four were counter-claims where the same spouse was sought by another in a bigamy case; one was the admission of contract with the rider that it included an unfulfilled condition; the remainder involved pre-contract. In three suits of this group the claimant had to overcome the objection of an earlier marriage advanced by the defendant or the court. Previous contract was also involved in the Geffrey case, but it was used to meet the objection of vows and holy orders: John Myntemoor, priest and Austin Canon of Anglesey, was brought before the court by Alice Geffrey who successfully claimed him as husband. The same claim was advanced in five other cases, not to overcome the objection of orders, but to bring about the separation of the defendant from his de facto spouse.

112 In one of these bigamy suits the successfully claimed spouse denied the contract. Thus, although Agnes Durant won over Alice Cakebred in her claim of John Draper, it was in spite of John’s denial of marriage with her and his affirmation of marriage with Alice: Durant, f. 48r. As was seen above, n. 111, this sentence proved difficult to enforce; see Draper, f. 69r, and Draper Durant, ff. 136v, 149v.

113 Porteous, f. 148r; Siret, f. 35r; Webster, f. 149r.

114 Geffrey, f. 78r.

115 Three of these judgments were in appeals against earlier decisions for marriage. The couples were required to separate and the pre-contract of appellant and appealed declared valid: Grantsdon, f. 133v; Drenge, f. 33v; Worleych Mason, ff. 133v-134r. All were appealed. In Cattefos, ff. 79r, 115v and Brodyng, ff. 94v, 143v, marriages solemnized before the Church were successfully challenged by women claiming pe-contract with the husband. The Cattefos decision was appealed.
On the other hand, twenty instance and appeal cases saw the claimant fail to vindicate his marriage; seven claims collapsed before denial of contract by the alleged spouse; four were the unsuccessful claims in bigamy cases; two failed because of unfulfilled conditions; one was met by proof of fear in making the contract and of the impediment of consanguinity between the parties; in two cases the defendants admitted the claim but proved previous contract with other women; four were unsuccessful attempts to claim as spouses persons who were already married — here at least three of the claimants said that theirs was the earlier marriage.

Ten suits were not brought to sentence in the period covered by the register. The reasons for opposing the claim was unspecified in three of them. Objections in the other suits were as follows: one unfulfilled condition, four bigamy claims, two prior contracts.

The second group of instance and appeal suits sought decrees of annulment against existing marriages. Five of the twelve were successful. Of these, three were appeals from judgments of the archdeacon's official in favour of marriages from which the appellants wished to escape. Robert Marion had his marriage to Agnes his wife annulled when he showed that there was an impediment of affinity between them, resulting from his relations with Katherine Bird, related to Agnes within the forbidden degree. In the fifth case, one in which the consistory seems to have had some reason to fear collusion, Alice Bakehwhyt brought Hugh Mayheu and Isabel Loot into court and proved that, though she and Hugh had been married before the Church, the marriage was invalid because Hugh and Isabel had solemnized their union thirty years before.

Failure to bring about annulment was the result in an equal number of suits, all five of them appeals against sentences in favour of the marriages in which the appellants were involved. Finally, there were two cases that were left incomplete. Both involved pre-contract; both have an unpleas-

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116 The Cazebred claim was the complement of that discussed above, n. 112.
117 *Pope*, ff. 95v, 123v.
118 *Wardam*, ff. 36v-37r; *Borowell*, f. 67v (Another instance, equally unsuccessful is found, ff. 96v, 134v; it was followed by an appeal.); *Wedene*, ff. 79v, 104v. The basis of claim of Joan Peyntor against Richard Lister and Emma his wife is not clear: *Lister*, ff. 5v, 21r.
119 In *Pymest*, f. 67r, the defendant admitted the marriage to the claimant but said that she had a previous contract; *Crisp*, f. 122r proceeded in writing immediately so the basis of claim is unspecified. The form of reporting however, gives reason for concluding that Juliana, daughter of Walter Crip claimed that her marriage to Lawrence Taillor was prior to his marriage to Catherine, his de facto wife.
120 *Niel*, ff. 53v, 159v; *Martin*, ff. 113v, 141v (appealed); *Tydd*, ff. 119r, 126r.
121 *Marion*, f. 80r.
122 *Bakehwhyt*, f. 138v.
ant odour about them. In one, William Kele claimed that his union with Helen his wife was invalid because before this marriage he had contracted with Alice Burgoyne, who later married Philip Disse.\(^{123}\) In the other, John Malyn Sr. was brought before the court by his wife Margaret, who asked for a divorce from him, claiming that both of them had previous contracts with persons still living.\(^{124}\)

It was shown in the earlier section dealing with the establishment of the marriage bond that office inquiries in rumoured clandestine unions uncovered a variety of marital situations. Thirty-nine of these inquiries became suits where an effort was made, sometimes against heavy opposition, to prove that a valid marriage existed. Twenty of them were successful. Of the successes, five were attained without dispute: the couple agreed that they had entered a clandestine union; there was no impediment, so the court instructed them to solemnize their marriage. Two other inquiries seemed to be leading to the same easy conclusion, when third parties appeared claiming to have married one of the persons involved in the inquiry. In both cases the defendants admitted the claim — thus confessing bigamy — but maintained with success that the contracts which were being investigated by the court were prior to those with the claimants. A similar decision resulted in a third case of this type where the opposition at first came from the court itself: John Haukyn and Margaret, daughter of Joan Wrong, claimed valid union when summoned, but the court confronted John with the rumour that he had a prior contract with Marion Foote. As was seen above, Marion failed to prove her position against John's denial.\(^{125}\) In addition, marriage was successfully asserted against three denials of the partner, three objections of unfulfilled condition, two counter-claims in bigamy suits and two objections of fear in making the contract.\(^{126}\) Finally, \textit{ex officio} investigations uncovered two anomalies, which the court proceeded to correct. The first was the Chiltern case, analysed in some detail above.\(^{127}\) Here a collusive claim of pre-contract had resulted in a

\(^{123}\) \textit{Kele}, f. 149v.

\(^{124}\) \textit{Malyn}, f. 150r.

\(^{125}\) \textit{Wrong}, f. 129r; see above, pp. 252-253.

\(^{126}\) \textit{Pulter}, f. 99r, presents the reader with an account of a fourteenth-century 'shotgun marriage' with all the speed of execution that the informality of the clandestine contract made possible. John Castre and Marion Pulter were summoned \textit{ex officio}; John denied marriage, adding that if there were a contract between them it was extracted from him by threats. He went on to describe how he was spending the night with Marion when servants of Sir Hugh Zouche, broke down the door of their room, beat him and threatened mutilation if he did not promise marriage. He admitted that he and Marion had continued to have carnal relations for more than a year. The court decided for the marriage and ordered solemnization: \textit{Pulter}, f. 114r.

\(^{127}\) P. 252.
declaration of nullity; the original couple was reunited. The second was
the discovery that William de Potton, subdeacon and brother of St. John’s
Cambridge, had entered into clandestine union with Agnes Knotte before
receiving orders. Here, too, the marriage was vindicated.\footnote{Potton
Knotte, f. 139r.}

Attempts to prove the existence of the marriage bond failed in nine of the
cases following office inquiries. The objections that stood in the way of
success were denial of contract by the alleged spouse in three cases, coun-
ter-claims in three bigamy suits, an impediment of consanguinity revealed by
the father of a de facto husband,\footnote{Symond, f. 28v.} an unspecified impediment that the
couple sought to hide by solemnization against the prohibition of \textit{Humana
concupiscencia} and a previous contract.\footnote{Lungdon, f. 71v: see above, p. 246. n. 69.}

Nine other suits developed along similar lines but were left incomplete.
In two of them, objections to the contract are uncertain;\footnote{Andrew, f. 5v: office proceedings involving Richard Andrew and Agnes, his de facto wife,
had come to sentence when the register opens. They were never brought into court nor was sen-
tence brought down though the suit remained on the docket until October, 1380. The Wright case is discussed above, pp. 244-245.} one saw a vigo-
orous denial by the alleged wife;\footnote{Saffrey, f. 27r.} two were dealing with the opposed claims
of a bigamy case; four involved couples whose union was threatened by
previous contracts.\footnote{Arneys, f. 117v: Etheldreda countered John Arney’s claim that she was his wife with the
allegation that he had two earlier contracts. In Wollem, f. 110v; Kirkby, f. 129v; and Gelion,
f. 136v, allegations of pre-contract were introduced \textit{ex officio}.}

The consistory was also active in supporting and enforcing contracts
of marriage. Thus when couples failed to cohabit the court investigated.
Six enquiries of this sort revealed a variety of difficulties. John Frebern
and Alice Attepool were obviously displeased with a judgement in favour
of their marriage and had delayed its solemnization. They were told to
see to it within a limited time.\footnote{Frebern, f. 54v: the official of Ely had judged John and Alice Attepol to be husband and wife
several years before. John had run the gamut of contumacy, excommunication, a request to the
king for his \textit{capta} and appeal to Canterbury in his effort to resist. The appeal had not been pros-
ecuted and finally, after three years he submitted and came before the court. He was instructed
to solemnize marriage with Alice before the third week after Easter, i.e. within eight weeks.
Nothing more is heard of the case.} But more serious legal problems appeared
in the other cases. One woman, having won a husband in a bigamy suit
began to have scruples about an earlier promise of marriage.\footnote{Durant
Draper, ff. 136r, 138v; discussed above, p. 256, n. 111.} Two hus-
bands refused to live with their wives because of impediments of affinity.\textsuperscript{136} One refused to do so because of a previous contract.\textsuperscript{137} Another inquiry showed that Joan, daughter of Robert Pencot had lived with John Maddynge for some time after their wedding, but had eventually left him because he was impotent. She asked that their marriage be annulled. However, proof of John's condition was not easily accomplished. Finally, after more than two years, she entered a second objection to their marriage, namely, the impediment of consanguinity. A declaration of nullity, based on this impediment was brought in more than a year later.\textsuperscript{138} A similar situation, but with more serious consequences, was revealed by an inquiry into the marital situation of John Poynant. He and Joan Swan had married and, after some time together, had their marriage annulled because of John's impotence. Joan married again and John took up with Isabel Pybbel, who became pregnant. He was on the point of marrying her when the court began its investigations.\textsuperscript{139} It was proposed that since John was not impotent he should be restored to his original spouse. John interposed the interesting objection that, since Joan and Isabel were related within the forbidden degree, an impediment of affinity would preclude his return to Joan. But two years later, the court, satisfied as to John's capacity and that the impediment did not obtain, corrected the earlier error, quashed the divorce and restored the original marriage.\textsuperscript{140}

The above analysis of contentious proceedings before the Ely consistory reveals many interesting facts about marriage and its problems in fourteenth-century Cambridgeshire, but above all it establishes two important patterns, one touching the activity of the court itself, the other the point at which marriage was most vulnerable. As for the first: the court's principal activity was the vindication and defence of the marriage bond; pleas of annulment occurred infrequently. This is true, not only of office proceedings, where the court set out to investigate the bond linking reputed couples and usually found itself deciding between alleged spouses who could not agree or between them and others who opposed their marriages, but also in instance suits, where the court was asked to vindicate a claim to marriage — usually against the objections of a reluctant spouse. Behind many of these suits lay clandestine marriage and the confusion as to act and intention that it tended to foster.

\textsuperscript{136} Gobat, f. 143v (see above, p. 243); Lile, f. 155v, was not brought to sentence.

\textsuperscript{137} Robert Puft said that he did not live with Inetta his wife of thirty years because of his precontract with Margaret Benet, then living in London: Puft, f. 153v. The suit was not brought to sentence.

\textsuperscript{138} Maddynge, ff. 91r, 154r.

\textsuperscript{139} Isabel said that she and John had already contracted marriage: Poynant, f. 100r.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
Clandestinity also contributed to the second pattern, the point at which marriage, as revealed by the register, was most vulnerable. It is something of a commonplace that the conscientious statement or the manipulation of the impediments of consanguinity and affinity were the main threats to the stability of the bond in the Middle Ages. The Ely evidence leads to a different conclusion. If the information from the suits discussed in the previous pages is compiled, the result is as follows:141

OBJECTIONS TO MARRIAGES THAT WERE PROPOSED, CLAIMED, ADMITTED BUT ALLEGED TO BE INVALID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Contract (ligament)</th>
<th>Vows and Orders</th>
<th>Consanguinity</th>
<th>Affinity</th>
<th>Crimen (adultery)</th>
<th>Ignorance</th>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Impotence</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
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<tr>
<td>MARRIAGES ANNOUNCED IN BANNS</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>objection in incomplete case</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>objection in incomplete case</td>
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<td>unsuccessfully, against</td>
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141 Simple denials of contract are not included in this table. Many of the bigamy cases probably turned on the question of which union was prior; since the reporting of these suits was not stated in these terms, they are not numbered among the objections based on pre-contract. Where several objections to a marriage are advanced, they are included; thus the four objections to the proposed marriage of Robert Andrew and Alice Solfa are those indicated as incomplete among the "objections to marriages announced in banns"; cf. Andrew, f. 149v.
FORMATION AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE

It becomes evident that marriages were not especially threatened by impediments of consanguinity and affinity. Revelation of a previous marriage was the greater danger. Here, where the possibilities of self-deception, error, dishonesty and collusion were especially strong, the fundamental weakness of the system seems to be indicated. It helps the historian to grasp why so much effort was expended to help men and women understand the necessity of due solemnization: the frequent occurrence of precontract was directly related to the possibility of clandestine marriage.

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A few conclusions — conclusions that at this stage of investigation must be sharply limited in their application both to time and place — can be drawn from the analysis of the Ely register. It is evident, first of all, that where difficulties led to court proceedings most of the marriages were clandestine and more than a third had a hint of bigamy about them. Second, the court was primarily a body for the proof and defence of marriage rather than an instrument of easy annulment. The third conclusion is much less precise; it is based on an impression rather than on a series of statistics. Yet, from the point of view of long-term social change, it may be the most important. The reporting of matrimonial suits in the Ely register reveals an astonishingly individualistic attitude to marriage and its problems. Familial and seigniorial decision as to the time of betrothal and the choice of spouse, practices that are always associated with medieval society, are simply not found in the register. The exertion of this kind of pressure by feudal or manorial lord is never mentioned. Parental consent appears in a few cases, but merely as a condition added, or said to have been added, by one of the alleged spouses. Financial arrangements seem of minimal importance, appearing, if they appear at all, as conditions attached by the spouses to the contract. Even the children were ignored except in a few cases where their birth seems to have been mentioned as an argument in favour of a claim. Older norms, those of family, village and upper-class society remained powerful, of that there is no doubt; but we know that even among the upper classes it was possible for a determined person to escape these norms by the rather simple process of entering a canonically acceptable marriage of his own choosing. The question posed at the beginning of this article remains: it is still impossible to say how rapidly the understanding and the use of freedom of choice of a marriage partner spread through medieval society as a whole, but perhaps some of the information that will contribute to an answer is here: the point of view manifested by the Ely register is an indication of a pressure in late medieval society that was pushing men and women towards the more individualistic view of marriage that was implicit in decisions made two hundred years before.

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The Literal and the Allegorical:
Jean de Meun and the "de Planctu Naturaë"

WINTHROP WETHERBEE

In the stormy history of critical discussion of the Roman de la Rose, a stable element has been the generally conceded obligation of Jean de Meun to those twelfth-century poets, notably Bernardus Silvestris and Alain de Lille, who drew upon the platonism of the School of Chartres. There is less agreement, however, as to the nature of this obligation. A number of critics, taking for granted Jean's obvious formal and thematic borrowings from these earlier poets, have emphasized his affinities with their intellectual milieu. Thus Edmond Faral, in a well-known discussion of the Roman, found Jean's work so pervaded by the naturalism of these poets and their philosophical precursors as to amount to "le miroir, moins d'un génie individuel, que du génie d'une époque entière". C. S. Lewis, while recognizing that the relationship was by no means a simple one, characterized Jean de Meun as "a poet of nature", "a poet of the School of Chartres", and viewed the Roman as a new attempt like that of Alain de Lille to establish a modus vivendi between religious and secular values. A. M. F. Gunn also stresses the continuity of Jean's thought with the Chartrians' "philosophy of plenitude" and their treatment of Natura as guide and standard of human morality.

Gérard Faré, on the other hand, cites Genius' elaborate defense of procreation as evidence of a conscious departure from the more "orthodox" naturalism of the Chartrians, and Félix Lecoy, the poem's most recent

1 "Le Roman de la Rose et la pensée française au XIIIe siècle," Revue des deux mondes 35 (1926), 452.
2 The Allegory of Love (Oxford, 1936), 137, 146.
3 The Mirror of Love (Lubbock, Texas, 1951), 205-750. Gunn's discussion of the "philosophy of plenitude" is perhaps more influenced by A. O. Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being than by the actual writings of the Chartrians, and his remarks about Jean's "originality" require considerable qualification (see, e.g., 244, 253, 447-48). More suggestive are his incidental observations: e.g., that the Roman is a sequel to Bernardus' De mundi universitate (p. 222), and to some extent a parody of the Antiochianus of Alain (226-27).
editor, emphasizes the danger of presuming too much on even the most obvious of Jean's allusions to Chartrian sources, particularly where the philosophical bases of his ideas are in question.5

One reason for this great divergence of opinion is that those who have sought a philosophy in the Roman have largely ignored the poem's irony and Jean's habit of playing off one speaker against another.6 More fruitful have been the excellent recent studies which stress the parodic element in the poem and the coherence of its thematic development, bringing Jean's psychological and moral purpose into focus by divesting them of the accretions of his supposed naturalism.7 But this approach has not been accompanied by a close study of the specific sources of the motifs and arguments which serve as foils to Jean's irony, and the structural patterns against which he pits the ups and downs of his turbulent narrative.

It is in this connection that I propose to reconsider Jean's debt to the Chartrian poets, a debt which I think must be seen as primarily a matter of highly complex poetic allusion, rather than adherence to their philosophical ideas. It is true that a major purpose of the Roman, as of the allegories of Bernardus and Alain, is to redefine the relations of man with the natural order; but this more or less philosophical purpose is inseparable from a complex sequence of debate and dialogue conducted in an allegorical setting which is itself more revealing than any stated argument. This allegorical setting is at once largely derived from the Chartrians and significantly different from their essentially platonic constructs, and it becomes the vehicle of an implicit "dialogue" which is a major theme of the Roman. To illustrate this complex relationship I propose to consider in some detail the relation of Jean's allegory to its most obvious literary source, the De planctu Naturae of Alain. Ernest Langlois long ago surveyed the many direct borrowings from the De planctu,7 but these only begin to explain the relationship of the two allegories.8 The late Rosemond Tuve, in a brilliant analysis of Jean's poetic technique, showed how his meaning is conveyed by a constant manipulation of the traditional associations of the allegorical figures and

6 Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 137-56, offers a vivid appreciation of the range and power of Jean's irony, but regards it as a sign of Jean's inconsistency rather than as a source of unity.
patterns he employs. In the De planctu he found the most elaborate of the many foils he employs for this purpose, and an "argument" which he follows with remarkable but deceptive fidelity, rejecting many of Alain's cherished moral and philosophical assumptions while at the same time offering a tentative reaffirmation of his trust in the providential workings of the natural order. Though the Roman departs from the pattern provided by the De planctu at certain significant junctures, and finally abandons it altogether, the former work is present as a more or less constant index to Jean's intention — an intention neither so outrageously hedonistic nor so simplistically orthodox as certain critics of divergent persuasions have suggested.

The De planctu Naturae deals with the effects of the Fall, and sets man's moral, intellectual and sexual nature in relation to the vitality and harmony of Natura and her domain. Man, it is made plain, cannot realize the innate capacities which make his destiny unique among creatures. His words are barren of legitimate significatio, and his actions wilful and self-destructive, because his corruption has rendered him psychologically unable to emulate his divine archetype and respond to the powers of reason and virtue who conspire with Nature to seek his restoration. The allegory proceeds from this analysis to an imaginative recreation of human nature in its original dignity, represented allegorically by the reconciliatory of Natura with the semi-divine procreative and tutelary Genius of the individual human nature, whom man's degeneration has alienated from his proper participatory role in the natural order. The poem ends with the anathematizing by Genius, newly revested with the auctoritas superessentialis usiae, of all the human wrongs touched on in the course of the poem.

Alain sees no contradiction between the formal autonomy of his allegorized natural order and the radical dependency of man on divine Grace. His harking back to the primal harmony of man and Nature is actually an imaginative view of the effect of such Grace, the psychic process involved in the opus restaurations, a view not uncommon in twelfth-century theology.

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9 Allegorical Imagery, esp. 272-79.
11 See the dreamer's reaction to the vision of the divine type of Ratio, and his "swoon" at the arrival of Nature: De planctu, ed. Wright, 445, 448; PL 210, 439-40, 442.
12 Wright, 510-21; PL 210, 476-82.
13 On the "continuité ontologique" of the works of creation and restoration as viewed by Alain
For poetic purposes the relation of his dramatization of man's psychological renewal, with its sexual and moral corollaries, to the true work of redemption must be understood, like the relation of his poetic vision to the sacramental conception of human history, as one of analogy. Thus, for instance, when Alain describes the act of cosmic creation, "the pure genial kiss of Nature and the Son", in terms reminiscent of the Annunciation,\(^\text{14}\) or imputes to the natural world a quasi-ecclesiastical hierarchy, scriptures and sacraments,\(^\text{15}\) he is not prostituting religious imagery in the service of naturalism. These are rather the most obvious instances of a sort of imaginative typology which operates throughout the *De planctu* to set the poetic theme and its platonic framework in their proper relation to the ongoing *opus restorationis*.\(^\text{16}\)

I stress the ultimately spiritual purpose of the *De planctu*, not because Alain's own essential orthodoxy has not been well enough vindicated against the old charges of pagan naturalism, but because of the function of his allegory in the scheme of Jean de Meun. Jean is often enough taken as the exponent of a naturalism far more radical than any dreamt of by Alain,\(^\text{17}\) but as I shall try to show that he was acutely sensitive to the religious implications of the *De planctu*, and an approach which allows for these may serve, with certain basic qualifications, to vindicate the *Roman* as well.

At the same time I cannot agree with certain recent commentators on the *Roman* whose defense of the orthodoxy of Jean's intention seems to me rather over-zealous. C. R. Dahlberg, reading the poem as an allegorical reenact-

\(^{14}\) Wright, 518; PL 210, 480. See also Cesare Vasoli, "Le idee filosofiche di Alano di Lilla nel *De planctu* e nell'*Anticlaudianus*," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 40 (1961), 478.

\(^{15}\) Nature is *viria Dei*, Venus her *subiuria*, Genius her *sacerdos* (Wright, 450, 469-70, 510; PL 210, 442, 453-54, 476); on Nature's scriptures, see Wright, 470; PL 210, 453. On Genius' priestly function, Wright, 431, 520-21; PL 210, 432, 481-482.


ment of the Fall, \textsuperscript{18} and D. W. Robertson, whose more general discussion tends to a similar view,\textsuperscript{19} place great stress on the role of selfish desire in the dreamer’s progress toward the Rose, and regard the poem’s denouement as no more than an acting out of the tendencies of an utterly depraved will, in ironic contrast to the nobler aims proposed by Genius and implied by the counterpoised visions of the vergier and the beau parc. John V. Fleming’s recent book on the Roman is essentially a restatement of this position.\textsuperscript{20} But such a reading assumes a radical separation of “wilful” from “natural” desire and an opposition of Venus to Nature which I do not think the poet intends.\textsuperscript{21} Jean’s conclusion is indeed an ironic comment on the possibility of a rational obedience to the commandments of Genius, but his mockery is not therefore extended to the commandments themselves (which the Lover does, after all, however unconsciously, obey).\textsuperscript{22} Procreation is not made the object of a cult, but neither is it wholly scorned. Its function in the poem, its relation to the pursuit of the Rose and to the preferred vision of the “pare dou champ joli”, cannot be understood until allowance is made for its allegorical context, first in the poetic world of the poem, and finally in the system of allusive correspondences by which this world is made to imply a religious view of the human condition.

A very general comparison of the Roman with the De planctu immediately reveals, together with marked similarities, what seem to be fundamental differences. Like the De planctu, Jean’s poem presents mankind as deeply alienated from nature, and we become increasingly aware that the false and dissipating environment in which the Lover is suspended is the product of human sin. Like Alain’s dreamer-poet, the Lover is unable to penetrate the integumanz of the various myths in which his situation is allusively set forth, and the broader and more profound metaphor of the “biau vergier qui est Deduit”. But unlike Alain’s hero, the Lover remains wilfully ignorant of his plight to the end. Nature and Genius interest themselves in his situation, and play a major role in his final sexual conquest, but they evoke no perceptible moral awakening, and are, indeed, as nearly as possible repudiated.

Here, it would seem, is an obvious effect of that thirteenth-century

\textsuperscript{18} “Macrobius and the Unity of the Roman de la Rose,” Studies in Philology 58 (1961), 573-82.
\textsuperscript{19} A Preface to Chaucer, 201-02; in Robertson’s “The Doctrine of Charity in Medieval Literary Gardens,” Speculum 26 (1951), 43, the Roman is characterized as “a humorous and witty retelling of the story of the Fall;” cf. Preface, 91-103.
\textsuperscript{20} The “Roman de la Rose” (Princeton, 1969).
\textsuperscript{21} See below.
\textsuperscript{22} The fact that a child is conceived as a result of the Lover’s campaign is simply ignored by Dahlberg and Robertson. Its importance is loudly denied by Fleming (342-44).
scepticism which has been noted as a feature of Jean’s point of view.\textsuperscript{23} Sexual fulfillment, not as a metaphor for rational self-awareness, but as an end in itself, is the Lover’s goal, and it is hard to see his success as affirming anything more positive. There is evidently something amiss in the world of the \textit{Roman} which has no clear precedent in the allegory of Alain. A recurring theme is the decline from a Golden Age when love, delight and justice were perfectly harmonized to a world of strife in which men thrive by acquisition and dominion. The voice of “experience” is everywhere in the \textit{Roman}, mocking the Chartrian golden virtues of moderation and \textit{largitas}, commercializing love and religion until all values are inverted and no man looks beyond his own interest. Human activity, it would seem, is fated to be sterile, whether motivated by greed, envy, or the effete, languorous pseudo-idealism of the Lover.

In developing this theme, Jean integrates his allegory with that of Guillaume de Lorris by effectively reducing the latter, in retrospect, to a study of immaturity and self-deception, exploiting in the process ambiguities of which Guillaume, master of his material, had been well aware. Though the moral focus of Guillaume’s allegory is hard to determine,\textsuperscript{24} in his treatment of the Lover’s psychology he shows marked affinities with Alain and Jean. He clearly acknowledges the potentially unmanning effect of the “blau vergier”, where nature is subtly violated in the interests of self-gratification. In the scene at the fountain of Narcissus, the poet’s admonition to the ladies to spare their suitors Narcissus’ fate is subtly juxtaposed with the Lover’s timid, skittish reaction to the fountain, which involves only selfish feelings.\textsuperscript{25} The fountain’s influence is described in terms which recall the violent effect of the \textit{Venus celesta} of the \textit{De planctu}:

\begin{quote}
Ci sort as genz noveile rage,  
ici se changent li corage, 
ici n’a mestier sens ne mesure,  
ici est d’amér volenté pure,  
ci ne ce set conseiller nus  
car Cupido, li filz Venus  
sema d’Amors ici la graine...\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} See Muscantine, 74-80; Tuve, 266-77.

\textsuperscript{24} A continuity of moral purpose between the two portions of the \textit{Roman} is assumed by Robertson, \textit{Preface}, 91-103, and Dahlberg, 573, 579-82, and on rhetorical as well as thematic grounds by Gunn, 95-198. For an opposing view, see Lewis, 135-47; Erich Köhler, “Narcisse, la Fontaine d’Amour et Guillaume de Lorris,” in \textit{L’humanisme médiéval dans les littératures romanes}: Centre de Philologie et de Littératures Romanes de l’Université de Strasbourg, \textit{Actes et colloques} 3 (Paris, 1964), 155-56.


\textsuperscript{26} Lecoy, 1581-87; Langlois, 1583-89. All quotations through line 16698 are from the text of
The suggestion of strong passion in these lines contrasts sharply with the outcome of the Lover’s encounter with Dangier, whose stout club and coarse strength wholly demoralize him:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Lors s’en est Bel Acueil fuiz} \\
\text{et je remainz tot esbaiz,} \\
\text{honteus et maz; si me repens} \\
\text{dont onques dis ce que je pens.} \\
\text{De ma folie me recors,} \\
\text{si voi que livrez est mes cors} \\
\text{a duel, a poine, et a martire;} \\
\text{et de ce ai la plus grant ire} \\
\text{que je n’ose passer la haie...}^{27}
\end{align*}
\]

Again, after rejecting the argument of Raison against the waste and folly of love, he approaches the Rose only to fall back at the hint of difficulty, despite the encouragement of Bel Acueil. Venus comes to his aid, but almost at once he is again demoralized, by the harsh realities of slander and jealousy.

It would no doubt be misrepresenting the spirit of Guillaume to insist on the affinity between his portrayal of the Lover, passionate in his rejection of Raison, yet weak-willed and somehow uneasy in his involvement with the passion of love, and the allegory of the *De planctu Natura*, where such “effeminate slackness” is made to illustrate the effects of sin, while mature sexuality serves as a metaphor for rational dignity. But these elements at least potentially present in Guillaume’s characterization are clearly brought out in the long exchange between the Lover and Raison which is the first major episode of Jean’s continuation. Both as a figure of authority and as an index to the condition of the Lover, Raison closely resembles Alain’s Nature.\(^{28}\) Her relation to the Nature of the *Roman* will be discussed further on. Her exhortation to the Lover moves quickly to the heart of precisely the dilemma which had vexed the dreamer of the *De planctu*. In terms borrowed from Alain and Bernardus she contrasts the barren love whose sole end is *delit*, and whose true nature, she allows, is *pas demonstrable*,\(^{29}\) with the office of generation ordained by Nature, which is also pleasurable, but of

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27 Lecoy, 2935-43; Langlois, 2951-59.
28 See Langlois, *Origines et sources*, 95-96; also Fleming, 196 (where, however, the two figures are rather confusingly linked with Alain’s *Theologia*).
29 Lecoy, 4250; Langlois, 4280. Cf. *De planctu*, ed. Wright, 471; PL 210, 455, where Nature prefixes *her descriptio capitannis* by declaring “rem immostrabilem demonstrabo, inextricabilem extricabo...” This and all subsequent quotations from the *De planctu* are from the text of Wright.
which pleasure must not be seen as the end.\textsuperscript{30} She establishes a moral context for her appeal by showing how lust drives men either to dissipation or to the repressive discipline of the cloister, and contrasting this plight with the freedom offered by a higher, rational love which expresses itself in charity and \textit{largice}.\textsuperscript{31} Such a love, superior to all accident and ensuring justice among men, involves a recognition of the right uses of things, and guards against that overvaluing of worldly goods which subjects men to Fortune. And this love, which is finally nothing but the love of Raison herself, she offers to the Lover.

It is important to realize that Raison is \textit{only} “reason”, that her high court of appeal is the will of Nature.\textsuperscript{32} She sees the Lover’s plight in natural terms and the love she asks is in effect a renewal of man’s sense of participation in the natural order. Her \textit{largice}, like the procreative function which is its corollary, is explicitly characterized as an emulation of God’s bounty,\textsuperscript{33} and depends on man’s power to evaluate all things in terms of the natural uses to which they were created.\textsuperscript{34} What Raison cannot understand, though it is ironically implicit in her speech, is a depravity such as to make man incapable of responding to her love. In her ignorance she sees no contradiction between the fact of a powerful \textit{Amors} for which the only remedy is flight,\textsuperscript{35} on the one hand, and the necessity of procreation in obedience to Nature on the other. Like the Nature of the \textit{De planctu}, Raison is incapable of conceiving the problem in theological terms,\textsuperscript{36} and the historical account


\textsuperscript{31} Lecoy, 4655-84; Langlois, 4685-714.

\textsuperscript{32} Robertson (\textit{Preface}, 199) points to Raison’s divine origin (Lecoy, 5783-87; Langlois, 5813-17), and professes to find in her words “the voice of Patristic authority.” Fleming, 112-37, emphasizes the same points. But insofar as Jean is allegorizing the effects of the Fall there is no inconsistency in Raison’s being God’s daughter and at the same time ignorant of Grace. See below, n. 36.

\textsuperscript{33} Lecoy, 5207-18; Langlois, 5237-48. The lines seem to me to recall Nature’s address to \textit{Largitas}, conceived as a sort of natural analogue to \textit{Caritas}, in the \textit{De planctu}: “O virgo, cuius arche-ctatione praesigni humanum: genus virtutum ingreditur thalamum, per quam homines favorabilis gratiae praemia consequuntur, per quam aetatis aureae antiqua saecula reviviscunt, per quam hominum sese amicitiae glutini praecordialis astringunt...” (Wright, 515, where this speech is erroneously attributed to \textit{Largitas} herself; PL 210, 478).

\textsuperscript{34} Lecoy, 4945-5040, 5133-63, 5290-328; Langlois, 4975-5070, 5183-93, 5320-58.

\textsuperscript{35} See Lecoy, 4321-28; Langlois, 4351-58. The lines are almost literally translated from Alain’s “descriptio Cupidinis,” \textit{De planctu}, ed. Wright, 472; PL 210, 455.

\textsuperscript{36} See Lecoy, 4373; Langlois, 4403, where Raison introduces her speech on procreation with what seems to me a pun on the verb \textit{deviser}, meaning “guess,” “prognosticate,” or “engage in theological speculation,” and her repeated references to the will of Nature. Raison’s limitations are those stated by Alain’s Nature in the course of her long comparison of God’s powers and her
she gives of man’s lapse from participation in the all-embracing joutice of his original condition rests in unresolved contradiction to her confidence that joutice, largice and Raison herself can still claim his affection.

The problem comes to a head with the Lover’s final rejection of Raison on the grounds of her ribaudie in alluding to the coilles of Saturn. 37 Here Jean de Meun is closely in touch with the allegory of the De planctu: man is desfigurez, no longer fully man; 38 as a result he no longer sees the true significance of things, the loss of reason having corrupted his sense of language. The Lover cannot understand the “Latin” in which Raison offers her love, 39 nor recognize the naturalness of physical terms, which suggests to him only an ambiguous power veiled by the allure of Deduit. He is incapable of heeding Raison and seeking in the integumanz aus poezen the meaning of the myth of Saturn, wherein are contained the cosmic, and, ironically, the theological implications of his situation. 40 And here Raison herself is incapable of aiding him, for it is in the underlying significance of this myth that the contradiction between her rejection of amors and her appeal to largice and procreation is revealed.

As ruler of mankind during the Golden Age, as the embodiment of


Nature’s rationes are of course reflections of the larger ratio which is the impress of the divine wisdom on creation, which Alain symbolizes by the “charioteer” of Nature, and which accounts for Jean’s allusion to Raison as a figure of Sapiencia, daughter of God (see n. 32 above). But here we must bear in mind Alain’s careful distinctions between the natural and sacramental orders; Raison in this primordial form exists in a basically flawed relation to the consciousness of man, and is incapable of expressing the Incarnation and its effects. See also below, n. 76.

37 Lecoy, 5667-94, 6898-7200; Langlois, 5697-724, 6928-7230.

38 Lecoy, 4235, 6352-60; Langlois, 4285, 6382-90. Cf. the opening words of Alain’s Natura to the dreamer, and her account of the defacement of man’s image on her robe (Wright, 449-50, 467; PL 210, 442, 452).

39 Lecoy, 5809-10, 6898-948; Langlois, 5839-40, 6928-78. The moral and psychological implications of the Lover’s squeamishness at this point are forcefully stated by Fleming, 133-36. Fleming refers (135, n. 28) to a gloss on Les Echos amoureux in which, he says, the allegorical meaning of coilles is discussed.

40 For the history of the term integumanz (Latin integumentum) employed by Raison (Lecoy, 7138; Langlois, 7168), see Chenu, “Involucrem. Le mythe selon les théologiens médiévaux,” Archives d’histoire 22 (1955), 75-79; Edouard Jeannenx, “L’usage de la notion d’integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches,” Archives d’histoire 24 (1957), 34-100. For a suggestive distinction between the poetic and philosophical integumentum on the one hand and scriptural allegoria on the other, see the prologue to a commentary on Martianus Capella, possibly by Bernardus Silvestris, printed by Jeannenx, “Notes sur l’école de Chartres,” Studi mediavali, ser. 3, 5 (1964), 856-57.
time, and as the cosmic source of earthly generation, Saturn was understood by late classical and medieval mythographers as representing the *saturatio*, the abundance or plenitude of universal life. His castration by Jupiter and the casting of his genitals into the sea represent both the destruction of the primitive harmony of human society and the beginning of temporal generation, the transference of cosmic plenitude into natural channels. Thence arise the assignment of a fixed term to all earthly existence and the birth of Venus, under whose influence man fulfils the responsibility of procreation which is his portion of the burden of physical necessity imposed upon all temporal existence.

The ambiguity of the birth of Venus did not escape the mythographers. She is creative and destructive, a link between man and the *amor quo caelum regitur* and a symbol of man’s mortality. Saturitatis abundantia, says Fulgentius, *libidinem creat*; the paradox gave rise to the medieval mythographers’ interest in the Platonic notion of the “two Venuses,” one an emulation of the *concordia mundi*, the other a direct consequence of the Fall and the agent of the transmission of its effects.


In the *Integumenta Ovidi* of John of Garland virtually all the traditional associations of the myth of Saturn are ingeniously compressed into three distichs (lines 69-74; ed. Fausto Ghisalberti, Messina-Milan, 1933, 40-41):

Saturnus satur est annus, saturatio primi
Temporis. Huic hostis filius eius erat.
Tempus quod sequitur secuisse virilia patris
Dicitas, inque maris precipitasce chaos.
Tempus Saturnus, ubertas mentula, proles
Posteriora, venter est mare, spuma Venus.

It would seem likely that this well-known compendium by an embattled humanist is the *integumentum aus poeto* to which Raison refers.

42 See Peter Dronek, “L’amor che move il sole e l’altra stelle,” *Studi medieci*, ser. 3, 6 (1965), 410-17; R. H. Green, “Alan of Lille’s *De planeta Naturalis*,” *Speculum* 31 (1956), 666-74.

43 On the “two Venuses” see Robertson, *Preface*, 125-26; Johannes Scotus, *Annotations*, 67; Remigius, *Commentum*, 69 (Where Hymen is linked with the “honest” Venus as the *amor* and con-
Alain’s Nature had founbered in paradox in her attempt to explain the history of Venus, created her subvicaria as Nature herself is vicaria Dei. She is eloquent in vindicating Venus’ procreative function, and the subordinate role of Cupid, but when the dreamer seeks an explanation of the ambiguous integumenta whereby poets have described Venus’ conduct, Nature is at a loss. She augments her account of the cosmic role of the goddess with the fable of Venus’ adultery with Antigamus and the birth of Jocus, a perverse counterpart to Cupid; but Jocus is no more than the negative aspect of Cupid himself as described by Nature in an elaborate descriptio transferred by Jean to the lips of Raison. Nature leaves this paradox unresolved.

Jean’s Raison partially evades Nature’s predicament by declining to gloss her allusion to the myth of Saturn, but her discourse leaves the same problems unsettled, and her insight into the nature of love in a sinful world is clearly equally limited. Like Alain’s Nature, she can think only in terms of an allegorically coherent universe where the integumenta of human behavior are reflective of a harmony with cosmic processes which man has now lost, and her rejection by the Lover only serves to underscore the effects of this loss. But at this point the Roman significantly parts company with the De planctu. For Alain’s moralizing dilation on the implications of his theme Jean de Meun substitutes a long excursion into the depths of the anti-allegorical world, suspending all overt moral judgement and allowing pragmatism, self-interest and worldly cunning to present their claims. When at last, with the introduction of Nature and Genius, the world of the Roman is once again brought into confrontation with that of the De planctu, the impossibility of a realignment with the natural order through Raison is as clear as ever, but it has become as nearly as possible a virtue.

cordia “by which subsist all the elements and the universe of creatures”), 135-136, 180; Bernardus, Commentum, 9-10 (where Aeneas, the human soul, is the son of Creator, Anchises, and mundana musices, Venus’; see also Green, 666-68, where, however, the good and bad Venuses are too simply equated with charity and earthly cupidity.

44 See Wright, 469-70, 474; PL 210, 454, 456.

45 Nature frowns, “authenticæa serenitatis vulturn tumultuose figurans;” this foreshadows the obscurity of her response to the dreamer: having given a conventional Macrobian account of the relation of poetic fable to philosophical and spiritual truth, she wholly evades the responsibility she has set herself, and instead of glossing the poetic integumenta concerning Venus she invents a new one of her own, the fable of Antigamus and Jocus; Wright, 465-66, 479-81, PL 210, 431-52, 459-60.

46 Wright, 472-74; PL 210, 455-56; cf. Lecoy, 4249-328; Langlois, 4279-358. On Jocus, see Bernardus, Commentum, 10, and Remigius’ “Two Cupids,” Commentum in Martianum, 69, based on Martianus Capella, De nuptiis 2, 144, ed. A. Dick (Leipzig, 1925, 62).

47 Wright, 482-502; PL 210, 461-71.
Raison’s place is usurped, and her point of view subtly undermined, by Ami, who frankly substitutes “Fole Largice”, bribery and temptation, for Raison’s largice as the basis of love, and almost loses the Lover’s confidence by his emphasis on tactics. Having bluntly declared the place of greed in the acquiescence of ladies, he contrives brilliantly to forestall criticism by placing an eloquent speech on the use and abuse of God-given beauty and purity in the mouth of a jealous husband whose own motives are fundamentally covetous. This oblique argument for free love is augmented by an account of the Fall in which all human ills are traced to covetousness and contrasted with the dazzling vision of a primal Paradise suffused with all the deceptive charm of Deduit:

Seur tex couches con je devise,
sanz rapine et sanz covoitise,
se-trarcoloient et besoient
cil cui li jeu d’amors plesoient.
Cil arbre vert, par ces gaudines,
leur pavillon et leur cortines
de leur rains seu eus estendoient,
qui dou soleil les defendoient.
La demenoient leur queroles,
leur jeux et leur oiseuses moles
les simples genz asseirees,
de toutes cures escurees,
ors de mener jolivetez
par leaus amiabletez.48

Ami prevails upon the Lover: Raison is scorned, Douz Penser revives, and the world is beautiful again.49

But the Lover is suspended between a desire to approach the Rose directly and a recognition that he must adopt a more devious course. His rejection by Richece makes still clearer the need for traision, a recourse he is reluctant to adopt. Richece offers as well a grim memento mori, describing the course of Fole Largice from wealth to the horrors of poverty, and she rebukes the Lover for his folly in rejecting Raison.50 The effect is to recall all the uncertainties of the quest thus far, and the Lover is once again dismayed:

Si fis ainsinc ma penitance
long tens a tele consciencie
Comme Dex set, car je fesoie
une chose et autre pensoire...
Traison me convint tracier

48 Lecoy, 8401-14; Langlois, 8431-44.
49 Lecoy, 9973-92; Langlois, 10003-22.
50 Lecoy, 10046-237; Langlois, 10076-267.
por ma besoigne porcharier;
onc traistres n’avoie esté,
n’oncor no m’en a nus resté.51

But love proves stronger than conscience, as in the aftermath of the initial defeat by Dangier, and Amors reappears immediately to reaffirm the Lover’s allegiance.

This episode marks a turning point in the poem. Though he will again be driven by Dangier to reflect momentarily on his situation,52 the Lover’s state of mind will henceforth be almost wholly obscured by the course of events and the interplay of forces which are, as it were, beyond him. From Amors’ initial mustering of his barons to the point at which Venus and Nature enter the picture, the action is determined by the complex interplay of the assailants and guardians of the Rose, and seems to me to defy analysis in terms of the Lover’s psychological development.

The campaign begins with Amors’ review of the poets who have served him well, down to the untimely death of Guillaume, and his prophecy of the coming of Jean, who will carry through the Roman to its triumphant conclusion, in the process so thoroughly expounding its significance that the book will be a true “Miroër aus Amoreus”, and a decisive rebuke to Raison.53 The prophecy is fulfilled, but in a deeply ironic way. For as the campaign proceeds, Jean abandons the world of Deduit and explores the nature of love, capido, on the fundamental level of selfish material desire. “The world of the Roman”, Miss Tuve observes, “is quite loveless.”54 This is certainly true of the portion of the poem dominated by Faus Semblant. His function is to divest human society of all pretension to any higher object than worldly acquisition. Explicit in his denial of the Word of God, Faus Semblant reviews in his long harangue the decay of all hierarchical and intellectual values, the decline to a state of existence in which the only “integumanz” is the sheep’s clothing which hides the wolf. His utter clear-sightedness as to the nature of those with whom he deals and his refusal to acknowledge the claims of name, station or religious sanction except as potential veils for some ulterior design enable him to define a world which is the inverse of the lost allegorical harmony invoke by Raison, utterly devoid of aspiration or cooperative participation. In this world, where dissimulation is the only sanctuary, Faus Semblant assumes priestly authority and claims “de tout le monde cure”, foreshadowing by grotesque inversion the

51 Lecoy, 10266-76; Langlois, 10296-306.
52 Lecoy, 14076-92; Langlois, 15108-22.
53 Lecoy, 10541-42, 10618-24; Langlois, 10571-72, 10649-54.
54 Allegorical Imagery, 261.
role of Genius. All levels of society confess to him their sins of avarice and treachery, and seek the security of a temporal grace by placing their worldly goods in his charge. His triumph is a caricature of the lost Paradise of abundance and delight, sustained by the inexhaustible bounty of human corruption:

Par ma lobe entas et amasse
grant tresor en tas et en masse,
qui ne peut por riens affonder;
car se j'en faz palès fonder
e: acomplis touz mes deliz
de compagnies ou de liz,
de tables plaines d'entremés
(car ne veill autre vie mes),
recoist mes argenz et mes ors;
car ainz que soit vui z mes tresors,
denier me viennent a resours.
Ne faz je bien tunber mes ours?  

The image of dancing bears provides a vivid illustration of the cooperation of a bestialized mankind in its own corruption, an utter denial of rationality and self-awareness. And the Lover is not spared: the pursuit of the Rose reaches its moral nadir at the moment when, finding himself at last within range of Bel Acueil, he asks God's blessing for

Faus Samblant, li traistres,
le filz Barat, li faus ministres
came Ypocrisie sa mcre,
cui tant est au vertuz amere,
et dame Attence Contrainte,
cui de Faus Samblant est enceinte,
preste d'anfanter Antecrit,
si con je truis an livre ecrit. 

La Vieille, who cooperates with Faus Semblant to bring the Lover into the presence of Bel Acueil, reveals the effects of his dominion in human life. An expert in the art of love and a victim of its deceptions, animated by an ingrained passion which the waste of her life has turned into a desire for revenge, she illustrates perfectly the infection of man's basic cupidó with the contagion of that world of anti-social desires of which Faus Semblant is the ruling spirit. But Faus Semblant is only an abstraction — the essence

55 Lecoy, 12306-15; Langlois, 12336-45, cf. Lecoy, 1157-68, 11687-748; Langlois, 11587-89, 11717-78.
56 Lecoy, 11523-34; Langlois, 11553-64.
57 Lecoy, 14709-16; Langlois, 14739-46.
of "how to succeed" — while la Vieille is a human being, vulnerable and pathetically self-revealing as well as greedy and malicious. In her long lecture to Bel Acueil we are given glimpses through human folly and corruption to their source in human nature. Her enunciation of the principle that Nature abhors a cloister has a familiar and a curiously intellectual ring:

Toujorz Nature recourra,
ja por habit ne demourra.
Que vaut ce ? Toute creature
veust retourner a sa nature,
ja nou lera por violance
de force ne de couvenance.
Ce doit mout Venus escuser
qu’el vouloit de franchise user,
et toutes dames qui se geuent,
conbien que mariage veuent,
car ce leur fet Nature fere,
quie les veust a franchise trere.
Trop est fort chose que Nature...58

As Charles Muscatine shrewdly observes,59 la Vicieille is "not too distant a relative of Raison", and it is Raison's evocation of the primordial naturalness of sexuality that her words here recall. What separates the two speakers and lends irony to la Vieille's citation of Nature is of course the Fall. But the irony has a more general point as well. That la Vieille is able to deduce empirically from the experience of a full life in a fallen world the vestiges of that responsiveness to Nature which Raison had taken for granted should mitigate somewhat the harsh judgment we have been encouraged to make of the society she represents. The life of la Vieille has been barren; she is at best an eloquent ruin like Rochester's Maim'd Debauchee. But we sense in her profound humanity and in the history of her life the working of forces more simply natural than those which galvanize the world depicted by Faus Semblant. The effect of his harangue had been to compel our acceptance of a world without meaning, neutral and colorless save for the tireless activity of self-interest. But with la Vieille's assertion of the claims of "natural law" we begin to sense the ultimate contingency of this world of negation. Corrupt love, carried to its logical extreme in the triumph of Faus Semblant, is now traced to its source in the basic condition of man, where it combines with an abiding sexuality to reveal, albeit imperfectly, the influence of a higher Nature who, as la Vieille herself observes, "ne peut mentir".

58 Lecoy, 13995-14007; Langlois, 14025-37.
59 Chaucer and the French Tradition, 75.
Faus Semblant remains an ally of Amors in his campaign, but the hint of a new perspective on the role of conscious *traîson* and covetousness is largely borne out by the episodes which follow. The thwarting of Amors by the demoralizing forces of Dangier, Honte and Pecur, who point up the infirmity of the Lover's *hardemanz*, leads to the intervention of Venus, whose coming imbues the quest with implications of a higher necessity. Passing over for the moment Jean's retelling of the story of Venus and Adonis, we may note the immediate effect of the goddess' arrival among the host. At her bidding Amors makes the barons swear a solemn oath to pursue the joys of love and pronounces a solemn curse upon all sons of Adam who seek through pride to evade this duty, concluding rhetorically:

Ou peut l'an querrer meilleur vie
que d'etre antre les braz s'amie?

The final couplet reveals the incorrigible limitation of Amors' point of view, like Ami's account of Paradise, but in its clear focus on the object of the quest it is in keeping with the speech as a whole, which is couched in significantly stronger terms than Amors' earlier resolution to overthrow Jalousie and liberate Bel Acueil. Amors thinks only of his own authority, but his words recall the more solemn curse pronounced by Alain's Genius at the conclusion of the *De planctu*, and anticipate the reentry into the cosmic context of the *De planctu* which comes about immediately after, as the renewed passion of the barons arouses the creative powers of Nature.

Jean's lengthy account of the labors and sorrows of Nature opens with a brief, vivid panorama which translates the action of the poem into terms of the struggle of life against death, whose all-consuming power is unceasingly countered by Nature's power of renewal. Jean then dwells on the indescribable beauty of the goddesss, and of her creations, which emanate from "une fontaine, tourjorç courant et tourjorç plaine," whose source is a divine mystery. This conventional view of the goddess is sustained in the brief description of her relations with her priest Genius, guiding principle of individual natures, to whom she comes for counsel, and elaborated by Nature herself in the preliminary stages of her confession. After reviewing the divine rationale and unceasing harmony of the universe at large she turns to the irregularities of human life, the unnatural follies and accidents which disrupt its natural course, tracing them to the basic imperfection of

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60 Leccy, 15845-46; Langlois, 15875-76.
61 Wright, 520-21; PL 210, 481-82.
62 Leccy, 15861-982; Langlois, 15891-16012.
63 Leccy, 16203-08; Langlois, 16233-38.
all material existence. She extols Raison as a means of liberation from the burden of cosmic necessity, and rebukes man for refusing to recognize his freedom of will and power to achieve self-knowledge.

All this is of course the essence of Nature’s complaint in the *De planctu*. As in that poem and in the discourse of Raison earlier in the *Roman* the sins with which man is charged reflect events and complications in the human situation of which the goddess herself is unaware. Her appeal assumes the efficacy of the natural order as a stabilizing influence on the human mind as Raison had assumed procreation to be a means to the fullest participation in that order, thus translating into cosmic terms the alienating effect of the Fall. But at this point, where Alain’s goddess had tacitly acknowledged her limitations and referred the problem of man’s aberration to Genius, Jean again abandons the pattern of the *De planctu*, embarking on a digression which provides a cosmic parallel to the earlier plunge into the depths of the world of Faus Semblant. Nature proceeds to analyze in minute detail the various aspects of the cosmic paradigm she has constructed. In the process she provides her own quite unconscious illustration of the very denaturing forces which have aroused her anger.

To show man’s superiority to physical necessity and chance, Nature gives a long discussion of divine foreknowledge, destiny and free will. Her arguments are for the most part conventional and stringent, but as she proceeds she is increasingly sidetracked by hypothetical considerations: what if man had foreknowledge, and could anticipate natural disasters? What if animals were endowed with reason? Nature seems oddly sympathetic to the pictures she conjures up, of man mocking the elements and engaging in feasts and orgies while famine and tempest rage, or of the animal kingdom rising up to overthrow tyrant man. She returns to her argument long enough to reassert the primacy of Raison, but as she goes on to other topics the casually centrifugal tendency of her thoughts becomes dominant. She dilates on the theme of the obedient cosmos, but is soon involved in describing the ravages of a flood, which lays waste fields and towns and sweeps the very images from shrines and altars. From the happy return of fair weather she passes to the optical phenomenon of the rainbow, and thence to the properties of magnifying glasses: had Venus and Mars had such a glass they would

64 Lecoy, 16925-17008; Langlois, 16955-17038.

65 Lecoy, 17029-70; Langlois, 17059-100.

66 The elaborate rhetorical structure of Nature’s discourse and its importance to the “Grand Debate” on the nature of love are stressed by Gunn (125-32, 396-406). It seems to me, however, that the careful disposition of her speech serves mainly as a foil to the headlong course of her thoughts and feelings, and that what she reveals unconsciously is more significant than any “argument” she presents. Cf. Tuve, 267-75.
have seen Vulcan’s fine net and escaped the shame of exposure. There fol-
low a discussion of the tricks of perspective played by mirrors and lenses
which leads into the topic of the distortions effected by dreams and hallu-
cinations, and a return to the theme of the heavens’ complex influence.
Finally she attempts to distinguish true human worth, based on rectitude
and good works, from the false gentilicte bestowed by Fortune and vulgar
acclaim, before reabsolving the universe and formally denouncing mankind.

By the extraordinary cavortings of Nature’s imagination Jean intends,
I think, to mirror the real and illusory attractions, the variety of impulses
and the many misleading paths by which the quest of the Rose has proceed-
ed. Jean’s Nature seems scarcely to know herself. She defines the order
of her universe only to evade its stern implications, divesting it of its
Chartrian platonic veil and subjecting it to a degrading materialistic
analysis which reflects all the corruptions of rationality and desire that
have been dramatized in the earthly context of Deduit and Faus Semblant.67
Fascinated by the ceaseless conflict within her dominions to the point of
virtually forgetting the rationale which contains it, sympathetic with
men’s attempts to evade necessity in pursuit of pleasure or expand the limits
of their earthbound vision by technology, Nature views herself, as it were,
through human eyes. This is a devastating elaboration on Alain’s critique
of the Chartrian faith in Nature as source and standard of moral law;
the ideal cooperation of Nature and Raison has become impossible, and
the “face of Nature”, which Alain had seen as obscured by human artifice
and perversion, is shown by Jean to be itself largely the product of these
corrupting influences.

The parallels between Jean’s cosmos and the human world within it
are compounded by the “personality” of Nature. She is more woman than
divine power, garrulous, subjective and easily distracted, and is seemingly
led to confession primarily by the need to vent her righteous indignation:

Fame sui, si ne me puis taire,
Ainz vucil des ja tout reveler;
Car fame ne peut rien celer;
N’ontues ne fu meauz laidengiez.
Mar s’est de mei tant estrangiez...

67 Nature’s frank exposure of her “secrets” contradicts the declaration of Macrobius, quoted
widely in the Chartrian ambience, that Nature never reveals herself openly, but adorns herself in
elaborate veils; Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, 1, 2, 17-18; Opera, 2, 7. Cf. the fascinating poem
68 Langlois, 19218-22. With the tone of these lines, which suggests a burlesque of the Heroides,
By the end of her denunciation she has forgotten the question of pro-
creation — though she taunts mankind as *sodomites* — and thinks, like
la Vieille, only of devising a fit punishment for her betrayer.\(^69\)

This larger-than-life femininity is set off by Jean’s treatment of Nature’s
relations with Genius. The elaborate formality of the *De planctu* is wholly
abandoned. There Nature had stated her grievances in a concise epistle
which Hymen had borne to Genius, while Nature herself waited in the
company of *Largitas, Temperantia, Humilitas* and other virtues appropriate
to her womanly dignity and subordination. At Genius’ appearance she
had greeted him with “kisses” of an archetypal purity, “mystici Cupidinis
signantia amplexus”, which had revived Genius’ sense of divine origin
and purpose and reestablished him in the position of masculine authority
from which to pronounce his anathema.\(^70\) In the *Roman*, though Genius’
priestly function is if anything more precisely indicated, his relationship
with Nature is flawed, in ways which once again reflect the conditions of
the world of the poem. Genius’ contributions to the dialogue with Nature
consist almost entirely of reflections on feminine duplicity, and though he
concurs in Nature’s general sense of wrong he has evident reservations, as
the poet implies in commenting on his ambivalent response to Nature’s
course allusion to Venus and Mars:

\[
\text{Ainsine s’acordent, ce me semble,}
\]
\[
\text{Nature e Genius ensemble.}
\]
\[
\text{Si dist Salemons toutefois,}
\]
\[
\text{puis que par la verite vois,}
\]
\[
\text{Que beneirez on serait}
\]
\[
\text{Qui bone fame trouverait.}\(^71\)
\]

The spectacle of Genius sparring with his mistress — the emissary of
Noys, as it were, declining to bestow the loving impress of the eternal
idea — is at once the most brilliant and the most crucial of Jean’s exploita-
tions of the allegory of the *De planctu*, the final measure of the contamination
of man’s relations with the natural order. It leads directly into the *Roman’s*
profoundly ironical denouement, as Genius goes forth to address, not Hymen
and the virtues, but the *homme moyen sensuel* in full armor, and submits his
authority to the will of Venus and Amors. There is clearly ample evidence
in all of this for seeing the *Roman* as no more than a carrying out to their
final implications of the effects of the Fall.

But Genius is more than a hapless tool of the passions of Nature and her

\(^{69}\) Langlois, 19309-19; cf. Lecoy, 12846-52; Langlois, 12876-82.

\(^{70}\) Wright, 519-20; PL 210, 480-81.

\(^{71}\) Langlois, 18147-52.
subordinates, and if his complicity in the final conquest amounts to a compromise with the forces of necessity, it is also an affirmation of powers operative on a higher level than the allegory thus far has attained. Genius’ role in the Roman is more complex than Alain’s elaborate but wholly static conception, yet it is necessary to recognize that his character is basically the same in the two works, for much in Jean’s use of him is otherwise inexplicable. It is Genius who provides a full allegorical context for the laws of conduct which Raison had offered to the Lover. It is he who elaborates on the myth of the castration of Saturn, showing how Jupiter’s violent act ushered in the world of necessity, yet did so in the name of a false, wilful delit.\textsuperscript{72} It is he, finally, who proffers the vision of Paradise, the beau parc which is to the garden of Deduit as substance to accident, and cites largesse, cleanliness, compassion and fidelity, together with obedience to Nature, as the means of gaining entry and possessing eternal life in the company of the Lamb. That Genius, ostensibly no more than the patron of the productive instinct, should presume to draw together so many diverse strands of the allegory, and offer to account for what transcends Nature and confounds Raison, is of course highly ironical, but is is also appropriate, in ways which a fuller account of his character may serve to indicate.

Very generally Genius, as conceived by Alain, and before him by Bernardus Silvestris, is the power which relates the natural order to the divine.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{72} Langlois, 20083-220.

\textsuperscript{73} The Genius figure appears twice in the De mundi universitate, first as the bestower of form whom Nature encounters at the outer limit of the universe, and again as the twin powers who wield the gentilium arma of human generation in an unceasing battle with the Fates (De mundi, 2, 4, p. 38; 2, 14, 157-66, p. 70). The latter passage is clearly recalled by the Genius of the Roman: Langlois, 19687-904. It seems to me that the cosmic and human offices of Genius are associated with the single figure of the De planctu. Alain’s conception may be glossed by reference to two works recently edited by Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Alain de Lille: Textes inédits (Paris, 1965). In the Sermo de sphaera intelligibili Alain gives an elaborate account of the relation of form with matter very similar to that of the birth of Veritas in the De planctu (Textes inédits, 299-301; cf. Wright, 518, PL 210, 480). In the Hierarchia Alani (Textes inédits, 228) Alain describes the substantiae genii of individual existences, and glosses Genius as deus nature, while at the same time making plain that his relation to the divine order does not make him capable of revealing that order to the human consciousness; such revelations come about by theophania, which Alain compares and contrasts to Genius. Alain’s Genius is compared with Bernardus’ in my article, “The Function of Poetry” (cited above, 13), pp. 112-18.


Robertson, Préface, 199, cites Guillaume de Conches and “Mythographus Tertius” in defining
In Alain’s platonic terms he administers “the genial kiss of Nature and the Son” by which the divine Word expresses itself in the forms impressed upon created existence. It is in this sense that he is Nature’s priest, the divine agent to whom she reveals her imperfections. Hence also his special relation to human reproduction, the transmission of the lineaments of the divine likeness to succeeding generations, and the act which links man by a slender thread of continuity with his paradisal origins. It is this continuity, I think, which is reflected in Genius’ evocation of the beau parc, a vision which both affirms and qualifies his authority. It is a vision made possible by his association with the original capacities and destiny of man, and has endured man’s rejection of his original eminence. Genius knows what Alain had declared in his treatise on the virtues, that Adam, had he not fallen, would have merited eternal life per naturalia. He knows the Good Shepherd and the Lamb, but not the Incarnation, and is unaware that Grace is a necessary supplement to those innate capacities which are his only resource. He is, in short, a symbol of all that is best in human nature, with the capabilities and limitations which the fact implies.

Genius as “natural inclination.” This definition would account for Genius activity in the Roman, but Robertson takes insufficient note of the cosmic and divine relationships implied by Genius’ “naturalness,” and the significant sense in which, as it were, he marches to the sound of a different drummer.

74 See Genius’ response to Nature’s greeting in the De planctu (Wright, 420; PL 210, 481): “Quamvis enim mens mea hominum vitiiis Augustiata deformibus, in infernum tristitiae peregrinans, lactitiae nesciat paradisum, in hoc tamen amoenantis gaudii odorat primordia, quod te mecum video ad debiaceae vindicatae suspirare suspiri.” Genius’ vision of Paradise in the Roman would seem to be an elaboration on the hint afforded by this passage. The concluding phrase is in ironic contrast to Nature’s thirst for vengeance in the Roman.

75 Tractatus de virtutibus et de vitiiis et de donibus Spiritus Sancti, ed. O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles, 7 vols. (Gembloux, 1942-60), 6, 65-66.

76 My interpretation of the roles of Genius and Nature is so different from Mr. Fleming’s that it seems a good idea at this point to note some basic differences of interpretation which help to account for more general disagreements. It will be obvious that my interpretation of Genius is very different from that of Fleming, who treats him only as the concupiscence of a “vitiated nature,” basically compromised by sin (193-94; cp. Robertson, Preface, 199). To explain the connection of this libidinous principle to Nature, Fleming quotes a passage from the anonymous sumnarium, very possibly Alain’s, appended to the Anticleaudianus in the edition of Robert Bossuat (Paris, 1955): “... primi autem dicitur artificis, id est Dei, quatuor sunt opera: opus in mente, opus in materia, opus in forma et opus in gubernacione; Nature uero duo; unum in pura natura consideratum, ab omni corruptione alienum, quale opus Nature fuit ante Ade peccatum; alium uero uaria corruptione uidatum, quale fuit post peccatum Ade...” Anticleaudianus, ed. Bossuat, 199; Fleming, 194). On the basis of this passage Fleming speaks of “two Nature”, one that of the Anticleaudianus, “a sublime figure intimately associated with Divine Sapience and the Nous,” the other “Nature at her forge,” a “wounded” Nature wholly and subrationally engaged in the work of generation and up to no good with Genius (194-96).

But it is clear that the sumnarium passage (of which Fleming quotes only the portion dealing
The limitations, of course, are severe: Genius must exert his influence through the sexual nature of a corrupt and irrational humanity obedient unconsciously, if at all, to laws which it can never strictly “know”. The vivid imagery of his plea for procreation recalls Bernardus’ explicit association of Genius with the male genitalia, an ironic reflection on the liability of his influence to distortion by the material in which it operates. Jean de Meun exploits this irony. The obstacles which have interposed themselves between the Lover’s sexual nature and any conscious fulfillment of a divine duty are made plain in the pageantry which surrounds Genius’ appeal to the barons. The renewed sense of dignity and authority which had been the direct result of Genius’ reunion with Nature in the _De planctu_ emerges in the _Roman_ only after Amors has clad him in priestly vestments of his own and Venus has armed him with her _ardent cierge._ Only then is he moved to recall in their full significance the duty of procreation and the Paradise lost by man through unnatural conduct. As he concludes, Venus augments his eloquence with the stimulus of her torch; the action moves beyond the context of the _De planctu_ altogether, and forward to the pell-mell anticlimactic events of the poem’s conclusion, on a wave of sexual impulse inspired by a virtually inextricable combination of nature and deception.

But the conquest of the Rose is not the sole result of Genius’ exhortation. Though the Lover mentions it only by the way, and immediately apologizes

with Nature) distinguishes not between two _Naturae_, but between two _opera Naturae_. Nature’s human creations before the Fall were free of any taint, but since the Fall they are corrupt. Nature herself is altered only by this flaw in her relations with man. This is as true in the _Antichlorianus_ (which clearly mentions her forge in the opening lines) as in the _De planctu_ and the _Roman_. In all three works her relation to divine wisdom and human reason is limited by the original terms of the _opus conditionis_, and so excludes the acknowledgment of the Fall as such, or of the sacramental process of redemption. This dual limitation is emphasized, I think, in Jean’s partial distinction between Nature and Raison — partial in that the latter takes over much of the moral instruction performed by Nature in the _De planctu_, enabling Jean de Meun to elaborate the passionate feminine character of the goddess herself.

Fleming acknowledges a sense in which Nature maintains her integrity in the _Roman_, and concedes that Genius is bad only as he is misused (197-98); but these concessions are hard to reconcile with other of his interpretations, and with his stern Pauline reading of the _Roman_ as a whole. The price paid is the assertion that Nature’s long ramble through the science and pseudoscience of Jean’s day is “clearly intended to move the reader to the contemplation of ‘the invisible things of God,’” (198) and a firm refusal to acknowledge the child conceived at the instigation of Genius (243-44).

77 Langlois, 19477-90. In the _De planctu_ Genius puts on his vestments after speaking with Nature, as preparation for pronouncing his anathema “auctoritate superessentials usiae”. There the Virtues bear torches which they cast down at the end of Genius’ pronouncement; as the torches die, the dreamer passes from vision into sleep. This parallels the effect of the casting down of Venus’ _cierge_ in the _Roman_; sensuality assumes the ascendancy and Genius “vanishes” (Langlois, 20668-703; cf. Wright, 522, PL 210, 482).
for his presumption, the action of the poem must be seen to conclude with
the conception of a child — the fulfillment of Genius’ commandment, the
renewal of the race. And the implications of this simple fact seem to
me to suggest a new point of view toward the allegory, raising it to a level
on which the forces which have dominated the poem thus far become them-

selves submissive. The interplay of impulse and dissimulation by which
Nature and Genius are made to collaborate more or less unwittingly with
Venus, Amors and Faus Semblant; the pervasive corruption which destroys
franchise on the very level at which Nature and Genius commune apart —
all this may now be seen as contained and impelled, almost imperceptibly
but decisively by a higher force, a power we may, and are, I think, intended,
to regard as providential. An intense subjectivity, with its inevitable taint of
cupidity and deception, determines the conscious motives of all the partic-
pants in the pursuit of the Rose down to and beyond the Lover’s final prayer
of gratitude; but all are subject as well to deeper influences. Ma mere la deesse,
says Amors, n’est pas du tout a mon desir; toute creature, adds la Vieille, veust
retournar a sa nature. This contingency of the corrupt and unfulfilled on the
natural, viewed in one way, accounts for the haplessness and vulnerability
on which the dominion of Faus Semblant is founded. But it is also the
means of entry for Genius, the vestigial capacity for self-realization and ful-
fillment which survived the Fall and which preserves man in a state of po-
tentiality, accessible to forces profoundly subconscious and supernatural,
but real and beneficent.

The devious path by which this perspective on the poem’s action is at-
tained is reflected in its form, a form which I have perhaps too loosely re-
ferred to as allegorical. H. R. Jauss has declared that Jean de Meun “no
longer took seriously” the allegorical mode which is his ostensible vehicle,
and in a sense this is true. Certainly the effect of his allusive dialogue with
Alain and the De planctu is to prohibit any naive attempt to educate a higher
significatio from the facts of human behavior by resource to the sort of poetic
typology which unifies the former poem, realigning its imagery and cosmo-
logy with the archetypal pattern which man’s depravity had obscured.
Raison cites Plato and seeks recourse to integumanz in defense of her plain
speaking on sexual matters, but the unflinching literalism of la Vieille and
Genius dominates, and reveals how thoroughly Jean has “de-allego-
rized” his materials. Nothing is clearer about his exploitation of his bor-

78 Langlois, 21719-31.
79 Lecoy, 10719021; Langlois, 10749-51.
80 “La transformation de la forme allégorique entre 1180 et 1240: d’Alain de Lille à Guillaume
de Lorris,” in L’humanisme médieval (cited above, n. 55), 146.
rowed resources than their firm denial of any but the most complex cause-and-effect relation to archetypes and moral paradigms. Sexuality in the Roman is a symptom of the minimal survival of man’s original dignity, but it is not a metaphor for that dignity. Venus, Amors, and a frankly dishevelled Nature inhabit and activate the world of the poem with their ambiguities and inconsistencies intact. Depravity, cupididity, all the perils of love in a fallen world become necessary means to the end of human survival.

An index to Jean’s complex consistency of purpose is his use of mythology. Narcissus, Adonis, Pygmalion and Orpheus are cited with decisive relevance in the course of the poem, but their conventional associations with the follies and consequences of love are consistently played upon to suit Jean’s special purposes. Narcissus, symbol of the madness and final disaster of self-love, is unmistakably associated with the Lover at the outset, and Raison alludes tellingly to his fatal rejection of Echo. But as the Roman proceeds his folly leads into a continually evolving pattern of idolatry which culminates in the Lover’s assumption of the role of pilgrim in preparation to assault the shrine of the Rose. We may gauge this development by Jean’s incorporation of the symbol of Narcissus into his account of the more literal idolatry of Pygmalion, who compares himself with Narcissus only to twist the comparison into a justification of his own “unnatural” passion.

Orpheus, on the other hand, traditionally the type of the wise man who emerges from the disillusionment of sensual love to devote himself to contemplation, is condemned by Genius for his failure to accept the responsibilities of his condition, and numbered among the sinners contra naturam.

A less obvious instance of Jean’s exploitation of mythography is the abrupt digression in which he recounts the story of Venus and Adonis, deliberately suspending his account of the swift action of the siege to do so. This story of a brief and idyllic love, with its conventional associations of the fleeting beauty of youth and the perpetual yearning of Venus, brings the worlds of Deduit and necessity into sharp confrontation, and Jean is at his best

81 See Tuve, 245-46.
82 See Robertson, Preface, 93-96.
83 Lecoy, 5804-08; Langlois, 5834-38.
84 Langlois, 20859-88. Robertson (Preface, 99-103) and Fleming (228-37) have well analyzed the Pygmalion episode as an illustration of the medieval conception of idolatry, but the moral implications of the tale itself are surely to be qualified by a recognition of its relation to the action of the Roman. The significant similarity between Pygmalion’s career and that of the Lover was pointed out to me by my colleague, Thomas D. Hill, who has graciously allowed me to read in manuscript his excellent forthcoming study of the mythography of the Roman.
in describing both the love and its aftermath in Adonis' violent death.\(^{86}\) I have referred to the note of seriousness which Venus introduces into the narrative; the digression seems to me to foreshadow this element in the ensuing action with a reminder that youth has its uses as well as its wilful pursuits, and that its waste in tragic.\(^{87}\)

It is further possible, I think, to see a complementary relationship between this myth and Jean's allusions to Vulcan's thwarting of the adultery of Venus and Mars, recalled with consummate irony by both la Vieille and Nature.\(^{88}\) For both, the butt of the jest is Vulcan, who seeks foolishly to restrain free love and thinks exposure a sufficient means to make an honest woman of his wife. Nature adds force to the latter thrust by eliciting Genius' testimony to the unfathomable duplicity of womankind. As conventionally moralized, the myth represents "the bondage implicit in unrestrained sensuality", and so reflects ironically on la Vieille, whose own life has subjected her to just such bondage.\(^{89}\) But for Nature to flaunt the same tale in the face of her confessor is obviously a bolder stroke, and though it is again one which reflects back upon the speaker, its point is more complex. I would suggest that it involves a far subtler allusion to mythographic tradition, and that its significance centers on the figure of Vulcan.

By an obvious naturalistic translation, Vulcan and his subterranean smithy were commonly associated with the *ignis terrenus*, source of *calor vitalis* in all creatures.\(^{90}\) In this vital essence participate the *ignis venereus* and the *naturale ingenium* of mankind, the former providing a naturalistic explanation of Vulcan's bond with Venus, the latter accounting for an impulse to form and creativity reflected in his vocation as artisan and the myth of his frustrated love for Pallas.\(^{91}\) His exile on marshy Lemnos, to which he was banished for his outward *deformitas*, reflects his involvement with the dank depths of sensuality, yet his powers are beneficent and continue to exert themselves on the material in which they exist.\(^{92}\)

\(^{86}\) Lecoy, 15645-720; Langlois, 15675-750.

\(^{87}\) The sense of a deeper seriousness in the story is perhaps reinforced by the naturalistic associations of the myth; the death of Adonis was seen to represent the annual declination of the sun *ad australes circulos*, while Venus, as *terras superficies or pulchritudo*, mourns the loss of his vital warmth; see Johannes Scotus, *Annotationes*, 13-14; Remigius, *Commentum*, 94; "Mythographus Tertius," 11, 17, pp. 238-39.

\(^{88}\) Lecoy, 13817-14156; Langlois, 13847-14186, 18061-146.


\(^{91}\) See Guillaume de Conches, *Glosae super Platonem*, 93-94.

\(^{92}\) See John of Garland's account of the adultery of Venus and Mars; Venus is the spring, Vul-
THE LITERAL AND THE ALLEGORICAL

This aspect of Vulcan is elaborated in the seminal commentaries of Johannes Scotus and Remigius of Auxerre on the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii of Martianus Capella. In Martianus' account of the gifts bestowed by the gods upon Psyche, the human spirit, Vulcan is said to have kindled within her "insopibilis perennitatis igniculos, ne caligantibus tenebris nocteque caeca opprimeretur".\(^{93}\) Scotus glosses this enduring flame as the ingenium "bestowed upon all mortals born into the world, that they be not wholly lacking in knowledge of their creator and their native dignity",\(^{94}\) and Remigius sees it as ensuring "lest the soul be overwhelmed by the murky darkness of ignorance".\(^{95}\) In both commentaries this beneficent power is set in opposition to the illecebrosa donaria Veneris, source of that mortifera delectatio to which all flesh in subject.\(^{96}\)

I think it is possible to discern in this array of conventional attributes the lineaments of a figure strikingly like the Genius of the Roman, a principle at once of appetite and aspiration, his labors subject to the imperfection of his materials yet responsive also to the influence of higher powers.\(^{97}\) Both figures have their undeniably comic aspect, yet both are maintained in their essential dignity by a vision which sees beyond the accidents of experience. We recall that it is Vulcan who, in the Aeneid, yields to Venus and forges arms for Aeneas; but wrought into the shield he fashions is a profound vision of the arduous history of Rome, the empire of necessity, which these arms will establish — at the price, as Vergil everywhere reminds us, of the destruction of the paradisal purity of Saturnian Italy. This great image of the artist's creative vision, operative on a level to which Venus and her son cannot attain, has its counterpart in the Roman. Genius responds to the goad of Venus with a vision of the ceaseless war of life against death, a vision violent and often harsh but ultimately affirmative, and at which the Lover, like Aeneas, rejoices in ignorance, blindly assuming responsibility for the fata nepotum.

Jean's is of course a comic vision; the recollection of Paradise becomes itself an invitation to enter the field, and despite Genius' vivid portraits can the summer which brings the fruits of spring to maturity, Mars the autumn which reaps the

fruits of another's labor (Integumenta Ovidii, 185-86, p. 51).

\(^{93}\) De nuptiis, 1, 7, p. 8.

\(^{94}\) Annotationes, 13.

\(^{95}\) Commentum, 79.

\(^{96}\) The complementary relationship of Vulcan and Venus is suggested by Scotus (13), who carefully distinguishes the gifts of the other gods, "bonas ac naturales humanae animae virtutes," from that of Venus, "omne quod merito originalis peccati ex corruptibili et mortali creatura naturabilis animae virtutibus et miscetur et inseritur:" cf. De nuptiis 1, 7, pp. 7-8.

\(^{97}\) The tutelary role assigned Vulcan by commentators on the De nuptiis may have been suggested by the juxtaposition of Terrae pater Vulcanaus et Genius in the procession of the Gods to Jove's palace (De nuptiis, 1, 49, p. 38); cf. Remigius, Commentum, 118, and, for other glosses on Genius, 139, 184.
of Cerberus and the Fates the overriding impression of his speech is one of immense vitality. And of course it would be impossible to show that Jean had in mind any such elaborate pattern of allusion as I have suggested. Nonetheless the affinities of the two creative figures are plain, and I have pursued them at such length because it seems to me that insofar as it is valid, the association of Vulcan with Genius offers an excellent insight into the complex system of checks and balances by which the world of the Roman is held together and made to conform to the will of the higher power represented by Genius. As Venus curbs and contains the impulsive nature of Adonis, drawing his wilfulness into the channels of sexuality, so Vulcan, in response to the same necessity, curbs the tendency of the ignis venereus to spend itself to no purpose in the violent embrace of Mars. By such virtually fortuitous manipulations of will and native impulse the world is stabilized and renewed, by powers which, operating in the depths of human nature, inseminate that nature with the impulse to fulfillment.

The sweep of the action of Jean’s poem is vast, suspended as it is between Raison’s vision of a lost harmony and Genius’ prophecy of a reconciliation to come. We are transported from the intelligible world of traditional allegory to the depths of negation, and again upward towards a new affirmation of the significance of existence. But Jean makes no easy promises: the final vision of the Roman is one of temporal fulfillment only. The forge and hammers of Vulcan and Genius are not those whereby, in the words of Richard of St. Victor, “we hammer out for ourselves the form of the angelic likeness.”98 The voice of Genius calls man home in the name of the Good Shepherd,99 but the full significance of his words in inaccessible even to himself, and Jean rigorously excludes from his conclusion any suggestion of the true connection between the here and now and the Paradise beyond. We have seen the evolution of this final position in his consistent refusal to acquiesce in Alain’s poetic sense of the natural order as the type and vehicle of the order of Grace; the allegorical world of the De planctu is finally the structure Jean destroys in order to construct his own world out of the actual facts of experience. His comic violation of the integrity of the Chartrian Natura and the hierarchy of her domain leads to a qualified reaffirmation of earthly life, but much is left unresolved. Rational idealism, conventional morality, and ultimately the venerable ideal of contemptus saeculi, are shrewdly criticized, but Jean is equally careful to undermine

98 Cited by Dronke, Medieval Latin..., 1, 63, from Richard’s Benjamin minor, 4, 2 (PL 196, 136): “Ut ergo in nobis angelicae similitudinis formam... possimus excudere...”

99 It is just possible that Jean intends an imaginative association between Genius and the Good Shepherd of Luke 15, traditionally a type of Christ descending into the regio dissimilitudinis to redeem fallen man. The parable is a favorite of Alain; see, with Mme d’Alverny’s notes, The Expositio prosae de angello (Textes inédits, 215).
the claims of secular experience to an intrinsic value of its own. What is clearly affirmed is that the proliferation of conflicting points of view overlies the rock and loam out of which any transcendent aspiration must necessarily spring.

In its relation to Chartistian allegory and to the work of later poets, Jean's Roman marks a stage in what J. A. W. Bennett has characterized as an ongoing dialogue between the medieval poet and his tradition. One culmination of this dialogue, as Bennett also notes, is the Canterbury Tales, and it is evidence of the centrality of Jean's vision that we may discern in this greatest of medieval "secular" poems the lineaments of the poetic world of the Roman. Chaucer's juxtapositions of experience and authority, disputes among men and universal yearnings, reveal in many ways the influence of Jean's exploitation of traditional resources in the interests of a full rendering of earthly experience. Traces of his "allegorical period", and his profound knowledge of Boethius and the Chartrians, are present in the Knight's Tale, where Theseus' final sermon is set against a bewildering and seemingly pessimistic survey of human life. Immediately Theseus' resolution is challenged by the Miller and the "cult of experience", as the rationalism of Chartres is aped and mocked by the voices of worldly wisdom in the Roman. The ad hominem focus of the Reeve's misguided response to the Miller brings us down to the level of the reckless striving for "maistrye" in which so much of human life is lived, and it is clear from the Cook's opening remarks that his tale would have completed the descensus ad inferos by glorifying the chaos of experience for its own sake, as in the triumph of Faus Semblant. It is surely no coincidence that the Canterbury Tales, like the Roman, move from an initial formalism and the voices of authority (Egeus, Theseus), through the stresses and crosspurposes of the central portions, where the sexes, the church hierarchy and other social problems are the major themes, to a new seriousness, as the significance of Nature and experience is questioned by the Canon Yeoman and the Nun's Priest.

Chaucer is perhaps more compassionate than Jean, if no less humorous, in his treatment of the haplessness of man. The questions raised by these later tales reflect a profound yearning for certitude, for some supplementary dispensation which may give a new meaning to earthly life. Jean, on the other hand, leaves us with the confident voice of Genius in our ears. But Genius' very eloquence testifies to a glory he cannot obtain; the Roman and the Canterbury Tales are finally one in articulating the longing for a life beyond experience.

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100 The Parlament of Foules (Oxford, 1957), 23.
Saint Edburga of Winchester: 
a study of her cult, a.d. 950-1500, 
with an edition of the fourteenth-century 
Middle English and Latin lives 

LAUREL BRASWELL

Saint Edburga of Winchester, daughter of King Edward the Elder 
and granddaughter of Alfred the Great,¹ spent her entire life in 
Winchester, Hants., latterly as abbess of Nunnaminster until her death in 
960. It was here that a cult began, even before her death. After Saint 
Edburga’s death the cult spread shortly afterwards to other ecclesiastical 
institutions of Winchester and eventually to other areas of the Southwest, 
especially to Pershore, in Worcs., which became by the mid-twelfth century 
the principal centre of her cult.

Limitation of Saint Edburga’s cult to certain specific areas of the South- 
west may be of significance for The South English Legendary (SEL), that great 
collection of Middle English legends for the temporale (moveable feasts) 
and sanctorale (saints’ days) compiled toward the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury, since three manuscripts of the SEL contain the legend of this saint. 
Certainly a study of her cult and related literary documents would throw 
some light upon the origins and techniques of the SEL as a whole, for few 
legends contained in it can be examined against such a tightly-knit body 
of extant material as relates to the cult of Saint Edburga.

The present examination will consider two areas of evidence, the topogra-
phical and the literary. The topographical will include monumental, 
historical, and liturgical matter associating Edburga with a particular 
area. The literary will include, first, the Latin lives of the saint, then the

¹ She is to be distinguished from two other virgin saints of the same name: (1) Edburga, sister 
to Saints Osith and Edith and daughter of Frithwald of Surrey, was a nun at Aylebury and died 
in 650; an alternative identification is suggested by F. G. Holweck, A Biographical Dictionary of 
Saints (London, 1924), p. 302, who thinks she may have been the sister of Wilurga, wife of King 
Penda of Mercia; and (2) Edburga, a disciple of Saint Mildred, Abbess of Minster-in-Thanet, 
and, before her death in 751, a correspondent of Saint Boniface.
one vernacular (Middle English) life. None of the complete lives has been published, and few of the fragmentary ones have received much notice. The fourteenth-century anonymous Latin and Middle English lives are here included in an appendix. The latter has been edited from the three so far unedited SEL manuscripts containing it; because of their bearing upon the localization of Saint Edburga's cult these manuscripts and their linguistic evidence will be discussed in some detail.

THE CULT OF SAINT EDBURGA

1. Topographical Evidence.

The cult of Saint Edburga seems to have been geographically limited in that it was confined chiefly to Hants., Worcs., and Oxon. The Middle English life describes the cult first at Winchester at the time of the saint's death, then at Pershore a century later, and finally at Bicester, Oxon., at the time of writing, i.e., about the beginning of the fourteenth century. This outline of its growth is substantiated by other evidence.

In Winchester the royal house of Wessex founded and re-established several religious institutions. New Minster, dedicated to the Holy Trinity, the Blessed Virgin, and Saint Peter, was founded immediately to the north of the Old Minster of St. Swithin by Edburga’s father, Edward the Elder. The date is given as the year of his accession, 901. His remains, along with those of his parents and other members of the family, were interred there. When New Minster was moved to a new site in 1109, henceforth to be known as Hyde Abbey, all royal remains were transferred with it. At an earlier date King Alfred the Great, Edburga’s grandfather, had founded a Benedictine Abbey for nuns in Winchester, known as Nunminster and dedicated to Saint Mary. Edward completed the buildings and enlarged the foundation. Here his daughter Edburga became abbess and was buried, later enshrined. A tenth-century list of shrines cites Nunminster for Edburga. Later vitae describe miracles associated with her tomb in the monastery. From Nunminster the cult may have spread through the large number of chaplains and priests with prebendal stalls at the monastery but with benefices which required parochial duties in other parishes in and around Winchester; perhaps such was the case at a Win-

2 Her cyd ymhe hal'gan de on Angelycynne restad, ed. George Hickes, Dissertatio epistolaris ad Bartholomaeum Showere (Oxford, 1703), p. 120.
3 See Osbert of Clare’s twelfth-century vita contained in Oxford, Bodleian Library MS. Laud. Misc. 114, ff. 98-106v, and the anonymous vita in London, British Museum MS. Lansdowne 436, ff. 43-43v: these manuscripts are described more fully below.
chester church dedicated to Saint Edburga in 1108.\(^4\) The following year she may have been venerated at Hyde Abbey, where other royal remains had been enshrined.\(^5\) It is likely Edburga was venerated at nearby Romsey Abbey, an institution also associated with the royal family, since one of the two extant *vita* is contained in a manuscript (London, British Museum MS. Lansdowne 436, edited in appendix) inscribed on the flyleaf as the property of the Abbey. The Abbey would have had a special interest in the cult of Saint Edburga, because Edburga’s sister Ethelfleda was an abbess there; her *vita* also appears in the manuscript.

Although Saint Edburga’s body remained at Nunnaminster, some relics were later acquired by Pershore Abbey. The account of that acquisition however, is far from clear, possibly because the account of the Abbey’s foundation is itself confused. Accounts of the foundation of Pershore fall into four main versions: (1) the Abbey was founded for canons by Oswald, nephew of King Ethelred, ca. 638;\(^6\) the Abbey was founded by Oswald, Archbishop of York and Bishop of Worcester, together with a noble co-founder in 883;\(^7\) (3) the Abbey was founded by King Edgar together with a noble co-founder, ca. 972;\(^8\) and (4) the Abbey was refounded, not founded, by King Edgar and without a co-founder ca. 972, at which time earlier titles were reaffirmed and the canons replaced by Benedictine monks.\(^9\) Accounts of the acquisition of Edgburga’s relics follow two main versions: (1) they were acquired at the time of the tenth-century foundation as the gift


\(^7\) *Annales de Wigornia*, ed. Luard, p. 369. These highly inaccurate annals have placed the foundation by Oswald a century too early. Saint Oswald, d. 992, was Archbishop of York under King Edgar but also held the see of Worcester, where he chiefly resided. Quite likely the Worcester annalist confused this Oswald with the earlier one, having been influenced by the similarity of names and dates and the fact that Archbishop Oswald did found Ramsey Abbey in 974 — an event which the Worcester annalist records on the same page.


\(^9\) See the royal charter dated 972, printed by Walter de Gray Birch in *Cartularium Saxonicum*, 3 (London, 1893), no. 1282.
of the noble co-founder;\textsuperscript{10} or (2) they were acquired later through someone other than the co-founder.\textsuperscript{11} Because differing accounts have resulted in several traditions among the extant lives of Saint Edburga, an examination of these is useful for determining the possible sources behind the Middle English life.

Differing traditions concerning the foundation of Pershore and acquisition of Edburga's relics may have arisen from the uncertain identity of the Abbey's co-founder and a similarity of names among the possible candidates. The royal charter of 972 does not name any co-founder, but it may still provide a clue to his identity. Among the signatories of this charter issued by King Edgar are the dukes Ælfhere, Oslac, and Ædelwine. The last can be identified as the "comes orientalium Anglorum" who, together with Saint Oswald, founded Ramsey Abbey in 974.\textsuperscript{12} The first is most likely the Al(h)er (Ædelward, Lat. Egelwardus or Ælfgwardus) listed by Searle as the "comes, dux, princeps Merciorum" and cited in other sources as a noted benefactor in tenth-century Worcs. and Gloucestershire.\textsuperscript{13} Later historians and hagiographers doubtless confused the two because of their similar reputations for founding religious houses and their associations with King Edgar: an example is in fact provided by the Worcester Annals, which attribute to Ædelwine the foundation of both Ramsey and Pershore. Another factor in the confusion is the existence of another and later Ædelwine who, although the founder of Deerhurst Abbey, was buried at Pershore.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} The vitae by Osbert of Clare and the anonymous author in MS. Lansdowne 436; the Middle English life, see below, vv. 102-7.
\textsuperscript{13} W. G. Searle, \textit{Anglo-Saxon Bishops, Kings, and Nobles} (Cambridge, 1899), p. 300. In his \textit{Onomasticon Anglo-Saxonicum} (Cambridge, 1897), p. 56, Searle erroneously identifies Ædelward as the founder of Pershore, probably on the basis of William of Malmesbury's account.
Finally, the similarity between the names Odda and Wada, which represent the shortened 1WS forms for Ædelwine and Ædewerdd respectively, could have contributed to the interchange of names. This is not only well illustrated in Searle’s *Onomasticon* but by the example of Leland’s quoted account of the foundation of Pershore and acquisition of Edburga’s relics: there Odda becomes the benefactor of Pershore, while his son, “comes Wada”, is the purchaser of the relics.

Accounts of Saint Edburga generally attribute the foundation of Pershore to Ælfere, i.e., Ædewerdd. He is “Egelwardus, dux” in William of Malmesbury’s *Gesta pontificum*, but “Alwardus, comes” in Osbert of Clare’s *vita* and “comes... Aelwardus Wade” in the Lansdowne manuscript. The Middle English life calls him simply “the earl”, v. 108. Although technically both titles were his, use of only this title would appear to link the Middle English with those versions using *comes*.

Among Latin accounts of the acquisition of Edburga’s relics for Pershore, only two specify that founder and purchaser were one and the same: Osbert of Clare and the Lansdowne author. (Leland’s unnamed source may go back in part to this tradition in naming a Wada as the purchaser of the relics; according to this version, however, he is not the earlier Wada, i.e., Ædewerdd, but his grandson).15 By making “the earl who began that house” also the purchaser of Edburga’s relics, the Middle English account thus shows itself part of the tradition represented by Osbert of Clare and the Lansdowne author.

However and through whom Edburga’s relics came to Pershore, the Abbey soon became an important cult centre. Much of its reputation was acquired through the reputed miraculous power of Edburga’s relics. This was observed by William of Malmesbury as early as 1125,16 commented upon by Osbert of Clare ca. 1140, and described by an anonymous author toward the end of the thirteenth century.17 Three other church dedications within the Pershore Hundred attest to the subsequent growth of her cult in Worcs. and neighboring regions. All three are in villages where the Abbey had manors: Yardley, in the northeast; Broadway, in the southeast,

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15 See above, n. 11.
where the abbots had their country residence; and Leigh, in the southwest.  

The parish church of St. Andrew was constructed opposite Pershore Abbey for tenants of Westminster, upon which institution much of the monastic land had been bestowed by Edward the Confessor and William the Conqueror; the cult would have been observed at St. Andrew's because of the proximity of the shrine and generally close relations between the parish church and the Abbey. A four-day fair during Saint Edburga's vigil, feast, and two following days was granted by Henry III to the town of Pershore in 1227.

In districts outside Pershore and its Hundred there may have been some relics of Edburga at Glastonbury Abbey in Somerset. Bishop Britwold is alleged to have presented the abbey with a "magna pars de sancta Edburga virgine". Somewhat closer to Pershore was the Benedictine Abbey of Abingdon (Berks.), which claimed to have had relics by 1116. North of Oxford an Augustinian Priory was dedicated to the Virgin and Saint Edburga at Bicester in 1182; the convent had the same name as the adjoining parish church, where canons carried out the parochial duties. It must have been an important cult centre by the end of the thirteenth century, for the Middle English life refers to this house as "Berneestre per biside Oxneford" and says that there were then three canons resident (vv. 111-2). The village of Adderbury, also in Oxon., appears in the Doomsday Book as "Edburg-berick" and in later records belonging to New College, Oxford, as "Ebborber-beri". Although evidence for a cult at Worchester cannot be verified, it should be noted that O, the fifteenth-century manuscript of the Middle English life, had some connection with Wor-

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20 An event cited only by William Dugdale, Monasticon Anglicanum, 1 (London, 1655), p. 4, who names no sources; William of Malmesbury, an authority on the history of the Abbey, does not mention Britwold's gift in his Gesta regum anglorum, although he describes others of lesser value (ed. Stubbs, p. 56).


22 VCH, Oxfordshire, ed. William Page, 2 (London, 1907), pp. 93-5; Knowles and Haddock, Medieval Religious Houses, p. 127. For dating the Middle English life it would be useful to know when Bicester became reduced to only three canons; however, numbers are available only for the date of foundation in 1182 (11) and for 1445 (7).

cester because a cathedral document was used in the binding. That the
Benedictine Priory at Great Malvern, southwest of Worcester, claimed
Edburga's relics in the fourteenth century is suggested by the counter-
claim mace in the Winchester Annals.24 Although Winchester denied that
there were major relics at Malvern, the fact remains that the latter was
closely allied with Pershore; both belonged to the diocese of Worcester and
both were partially administered by St. Peter's, Westminster. Accordingly,
veneration of the saint could easily have passed from Pershore through Wor-
cester to Malvern.25

Liturgical combines with other topographical evidence to substantiate
existence of a cult in the Southwest from the eleventh century. Her feast
on June 15th is commemorated earliest in several calendars associated with
Winchester.26 The calendar contained in the Missal of Robert of Jumièges,
compiled at Winchester early in the eleventh century, also commemorates
the feast.27 Several eleventh-century calendars from elsewhere with an en-
try for Saint Edburga are the Bosworth Psalter from St. Augustine's, Can-
terbury,28 a Sherbourne calendar,29 several associated with Worcester,30
one attributed to Bury St. Edmunds,31 and another attributed to Croyland.32
From the end of the century is a calendar attributed to Wells, which also
commemorates the feast.33 A late eleventh-century missal, possibly of Win-
cester origin, includes a collect, secret, and post-communion for Saint
Edburga in its Proprium Sanctorum.34 They are nearly identical to an early

25 Repeated contacts between Worcester, Pershore, and Malvern are well documented in
26 These are printed in *English Kalendars before A.D. 1100*, 1, ed. Francis Wormald. Henry Brad-
shaw Society 72 (London, 1934), sa nos. 9 (British Museum MS. Cott. Titus D. XXVII, from New
Minster, 1023-25); 10 (Cambridge, Trinity College MS. 15. 32, pp. 15-26, from New Minster, ca.
1025); 11 (British Museum MS. Arundel 60, ff. 2-7v, ca. 1060); 12 (British Museum MS. Cott.
Vit. E. XVIII, f. 4v, from Hyde Abbey, ca. 1060); and possibly no. 2 (Salisbury, Cathedral
Library MS. 501, ff. 3-8v, dated by the editor as the earliest of the group, i.e., 969-78) and 6
(Cambridge University Library MS. K. k. v. 32, f. 50-55v, late eleventh century).
27 Ed. F. E. Warren, *The Leofric Missal* (Oxford, 1883), p. 28; the date of Edburga's death is
here incorrectly given.
28 Edited from British Museum MS. Addit. 37517, ff. 2-3, by Wormald, *English Kalendars*, as
no. 5, and dated by him 988-1012.
29 Ed. Wormald as no. 14, ca. 1061.
30 Ed. Wormald as nos. 16 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Hatton 113, ff. iii-viii, latter half
of the eleventh century) and 17 (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS. 391, pp. 3-14, same date).
twelfth-century missal fragment, so far unedited. Both bear textual similarities to that portion of the Hyde Abbey sanctorale commemorating Saint Edurga, a document in which the saint clearly receives her highest veneration. The late thirteenth-century Hereford calendar notes Edurga’s feast has three lessons, while the Hereford sanctorale gives a memoria in the form of an oratio and in the rubrics states three lessons are to be read at matins on the saint’s feast. Finally, a late fourteenth-century manuscript of the Exeter martillogium (but no other manuscript nor the calendar) lists a depositio on Edurga’s feast day. Citations in Sarum and York liturgical documents are totally absent. Thus, Winchester, Worcester, and later Hereford provide the liturgical background against which Edurga’s cult flourished, but there are isolated examples of its extension to Canterbury, Croydon, Sherbourne, and Bury St. Edmunds. None of the liturgical documents I have examined appears to have belonged to Pershore, since none contain any reference to the translation of Edurga’s relics on 18 October, the great feast day celebrated by the Abbey according to Osbert of Clare (f. 119v).

2. Latin Literary Evidence.

The literary evidence for Saint Edurga, and indeed for most saints, may be divided into three general approaches to biography: (1) hagiographical, which attempts a complete chronological account of her life; (2) historical, which simply offers within a larger historical context a few relevant facts or selected incidents; and (3) liturgical, which concerns itself with the feast but may use selected hagiographical matter in a thematic way. All deal with one or more of the five principle topics around which


36 Ed. J. B. L. Tollhurst, The Monastic Breviary of Hyde Abbey, Winchester, 3: Sanctorale, 1. Henry Bradshaw Soc. 76 (London, 1938), no pagination, ff. 264v-265. The manuscript upon which this text is based, Oxford, Bodl. Lib., MS. Rawl. liturg. e. 1 (S.C. 15842), dates to the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The liturgy includes Cap., Hymn., Oratio (text identical to the oratio of MS. Cott. Vitell. A. xviii, see n. 34 above), and eight lessons giving a summary of Edurga’s life. The lessons are discussed below.


the biography of Saint Edburga is constructed. These are (1) Lineage; (2) Choice of Religious Life; (3) Saintliness exemplified by (a) humility, (b) power to perform miracles, and (c) secret vigils; (4) Death; and (5) Translation and later Reputation. The following presentation of the literary evidence is based upon these five topics for the sake of convenience, since no two documents deal similarly with the same topic nor present them in the same order.

(a) Hagiographical.


A full resume is essential because, while the *vita* is too long to edit in full here, it appears to be the source of several later documents.

The Prologue serves to explain how the *vita* came to be written and offers a good introduction to Osbert’s highly rhetorical style. He explains that the monks of Pershore requested a more elegant *vita* than the one they had (no longer extant, unless the flyleaf of Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. 451 contains a fragment, see below). Since “saepe bona materia cessat sine artifice”, says Osbert in a quotation from Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 47. 16, he will shape his *vita* into a more permanent piece of work. His rhetorical skills were set in motion, he claims, by the immediate inspiration of a wondrous vision of Saint Edburga in the choir of Pershore, which he describes on f. 85v, but his real ability in the exercise of twelfth-century rhetorical devices is evident throughout the work.

The *vita* proper follows on f. 87v. First, Osbert discusses (1) Lineage. He outlines the accomplishments of Edburga’s grandfather Alfred and mentions the foundation of Nunnaminter by the king and his consort, Alhswitha, with the installation of Etheldreda as its first abbess. Alfred’s

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40 The letter of introduction written by Osbert is included in the manuscript along with the *vita*; together they occupy ff. 85-'120' (foliosation is incorrect, since f. 120 follows f. 110 and should therefore be marked f. 111; there are 25 ff. in all). The manuscript belongs to the second half of the twelfth century; a marginal inscription on f. 23 identifies it as the property of Pershore Abbey. It has not been edited in full. The introductory letter, ff. 85-85v, is included in *The Letters of Osbert of Clare*, ed. E. W. Williamson (London, 1929), no. 43, pp. 179-82. Several extracts from the *vita* appear in John Leland’s *De rebus Britannicis Collectanea*, 1 (London, 1774), pp. 277-8. The *vita* is listed in *BHL* as no. 2385 and by Thomas Duffus Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue of Materials Relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland*, RS 26, 2 (London, 1862), pp. 564-5, as no. 1144.

41 Cf., e.g., his play upon the concepts of fire: “Igitur ignis ille celestis, qui in anima beate virginis EADBURGE ferventis illumit, ita fulgore suo mentem dictantis illuminat, ut pene gloriosam eius vitam audientes ad amorem sponse celestis inflammt”. (f. 87, 28-31).
son Edward, called the Elder (senior) succeeded him. Mentioning the baptism of Edward’s daughter Edburga, Osbert again indulges in a common rhetorical device, name-etymology, which purports to reveal the saint’s character.42

Osbert next considers (2) Choice of Religious Life, a topic prominent in most later accounts of the saint. When Edburga was three years old, her father set before her both religious objects (Bible, chalice, and paten) and secular (jewels, gold, and silver) in an attempt to decide the future course of her life. She chose immediately the religious objects, and, praising God, her father entrusts her to the care of Abbess Etheldreda for her religious education. He also bestows generous gifts upon the foundation at the same time.43 Here Edburga continues to grow in knowledge ("ebit nectar ethereum uirgo regia et crescit cotidie proficiens in doctrina," f. 88, 25-6).

As she grows in religious knowledge, Edburga shows increasingly her disposition toward saintly behavior. Manifestations of this, which I have designated as topic (3) Saintliness, are given a very full account by Osbert. They occupy, in fact, the major part of his vita, ff. 88v-95v. This topic can be divided into three central incidents. (3, a) Humility, uses as its central incident Edburga’s cleaning of her sisters’ shoes. Just as in his humility Christ washed his disciples’ feet, so Edburga a royal princess shows her humility in collecting her sisters’ shoes each night while they are asleep, cleaning them, softening them with grease, and returning them stealthily to each bed.44 Topic (3, b), Power to Perform Miracles, centres on one particular miracle. A blind woman has a vision in which she is told she will be healed by Edburga and, after application to the sisters, receives water in which Edburga has washed her hands. Bathing her eyes she

42 "Eadburga autem felix vel beata ciuitas lingua anglorum dicitur; in qua sanctarum uirtutum exercitus triumphali maestate collocatur." (f. 87v, 24-25).


44 "Sic ipsa sororibus suis facta est eiusdem uirtutis imitabile documentum. Calciamenta namque earum sola teste conscientia per singulas noctes clam soletar arripere et liquido defecata elemento ad lumen uulcani aruinæi fluoribus (sic) emoliese. Clamque reconsignabat lectulis singularum singula, nec de aliquo uirtutis genere intumescebat elata. Sic longo tempore opus istud exercuit." (f. 89v, 1-7).
recovers her sight. Topic (3, c), Secret Vigils describes how Saint Edburga kept nightly vigils in the chapel of St. Peter’s monastery near by, but was suspected of misconduct by jealous individuals and spied upon. They gape at her naked feet as she makes her way through the heavy dew. For their evil thoughts they are chastised by God and blinded, but soon realize that Edburga herself can cure them if they beg her forgiveness. Following the example of the blind woman, they bathe their eyes with water in which Edburga has washed her hands and receive their sight.

Osbert’s description of Edburga’s death, topic (4), begins immediately after this episode (f. 95v). Afflicted with various illnesses, Edburga yet remains strong in her faith and active in acts of charity. Death comes at the age of 30 on the 15th day of June (97v, 15-6), and she is placed in a humble tomb in the monastery.

Osbert concludes with a lengthy section (ff. 98-111v) on (5) Translation, lengthy because due to the efficacy of Edburga’s relics they had a long history. During the reign of King Edgar, son of King Edmund, Bishop Ethelwold of Winchester considered her body worthy of a more imposing resting place. With the help of the Abbess Alfghena he had it translated to a costly shrine. The shrine was refurnished under the Abbess Alfleda (ff. 103v-4). Many miracles took place in Winchester. Osbert cites one for Wilton (f. 106v, 3-9). A second translation took place, this time to Pershore, as the donation of the Abbey’s benefactor Earl Wada: “Quidam comes ALWARDUS ... qui persorese cenobium in honore beate dei generiris et perpetuæ uirginis MARIE cum summa deuoitione... Huic agnomen WADA anglico sermone... est,” f. 107v, 7-10). Wada was a relative of Alfgiva, at that time Abbess of Nunnaminster; through her aid be procured Edburga’s skull, some ribs, and other bones. Osbert dwells at some length upon the splendour of the shrine with its gold, silver, and topazes (f. 108v). He describes miracles at Pershore and in the province of Worcester. A short prayer for the saint’s intercession concludes his vita (f. 111, 2-6).

47 “Assumta est beata uirgo AEDBURGA solemniter de sepulchro et in sacello reponitur argenteis floribus aureisque compacto, quibus intexti sunt preciosi lapides claritatis sue radios intuentes ministrantes.” (ff. 103, 27-28; 103v, 1-2).
48 “Sinciput itaque uirginis pretiose cum aliquibus costis et minutioribus sacratis ossibus aliisque”.
(2) Anon., *De vita sanctae Edburgae virginis* (mid. fourteenth century), London, British Museum MS. Lansdowne 436, ff. 41va32-43va34.49

This life is contained in a *legenda sanctorum* of mostly English saints, which a slightly later fly-leaf inscription claims was the property of Romsey Abbey, Hants. The life of Saint Edburga contained in the collection appears to be in the same style (and hand) as the others. It need not be discussed in detail, since I have edited it in full in an appendix and its relation to the other material can readily be seen. There are, however, several points which should be commented upon.

Generally speaking the anonymous *vita* seems to be derived from Osbert’s or a common source. Although the Lansdowne *vita* gives a summary treatment of most topics, it contains the same essential elements in the same order. There appear to be a few verbal echoes. (1) Lineage mentions only the foundation of Nunnaminster by Alfred’s queen, Ælswitha; it recounts more fully Edburga’s religious education there. (2) Choice of Religious Life is omitted; there may be an echo of the incident in “supra quam potest humana infantia credi divina celitus inspirante gratia,” l. 15. Or, it may be that by commencing this *vita* with what corresponds to approximately the third folio of Osbert’s the author simply failed to include the material which preceded his starting point. He continued, however, to make further omissions. Missing are the accounts of the soldiers Alla and Mulucca (cf. Osbert, f. 90v) and (3, a) the Shoe-Cleaning episode. Nevertheless, the Lansdowne *vita* does give several examples of Edburga’s devotion, humility, and acts of charity. Receiving full treatment is the description of Edburga’s talent for psalmistry; no other version known to me relates Edburga’s composition of seven songs a day,50 although Osbert mentions her ability to sing (f. 91v) and the Hyde Abbey *sanctorale* makes it the theme of a *lectio*.51 Reconciliation of largesse in charitable acts to the requirements of monastic poverty, f. 42, may be compared with Osbert’s very similar remarks, ff. 92v-93. There may be an echo of Osbert’s name-etymology in “Set quia ciuitas supra montem posita non potest abscondi nec lucerna sub modo solet reponi,” ll. 70-1. The most noteworthy contribution of the Lansdowne author is his account of (3, c) Secret Vigils. He gives it a concreteness and dramatic quality completely lacking in Osbert’s profuse and often obtuse narrative. For example, he describes how Edburga lifted up her

49 *BHL*, no. 2386; Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue*, no. 1145. A description of the manuscript with an edition of one legend has been made by P. Grosjean, “Vita Roberti Novi Monasterii in Anglia Abbatis,” *Analecta Bollandiana*, 56 (1938), pp. 334-60.

50 Psal. 119. 164 is quoted in the text: “Seven times daily shall I give praises to thee.”

51 See discussion of liturgical evidence above.
garments so as not to trail them in the heavy dew and how this exposed her naked feet, so radiant that their brightness struck her enemies blind (ll. 85-85). In the final topic, (5) Translation, the Landsdowne life offers the date August 15th for the new shrine at Nunaminster but condenses the account of the endowment of Pershore, even reducing the number of relics to a few ribs and other bones (ll. 200-10).

(3) Anon., *De vita sanctae Edburgae virginis*, (ca. 1150), Oxford, Bodleian Library MS. 451, (s.c. 2401) f. 120.

This fragment contained in a fly-leaf has never been identified as from the life of Saint Edburga. It contains only (3, b) Healing of the Blind Woman, which resembles Osbert’s and even more closely the Landsdowne account, and part of (3, c) Secret Vigils. Similarity to the Landsdowne text suggests it or another copy may have provided that author with his source. The assumption that the fragment is from a *vita* of Saint Edburga is further supported by a fly-leaf notice at the beginning of the manuscript (f. ii), which offers a few dates concerning the saint.53

53 *Inc.* “Probat hoc quaedam femina ceca...”; *Exp.* “quae dicitur alba spina proiecti ipius innocentiae irsidiari.” The manuscript is a twelfth-century collection comprising the *Diadema monachorum* by Smaregdu and *sermons* by Saint Augustin. It was transcribed by a woman: “Salua et incolumnis maneant per secula scriptrix,” f. 119v. The extract from the life of Saint Edburga, however, is in a different hand and appears to have been written by a non-professional scribe or someone advanced in years. In a third hand are two leaves from a missal (ff. ii-iii) bound in as fly-leaves at an early date, since they have off-set on the medieval board binding. All the evidence suggests that the manuscript belonged to a house for nuns.

53 The notice on f. iv (numbered in manuscript as ii) is in the same ‘profesional feminine’ hand as the body of the manuscript but different from that of the *vita* extract on f. 120. It is as follows: “Rex Aluredus et beatus Neutos fratres fuerunt, filii Adulfii regis, qui terciam partem totius regni sui liberam ab omni tributo fecit. Et sic liberam sanctae ecclesiae dedit. Huius filius et dixit rex Aluardus, qui xxix anni regni sui obiit. Sed ante mortem multa passus, ut sic perdiexerat beatus Neutos. Huius Aluredi filius fuit rex Edwardus senior, pater sanctae Edburga virginis, que quattuor fratres et tres sorores habuit, quarum una regina romanorum, alia francorum sponsa eiusdam Karoli, tertia regina norïamhymborum, et ipsa sancta Edburga sponsa Theus Kristi. Transitus ut Aluredi regis usque M C I annum ab incarnatione domini dicccc l. (* viginti- sime* written over *ccc*). Transitus sancte virginis Edburga in codem MCI anno incarnationis domini. Complecti sunt ccxix anni. Sunt itaque incepto obitum Aluerti regis et transitus sancte Edburga anni xxx.xi. Beatit Neutos et x annis ante obitum aluerti regis transiiit.” None of the figures appears to be accurate, but if I have interpreted them correctly the writer means Alfred’s death was A.D. 901, the 29th year of his reign; Edburga died the same year but Saint Neot ten years before that. Since the deaths of Alfred and Edburga 219 years have passed. This suggests the note was written ca. 1120. An identical notice which goes as far as “Theus Kristi” and then breaks off is found in another manuscript, Oxford, Bodleian Library MS. Laud. Misc. 664 (S.C. 1048), also on a fly-leaf (f. i). The manuscript dates to the end of the thirteenth century and contains only Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *Gesta regum Britanniae*.
(b) Historical.


In this work is contained William’s first reference to Saint Edburga, one in which he lists her as a member of Edward the Elder’s family. The list is long, and her name appears at the end as one of the two daughters by Edward’s “third wife”, Edgiva. William adds that she was a “sacrata virgo” and lies buried in Winchester.

*Idem, Gesta pontificum anglorum*, ca. 1125.

William here gives a more complete biography. He begins in a way similar to the Lansdowne life with (1) Lineage and describes the foundation of Nunnaminster by Alfred. He then proceeds to expand the topic by describing later amplifications under Bishop Ethelwold in the tenth century, details not given in any other version. Succinctly William describes how Edburga, daughter of Edward the Elder, was placed in Nunnaminster for her education. He omits the name of the abbess. At this point he goes back in time to an important event in Edburga’s childhood, her choice of the religious life, which becomes in his short account the central episode. His other focus is upon (3, a) Humility, although once again his single example (the shoe-cleaning episode) is given summary treatment. William concludes with general remarks on Edburga’s reputation. He had noted elsewhere in the work the foundation of Pershore by “Egilwardus, dux,” but here he fails to mention the event. He makes no reference to the translation of relics at all.

(2) Anon., *De sancta Edburga virgine miracula* (ca. 1280), London, British Museum MS. Harleian 64, ff. 184-185v.

Although *miracula* should be considered hagiographical in nature, I have listed this work among the historical accounts of Saint Edburga because the

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54 I give the list in full because, as the most complete, it was doubtless important for contemporary and later historians: from Egwinna was born Ethelstan; from Elleda the daughters Edleda, Edgiva, Ethelhilda, Ethilda, Edgitha, Eflegiva, and a son Ethelward; from Edgiva was born Edburga, another Edgiva, and the sons Edmund and Edred. The names of three wives and a total of twelve children, all with alliterative names, led inevitably to much confusion among historians.

55 *Gesta regum anglorum*, ed. Stubbs, p. 137.

56 BHL, 2387; Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue*, 1146. The manuscript is unedited. It contains various historical works by Henry of Huntingdon and others, along with some ecclesiastical and political documents, see *A Catalogue of the Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum*, 1 (London, 1808), p. 16. Not clear from the catalogue is the fact that ff. 177-86 form a separate collection in a single hand of thirteenth-century documents. They include copies of papal correspondence
Prologue is nearly identical to William of Malmesbury’s life in the *Gesta pontificum anglorum*. Possibly they both derive primarily from Winchester documents; to these the Harleian author has added information specifically relevant to Pershore. The Prologue forms part one of this work and divides itself into two sections after a brief introduction extolling the saint’s merit and reputation for miracles.\(^{57}\) The first section recounts Edburga’s choice of holy life as a child;\(^{58}\) the second tells of her early education and later good works in the monastery.\(^{59}\) Following the Prologue and forming part two of the work is an account of eight miracles performed through the power of Edburga’s relics at Pershore.\(^{60}\)

(3) Anon., *Liber de Hyde* (ca. 1300).

(4) John Brompton (?), *Chronicon* (ca. 1450).\(^{61}\)

The *Liber de Hyde* and *Chronicon* may be taken to represent the same text, one probably derived from William of Malmesbury’s *Gesta pontificum anglorum*. They have reduced his account to two episodes, however: (2) the Choice, and (3, a) Humility.

The more precise relation of these four historical accounts may be seen in the following selections taken from topics (2) the Choice, (3, a) Humility, and (5) Translation and Later Reputation. First, here is how the texts describe Edburga’s choice of the religious life at the age of three.

*Gesta Pontificum Anglorum:*

Edburga vix dum trima esset, spectabile futurae sanctitatis dedit periculum. Explorare volebat pater utrum ad Deum an ad saeculum declinatura esset pusiosia. Posueratque in triclinio diversarum professionum ornamenta, hinc calicem et evangelia, inde armillas et monilia. Iiunc virguncula a nitrice allata, genibus parentis assedit; jussaque utrum vellet eligere, torvo aspectu addressed to Henry III and accounts of the canonizations of Peter the Martyr, O.P. (ff. 177-9), Saint Francis, O.M. (ff. 183v-184), and Saint Anthony, O.M. (f. 184). A *terminus a quo* for the date of the manuscript would be the date of the translation of Saint Francis, 1270, an event mentioned on f. 184. The miracles of Saint Edburga are considered by the writer contemporary and for one (f. 185b, 36) he gives the date 1260. On paleographical grounds the manuscript could not be much later than 1280.


\(^{58}\) *Incip.* “Qualiter beata edburga ab infancia...”; *Expi.* “putaret christi serviciio inclinare.” (ff. 184-184v).


saecularia despuers, prompteque manibus repens evangelia et calicem, pulellarí adoravit inoccencia.\textsuperscript{62}

**MS. Harleian 64:**

Pater suus anglorum rex eadwardus huius nomenis primus explorare volens, utrum ad deum an ad seculum declinatura esset pusiola, posuerat in triclinio deuersarum professionum ornamenta, hinc calicem et evangelia, inde armillas et monilia. Illuc uirguncula illius nutricis blandimentis allata, genibus parentis assedit, iussa quod utrum ullet eligere, torvo aspectu secularia despiècens, prompteque manibus reptans, euuangelia et calicem puellari adoravit inoccencia (ff. 184b35-184va6).

**Liber de Hyda:**

De ista virgine, sancta Edburga, traditur quod cum vellet pater eius experiri utrum ad Deum aut ad seaculum esset declinatura, posuit ex una parte triclinii sui diversarum possessionum ornamenta; ex alia parte calicem et Evangelia inde armillas et monilia, illuc pristica virgo nutricie allata jubetur quae vellet eligere. At ipsa manibus reperiens Evangelia apprehendit (p. 113).

**Chronicon:**

[Edburga], virgo Dei et Deo valde devota, quae cum trienna esset, pater ejus rex experiri volers an ad deum an ad seculum declinatura esset, posuit ex una parte triclinii sui diversarum possessionum ornamenta, ex altera parte calicem et evangelia: inde armillas, illic monilia. Pusiola virgo illic nutricie allata, jubetur ut quae vellet eligere; at ipsa manibus repens evangelia adoravit, quam deosculans pater ait, 'vade', inquit, 'quo te vocat divinitas, sequere fausto pede qui te ducit' (coll. 831-2).

The next topic, (3, a) Humility, shows a similar amount of variation among the texts.

**Gesta pontificum anglorum:**

Crescebat cum etate sanctitas, adolescebat tamen adulta humilitas, in tantu ut singularum soccos furtim noctu surriperet, et diligenter lotos et inunctos lectis rursus apponeret (p. 174).\textsuperscript{63}

**MS. Harleian 64:**

Crescebat in ea cum etate sanctitas [corrected by scribe from sanctitatis] adholescebat cum adulta humilitas in tantum in singularum sororum soccos furtim noctu surriperet et diligentur lotos et inunctos lectis rursus apponeret (f. 184vb25-28).

**Liber de Hyda:**

Sicque postmodum facta est monacha, quam non ressummant regalis prosapia, quin etiam saccos (sic) sororum suarum de nocte latenter surripuit, et lotos unctosque clam reportavit (p. 113).


\textsuperscript{63} Cf. Osbert of Clare, n. 44 above.
The text of the *Chronicon* is so similar to the *Liber de Hyde* for this passage that it need not be quoted here. Both the *Chronicon* and *Liber de Hyde* end after their account of (3, a) Humility, of which the shoe-cleaning episode is their only example. The *Gesta regum anglorum* and MS. Harleian 64 continue with some account of Edburga’s death and later reputation. Both omit the saint’s age at the time of death, a detail supplied by Osbert of Clare, the Lansdowne author, and the Middle English poet. Both fail to mention the translation to Pershore but both indicate her relics there acquired a considerable reputation for miracles:

*Gesta regum anglorum:*

Quapropter, licet multis miraculis Deus viventem insignierit istud exemplum consummabat humilitas. Denique devotionem pectoris et integratam corporis ejus miracula, in vita et post mortem, commendant plurima, quae templorum ejus aeditui Wintoniae et Pershore nescientibus viva voce pronuntiant (p. 269).

MS. Harleian 64:

uirtutibus et signis miracula in vita et post mortem antiquantur, antiquioribus tam anglice quam latine de ipsa conscriptis, licite commendant plurima, que templorum ejus editui Pershore et Wintoniae nescientibus viva voce pronuntiant (ff. 184vbl-3).

More specific comparison of these texts will be discussed further below in connection with the Middle English life.

(5) Shorter Notices.

Shorter notices of Saint Edburgha are found in other chronicles from the twelfth to the thirteenth centuries. Most descend from the brief description of Edward the Elder’s family in William of Malmsbury’s *Gesta regum anglorum*. As a result of the familial complexities they are usually confused or inaccurate. They are Florence of Worcester, *Chronicon ex chronicis*, ca. 1110;64 Simeon of Durham, *Historia regum*, ca. 1120;65 Aelred of Rievaulx, *Genealogia regum anglorum*, ca. 1160;66 Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ca. 1200;67

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64 Florence of Worcester says that Edward’s second wife, Edgitha, had two daughters, the first of whom was Edgiva and the second “Edburgam filiam Deo devotam virginem.” Ed. B. Thorpe, 1 (London, 1846), p. 116.


66 Using the common notion of the virgin saint as bride of Christ (cf. n. 53 above), Aelred of Rievaulx says in his *Genealogia* that Edgiva had four daughters, “quarum prima Edburgha in Dei sponsam eligitur et consecratur.” Ed. Twysden, *Historiae Anglicanae*, col. 356.

67 Dependent elsewhere upon Simeon of Durham’s *Historia regum*, Roger of Hoveden repeats the phrase “filiam Deo devotam virginem” (some manuscripts read “devotissimam”); he adds Ed-

(c) Liturgical.

Of the various liturgical documents discussed above under the heading ‘topographical evidence’ only the Hyde Abbey *sanctorale* is of any literary interest. The eight lessons included in the office summarize Edburga’s life in a series of incidents. Lessons 1-3 describe topics (1) Lineage and (2) Choice. The fourth tells how she grew in knowledge as she grew in age while the pupil of abbess Etheldritha at Nunnaminster. Lessons 5-6 recount her special talent for music, how her father requested her to sing during a royal banquet, and how she hesitated out of shyness but at last began to sing the psalm “Eripe me de inimicis meis deus meus.” For this her father made large gifts to Nunnaminster. Lessons 7-8 describe Edburga’s last days and death. Clearly there are many striking similarities between the Hyde Abbey *sanctorale* version and Osbert of Clare’s *vita*. They are the only accounts to include a paten among the religious objects placed before the infant girl; there is a verbal echo to Osbert in “Crescebat interim beata edburga etate et scientia omnique uirtutum flore et gracia prefulgida, nocte et die in ecclesia oratione, quantum licebat, assidua,” *Lectio iv*; the substance of *Lectio vi*, Edburga’s gift of song, is related by Osbert (the MS. Lansdowne account illustrates this gift in another way); the divine nuptials metaphor of *Lectio vii* is also found in Osbert and so are the same details concerning her death and age. Yet Osbert’s *vita* could hardly be the source, for there are too many differences, too many singular details. It seems logical to assume the author of the office used local documents rather than any associated with Pershore, including Osbert’s *vita*: there is no mention, for example,

...
of Edburga’s translation to or later reputation at Pershore. Certainly one should not exclude the possibility that the Hyde Abbey account derives from sources used by Osbert and coming from Winchester.


The only extant vernacular account of Saint Edburga is the Middle English verse legend contained in three manuscripts of the SEL. There are two notices in Middle English chronicles; although they post-date the original redaction of the legend, I shall cite them first because of their brevity and derivation from the Latin chronicles discussed above.

(a) Historical.

(1) Robert of Gloucester, Chronicle (late thirteenth century).

Recension A, made probably at the end of the thirteenth century by Robert or under his supervision, ignores the saint even though it mentions other members of Edward’s family. Recension B, made during the fifteenth century, lists Edburga as one of Edward’s three daughters dedicated to the religious life.72

(2) Anon., Short Chronicle, ca. 1325.

The notice in the Short Chronicle offers more information about Edward’s three religious daughters.73 The description of “Alubed”, i.e., Ethelfleda, as abbess of Romsey is correct and may be compared with the incorrect description by William of Malmesbury, who says in his Gesta regum anglorum that she was abbess of Wilton, a mistake followed in recension A of the Gloucester chronicle. The correct assignation in the Short Chronicle implies access to other documents — the Liber de Hyda would be a reasonable guess, cf. p. 112. Although such an investigation goes beyond the scope of this study, any relation between the Short Chronicle, the Liber de Hyda, and the SEL

73 “Alubed het þat o ladi / He was abbesse of Romesi

Edith het þat oþer mai / He was abbesse at Wiltone abbai
þe þrycde het Seynt Albourw / An holi womman þoru and þoru.”

An Anonymous Short English Metrical Chronicle, ed. Ewald Zettl. EETS. OS 196 (London, 1935), vv. 511-6. The editor not only fails p. LXXVI, n. 10, to identify the names correctly but also overlooks the fact that Edith was the daughter of King Edgar and hence Edburga’s niece, not sister. The chronicler (see n. 54 above) either meant Editha or confused this Edburga with another (see n. 1 above).
would bear further examination. One might note, e.g., the verbal echoes of SEL, Edburga, 24, and *Short Chronicle*, 416.

(b) Hagiographical.


The text of this Middle English life I have edited in an appendix. Upon it is based the following discussion of sources, language, and manuscripts.

Sources.

The Middle English life of Saint Edburga shows no conclusive relation to nor derivation from any of the extant lives, historical notices, or liturgies discussed above. This elusive nature is characteristic of most of the legends of the SEL, a fact which suggests that the individuality of the work has been greatly underestimated. There are, however, certain associations between the legend of Saint Edburga contained in the SEL and other documents pertaining to the saint, and these associations can be summarized as follows. Topic (2) Choice compares closest with the version in the *Gesta pontificum anglorum* and MS. Harleian 64 in that Bible and chalice without paten (cf. Osbert of Clare and the Hyde Abbey *sanctorale*) are the religious objects set before the infant Edburga. In these accounts, too, she touches both rather than just the Bible (cf. the *Liber de Hydra* and *Chronicon*). Topic (3, a), Humility with its emphasis upon the shoe-cleaning episode has good parallels in Osbert of Clare's *vita*, the *Gesta pontificum anglorum*, *Liber de Hydra*, and *Chronicon*, but the Middle English life adds a detail found only in Osbert of Clare — the smearing of the shoes with grease. Only Osbert of Clare and the Lansdowne author relate Edburga's secret vigils, (3, c), and of the two the Lansdowne version more closely resembles the Middle English. It would seem, however, that the Middle English author or his immediate source was clearer about the motivation and actions of the characters involved. Topic (4) Death, is as condensed in the Middle English life as in the historical accounts, but once again a detail is supplied which is found only in a limited number of accounts: the saint's age at the time of death. Again, only Osbert and the Lansdowne author describe (5) the foundation and endowment of Pershore by Earl Wada. The Middle English version, however, has reduced the relics to only the skull. Finally, in terms similar to the passages in cf. the *Gesta regum anglorum* and MS. Harleian 64, the Middle English life concludes with a reference to the divided reputation.
of Edburga at Winchester and Pershore. Placement of the legend among the saints for June in MSS. Egerton 1993 and Eng. Poet. a. 1 ("Vernon") suggests the usual feast date, June 15th, rather than the special Pershore date of October 18th.

The Middle English life of Saint Edburga is distinct and unique in the way in which it borrows, develops, and adapts. The author fuses historical with hagiographical matter in offering a chronicle-type of introduction (vv. 1-26), which also serves to link past with present by relating Edburga's father Edward to the present king Edward (Edward III). The author then follows his historical introduction with the life proper, one which accords with the common hagiographical pattern of the "virgo sacrata christo" and thus holds certain themes and details in common with such legends as those of saints Edith, Frideswide, and Hilda. In combining an historical prologue with the saint's life the author achieves more than an exemplary legend of this type, however: he gives to spiritual biography historical verisimilitude and contemporary interest. The Middle English legend is unique among the other accounts of Saint Edburga in its popular style. That style is determined largely by the mere fact the legend is in the vernacular. It is also accomplished through the use of verse, a type called "septenary" because of the preponderance of seven-stress lines. It is also achieved by means of certain techniques in which the author shows himself particularly skillful. First, he selects. He has decided which incidents are most relevant to his central theme and he has discarded the rest. Next, he heightens the effect of these incidents by making the details within them more vivid. This, too, involves selection initially, but it also involves a certain eye for realism. Being more selective and realistic, the incidents have become more dramatic. The narrative thereby acquires a more compelling quality. In its realism and in its dramatic succinctness the legend of Saint Edburga is not unique in the SEL collection, but it is like many of those legends thus distinguished from sources and analogues.

Language.

The language of the three manuscripts (L: MS. Egerton 1993; V: MS. Eng. Poet. a. 1, "Vernon"; O: MS. Bodleian Library 779) is homogeneous given the fact that the texts extend over a period of about a century. General characteristics suggest Southwest Midlands, but there are individual differences as the following survey will show.74

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74 There are no adequate studies on the language of these manuscripts. A comparison of forms from selected legends found in LVO and certain other SEL manuscripts was made by Friederich Mohr in Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu den mittelenglischen Legenden aus Gloucestshire (Bonn. Inaugural-
SAINT EDBURGA OF WINCHESTER

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(1) **Phonology.**

OE \( a \): scribal practice retains the letter, but no rhyme evidence attests
to a retention of the OE sound: *man, 11, whan, 73; mani, 101;
cf. VO, in which \( a \) is written \( o \) except for *whan, O, 73. In lengthening
groups \( a \) is written \( o \): Engelond: *understounde, 1-2; among, 34;
*lond, 44; honden, 66. Before the lengthening group \( l + \) cons.
(WGmc., Angl \( a \), WS, Kt *ea*)\(^{75}\) \( a \) is written \( o \) [\( ð \)]: *old, 29;
colle, 82.

OE \( ð \): regularly written \( o \) and would appear to represent the rounded
sound from *also: undo, 31-2; also: do, 52-3; won: fon, 95-6 (ON
*ván); also: *ido, 105-6. hamward, 91, may represent L’s tolerance
of an archaic form preserved in the adverbial compound.

OE \( x \): regularly written \( a \) and rhyming once with \( ð \): Edgar: onixoar,
5-6 (OE *Eādgār: *ungewer); cf. *fader, 2; after, 20; *pat, passim;
was, passim; fawe: draw, 35-6; glad, 36; bad, 69.\(^{76}\) \( a \) + \( g \) is written \( ai:
vaιr (OE *fegr), 59; alday, 69; mædnes, 69.

WS \( æ \) (WGmc \( ð \), Angl, Kt[\( ð \)]) is usually written \( e \): echon, 26 (cf.
uchon, V);\(^{77}\) dede, 55; the rhyme aslepe: hepe, 49-50, offers one

Dissertation, 1888). Unfortunately he began with the now untenable assumption that the SEL
was originally compiled by Robert of Gloucester and that the earliest extant manuscript
(Laud. 108) represents Robert’s own dialect. Moreover, having failed to take sufficiently into account
mere orthographical variation Mohr offers little toward an assessment of the probable localization
of LVO. Nor are the arguments of Miss Mary Serjeantson, who thinks (“The Index of the Vernon
MS,” Modern Language Review, 22 (1937), pp. 222-61) that MS.V is written in the dialect of southern
Staffs. or southern Shrops., and Miss Hope Emily Allen, who assigns V precisely to Lichfield
(“The Bodleian Vernon Manuscript,” Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 8, 1936, p. 116) entirely con-
vincing. Professors A. McIntosh (“A New Approach to Middle English Dialectology,” English
Studies, 44 (1963), p. 7, n. 16) and M. L. Samuels (“Some Applications of Middle English Dia-
lectology,” English Studies, 44 (1963), p. 61-94) have grave doubts about such a localization.
Dr. Kari Sajavaara (“The Relationship of the Vernon and Simeon MSS,” Neuphilologische Mit-
teilungen, 68 (1967), pp. 35-9) and and Mrs. Nita Scudder Baugh (ed., A Worcestershire Miscellany,
Compiled by John Northwood, c. 1400 (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 39) suggest the same scriptorium pro-
duced the “Vernon” and “Simeon” manuscripts and that it was located in a Cistercian monastery
in northern Worcs. However, most of this argument has been based on content rather than lan-
guage: it is quite possible, according to Beril Sundby (Studies in the Middle English Dialect
Material of Worcestershire Records (Oslo, 1963), p. 3 et pass.) that the manuscripts were only copied
there.

\(^{75}\) See Karl Brunner, Allnngische Grammatik, 3rd ed. (Tübingen, 1965), par. 85.

\(^{76}\) bad may represent a confusion of OE *bad, pret. sg. *béðan, V, with OE *bīðan, pret. sg. *bīðan,
11: see A. Campbell, Old English Grammar (Oxford, 1959), par. 740, and cf. Hans Kurath and Sher-

\(^{77}\) Cf. WS *ēl with Vespasian Psalter Gloss (VP) *ēl and see Campbell, Old English Grammar,
par. 725. ME *e* forms are generally found no farther north than around Gloucester and areas of
instance of WS Æ/Angl ē: ēā. WS Æ + r is also represented by e: were, passim (cf. weoren, V).

WS ē: (WGmc ai [ i, j; Angl [e:]] is written e and rhymes on [e:] in were: lere, 37-38, and lere: were, 51-2; cf. teche, 40; clene, 51; helede, 64; hele, 72.

OE ē: represented usually as u: furste, 4 (cf. ferste, 16, O); muche, 44 (cf. moche, O); suche, 55 (cf. soche, O); bouste(n), 37, 78 (pret. sg. and pl. OE þyncan); Shafteburi, 7 (cf. Shaftebri, O); kunde, 55 (cf. kinde, O). In kudde, 35 (pret. sg. OE cyðan) and hudden, 80 (pret. pl. OE hýdæn) retention or re-acquisition of pret. -d- may have shortened the vowel: cf. kidde and hidde, O.78 Thus, with the exception of the rhyme king: þing: 7-8, in which unrounding has taken place (possibly under the influence of the following -i-)79, it cannot be determined what u represents for the scribe of L. From the consistency of u-spellings in LV and i/e-spellings in O, it would appear that LV originated in an area farther west than O.80

WS ēā, Angl, Kt ē is written e: zer, 19; aslepe: hepe, 49-50; gret, passim.

OE eo (diphthongization before r + cons.) is represented by e: derkhete, 87; erþe, passim (cf. eorþe, V).

OE ēē is written e: þre, 111. When the result of initial palatalization it is written u and thus may represent the IWS rounded form in āut (IWS ȝeot, ȝyt), 87: cf. ȝit, VO (EWS, nonWS ȝet).

(2) Orthography.

It is an inescapable fact that Middle English orthography largely determines any interpretation of the phonological system reflected in any manuscript; this was certainly evident in the preceding section. The following section, while also a 'phonological' survey in a sense, attempts to particularize scribal practice in regard to consonants.

æ is written as such in aeldredes, 8 (cf. eldred, 26): ædbrow, 112 (cf. Edborw, passim); apart from these two exceptions in L only, it is not used. e [k] may be represented by k, as in kudde, 35; kuchene, 51; kunde, 55; king,

southern Oxon.; wch is found from Worcester to Hereford (see Samuels, "Applications", 84). LO may therefore have originated farther south and east than V.

78 See Brunner, Altenglische Grammatik, par. 405, n. 3.
79 The explanation offered by Richard Jordan, Handbuch der mittelenglische Grammatik, 1 (Heidelberg, 1925), par. 42.
80 See Jordan, Handbuch, par 43, n. 1, and MED, 1, Plan and Bibliography, p. 10, Map 5; Mohr illustrates the variety of y/j/e/u spellings in Sprachliche Untersuchungen, 16-18.
passim; cf. com(e), passim, and colde, 82. (Generally the V scribe has c, ch: cf. cudde, chuchene).

d [d] [t] is written d, as in wolde, 37 and passim; wilnedes, 42; wende(n), 79, 85, and passim (cf. went, 79, 85, O).

f [v] [f] is usually written as if unvoiced: vor, 3, 19; vor, 6 and passim; vurst, 14; verst, 16; liue, 35; vrom, 50; uelle, 55; vair, 59, 101; vonded, 70; vorte, 78; beleveden, 85, 89; vorp, 114; heuene, 115. There are, however, fader, 2, passim; furste, 4, 32; fere, 10; bifo, 17; folle, 24; fonde, 32. (Cf. VO, which consistently have f initially and u medially).

3 [j] is retained initially in zer, 29; zong(e), 33; zaf, 44; zeue, 72; underzet, 77; zif, 80; zerne, 113. It is used as the OF palatal in abbeiz, 107, 109. 3 is employed as the guttural spirant [X] in eh3te, 12, 24; douzter, 27, passim; lou3t(e), 28, passim; mi3te, 45; nou3t, 47; nzit, 49, passim; az3en, 53; az3en, 63; (i)brou3t, 68, 113; sei3e(n), 87, 95; ri3t, 84; li3t, 88; woff3t, 102. (Cf. O, in which 3he represents leo, LV.) In final positions the scribe renders this letter w: Edborw, 1, passim; borw, 7, passim; drow, 33, 41; heiw, 96; cf. i3et, 36. (In V h represents the guttural in final positions. I do not know what the explanation may be for Alkine, L, Ayl3ine, V, and Elsine, O, 105, unless the scribe of V has retained 3 from the original 3del3ifu, while the LO scribes were misled by the Lat. Algiva/Ælghina (see MSS. Laud. Misc. 114 and Lansdowne 436).

g [g] is represented by the continental g, as in gode, 62; grace, 62; gome 64; gret, 64.

g [d3] (OE cg, OF g) is written gg, as in ligge, 76; ginne, 69.

j [d3] (OF j) is rendered g in giweles, 30 (cf. juweles, V; iueles, O) but j in joie, 114.

p is still retained in both initial and final positions for [d]: pat, 1, passim pe, 2, passim; habbeþ, 3 (cf. haue, O); suppe, 4; oþer, 5, passim leþ, 7 (cf. lith, V; borw, 7; ping, 7, passim.

(3) Accidence.

Just as L shows itself more conservative in the matter of phonology and orthography, so it tends to preserve the greatest number of OE inflections.

(a) Nouns: -es, gen. sg.: kinges, 5, passim; Eildredes, 8; lordes, 75. (Cf. O, i which (h)i may occur for gen. sg. with noun: edborh his, 13; oþer is, 56). Eadborw, 13, has no gen. inflexion but cf. V. -e, dat. sg.: schrine, 9; erþe, 20; gode, 41 (cf. good, O). -es, nom. acc. pl: kinges, 3, 17; lawes, 14; dukes, 18; giweles, 30. -e(n), nom. acc. pl., weak: schon, 50
(cf. shos, V); honden, 61 (cf. hondes, O); esen, 63; nonne, 73 (cf. nonnes, O); fon, 82 (gon). pound, acc. pl., 108, is undetermined in all manuscripts. -e, dat. pl.: preciouse finge, 30.

(b) Adjectives: No distinction is made between strong and weak.

Only L preserves the gen. pl. -re, in alre, 50 (OE -ra), although O has written alle over an erasure; cf. of alle, LVO, 15. grettere, 42, shows the comp. with shortening and doubled cons. 81

(c) Pronouns: Personal: ich, 2; we, 27; us, oure, 74; he, 21, passim, him, 12, passim; it, 37 (cf. hit, V); heo, 33, passim (cf. she, O), hire (gen.), 69, (dat.) 86, (acc.) 43; hi (nom. pl.), 47, 49 (cf. heo, V), pei, (nom. pl.) passim; hem (acc. pl.), 80. 82 Possessive: oure, 20; (h)is, 6, 8, passim; hir(e) (sg.), 66, passim (cf. here, O); here (pl.), 50, 53 (cf. heore, V). Reflexive: hem, 80, 95; hire, 43. Indefinite: a(n), 31, 80, passim; moni a, 92; man 47 (OE nāwiht + ān), 47, passim; echon, 84; some, 2, passim; oðer (OE ordinal oðer, confused with indef. pron. eghwaðer), 45; me(n), impers., 12, passim (used with sg. vb. passive meaning; perhaps pl. meaning 69).

Demonstrative and Relative: þat (OE þat) and þe (OE se) alternate, cf. þat holi maide, 1, þe oðer, 5, al þat oðer, 34 (not O, in which more consistent use of þe illustrates the later trend toward relegating þat to emphatic or demonstrative use); þe king Edward, 2 (this use of þe + apppellative + name not in O); w(ð)e, 16 (separated in O); þis (OE þís, þeós, þís, pl. þís) alternates with þe, cf. 34, 81, 93, 105, 107 (cf. þeos, V, 83, nom. pl.); 83 þilk (OE se + ilce), 70, 71 (cf. þat, O); whan (OE hwâ), 27 (cf. whom, VO); whom (OE hûyle), 32.

(d) Verbs: Inflexions: Infinitive loses final -n (but not regularly in L.V); dat. infin. for to occurs in forto don, 55, vorte vinden, 78, but omitted to jonde, 32 (cf. also 40, 42, 46, 56); pres. indic. sg. -þ, cf. liþ, 7, beþ, 111, seþ, 113; pl. -eþ in only two cases, 3, 18 (not O); pret. pl. ends -en in most

81 For a history and explanation see Ferdinand Brück, Die Consonantendoppelung in den mittelenglischen Comparativen und Superlativen (Leipzig, 1886), p. 37.
82 The form she [she] is found in a limited number of texts but most consistently in William of Palerne, translated from French by Humphrey de Bohun, Earl of Hereford, ca. 1350, and associated closely with Gloucester; see Walter W. Skeat, ed., EETS ES l (London, 1867), pp. x-xi; x-xl. The form heo, pl., is common in the Northwest Midlands by the early fifteenth century (see Samuels, "Applications," pp. 82-3). V, then, would seem a somewhat northern text than L.O.
83 Cf. þeos, nom. pl., found in the dialect of Oxford, Bodleian MS. 34 (Katherine Group) and Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS. 102 (Ancrene Wisse), i.e., AB dialect: see S.R.T.O. d’Ardennne, ed., De Lislade ant te Passion de Sintne Iulisme. EETS. 248 (London, 1960), who explains the form as derived from OE fem. nom. sg. or a shortened form of dat. pl. þeossum. The occurrence of þeos in V but not LO would suggest, once again, localization farther north and west for V.
cases, but cf. 17, 18, 70, 71, 114, and O; subj. pl. -en (not O), mizten, 80, scholden, 88, cf. vondede, 70; past part. prefix i-, ibrouȝt, 68, 93, 101; tburied, 21; icrowned, 16; ibeo, 3; cf. coup, 68; told, 104 (stold, V); wrouȝt, 102; (the scribe of O writes the prefix separately).

(4) Vocabulary.

(a) Words of French origin or influence:


**canones**, ‘canons’ sb., nom. pl., 111 (OF chanoine).

**chapelle**, ‘chapel’ sb., dat. sg., 75, 85 (OF chapele).

**costume**, ‘custom’ sb., dat. sg., 54 (OF custume, costume).

**court**, ‘court’ sb., dat. sg., 16 (OF court).

**criede**, ‘cried’ pret. pl., 93 (OF crier).

**icrowned**, ‘crowned’ pp., 16 (AN coroner, OF coroner).

**deol**, ‘grief’ sb., acc. sg., 91 (OF doel).

**desired**, ‘wished’ pref. sg., O, 42 (cf. LV wilneede) (F desirer).

**dukes**, ‘dukes’ sb., nom. pl., 18 (OF duc).

**envie**, ‘envy’ sb., dat. sg., 6, 77 (OF envie).

**erber**, ‘armour’ sb., dat. sg., 80, 81 (AN erber, OF herbier).


**giuvesles**, ‘jewels’ sb., acc. pl., 30 (OF jouel, jouel).

**grace**, ‘grace’ sb., acc. sg., 59, dat. sg., 62 (OF grace).

**grece**, ‘grease’ inf., O, 52 (LV, smerie) (AN grece, OF graisse, sb.).


**joie**, ‘joy’ sb., dat. sg., 114 (OF joie).

**merci**, ‘forgiveness’ sb., acc. sg., 94 (OF merci).

**miracle**, ‘miracle’ sb., nom. sg., 102; -s, acc. pl., 60 (OF miracle).

**noble**, ‘noble’ adj., nom. sg., 10, 11 (OF noble); nobliche, adv., 7 (OF noble + ME -liche).

**monnere**, ‘nunnery’ sb., dat. sg., 39, 100; nom. sg., 110 (AN, OF monnerie).

**orisons**, ‘prayers’ sb., dat. pl., 76 (AN ur-, OF orison, oreison).


**prestore**, ‘readier’ comp. adj., 46 (OF prest).

**prierie**, ‘priory’ sb., nom. sg., 22 (OF prierie).

**privet**, ‘secret’, ‘privacy’ sb., dat. sg., 70 (OF privet).
prou, ‘advantage’, ‘profit’, sb., acc. sg., 12 (OF prou); cf. puosse, O, which have been influenced by OF prouesse, ‘prowess’.
seint, ‘saint’, ‘holy’, adj., sb., nom. sg., 1, 5, 9, 13, 27, 73, 97, 103; gen. sg., 75, 109, 112; dat. sg., 113 (OF seint).
serve(n), ‘serve’, inf., 46 (OF servī); service, sb., 47, 74 (OF service, servīse).

(b) Words of Scandinavian origin or influence:
felas, ‘fellows’, sb., nom. pl., 77 (ON fēlaeri).
geten, ‘get’, pret. pl., V, 95 (ON geta; cf. OE bezietan).
mekere, ‘meeker’, comp. adj., 58 (ON mjúkr); meknese, ‘meekness’, sb., acc. sg., 57 (ON mjúkr + ME -nesse).

score, ‘score’, sb., dat. pl., 19 (ON skor).
taken, ‘take’, inf., V, 78; tok, pret. sg., V, 64 (cf. bitok, pret. sg., LV, 39); ontake, LO, 78 (ON taka).
þei, ‘they’, prn., nom. pl., LO, 18 (and passim, O) (ON þer).

(c) English Words of Special Interest.
ablenden, ‘become blind’, pret. pl., 84 (OE ablēndan; last recorded date in MED is ca. 1400; cf. O, wort blind).
bi, ‘by’; bi on, ‘the same’, prep. + pron., 90 (OE bi + án; see MED, s.v., bi, 8 [a] and cf. SEL, Michael, ed. Horstmann, 645).
fawe, ‘delighted’, adj., nom. sg., 36 (OE fægen, fegn). This form appears in the SEL only in the verse-end formula ‘glad and fawe’, cf. Francis, 277, with Edmund Abp., 424, and 1100 Virgins, 132, 134.
foro, ‘to’, adv. + part. with inf., 55; used here as an infin. particle, cf. Becket, 90, and see MED, s.v. 3 (a); vorte, 78, ‘in order to’, is used purposely, see MED, s.v. 1; vorte, 89, prep. ‘until’, see MED, s.v. foro, prep., 1 (a).
give in, ‘bestow’, 3af in, pret. sg., 44 (OE giefan + in; ongifan is not similarly used, but cf. ongildan). The scribe of V omits the prep. in, which suggests use of the verb with this separable prefix was not
common; OED, s.v. ‘give’, 59 (e) (f) records no examples of the sense ‘bestow’ before 1602.

tdown, ‘unawares’, adv., 6 (OE un + gewær). Cf. OED, s.v. ‘unawares’, adv., 2 and 4 (b), which lists no examples before 1535, but see Gloucester Chronicle, ed. Wright, 88.

todrow, ‘was inclined’, ‘attracted toward’, pret. sg., 43; cf. drów... to, 33, 41, and cf. wharto... draue, 35. OE dragan to, dragan toward has usually the sense ‘draw toward’, ‘go’, ‘endure’, but the sense here appears also in the Ormulum, see MED, s.v. 3d, and OED, s.v. ‘draw’, 69, although such usage appears to be limited.

bilke, ‘such’, ‘that’, adj., dat. sg., 70; acc. pl., 52 (OE þyle, cf. ON þylikr).


Manuscripts.


The manuscript contains 244 leaves: iii 1-3 (12) 4 (4 plus 1 as f. 41 plus 6) 5-19 (13) 20 (6 plus 1 as f. 234 plus 4).

Ff. 1-238 are on parchment with a written area of 13 × 25 cm. Each leaf is ruled for 44 lines in single column. The few fifteenth-century jottings are mostly illegible, but the name Annis de Barne may be read on f. 213v. Extensive seventeenth-century marginal glosses of an historical or biographical nature are most certainly in the hand of James Ussher (1581-1656), Archbishop of Armagh from 1625. This might explain how the manuscript happened to be in Armagh in 1866, when it was acquired by the British Museum at Sotheby’s from Lord Charlemont. The binding is calf and eighteenth century; the poor condition of the first and last parchment folios, which are stained and have the writing nearly rubbed off, suggests this was the first binding.

The writing of the manuscript is characteristic of a professional book-hand during the second quarter of the fourteenth century. The ascenders of b, h, k, and l are exaggerated on the top lines and out-lined in red. a has a rounded body and head; g has a closed tail; r is both r and 2; final s is kidney-shaped. The stem of ā is vertical with scarcely any backward loop from the top. y and w are usually undotted, the latter written as l plus B. Decoration consists of blue initials with red scrolls alternating with red initials and blue scrolls. Proper names usually have the initial slashed with red. The blue paint on ff. 1-5 has eaten through the parchment.
Each line begins with a capital slashed with red. There are no rubrics except for some Latin headings in the temporale, e.g., ff. 35, 38 and 39v, and several marginal indications of miracula in the sanctorale. Between temporale and sanctorale the bottom-half of f. 40, all of f. 40v, and the first 19 lines of f. 41 (i.e., the leaf inserted in the gathering) are blank although ruled: f. 41 thus introduces the Banna sanctorum or introduction to the sanctorale at l. 20. Punctuation consists of single points. These occur always between half-lines and usually at the end of each line. They may also come between words, probably for emphasis. Paragraph signs are found in the left margins.

The manuscript contains only *The South English Legendary*.84 The legend of Saint Edburgha occupies ff. 160-1, properly placed for June 15th between the legends of Saints Barnabas, June 11th (ff. 158v-60), and Botulf, June 17th (ff. 161-2).85


The manuscript should probably contain 420 leaves (viii + 412), but approximately 69 have been lost, i.e., ff. 57-64, 81-8, 102, 106-13, 127-66, 248, 389-92, and 402. The remaining leaves are parchment with a written area of 30 × 40 cm, each ruled for 80 lines in double (ff. 1-80, 319-406) and triple (ff. 89-318) columns. The binding is Russian leather and nineteenth century.

The writing of the manuscript is characteristic of a modified court-hand at the end of the fourteenth century: the same scribe may have also written parts of the “Simeon” manuscript (see n. 74 below). A later hand added ff. i-viii, probably during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Someone other than the scribes provided the rich decoration, which consists of rubrics and paragraph indications in red and blue, large and elaborately coloured initials (some with gold-leaf), and many coloured miniatures of which only 17 have survived. Borders throughout are foliated. Punctuation in the SEL section consists of a punctus elevatus between half-lines.

The manuscript contains various religious and secular pieces in English and Anglo-Norman.86 A later index (ff. i-iii) assigns on f. i the title “salus

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85 The legend of Saint Edburgha in L is listed by Brown, *Register*, 2 (1920), as no. 1800.

86 For further descriptions of the manuscript contents see J. O. Halliwell, *Some Account of the Vernon MS* (London, 1848); Carl Horstmann, *Altenglische Legenden* (Paderborn, 1875), pp. xix-
anime. and in engly:s tonge sowlehele” to the collection. The SEL occupies ff. 1-87 and is divided into temporale (ff. 1-8v) and sanctore (ff. 8v-87). The latter is based upon the calendar rather than the liturgical year, but there are gaps throughout. Beginning on f. 55 the legend of Saint Francis is imperfect and the next 10 items listed in the index missing. The legend of Saint Clement begins on f. 64v with the first 322 lines missing. Another gap occurs between ff. 80v an 87, in which the last 21 lines of the legend of Thomas a Becket and another 11 legends are lost. Fortunately the legend of Saint Edburga on ff. 32-32v is complete. It is properly placed between the legends of Saints Barnabas (ff. 31-2) and Alban, June 22nd (f. 32v).


The manuscript contains 307 leaves, not 306 as usually described, because the number for f. 141 is repeated. The leaves are paper and the four different watermarks are similar to some common in France and the Netherlands 1380-1410. The written area covers 15 × 25 cm in single columns. The highly irregular collation suggests the manuscript was made up as material became available: i (index pasted in) 1 (20 plus 1) 2 (12 plus 1) 3 (12) 4 (12 plus 1) 5 (12 plus 1) 6 (14 plus 1) 7 (4 minus 1, last one-and-a-half leaves blank) 8 (12) 9-10 (13 plus 1) 11-12 12 (4) 13 (12) 14 (4 minus two final leaves) i (pasted on inside back clover). Each quire is reinforced along the back by a folded parchment strip plus another strip down the centre of the middle sheet. One of these — that backing the second quire and visible at ff. 44 and 69v — is cut from an older manuscript, originally a Worcester charter concerning an ecclesiastical gift during the episcopacy of one Robert. This was doubtless Robert Tideman of Winchcombe, O. Cist., who was transferred from the see of Llandaff to that of Worcester on June 15, 1395, the feast, incidentally, of Saint


87 The lacunae may account for the lack of editions of legends from the sanctore: only the Miracles of the Virgin (from the legend of Theophilus) have been edited (Beverly Boyd, ed., The Middle English Miracles of the Virgin (San Marino, 1964), pp. 30-49).

88 V: Brown, Register, 2, no. 1800.

89 Cf. (1) the double, barred circle ff. 4-45 with C. M. Briet, Les filigranes, ed. Allan Stevenson (Amsterdam, 1968), nos. 3175, 3183, 3195; (2) the axe ff. 46-142 with nos. 7508, 7509, 7513; (3) the scales ff. 143-173, 179-308 with nos. 2615, 1616; and (4) the pierced heart ff. 174-178 with nos. 4228, 4229.
Edburga; he died in 1401. The binding is contemporary medieval white sheepskin on boards. The manuscript was presented to the Bodleian Library by William Harwood, Prebendary of Winchester, in 1611.

The writing in the manuscript is very early fifteenth-century cursive and non-professional in appearance. The single scribe employs a punctus elevatus as caesura; there is no final punctuation, but the rhymes are joined by brackets. The scribe also seems to have supplied the crude decoration after binding, a further indication that writing and binding are nearly contemporary. Decoration consists of red and blue capitals with scrolls and red and blue paragraph indications. These cease at f. 266v (blue) and 269v (red). The remaining leaves have spaces for decoration, but these were never filled in. Some rubrics have been pasted in later, e.g., f. 17, on which a strip reading "saint cristine be holy virgine" is pasted over the Latin explicit to Saint Patrick. Corrections have also been similarly made, e.g., f. 88v. Several caricatures, e.g., on f. 135, and other notations have been added by a later hand — probably late fifteenth century to judge by the writing and clothing represented. There are a few Latin marginal notes in a still later hand, e.g., ff. 70 and 75. Several legends have been cancelled entirely; others have deleted passages, e.g., f. 254.

Except for an English Pater Noster, Ave Maria, Credo, Misereatur, and Confiteor written on f. 307 (pasted on the inside of the back cover but written by the same scribe) the manuscript contains only the SEL. With 136 items this manuscript represents the largest redaction extant. The items have not been arranged in any kind of order: even temporale and sanctorale matter has been interchanged. The legend of Saint Edburga occupies ff. 282-283v as part of an appendix, and so from its position the date attached to the feast in this manuscript cannot be determined.

Text.

The text given below is based upon L as the earliest and least corrupt of the three manuscripts. That L is not the original is clear from the omission

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90 For further descriptions of the contents see Horstmann, ed., The Early South English Legendary Collection, pp. xxii-xxiii (item 8b, Thomas the Apostle, omitted); Brown, Register, 1, pp. 29-37, whose figure for the total is higher because Philip-James and Fabian-Sebastian are counted as four legends; Wells, Manual, pp. 299-300; and Charlotte D'Evelyn, ed., The South English Legendary, 3: Introduction and Glossary. EETS. ES 244 (London, 1959), 2. Horstmann edited ff. 173-241 (Barlaam and Josaphat) in Archiv, 82 (1889), 307-53, 369-422; Friedrich Schubel included the legend of Saint Ursula from O, ff. 195v-7, in Die süddeutschische Legende von den elftausend Jungfrauen. Greifswalder Beiträge zur Literatur- und Stüfsorschung, 21 (1938), pp. 237-44.

91 Brown, Register, 2, no. 1800. MS. O represents the only ME life of Edburga mentioned by Hardy in his Descriptive Catalogue: see no. 1147, p. 566.
of a verse supplied by VO, 93, and several errors most notably 12, 61, and 62. Except for certain dialectal differences noted above V agrees with L for most readings. However, that V does not derive from L is supported by such variants as the following: altheore, VO/heore are, L, 50; such werkes, V/such depe, LO, 55; nome, VO/come, L, 61; siht, VO/hele, L, 63; weore to wyde coupı, VO/wide to coupı, L, 68. MS. O derives neither from L nor V, since its many differences cannot all be ascribed to its late date. In O the seven-stress lines are usually reduced to six, resulting in the displacement of the caesura and often a rephrasing, e.g., 6, 34, and 47. Some readings are grossly inaccurate: six hondred, 19, and derworply, 71. Others make better sense, e.g., prosse, 12. That the O-scribe was better acquainted with French is suggested by his use of greece, 52 (cf. smerie, LV), desirid, 42 (cf. wilnete, LV). That some English words were unfamiliar is suggested by his omission of sore, 65, and ierne, 113, and his changes from bileweden to laft, 89, forte to til, 89, alday to now, 112 (but cf. 69), reuliche to ruly, 93, and ablenden to worp blind, 84.

The following stemma is suggested by such differences:

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   X
    |
     V
    /\  
   L'  V   z  O
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If one can assume that L dates to the first quarter of the fourteenth century or beginning of the second quarter at the latest but does not represent the earliest redaction, what might have been the date of the original, X? Several factors suggest ca. 1280. The date 1269 would have to be the terminus a quo, since the translation of Edward the Confessor, mentioned in v. 9, took place on October 13th of that year. Edward I is described in the legend as coming "now late sine", 10: he was in fact crowned at Westminster in August, 1274. There was a renewal of royal favour to St. Swithin's (the Old Minster, Winchester) in 1275 when Edward visited the cathedral to ask the Chapter's prayers for his intended crusade to North Africa.92 Certainly the eulogy of Edward and his ancestors which constitutes the prologue of the

92 See the Winchester Annals (Annales de Wintoniae), ed. Luard, p. 120, the only document I have found which mentions the event.
legend (vv. 1-26) reflects the Edwardianism of the period ca. 1270-1300. A terminus ad quem for the original redaction might be 1280, the date of ff. 177-86, MS. Harleian 64 (see n. 56 below), which cite as authority for the miracles of Saint Edburga writings in both Latin and English: “antiquioribus tam anglice quam latine de ipsa conscriptis,” f. 184vbl. Until another English life of the saint is discovered, I shall assume that this refers to the legend of Saint Edburga in the SEL. That a redaction of the SEL may have existed ca. 1280 is highly significant for assessing the originality of at least the earliest redactions of the SEL, since such a date would make the influence of Jacobus de Voragine’s Legenda Aurea unlikely. Such an assessment, however, is beyond the scope of the present study.

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93 See especially the Winchester Annals, s.d. 1053, in which the account of Edward the Confessor’s lineage bears some resemblance to the tracing of Edward I’s lineage in the ME life of Edburga, and “La Estorie de Seint Ædward le Rei” (ca. 1250) with other lives in Henry Luard, ed., The Lives of Edward the Confessor. RS 3 (London, 1858).

94 I should like to thank the Canada Council for the award of a postdoctoral fellowship during the tenure of which at St. Anne’s College, Oxford, this study was completed, Professor Norman Davis for his criticism of an earlier version, and Professor Rolf Kaiser both for his suggestions and, above all, for his unfailing kindness and assistance during my three semesters of lecturing in Berlin where this study was begun.


Seint Eadbow, þat holi maide, was her of engelond. (L: f. 160)

De King Edward hir fader was, as ich understounde.
Now habbeþ þe kinges of þis lond vour Edwardes beo:
De furste Edward hir fader was, and suþþe oper þreo. 5
De oper was þe Seint Edward, þe kinges sone Edgar,
Pat his stepmoder vor envie let sle an oniwair,
Pat at Schæfæburi wel nobliche liþ þorw alle þing.
De þride was is broþer sone, Ældredes sone þe king —
Seint Edward þe gode king, þat at Westminstre is in schrine.
De noble king þe ferþe was, þat com now late sene, 10
Sir Edward þe noble man, þe kinges sone Henri;
Muche prov of him me spek and me wot wel wharbi.
Seint Eadbowr fader was þe kinges sone Alfred,
Pat made vurst þe gode lawes and so wis was of red.
He was king of Engelond, of alle þat þer come,
Pat verst was anoint and suþþe icrowned ate court of Rome, 15

LVO generally employ the usual Middle English abbreviations, i.e., ampersand for and, contraction mark for m, n, apostrophe for s, er, or, elevated t for at, elevated 9 for ea, ia, us. These have been expanded silently in the text. Punctuation has been modernized, including capitalization of proper names.

2 þe: om., O. 3 habbeþ: haue, O. þe: om., V. 5 þe: þat, V; þe: om., VO. 6 vor...
oniwair: lect sle'. for enuye nuwar, O. 8 sone: om., O. 9 gode: om., O. is: lith, V. 10
now late sene: at þe fyne, O. 11 Sir; Seint, O. noble: holy, O. henri: herry, O. 12 prow:
puosse, O. wel wharbi: wher bi-well, V; wher by, O. 13 eadbowr: adburhs, V; ebdorh his, O. 14 vurst: om., O. 16 was... rome: anoynt was. and seþþe i crowned. ate court of rome, V.

5 King Edward, son of King Edgar, was murdered in 975 at Warham by agents of his stepmother, Elfrida. For versions of the story see William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum anglorum, ed. Stubbs, p. 183; Liber de Hyda, ed. Edwards, p. 207; Annales de Wintonia, ed. Luard, p. 13; and The South English Legendary, edd. A. Mill and C. D'Evelyn. EETS 235 (London, 1956), pp. 110-8, although the editors designate him (following Horstmann's error, p. xiii) as "the Elder" rather than "the Younger" as he is generally called.

16 The appointing of Alfred in Rome (A.D. 853) is mentioned by most medieval historians, e.g., William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum anglorum, ed. Stubbs, p. 124, and Liber de Hyda, ed. Edwards, p. 25. After the Anglo Saxon Chronicle and the biography attributed to Asser (De rebus gestis Alfredi) had erroneously established, this notion for political reasons, it was continually repeated without qualification. Actually the ceremony which took place during Æthelwulf's visit
Vor kinges þat were biforn him þer nas anoint not on,  
Bote as it dukes were, ac seþ þe þer habbeþ echon.  
Eþyte hondred þer and your score his ende dai him nom  
After þat oure swete lord an erþe vor us com.  
At Winchester he is iburied, þe wise king iwis,  
In þe minstre of Seint Swithan, þer þe priori is.  
He was king on and þriti þer, and Edward is sone þo  
Eþyte and twenti folle þer king was and namo.  
Þe king Apelston was is sone, þat after him com anon,  
And king Edmund and king Eldred, þat kinges were echon,  
Seint Eadborw is douȝter was, of whan we moten ende.  
Þis holi maide bigan wel ʒɔŋg hir þouȝt to gode wende.  
Unneþe heo was þreo þer old þo hir fader hire let bringe  
Gold and seluer and giweles of precious þinge,  
And a bok of þe gospeles, and a chalis also,  
To fonde whoch heo wolde hir honð furst undo.  
As ʒɔŋg as þis maide was heo drow to hire þis bok,  
And þis chalis among þis oþre, and al þat oþer forsok.  
Heo kudde wel in hire ʒɔŋge liue wharto heo wolde drawe.  
Þo hire fader þat iseig, he was glad and fawe;  
He þouȝte wel þat god it wolde, þat heo god womane were.  
As sone as heo was of more elde in bok he lette hire lere.

17 biforn: biforn him, V; afor hym, O. þer nas: ne were, O. 18 þei: hit, V; dukes were:  
were dukes, O. 19 Eþyte: hondred þer and your score: sex honodrid and fourt score þer, O.  
him: om. O. 21 þei: þat, O. 24 twenti: XX, O. 25 is: om., V. 27 whan:  
whom, VO. 28 holi: om., O. vel: om., V. hire þouȝt to gode: to god her þouȝt to, O.  
29 hire: om., V. let: lette, V. 30 and: first and om. O. 31 þei: om., VO. 32 fonde:  
loke, V. hir... undo: formost hire honð do, V; wyȝtlokest here honð do, O. 33 þis: þe, O.  
þis: þe, VO. 34 þis... oþre: þe chalys also, O. 36 he was glad: glad he was, O.

to Rome was not his son’s royal consecration by Pope Leo IV but rather Alfred’s investiture with  
the insignia of a Roman consul and confirmation as the Pope’s «spiritualis filius». See William  
author’s comparison with earlier custom seems his own; there is no parallel in any text known to  
me.

19 Alfred’s death occurred, according to most medieval historians, in 901; modern historians  
generally agree on 899, see M. L. R. Beaven, “The Regnal Dates of Alfred, Edward the Elder, and  
Athelstan,” English Historical Review, 32 (1917), pp. 526-31. The date 880 given in LV agrees only  
with the highly corrupt Worcester Annals, see Annales de Wigornia, ed. Luard, pp. 368-9.

21-2 Whereas most chroniclers give Winchester or Hyde Abbey as the burial place of Alfred  
the Great, only the Liber de Hyde (ed. Edwards, p. 76) says that he was first interred at St. Swithun’s.

23-4 Alfred’s reign is described as lasting 31 years in no other text known to me. The Anglo- 
Saxon Chronicle gives it as 28 1/2 years (“Þe þrum healfum læs þe xxx wintrað”); William of Malmesbury  
agrees; Florence of Worcester says 29 1/2. (The Middle English author has assigned instead  
a 28-year reign to Edward the Elder, a reign most chroniclers give as 24 years). It is possible the  
Middle English author was using a copy of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and mis-read the Old English?
In þe nonnerie of Winchestr þis maide he bitok
De abbesse Ailred þat was þo to teche hire on þe bok.
Di child drow euer to gode as heo hedde er bigonne.
Po heo was of gretore elde heo wilned to beo nonne.
Hire fader hire made nonne þer, as hire herte to drow,
And muche lond 3af in wip hire and oper richesse inow.
Mildore þing þan heo was ne miȝte no womman beo,
Ne prestore to servi al aboute, þat wonder it was to seo,
Whan hire sostren nolden soffri nouȝt hire seruise Pat hi wuste,
For heo kinges douȝter was heo wolde þat ni nuste.

A miȝte heo wolde stillliche, whan hi were alle aslepe,
Heore alre schon vrom bed to bed bringe to one hepe,
And beren hem to þe kuchene adoun and clene hem and wipe þere,
And washen and smerie ek þilke þat nede were,
And to here beddes stillliche bere hem aȝen also.
Þis heo wolde bi cotume miȝt after oper do,
Alwei euele hire kunde it was, such gode forto do:
Þe kinges douȝter of Englonde to smeri òperes schon.

How miȝte more mektresse ani man iso
Oper such womman as heo was mekere ani beo?
So vair grace heo hedde of god, þat al bi hire liue
Oure lord dude for hire loue miracles wel riue.
Of þe water þat heo wosch hire honden manie sike men nome,
And þer þorw oure Lordes grace to gode hele come.
Blinde wesschen þer wip þere aȝen and hedden hele ilome,
And men helede eke of oper euel whar of me nom gret come.
Hit of douȝte þis maide sore þat he spak þer of so wide;
Perfore heo wesc hire honden selde bote somewhere þis biside,
Þat nomen scholde it seo ne bere þer of nouȝt,
Laste it were to wyde couþ and to wide aboute ibrout;

Me bad hire maidnes alday þo, þat hi þorw some ginne
Vondede al in priuete of þilke water winne.

40 þe: om., VO.  41 þis: þe, V. drow euer: euere drouh, V; euer drow, O. er: om., VO.
42 wilned: desirid, O. nonne: annone, O.  43 to drow: drow3, O.  44 in: om., V.  47
soffri nouȝt: suffrin here, O hire... wuste: serue hem þat þey wist, O.  48 his: heo, V; þey, O.
49 stillliche: al stillleích, O. hi: heo, V; þey, O. alle aslepe: on slepe, O.  50 Heore alre schon: al heore schos, V; alle [written partly in margin over erasure] her schon, O. bringe to one hepe: gedere
to on hepe, V; bringe on an hepe, O.  51 adoun: om., O. clene... þer: and, om., L; wuþe, V; wiphe, V; smerie: grecce, O.  54 after: and, O. oper: over an erasure, L.  55
dede: werkis, V.  56 òperes: oper is, O.  57 how: now, L; nou, V.  58 mekere ani
beo: any mekere be, O.  59 heo hedde of god: of god ȝhe had, O. þat: om., O.  60 oure
lورد: þat he, O.  61 nome: come, L, the c written over a partially erased n.  62 and: in,
O. come: nome, L.  63 hele: heore siht, V; siȝt, O.  64 non: tok V.  65 þis: þe, V.
maide sore: holy mayd, O.  67 þer: om., O. scholde: om., O.  68 Laste: lest, O. were to
wyde couþ: wide to couþ, L.  69 hire: þe, O. þo: om., O. hi: heo, V; þey, O.  70 winne:
to winne, O.
And hi ofte derneliche of pulke water nome
And 3eue hit about sike men, and hi to hele come.
A niȝt, when þe nonne slepe, Seint Edbowr wolde arise
And to chirche go wel stilliche in oure lordes seruise,
To þe chapel of Seint Petur gon heo wolde ofte
An ligge þer in orisons and supþe aȝen wel softe.
Hire felas hit underȝete some and in greet emiue were
And þouȝten how hi miȝten ontakene vorte finden hire þere.
Hi wenden and stode bi a þorn, as hire weyl scholde be
In an erber, and hudden hem þer, ȝif hi hire miȝten ise.

At midniȝt þis holi maide in þis erber com gon
Al barfot in þe colde dewe — colde weren hire ton.
Þis oþer, þo hei seijen hire come, to hire hi wenden anon
And niȝt as hi wolde hire nime hi abladen echon.
Þis maide wende to þe chapele, and hi beleueden bihinde;
Hi ne awaited hire namore, vor heo were pure blinde,
And ȝut hi wenden þat hit were vor derkhete of þe niȝt
And þat hi scholden wel isco, when it were day liȝt.
Hi bileueden þer al þe long niȝt vorte þe sonne schon,
And euer hi were illiche blinde, and euer it was bi on.
Þo gonne hi make deol inow and hamward softe gon;
Hi souȝten here wey wel gildliche and sporne et moni a ston.
Bifore þis maide hi were ibrouȝt, reulichhe hi crienden echon,
And beeden merci of heore gult and weoren aknownen anon.
Hi wonnen hem of here hond water, þo hei ne seij þer won.
And þorw here siȝt com aȝen, al þeip hit were hire fon.

Þis holi maide Seint Edbowr god lif ladde inow.
Ate laste, as God wolde, toward hire deþe heo drow.

71 hi: heo; V; þey, O. derneliche: derworsly, O. pulke: þat, O. 72 sike: to sike, V.
men: written over an erasure, L. hi: heo, V; þey, O. 73 nonne: nonnes, VO. In V a large,
illuminated capital begins this line. 74 and: in, L. in oure: in to ur, V. 75 to þe: into a,
V. ofte: wel ofte, V. 76 orisons: here orisonys, O. aȝen: aȝein go, O. 77 hit underȝete
some: hit underȝete some, V: summe it ondriȝt, O. 78 hi: heo, V; þey, O. ontake;
taken, V. 79 Hi: heo, V; þey, O. bi a: ondir, O. korn: rowe, V. 80 In written over
þis: þeos, V; þe and, O. hi: heo, V; key, O. 81 com: gan, O. 82 O. hi: heo, V;
þey, O. hi wenden: heo wenden, V; om., O. 84 hi: heo, V; þey, O. abladen: worp
blind, O. 85 þis: þe, O. and: om., O. Hi: heo, V; þey, O. 86 Hi: heo, V; þey, O. ne:
om., O. heo: þey, O. pure: om., O. 87 hi: heo, V; þey, O. derkhete: derkesnes, V. 88
hi: heo, V; þey, O. 89 hi: heo, V; þey, O. bileueden: laft, O. þe longe: þe om., LV. vorte:
til, O. 90 euer: om., V. hi: heo, V; þey, O. and euer it was: euer mor be on, O. 91 hi:
heo, V; þey, O. go: to gon, O. 92 Hi: heo, V; þey, O. 93 Bifore: Bi- a large illumined
capitol, V; ac after, O. þis: þe, O. hi: heo, V; þey, O. reulichhe: reulichhe, V; ruly, O. 94 Line
om. L, supplied from V; And bidding here merci of heere gult, and were beknome anon, O. 95 Hi:
heo, V; þey O. wonnen: geeten, V; nome, O. hem: om., O. of here hond water: water of here hond,
O. his: heo, V; þey, O. ne... won: myȝt non oþer don, O. In the left margin O has the symbol 3 + b.,
perhaps a later notation that the preceding line is wanting. 96 oþer þorw: þer wiþ, V. siȝt: siȝt sone,
V. it: þey, O.
SAINTE DBURA OF WINCHESTER

Pritti þær heo was old, þo heo gan henne wende.
In þe nonnerie of Winchestre heo brouȝte hire lif to ende
And þær heo was wiþ gret honour an erþe verst ibrouȝt.
Mani is þær vair miracle, þat God hæþ for hire wrouȝt.
Hit biþel þær afterward þat Seint Aelwold
Bischop was of Winchestre, as þe bok us hæþ told.
Þe abbesse Alkine þær was þo and þis bischop also
Let nyme up þis holbi bodi and in schrine ido.
Þe abbesse solde hir scolle to þe abbeþe of Pershore,
Vor þær el þat began þat hous an honerd pound þaf perfore.
So þat þær abbeþe of Pershore of Seint Eadborw is,
And þe nonnerie of Winchestre ek, þer heo was nonne iwis,
And Burcestre þær biside Oxnefode þære canones þeb
Of Seint Ædborw hii þeþ all þreo, as men al dai seþ.
Now bidde we þerne Seint Edborw, þat þær brouȝte her lif to ende,
Þat we mote vorþ wiþ hire to þe joice of heune wende.

APPENDIX B

De sancta Edburga virgine, London, British Museum MS.
Lansdowne 436, ff. 41va32-43va34
Incipit de sancta Edburga virgine

In ciuitate Wyntoniiensi est quoddam monasterium sanctimonialium in honore sancte dei genitricis constructum; et ideo Abbathia sancte marie congrue nuncupatum. Istud monasterium Ealhsuitis regis Alfredi reginae fundare cepit, sed Edwardus rex eorum filius, qui propter morum maturitatem dictus est senior, ob amorem filiae sue beate Edburge in multis possessionibus regaliter ditauit. Erat autem tunc

98 wolde; hit wolde, VO.
100 lif: over an erasure, L.
102 mani: mony is, VO, 103
V begins the line with an illuminated capital.
105 Alkine: Aylȝine, V; elfine, O. was þo: þo was,
O. þis: þe, O.
107 scolle: holy scolle, O.
108 þat began... perfore: þaf þat begun þat hous,
an hundred pound þerfore, V; gaf to þe hous, an honerd pound þer for, O.
110 ek: om., O. was nonne: nonne was, O.
111 and: at, VO. Burcestre: bernestre, L; dorchestre,
O. þer biside: biydes, V; bysyde, O.
112 hii: heo, V; þey, O. alday: now, O.
113 þerne:
om., O. þer: þus, O.
114 V adds A.M.E.N.

102 Saint Ethelwold, Bishop of Winchester 963-84, was responsible for many reforms and foundations, including (with King Edgar) the re-foundation of Nunnaminster. See the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle for the years 963 and 984 and cf. William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum pontificum, ed. Hamilton, pp. 166-8.

108 Whereas LV observe the tradition in which the founder and benefactor of Pershore are one and the same, O makes him only the benefactor. It is possible the O-scribe ‘edited’ his text to conform to the later tradition represented in such documents as Leland’s account, see n. 11 above.

1 ms. regia.
temporis in eodem monasterio abbatissa Edeldrida nomine, femina generous ex regali progenie orta, cui praedictus rex Edwardus filiam suam Edburgam tradidit regularibus atque sacris doctrinis instruendam; que illam deuote suscepit, et iuxta illud quod melius potuit edocuit dum uixit. Crescens itaque Edburga puella deo deuotissima honestissimorum omnium modorum assumebat ornamenta; supra quam potest humana infantia credi diuina celitus inspirante gratia. Namque omnibus exhibebat se predicabilem obsequio benignam eloquio suauem humilitatis studio. Macerabat namque corpus suum uiligiiis et orationibus, psalmos assidue canens nocte ac die, intendens animum ad psalmiste dictum: 

Species in die laudem dixi tibi (ps. 118, 164). Studebat per septenarium numerum ymnorum cotidie perficere. Quod haberetur in octaua beatitudine.

Capitulum secundum

Operibus uero misericordie in quantum pollebat non est nostri eloqui ecicere. Apparebat hoc in indigentibus, quibus in die profutuebant illis misericorditer manus larga. Anros siquidem tringita paupercibus quando posset solita erat ergore; quod si aliquando defecisset, impossibilitas hoc habebat. Precipue tamen hoc in diebus solenmibus faciebat, tanto curans deuocius (f. 42a1) domino famulari, quante dies ad honorem ipsius sanctorumque eius uidebantur² exaltari. Licebat namque illi et aliis habere unde pararent sibi necessaria, quia nondum ibi sancti patris Benedicti feruebat regula. Ista autem sibi subtrahens necessaria, omnibus exhibebat commune, quod sibi soli uix poterat sufficere. Ceterorum quoque bonorum operum eius gesta nostra nequibit enumerare eloquencia, cum sit incognitum præ multitudine quociens nudos uuesterit, infirmos uisitauiet, esurientes³ puererit, sientibus potum ministravit, iniqua carcerum maceracione constrictis solacium dederit; que omnia aut opere compleuit aut implere concupiuit aliisque ut facerent ammonuit. Si enim quales in malo facientes, tales sunt et conscientes multi melius idem in bono inferre possumus. Exemplum apostoli secuta est qui dicit: turpis sermo de ore uestro non procedat (Col. 3, 8) numquam enim alicui aliquod turpe dixit.

Capitulum tertium

Ornata igitur hiis omnibus et alius bonis studiis consequenter demonstrabant eaque deus ad laudem suam par eam operabatur miracula, quanta qualsique eius fueri, uita. Si quicem abluco eius munenum extitit sepe medicamentum infirorum, quoniam ceci a eo per uirtutem dei illuminabatur alique quam plures infirmitates clam ab ea curabantur. Hoc itaque sepe fieri quodam tempore indicavit quodam ceca, cui dictum est in uisione quod deberet accipere de munenum eius abluzione oculosque eius caligine prepeditos inde lauandos uisum recipere, si corde toto uellet credere. Quod intelligens pedisseuas eius nichil in fide hesitans adiit atque ut manuum eius aqua sibi daretur postulavit. Ille autem aperte ei dare timentes clam dederunt et ut nemini id patefaceret preceperunt. Que recipiensi gratanter demum reuera est moxque inuocans Christum super omnes in omnibus beneficium deprecabatur per merita sancte urginis Edburge dare sibi munera lucis. Madefactis igitur predicta aqua oculus spiritus sancti superueniente uirtute albugo que male iam diu

² ms. videbatur.
³ ms. esuerentes.
oculorum tezerat pupillar, statim revoluta cecidit atro sanguine profluente, lauatisque iterum luminibus aqua quam a sancte habuerat manibus deum cepit beneficere, quia celu lucem uidebat clare meritis sanctissime Edburge.

*Capitulum quattuor*

Sit quia ciuitas supra montem posita non potest abscondi nec lucerna sub modio solet reponi (Matt. 5, 15) subsequentibus temporibus patuit quantum uita sancte Edburge propinquaa deo fuit. Solita namque erat singulis noctibus ad ecclesiam beati Petri apostolorum principis, quia vicina monasterio suo erat causa orationis per orturn monasterii pergere ibique intenta uigilii deo laudes persoluebat deuota intencione mentis ceterisque dormientibus hec insudabat uigilis et orationibus. Cumque hoc assidue faceret quidam consilio malignitatis usi, cum per singulas noctes uiderent illam singularem incedere, conati sunt ei insidias infra orturn tendere (f. 42va1).

Erat in orto quodam uulgo dicit alba spina sub qua illi infelices quadam nocte considentes observabant per lunam prospicientes qualiter sancta Edburga uirgo more solito ad oratorium nudis pedibus pergeberat surgens de lectulo suo sulleuasquae usitamenta sua propter multum roris qui ceciderat nocte illa festinante cepit pergere, operi dei nunquam uoleas moras innectere. Nec post se respexit nec alicuem uidiit, quia querebat dominum intenta deuocione mentis, sed illi miseri putantes alicuqu opus nefarium sanctam uirginem uelle patrare cuius cor remotum erat ab omni turpitudine; cum persisterent in eius insidiis uidentes sub lune lucce pedes eius radiare, priuati sunt lucis munere ac per hoc bene patuit, quod mens illorum praueas insidas sancte tetendit, quando mox ut illam aspexerunt consciencia illis reddente malum testimonium priuari menuerunt instrumento lucis corporeo.

*Capitulum quintum*

Sancta ergo postquam orationem compleuit uota, reuersa est ad monasterium cadem uia. Ilii quoque caliginem oculorum cum caligine pacientes mentis passi sunt rorem et incommodeutates totius illius noctis. Mano itaque facto cum ab amicis perquirerunt, tandem inuenti sunt circumvago errore queque de uia pergendo peragrande, a quibus cum comperissent quicquid factum fuerat, domum illos perduxerunt atque tantium miraculum omnibus aperuerunt, uenientesque ad sanctam uirginem rogabant quatinus eius misere (f. 42vb1) retur ac tanti sceleris facinus condonaret, totum narrantes ex ordine quicquid illis acciderat in preterita nocte. Ipso uero humilitate respondens se nichil eos lesisse, quasi commota respondit non uiste eos egis quia ancillis de uellent insidiari. Iustum autem dominum cuncta prouidentem non propter se egisse, sed ut omnibus essent exemplum, ne ultra aliquis presumeret ancillis deuicii ferre incommodum. Que omnia illi asseuerantes uera instantab quod eis dismittere deberet, quod presumendo peccassent. Que reputans sibi illud euangelicum: ne reddas pro malo alicui malum (1 Thes. 5, 15); et illud: non tantum dimitti debere fratribus sepcies, sed usque septuagies sepcies (Matt. 18, 22) dixit se non confiderde sequer de suo merito, sed de communi sociorum per orationem auxilio. Tunc manus omnibus lauans aquam de qua lauerat eis misit, manans quod fidem haberent, si ab illa inuirmitate cripi uellent. Statim igitur ut oculos suos illa aqua perfuderunt uisum receperunt, immensas gratias deo reddentes qui illos curasset, qui sancte eburge uirginis meritis eos excceaut, cuius orationibus et uisum restituit. Hiis igitur ac talibus Edburga deo deuotissima pollens insignibus de die in diem augebatur in melius.
Capitulum sextum

Cum autem iam terminus eius utique approquinaret atque eam dominus de uite huius ergastulo uocare iam uellet, insistere magis magisque bonis operum exhibitionibus studebat, habitaculum dei diversis spirituAlium operum ornamentalis apparere satagebat, quatuum dignum deo templum appareret in quo ipse habitare uellet, commendans memorie quod sciebat apostolum dixisse: Necesis quod templum dei estis et spiritus sanctus habitat in uobis (1 Cor. 3, 16). Cum ergo eam dominus orationem iam uellet remunerare pro bona illius perseverancia et concertatione grauare cepit modica corporis infirmitate, non tamen a uigiliiis et orationibus cessabat, sed cotidie animam suam deo factori suo attentius commendabat. Quantoque grauabatur infirmitate, tanto perseverabat in dieuina meditacione. Nox dies continuabat in dei laudibus, ne aliquam horam intercipere posset diabolum. Armabant armis spirituAlibus, ne ex parte aliqua irruree posset inimicus, memor illius qui dicit nocte et die sine intermissione orate (1 Thes. 5, 17). Grauiter igitur crescente infirmitate uocari fecit sacerdotes cum sororum congregatione, uolens exitum suum per diuina misteria commendare. Quibus coram illa astantibus sua distribuit sacerdotibus, sororibus ac pauperibus, commendans se illorum orationibus. Quo facto uiaticum petit, atque ut psalms incipere canere precepet, quandiu quoque loqui potuit cum eis cecinit, oculis in cruce dominica, que ante eam apposita fuerat, semper definix ac tota mentis acie intendens eterna omnibus uotis pertingere uolens ad illa. Mox igitur grauitate infirmitatis uim prorsus uincente occidue carnis constituta in ultimo spiritus certamine manu sibi posuit signum crucis in fronte, cupiens dissolvi et cum Christo esse. Cum hac itaque sancta confessione soluta carnis ergastulo etatis sue anno tricesimo regi regum cum sanctis virginibus conuncta est in supremo celorum habitaculo, mortuaque carne mundo que prius fuerat animo, ut credimus, spiritu simul uiiit cum deo cum sanctis omnibus corpore resurgentia in perpetua gloria. Sulpita autem fuit beata uirgo Edburga primo extra ecclesiam, sed post per signa ipsamque ostendente quod inde uoluit leuari in ecclesia traditur sepulture. Et extunc recipiebat ibi ced uisum, surdi auditum, muti loquelam, claudi gressum contracti diversis infirmitatibus reformabantur in pristinas incolumitates deo sancteque Edburge gratias referentes; tanta enim in luce miraculorum radiebat, quatenus sancto Swithinio Wyntoniensis episcopo concordia caritatis commortatur, ita quod infra mensem centum a diversis infirmitatibus curarentur ad Christi honorum tantaque miraculorum gloria sanctus Edburga et Edburga gloriosa uirgo pollebant dei mericordia ut quasi miraculis ucrificando deum laudarent; dum quando gloriosus Swithinus unum sanabant, statim gloriosa uirgo Edburga alium a quacumque infirmitate detineretur eriperet. Florentibus igitur beatissimis talibus signis languidi morbis diversorum generum laborantes recedebant alacres, deum in sanctis suis gloriantes, cui sit honor et imperium per omnia secula seculorum amen. Aliquanto autem, temporis sancta Edburga in tam crebris miraculis perseverante sanctus Ethelwaldus, Wyntoniensis episcopus, crebris admonicionibus rcuelacionum quas multi uidebant admonitus, eius corpusculum a tumulo in quo iacuit transitulit ad scrinium auro, argento et lapidibus preciosis decoratum, dicens non esse iustum ut illud terrae tegretur corpusculum, per quod tantorum operaretur signa miraculorum deus omnium.

4 ms. accidue.
5 sic. ms.
Huius autem gloriose virginis principalis solemnitas celebratur septimo decimo kalendas Iulii; translacio uero quinto decimo kalendas Augusti ad laudem domini nostri Ihesu Christi. Contigit autem post hoc quod comes quidam dicitur Aelfwardus Wade cum monasterium monachorum de persona construeret prece et pretio ab Aeligina tunc abbatissa consanguinea sua de reliquis sancte Edburge, scilicet sincipit eius cum quibusdam costis et aliis ossium reliquis, obtinuit et in scrinio ex argento et auro decenter preparato apud persore honorifice eas collocavit, ubi ob eius merita ita crebra fient miracula sicut Wytonie fieri consueuerunt. Et quia pars reliquiarum apud persoram deportabatur et pars Wytonie dimittebatur, utroque per sincipio haberi predicatur. Explicit de sancta Edburga virgine.
The Army of the First Crusade
and the Crusade Vow:
some reflections on a recent book

JAMES A. BRUNDAGE

The soldiers and pilgrims who made up the army of the first crusade made vows at the beginning of their expedition which bound them to march to Jerusalem and to liberate the Holy City from its Muslim rulers. This has generally been the opinion held by historians who have studied the first crusade. That opinion has recently been challenged in a book whose arguments, if accepted, would revise in a basic way the conventional picture of the votive obligations assumed by the participants in the first crusade.

The book in question is by Dr. Albrecht Noth, whose study was accepted in 1964 as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Bonn. The published work, under the title Heiliger Krieg und heiliger Kampf in Islam und Christentum, is a revised version of Dr. Noth's original work. As the title indicates, the principal topic which Noth treats in his book is the idea of holy war and holy battle and he undertakes to compare the treatment of these themes by both Muslim and Christian writers in the period prior to the first crusade. Noth is able to point to some interesting and suggestive parallels in Christian and Muslim writing on these two major themes, but he cannot demonstrate any direct influence of Muslim notions of the holy war upon the holy war and holy battle ideas current in eleventh-century Christendom. His argument concerning the vows of the crusaders in the first crusade is developed as a subsidiary thesis to his central theme. Because this subsidiary thesis touches upon some significant problems in the history of the crusades and also because it raises some methodological questions, an analysis of his treatment of crusaders' vows seems to be in order.

In outline, Dr. Noth argues that the crusade vow was in no sense an instrument of Pope Urban II's crusade policy. Indeed, he believes that the pope had not even conceived of the crusade vow when he proclaimed the first crusade at Clermont in 1095. Rather, Noth maintains, the crusade

1 The book bears the subtitle, Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Kreuzzüge. It was published at Bonn in 1966 and is vol. 28 of the "Bonner historische Forschungen" series.
vow was a product of the first crusade expedition’s needs and experience. In his view there is no reliable evidence at all that the vow was even mentioned by Pope Urban at Clermont or subsequently. There is, of course, the inconvenient fact that in his letter to the Flemings in December 1095, about a month after the proclamation of the crusade of Clermont, Pope Urban spoke of a *votum* to participate in the crusade expedition.\(^2\) Noth explains away this difficulty by interpreting the word *votum* in this letter to mean “wish” or “desire”, a usage for which there are indeed some respectable precedents. Having dismissed this reference as inapplicable, Noth maintains that there is no further evidence for the existence of a crusade vow in the first crusade until after the capture of Antioch in the summer of 1098. At that point, he continues, the crusading princes, who learned that the armies which they led might disintegrate, required some technique to hold their forces together on the next stage of their campaign through the enemy-held territories of Syria and Palestine. The princes, then, hit upon the idea that they might treat the taking of the cross as a *de facto* assumption of a votive obligation. Noth believes that this scheme of the princes was not immediately accepted by the army and he argues from the evidence in the letters of Bishop Anselm of Ribemont that as of the summer and early autumn of 1098 no agreement existed among the ranks of the crusade concerning any obligation which arose from taking the cross.\(^3\) The letter directed by the crusading princes to Pope Urban II in September 1098 is construed by Dr. Noth as an appeal for a declaration by the Pope that such a votive obligation did in fact exist and that it was binding upon all crusaders.\(^4\)

When he reads a further papal letter, this one addressed by Pope Paschal II to the French hierarchy in December 1099, Dr. Noth finds further support for his theory. In this document, he argues, Pope Paschal distinguished three classes of crusaders: (1) potential crusaders, those who had not yet taken the cross: they were urged to do so; (2) laggard crusaders, those who had taken the cross but had not yet set out for the Holy Land: these were to be encouraged to commence their journey and, if they failed to do so, they were to be judged *infames*; and (3) renegade crusaders, those who fled from the siege of Antioch: they were to return to the Holy Land,

\(^2\) Heinrich Hagenmeyer, ed., *Epistulae et chartae ad historiam primi belli sacri spectantes* [hereafter *HEp*] (Innsbruck, 1901), p. 137: “si quibus autem uestrum Deus hoc uotum inspirauerit, sciant eum in beatae Mariae Adumsptione cum Dei aadiatorio professurum eiusque comitatui tunc se adhaerere posse.”

\(^3\) Epist. 2 in *HEp*, pp. 156-160.

\(^4\) *HEp*, pp. 161-165.
but if they failed to do so they were to remain excommunicated.\(^5\) Dr. Noth takes the distinction between classes (2) and (3) to be clear proof of the correctness of his belief that as of 1099 the papacy did not recognize the existence of a votive obligation which was binding on crusaders. In Noth’s view, laggard crusaders were subject only to the relatively mild penalty of _infamia_, while renegade crusaders were subject to the full rigors of excommunication. This, he believes, would necessarily exclude the notion that the papacy at this time recognized any obligation flowing from a vow which was assumed in effect by taking the cross. Only actual participation in the crusade, apparently, created so serious an obligation that its infraction resulted in excommunication. The exclusion of poor crusaders from the categories of those to be punished for non-participation Dr. Noth takes to be further evidence that at this time the act of taking the cross implied no necessary votive obligation.

The development of the crusade vow, Dr. Noth believes, was carried a step further in 1100, when the Synod of Anse decreed that all of those who had vowed to go on crusade and then failed to do so were to be excommunicated.\(^6\) The final stage of this development was concluded, according to Noth’s theory, only during the pontificate of Callixtus II, when a formal papal statement finally defined the sanction of excommunication for those who failed to fulfill a crusade vow.\(^7\) Thus far Dr. Noth.

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\(^5\) _HEp_, p. 175: “_omnes ergo regionum uestrarum milites in peccatorum suorum remissionem uel ueniam cohotamini, ut ad illem matrem nostram Orientalem ecclesiam studeant festinare; eos praesertim, qui huius militiae voto crucis signa sumpserunt, illud properare compellite, nisi paupertatis retineantur obstatculo: aliquoq eos infames haberit decernimus. qui uero de Antiochena obsidione fide pusillaminet et ambigua recesserunt, in excommunicatione permaneant, nisi se ridituros certis securitatis confirmauerint._”

\(^6\) Hugh of Flavigny, _Chronicon_, lib. 2, s.a. 1100, in _Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores_ 8: 487: “_Anno s habituatione Domini 1100 apud Ansam conuenerunt archiepiscopi Lugdunensis, Cantuariensis, Touronensis, Bituricensis, et episcopi numero novem... et pace statuta, de via Hierosolimitana loquuti sunt, eos qui voverant, et voti executores non fuerant, a communione segregantes, quoadusque vota sua complerunt._”


2. Das energische Eintreten der ersten Kreuzfahrer für ein verpflichtendes Gelübde vermag uns Aufschluss über ihre Vorstellungen von Kreuzzug zu geben. Das Kreuzfahrergelübde entsprach einem Pilgergelübde und war wie dieses ein individueller Akt, der nur für den Einzelnen Bedeutung hatte. Somit galt die Orientfahrt den Kreuzfahrern nicht war — und vielleicht nicht
His theory is original and ingenious. It is also open to a number of serious objections. Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of Dr. Noth's thesis is that it fails to take adequate account of the evidence concerning the character and nature of the canon law concerning vows prior to the first crusade. If Dr. Noth had assumed that by the time of the first crusade there was a clearly-defined agreement in the canon law as to what a vow was and what obligations it entailed, then the case would be simple. Such an assumption is false, as has been shown elsewhere. The vow as a developed juristic institution played no part in the first crusade, for a refined canonistic theory of the vow did not exist in 1095; it came into being only after, and in part as a result of, the crusade itself.

But if one takes Dr. Noth's thesis to mean that the vow in the somewhat vague and general sense current in the late eleventh century played no part in the crusade at the time of Urban II and Paschal II — and this does appear to be his meaning — then some objections are in order.

It is true that the evidence for a crusade vow at the time of the Council of Clermont is scanty. However there is some evidence and it seriously undermines Dr. Noth's argument. For one thing, the narrative sources concerning the Council of Clermont point unmistakably to the existence of a crusade vow from the time of that Council onward. Admittedly, the statements of chroniclers should not be accepted blindly; but this does not mean that they need not be used at all. The accounts of a number of contemporary narrators writing independently cannot be ignored when they corroborate one another's statements. This is precisely what we have in the way of narrative evidence about the crusade vow at the Council of Clermont. Four of the witnesses of the events at Clermont — Fulcher of Chartres, Baldric of Dol, Robert the Monk, and Guibert of Nogent — agree that Pope Urban II spoke of a crusade or pilgrimage vow in his sermon at Clermont. It is true that all of these writers set down their accounts some years after the event and, therefore, the possibility of anachronistic contamination cannot be excluded. It is also true that these
four chroniclers are the most reliable witnesses we have to the events at Clermont. Both Robert and Baldric claim to have been present at the council; Fulcher probably was there and Guibert may have been. When these four witnesses agree in their independent versions of the pope’s remarks that the crusade vow was a subject which Urban mentioned, their testimony should be taken seriously. One or another of them certainly might have been guilty of reading into his account of the pope’s address some mention of an idea about vows which had actually developed later. That four independent witnesses should have made the same error is extremely improbable. It is far more probable that Dr. Noth, by ignoring this evidence, has been led to a faulty conclusion.10

This probability is further strengthened if one examines critically the other testimony which Noth alleges in support of his views. The use of the term *votum* by Pope Urban II in his letter to the Flemings, for one thing, may have more significance than Dr. Noth is willing to concede. Although the use of the word *votum* to mean “wish” or “desire” is clear in some contexts, by far the commonest meaning of the word in eleventh-century documents is “vow”. Dr. Noth’s argument that the pope elsewhere used the terms *velle* and *desiderium* to refer to a proposal to enlist in the crusade is not really a convincing proof that when he used the word *votum* he meant the same thing as when he used the other two words. There is no reason to believe that Pope Urban II may not have wished on one occasion to speak of the crusade vow and on two other occasions to refer to the wish or desire to participate in the crusade.11 The meanings are not necessarily identical. Furthermore, the argument that the pope used *votum* and *desiderium* in essentially the same sense can cut both ways. The term *desiderium* was, in fact, used somewhat later in the twelfth century to describe one stage in the canonistic analysis of the process of making a vow.12 About all that can be concluded from the passage in the pope’s letter to the Flemings is that Pope Urban may have used the word *votum* ambiguously. The more probable interpretation of his meaning, however, is that when he wrote *hoc votum* he meant “this vow”.

In addition, Dr. Noth’s thesis requires him to discount the evidence of two further letters. One is from the papal legate, Adhémar du Puy,  

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10 Noth cites this evidence in *Heilige Krieg*, p. 125 n. 191, but says nothing further about it.
and the Patriarch Symeon II of Jerusalem; it can be dated to 1097. The other letter is from the patriarch Symeon and other Eastern bishops, dated in January 1098. Both are directed to the bishops of the West and both were apparently designed for general circulation. Dr. Noth disposes of the inconvenient testimony of these two letters by declaring them forgeries. He asserts that it is inherently improbable that the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Eastern Bishops, with or without the collaboration of a papal legate, would have had the temerity to address a letter to the bishops of the West. Such proof as this is not, perhaps, entirely convincing. But, Dr. Noth adds, we have a statement by Albert of Aachen to the effect that the Patriarch of Jerusalem fled to Cyprus at the time of the arrival of the crusading army before Antioch and that he joined the crusading army when it was engaged in the siege of Jerusalem. Therefore, he concludes, the Patriarch could not have joined in writing a letter which is dated at the crusaders' camp near Antioch. Aside from the fact that this tale is derived solely from the account of Albert, who was at home in Aachen while all of this was happening, it is at least conceivable that the patriarch may have had contacts with the crusaders other than those reported by Albert; certainly the journey from Cyprus to Antioch was not so difficult as to preclude the possibility of such a contact. Dr. Noth's argument e silentio that no such contact is mentioned by the other chroniclers is weak and is not sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the authenticity of the letter which is created by the other internal evidence in the documents. Moreover, Dr. Noth questions the provenance of the first of these letters. The place of origin is indicated by the phrase ubi nos sumus in Romania. Noth interprets this to mean that it was written while the crusading army was still in Asia Minor. A little consideration of the usage of Romania at this period casts doubt on the force of this argument, too. Romania could be used at this time to designate not only Asia Minor, but more generally the areas ruled by the Basileus, in other words the whole of the Byzantine Empire. Since the crusaders considered Antioch to be rightfully a part of the Byzantine Empire — as the difficulties which arose after the capture of Antioch made amply plain — this argument, too, seems less than conclusive.

The greater probability is that these two letters are, in fact, genuine.

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13 HEβ, pp. 141-142, 145-149.
14 Cf. the study of the term Romania in medieval usage by Robert Lee Wolff in Speculum 23 (1948) 1-34.
15 The MS. evidence for both of them goes back to the beginning of the twelfth century. The first of the letters survives in a single MS.; the second was much better known, apparently, and more than thirty MSS. are listed in HEβ, where the question of their authenticity is treated at length.
If so, the references in them to the crusade vow and to the penalties to be inflicted upon those who violated the obligations arising from that vow are gravely damaging to Dr. Noth’s case.16 As for his negative judgment on the genuineness of the letters, based upon the alleged improbability of Eastern bishops communicating with Western churchmen, there is an alternate explanation which is at least as likely as the one proposed by Noth. If one of the major goals of the crusade was to establish easier and more friendly relations between the Roman Church and the Churches of the East, then it may be thought that these two letters constitute evidence that the papal legate with the first crusade, Adhémar du Puy, had scored a significant success in this phase of his mission. These letters show that he had secured the help and cooperation of the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the other Eastern bishops in calling for the strict enforcement of the votive obligations of those who had taken the cross.17

Dr. Noth also advances some further arguments based upon other letters from the crusading army in Syria which, he believes, can be interpreted in a sense favorable to his thesis. He refers to a letter of Bishop Anselm of Ribeumont to Archbishop Manasses of Reims18 and another letter of the crusading princes to Pope Urban II.19 Both called for ecclesiastical censures against those who had taken the cross but had failed to set out for Jerusalem. Noth contends that these letters furnish positive proof for his theory. If there were indeed a crusade vow prior to this time, he contends, there would have been no need to ask for the imposition of penalties upon those who had failed to fulfill their vows. But since such penalties are called for, Dr. Noth thinks that it must follow that no votive obligations had previously existed. Thus, the letters calling for the imposition of penalties upon those who had broken the terms of their vows are said to prove that the vows had only just recently been made. What makes the argument even less compelling is

16 Thus in the earlier letter, the patriarch and Adhémar du Puy jointly declared: “uos igitur, quia bene scitis, quod uere sint excommunicati, quicumque fuerint sancta cruce signati et remanerint apostatae facti, per eandem crucem sanctam et sepulcrum Domini monemos, obsecramus, quatinus eos omnes anathematis gladio percutiatis nisi nos sequantur et festinent, ut, ibi nos sumus in Romania, sint et illi in futurum et proximum Pascha.” (HEp, p. 142) The second letter was even more emphatic on this point: “maxime uero hi, qui uota fecerunt, nisi ueniante et uota persolvant, ego apostolicus patriarcha et episcopi omniumque ordo orthodoxorum excommunicus et omnino eos a communione ecclesiæ remouemus. Et uos idem facite, quod nec sepulturas inter Christianos habeant, nisi competenti causa remaneant.” (HEp, pp. 148-149).

17 I have developed this argument in greater detail in “Adhémar of Puy: The Bishop and His Critics” Speculum 34 (1959) 289-310; see also Daniel Stiermon, “Rome et les églises orientales”, Euntes doceTe 15 (1962) 319-385.

18 HEP, pp. 156-160; this letter can be dated to July 1098.

the inchoate status of the canonistic theory about votive obligations at this period. To be sure the most eminent canonist of the late eleventh century, Bishop Ivo of Chartres, recognized that a vow creates an obligation and that the person who broke a vow should be punished, but he specifies no particular punishment, except public penance for the transgressor. What the letters of Bishop Manasses and the crusading princes are asking for is the imposition of a rather more definite and stricter form of punishment for this offence. This is not the same thing as creating a new votive obligation.

Dr. Noth’s thesis also involves the notion that the crusading forces themselves first began to construe the obligation to complete the crusade as a votive obligation after the capture of Antioch in 1098. His reconstruction of events seems unlikely in the extreme. If we accept Noth’s interpretation, then we must postulate that the crusaders entered upon their crusade by taking the cross, which meant nothing more than affixing the cloth symbol of a cross to their garments. In the beginning, according to Noth, this act had no special juridical or moral result. It was a purely symbolic act, indicating that the wearer of the cross had made a decision to undertake the journey to Jerusalem. Then, after an exhausting march through Constantinople and Asia Minor and after surviving the hardships and perils of their long-drawn-out siege of Antioch, the remaining crusaders were shocked by a number of major desertions from their ranks. At this point, Noth supposes, the leaders of the expedition sought to secure papal recognition of the proposition that those who had taken the cross had by that act constructively assumed a votive obligation and, as a result, the leaders sought guarantees from the pope that sanctions would be imposed upon those who defaulted on this obligation. This reconstruction is not intrinsically impossible. It involves no necessary physical or logical impossibilities. But it does involve something very close to a moral impossibility. To accept it, we must believe that the crusading princes and their followers agreed to seek a post factum declaration that they themselves, as well as the deserting crusaders, had assumed a grave votive obligation several years previously. It is on the whole quite unlikely that the crusading princes — especially such men as Bohemund and Tancred, — would readily have consented to such an arrangement. It is equally improbable that they could have persuaded any great number of their followers to assent to this sort of proceeding. In the face of the extreme improbability that the crusading princes and their armies would have entertained any such far-fetched

proposal, Dr. Noth fails to adduce one iota of convincing proof to support his contention that they did so.

Dr. Noth's thesis is ingenious, but feebly supported by the evidence. It is altogether more probable that the votive obligations of the crusaders existed from the beginning of the crusade, that is, from the time of the Council of Clermont. Not only is this view supported by the consensus of the contemporary narrative writers, but it is also indicated by the most likely interpretation of Pope Urban's letter to the Flemings, by the letters of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, the papal legate, the Eastern bishops, the crusading princes, and the correspondence of Bishop Anselm of Ribemont.

As for the arguments which Dr. Noth bases upon the letter of Pope Paschal II to the French hierarchy, these are also questionable. The fact that some crusaders might be excused because of their poverty from their votive obligations to participate in the crusade is not exactly a clinching argument to show that no votive obligations existed. The exception which is specified in Pope Paschal's letter can most easily and naturally be interpreted as a dispensation from the crusading obligation, rather than a declaration that there was no such obligation. The surprising thing about this document is the fact that it does not specify any means of commuting or redeeming the obligation, but rather dispenses from it outright. Again, however, one must bear in mind that canonistic doctrines of dispensation at the time of the first crusade were still in their formative stage and were far from uniform at this period. Any explanation of the distinction made in Pope Paschal's letter between the sanctions against laggard crusaders and those against renegade crusaders must be more tentative. One possible explanation of that distinction might be that the laggard crusader was considered to be bound in a less serious way than the renegade crusader by the obligation to fulfill a crusade vow. We might, in other words, see here a fore-shadowing of the distinction between a propositum and a full-fledged votum, such as appears in later canonistic thought. It is even more likely, however, that no real distinction between the two groups was intended. The pope, after all, directed that laggard crusaders — those who had vowed to go on crusade (eos praesertim, qui huius militiae voto crucis signa sumpsersunt) but who had not yet done what they had vowed — were to depart for the Holy Land forthwith under pain of infamia. The term infamia in this context could quite properly be construed in a general sense to indicate that

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21 HEp, pp. 174-175.

22 On the development of the doctrine of dispensation from vows at this period, see Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader, pp. 35-36, 42-43.

23 For this distinction, see Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader, pp. 40, 50-53, 59-61.
they were to be treated as outcasts, as excommunicates, or even as outlaws. The Synod of Anse, if this interpretation is accepted, can be said simply to have specified more precisely than had the pope the appropriate penalties to be inflicted on laggard crusaders. As for the pope's statement that renegade crusaders were to remain excommunicated, this would seem to mean that they had already done something which warranted excommunication, i.e. they had broken their vows. This scarcely supports Dr. Noth's thesis.

All in all, Dr. Noth fails to make a convincing case for his thesis concerning the origin of the crusader's vows on the first crusade. His arguments are contradicted by the majority of the surviving documents. He attempts to support his position by attacking the credibility of some of the documents, ignoring the testimony of others, and torturing the interpretation of the rest to fit his thesis. Certainly the argument is original, but the evidence to support it has not yet been found.

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24 The term is sometimes used in this sense in the Decretum Gratiani, e.g. C. 6 q. 1 c. 3; cf. Ivo of Chartres, Panormia 5.1.1 (PL 161: 1211). For the later development of infamia see Peter Landau, Die Entstehung des kanonischen Infamiebegriffs von Gratian bis zur Glossa Ordinaria (Köln, 1966; For- schungen zur kirchlichen Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht, v. 5).
Concerning a key episode at the Battle of Hastings in 1066 William of Poitiers writes:

The Normans and their allies, observing that they could not overcome an enemy which was so numerous and so solidly drawn up, without severe losses, retreated, simulating flight as a trick... among the barbarians there was great joy... some thousands of them... threw themselves in pursuit of those whom they believed to be in flight. Suddenly the Normans reined in their horses, intercepted and surrounded [the enemy] and killed them to the last man.¹

William of Malmesbury gives largely the same account of this episode:

The English... formed an impenetrable body, which would have kept them safe that day, if the Normans had not tricked them into opening their ranks by a feigned flight.²

For well over half a century medievalists have generally accepted accounts of the feigned retreat as true.³ In the spate of works which have appeared more or less in conjunction with the nine-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Hastings, however, there has been a tendency to reject the feigned retreat as a hoax perpetrated by Norman chroniclers who “dared not record that the Norman cavalry ran away.”⁴

⁴ See Charles H. Lemmon, The Field of Hastings, (St. Leonards-on-Sea, 1956), 44 for the quotation. There have been earlier rejections. Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen des Politische Geschichte, (Berlin, 1907), III, 162 rejected the feigned retreat. Alfred H. Burne, The Battlefields of England, (London, 1950), 31, 42, 43 also rejected it. The list of recent rejections is
Colonel Charles H. Lemmon has presented the most influential criticism of the feigned retreat. He asserts that such a tactic "would demand that every man taking part in it had to know when to retreat, how far to retreat and when to turn around and fight back; and, moreover, that these movements had to be carefully synchronized, or disaster would result." He contends that it would have been impossible to arrange such a maneuver in the heat of battle and rejects equally the possibility that feudal cavalry of the eleventh century could carry out such a tactic even with extensive training. Lemmon tries to support this latter contention by asserting that well-drilled and well-disciplined modern troops, even in small numbers, have difficulty carrying out similar actions in military tournaments. Moreover, he implies that any talk about feigned retreats is nonsense since they violate a "military maxim, evolved after long years of experience in warfare, that 'troops once committed to the attack cannot be made to change direction.'"

Lemmon does not demonstrate that William the Conqueror adhered to or even knew about the maxim of irreversible troop commitment. In fact Colonel Lemmon does not present any evidence that the above-mentioned maxim was current among medieval military commanders. C. N. Barclay finds Lemmon's characterization of the difficulties involved in carrying out a feigned retreat to be exaggerated. In contrast to Lemmon he argues that it was "quite practicable" to employ the feigned retreat tactic at Hastings. But, reliance upon the assertions and counter-assertions of modern military officers for the solving of problems in medieval history is a dubious historical method. Argument from military maxims is hardly any better, especially when there is more reliable evidence to be examined.

Arrian, one of the first Roman generals to fight against steppe horsemen, wrote a tactical plan for dealing with the Alans. A part of this work, Tactic and Formation against the Alans, still survives, and in one section of it Arrian makes special note of precautions which are to be taken by his troops to avoid being trapped by a feigned retreat. Arrian notes that only a part of his cavalry are to pursue the retreating enemy rapidly while another part of the cavalry advances behind them in tight order. The infantry must not break ranks, but must remain in good order.


6 Battle 1066, 81.  

7 Scriptura Minora, ed. E. Hercher (Leipzig, 1885), 84-5.
use of the feigned retreat tactic. These authors reinforce the impression that it was a traditional steppe tactic.  

People who had contact with steppe cavalry also adopted this tactic. The Visigoths apparently learned it during their sojourn in southern Russia and on one occasion, at least, used it successfully against the Franks. The Byzantine commander Narses adopted the feigned retreat tactic and used it successfully against a force of Franks which was positioned much as was Harold’s force of Hastings. The Franks reacted in a manner similar to that attributed to the English when faced with the enemies’ retreat, including the alleged joy at seeing the attackers flee and the pursuit of them. The Byzantines acted much as the Normans at Hastings are said to have acted, wheeling their horses after the enemy had broken its line and slaughtering the scattered infantry. The Byzantine Emperor, Leo the Wise, was so favorably impressed by the feigned retreat tactic that he strongly advocated its use in his work on military tactics.  

Even this brief elaboration of the evidence demonstrates that the feigned retreat tactic was widely accepted in the years before the Battle of Hastings. But the steppe peoples practically lived in their saddles, and the Byzantines were among the best trained troops in the middle ages; could William’s followers do what the Byzantines, the Alans, the Huns, the Magyars, and the Visigoths did? Lemmon and his supporters think not, but Stenton and Douglas disagree. The latter argues that William’s followers had a consciousness of unity and a cohesiveness which comes from fighting together for many years. William’s vassals had long fought together and these men had knights of their own who were accustomed to fighting as a unit.  

Yet assertions of knightly togetherness are of as little value for proving the use of the feigned retreat as invocations of modern military maxims are in disproving its use. In short, is there any real reason to believe the chroniclers who tell of the feigned retreat? Is there any reason to conclude that William or his followers knew of the feigned retreat tactic and could be expected to execute it? Though the steppe of

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9 Gregory of Tours, Historiarum libri X, ix, 31 (ed. B. Krusch and W. Levison; MGH: Scr. rer. mer., I, 1 [2nd ed. Hannover, 1937-51]) and Agathias II, 6. A detailed discussion of Byzantine tactics is given by Oman, Art of War, I, 205 ff. He gives special attention to Leo’s advocacy of the feigned retreat tactic. Lemmon, “Campaign of 1066,” 109, rejects the feigned retreat as a “recognized tactical operation in ancient warfare...” He does this partly “In view of the disbelief with which a ‘retreat according to plan’ in an enemy communique during the last wars was received...” and he concludes, “would it not be more correct to say that a ‘feigned retreat’ was the recognized method by which chroniclers concealed the fact that troops on their own side ran away?” Such presentation is worse than dubious historical method, it is absurd. Gregory of Tours, op. cit., hated the Visigoths whom he describes as using the feigned retreat effectively. Both Regius and Liutprand (op. cit.) describe enemy forces using the feigned retreat successfully, and Leo the Wise advocates its use as a military tactic for his own forces. R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare 1097-1193 (Cambridge, 1956), 78-80 notes the use of the feigned retreat by both crusaders and their enemies.

southern Russia are far indeed from the west of France, even Lemmon admits that Norman horsemen used the feigned retreat tactic on at least two occasions previous to the Battle of Hastings. Normans apparently executed a feigned retreat at Arques (Normandy) in 1053 and at Messina in 1060. The commander at Arques, Walter Giffard, served at Hastings as did a number of knights who had fought in the Sicilian campaigns.\textsuperscript{11}

It may be argued that two such examples of the feigned retreat in less than a decade (three in thirteen years if Hastings is counted) were lies to cover up real retreats or aberrant actions with little or no relation to events at Hastings.\textsuperscript{12} Such arguments, however, ignore the fact that steppe influences permeated the military tactics of western France. The Alans, mentioned above, were a nomad people of the steppes, and a group of them had been settled by the Romans in Armorica. Alan influence on Armorican cavalry tactics dates from the fifth century and can be traced right up through the twelfth century. In the tenth century, for example, Regino of Prüm, in describing the cavalry tactics of the Magyars, who used the feigned retreat extensively, notes their great similarity to the tactics of the Bretons.\textsuperscript{13} Count Alan of Brittany served under William at Hastings and in fact commanded the left wing of the Conqueror's forces.

In conclusion, the feigned retreat can be considered a well established part of the tactical repertoire in western France. It was part of the Alan heritage in Armorica before the Norman settlement in the tenth century, and the Normans with their usual hospitality to effective military innovations learned the tactic and used it at least three times, including Hastings, in little more than a decade. I find it impossible to reject the evidence of contemporary and near contemporary chroniclers who record the use of this tactic in the second retreat at Hastings and indeed I am inclined to speculate that the first retreat at Hastings, that by the Bretons which is usually considered to have been real, was also a feigned retreat.\textsuperscript{14}

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\textsuperscript{12} Lemmon, "Campaign of 1066," 109.

\textsuperscript{13} For a detailed discussion of Alan influences in Armorica see my articles "The Alans in Gaul," \textit{Traditio}, 23 (1967), 480-82, 484-89 and "The Origin of Armorican Chivalry," \textit{Technology and Culture}, 10 (1969), 166-171. Armorica is used here in its early medieval sense e.g. the area between Orleans in the south and Beine de la Seine in the north and extending west through Brittany. For the similarity of Magyar and Breton tactics see Regino, an. 889.

\textsuperscript{14} Geoffrey Gaimar, \textit{L'Etoire des Engleis}, ed. Alexander Bell, (Oxford, 1960), lines 5309 ff, dwells upon the effective role played by Count Alan of Brittany at the Battle of Hastings. The first retreat was put to very good use by William, and by interpreting it as feigned, William of Poitiers' remark (II, 21): "Twice the same trick was used..." is made more understandable.
THE COLOR OF DANTE'S HAIR

ROBERT W. CARRUBBA

Two passages in the Latin correspondence of Dante and Del Virgilio have presented a problem for commentators and translators. Dante writes to Del Virgilio:

Nonne triumphales melius pexare capillos
e patrio redeam si quando abscondere canos
fronde sub inserta solitum flavescere Sarno?
(Dante to Del Virgilio, I.42-44)

and Del Virgilio replies:

O si quando sacros iterum flavescere canos
fonte tuo videas et ab ipsa Phyllide pexos,
quam visando tuas teretes miraberis uvas!
(Del Virgilio to Dante, II.44-46)

In the first passage, canos (sc. capillos) can have no other immediate meaning than that Dante's hair is now white or grey in color. Solitum flavescere appears to mean that Dante's locks were in his youth some shade of blond. The second passage repeats both items (iterum flavescere canos) and seems to confirm the colors of Dante's hair, now and in his youth. Yet, if we are to trust Boccaccio (Vita, 0), Dante's complexion was dark, and i capelli e la barba spessi, neri e crespi. What are we to make of all this?

We ought, first of all, to cite the testimony of four editors and translators in chronological order. P. H. Wicksteed and E. G. Gardner¹ comment on Dante v. 44: "Flavescere presents a certain difficulty;" and translate solitum flavescere as "who erst was auburn." On Del Virgilio v. 44, they comment: "the phrase certainly refers to the color of Dante's youthful locks," but translate iterum flavescere canos as "hoary locks glow once again." Their commentary explains: "... though he [Del Virgilio] cannot promise Dante a renewal of his youth, he declares that his locks shall 'glow' once again." Wicksteed and Gardner see Dante's use of flavescere for a precise color and Del Virgilio's repetition for a secondary meaning, "glow." More recently, E. Bolisani and M. Valgimigli² comment on Dante v. 44: "Il Cortese traduce fiorenti 'essendo risaputo che Dante non aveva i capelli biondi, ma neri.' Ma noi non abbiamo creduto di dare al verso un significato che non ha." They translate: "nascondere i capelli, or canuti, un di biondeggianti." On Del Virgilio v. 44, Bolisani and Valgimigli have no note relevant to color, but they translate flavescere by rimverdire. Thus all these four editors and translators recognize the difficulties and offer similar, if not identical, solutions. These solutions are, I think, correct for the immediate explanation and translation of the text, but do not attempt to resolve the contradiction of colors posed by the texts of Dante and Del Vigilio on the one hand and Boccaccio on the other.

¹ Dante and Giovanni del Virgilio (Westminster, 1902).
² La Corrispondenza poetica di Dante Alighieri e Giovanni Del Virgilio (Florence, 1963).
What really was the color of Dante's youthful hair? Is the apparent Dante-Del Virgilio and Boccaccio contradiction a real one?

Let me state, first of all, that I do not believe that there is any necessary contradiction. I will not argue that Dante's hair is his early youth was light and then darkened in manhood, only to grow grey in later years. This explanation would seem to have the best of all worlds. All the sources are correct; no one is wrong. But what evidence, aside from conjecture, is there for this pleasant solution?

I think that we must direct our attention to two facts: 1) Dante and Del Virgilio are deliberately writing in the manner of a Vergilian pastoral eclogue; 2) in this genre allegory and autobiography are interwoven. Dante chooses to mask himself with the name "Tityrus," even as Vergil had done in his own first eclogue. Striking parallels emerge. Even as the Vita by Boccaccio tells us that Dante was dark, so too do ancient biographies tell us that Vergil was dark. Tityrus of eclogue one corresponds and yet does not correspond to the Vergil of real life. His experience with land confiscation is real. But Tityrus is twice described as an old man (senex, vv. 46 and 51) whose hair is grey or white (candidior barba, v. 28). Vergil was neither an old man at the time of confiscations (after the Battle of Philippi, 42 B.C.) nor at the time of the composition of eclogue one (Vergil was born in 70 B.C. and the Eclogues were published in 38 or 37 B.C.). Yet, Vergil chose the name "Tityrus" and pictured the character as an old man with grey hair. Autobiographical truth and poetic imagination are blended.

The same, I would suggest, is true for Dante. But to what extent? That Dante's hair was grey at the time he wrote to Del Virgilio may indeed be fact. If so, or in any case, Dante wishes by way of pastoral allegory to picture his youth. To accord strictly with Boccaccio, were Dante to present autobiographic fact the poet should use some such Latin term as fuscus. The contrast of black and white would be stark and appealing. But the term employed by Dante is not fuscus but the verb form of flavus, flavescere. Why? When Dante elected to answer Del Virgilio's first eclogue, whose character is Vergilian and heroic or epic, with an eclogue, whose character is Vergilian and pastoral, he observed in this matter the conventions of both the epic and pastoral genres. While it may be true that today "blondes have more fun" and that "gentlemen prefer blondes," among the ancients both assertions are certain. As a rule, the Greek and Roman epic and bucolic heroes not only preferred blondes but were themselves blond, though there are references to dark hair. Vergil often takes notice of fair hair. The complexion of Aeneas, like that of the Achaeans and Achilles in the Iliad (1.197, 23.141), is blond (Aeneid, 1.589-593). One calls to mind an even more striking example-Dido. Vergil blatantly ignores ethnological exactness when he ascribes blond (flavus) hair to Phoenician Dido (4.590, 698). Elsewhere, Dido's complexion is candida (5.571), a blond type of beauty common in the Eclogues (2.16, 5.56-57, 7.38). The passage from Del Virgilio printed above helps make the point.

4 Several versions of the "Life of Vergil" have come down to us and are based on that by Suetonius, De Poetis. See C. Hardie, Vita Vergiliana Antiquae (Oxford, 1954).
5 The year assigned to these eclogues is 1319. Dante was then in his fifties.
6 For copious citations and commentary see A. S. Pease, Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus (Darmstadt, 1967) 421-473. See also M. N. Wetmore, Index Verborum Vergilianus (Hildesheim, 1961) 178.
7 The Homeric Greek for flavus is ἐρυθος, H. 1, 191.
clear beyond doubt. Del Virgilio borrowed the character Phyllis, a typical country beauty, from Vergil’s *Eclogues*. Phyllis appears in eclogues 3, 5, 7 and 10. She may figure in the title of a song (5) or shepherds may vie with each other in her praises (7). But Phyllis of eclogue 10, the girl whom Gallus would happily take in exchange for his actress mistress, is thus presented by Vergil (35-41):

atque utinam ex vobis unus vestrique fussem
aut custos gregis aut maturae vinitor uvae!
certe sive mihi Phyllis sive esset Amyntas,
seu quicumque furor (quid tum, si fuscus Amyntas?
et nigrae violae sunt et vaccinia nigra),
meum inter salices lenta sub vite iaceret;
serta mihi Phyllis legeret, cantaret Amyntas.

Her fair complexion is taken for granted, while that of Amyntas (*fuscus*) must be noted as exceptional and (exquisitely) apologized for.

I would thus conclude that the use by Dante as well as by Del Virgilio of *flavescere* tells us nothing of the real color of Dante’s hair. What it does tell us, once again, is Dante’s understanding of and respect for his master’s genres and conventions. Boccaccio’s assertion of dark hair has not been undermined.
AMOR COMMUNIS OMNIBUS: PARIS, B.N., LAT. 11, 130

BRIAN STOCK

The MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, latin 11,130 is a collection of miscellaneous scientific works of the Middle Ages. Léopold Delisle cited it briefly in his Inventaire and Hauréau gave more precise information about its contents. Both scholars recognized the oldest, best-known text in the manuscript, the De natura rerum of Bede; but Hauréau remarked that it is not reproduced exactly as in Patrologia Latina, volume 90. Several chapters added at the end treat de presagis lunae, stelarum, nubium,..., that is, topics in astrology. Astonished, Hauréau asked: "Les a-t-on supprimé pour l'honneur de Bède?"

The manuscript was written in France, very probably before 1150. The revival of the study of astronomy and astrology at the time possibly accounts for the additions to Bede's work. The entire codex, moreover, provides an interesting example of the way in which an earlier encyclopedia of natural history was associated in the minds of twelfth-century readers with contemporary interests. The contents of the whole manuscript are as follows:

ff. 28v-69r: William of Conches, Philosophia mundi.  
ff. 69r-78v: Bede, De natura rerum.
ff. 78v-84r: notes on astrological subjects, dating from the twelfth century.
ff. 84r: Bede, De tempore ratione, cap. 4, "De ratione unciarum."
ff. 85r: a figure illustrating a division of the sciences.
ff. 85v: an anonymous (?) treatise on the active and passive life.
incipit: Practica est quae non actalem dicere possimus...
ff. 85v: a notice of the eighteenth century of the librarian of the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan.
ff. 86r: a second figure illustrating a division of the sciences, perhaps inspired by Bede.
ff. 86r: two short literary works written in a small hand at the right-hand side of the folio.

The most remarkable aspect of the codex, overlooked by previous researchers, is the two, anonymous poetic works on f. 86r. Unfortunately the outer margins of the folios have been reduced, possibly in rebinding, and certain words in each poem have

1 Inventaire des manuscrits conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les nos. 6822-11503 du fonds latin et faisant suite à la série dont le catalogue a été publié en 1744 (Paris, 1863), p. 111. Delisle appears to be citing a previous authority who is not named.
4 P. L., 90, 307A-308C.
been truncated. In addition, the second of the two works, inferior to the first, is written, in part, under a bad stain on the manuscript. Nonetheless, the two little poems, composed, it may be assumed, around 1125,\(^5\) comprise delightful additions to the growing corpus of medieval Latin poetry.

I

Amor communis omnibus
dulcis inicio,
al[iis] repugnantibus,
hoc in me sentio,
qui multa mal[a] suffero
palam et clanculo,
ut quiescam dulce t[uo]
amice lectulo.
Oy, oy, oy.

Amor, amor, a[mor]
ammirabilis,
tu es hostis omnibus
intollera[bilis];
quem tuo vales igneo
ferire spiculo
sub[ia]cebit utique
graui periculo.
Oy, oy, oy.

S[i] modo cernere
possem corporeum
altare tib<i> fieri
vellem marmoreum,
et multa super po<ne>rem
rerum libamina.
Non ergo deves spermere
mea precamina.
Oy, oy, oy, Amor.

II

1a Amor accendit mentes
et subdit acriter
calcari et probitatis
urget studia.

1b Amor reddit ho<mines>
magnanimos
et strenuo<s>
et dapsiles.

\(^5\) In the article cited, p. 244, Vernet proposes the dates 1125-35 for William of Conches’ *Philosophia mundi.*
2a Amor felle <est> amarior; 
amor melle est dulcior.
2b Amor durus et placidus, 
amor audax et pauidus;
3a Amore nil melius, 
amore nil deterius.
3b Hic preualet in omnibus 
et durat in mortalibus.
4a Amor iuuat, si steterit; 
amor iuuat, si preterit.
4b Amor nocet, si maneat; 
amor nocet, si transeat.
5 Hic me cepit: 
per6 Christum 
<h>abitem 
et seruirem
suo uoto.

6 Per christum habitem is no: clear in the manuscript; it might very well be pro christo or christi; habitem is abicem in the manuscript.
MORGAN AND THE MISSING DAY
IN SIR GAWAIN AND THE GREEN KNIGHT

VICTOR YELVERTON HAINES

If, as appears from the dénouement, the anonymous Gawain poet knows so well what Morgan has been doing, perhaps he himself may be suspect as fairy; that would be one good explanation why MS. Cotton Nero A. x, Art. 3, has survived so long in dusty nooks to be discovered by an audience just now ready to comprehend its intricate beauty. It would, of course, also explain why he actually makes poetry as if he were of fairy kin, setting up a structure of illusion in *Sir Gawain & De Grene Knyst* which: recreates that strange and fugitive play of romance fronting the unknown. Ordinary story-tellers may tell of past marvels and mass-hallucinations, but the Gawain poet is able to make his own poem into one itself. Although his game as poet with the artifice of verbal contraption is to keep this hidden, his submerged activity in the illusion’s structure may be detected in a number of ways.

One of the most interesting of these is the way in which he plays off cyclical time in nature against linear history and human will. Human values and the unique adventures of a society stand in the clearing of a brilliant court around which the repetitive, the impersonal, and the odd, close in like fog on the battlements. Time from both areas is vividly represented in the poem: history, at the beginning of Fitt I (with Aneas, Troy, Ticius, Camelot); and, once the historical choice has been taken to keep a promise, nature at the beginning of Fitt II (with the inevitable cycle of seasons). The two areas intertwine throughout the poem and intersect on the various Saints’ and holy days of the Christian calendar year: process in nature is sectored by the history of progress commemorated in the sacred points of man’s development. The human community may participate at these points in both natural and historical dimensions of time, and feel them, as Morton W. Bloomfield says, as “part of the bulwarks of life; they give security and strength.” But, no less than creating this comfortable reliance on his dazzling description, the Gawain poet works at the same time to undermine it. The felt dimensions of time in the poem “are the framework of the human universe,” as Bloomfield says, “into which fantastic and puzzling irrationality penetrates and which it seems to wish to destroy.” Into the sumptuous image of Camelot at Christmas “hales in” the fairy threat of a twelvemonth and a day, and at Hautdesert this extra day, though usually just a legal convention, is perhaps not forgotten.

Here at Hautdesert as one awaits the stroke “To be 3ederly 3olden on Nw 3eres morn,” (453)\(^a\), the Gawain poet plays a subtle game in crumbling the apparent time structure of his narrative world. Just after they have finished the feast of Saint John’s

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2 Bloomfield, 18.
day, the third day of Christmas, the lord of the castle draws Gawain “on dry3e” (1031), and asks him if he won’t stay longer, but Gawain, who has his appointment on New Year’s day, replies:

And of þat ilk Nw ȝere bot neked now wantez, ...
Naf I now to busy bot bare þre dayes,

(1062, 1066)

Now, there is a difficulty in numbering the days. As the narrative continues:

Much dut watz þer dryuen þat day and þat oþer,
And þe þryd as þro þronge in þerafter;
þe loye of sayn Jonez day watz gentyle to here,
And watz þe last of þe layk, leudeþ þer þoȝten.
þer wer gestes to go vpon þe gray morne,
Forby wonderly þay wok, and þe wyn dronken,
Daunsed ful dreȝly wyth dere carolez.
At þe last, when hit watz late, þay lachen her leue,
Vchon to wende on his way þat watz wyȝe stronge.
Gawan gef hynm god day, þe god man hynm lachchez,
Ledes hynm to his awen cambre, þe chynmey bysye,

(1020-1030)

so apparently they are passing the night after the day of the 27th; Gawain says he has “to busy bot bare þre dayez” (1066), and a relaxed audience gets the impression it’s just the next three days after Saint John’s day. But if you count them — the 28th, 29th, and 30th; and Gawain goes out on New Year’s day, where did the extra day go?

Unwilling to accept a slip in the Gawain poet’s rigour some have said a line must be missing after line 1022.¹ But there is no break in either sense or syntax here, and, moreover, in the whole manuscript no other line is missing. So far as we know, that is. Theoretically, hundreds could be missing, but why ruin the poem we have, which is already excellent, with a regrettable interpretation that it’s damaged beyond repair.

The correct explanation for this apparent time discrepancy lies in the fact that Gawain sleeps for most of the day of the 28th. The guests are going to go upon the “grey morne” (1024) after staying up all night as is the custom on St. John’s day, and near the solstice at the latitude of Lancashire this could easily make it about nine o’clock. This is why Gawain gives the lord of the castle “god day” (1029); it is not a term of leave-taking used in the middle of the night. The time actually is day and to make sense of Gawain’s comment, “Naf I now to busy bot bare þre dayez,” one must assume he is talking to the lord of the castle during the day of the 28th. “I have barely three pounds of flour,” for example, means three and some over;² so the “bare þre dayez” referred to is the rest of the day after St. John’s day and then the 29th, 30th, and 31st.³

Hence when the lord of the castle asks Gawain, “Wyl ȝe halde þis heres at þys onez ?” (1090), there is good reason, underneath the appearance to involve an appeal to a “hes”, even though it is done in sport. The request to “lenge in your lofte, and

⁴ Davis, 104.
⁵ See O. E. D. barely: 5, only just, eg., “The speakers... had barely time to get out of his way.”
⁶ The Julian Gregorian calendar has always had 31 days in December and the feast of Saint John has been the 27th since the fourth or fifth century. See Dom Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (London: Dacre, 1960), 377.
lyye in your ese. To-morn quyle þe messequyle” (1096-97) is actually a request by Bertilak to “lie in” not only during mass-time tomorrow morning but all the rest of the present day too.

The ladies have been fetched back to the party which gets going again for a while, “vnytystel,” but everyone has been up all night dancing carols, so, less active now, “pay stoder and stemed and stelly spoken” (1117) till they took their leave and “Vche burne to his bed watz broȝt at þe laste” (1120). The castle is left in the daylight with most people sleeping, including the man “not wel waryst” whose powers, in the old legends, are traditionally at their height as the sun is rising.

According to this sequence of events it is clear at the end of Fitt II that the “lemande torches” are used not because it is night but as a matter of honour. Inside the castle would be cinemagazine enough to warrant their pleasant use as a luxury; moreover they would still have them around after the night’s feast. Nevertheless the reader is easily misled here at the end of the Fitt into thinking that since this marks the end of the activities for St. John’s day the action will resume on the day after that. In a way this is what the Gawain poet would like the audience to assume in the narrative structure here between the second and third Fitt since he would not like the action to peter out into a day of sleep. Also he would like the reader to retain the general impression of two groups of three days — three being such an important number at Hautdesert.

The third Fitt begins briskly with the departure of some more of the guests: “Ful erly before þe day þe folk uprysen, / Gestes þat go wolde hor gromex þay calden”, (1126-27). These are the guests who were not “wyȝe stronge” (1028) enough to wend their way right after the all-night feast and drinking of St. John’s day, and who would avail themselves on the 28th of a day’s rest before travelling home. This is also the morning when the lord begins his first hunt: “By þat any daylyȝt lemed vpon erþe. / He with his hapeles on hysȝe horses weren” (1137-38). It is clear, then, that they are up before the “grey morne,” and this cannot be the morning of the 28th when the feast terminated. This all depends, of course, on the interpretation of line 1024: “þer wer gestes to go vpon þe gray morne.” The text does not say that there were guests to go “on the morrow,” “in the morning,” “to-morn,” or the “next morning,” but rather “upon þe grey morne.” The “upon” emphasizes that the company was going to stay up to meet the time when it gets grey. This discount a sense that they all go to bed in good time to get up “vpon þe gray morn” of the day right after St. John’s day. “Forpy wonderly þay woke” it says in the next line; as Tolkien and Gordon say in their note to this line: “They stayed up all night.” It was the custom to stay up the night of “Sayn Jonez” day, and to say they don’t do so at Hautdesert leads to a distortion of lines 1024-25; it misjudges the human situation: rest is natural after three days of feasting and Bertilak’s “hapes” would not be ready to hunt before the “grey morn” on the 28th; and it would implicate the poem, which is so highly worked here, in a chronological error.

Moreover, to say the day of the first hunt is the 28th, leads to some confusion about the departure of the guests and the meaning of the word “stronge” (1208). The normal meaning of this word in the poet’s dialect would be “strong” not “strange;” Tolkien and Gordon gloss it as such, but it doesn’t make much sense this way if

everybody is going to bed before “pe gray morne.” Accordingly, Norman Davis feels it should be “strange” since “the meaning is plainly ‘not belonging to the household’:”

At þe last, when hit watz late, þay lachen her leue,
Vchon to wende on his way þat watz wyȝe stronge,

(1027-28)

Perhaps there is a component of this meaning in the lines, especially when the 28th is considered missing. The resultant meaning however points to “strong,” because actually there are two groups of departing guests. The text does not say “the guests were to go” but “þer wer gestes to go vpon þe gray morne;” just some of the guests are going to go. These guests, when morning comes, “lachen her leue,/ Vchon to wende on his way;” and now Gawain also gives the lord “god day.” The force of the lines is that these guests take their leave to go right away, not the next morning as Davis implies in a note to line 1022: “Guests who mean to leave in the morning take leave of the host before going to bed, but Gawain is induced to stay longer. The others duly leave very early (1126 ff.) and the same morning the host goes hunting. But…”

There is a day missing. The guests in lines 1126 ff. are actually another group of guests leaving on the morning of the 29th; and it gives a nice human touch to say of the first group in the typical heroic way that they were good strong men to be journeying after such feasting. Moreover, linguistically, Old French “estrang” is not likely to develop to [strcːɡ] north of the Humber where Old English ǣ was not raised to ọ; hence by all accounts “strong” is the correct gloss for “strange” in line 1028.

This day after the “ioye of sayn Jones day” would not have been so obscured to a fourteenth century audience as it has been to the twentieth, since they would have experienced fourteenth century Christmases. Even then, however, would not have noticed it without reflection and figuring. The narrative moves in a virtual reality so structured that the effect of becoming aware of this missing day, is mediate rather than immediate experience. As such, requiring second thoughts, the events here correspond with the mind’s activity. To lose a day without being aware of it brings on the flow of time, when you finally reckon it, more inexorably than ever. And even if it is never realized consciously, somehow time catches up with an ineluctable sense, as in the last of Sir Gawain, when it’s one, two, three, and then you have to go. It’s a normal enough man who loses a day in the waking and drinking somewhere between Christmas and New Year’s; the apparent time suggests felt time. Moreover, the day of sleep is obscured to Gawain’s consciousness just as it is to the reader’s; the hero and reader both are in similar situations.

Gawain’s consciousness has been put to sleep, as it were, as an innocent babe. He has still much to learn after his journey though Advent, and if, to teach him a lesson, he is snicked on New Year’s Day, the Feast of the Circumcision, it is appropriate that he should sleep through Holy Innocents’ Day, the 28th of December. With a view to such a correspondence on the liturgical calendar the Gawain poet suggests the innocence which, despite Gawain’s reputation for sophistication, evolves from his frequent ignorance of what is happening.

9 Davis, 104.
10 Ibid.
The Gawain poet manages this obscurity rolled like a cloud across the day of sleep by diverting attention in various ways, especially at the beginning of Fitt III where a new day dawns so emphatically: “ful crly bfore þe day þe folk vprysen,” that, at this point, one naturally thinks it’s the next day after the previous night’s feast. This impression is so strong at the end of the second division in the poem that M. R. Watson, although he noticed a missing day was concealed, still felt that, “the last four stanzas of this second part [i.e. Fitt II] (excluding line 1020) all take place on Dec. 27th.”

But eventually as criticism builds on itself the reader’s hard mediate experience ploughs through the obfuscation in the poem to an under level of significance. The facts open up for the reader as the ground is suddenly sighted from an airplane coming down through the fog—the author is creating like the fairies. The fairies create mass-hallucinations such as the “gome in the gerne,” and the author is actually doing something similar. As Denton Fox says, “From his style, the poet seems like Bertilak himself: jovial, prodigious, bustling, and thoroughly inscrutable.”

No sooner is the reader comfortably ensconced in the world of the narrative than he senses strange agents behind the appearances. Like the detective in Robert Heinlein’s story, “The Unpleasant Occupation of Jonathan Hoag,” the reader travels up an elevator to the thirteenth floor which he has recently visited, but this time learns from the elevator operator (perhaps the critic) that, “No, sir. They never put a floor with number 13 in these buildings. Too many people figure it’s unlucky.” Although the Gawain poet dazzles readers with his brilliant illusion he continually hints at depths which only glint under his carefully prepared surface. “The author is playing a game with us,” as Morton W. Bloomfield says in summary of an unpublished paper by John Conley, “just as Morgan is playing a game with Arthur’s court. He is keeping us in a state of suspense, holding back information, and fooling us.” Hc tantalizes the reader to move deeper and deeper into the virtual reality he has so playfully created for us. Once inside, the reader senses the action as symbolic of the feeling of merriness for keeping on top of things, the divine joke of existence, almost as if the dancer Krishna himself were merrily whirling witty hallucinations around him. The divine comedy of getting along, however, has both its chummy side of good times and its complement of rueful laughter that this is all just for a while and may soon disappear in deeper lights. Gawain may sport with Arthur and the lord of the castle in their halls, but these men also represent the force of noble personalities who are reacting in matters of consequence. Bertilak may humanly ask Gawain, wouldn’t he like to have a good long rest now, but one may remember that Gawain’s ancestor in legend is the sun god whose powers would go wrong if darkened during the day. The fairies need this time when Gawain’s consciousness is obscured during the day for an attack. Then they can set up their traps and tests as the days group themselves in favour of the castle Hautdesert’s magic number three.

Eerie suggestions such as this turn playful laughter into sprightly play where the whole fairy level becomes vivacious. At such points the reader's relation to the author intersects with the hero's scary relation to the fairies. He participates in the same sort of adversities Gawain does. Normally the reader's relation to the creative energy of an author goes unnoticed and attention is diverted to the artistic illusion which is created for him. But because the Gawain poet teases us by playing with his story, as Henry James does in *The Turn of the Screw*, his hand behind the scenes is hard to ignore. As the reader's semi-awareness of this increases, the weird feeling that some master is behind it all grows until one is not sure, when truly caught up in the virtual reality of the work, who is doing it, Morgan with the fairies, the author, your own mind, or — it's all (just) your imagination. The reader is conned by the skills of a fairy poet, just as Gawain by the fairies. The historical will of another human, just as Aeneas, "tried for his trichirie," comes up against "gisterdayez mony," and time, usually such a vivid frame of reference in the poem, goes awry for a moment as things catch up.
SIMON OF FAVERSHAM’S SOPHISMA \textit{UNIVERSALE EST INTENTIO}: A SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

JAN PINBORG

The Sophisma “Universale est intentio,” excellently edited by the late professor Yokoyama in \textit{Medieval Studies} 31 (1969) 1-14 from the one MS, Munich, Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3852, is also found anonymously in three other MSS:

\begin{itemize}
  \item K = Krakow, Bibli. Jagellonica, 1252 f. 176vb (Abbreviated and very fragmentary version, which stops at p. 4, line 37 of the edition. Last word of K: agentis).
\end{itemize}

Some of the readings of these Mss. confirm the conjectures of professor Yokoyama, while other variant readings offer a better text than that given by the Ms of Munich. I propose to give a list of the most relevant variant readings of these MSS. The text of the Munich MS is referred to by “M”, the corrections or readings of professor Yokoyama by “Y”. Changes from the text of Y are indicated by italics; the various readings offered refer to these italicized “lemmata.”

\textbf{p. 3} 1.13: \textit{una in multis immo} abstracta a multis KLV: ut M.
1.21 (note 3) et KLVY: eo M.
1.33 omne actu abstractum est KLVY: om. M.
1.34 (note 4) abstrahens KLVY: abstrahentem M.
1.36 (note 5) comparatur KLVY: operatur M.
1.37 per quam posse int movere KLV: posit M.

\textbf{p. 4} 1.1 immo de se sunt visibles KL: vero V ideo M.
1.5 (note 7) \textit{non recte} comparatur LY: non bene V noster (?) M.
1.10 Item, si (KLV: om. M) universale est praedicabile de pluribus (LV: multis KM), \textit{ergo quod est actu universale est actu praedicabile de pluribus.}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Sed cognitio rei... KLV: om. M.
\end{itemize}
1.16 \textit{Sed} secundum actu quod KL: om M.
1.29 in fantasmatisbus per te V; fantasmatisbus particularibus M singularibus L.
1.34 Deinde respondebatur \textit{altier}, quod LMV: arguitur Y.

\textbf{p. 5} 1.2-3 sunt, \textit{cum} (LV: tunc M) intellectus... sequitur (sequeretur (V) quod intellectus simul \textit{multa intelligeret}. Hoc est inconvenientis. \textit{Ergo et ipse intellectus} (LV: om. M) per hoc quod (LVY: om. M) comparat...
1.10 tunc \textit{intellectus} in aliqua re LV: intelligit M.
1.12 \textit{magis attributa} animali LV: magis Y om. M.
1.15 (note 11) faciente LYV: sumente M.
1.25 et per hoc quod LYV: om. M.
1.26 \textit{cum alio; sed cum} LV: \textit{cum} Y om. M.
1.34 habent \textit{esse} LVY: om. M.
1.43 \textit{intelligibilibus, sicut nec} idem corpus LV: secundum M.
p. 6 1.4 dimittat: convertat V.
1.10 (note 12) apprehendit Y: intelligit LMV.
1.11 sensitiva M: sensu communi LV.
1.14 est inter duo aliqua LM: aliqua Y aliqua alia V.
1.26 Here I should prefer another punctuation: Haec fuerunt arguta (LV: argumenta YM (?)). De esse et natura universalis parum habemus...
1.27 philosophorum M: platoniciorum LV.
1.42 (note 16) naturae LVY: natura M.

p. 7 1.7-8 est unum in multis et praeter multa L: et propter hoc praeter Y et propter hoc nota M et de multis praeter V.
1.9 Nunc autem LV: non M.
1.11 singulariter eit: in singulari, est singulare L.
1.24 quod formae apprehensae in imaginatione LV: apprehensive M.
1.28 (Note 21a) movere Y: moveri LMV.
1.29 Apparet ergo ex praedicit V: parte intellectus M dictis L.
1.37 actu lucidum ad hoc quod visus possit immutari LV: quod possit ad hoc M.
1.39 intelligibilia fiant actu intelligibilia LV: facit M.
1.40 signatur dicit Philosophus LMV: figurative Y.

p. 8 1.2 (note 24) Et sicut LVY: et sic M.
1.7 praeter omne LV: esse M.
1.8-9 et maxime a principis individuanti facientibus ipsam hic et nunc virtute intellectus LV: cf. note 25.
1.9 sic est in propinqua dispositione VY: sic M sicut in virtute intellectus agentis est in propinqua dispositione ad hoc quod sicut acta intellecta sic est L.
1.14-15 manifestum est quod terminus (LMV: causa Y) actionis suae est aliqua natura abstracta ut sic. Natura autem rei LV: utrum sit natura aut M.
1.16 ad supposita: + nihil autem est actu universale nisi per respectum ad supposita LV.
1.21 cum non sit purum figuratum L: praesentia fantasmatis MV.
1.27 (note 27-28) qui ... qui LVY: quod ... quod M.
1.28-32 Apparet-transferre: Apparet igitur ex praedicitis, quod natura rei ex hoc solo, quod abstracta est, non est actu universalis. Sed ipsa est acto immaterialis et actu objectum intellectus possibils, quia omne immateriale de se est actu intelligibile; unde intellectus agentis in eo quod abstrahit dat formam et virtutem, per quam possit agere in intellectum et dat ipsi formam, per quam possit recipere LV.
1.34 (note 30) imaginatas LVY: imaginantis M.
1.35 (note 31) intelligere LVY: intellectus M.
1.36 (note 32) per operationem LV: operatione Y operationi M.
1.40 ab intellecti possibili LV: principali M.
1.41 sic licet unitas et communitas LV: universalitas M.

p. 9 1.2 ut dicibiis (LV: dicitur M) de pluribus non diversificata (LV: diminuta M) in illis...
1.10 quod ad hoc quod LVY: om. M.
1.23 ubi dicit quod in corpore tria sint LV: cum demonstratione M.
1.24 (note 35) magnitudinem LVY: magnitude M.
1.25 (note 37) perveniat LY: veniat V perveniant M.
1.28 Istud etiam est de intentione LV: considerandum est etiam M.
temporis, quomodo in codem V: utrum Y om. LM.
1.4 alicuius formae LV: figurae M.
1.4-6 inductur-formam: om. V.
1.4-5 inductur forma ista vel aliter esset L: ita saltem M aliter saltem Y.
1.5 materiam sine forma L: sive formam M sine formam Y.
1.6 <quando> Y: om. LM.
1.6 ad recipiendum formam L: aliquam M.
1.6 [quod] Y: quod LMV.
1.7 contraria: + sed in instante recipit illam formam V.
1.7 Nunc autem cum LM: ita codem modo est de V.
1.7 rei: + cum V.
1.11 vel (V: secundum M) totum aggregatum ex utroque (MV: utraque Y).
1.12 comparatur ad intellectum possibilem sicut V: om. M.
1.20 quorum ut sic non est aliqua una ratio V.
1.23 aliibi. This might be a reference to Simon’s Quæstiones super librum Praedicamentorum (ed. Ottaviani p. 277, 16 sq.).
1.24 prius intelligat quidditatem rei absolute quam intelligit eam ut comparatam ad aliud V.

p. 11 1.3 attributus VY: inattributus M.
1.7 (note 42) quia V: quoniam Y qui M.
1.16-17 intellectus, sed (om. M) sub ea ratione, sub qua est (om. M) absolute consideratæ praeter omne accidens V.
1.22 cum: om. V.
1.23 non praedicatur VY: om. M.
1.29 Verum est quod VY: om. M.
1.33 manifesta sunt in generali V: generibus M.
1.36 (note 43) quartum VY: quarta M.
1.41 animae, quod sit (V: cum M tamen Y) plurificata tamen (M: cum Y in re V) secundum <es> se extra [non]. But the corruption may be more extensive.

p. 12 1.2 actu universale est actu intellectum V: in intellectu M.
1.7 agentem, immo abstracta conici: vero V idem M, cf. p. 4 line 1.
1.11 (note 45) et quod Y: et quid M om. V.
1.15 contradictoria: contradictionem V.
1.16 contradictoria: contradicionem V.
1.20 impotentialitas: impossibilitas V.
1.22 Dico ergo ad maiorem V: minorem M.
1.22 (note 46) maioris VY: minoris M.
1.27 oportet non attendi ex parte V.
1.38 est actu intelligentis V: intellectus M.
1.39 est ponere esse idem secundum substantiam quod: secundum substantiam esse M secundum substantiam <idem> esse Y.
1.40 sed tamen secundum aliam V: om. M.
1.41 secundum quod intellectus M: secundum quod possibilis V haud recte.
1.42 intellectus agens et intellectus: + possibilis V haud recte.
1.42 inseparabiles (V: separabilia M) sunt secundum substantiam (MV: virtutem Y, note 47). But something seems to be missing.

p. 13 1.2 inquantum VY: quantum M.
1.6 ut hae tres MV: haec V.
1.17 quintam Y (note 50): quartam M aliam V.
The structure of the Sophisma

The structure of the Sophisma does not appear clearly from the edition.

In the introduction (p. 3) Simon promises to determine three questions, of which the Mss. offer only the first. The determination of the problems raised in the two other questions, however, may be inferred from the determination of the first. But the titles of these two questions cannot be used to structure the determination of the first question as the editor seems to think. The only extant question falls into four parts: 1. "Positio quaestionis" (p. 3 1. 1-15, last word: rebus). 2. First "responsio," probably by a bachelor with counter-arguments by the "opponentes" (remainder of part I of the edition). 3. Second "responsio," probably by another bachelor, with counter-arguments by the "opponentes" (part II of the edition, except the last 7 lines, from De natura et ...). 4. The "determinatio magistralis," which includes the rest of the Sophisma, consisting of a) the determination of the main ("principalis") question (p. 6-9 last line included), with b) additional "dubitationes" and their solution (p. 10, line 1-41 and p. 10.1.43-p. 11.1.32, thus the subtitle of part VI separates what belongs together), c) summary (p. 11, line 33-42), and d) "responsiones" to the principal arguments from the "Positio quaestionis" (part VII, 1-2). It is peculiar that Simon here includes answers to the arguments raised by the "opponentes" against the first "respondens" (part VII, 3-end). I have found no other example of this procedure in a 13th century Sophisma. For further remarks on the structure of sophismata I refer to the paper by H. Roos: "Ein unbekanntes Sophisma des Boetius de Dacia" Scholastik, 38 (1963), 378-391.

Since Professor E. A. Synan reviewed Professor Yokoyama's edition of the Munich manuscript (see note on the contributor, Medieval Studies 31 (1969) 1), it seemed right that he review the readings provided by this supplementary note also; I should like to acknowledge that he has done this for K and V, whereas L was discovered later and we have agreed that its eight readings, unsupported by at least one other manuscript, do not require this step.


On Simon's doctrinal position

The doctrine of the Sophisma is strongly influenced by Avicenna (Metaph. V. tr. 6, c. 6-7), Averroes (De anima I, c. 18) and Albertus Magnus (Metaph. V tract. 6, c. 6-7), but it is far more explicit. What is new in Simon is the careful distinction of the operations of the two intellects, viz. intellectus agens and intellectus possibilis, where
the former effects an abstracted form, whereas the latter effects the *completa ratio universalis*. A similar doctrine can be found in the writings of another "Albertist," Thomas of Erfurt, cited in my "Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelelter, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42, 2 (Münster: Aschendorff 1967), p. 176 note 18. The tendency of these authors to decrease the importance of the *intelectus agens*, however, is not yet so radical as the opinion expressed by Walter Burleigh, cited by L. M. Baudry in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 9 (1934), p. 164-165: *Necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem est non ad remondum conditiones individuantes vel materiales... sed tota necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem est quia intentiones existentes in potentia alias in virtute imaginativa solae non sufficient ad movendum intellectum possibilem*. The development of these conceptions deserve closer scrutiny.

*University of Copenhagen.*
AN ABUSIVE LETTER OF NICOLAS OF CLAIRVAUX
FOR A BISHOP OF AUXERRE, POSSIBLY BLESSED HUGH OF MÂCON

JOHN F. BENTON

The next to the last piece in the collected letters of Nicolas of Clairvaux in Berlin Ms. Philippps 1719 is a vigorous and scurrilous epistle which bears no rubric, heading or identification of sender or recipient. The references in the letter rule out the possibility that Nicolas wrote it in his own name, but since the collection contains many other letters which St. Bernard's well-known secretary wrote for other people, its presence here between two letters which are surely by Nicolas suggests that he wrote it in persona of someone else. Who this person might have been must be inferred from the text itself.

(A)ngelus tenebrarum nunquam cessat a fidelibus impugnandis, qui principem illorum persecutus est ad mortem crucis. Struit insidias de die in diem, et tali modo deponere membra nititur ne capiti suo per caritatis glutinum uniantur. Eregit istor antiquissimus serpens quosdam de capitulo Autusiodorensi et pessimos reddidit quos malignos inventit. Ad accusandam innocentiam meam nescitibus indigebat. Vidit lupos qui mentietantur oves in domo Dei. Introivit in eos Satanas. Insurrexerunt adversum me viri mendaces, qui gloriantur in malicia et potentes sunt in iniquitate. Agerem in eos de eorum enormitate, nisi puderet me dicere, vos audire. Quantis redundat illorum vita flagitiis, quam turbiter utrumque sexum libidinis imbre compluerint, transeo, pater, quoniam vobis notum est et totius populi aures...


1 The 13th-century manuscript is described by Valentin Rose, Verzeichnis der lateinischen Handschriften der kgl. Bibliothek zu Berlin, I, Die Merian-Handschriften des Sir Thomas Philipps (Berlin, 1893), 418-422. This letter, which is on fols. 117-117v., is published with the authorization of the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek in Berlin. I am grateful to Dr. Helmut Boese and Dr. Hans Lülfing for their assistance. For another letter in this collection see "Nicolas de Clairvaux à la recherche du vin d'Auxerre," Annales de Bourgogne, 24 (1962), 252-255. Giles Constable has made a fine study of Nicolas' early career in The Letters of Peter the Venerable (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 2, 316-330.

2 Philippians 2: 8.
3 John 13: 27.
4 Psalms 51: 3.
5 Ms. is corrupt; it appears to read either utrimque or utriusque.
6 Lacuna in Ms. (offenduntur?)
7 Isaiah 1: 2.
8 Psalms 11: 5.
9 Cf. Isaiah 29: 16.
sermonibus toxicatis. Filii Sathane sunt, vasa et instrumenta diaboli. Et tu, pater, bene legisti et intelligis, quia diabolus mendax est, et pater eius. 10

Verbum est impositum a quorundam detractorum malicia vestris auribus quod sores mec castitatem Deo promissam fregerunt ad amplexus illicitos ascendentes. Non debetis accedere sermoni talium, pater et domine, quorum lingua venenum evo-
mit, et in suis excessibus est felicia perturbare.

Iure consilium ab illo queritur a quo solet consilium in rebus arduis emanare.

Quod pie postulatur, iuste debet effectu mancipari.

Apud regem nostrum tantum evaluat quorundam suggestio toxicata quod G., quem amore complectiur diligenti, horribili fecit in carcere detineri. Eapropter actentius vos rogamus quatinus causa nostri vestra sedulitas sic laboret quod vestris praebus amicus noster a carcere liberetur.

Tradditis nobis priorem inutilém et nimis inhonestum qui, relicta cura cele sibi commisce, bona nostra deportat ad tribades. Et polluta frequens est incola lupanaris. Revocate pollutum hominem si vobis est placitum, ne per eum nostra religio diffa-
metur.

This letter clearly raises more questions than it answers. We learn that its sender was the dominius of some canons of Auxerre and that he had in fact made (creavi) them canons. Since the bishop of Auxerre held the right of appointment to canonries in the cathedral, we may conclude that the sender was bishop of that city. At the time of writing he was in conflict with these canons, who had, he said, accused him falsely and told lies about him. We also learn that he was responsible for some nuns who were accused of sexual laxity. He in turn denounced but could not replace a prior whose appointment was in the hands of the recipient of the letter, and for some reason he referred to the property of the cell or priory as “our” goods. The letter was written at a time when the king had just imprisoned someone named “G.”, and the sender believed that the recipient could influence the king to have “G.” released.

It is obvious that without external evidence, such as a letter which replies to this one, we cannot establish the sender, date or circumstances of this letter with certainty. There is, however, an historical setting into which the letter can be fitted neatly. Whether or not the situation about to be described is the actual setting of the letter, it seems at least to be a possible one.

Blessed Hugh of Maçon had a long and distinguished ecclesiastical career. He was one of the original 30 Burgundian nobles who entered Citeaux with St. Bernard in 1113, became the first abbot of Pontigny (1114-1136), and then served as bishop of Auxerre (1137-1151). 12 At the end of his life he provided both for the church of Auxerre and for his nephew, a canon of the cathedral, named Stephen. For Stephen he re instituted the office of provost of the cathedral chapter, a grant which was confirmed by the pope. 13 To the cathedral chapter he left rights of usage in a wood which the canons had long been trying to acquire, some very rich sacerdotal vestments, a gilded chalice, an annual income of 30 sous from the village of Lindry, and the church of

10 John 8: 46.
11 Ms. carcarem.
13 Gesta pontificum Austissiodorensium, ch. 55, in Migne, PL, 138, 299-300.
Lindry after the death or resignation of the incumbent. He also left an additional income of 10 sous for the use of the canons under the control of provost Stephen.  

The office of provost was the source of considerable trouble at Auxerre. Provost Ulgerius had opposed the election of Hugh of Montaigu, Hugh of Mâcon's predecessor; and when Hugh of Montaigu later had a chance to do so, he abolished the office and added its revenues to the income of the canons. When Hugh of Mâcon reestablished the office, he had to endow it with episcopal revenues which he could otherwise have left to the chapter. From the canons' point of view, Hugh's appointment of his nephew was not only an act of nepotism but a novelty paid for out of their revenues. Even after Stephen had passed from the scene they continued to oppose the office, and the provostship was finally abolished by Hugh's successor, Alan, who again added its revenues to the collective income of the canons. The appointment of Stephen split the chapter. According to a letter St. Bernard wrote not long after the bishop's death, Stephen's party consisted only of the cantor, the archdeacon, and the treasurer (whose incomes were probably separately funded), and one other canon, while 20 deacons and priests of the chapter were on the other side.  

Hugh of Mâcon died at Pontigny on 10 October 1151. St. Bernard wrote the pope that in the previous year when he had seemed to be on the point of death Hugh had granted the revenues of a church to his nephew. Bernard added that he had been informed on the best of authority that after Hugh recovered, he did not recognize what he had done. Whatever the truth of the charge that the bishop was out of his senses when he favored his nephew, we may conclude from this statement that sometime in the year before his death Hugh had begun to take steps to favor his nephew. Meeting resistance, he retired to friendly surroundings at Pontigny, taking his supporters with him. These circumstances would explain a mysterious note which Abbot Guichard of Pontigny wrote to Suger of St. Denis, recommending to him the treasurer of Auxerre, who was seeking Suger's support. Guichard ended by saying that since his own seal was not at hand, he would use that of the bishop of Auxerre.  

This story of Hugh and his nephew has been told in detail because it is usually recounted only on the basis of the letters of St. Bernard. Bernard found it hard to believe that such a saintly man as his old comrade could consciously commit nepotism, and he therefore explained to the pope that Hugh did not know what he was doing (cum in morte aliquantum stupidus esset et turbatus). Bernard declared that Stephen had made the bishop die practically intestate, leaving nothing or next to nothing to the poor and the churches. He specified that Stephen received the golden things in the bishop's

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16 Bernard wrote a series of letters to Pope Eugene and Cardinal Hugh of Ostia, first supporting the nephew of his departed friend and them, after hearing more of the story of the dissident canons, denouncing Stephen and withdrawing his approval. The three surviving letters, nos. 274-276 in Mabillon's edition (PL, 182, 480-482), are the basis of the statements credited to St. Bernard here and in the next three paragraphs.
personal property, his mounts, and seven churches and the tithes and fields in the bishop's woods. Of the legacy which Hugh actually left to the chapter Bernard said nothing, nor did he explain (what we must infer) that the income from the seven churches went to reestablish the provostship. While there is some exaggeration in Bernard's statement that Hugh had left next to nothing to the church, 30 or 40 sous and the expectation of one church must have seemed very little to the canons in comparison to what it took to endow Stephen's provostship.

Bernard placed all the blame for this unbalanced legacy on Stephen, saying that the bishop had been made to sin, and adding that "some people think" that Stephen had drawn up the will and sealed it. Perhaps the nephew did exercise improper influence on the old man, but the weight of the evidence does show that the bishop consciously favored his nephew. The author of the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium, who disapproved of the re-creation of the provostship, states clearly that Hugh was responsible and that the pope confirmed the appointment. Abbot Guichard's letter to Suger also indicates that Hugh and the treasurer were seeking support before January 1151. The story that his favoring of his nephew was the act of an unsound or senile mind probably originated with the aggrieved canons, rather than with Bernard himself. It shows how bitter the division in the chapter of Auxerre had become, and provides a motive for the bishop to write with outrage that his sons had risen up against him and were trying to tear apart his person.

If Hugh did conclude in the year before his death that some of his canons were insubordinate and malicious, he had the opportunity to ask an established stylist like Nicolas of Clairvaux to compose a letter which would express these feelings. In the winter of 1150-51 Nicolas was sent by St. Bernard to attend the bishop of Auxerre, and since Nicolas fell ill, he was away from Clairvaux longer than anticipated.18 This long visit with Hugh of Mâcon would have given Nicolas the occasion to he his temporary secretary.

The rest of the letter accords with what we know of Hugh of Mâcon's situation at the end of his life, though the references are so vague that no case can be built upon them. As bishop of Auxerre, Hugh held a position of oversight and authority over the nuns of Crisenon, who had been freed from the control of the monastery of Molesmes in 1140.19 This relationship would explain why the bishop could feel called upon to defend his "sisters" from criticism, particularly if he was addressing a monastic correspondent. In the year or two before his death Hugh was also in conflict with the prior of La Charité-sur-Loire. The foundation grant to La Charité was made in 1059 by the bishop of Auxerre, and the bishops continued to take a close interest in the priory, but the prior was named by the abbot of Cluny and was responsible to him.20 It is easy to understand how Hugh could become involved in the affairs of his oldest daughter of Cluny, both as bishop and because of his own experience as head of a monastery. In 1149 or 1150 the prior of La Charité wrote to Suger about the mistreatment he had received from Hugh, who had appropriated his tithes and churches, had seized and sold some of his cattle, and had incited the count of Nevers and Geoffroi of Donzy to attack him.21 This letter shows how Hugh could have considered that the

18 Ep. 265 (PL 182, 470). On the date see Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. Constable, 2, 324.
19 Gallia christiana, 12 (Paris, 1770), 425 and instr., col. 112 (Jaffé-Loewenfeld, no. 8104).
20 René de Lespinaise, Cartulaire du prieuré de la Charité-sur-Loire (Nevers and Paris, 1887), 1-3, 76-82.
21 Recueil des historiens, 15, 510. The letter is here dated 1149.
prior was wasting *bona nostra* and provides a motive for asking for his removal. If the author of the letter under consideration was not asking for the removal of the prior of La Charité-sur-Loire, he could have been.

The tissue of circumstantial evidence being wound around this letter would be greatly strengthened if it could be shown that in 1151 King Louis imprisoned a friend of Bishop Hugh’s named “G.” Unfortunately, the uncertainty of an initial can only be matched with other uncertain information. The most that can be said is that the mysterious reference may be related to the crisis at Saint-Denis after the death of Suger. This crisis brought the new abbot, Eudes of Deuil, into conflict with Suger’s nephew Simon and a number of the former abbot’s relatives and followers. The king became involved as an active supporter of Abbot Eudes, Suger’s biographer Guillaume of Saint-Denis was temporarily exiled to Aquitaine, and someone known only as “G.” met his death. St. Bernard wrote to the pope and Cardinal Hugh of Ostia on Eudes’ behalf and declared that he was not responsible for the death of “G.” Little can be built on such information, but it indicates a crisis which could have interested Hugh of Mâcon in 1151.22

If this letter was written for Hugh of Mâcon, to whom was it addressed? All we know is that the recipient was a leading ecclesiastic, addressed as *pater et dominus* and *sanctissimus pater*, that he was responsible for the appointment of the prior in question, that he was thought to have influence with the king, and that the sender felt that the recipient should listen to his side of the story rather than the canons. The reference to the prior suggests a monastic correspondent, and the names of three great abbots, all of whom could influence the king, come to mind: Peter of Cluny, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Suger of St. Denis. Peter’s authority over the prior of La Charité makes him the most likely candidate, and Suger’s death in early 1151 limits the likelihood that it was addressed to him.23 We may well never know.

Although this letter is so unspecific that it cannot tell us anything about affairs in the diocese of Auxerre which we did not already know, its text is evidence of what its author, almost certainly Nicolas of Clairvaux, thought was appropriate for a great churchman to send. When writing for himself, Nicolas made a practice of urbanity, gracefulness and elaborate flattery. This letter is unusual in expressing outrage and distress, its message is brutal and even offensive, and its tone is not one of supplication but indignation. For vigor of denunciation it matches or surpasses the most outspoken letters of its time, including the letter St. Bernard wrote to Pope Eugene denouncing Nicolas himself.24

The letter deals with three ecclesiastical matters, the conflict between the canons and their lord, the conflict with a prior, and the defense against the charge of faulty supervision of a nunnery. Strikingly, all three of these affairs are expressed through allegations of sexual misconduct. The insubordinate canons are not only treacherous, but they are engaged in a torrent of lechery, including homosexuality. The prior

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23 If Peter the Venerable was the recipient, the relatively unfriendly tone of the letter may have been in part the result of a conflict which Hugh and Peter had in 1148 over the church of Saint-Germain of Auxerre; see *Gall. christ.*, 12, instr., cols. 122-123 (Jaffé-Loewenfeld, no. 9259).

is not only wasting the goods of his church, but he is spending them on *tribades*, a word here oddly dredged out of the vocabulary of erotic insult, probably from Martial. And conversely, the charge of mismanagement which the sender has to face is that his sisters have broken their vows of chastity. Rather than deal directly with personal and ecclesiastical conflict, both the sender and his critics found it easier to circulate charges of sexual impurity and unnatural practice.

The letter may have been written to suit a sick and disturbed old man, but it had its interest for a wider audience in the twelfth century. If it was written by Nicolas of Clairvaux, it was probably he who kept a copy for the collection of letters made late in his lifetime. At some point in its transmission to us the author, collector or copyist discreetly removed all information which would allow us to be sure of the sender. The letter has come down to us in the form in which its copyist thought of it, not as the record of a particular historical circumstance but as a model of epistolary outrage and invective.

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WALTER OF WIMBORNE, O.F.M.: 
AN ANGLO-LATIN POET OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

A. G. Rigg

Walter of Wimborne was one of the major early English Franciscan writers; despite his importance his works have been neglected by all but a handful of scholars for more than six centuries. The purpose of this article is to present briefly the results of my recent investigations into his works and his identity. If my deductions are correct, Walter began his career as a member of the college of Secular Canons at Wimborne Minster, Dorset, where he seems to have been a schoolmaster. Probably through the proselytizing of the Salisbury Friars he became a member of the Franciscan Order; he went to Cambridge, where he was a lector in 1261-63, and finally settled at the Franciscan house in Norwich. He was the author of one long prose work and six major poems, three satirical and three religious; one of the religious poems is now lost.

The neglect which he has suffered has been the result partly of two minor confusions, over his name (forms in Wimb- or Wib-) and his date (given as both late thirteenth century, and ca. 1367); consequently, an unnecessary distinction has sometimes been made between Walter of Wimborne and a Walter Wiborn, and between two authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries respectively. His surname, however, was

1 Much of my work on Walter has been aided by a research grant from the Canada Council to whom I would like to express my thanks. I am grateful to Malcolm B. Parkes for his invaluable assistance in the dating of the manuscripts, and to Professors Leonard Boyle and Angus Cameron for their helpful advice and suggestions.

2 He was known to Leland and Bale, and through them to Willot, Pits, Leyser, Tanner, and Blomefield: John Leland, Commentarii de Scriptoribus Britannicis (Oxford, 1709), Ch. 331, p. 326; John Bale, Scriptorum illustrarium maioris Britanniae... Catalogus (Basel, 1557), Centuria sexta, XXIII, p. 468; id., Index Britanniae Scriptorum, ed. R. L. Poole, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Medieval and Modern Ser. 9 (Oxford, 1902), 111; Henry Willot, Athene orthodoxorum sodalitii Franciscani (Liège, 1598), 163-4; John Pits, Relationum historiarum de rebus anglicis, I (Paris, 1619), 500; Polycarp Leyser, Historia poetarum et poematum medii aevi (Halle, 1721), 2045-6; Thomas Tanner, Bibliotheca Britannica-Hibernica (London, 1748), 765; F. Blomefield, An essay towards a Topographical History of... Norfolk, 4 (London, 1806), 115. Only Leland and Bale seem to have had first-hand acquaintance with Walter's works.

The fullest modern account of Walter is given by Beryl Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, New York, 1960), 50-51, 365-8; see also A. B. Emden, Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500 (Cambridge, 1963), s. v. Wynbourne. For references to him in writings by A. G. Little, J. R. H. Moorman, F. J. E. Raby, and R. Woolf, see below. I give a brief anticipatory note of my investigations in my Glastonbury Miscellany of the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, 1968), 62-63. Miss Smalley and subsequent authorities credit Walter with the prose treatise on the four elements, the *Ave Virgo*, and the *Marie carmina*; no one, however, has previously recognized the poems *De Falpone*, *De Symonia*, or *De Mundi Vanitate* as Walter's works.
certainly Wimborne (indicated by forms with a nasal before the b, as opposed to Wib- spellings). In the thirteenth century Thomas of Eccleston called him W. de Wynbourne; and in the fourteenth century Holcot, quoting from the prose treatise (1), named him Wymborne; only one ancient authority, the manuscript of the *De Mundi Vanitate* (4), has a form lacking a nasal in the first syllable, being dedicated to the pueris Wyburnie. This poem, however, is certainly by the author of the *De Palpone* (2), who clearly came from Wimborne Minster, Dorset. The form without a nasal was introduced by Leland, who has Viburnus. Bale used forms both with and without m in his *Index*; but in his printed *Catalogus* used only Viiburnus, Wiiburne. Willot’s *Viiburne* is evidently a misreading of Bale’s *Viburnus*. Pits noted, on what authority I do not know, “Viiburnum ali vacant”, and since then the alternative forms have usually been given. No date was given to Walter before Pits inexplicably affirmed “claruit... 1367”; this date was adopted by Leyser (who added 1366 as an alternative !, Tanner, and Blomefield.

This combination of errors was passed on to modern scholarship when Dreves ascribed the poem *Ave Virgo* (5) to “Gualterus Viburnus... nach 1367?”; Raby for instance, made no connection between the author of the *Ave Virgo* and the Walter of Wimborne who wrote the *De Palpone*; Little, citing both of Raby’s references as well as the usual early authorities, asserts that “there were two writers of the same name”; Moorman states that the Cambridge lector of the thirteenth century “must not be confused with Walter Wiburn or Wimburn, O.F.M., who wrote poems about a century later.” Only Miss Smalley, followed by Emend, saw the truth when she suggested that the bibliographers “cut Wimborne in half, ascribing the verses to a fourteenth century namesake who may not have existed at all.” Once we remove the form *Wiburn*, introduced by Leland, and the date 1367, introduced by Pits, three seemingly distinct Franciscan friars turn out to have the same name and the same date. I hope that it will emerge in the following account of the works that there is a good case for the identification of all three as the same man.

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4 Smalley, *op. cit.*, 366. Numbers in parentheses refer to the section on *Works* below.

5 He ascribed the *Marie carmina* (6) to Gualtherus Wiburne, the prose treatise (1) to Gualtherus Wymburne; in his *Catalogus* he brought both entries together.

6 See note 19 below.


11 It may be wondered whether Pits, who gives the alternative form *Viiburnum* (not in Leland, Willot, or Bale’s *Catalogus*) and the date 1367, had access to some other source, but as far as I know he used only Leland and Willot (both of whom he acknowledged) and Bale’s *Catalogus* (which, according to his usual custom, he did not acknowledge). He certainly used the latter, as he cites (incorrectly) the *incipits* of the poems which are in neither Leland nor Willot, and he professes to “guess” that Walter came from Norwich.
WALTER OF WIMBORNE

WORKS

1) Tractatus moralis super quatuor elementa.

    Inc. Pulsante fratrum instantia qui me dormitantem...
    Expl. ... somnus est comes motus.

This prose treatise is extant only in Cambridge Univ. Lib. MS I.2.27 (s. xiv), ff. 1r-107v; the manuscript bears a Norwich pressmark.12 Quotations from the work were made in the fourteenth century by Holcot (who names the author Wymborne) and Lathbury.13 It was ascribed to Walter of Wimborne by Bale, who had probably seen this manuscript. Bale names it the Proprietates terrae, perhaps having read the first section only; to this title derivative scholars (of whom Willott was the first, followed by Pits) added the word sanctae, thus indicating that they had not seen the work.14 The treatise interprets each of the four elements in turn, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, using all levels of exegesis, literal, typological, moral, and analogical; its authorities include Martianus, Macrobius, Isidore, and Remigius.

2) De Palpone et Assentatore.15

This poem is extant in two versions:

A. Inc. Multi mortalium in mundi stadio16
    Brit. Mus., Cotton Vespasian E. x (s. xiv), ff. 88v-100v;

B. Inc. In aula veritas est pestilencia17
    Corpus Christi Coll., Cambridge, MS 450 (s. xi), ff. 64r-65r.

The A-text consists of 200 quatrains, the B-text of 34 quatrains, two of which are not in the A-text. The poem, which is in rhythmical asclepiads,18 deals with the various manifestations of Flattery, especially at court. In the A-text only the poet names himself Gauterus; he prays to St. Cuthburga, patron saint of the abbey church at Wimborne, and hopes that Flattery will stay away from Wimborne. He dedicates the poem to the boys of Wimborne, and especially to the rex tener; Wright conjectured that this referred to Henry III during his minority (1216-23), but the reference may equally well be to the Christ-child, as a date before 1223 stretches Walter’s career beyond likely limits.

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12 N. R. Ker, Medieval Libraries of Great Britain, 2nd ed. (London, 1964), 136. The manuscript was not known to Miss Smalley, but it is now recorded by Emden, B.R.U.C., loc. cit.
14 For example, Blomefield, op. cit., says that Walter wrote “a history or treatise of the properties of the Holy Land.”
16 H. Walther, Initia carminum ac versuum medii aevi posteriores latinorum (Göttingen, 1939), No. 11382.
17 Walther, No. 8827. The manuscript is associated with Durham; the fourth quire, which includes this poem, consists mainly of “Goliardic” material.
3) De Symoia et Avaritia

Inc. Relatu plurium interdum audio.

Extant only in Trinity College, Cambridge, MS 0.9.38 (s. xv), ff. 29r-36v. This poem, also in rhythmical asclepiads, consists of 209 quatrains. The first 54 deal with the theme of Avarice; the remainder of the poem concerns Death, which even wealth is unable to overcome. The poem is not "signed", but the attribution seems to me almost certain: the poet states that there are two evils which especially afflict the world, Greed and Flattery,

Sed de palponibus hic nichil cudimus
de quibus alias diffuse scripsumus.

I take these lines to refer to the De Pulpone, to which this poem is remarkably similar: the two poems share many common expressions, similar vocabulary, and a frequent usage of the same rhetorical devices, especially anaphora.

4) De Mundi Vanitate.

Inc. Mundi volo vanitatem
et fortune levitatem
breviter describere.

This poem is extant in two versions:

A. Corpus Christi Coll., Oxford, MS 232 (ca. 1300), ff. 77v-81r;
B. Cambridge Univ. Lib., MS Dd. 4.35 (s. xv), ff. 46v-48r.

The A-text has 154 stanzas of six lines each, in the metre of the regular Victorine sequence; the B-text has 66 half stanzas, following the same order as the A-text and taken from different sections of it. The A-text is dedicated to the aieris Wiburnie; it is thematically and structurally very similar to the De Symonia; the first 124 stanzas deal with the corruption of society caused by Avarice (and to some extent by Flattery), and the poem concludes with an account of the inevitability of death.

5) Ave Virgo Mater Christi.

This poem is also in the metre of the Victorine sequence; there are two very distinct versions:

A. Inc. Ave virgo mater Christi
que pudore meruisti
dici fenix virginit.

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20 Walther, No. 16560: Walther misread Relatu as Relatum.
21 Walther, No. 11438; U. Chevalier, Repertorium hymnologicum, 5 vols. (Louvain, 1892-1921), No. 11792. The poem has never been edited. The title is mine.
22 Chevalier, No. 2225. Edited from the A-text only by G. M. Dreves, Analecta hymnica 50 (Leipzig, 1907), 630-43. Dreves knew of the version in the Digby MS but did not attempt to compare the variants. See also Raby, Christian Latin Poetry, 455, Smalley, op. cit., 50; Dreves in-
Corpus Christi Col., Oxford, MS 232 (ca. 1300), ff. 73r-77r;

B. Three poems, Bodley, Digby MS 19 (ca. 1300), ff. 72r-75r.

The two versions share over 140 stanzas in common. The A-text has 162 stanzas; the B-text represents a total reworking of the poem: each of the three poems has fifty stanzas; all the stanzas of the first poem begin with Ave, of the second with Salve, and of the third with Gaude. There is no autobiographical information in the poems of the B-text, but in the A-text the poet names himself Gauterus, and calls himself *fex et alga cleri, minorumque scoria*, that is, he was a Franciscan. This self-description, and the fact that the A-text precedes the *De Mundi Vanitate* in the Corpus (Oxford) manuscript, provide the reason for the ascription of the poem (or the A-text of it) to Walter of Wimborne. I regard this as the least certain of the attributions. The poem celebrates the Virgin, utilizing a great deal of traditional and novel symbolism; there is no semblance of organization or order in the A-text, and the B-text depends for its order simply on the *Ave, Salve, Gaude* openings to each of its stanzas.

6) *Marie carmina.*

This also is extant in two versions:

A. *Inc. Marie carmina quondam exametra*

Bodley, Laud misc. 368 (this part s. xv), ff. 203r-216r;

B. *Inc. Pone scribencium tot esse milia*

Brit. Mus., Cotton Titus A. xx (s. xiv-xv), ff. 171v-175r.

The poems is in rhythmical asclepiads. The A-text consists of 644 quatrains, the B-text of 144 quatrains (two of which are not in the Bodley version). In neither version does the poet give any indication of his identity, but the A-text (i.e. a poem with

advertently omitted two stanzas. When this article was already with the printer, I discovered that part of the A-text is contained in Bodley MS 851 (S.C. 3041, ss. xiv|xv), ff. 78r-80r. The fragment begins, after some lost leaves, about halfway through the poem.

The poems are the sole contents of the last gathering in the manuscript; the leaves of this gathering have been misplaced, so that the division into three poems is not immediately clear. Chevalier records the second poem as No. 17880, but his No. 18121 is in fact the opening of a stanza in the middle of the second poem. The misordering of the leaves has not been noticed before.

The *Ave Virgo* and the *De Mundi Vanitate* were originally the sole contents of the seventh quire of this manuscript.

23 Edited from the B-text only by T. Wright, *Poems commonly attributed to Walter Mapes*, 191-207. Wright (Introduction, p. xv) noted the similarity in style between this poem and the *De Pulpone*.

24 Walther, No. 10699; Smalley, *op. cit.*, 50-51. That this poem is simply a long version of the B-text has previously been noticed only by Rosemary Woolf, *English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1968), 131-2 and n. 6. The manuscript is certainly a Durham book. It consists of two originally separate parts: Part II (in which this poem is contained) consists of devotional poems, mainly by John of Hoveden — the group of poems is "framed" by the Nightingale poems of Hoveden and John Peckam. The scribe of the poem has made annotations in Part I (which includes Peter of Blois' *De Anticitia*), and was probably responsible for binding both parts together.

25 Walther, No. 14232. Bale, *Index*, p. 110, attributes the poem to Walter Mapes, and is followed in this by Leyser, 787, who refers it to the now lost MS Cotton Vitellius D. VIII.
the *incipit* of the A-text) was confidently attributed to Walter of Wimborne by Bale, who had probably seen the Bodley version of it in Leland’s library. The style and contents fully confirm Bale’s attribution. The first 214 stanzas celebrate the Virgin in general terms and with some very elaborate images; the remainder of the poem is a recreation of the life of Christ, during which the poet represents himself as an eyewitness and sometimes an active participant. The B-text follows the same order of description and narrative, but omits one important transitional stanza.

7) *Encomium Christiflorae Virginis* (lost).

The evidence for this lost hexameter poem is to be found in the opening lines of the *Marie carmina*, in which the poet says that he once wrote a hexameter poem in praise of the Virgin, and in Leland’s testimony, “*Encomium Christiflorae Virginis* carmine cecinit hexametro, illo saeculo plane non contemnendo.” It is possible that Leland was simply making an inference from the opening stanza of the *Marie carmina*, but his somewhat patronizing praise of it suggests that he had in fact seen the hexameter poem.

The argument for these attributions may be briefly summarized:

(a) the prose *Tractatus moralis* (1): ascribed by Holcot to Wyborne, and by Bale to Gualtherius Wyburne, Minorita, doctor; Bale, who ascribed the poem *Marie carmina* (6) to Gualtherius Wyburne, claimed to have seen both the *Tractatus* and the *Marie carmina* as well as some other poems, and in fact in his *Catalogus* he identifies the authors of both these works under the heading *V(ulgaris)burnum*.

(b) *De Palpone* (2): signed by a Walter of Wimborne.

(c) *De Synonia* (3): refers to an earlier work probably identifiable with the *De Palpone*.

(d) *De Mundi Vanitate* (4): thematically and structurally very similar to the *De Synonia*, and dedicated to the *pueris Wyburnie*.

(e) *Ave Virgo* (5): precedes the *De Mundi Vanitate* in the Oxford manuscript; the author names himself Walter and a Minorite.

(f) Striking similarities between all five poems, especially Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 6. Features of his style may be seen readily in the texts of the *De Palpone* and the *Marie carmina* (B-text) printed by Wright. The most striking is anaphora, the repetition of the opening phrase of a line or stanza; similar repetitions, sometimes of whole lines, are used to form a refrain pattern. The same phrases, in all positions, recur through several poems. Frequent use is made of the topoi of Modesty, *impossibilita*, and Inexpressibility. Other especially common stylistic devices include alliteration, asyndeton, word-play, and the use of newly formed diminutives.

**Life**

Walter’s early connection with Wimborne Minster is evident from the *De Palpone* and the *De Mundi Vanitate*: he was presumably a member of the college of Secular Canons which had been there possibly since the time of Edward the Confessor.28 The interest in the boys of Wimborne (and in the *De Palpone* his emphasis on corporal punishment) suggest that he may have been a schoolmaster: the exotic voca-

WALTER OF WIMBORNE

bulary of the *De Paipone* and the *De Symonia* may have been intended for pedagogic purposes. He was probably recruited to the Franciscan Order while still at Wimborne. The newly arrived Franciscans had many connections with Wimborne: they reached Salisbury sometime between 1225 and 1228, and in 1243 there were 20 friars there. Among the relics at Wimborne were "some of the clothes of St. Francis, his hairs and hairshirt." Eccleston records a Franciscan named Symon de Wymborne, and it was common for recruits to the Order to be surname after the place from which they came. A parallel history to Walter's may be seen in John of Winchelsey, D.D., Canon of Salisbury, who entered the Minorite Order at Salisbury, but died within a year, 1325 or 1327, while still a novice.

Walter is next mentioned as the eighth Franciscan lector at the University of Cambridge in 1261-63 (or 1263-66), and seems finally to have settled at the Franciscan house at Norwich. It was at Norwich that Bale had seen his works, and the one extant text of the *Tractatus moralis* is in a Norwich book.

It remains to indicate broadly the nature of the poems. Nothing further needs to be said about the two poems which are already available in print, the *De Paipone* and the *Ave Virgo*. The *De Symonia* is very similar to the *De Paipone*: it denounces Avarice as the corrupting factor in society; the sin of Judas has been reborn and has infected the whole world. In the presence of Avarice (as of Flattery) Truth must yield and go into exile; Death, however, triumphs over any wealth or power, and makes all men and women equal; therefore we should repent now, for in life we are in the midst of Death. The proximity of the *De Symonia* is shared by the *De Mundi Vanitati*, which also emphasizes the overwhelming power of money, especially in the law-courts, from which Truth must retire. Although the two poems are in very different metres, they share many expressions and rhetorical devices. The B-text of the *Marie carmina* is available in print, and gives a useful outline of the poem, but it must be remembered that the A-text is 200 lines longer. It is the most successfully organized of the poems: the first 214 quatrains are very repetitive and random in their praise of the Virgin and paradoxes of the Virgin Birth, but the remainder of the poem follows a clear narrative pattern. The section on the life of Christ is divided roughly in two, the Nativity and Early Life, and the Conspiracy and Passion. The themes are expanded by long and elaborate digressions; for instance, when the young Christ stays behind

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21 Little, *op. cit.*, ed. Little, p. 58, "8us frater W. de Wynbourne"; the date is arrived at by dividing the number of lectors into the time available. The later date is given by Moorman, *op. cit*.
22 Bale (*Catalogus*) lists the prose treatise (1), the *Marie carmina* (6), the hexameter *Encomium Christi parae* (7) and a single book containing *Carmina diversi generis*. He notes "ego in Nordouencis monachorum bibliotheca praeert haec nulla vidi"; in the *Index*, however, he refers to the *Marie carmina* as "ex bibliotheca eiusdem (Lelandi)." Bale found other Franciscan books in the Norwich Cathedral Library (see his *Index*, 371), and listed a work by John of Hoveden as "ex Minoritis Nordouici" (*Index*, 220). I have investigated all the sources known to me for the contents of Norwich libraries, and have found no other references to Walter or his works.
in the Temple to the dismay of his parents, Walter presents a case against Him in the Court of Christ’s Clemency; Christ’s willing subjection to his parents is the opportunity for a long denunciation of all kinds of Pride — several of these sections resemble parts of the *De Symonia*; at the Crucifixion, Walter intervenes in the action in person, by slaying the carpenter who made the Cross, and denounces all the various elements which have contributed to the manufacture of the Cross; the Judgement of Pilate is the occasion for an analysis of the legal deficiencies of the judgement; finally, the scene of the Crucifixion itself provides Walter with the opportunity for a long plea to Christ to have mercy on his Mother.

I hope that when all the poems are available in print Walter may take his place among the significant Anglo-Latin Franciscan poets of the Middle Ages. In his poems to the Virgin he is very close to the sentiments and style of Peckam and Hoveden. The satirical poems may have been written before he became a Franciscan: both the *De Palpone* and the *De Mundi Vanitate* mention Wimborne, and may have been written while he was still there; the *De Symonia* is almost the sister-poem of the *De Palpone*. In the religious poems it is possible that we see the changing style and interests of Walter as his religious feelings were redirected on his recruitment to the Franciscan Order.

*University of Toronto.*
"HWYRFTUM SCRĪPĀÐ": BEOWULF, LINE 163

THOMAS D. HILL

In an important series of articles in Anglia, Fr. Klaeber discussed the patristic and Biblical antecedents of the pervasive Christian imagery in Beowulf.¹ In this paper I should like to discuss the provenance and meaning of an image which Klaeber did not discuss, but which derives, I believe, from a specific Biblical verse and the tradition of patristic commentary upon it. In the beginning of Beowulf the poet tells how Grendel persecuted the Danes for “XII wintra tid” and describes Grendel’s habitat in the following terms:

ac se æglæca ehtende wæs,
dœorc deæpscæa, duguðe ond geogoðe,
seomade ond syrzde, sinnihæte heóld
mistige moras; men ne cunnon
hwyrder helrunan hwyrftum scrīpāð. (159-163)²

The final line of the passage is marvelously suggestive; but for the most part critics and editors have been concerned with the hapax legomenon “helrunan”, which presumably means something like “hellish mysterious ones” and have not seriously concerned themselves with the phrase “hwyrftum scrīpāð”. Thus Klaeber remarks hwyrftum merely amplifies scrīpāð ‘go’ (moving).³ The verb scrīban consistently implies continual motion and is sometimes translated “glide” whereas hwyrfti ordinarily means “circle” or “circuit”. Thus a literal translation of lines 162-163 might be something like “men know not where hellish mysterious creatures move on in circles”.

The phrase “hwyrftum scrīpāð” also occurs in the O. E. poem Christ and Satan, in which the poet describes the process of judgment. After Christ dismisses the damned then,

Sona æfter þæm wordum weorlæ gæstas,
hæl hæftas, hwyrftum scrīpāð
þæsendumælum, and þider leaðāð
in þet sceadæna scræf, scufāð to grunde
in þet nearwe nið... (628-632)

Thus in two Old English poems the phrase “hwyrftum scrīpāð” occurs in the context of the punishment of sinners — since both the “helrunan” and the “weorlæ gæstas” are clearly among the lost.

² All quotations of Anglo-Saxon poetry are from the ASPR by line numbers.
The fundamental reason why it has been assumed that the phrase in question must mean something like “go moving on” is that no one has been able to discern any very specific significance for the literal meaning of this phrase. But I would suggest that when the O. E. poets describe how the “helruman” and the “werigega stas” move on in circles, both poets were alluding to the first clause of Psalm 11:9, “Impii in circuitu ambulant” and to traditional exegesis of this text. The Latin phrase and the half line are really quite similar; an immediate gloss for $hwyrf$ is $circitus$ and in The Vespasian Psalter, for example, the first clause of Psalm 11:9 is translated “in ymbhwyrfte $da$ arleasan gongað”.4

The tradition of commentary on this verse strengthens the argument that the Old English poets were consciously alluding to Psalm 11:9 in that the commentators consistently take the ceaseless circular movement of the “impii” as an emblem of their spiritual condition. Thus Augustine comments on Psalm 11:9 in the following terms:

In circuitu impii ambulant: id est, in temporaliun rerum cupiditate, quae septem dierum repetito circuitu, tanquam rota voluitur; et ideo non pervenit in octavum, id est in aeternum, pro quo iste psalmus titulatus est. Ita et per Salomonem dicitur: Ventilator enim est impiorum rex septentes, et immittit illis rotam malorum (Prov. XX, 26).5

Augustine returns to this image in commenting on Psalm 139:10

Caput circuitus eorum: ipsa est superbia. Quis est, circuitus ipsorum? Ut circumcitant, et non stent; in gyram eant erroris, ubi inter est sine fine. Quis enim in longum it, alicunde incipit, alicubi finit: qui in gyram it, nusquam finit. Ipsa est labor impiorum, qui demonstratur in alio psalmio evidentius: In circuitu impii ambulant (Psal. XI, 9).6

Gregory in discussing the dialogue between God and Satan at the beginning of the book of Job — “Unde venis?” Qui respondens ait: “Circaui terram et perambulavi eam” (Job 2:3) — also take circular motion in this context as an image of the ceaseless, pointless toil of the wicked which can never end, precisely because its object is unobtainable.

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4 Sherman M. Kuhn ed., The Vespasian Psalter (Ann Arbor, 1965). While a summary of the Old English psalter gloss tradition on this verse is unnecessary at this point, I have consulted the accessible glosses, which are for the most part similar in their phrasing to the Vespasian Psalter.

5 Enarrationes in Psalmos, PL 36, 139. Cf. also Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XII, 12-17, PL 41, 359-367.

6 Ibid., PL 37, 1810-11. Note that Cassiodorus in his commentary on Psalms expounds Psalm 11:9 in essentially the same terms:

Dicit enim sub brevisima sententia: In circuitu impios ambulare; ut nunquam ad rectam posint semitam pervenire. Tortuosae siquidem viae mulie semper moribus applicatur, sicut Solomon de impiis dicit: Dereliquerunt viae rectas, ut ambularent in viae pravas (Prov. II, 13). Et ideo pervenire ad requiem octvae diei nequenunt, qui rotarum more in qua semper terga vertuntur (PL 70, 99).

See also Nothers' translation and comment which briefly summarizes the traditions: “Incircuittu impii ambulan: Die argen gant umbe. uuanda sie niomer daner neigerhent ad requiem octau diei [the Latin glossed as ze dero rauo des ahtodin tages]. Sie uuellen temporalia [glossed as Zit- fristigdo dlinc], nals eterna [glossed as eeuigiu].” Die Schriften Nothers, ed. Paul Piper (Freiburg und Tübingen, 1883) II, 34.
Solet per gyrum circuitus, laboris anxietas designari. Satan ergo laborans terram circuitivit, quia quietus in coeli culmine stare contemptus. Cumque se non volasse, sed perambulasse insinuat, quanto peccati pandere in imis prematur, demonstrat. Perambulans ergo terram circuitivit; quia ab illo spiritualis potentiae volatu corruens, malitiae suae pressus gravedine, foras ad gyram laboris venit. Hinc est enim quod et de ejus membris per Psalmistam dictur:

**In circuitu impii ambulant** (Psal. XI, 9); quia dum interiora non appetunt, in exteriorum labore fatigantur.⁷

The point of these quotations, then, is that there existed a tradition of commentary on the verse “impii in circuitu ambulant” and that in terms of this tradition the circular movement of the “impii” is an emblem of their condition and one which suggests a definition of it. In Augustinian terms, all men desire the good but human desire cannot content itself with anything less than an infinite good. Thus, as Augustine says in the *Confessions*, our hearts are unquiet until they rest in God.⁸ The wicked — the “impii” — are men who have cut them selves off from the hope of an eternal good and who attempt to find final satisfaction in “temporalia”. But this attempt is hopeless and as a result the “impii” are attempting to achieve the impossible.

While Klaeber and various other editors and lexicographers have suggested that the phrase “hwyrfum scripāð” in *Beowulf* and *Christ and Satan* does not bear any very specific meaning, their comments on the phrase were necessarily somewhat tentative. In terms of the tradition of commentary on Psalm 11: 9 I have outlined, the half-line “hwyrfum scripāð” is meaningful in its context; and while the relevance of patristic exegesis to Old English poetry is still disputed to some degree, both the prominence of the Psalms and Psalm commentary in the religious life of Anglo-Saxon England,⁹ and the generally accepted fact that the poets with whom we are concerned exhibit a considerable breadth of Christian learning make it unlikely that the appropriateness of this image to its context is merely fortuitous.

_Cornell University._

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⁸ *Confessions* 3, 1, PL 32, 661.

⁹ Thus there are thirteen psalters containing an Old English gloss and the Paris manuscript (Bibliothèque Nationale Paris, fonds latin 8824) contains a prose translation of psalms 1-50 and a verse translation of psalms 51-150. The Benedictine rule (chapter 18) requires the repetition of the entire psalter every week and memorization of the psalter of various psalms was a common religious exercise. I would argue that an educated Anglo-Saxon Christian would in all probability know his psalms very well indeed and that the language and imagery of the psalter would be as familiar to him as that of the best known passages of the gospels. For the currency and accessibility of the various commentaries I have cited, see D. A. Ogilvy, *Books Known to the English 937-1066* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) p. 85; pp. 152-153; p. 108.
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