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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Virtus essendi .................................................. 1
Etienne Gilson

Une "Admonitio Synodalis" de l'époque carolingienne: Étude critique et Édition ......................... 12
Robert Amiet

The "Analytics" and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure .............................................................. 83
Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

The "De contemptu mundi" of Bernardus Morvalensis — Book Two: A Study in Commonplace .............. 109
George J. Engelhardt

Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early fourteenth Century ................................. 143
James A. Weisheipl, O.P.

Financial Activities of the Estates of Poitou .......................................................... 186
Joseph M. Tyrrell

William Flete’s "De Remediis contra Temptaciones" in its Latin and English Recensions: The Growth of a Text .......................................................... 210
Benedict Hackett, O.S.A., Eric Colledge, Noel Chadwick

Religious Despair in Mediaeval Literature and Art ................................................................. 231
Arieh Sachs

The "Insolubilia" of Roger Nottingham O.F.M.......................................................... 257
Edward A. Synan

Thierry of Chartres and Dominicus Gundissalinus ............................................................. 271
Nicholas M. Haring, S.A.C.

Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause ................................................ 287
William Dunphy

Godfrey of Fontaines' Abridgement of Boetius of Dacia's "Quaestiones supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis" ............................... 302
Bruce Braswell
The Function of the Martyrology of Tallaght

An Ambry of 1299 at San Clemente, Rome

A propos du dicton "Clastrum sine armario, quasi castrum sine armamentario"

Pierre d'Ailly and Papal Infallibility

The Old English "Seasons of Fasting"

Constantine-Cyril and the Basilica of San Clemente, Rome

Guillaume de Conches and the Elements: Homiomeria und Organica

John Hennig 315
Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. 329
Hubert Silvestre 351
Francis Oakley 353
P. E. Heyworth 358
Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. 359
Theodore Silverstein 363
Virtus Essendi

ETIENNE GILSON

On rencontre parfois dans les écrits de saint Thomas d'Aquin l'expression *virius essendi, virtutem essendi*. Les lexiques de sa langue que nous connaissons ne semblent pas l'avoir relevée. Le R.P. L.-B. Geiger, O.P. a récemment attiré l'attention sur elle. Il montrait en même temps quel intérêt présenterait son étude : "Aristote s'était contenté... de poser au-dessus des êtres *mobiles*, des substances *immobiles* et éternelles. Saint Thomas approfondit cette manière de voir en mettant en évidence une sorte d'intensité croissante ou de perfection, en quelque sorte qualitative, de l'actus *essendi*. Une étude de son vocabulaire, à cet égard, serait des plus révélatrices. L'esse comporte une *virtus*, une *perfectio* qui va croissant à mesure qu'on s'élève dans l'échelle des êtres (idée qui eût sans doute paru inintelligible à Aristote)."¹

Si l'on s'en tient à l'expression même, elle ne semble pas être née d'un approfondissement de la doctrine aristotélicienne de l'être. Saint Thomas l'a rencontrée toute faite dans la traduction latine du traité des *Noms divins*, œuvre de l'auteur que nous connaissons sous le nom de Denis l'Aréopagite. Denis y nomme l'αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι δύναμιν. L'expression s'y applique à Dieu conçu comme ayant, et pré-ayant, en soi toute vertu. Il est remarquable que cette vertu, ou énergie, est entendue par Denis lui-même, comme saint Thomas le fera après lui, en un sens causal. Dieu a en soi toute vertu, en tant qu'il est *praehabens et superhabens* la vertu ou énergie en question. Dieu produit donc tout en tant qu'il est une vertu sans fin et sans limite, spécialement en tant qu'il est cause particulière et universelle produisant la vertu d'être. Dans le langage de la traduction latine, que saint Thomas aura soin d'incorporer au sien, l'effet en question est *ipsius quod est esse virtutem* ; littéralement : la vertu de cela même qui est l'être.² Il semble donc que

On ne trouvera pas ici l'étude désirée, qui mettrait d'ailleurs en cause l'interprétation d'ensemble des doctrines de Saint Thomas et d'Aristote, mais ayant dès longtemps noté quelques expressions de ce genre, j'ai pensé qu'il ne serait pas inutile de les publier, en y joignant les réflexions que leur rapprochement me suggère.

l'être même soit la virtus ou dunamis en question. Cette interprétation est confirmée par une remarque faite quelques lignes plus loin. Denis spécifie que, si l'on peut dire, même l'être ne tient sa vertu ou son pouvoir d'être, que de la vertu qui est au-dessus de l'être: τὸ εἶναι δύναμιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἕχει παρὰ τῆς ὑπέρονοιον δύναμεος.

La traduction latine donne ici: "et ipsum etiam esse, si fas est dicere, virtutem ad hoc quod sit, habet a supersubstantiali virtute." A quoi saint Thomas ajoute ce commentaire personnel, qui renforce la signification causale de l'expression: "Et dicit, si fas est dicere, quia non sic propris dicitur quod esse sit, sed quod per esse, aliquid sit." L'être tient la vertu (ou le pouvoir, ou l'énergie) d'être, de la vertu (ou pouvoir, ou énergie) qui est au-dessus de l'être. La traduction latine qui rend super-étre par supersubstantialis risque d'égarter le lecteur. Le sens du texte de Denis est que la vertu d'être, dont jouit tout ce qui est, lui vient d'une vertu qui est au-dessus de l'être, ou, comme nous dirions aujourd'hui, qui le transcende.

Tel semble avoir été la formule et la notion dont saint Thomas a recueilli l'héritage. Il a conservé l'un et l'autre avec leur sens original. Cette manière de faire s'accordait d'ailleurs avec le rôle qu'il semble s'être attribué: rassembler et ordonner en une synthèse unique la totalité de la tradition théologique chrétienne. A ce niveau, Thomas recueille telle quelle la vue générale de Denis, que Dieu a tout ce qu'ont les autres êtres, en tant qu'il est la cause en vertu de laquelle ils le possèdent. Dieu a tout ce qu'ils ont, comme étant cause qu'ils l'ont. Et cela est vrai de l'être même. En effet, dit Denis au ch. V, § 4, "Dieu n'est pas étant d'une certaine manière, mais il l'est simplement et sans limitation, comme ayant reçu et pré-reçu en soi-même l'être tout entier."

Le commentaire que saint Thomas donne de ce passage est sans doute le meilleur qu'il nous ait laissé sur la notion de "vertu d'être". Il est d'autant plus intéressant que l'expression n'est pas dans le texte; c'est saint Thomas qui l'introduit dans le commentaire, pour dire que ce qu'elle signifie est exactement ceci, que Dieu est l'être même sans aucune qualification et, par conséquent, sans aucune limitation. Être l'être pur et simple, c'est avoir toute la virtutem essendi.

Mais écoutons saint Thomas lui-même commentant Denis. Selon lui, le sens de la phrase est que tout appartient à Dieu d'une certaine manière, et que tout ce qui convient à un être particulier lui convient

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3 Denis, op. cit., § 334.
4 Denis, op. cit., commentaire de saint Thomas, cap. V, lectio I, § 629.

Partons du principe bien connu que tout ce qui est reçu dans un sujet y est reçu selon la nature du récipient. Cela s’applique aux formes. Toute forme reçue dans un sujet s’y trouve limitée et finie à la mesure du récipient. De soi, le ‘blanc’ est illimité, mais si elle est reçue dans un corps particulier, elle y devient la blancheur d’un corps blanc; elle se trouve limitée à son étendue, plus grande s’il est plus grand, plus petite s’il est plus petit. Ce corps n’a donc pas la blancheur totale, celle dont le blanc pris en soi (s’il existait) serait capable. Pour exprimer cette restriction, Thomas dit que l’objet en question n’est pas aussi blanc que la blancheur peut l’être: “non habet totam albedinem secundum totum posse albedinis.” Tel ne serait pas le cas de la blancheur en soi: “S’il y avait une blancheur séparée, rien ne lui ferait défaut de ce qui appartient à la vertu de la blancheur.” En d’autres termes, il serait aussi blanc que le blanc peut l’être; il serait absolument et intégralement blanc. La traduction est gauche, mais *virtus* traduit *dynamis* et ce mot grec lui-même n’est pas clair. Peut-être la réalité qu’il veut désigner est-elle obscure. Le grec *dynamis* suggère pour nous la notion de *dynamique*, de *dynamisme*, bref de force ou d’énergie, et nous ne penserions pas aujourd’hui à la blancheur comme à une force ou énergie de ce genre. A quoi pensait Denis lui-même en employant cette expression? Il est bien difficile de le préciser. Quoi qu’il en soit, saint Thomas lui-même, qui commentait ici Denis, ne pouvait que suivre son langage. C’est ce qu’il fait: “Sed si esset albedo separata, nihil de esse at quod ad virtutem albedinis pertineret.” Il parle donc de la blancheur comme d’une qualité qui peut être plus ou moins étendue, plus ou moins grande, plus ou moins limitée. La *virtus albedinis*, le *posse albedinis* est donc la blancheur elle-même prise soit comme le Blanc absolu, soit dans un degré quelconque de limitation; ce *posse* est moins un pouvoir qu’une possibilité formelle.

Les choses créées ne possédant qu’un être reçu selon la limitation de leurs essences, elles ne le reçoivent que comme les corps blancs reçoivent la blancheur. Elles ne possèdent donc pas l’être dans toute sa force: “non habent esse secundum totam virtutem essendi.” Aucune d’elles n’est tout ce que l’être peut être. Mais alors qu’il n’existe pas de blanc en soi et séparé, il existe un être en soi et séparé. Ou plutôt, ce n’est pas un être, c’est alors l’être. Dieu seul, qui est l’être même subsistant, possède l’être selon toute la possibilité de l’être: “solus Deus, qui est ipsum esse subsistens, secundum totam virtutem essendi esse habet.” C’est, continue Thomas, ce que dit Denis dans les mots que
nous commentons: "que Dieu peut être cause que toutes choses soient, parce que lui-même n'est pas existant d'une certaine manière, c'est-à-dire selon quelque mode fini et limité, mais qu'il a reçu,\(^5\) ou pré-reçu en soi l'être total, parce que l'être préexiste en lui comme dans sa cause et dérive de lui aux autres."

Ce commentaire thomiste de la formule permet de lever un certain nombre de doutes. D'abord touchant le sens du mot *virtus*. Les lexiques de la langue thomiste lui attribuent à bon droit tant de sens différents, qu'il serait difficile de choisir si le commentaire de saint Thomas ne nous imposait ici le choix qui convient. Les mots de *virtus* et de *posse*, l'un et l'autre chargés de dynamisme, inviennent irrésistiblement à les concevoir comme des forces opératives, mais le fait que la blancheur soit elle aussi douée de *virtus* et de *posse*, bien qu'elle soit une simple qualité sans pouvoir d'opérer qui lui soit propre, donne plutôt à penser que la *virtus* en cause est simplement l'essence formelle de la réalité en question. La vertu totale du blanc, s'il pouvait exister, serait la blancheur pure et absolue; la vertu partielle de la blancheur est le blanc réel participé par un objet blanc quelconque; de même aussi la vertu totale d'être: *tota virtus essendi*, ou l'être qui est tout ce qu'il peut: *esse secundum totum suum posse*, est simplement l'acte pur d'être, ce qui est l'être et rien d'autre, si bien qu'il est ce dont tous les autres êtes participent sans que lui-même participe de rien, puisqu'il les cause. Bref, comme dit expressément le commentaire, c'est Dieu.

A prendre ce texte au pied de la lettre, il ne faudrait donc pas imaginer l'*esse* comme une sorte d'efficace d'intensité variable, qui atteindrait en Dieu son maximum. L'exemple du 'blanc' fait plutôt penser à une perfection formelle, ou simplement à une forme, dont l'actualité est en Dieu totale, qui est donc en lui tout ce qu'il est dans la nature d'un tel acte qu'il soit. L'être *secundum totam virtutem essendi* est en acte toute la possibilité de l'être même. On vient de dire qu'il est tant qu'il peut, mais il faut comprendre qu'il est tant qu'il se peut étant donné ce qu'est l'être. Dieu est tout ce qu'il est possible d'être, à tel point que le poser suffit à mettre en fuite la notion même de possibilité.

Le chapitre du commentaire des *Noms divins* qui contient cette explication est naturellement consacré à une analyse des caractéristiques de l'être divin et, par là même, des noms par lesquels nous le désignons.

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\(^5\) Il ne faut pas entendre ce mot comme signifiant que Dieu a reçu l'être d'une cause antérieure. Peut-être Denis pense-t-il que Dieu l'a reçu du Bien, mais Thomas lui-même ne l'entend pas ainsi. Dieu possède l'être en ce sens qu'il est le premier à l'avoir: *praehabet*, ce qui lui permet d'en être la source universelle.
Pur de toute possibilité, il est donc infini, éternel; cause de tous les êtres participés, il est donc leur être (la cause qui fait qu'ils sont), leur vie, leur bien, etc. En conséquence, on doit s'attendre à rencontrer l'expression dans les contextes les plus divers, mais qui seront tous en rapport avec quelque aspect de l'être. Plus précisément, la notion peut intervenir chaque fois qu'il s'agit de marquer un des privilèges de l'acte pur d'être soit dans l'ordre de la perfection, soit dans celui de la causalité, soit dans celui de l'éternité et ainsi de suite. Quelques exemples confirmeront cette interprétation.

* * *

Le Contra Gentiles, I,20, est particulièrement intéressant à cet égard. Le problème est de démontrer que Dieu n'est pas un corps. Saint Thomas dispose de mainte démonstration. Par exemple: Dieu est simple, aucun corps n'est simple (l'étendue étant divisible), ergo. Ou encore: tout corps est quantité, tout quantum est en puissance à quelque égard, puisqu'il peut être nombré et que tout nombre peut être divisé ou augmenté à l'infini; or Dieu est acte pur, ergo. Il s'agit donc ici d'une pure actualité formelle de l'être pur. C'est d'ailleurs dans ce même chapitre, au § 24, que saint Thomas fait comme en passant la remarque d'importance capitale: "Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente." Il est donc certain que, quoique causale, la virtus essendi n'est pas une énergie efficiente; elle est acte, mais elle ne fait rien. Mais la cause efficiente n'est pas la seule; la cause formelle aussi a des effets. Dans l'ordre de l'essence, elle spécifie. Elle fait que l'étant soit tel ou tel: un homme, un cheval, une plante. Dans l'ordre de l'être, elle fait que l'étant soit actulement existant. C'est pourquoi, cédant à l'imagination, nous imaginons l'esse comme produisant activement l'existence de l'étant. Il exerce bien une puissance quasi active, puisque son actualité a un résultat positif, l'existence actuelle, mais ce résultat tient d'abord à la nature de l'étant, dont l'essence comporte l'aptitude à exister.

L'exemple sur lequel raisonne saint Thomas permet de comprendre sa pensée. Il s'agit des corps célestes. N'étant pas en puissance à l'égard de sa forme, la matière du corps céleste n'est pas en puissance passive à l'égard de l'être. Ce que son esse rend existant n'est pas de telle nature qu'il ait encore à acquérir sa forme, ni par conséquent son être. Pourtant, ajoute saint Thomas, il y a dans le corps céleste en question, une puissance pour ainsi dire active, qui est une puissance d'être: "Quia etsi detur quod in corpore cælesti non sit potentia quasi
passiva ad esse, quae est potentia materiae, est tamam in eo potentia quasi activa, quae est virtus essendi." En quel sens cette puissance, ou vertu d'être, est-elle quasi active? En ce sens que, selon Aristote, le ciel a le pouvoir d'être à jamais.

On notera d'abord à ce propos que la raison pour laquelle le ciel est éternel (une fois créé par Dieu et le supposant conservé par son créateur) est que, sa matière étant totalement actualisée par sa forme, il n'y a dans le corps céleste aucune possibilité intrinsèque de dissolution. C'est sa nature, son essence, qui fait que le ciel ne saurait perdre l'esse qu'il a une fois reçu. On notera en outre que la vertu en question est celle d'une créature, qui est un être fini; néanmoins, puisqu'elle assure une existence sans fin au corps céleste, cette vertu d'être finie peut conférer à l'étant dont elle est l'acte une durée infinie. Tout différent est le cas de la puissance motrice (cause efficiente) qui meut le ciel. Il faut une puissance infinie pour mouvoir le ciel pendant une durée infinie, mais on ne peut arguer de la cause motrice à la cause formelle d'être: "car l'esse n'a aucune extension de quantité, surtout dans une chose dont l'esse est invariable, comme le ciel. Il n'est donc pas nécessaire que la virtus essendi d'un corps fini soit infinie pour que sa durée soit infinie. Il n'y a aucune différence pour une chose, du point de vue de cette virtus, entre durer un instant et durer un temps infini, puisque le temps ne concerne cet être invariable que par accident." L'effet de la vertu d'esse est de conférer l'existence actuelle, mais elle fait seulement que l'être soit selon le mode qui convient à sa nature, périssable si celle-ci est sujette à se dissoudre, impérissable si celle-ci est indestructible comme exempte de toute potentialité.

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Un autre exemple sera emprunté au Contra gentiles. Saint Thomas y déduit l'infinité du pouvoir d'être propre à Dieu du fait qu'il est son propre être. Il s'agit cette fois de Dieu, mais la substance du raisonnement est la même: c'est dans la nature de l'être divin que le théologien cherche le fondement de son infini pouvoir d'être. Ce qui est à soi-même son propre être, ne manque d'aucune excellence dans l'ordre

6 Aristote, De caelo et mundo, I, 3, 270a 19 ss. Voyez aussi ce texte curieux: "unaquaque res tantum durat in esse quanta est sua virtus essendi, nisi per accidens, sicut in his quae violenter corrupcantur". (Contra gentiles, II, 33, § 2).
7 Contra gentiles, I, 20, § 21.
8 Contra gentiles, I, 28, § 2.
de l'être (puisqu'il l'a du seul fait qu'il est); un tel être est donc parfait et illimité, ou infini. Ce que saint Thomas nomme en cet endroit "tota virtus ipsum esse" est donc la totalité de ce à quoi s'étend l'acte d'être. Voulant illustrer sa pensée par une image, il recourt à la comparaison entre l'esse et l'albedo que nous avons déjà rencontrée. Voici d'ailleurs le passage en son entier:

Omnis enim nobilitas cujuscumque rei est sibi secundum suum esse: nulla enim nobilitas esst homini ex sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens esset, et sic de aliis. Sic ergo secundum modum quo res habeat esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: nam res secundum quod suum esse contrahitur ad aliquem specialem modum nobilitatis maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse secundum hoc nobilior vel minus nobilis. Igitur si aliquis est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alcuui rei conventat. Sed rei quae est suum esse competit esse secundum totam essendi potentatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alcuui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis.

Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra (cap. 22) probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipusius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alcuui rei conventat.9

La virtus albedinis ne semble pouvoir s'interpréter ici que comme l'essence même de la blancheur. Aucune énergie active ne saurait convenir à cette simple qualité de l'étendue; sa pureté essentielle est seule en cause. Posséder la blancheur dans sa vertu d'être totale, c'est être totalement blanc, sans mélange d'aucune autre couleur. Le degré de blancheur dépend du sujet qui la reçoit. De même pour l'être; son degré dépend de ce que son sujet lui permet de faire exister. Dans le cas où il n'y a pas de sujet récepteur distinct de l'être lui-même, rien ne le limite. Il est donc là dans toute l'étendue de ce qu'il peut être: "habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsum esse."

Le parallélisme entre le degré de la vertu d'être et la perfection du sujet qui la reçoit se montre avec évidence dans les degrés de perfection des êtres eux-mêmes. Les choses dont on dit qu'elles sont seulement, sans être ni vivantes, ni sentantes, ni intelligentes sont assurément moins parfaites que les autres, mais leur imperfection ne tient pas à celle de leur esse pris à part; elle vient de celle du sujet qui le reçoit et manque des perfections de la vie, de la sensibilité et de l'intellection. Ainsi, sans l'esse, la plus haute des perfections formelles n'est rien (puisqu'elle n'est pas), mais l'esse lui-même déploie son pouvoir, sa vertu d'être selon la mesure des perfections formelles qu'il fait exister.

9 Loc. cit.
Dieu seul, dont l’essence formelle est précisément l’esse même, l’est sans aucune restriction et, si l’on peut dire, dans toute son étendue. L’imperfection des sujets récepteurs, et d’abord celle d’avoir à être reçu in alio, fait qu’ils ne le possèdent pas intégralement: “non enim ipsa habent esse secundum suum totum posse, sed participant esse per quem-dam particularem modum et imperfectissimum.” 10

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La même position doctrinale se retrouve dans les questions disputées, en un endroit où on ne l’attendait pas. 11 Il s’agit là de savoir si les démons peuvent transmuter les corps en transmutant leurs formes. La réponse est non, car les formes séparées, telles que les démons, ont des natures spécifiquement déterminées; elles ne peuvent donc opérer que selon leur espèce et autant que la matière corporelle sur laquelle ils agissent se prête à subir leur action.

Mais il y a une forme séparée, qui est acte pur; c’est Dieu. Il n’est inclus dans aucune espèce ni aucun genre, mais il possède sans aucune limitation la vertu d’être, comme étant son être même. Il n’y a donc aucune action qui ne soit possible à son pouvoir: “forma separatur quae est purus actus, scilicet Deus, non determinatur ad aliquam speciem vel genus aliquod; sed incircumscripte habet totam virtutem essendi, utpote ipsum suum esse existens, sicut patet per Dionysium cap V De divinis necominibus…” Nous sommes donc renvoyés une fois de plus à Denis comme à l’inspirateur de la doctrine. Le sens de la formule reste constant. Seul l’être pur actualise totalement la possibilité totale de l’être, il est donc seul à avoir totam virtutem essendi.

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La leçon générale qui se dégage de ces textes semble bien être que l’on ferait fausse route en cherchant dans saint Thomas une doctrine de l’être qui reconnaîtrait à l’esse une intensité intrinsèque variable à laquelle correspondraient, dans la nature, les degrés différents de perfection qui distinguent les êtres. Le mouvement comporte des degrés de quantité qui permettent de le dire plus ou moins grand, l’être n’en a pas: “Essae autem non habet aliquam extensionem quantitatis.” 12

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10 Contra gentiles, I, 28, § 4.
11 Qu. disp. De malo, 3, 16, art. 9, ad 5m.
12 Contra gentiles, I, 26, § 21.
L'étant (ens) peut se mesurer; il est plus ou moins selon les degrés de perfection de son essence, mais l'être (esse) en vertu duquel il est un étant, est ou n'est pas, sans degrés possibles. Pris en soi, comme acte formel de l'essence mais hors de l'essence, l'esse est étranger à la quantité, au plus et au moins, au mouvement et au temps, à plus forte raison au devenir. Ne pouvant commencer que par création, il ne pourrait finir que par annihilation.

La réflexion atteint ici l'origine des obscurités qui, malgré tout, planent sur la notion thomiste d'être. Il nous est pratiquement impossible de ne pas la concevoir comme analogue aux forces physiques observables dans la nature. Parce qu'il est toujours soucieux de rendre justice au langage de ses prédécesseurs, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'autorités aussi hautes que Denis, saint Thomas emprunte occasionnellement le mot virtus. Pour l'imagination, une virtus, une dynamis est une force, et si l'on en parle comme de quelque chose qui peut être donné dans sa totalité, ou ne se rencontrer que sous forme de participation limitée, il est inévitable que nous l'imaginions comme une quantité variable. Le plus simple est de lui attribuer divers degrés d'intensité.

C'est justement là que l'erreur d'interprétation guette le lecteur. Il convient de ne pas transposer les attributs du physique dans l'ordre du métaphysique. Au delà de la nature il n'y a plus de matière, ni d'étendue, ni de quantité, ni de plus ou moins. L'esse échappe à toutes ces déterminations, mais comme malgré tout il y a des différences d'être, nous nous représentons des degrés de pureté et d'actualité formelle sous l'aspect de degrés d'intensité quantitative qui ne conviennent aucunement à l'être. A toutes ces difficultés, nous sentons que la réflexion s'approche de ce qui est pour la pensée son objet limite, car en fait, l'être, c'est Dieu, et même sous ses formes finies, il reste une participation du Qui est mystérieux, caché dans la nuée d'où il se fait entendre sans se laisser voir.

Un des points d'accès au sens de la doctrine est l'opposition de saint Thomas à la manière dont Averroès comprenait l'indestructibilité du monde. Aristote avait déjà dit que le monde est destiné à demeurer toujours. Averroès y consent, naturellement, mais il y consent presque trop facilement. Pour lui, le monde sera toujours, comme il a toujours été, simplement en vertu de sa nécessité naturelle. Ce qui est ne peut ne pas être. C'est particulièrement vrai du ciel. Selon le Commentateur, bien qu'il y ait dans le ciel une virtus sive potentia de se mouvoir dans le lieu, il ne s'y trouve pas de potentia ad esse, ni finie ni infinie. Si le ciel est éternel, ce n'est pas à une puissance de ce genre que tient son éternité.
Saint Thomas estime que c'est un des points sur lesquels Averroès a mal compris le Philosophe, car celui-ci attribue expressément aux corps célestes le "pouvoir d'exister toujours."

Le commentaire thomiste de cette proposition intéresse directement notre problème. Selon saint Thomas, l'erreur d'Averroès consiste à confondre le pouvoir de se mouvoir avec le pouvoir d'être. Le pouvoir de se mouvoir appartient à la puissance passive de la matière, puisque les corps étendus seuls sont susceptibles de mouvement. Au contraire le pouvoir d'être, la *virtus essendi*, appartient à la forme, puisqu'il n'y a rien de plus formel que l'être. Incidemment, rappelons ici que, justement parce qu'il est encore plus formel que les formes essentielles, l'esse n'est pas l'une d'elles. Il est l'acte de ces formes et la perfection de ces perfections. Se fondant sur cette notion, qui lui est personnelle au sens précis où lui-même l'entend, saint Thomas conclut que l'esse qui actue les formes est en elles comme une puissance active d'exister. Si elles sont douées d'une essence formelle simple, donc indestructible, ce pouvoir est par là même un devoir d'exister toujours. Ainsi, non seulement les corps célestes, dont la matière est totalement actualisée par leurs formes (sauf à l'égard du lieu), mais toutes les substances séparées, qui sont formes pures, tiennent de leurs esse respectifs le pouvoir de toujours exister. Ils ont une puissance active d'être: "Et sic non solum in corporibus caelestibus, sed etiam in substantiis separatis, est *virtus essendi* semper." 13

Ceci compris, et l'on notera incidemment que la preuve thomiste de l'immortalité de l'âme humaine en dépend, on peut risquer un pas de plus. Il s'agit alors de comprendre que, parce que l'être diffère du mouvement comme le physique du métaphysique, leurs rapports aux objets ne sont pas les mêmes. L'être du ciel est fini; pourtant, puisque son mouvement est éternel, il faut une vertu motrice infinie pour le mouvoir. Au contraire, bien que cet être soit en effet éternel, son esse n'est pas infini. L'être de la vertu motrice infinie du ciel est fini. Saint Thomas en donne une raison bien remarquable. C'est que, pris en soi, l'être d'une chose quelconque échappe à la quantité; il n'a donc pas de parties, il est tout à la fois: "Ipsum autem esse aliquis rei secundum se consideratum (i.e. abstraction faite de ce dont il est l'esse) non est quantum: non enim habet partes, sed totum est simul." La *virtus essendi* d'un corps fini peut donc être un esse fini, sans que le corps céleste soit destiné pour autant à ne durer qu'un temps fini: "Sic igitur dicendum est quod *virtus essendi* corporis caelestis est finita;

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nec tamen sequitur quod sit ad essendum tempore finito; quia finitum et infinitum temporis accidit ipsi esse rei, quod non est subjectum varietati temporis."\textsuperscript{14} On en revient toujours à la différence qui situe l'esse dans un genre différent de tout le reste.

À la lumière de ces remarques, que devons-nous penser de la \textit{virtus essendi} thomiste?

Tout d'abord, que l'expression n'est pas de l'invention personnelle de saint Thomas. C'est une de ces formules que, pour des raisons diverses, il ne faut pas laisser perdre. Mais parmi ces raisons il en est au moins une qui tient à ce qu'il y a de plus personnel dans la pensée métaphysique et théologique de saint Thomas. On a tout à fait raison de dire que cette notion nous conduit immédiatement bien au-delà d'Aristote. Elle nous conduit d'abord au moins jusqu'à Denis, dont la formule est empruntée. Mais ce n'est pas tout, car chez Denis lui-même (autant qu'on ose préciser une pensée difficile à saisir) l'être, l'esse, n'est pas encore la perfection formelle suprême. Avant lui se trouve le bien, qui découle vers les étants sous la forme de l'esse. L'ens, c'est l'être (esse) engagé dans ses participations. Pour saint Thomas, il n'y a rien au-dessus de l'esse. L'acte propre en vertu duquel l'étant est, nous est donné comme un accomplissement et perfection de l'essence de cet étant. Présence intime à l'étant de l'Ipsum purum esse, qui l'habite comme la cause pénètre son effet, cet esse est une vertu, puisqu'il est suprêmement acte. Cette vertu active, et non passive, se rencontre à des degrés divers de perfection qui sont ceux de la pureté formelle même, mais parce qu'elle est sans rapport au mouvement et à la grandeur, on ne peut lui attribuer qu'une intensité non quantitative. C'est donc, comme le dit avec pleine raison le R.P. Geiger, d'une pureté qualitative qu'il s'agit, celle qui convient à l'acte d'être dont on a vu que, même dans ses participations finies, il est immobile et en repos, étranger au devenir.

\textit{Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies}

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Op. cit.}, § 62.
Une “Admonitio Synodalis”
de l’époque carolingienne

Étude critique et Édition

ROBERT AMIET

Le document dont je me propose aujourd’hui d’établir le texte critique définitif, ainsi que la date, la provenance et la destination, a joui pendant tout le moyen âge d’une célébrité exceptionnelle, et il est connu des érudits depuis exactement quatre siècles. C’est en 1560 en effet que l’auteur anonyme de l’édition du Décret de Burchard de Worms, parue cette année-là à Cologne, en imprima pour la première fois le texte dans son introduction à l’œuvre du célèbre canoniste allemand. A partir de cette date, et pendant un espace de temps d’un peu plus de trois siècles, cette pièce fut éditée et rééditée jusqu’à 30 fois, à partir de 16 manuscrits différents, en sorte qu’on pourrait supposer qu’elle est connue et archi-connue, que tout a été dit à son sujet, et que la question — si question il y avait — est parfaitement et définitivement réglée.

Penser ainsi serait cependant contraire aux faits, ainsi qu’à l’évidence elle-même, et ce pour deux motifs, très différents et complémentaires. Le premier, c’est que tous les éditeurs des XVIᵉ, XVIIᵉ et XVIIIᵉ siècles, qui ont publié des manuscrits, n’ont jamais pu s’empêcher de les corriger, de les amender, d’en restaurer les mots, ou même parfois — qui pis est — d’en modifier arbitrairement l’ordre de phrases. Il en résulte que le texte imprimé diffère souvent très sensiblement du texte du manuscrit qu’il est censé reproduire, et qu’un nombre parfois important de précieuses variantes est ainsi annihilé, au plus grand dam des érudits. Le second, c’est que certains éditeurs, ayant sous les yeux deux ou plusieurs manuscrits ou éditions antérieures, n’ont pas hésité, au mépris de toute saine critique, à en combiner ensemble les diverses leçons, sans jamais, bien entendu, préciser ce qui revient à l’un et ce qui revient à l’autre, créant ainsi de toutes pièces de véritables mosaïques sans autorité. Ainsi l’ont fait pour notre Admonitio, Hittorp, Baronius, Baluze et très spécialement Giorgi.

Il résulte de ces considérations élémentaires que l’édition critique
est encore à faire, et c'est cette lacune que veut combler le présent travail. Cette question n'avait du reste pas échappé à certains érudits du temps passé, et c'est Mansi lui-même qui, en 1769, posait déjà la question en termes fort précis à propos de notre pièce : *Cum maxime variet in manuscriptis codicibus, nec in editis semper sibi cohaeret, permagi interesse arbitror, si collatio inter varios codices instituatur, quo ex consensu plurimorum eliciatur quid genuinum sit, quid adulterinum et ascititium.* (PL 115, 675).

Eu égard à ce qui vient d'être énoncé, je me suis efforcé tout d'abord de débrouiller l'écheveau parfaitement confus des éditions successives de notre *Admonitio*, de manière à tirer au clair d'une part les filiations des diverses éditions, et, de l'autre, les indications — trop rares — données par les anciens éditeurs sur les manuscrits qu'ils avaient utilisés. Cela fait, je me suis attaqué à la recherche de ces manuscrits eux-mêmes, et cette recherche, — on le supposera sans peine, — n'a pas toujours été de la plus extrême facilité. Dans six cas, elle s'est malheureusement avérée négative (ABGYZ). Dans d'autres, au contraire, elle a été couronnée de succès, et le lecteur pourra lire combien je suis redevable, dans cette recherche, à l'amabilité d'éminents érudits, sans le secours desquels j'aurais échoué. Bien plus, j'ai répéré moi-même cinq manuscrits nouveaux contenant notre *Admonitio*, que j'ai le plaisir de verser au dossier (NQVWX), auxquels il convient d'ajouter encore deux autres manuscrits, qui avaient été signalés, mais non édités (PT).

La présente édition table donc sur 25 manuscrits différents, et ce nombre est tout à fait suffisant pour asseoir une édition critique définitive. Il est bien vraisemblable que si l'on feuilletait les très nombreux manuscrits canoniques qui sont parvenus jusqu'à nous et qui sont encore inédits, on découvrirait sans trop de peine de nouveaux exemplaires de notre *Admonitio*. Mais je crois pouvoir dire que si ces découvertes augmenteraient numériquement la quantité des témoins, elle ne saurait en modifier d'une façon tant soit peu importante la qualité et le classement tels qu'ils sont définis dans le présent travail. J'ose affirmer que de nouvelles découvertes ne sauraient en aucun cas modifier mes conclusions.

Mais il est temps de faire plus ample connaissance avec chacun de nos témoins.

I — NOMENCLATURE DES MANUSCRITS

Je viens de dire que je disposais pour mon édition critique de l'*Admonitio* de 23 manuscrits. Je rassemble ici tous les renseignements que j'ai pu recueillir sur chacun d'eux : lieux où ils sont conservés, lieu
d’écriture, date, particularités diverses, contenu, avec en plus, dans le cas où ils ont été édités, voire réédités, des indications exhaustives sur les ouvrages où ils ont été publiés. Le lecteur pourra se faire ainsi une idée très précise non seulement des sources elles-mêmes, mais encore de la manière dont elles ont été exploitées dans le passé.

Cela dit, étudions un à un les témoins qui nous livrent l’Admonitio.

A — Ce manuscrit, aujourd’hui perdu ou inidentifiable, était conservé au xviiiᵉ siècle à la bibliothèque de l’abbaye de Vicoigne, au diocèse d’Arras. Je ne possède aucune indication sur sa nature et son contenu. Ce qu’il y a de sûr, c’est que c’est là qu’il fut feuilleté par Martène, qui lui assigna une antiquité de 500 ans, — ce qui le daterait du xixe siècle, — et qui y découvrit le texte de notre Admonitio. Il s’empressa de le publier dans le monumental ouvrage qu’il faisait paraître de concert avec Dom Durand : Veterum scriptorum ... amplissima collectio, VII (Paris, 1733), col. 1-5. Le texte de l’Admonitio y est divisé en petits paragraphes, numérotés de I à XLVII en chiffres romains, dont je crois pouvoir affirmer qu’ils n’appartenaient pas au manuscrit original, et doivent en conséquence être attribués à l’éditeur. Ce texte donné par Martène a été reproduit parmi les anonymes du viiiᵉ siècle en PL 96, 1375-1380. Il avait auparavant été déjà reproduit par Mansi : Conciliorum ... (XIV, col. 889-898), qui le mettait en parallèle avec deux autres recensions, les MSS C et D de ma nomenclature. Ce texte tripartite de Mansi a été reproduit en PL 115, 675-684 : le texte du MS A figure dans la colonne de gauche.

B — Ce manuscrit, aujourd’hui perdu ou inidentifiable, était conservé au xviiiᵉ siècle à la bibliothèque de l’abbaye de Saint-Victor de Paris. Comme le précédent, nous ignorons sa nature et son contenu. Comme le précédent, il fut feuilleté par Martène, qui lui assigna semblablement une antiquité de 500 ans, c’est-à-dire le xixe siècle. Comme le précédent, ce manuscrit contenait le texte de notre Admonitio, qui fut copié par Martène, comparé par lui au MS A, et dont les nombreuses et très intéressantes variantes furent collationnées par lui et indiquées en notes dans l’édition précédemment citée. Ces variantes furent fidèlement reproduites en PL 96, mais restèrent ignorées de Mansi, et donc de PL 115.

C — Rome, Bibl. Vat. Barb. lat. 535, fol. 7r-8r.

Ce manuscrit, copié sous le pontificat d’Honorius II (1124-1130), contient la collection canonique d’Anselme de Lucques, agrémentée au début de plusieurs pièces canoniques étrangères à cette collection, parmi lesquelles le texte de notre Admonitio. Ce texte a été découvert
et publié par Baronius: *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1ᵉʳ éd. X, (Romae, 1602), 129-127, puis 2ᵉ éd. XIV (Lucae, 1743), 445-447. 1 Il a été reproduit par Labbe, sans dire qu'il l'empruntait à Baronius: *Sacro sancta concilia*, 1ᵉʳ éd. VIII (Paris, 1671), col. 33-38, puis 2ᵉ éd. IX (Venise, 1729), col. 1031-1034. C'est ce dernier texte qui a été reproduit par Mansi (voir ci-dessus), lequel a été reproduit définitivement en PL 115, dans la colonne du milieu. 2 Au sujet de la source qu'il reproduit, Baronius donne la brève mais intéressante précision suivante: *Reperi eam apud Anselmum Lucensem episcopum, suorum temporum celeberrimum theologum.* Fort de ce renseignement, j'ai fait examiner par Mère Renata Ausenda Orazi tous les exemplaires manuscrits de la collection d'Anselme de Lucques, conservés à la Vaticane, et elle a pu facilement constater qu'un seul contenait l'Admonitio, à savoir le MS C. La comparaison entre C et le texte de Baronius acheva d'asseoir ma certitude. D'autre part, Baronius laisse entendre qu'il a eu à sa disposition un second texte de l'Admonitio, dont il mêlange le texte avec celui de C: c'est le MS Z, dont je parle plus loin.

D — Lucques, Bibl. capitulaire, 124, fol. 193'-194'.

Ce manuscrit du xiᵉ siècle renferme la collection canonique de Burchard de Worms, agrémentée d'un certain nombre de pièces adventices qui lui sont étrangères, 3 dont notre *Admonitio*. Ce texte avait été repéré au xviiiᵉ siècle par Mansi, qui en publia, conjointement avec les textes de A et de B (voir-ci-dessus), un certain nombre d'extraits, malheureusement très fragmentaires, très incomplets, et surtout ne donnant pas la physionomie exacte du texte de ce manuscrit. Ces extraits ont passé en PL 115, dans la colonne de droite. Je dois à l'amabilité de M. Eugenio Lucchesi, archiviste capitulaire de Lucques, l'identification de cet intéressant témoign de notre *Admonitio*.

E — Rome, Bibl. Vat. *Ottob. lat.* 256, fol. 86'-90'.

Ce manuscrit est un pontifical copié pour le diocèse de Valence, en Dauphiné, à la fin du xiᵉ siècle. Ce n'est pas par hasard, nous le

1 Le cod. *Barb. lat.* 535 a été recopié intégralement au xviᵉ siècle sur papier fort. Cette copie, conservée elle aussi à la Bibl. Vaticane, porte la cote *Regin. lat.* 325. J'ai comparé mot à mot les trois textes du 535, du 325 et de Baronius, et j'ai acquise la certitude d'une part que le 325 n'est pas une copie parfaitement fidèle du 535, et, de l'autre, que Baronius a utilisé le 535. Le MS 325 n'a donc pour mon propos aucun intérêt.

2 Entre les cols. 679-680 et 681-682, Migne a omis par mégarde, dans les nos 59-59bis, les mots suivants, indiqués entre crochets: *Nullus baptizare praesumat, nisi in vigiliis Paschae et Pentecostes, [nisi pro periculis mortis. Nullus] clericus vel laicus...*

3 Entre autres, on y trouve deux catalogues des évêques de Lucques, ainsi que les canons du concile de Seligenstadt (1022).


Etienne Baluze, grand collectionneur de textes anciens, avait pris copie lui-même, ou fait prendre copie par d’autres, de quantité de textes, concernant les sujets les plus divers, qu’il rencontrait ou qu’on lui indiquait dans de vieux manuscrits. C’est ainsi qu’il fit copier tout ou partie du MS 112 de la bibliothèque de l’abbaye de Ripoll, au diocèse de Vich, en Catalogne, copie qui se trouve actuellement dans le manuscrit ci-dessus désigné. Dans ce document est relatée la prise de Tortosa, au moment de la reconquête, par le comte de Barcelone et le roi d’Aragon: cet événement ayant eu lieu en 1148, on en conclura que le document qui en parle est de la seconde moitié du xiième siècle. Par un heureux hasard, le MS 112 de Ripoll contenait le texte de notre Admonitio, qui fut copié par ou pour Baluze et publié par lui, — en combinant malheureusement le texte avec celui du MS G. (voir ci-dessous), — dans son édition des œuvres de Régimon de Prüm: Reginonis abbatis Prumiensis libri duo de ecclesiasticis disciplinis et religione christiana (Paris, 1671), Appendix, 602-606. Ce texte a été reproduit en PL 132, 455-458. Je dois l’identification du MS de Baluze contenant la copie directe de celui de Ripoll à la compétence de M. Pamfilova, de l’Office de Documentation de la Bibliothèque Nationale.

G — Ce manuscrit, aujourd’hui perdu ou inidentifiable, était à la fin du xviième siècle la propriété personnelle de Baluze, qui n’a fourni aucune indication sur sa nature, son contenu ou sa date. Il se contentera de le désigner sous le nom de vestissimus codex. Il n’est pourtant pas tout à fait impossible cependant de se faire une idée de ce qu’était ce document, car, tout à fait incidemment, Baluze fournit à son sujet le maigre mais fort intéressant renseignement suivant: l’Admonitio, dit-il, y était précédée du contexte que voici: « Postea legatur evangelium more solito: Respicientis Jesus discipulos dixit Simoni Petro: Si peccaverit in te frater tuus. Sequantur VII psalmi cum precibus, quibus placuerint. Quibus finitis, episcofo et ceteris in ordine sedentibus, a diacono legatur haec admonitio: Fratres presbyteri... » (PL 132, 407). Nous le verrons plus loin, ce texte
est celui-là même du Pontifical romano-germanique (MS H., ci-dessous), et il y a fort à parier que le manuscrit qui était en possession de Baluze était un exemplaire — complet ou incomplet, peu importe, — du célèbre livre rhénan. L'examen du texte imprimé par Baluze confirme pleinement cette conclusion. Si, en effet, on met en parallèle, phrase par phrase, le texte du MS F et le texte imprimé de Baluze, qui est un combiné des MS F et G, et qu'avec un crayon de couleur, on souligne dans ce dernier tous les mots ou membres de phrases qui ne figurent pas dans le MS F, on voit apparaître des fragments de texte en tous points identiques à celui que donne le MS H. Il y a lieu d'ajouter que le texte de l'Admonitio contenu dans le MS G était augmenté de l'Appendix intégral, que ne comportait pas le Pontifical romano-germanique; j'y reviendrai plus loin.

H — Pontifical romano-germanique, compilé par un moine de l'abbaye S. Alban de Mayence vers l'an 950. Nul liturgiste n'ignore plus aujourd'hui cet imposant recueil canonique et liturgique dû à l'initiative de ce religieux rhénan, depuis les magistrales études que lui a naguère consacrées Andrieu. Parmi les innombrables têtes de chapitres de cet ouvrage monumental figure un Ordo qualiter agatur concilium provinciale, dans lequel sont minutieusement spécifiées les diverses réunions qui doivent se tenir pendant quatre jours, non moins que tous les textes qui doivent être lus. Notre Admonitio figure en bonne place dans le cérémonial du quatrième et dernier jour du Synode, d'où le qualificatif d'Admontio synodalis par lequel elle y est très justement désignée. Le Pontifical romano-germanique n'a malheureusement pas encore fait l'objet d'une édition critique, bien que la presque totalité de ses parties aient déjà été publiées ça et là dans un certain nombre d'ouvrages. C'est ainsi que l'Admonitio, — dans l'Ordo du Synode provincial qui l'inclut, — fut publié dès le xvi° siècle par Melchior Hittorp: De divinis catholicae Ecclesiae officiis (Cologne, 1568), 155-157,4 d'après trois manuscrits du Pontifical romano-germanique aujourd'hui perdus ou inidentifiables. L'incertitude qui plane sur la qualité et la valeur des témoins utilisés par Hittorp m'a incité à recourir directement aux sources manuscrites elles-mêmes, et c'est ainsi que j'ai consulté les trois plus anciennes copies du Pontifical qui nous ont été conservées.5 Je les énumère brièvement ci-dessous:

4 Réimpression dans le t. X de la Magna bibliotheca veterum patrum de Margarin de la Bigné (Paris, 1610), col. 170-176.
5 Sur ces trois manuscrits, voir Michel Andrieu: Les Ordines Romani du haut moyen âge, I, 156-165 et 176-211.
H¹ — Lucques, Bibl. Capitulaire, 607, fol. 99*-100°. Pontifical romano-germanique copié à Lucques, à la fin du x⁰ siècle, sur un exemplaire venu directement de Mayence.

H² — Mont-Cassin, Bibl. de l'abbaye, 451, 150-153. Pontifical romano-germanique copié au Mont-Cassin vers 1025 sur un exemplaire se trouvant à Rome vers l'an 1000, lequel provenait lui-même directement de Mayence.

H³ — Rome, Bibl. Vallicelliane, D 5, fol. 63*-64°. Pontifical romano-germanique copié au Mont-Cassin vers 1050 sur le même exemplaire que le précédent. Une cinquantaine d'années après sa transcription, le texte de l'Admonitio qu'il contient a subi le zèle d'un réviseur, qui a amendé, voire corrigé, un certain nombre de ses paragraphes. Dans mon édition, j'indiquerai avec soin ces modifications par le sigle corr. H³.

J'ai collationné avec le plus grand soin les textes de l'Admonitio fournis par ces trois manuscrits et j'ai pu constater qu'ils étaient tous trois pratiquement identiques. Je suis donc assuré de posséder le texte original utilisé par le compilateur du pontifical mayençais, et, dans tout ce qui suit, je désignerai par le sigle H le texte commun aux trois témoins. Je spécifierai au contraire par H¹, H² ou H³ les menues variantes propres à chacun d'entre eux.⁶


⁶ Dans son article intitulé: "Die Kommunionvorbereitung im Mittelalter," publié dans le Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, 56 (Innsbruck, 1932), 389, note 60, Peter Browe signale que le texte de l'Admonitio, contenu dans le Pontifical de Gondekar d'Eichstätt (Eichstätt, Évéché, MS non coté, fol. 60*-62°) a été publié dans le périodique Eichstätter Pastoralblatt, 24 (1882), 165. Cette référence est fausse. En effet, le t. 24 correspond à l'année 1877, et l'année 1882 correspond au t. 29. J'ai examiné personnellement, page par page, les tomes 24 à 30 inclus de cette revue, sans trouver trace de l'Admonitio. En ce qui me concerne, du reste, cela n'a aucune importance, car le Pontifical de Gondekar n'est qu'un exemplaire tardif (fin du xve siècle) du Pontifical romano-germanique, dont je possède le texte des trois plus anciennes copies.
K — Prague, Bibl. de l'Université, MS III.F.6, fol. 42°-48°.

Ce manuscrit est un homiliaire compilé au xir siècle pour Gebhard (alias Jaromír), évêque de Prague (1068-1089). Il a été découvert et publié intégralement par le Dr Ferdinand Hecht: "Das Homiliar des Bischofs von Prag sacc. xir," dans les Beiträge zur Geschichte Böhmens, Abtheilung I, Quellensammlung, I Band (Prag, 1863). Dans ce manuscrit figure notre Admonitio, qui se trouve reproduite ad litteram dans l'ouvrage précité, p. 21-22. Il y a lieu de noter que le copiste de ce codex n'a pas su toujours bien déchiffrer son modèle. C'est ainsi qu'il a lu extinguita au lieu de extirgite (n° 13), et sanctuarium au lieu de saecularium (n° 50). Dans un cas, il a carrément interprété ce qu'il ne pouvait sans doute lire: il a transcrit: ad tempus poenitentiam, alors que le texte exact était: ad praesens eimostianam (n° 52).

L — Berlin, Bibl. d'Etat, MS lat. 615, fol. 254.

Ce manuscrit, qui remonte à la fin du xiii° siècle, contient le Décret de Gratien. Sur le dernier feuillet, demeuré en blanc, le copiste transcrit le texte de notre Admonitio, qui se trouve ainsi être le témoin le plus tardif que j'ai repéré. Il a été découvert et publié par W. Wattenbach: "Ein alter Pastoralschreiben," dans Neues Archiv, VI (1881), 192-194. Dans les quelques lignes d'introduction qu'il lui consacre, l'éditeur émet l'opinion que cette pièce était tout à fait inconnue, mais une note de P. Ewald, à la fin du volume (p. 652), rectifie sur ce point: l'assertion de l'auteur en citant l'édition tripartite de Mansi (voir ci-dessus). Il convient de noter que le modèle recopié par le scribe du manuscrit de Berlin devait comporter une lacune, car, aux n° 68-69, il omet sans s'en apercevoir les mots suivants entre crochets:

68 — Nullus rem aut possessionem aut mancipium ecclesiae vendere aut commutare aut quocunque [ingenio alienare praesumat. 69 — Diem dominicum et alias festivitates absque] opere servili a vesperum celebrare docete.

M — Wolfenbüttel, Bibl. du Duc Auguste, MS Gud. 212, fol. 47°-47°.


N — Munich, Bibl. bavaroise d'Etat, Clm 6241, fol. 97°-100°.

Ce manuscrit contient un important recueil canonique, copié au
scriptorium épiscopal de Freising. Il se compose de 142 feuillets en excellent état de conservation, et l'examen paléographique permet de lui assigner comme date la fin du Xe siècle, et non pas le IXe, comme l'indique par erreur le catalogue.7 Le texte de l'Admonitio qu'il contient est inédit.

P — Munich, Bibl. bavaroise d'Etat, Clm 5515, fol. 118v-120r.

Ce manuscrit du XIe siècle provient de l'abbaye de Diessen, au diocèse d'Augsbourg (Bavière). Il se compose de 126 folios en bon état de conservation. Il contient un recueil de sermons d'Honorius d'Autun, intitulé Speculum Ecclesiae, auxquels ont été ajoutées de première main un certain nombre de pièces adventices, dont une partie de la célèbre synodique de Rathié de Vérone, incluant notre Admonitio, dont le texte est inédit.8

Q — Tortosa, Bibl. capitulaire, 34, fol. 10r-15r.

Ce manuscrit est un sacramentaire copié pour la cathédrale de Tortosa dans la seconde moitié du XIe siècle, sous le règne d'Alphonse II le Chaste, roi de Catalogne et d'Aragon (1164-1196).9 Sur les premiers folios du codex, avant le début du texte liturgique, ont été transcrits plusieurs textes canoniques, dont celui de notre Admonitio, qui est inédit.

R — Rome, Bibl. Vat. Regin. lat. 73, folio 63r-64v.

Ce manuscrit, dont on ignore la provenance, remonte au XIe siècle, et est constitué par un recueil disparate de pièces patristiques, canoniques et liturgiques. Le texte de l'Admonitio, qu'il contient, a été découvert par Domenico Giorgi, qui eut l'excellente idée de le publier. Malheureusement, au lieu de reproduire purement et simplement le manuscrit qu'il avait sous les yeux, il eut la funeste idée d'en combiner le texte avec celui, — déjà composite — de Baluze. Cette mosaique sans autorité parut dans son ouvrage: De liturgia romani pontificis, III (Romae, 1744), 426-433. Je signale que le copiste du manuscrit R n'a

7 Je suis redevable de ce renseignement à l'amitié du Dr. Bernhard Bischoff. A défaut de critères paléographiques, la seule présence de l'Admonitio selon la récension vénitaine (966) aboutit à la même conclusion. Je suis heureux de rendre hommage à ce propos à la perspicacité de M. Bischoff.

8 Ce manuscrit avait été signalé naguère par Dom Germain Morin, "L'auteur de l'Admonitio synodalis sur les devoirs du clergé," dans la Revue Bénédictine, IX (1892), 105-106. Je parlerai plus loin de l'hypothèse formulée par lui au sujet de ce texte, sur lequel il s'est mépris.

9 Le nom du roi figure dans l'oraison de la Missa pro rege, où on lit: "...famulum tuum regem nostrum Ildefonsum...“ fol. 194v.
pas toujours lu très attentivement son modèle, et je relèverai seulement les trois grosses erreurs suivantes: cooperantes mis pour cooperatores (n° 1), omnis actio mis pour conversatio (n° 8), et enfin semper mis pour sepe (n° 29).

S — Lettre synodique adressée par Rathier, évêque de Vérone aux membres de son clergé en 966. Dans cette longue et célèbre épître, qui ressemble parfois à une satire des mœurs ecclésiastiques de l'époque, Rathier a inclus, en le reprenant à son compte, le texte à peu près intégral de notre Admonitio. Les diverses éditions des œuvres de Rathier, que je signalerai dans un instant, n'étant ni ad litteram ni encore moins critiques, je me suis reporté — exactement comme pour le Pontificale romano-germanique — aux manuscrits eux-mêmes. J'en ai consulté les deux plus anciens, dont je donne ci-dessous les caractéristiques.

S¹ — Laon, Bibl. municipale, MS 274, fol. 61r-63v.

Ce beau manuscrit, de la fin du xᵉ siècle, provient de la cathédrale Notre-Dame de Laon et renferme le texte complet des 25 opuscules de Rathier. Ce manuscrit a été communiqué au xviᵉ siècle par le fameux chanoine Antoine Bellotte à deux érudits bénédictions contemporains, Dom Luc d'Achery et Dom Hugues Mathoud.


Je dois l'identification du manuscrit qui a été utilisé par ces deux auteurs à l'amabilité de M. Bernard Lefèvre, conservateur de la Bibliothèque Municipale de Laon.

S² — Munich, Bibl. bavaroise d'État, Clm 6340, fol. 36r-38v.

Ce manuscrit date de la fin du xᵉ siècle et provient du chapitre de la cathédrale de Freising. Il renferme la Translatio sancti Metronis, les œuvres complètes de Rathier de Vérone et une compilation patristique. C'est lui qui a été édité par Pierre et Jérôme Ballerini: Ratherii veromensis, episcopi opera omnia (Vérone, 1765), dans lequel ouvrage l'Admonitio contenue dans la synodique se trouve aux pp. 414-419, d'où elle a passé en PL 136, 558-564. Malheureusement, et en conformité avec les coutumes de l'époque, les Ballerini n'ont pu s'empêcher de combiner le
texte de ce manuscrit avec le texte déjà imprimé par d'Achéry d'après le codex de Laon. Sans doute indiquent-ils parfois en note les leçons divergentes, mais il est impossible, en lisant leur ouvrage, de savoir la teneur exacte de leur modèle, le manuscrit de Freising. Je dois l'identification de ce codex et les quelques renseignements que je donne sur lui à l'amabilité du Dr Gichtel, de la bibliothèque de Munich.

Dans tout ce qui suit, je désignerai par le sigle S le texte commun des deux témoins, et je spécifierai au contraire par S¹ et S² les leçons propres à chacun de ces deux manuscrits.

T — Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat. 1355, fol. 310*-311*.

Ce manuscrit, de provenance inconnue, a été copié au xir siècle et contient le Decretum de Burchard de Worms, à la suite duquel, de première main, ont été copiées plusieurs pièces canoniques adventices, dont la dernière n'est autre que notre Admonitio. Son texte est inédit.¹⁰

V — Bordeaux, Bibl. municipale, MS 11, fol. 76*-77*.

Ce manuscrit est une vaste compilation de textes ecclésiastiques les plus divers, exécutés au xir siècle à l'abbaye de la Grande-Sauve, au diocèse de Bordeaux. Parmi les innombrables pièces reproduites figure notre Admonitio, dont le texte est inédit.

W — Bordeaux, même manuscrit, fol. 179*-179*.

Seconde copie de l'Admonitio contenue dans ce codex, différente de la première, et également inédite.

X — Rome, Bibl. Vat. lat. 5273, fol. 84*-85*.

Ce manuscrit, copié vers 1277 par une main italienne, contient la vieille chronique des Vénètes, appelée Chronicon Altinate.¹¹ Sur ses derniers feuillets ont été reproduits divers documents canoniques, dont notre Admonitio. Son texte est inédit. Au sujet de ce manuscrit, il convient de noter que le scribe qui l'a copié était aussi mauvais calligraphe que mauvais latiniste. Mieux: il semble avoir été totalement ignorant de la langue latine. Avec une véritable désinvolture, il modifie à sa guise l'orthographe, il italianise un certain nombre de mots latins, et surtout il transcrit sans sourciller des assemblages incohérents de lettres lorsqu'il ne peut pas — ou ne veut pas se donner la peine —

¹⁰ L'Admonitio contenue dans ce manuscrit avait été repérée par les Ballerini et signalée par eux dans leurs prélègomenes à l'édition de la synodique de Rathier. Je signale une erreur qui s'est glissée dans la typographie de leur ouvrage et qui est reproduite en PL 196, 551-552: au lieu d'indiquer le fol. 310, ils indiquent la p. 370.

¹¹ Cette chronique a été publiée dans les Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores, XIV, 1-69.
de déchiffrer son modèle ! Le lecteur curieux trouvera dans l'apparatus criticus toutes les fantaisies de ce personnage : à titre simplement indicatif, qu'il me soit permis de donner quelques exemples pris entre beaucoup :

— Redoublement anormal de consonnes simples : Elleazaris (n° 2), Iessu (n° 5), perrizllum (n° 6), uassa (n° 13), cassulla (n° 16), sollus (n° 30n°), evangellia (n° 33), etc.

— Réduction anormale de consonnes redoublées : sumo (n° 5), redituri (n° 5), ofitii (n° 6), nullus (n° 30n°), etc.

— Mots latins italienisés : note (nocte, n° 9), rellighiose (religiose, n° 11), litighiousus (litigiosus, n° 36), exighat (exigat, n° 47), vighillia, (n° 59), salmos (psalms, n° 92n°), etc.

— Mots mal lus dans le modèle ou mal transcrits : rex (res, n° 48), ouibus (omnibus, n° 65n°), oracio (oratio, n° 66n°), hac (ac, n° 87), etc.

— Assemblage incohérent de lettres sans aucun sens : alicomallo (aliquo malo, n° 34), thaboc (et ad hoc, n° 44), nurem (nullus rem, n° 68), dibercl (diabolic, n° 71), etc.

Y — Ce manuscrit, dont nous ne savons absolument rien, devait probablement contenir, de la même manière que les MSS D et T, le Decretum de Burchard de Worms. C'est du moins ce que l'on peut inférer de l'édition anonyme du dit Decretum, lequel contient, au dernier feuillet de l'Introduction (non paginée) le texte de l'Admonitio. comme si cette dernière faisait partie du manuscrit reproduit : Locis communes congosti cur ex decretorum libris tum conciliis et orthodoxorum patrum decretis... authore D. Burchardo Wormaciensis Ecclesiae episcoi (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1560).

C'est Baluze qui, dans ses notes à l'édition des œuvres de Reginon de Prüm, déclare incidemment qu'une édition du Décret de Burchard contenait l'Admonitio (PL 132, 406). Trois éditions du Décret avaient paru au moment où Baluze écrivait : Cologne 1548, Paris 1549 (reproduite en PL 140) et Cologne 1560. Seule, la troisième contient cette pièce. On ne peut que déplorer que l'auteur anonyme de cette édition n'ait donné aucune indication sur la source qu'il reproduisait. Cependant, il faut précéder le texte de l'Admonitio d'un titre qui ne laisse pas d'être très intéressant: Admonitio in synodo, finito evangelio, a diacono legenda, episcopo et ceveris in ordine sedentibus. À y regarder de près, c'est la phrase même, — à une variante insignifiante près, — qui précède le texte de l'Admonitio dans le Pontifical romano-germanique (voir ci-dessus). Il est facile d'en conclure que la source utilisée par l'imprimeur dérivait, — immédiatement ou médiatement, peu importe — du vieux pontifical mayençais. Ce qu'il y a de sûr, en tout cas, c'est que la numé-
rotation en 67 paragraphes, qui figure dans l'édition de Cologne, ne figurait certainement pas dans le manuscrit que l'éditeur avait sous les yeux.

Z — Ce manuscrit, que, malgré toutes mes recherches, je ne suis pas arrivé à identifier, a été utilisé par Baronius conjointement avec le MS C. Cet auteur, averti de renseignements sur ses sources, laisse cependant filtrer, dans une note marginale, la mince indication suivante: *Leonis quarti romani pontificis sermo ex Vaticanae Bibliothecae codice qui inscribitur Liber censuum*. On sait que le *Liber censuum bibliothecae vaticanae*, auquel se réfère constamment Baronius dans ses célébres Annales, n'est autre que l'actuel cod. 228 de la Bibl. Riccardiana de Florence, qui a été copié en 1228 et qui était alors conservé à la Vaticane sous la cote B 445.\(^12\) Or, c'est un fait: ce manuscrit obligemment examiné pour moi par la Dott. Berta Maracchi Biagiarelli, conservatrice de la Bibliothèque, ne contient pas le texte de l'*Admonitio*, pas plus, du reste, que le cod. 229, qui en est une copie postérieure. A qui veut se faire une idée du texte de l'*Admonitio* contenu dans le MS Z, il ne reste qu'un procédé, celui déjà employé pour le MS G, à savoir mettre en parallèle, phrase par phrase, le texte du MS C et le texte imprimé par Baronius, — lequel est un combiné des MSS C et Z, — et de souligner dans ce dernier avec un crayon de couleur tous les mots ou membres de phrases qui ne se trouvent pas dans le MS C. Les quelques petits renseignements qui apparaissent ainsi ne sont certainement pas dépourvus d'intérêt.

II — UNE DISTINCTION NÉCESSAIRE

L'examen superficiel et rapide de nos 23 manuscrits fait immédiatement apparaître l'existence de deux catégories de textes de notre *Admonitio*: un texte court et un texte long, et l'on serait tenté tout naturellement d'y voir aussitôt deux recensions, dont la plus courte serait vraisemblablement la plus ancienne, et la plus longue la plus récente. Et pourtant il faut affirmer — toutes les pages qui suivent le prouveront jusqu'à l'évidence, — qu'une telle vision des choses non seulement serait parfaitement inexacte, mais encore fauserait complètement les conclusions qu'on prétendrait en tirer.

Disons-le tout net: il n'y a pas deux recensions de l'*Admonitio*, il n'y en a qu'une. Il n'y a pas un texte court et un texte long: il y a deux textes, primitivement tout à fait indépendants l'un de l'autre, et qui.

\(^12\) Paul Fabre: *Etude sur le Liber Censuum de l'Église Romaine* (Paris, 1892), 225.
dans des conditions difficiles à éclaircir, ont un beau jour été soudés ensemble de manière à n'en faire plus qu'un. De ces deux textes, l'Admonitio constitue le premier, qui est donné intégralement par les 23 manuscrits. Quant au second, que je n'ai jamais rencontré isolément, il n'apparaît que soudé au premier, et cela dans 11 seulement des 23 témoins étudiés, à savoir les MSS A, E, F, G, J, N, P, Q, S, V, X. Dans tout ce qui suit, cette partie additionnelle sera appelée Appendix. Faute de faire cette distinction capitale, un certain nombre d'auteurs ont erré — et errer peut-être encore — au sujet de cette pièce, dont l'intérêt pour l'histoire de certains points du droit ecclésiastique n'est certainement pas à démontrer.

III — LE TEXTE PRIMITIF DE L'ADMONITIO

Si l'on examine l'âge des 23 témoins que je produis, on constate que 3 d'entre eux appartiennent au xᵉ siècle (H N S), 3 sont du xiᵉ (D J K), 12 remontent au xiiᵉ (A B C E F M P Q R T V W), 2 enfin sont du xiiiᵉ (L X). Quant aux trois MSS G Y Z, que je ne connais que par les éditions et au sujet desquels je ne possède aucun renseignement, nul indice ne permet de leur attribuer une date quelconque de préférence à une autre.

Les manuscrits les plus anciens sont a priori ceux qui ont le plus de chances d'être les copies les plus fidèles de l'archétype. Cette règle, de simple bon sens, est complétée par une autre, non moins de simple bon sens, selon laquelle les textes les plus courts ont toute chance d'être les plus anciens. L'examen minutieux de chacun des témoins montre la rigoureuse exactitude des deux règles énoncées ci-dessus, et le lecteur le moins avertis pourra très facilement se convaincre, en parcourant les analyses qui vont suivre et en examinant l'appareil critique, que le MS H, c'est-à-dire le texte de l'Admonitio inclus dans le Pontifical romano-germanique, est à la fois le plus ancien et le plus court de tous, et est donc celui qui est le plus proche de l'original. Il représente le texte de l'Admonitio tel qu'il circulait à Mayence aux environs de l'an 950, et c'est lui qui servira de base à la présente édition.

On comprendra dès lors que j'aie tenu à en établir le texte de la façon la plus parfaite possible, et la chose ne présente aucune difficulté, car les trois témoins du Pontifical que j'ai interrogés présentent un texte remarquablement homogène. Ils ne se distinguent les uns des autres que par quelques menues différences de graphie ou quelques infimes accidents de transcription. Nous sommes donc assurés de posséder le texte original du célèbre livre rhénan.
L’examen attentif de l’*apparatus criticus* permet de dégager à ce sujet les trois conclusions suivantes, étant entendu que je ne fais pas entrer en ligne de compte ici les simples variantes orthographiques.

a) H¹ et H², copies de deux prototypes différents, sont absolument identiques. Le premier comporte simplement deux erreurs de mots,¹³ le second n’en comporte qu’une.¹⁴

b) H³, qui recopie le même modèle que H², en est cependant une copie un peu moins parfaite, puisque son scribe a à son actif cinq omissions de mots¹⁵ et six erreurs.¹⁶

c) Enfin, il est curieux de constater une omission commise par le prototype commun à H² et H³, à savoir l’absence dans ce manuscrit du n° 19. La présence unanime de cet article dans tous les témoins dérivant directement de l’archétype mayencçois me permet d’affirmer que son absence du modèle de H² et H³ n’est imputable qu’à un accident de transmission.

Dans la présente édition, le texte de H figure en caractères d’imprimerie normaux dans la colonne de gauche de chaque page de l’*Admonitio*.

**IV — LE TEXTE PRIMITIF DE L’APPENDIX**

Les mêmes critères qui m’ont fait choisir le MS H comme chef de file de tous les autres pour l’*Admonitio*, à savoir l’ancienneté et la brièveté du texte, m’ont fait semblablement choisir le MS S comme chef de file de tous les autres pour l’*Appendix*, c’est-à-dire le texte inclus dans la fameuse synodique de Rathier de Vérone, datée très précisément du Carême de l’année 966.

Exactement comme dans le cas du Pontifical romano-germanique, j’ai interrogé les deux plus anciens témoins de cette synodique, le manuscrit de Laon (S¹) et le manuscrit de Freising (S²), tous deux copiés à la fin du ixᵉ siècle, moins de trente ans après la promulgation de ce document. J’indiquerai en son temps les menues différences qui les caractérisent quant au texte de l’*Admonitio* et qui me font penser que le MS S² est encore plus proche de l’original que le MS S¹. Ces nuances

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¹³ N° 30, var. 1 — n° 48, var. 2.
¹⁴ N° 49, var. 3.
¹⁵ N° 59, var. 6 — n° 60, var. 7 — n° 64, var. 4 — n° 71, var. 1 — n° 80, var. 7.
¹⁶ N° 17, var. 3 — n° 40, var. 7 — n° 48, var. 2 — n° 49, var. 3 — n° 55, var. 3 — n° 64, var. 6.
n’existent même pas, j’ose dire, pour le texte de l’Appendix, et il suffira de parcourir les notes de l’appareil critique pour s’en convaincre. Le MS S, c’est-à-dire le texte de l’Appendix contenu dans la synodique de Rathier, est le plus ancien et le plus court de tous, et c’est donc celui qui est le plus proche de l’archétype. Il représente le texte de l’Appendix tel qu’il circulait à Vérone, en l’année 966, et c’est lui qui servira de base à la présente édition. Il figure en caractères d’imprimerie normaux dans la colonne de gauche de chaque page de l’Appendix.

V — Le classement des manuscrits

Les textes de base étant ainsi parfaitement définis, tant pour l’Admonitio que pour l’Appendix, le classement des manuscrits et l’étude de leur filiation ou de leur dérivation successives n’est qu’un jeu. Il s’est en effet produit pour ces textes ce qui se produit toujours en pareil cas, à savoir que, de transcription en transcription, de migration en migration dans des Églises toujours plus nombreuses et toujours plus lointaines de la chrétienté médiévale, des modifications plus ou moins importantes y ont été apportées. Pour être bref, disons que ces modifications sont de trois sortes :

a) *Additions* d’articles nouveaux, étrangers au texte primitif. Dans mon édition, leurs numéros seront affectés des notes *bis* ou *ter*, suivant le cas.

b) *Suppressions* d’articles originaux, certainement contenus dans le texte primitif.

c) *Interpolations* de mots ou de membres de phrases dans le corps des articles préexistants, — ou même déjà remaniés, — pour en éclairer, modifier ou compléter le sens.

Il est superflu de souligner que chacun de ces remaniements présente un intérêt considérable, puisqu’il permet de suivre l’évolution de ces textes à travers le temps et l’espace. De l’ensemble de ces constatations se dégage tout naturellement une très intéressante vue d’ensemble sur ces documents, qui couvre quatre siècles d’histoire et une aire aussi grande que l’Europe occidentale. Il va de soi que le texte critique de ces divers remaniements sera établi avec le plus grand soin. Nous allons voir que les 23 manuscrits se laissent très facilement diviser en cinq groupes tout à fait spécifiques, et que, à l’intérieur de chaque groupe, chaque témoin possède sa physionomie particulière. On pourra constater au passage qu’il s’est produit pour certains témoins un phénomène bien connu de tous ceux qui s’occupent d’éditions critiques, à
savoir la « contamination latérale » de certains d’entre eux par des manuscrits appartenant à un autre groupe. Dans certains cas, la chose est évidente: dans d’autres, au contraire, elle demande à être mise en évidence. Je préviens le lecteur que, dans chacun des groupes, je classe les témoins par ordre de fidélité décroissante au chef de groupe.

1 — Groupe de Mayence: B G K L M R Y.

Ce groupe, très ferme, se caractérise par une grande fidélité au prototype représenté par H, c’est-à-dire par le Pontifical romano-germanique, d’où le nom que je lui donne. Comme le prototype, les témoins de ce groupe ignorent l’Appendix, sauf le MS G, comme il sera dit ci-dessous. Caractérisons rapidement chacun des manuscrits.

B — Autant qu'on peut en juger à travers les variantes qu’a publiées Martène, ce témoin constituait une excellente copie de H. Tout au plus peut-on noter à son actif une omission (n° 59).

Y — Copie très fidèle du prototype H. On ne peut y découvrir que trois interpolations (n° 2, 5, 20), provenant de toute évidence d’une contamination latérale avec le groupe de Worms (w).

K — Excellente copie du prototype H. On doit cependant noter une omission (n° 6), une interversion (le n° 15 se trouve entre les n° 13 et 14), et enfin une interpolation (n° 45), qui paraît provenir d’une contamination latérale avec le groupe provençal (p).

LM — Ces deux témoins sont manifestement deux copies d’un même original, qui, tout en étant très proche de H, comportait cependant en plus une addition (n° 30° et) et trois interpolations (n° 58, 59, 60), provenant évidemment d’une contamination latérale avec le groupe de Vérone (v). Ces deux manuscrits ont en outre 19 variantes communes caractéristiques. Signalons, par ailleurs, que le MS L a en propre une interpolation (n° 5), provenant d’une contamination latérale avec le groupe de Worms (w) et que le MS M a en propre trois interpolations (n° 3, 9 et 45), provenant d’une contamination latérale avec le groupe picard (p1).

R — Ce manuscrit est, lui aussi, proche de H, dont il s’écarte cependant notablement plus que les autres témoins déjà cités. Il a, en effet, en propre, une addition tout à fait particulière (n° 50°), six

17 N° 2, var. 5 et 7 — n° 4, var. 1 et 2 — n° 5, var. 1 — n° 18, var. 2 — n° 23, var. 3 n° 27, var. 3 — n° 32, var. 2 et 5 — n° 33, var. 2 — n° 37, var. 3 — n° 42, var. 1 — n° 46, var. 4 et 10 — n° 55, var. 3 — n° 60, var. 2 et 5 — n° 67, var. 1.
omissions (n° 11, 18, 34, 35, 36, 37), et deux interpolations (n° 45, 47), provenant peut-être d'une contamination latérale avec le groupe picard (p1). Il possède de plus une rédaction tout à fait particulière de cinq articles (n° 55, 56, 72, 74, 82), et il a en propre 36 variantes tout à fait caractéristiques.18

G — Je ne peux que déplorer de n'avoir pas réussi à retrouver cet intéressant manuscrit dans les papiers et les documents laissés par Baluze. Autant qu'on peut en juger grâce au procédé dont j'ai parlé plus haut, G devait être une copie très fidèle de H, ce qui ne saurait surprendre, puisque, selon Baluze, le contexte dont il faisait partie n'était autre que celui du Pontifical romano-germanique. La seule différence qu'il est possible de noter, c'est une unique interpolation (n° 47), qui semble provenir d'une contamination latérale avec le groupe picard (p1). Mais le grand intérêt de ce témoin malheureusement introuvable, c'est que bien qu'appartenant essentiellement au groupe de Mayence, lequel, nous l'avons vu, ignore l'Appendix, il comportait cependant cet Appendix, et, fait encore plus digne de remarque, parce que rigoureusement seul de son espèce, un Appendix absolument complet (a = n° 83-99 inclus), et non pas le texte, tronqué de ses deux derniers articles, qui a été inclus dans le groupe de Vérone (v). J'ajoute, pour être exhaustif, que Baluze n'a pu s'empêcher, en combinant les MSS F et G, de modifier tant soit peu l'ordonnance de ce dernier. C'est en effet probablement à cet édifici — et non pas au texte original de G, — qu'il faut rapporter l'omission du n° 82 de l'Admonitio (incompatible avec le n° 99 de l'Appendix), ainsi que le report du n° 81 de l'Admonitio (incompatible avec le n° 83 de l'Appendix) juste avant le n° 99, avec lequel il fait manifestement double emploi.

Si l'on essaye maintenant de grouper toutes les indications que je viens de donner dans un stemma codicum qui tienne compte de tous les détails et de toutes les nuances, on obtient, sans trop de difficultés, le tableau suivant, dans lequel les traits pleins indiquent les relations de filiation directe, et les traits pointillés les contaminations latérales.

18 N° 1, var. 5 — n° 2, var. 1 — n° 3, var. 3 — n° 5, var. 4 — n° 8, var. 7 — n° 15, var. 1 — n° 16, var. 1 — n° 17, var. 7 — n° 23, var. 3 — n° 26, var. 1 — n° 27, var. 6 — n° 30, var. 3 — n° 31, var. 7 — n° 32, var. 3 et 6 — n° 33, var. 4 — n° 40, var. 3 — n° 43, var. 1 — n° 46, var. 4 — n° 52, var. 3 — n° 60, var. 2 — n° 61, var. 6 — n° 62, var. 1, 5 et 6 — n° 64, var. 5 — n° 67, var. 2 — n° 68, var. 3 — n° 69, var. 6 — n° 73, var. 2 — n° 74, var. 1 — n° 77, var. 1 et 3 — n° 79, var. 3 — n° 80, var. 5 et 7.
2 — Groupe de Worms: C D T V W Z.

L'épithète par laquelle je désigne ce groupe si caractéristique et très ferme ne veut nullement signifier que son prototype (w) est germanique, et encore moins qu'il a vu le jour dans la ville de Worms. Mais, faute de connaître l'origine de ce prototype, j'ai désigné le groupe qu'il commande par le contenu des deux manuscrits D et T, qui sont, nous le verrons, très proches du prototype. Or, ces deux manuscrits contiennent tous deux le Decretum de Burchard de Worms. J'ajoute que, pas plus que le groupe de Mayence (H), dont il dépend médiatement, le groupe de Worms ne connaît l'Appendix. En appliquant les mêmes règles critiques que précédemment, on arrive facilement à la conclusion que les MSS D T doivent être très proches du prototype de ce groupe (w), et que les quatre autres témoins en sont des copies plus ou moins médiates, ayant subi quelques interpolations et additions.

D T — Ces deux témoins, qui sont pratiquement identiques entre eux, ont toute chance d'être de très fidèles reproductions du prototype.

19 Ces deux manuscrits ont en commun 10 variantes absolument caractéristiques: n° 1, var. 2 — n° 18, var. 1 — n° 33, var. 7 — n° 33, var. 8 — n° 45, var. 1 — n° 46, var. 13 — n° 56, var. 6 — n° 58, var. 4 — n° 59, var. 2 — n° 69, var. 7.
de ce groupe. Celui-ci se caractérise parfaitement bien par la présence des modifications suivantes, qu'il a fait subir à l'archétype (H):

a) 22 interpolations caractéristiques: n° 2, 5, 8, 16, 19, 20, 22, 27, 30, 35, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77.

b) 4 additions d'articles nouveaux inconnus de l'archétype: n° 13bis, 13ter, 59bis, 59ter.

c) 1 suppression très caractéristique, celle du n° 55.

Les seules différences que j'ai pu relever entre ces deux témoins, c'est qu'au n° 35, le MS T ne comporte pas l'interpolation qui présente le MS D en cet endroit, et qu'au n° 9 se révèle une contamination latérale du groupe picard (p1).

W — Ce manuscrit appartient évidemment au groupe de Worms, puisqu'il en possède toutes les caractéristiques qui viennent d'être énumérées. Et pourtant, il n'est certainement pas un témoin immédiat du prototype w, car il possède en propre à son actif les modifications que voici:

a) 3 interpolations caractéristiques: n° 32, 62, 70.

b) 3 additions non moins caractéristiques: n° 40bis, 50ter, 63bis.

c) 1 suppression, qui lui est strictement personnelle: n° 19.

Il convient de plus de noter le curieux désordre qui a présidé à l'insertion dans ce témoin de deux des articles additionnels, dont la place est par ailleurs parfaitement assurée par le témoignage des autres manuscrits. Le n° 40bis ne se trouve pas inséré normalement entre les n° 40 et 41, mais bien, et pour une raison inconnue, entre les n° 39 et 40. Quant au n° 63bis, il ne se trouve nullement à sa place normale, c'est-à-dire entre les n° 63 et 64: il est au contraire bizarrement inséré dans le corps même du n° 64. Il paraît évident qu'il ne peut s'agir que d'une distraction de copiste.

C — Ce manuscrit forme avec les MSS V et Z un sous-groupe dont le prototype comportait toutes les caractéristiques du MS W et qui est parfaitement défini par l'addition qui lui est propre de deux articles, les n° 31bis et 31ter, qui proviennent certainement d'une contamination latérale du groupe de Vérone (v).

A ce trait commun aux trois témoins C V Z viennent, bien entendu, s'ajouter des particularités propres au seul MS C. C'est ainsi que la suppression du n° 55, qui affectait le prototype w a été comblée, et que des 22 interpolations qui affectaient ce même prototype, il n'en reproduit que 18, rétablissant pour 4 d'entre-elles (n° 5, 27, 46 et 47) le texte de l'archétype (H) grâce à une contamination latérale avec le groupe
de Mayence. Enfin, et surtout, le MS C a certainement subi personnellement la contamination latérale du groupe de Vérone (v), car, autrement, serait inexplicable la présence dans son texte des interpolations des n° 7, 25, 39, 42 et 64, la première surtout, où C reprend à son compte l’incise *sicat alibi scriptum invenimus*, qui est de la plume même du célèbre Rathier, et qui n’a absolument aucun sens en dehors du contexte très précis de sa synodique.

Z — Bien que je n’aie pas réussi à découvrir ce manuscrit, je puis affirmer qu’il appartenait certainement au groupe de Worms, et que, dans ce groupe, il était très proche du MS C. Pour autant qu’on en puisse juger d’après la comparaison entre le texte de C et celui de Baronius, on constate, en effet, qu’il possédait formellement 15 des 22 interpolations (n° 5, 16, 19, 22, 27, 30, 41, 47, 48, 50, 52, 68, 69, 75, 77), et 3 des 4 additions (n° 13, 59 bis et 59 ter) propres au prototype w. Il possédait certainement de même deux des interpolations (n° 32, 62) et deux des additions (n° 40 bis, 63 ter) propres au MS W. Il possédait évidemment enfin les deux additions (n° 31 bis, 31 ter) propres au MS C.

Il convient d’ajouter que, toujours autant qu’on puisse le savoir, le MS Z avait lui aussi subi la contamination latérale du groupe de Vérone, mais tout à fait différemment du C, puisque, sur les trois interpolations qu’il possède et qui sont imputables à cette source (n° 13, 25, 45), aucune d’entre elles n’est commune avec C. J’ajoute, pour être complet, que Z possède en outre trois interpolations qui lui sont strictement personnelles (n° 40, 60, 74) et que, pour une raison inconnue, il ne comportait pas dans son texte le n° 49.

V — Ce manuscrit possède toutes les interpolations et additions qui caractérisent le MS C, jusques, et y compris, la présence du n° 55, qui ne figurait pas dans le prototype w. Mais, à tous ces traits de famille, ce témoin ajoute évidemment quelques petites particularités qui lui sont propres. C’est ainsi que — comme nous venons de le voir pour C à propos d’autres articles — il a corrigé grâce à une contamination latérale du groupe de Mayence 4 interpolations qui figuraient dans le prototype (n° 19, 20, 35, 47). De même, il a subi une contamination latérale du groupe provençal dans la rédaction du n° 3, et il possède en propre l’interpolation du n° 6. Enfin, l’addition des n° 31 bis et 31 ter n’est pas faite après le n° 31, comme dans les autres témoins, mais bien entre les n° 30 et 31.

Mais ce qui fait l’intérêt particulier du MS V, c’est qu’il a subi une contamination latérale massive du groupe de Vérone (v), auquel il emprunte ni plus ni moins que tout l’*Appendix*, tronqué il est vrai, — on ne sait pourquoi, — des n° 83 et 84. Le caractère additionnel de
cette pièce dans le MS V se trahit de lui-même d’une part parce que le groupe de Worms auquel il appartient ne la comportait pas, et, de l’autre, et surtout, parce que l’entrée en ligne de compte de cette adjonction a manifestement déconcerté le copiste, ou celui du manuscrit qu’il reproduisait. Le texte de l’Admonitio qu’il avait sous les yeux se terminait très normalement par les n° 81 et 82. Voulant y insérer l’Appendix, tout en conservant par ailleurs aux n° 81 et 82 leur caractère terminal, il arrêta la copie de l’Admonitio après le n° 80, transcrivit alors l’Appendix, — qui fait ainsi figure d’énorme addition, — et clôtura le tout par les n° 81 et 82. Cette particularité donne à ce manuscrit un caractère tout à fait sui generis.

Il est facile, à partir de toutes les indications que je viens de fournir sur ces divers manuscrits, de dresser le stemma codicum du groupe de Worms,
3 — Groupe de Vérone: J N P S.

Autant le vocable que j’ai attribué au second groupe de nos manuscrits est discutable et purement pragmatique, autant celui que je donne au groupe que je vais maintenant présenter est fondé dans la réalité des faits. Le plus ancien manuscrit de ce groupe n’est autre, en effet, que la synodique du fameux Rathier de Vérone, se rapportant, nous l’avons déjà dit, au Carême de l’année 966.

Le texte de cette synodique, publié naguère par les Ballerini, a été divisé par ses éditeurs en 15 paragraphes, de manière à faciliter les références. Sur ces 15 paragraphes, 8 seulement sont de la plume de Rathier (§§ 1-5 et 13-15); les 7 autres, — un peu moins de la moitié du documents (§§ 6-12), — constituent le texte de l’Admonitio, possédant des caractéristiques sui generis, auquel est soudé l’Appendix. Les 4 manuscrits qui forment ce groupe constituent un ensemble très ferme et parfaitement homogène, et j’ai dit plus haut les raisons qui m’ont fait choisir le MS S comme prototype de l’Appendix, comme aussi de cette recension si particulière de l’Admonitio.

S — J’ai consulté, nous l’avons vu plus haut, les deux plus anciens manuscrits de la synodique de Rathier (S¹, S²) et le texte qu’ils donnent chacun est tellement concordant qu’il est évident qu’ils nous livrent la teneur du texte original, tel qu’il est sorti de la plume de son auteur.

L’Admonitio, telle qu’elle a été insérée par Rathier dans sa synodique comporte les particularités spécifiques suivantes :

a) 29 interpolations tout à fait caractéristiques, affectant les n” 7, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 52, 56, 58, 59, 60, 64, 67, 69, 71, 79.

b) 3 additions, non moins caractéristiques: n” 30bis, 31bis, 31ter.

c) 18 suppressions, dont on comprend parfaitement la raison pour les six premières et les deux dernières, à savoir leur incompatibilité respective avec la nature de la synodique d’une part, et, de l’autre, avec la présence de l’Appendix, mais dont on ne peut en deviner l’objet pour les autres. Il s’agit des n” 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 28, 29, 31, 40, 41, 50, 53, 54, 55, 81, 82.

Quant à l’Appendix, s’il est complet du début, ce dont nous sommes assurés par la concordance avec MS G, il ne l’est pas de la fin, puisqu’il lui manque les deux derniers articles (n” 98, 99) et que l’antépénultième est tronqué (n” 97). Il semble certain que cette petite mutilation soit le fait de Rathier lui-même, car il a pris soin, au moment où il interrompt brusquement la citation de ce document, de glisser dans le texte un et cetera révélateur (n” 97).
J'ajoute, pour être complet, que le MS S1 semble un peu moins parfait que S2. En effet, alors que le n° 31\,*\, y figure à sa place normale, le n° 31\,**\, bien loin de le précéder immédiatement, se trouve bizarrement intercalé entre les n° 16 et 17, et présente un texte mutilé et presque incohérent.20 De plus, ce manuscrit a en propre une omission, qui semble purement accidentelle, celle du n° 70. Enfin, il présente deux additions (n° 50, 66\,**\,), dont la seconde, absolument insolite, provient de toute évidence d'une contamination latérale du groupe provençal (p).

N — Excellent copie de S, qui présente cependant une interpolation (n° 39) dans le texte de l'Admonitio, ainsi que deux inexplicables suppressions dans celui de l'Appendix (n° 83, 84).

P — J'ai déjà signalé que ce manuscrit contient non seulement l'Admonitio et l'Appendix, mais encore toute la finale de la synodique de Rathier, à savoir les §§ 13-15 de l'édition des Ballerini. Il est plus tardif que les précédents, et, conséquence naturelle, il est moins proche de l'original. Son texte de l'Admonitio présente 4 interpolations particulières (n° 9, 19, 49, 61), et il a été augmenté de 3 additions (n° 31, 39\,**\,, 39\,**\,), pour les deux dernières desquelles il est le seul et unique témoin. Quant à son texte de l'Appendix, il est tronqué, comme dans le MS N, de deux articles (n° 83, 84), et il offre des deux n° 93-94 une rédaction spéciale et condensée, dont il est également le seul témoin.

J — Ce manuscrit dérive certainement de quelque manière d'un témoin du groupe de Vérone, puisque son texte de l'Admonitio en possède les 3 additions caractéristiques et 24 de ses 29 interpolations.21 Son texte de l'Appendix est de même identique à celui de S. Il a en propre une interpolation (n° 39), qu'il a en commun avec le MS P, et il omet, pour une raison inconnue, 5 articles qui figuraient dans S (n° 40, 51, 57, 83, 84). De plus, il place anormalement le n° 30\,**\, entre les n° 31 et 31\,**\.

Et cependant, il ignore systématiquement 18 des 19 suppressions si caractéristiques de S.22 Ce fait si particulier ne comporte qu'une seule explication, à savoir que son rédacteur — ou celui de son modèle — avait sous les yeux un exemplaire du texte de l'Admonitio du groupe de Mayence, et qu'il a purement et simplement combiné les deux textes. Cette hypothèse, non gratuite, est corroborée par un petit détail signi-

20 Je donne ce texte en note spéciale dans l'appareil critique.
21 Il ignore les interpolations des n° 16, 27, 43, 56 et 79.
22 Il n'en connaît que celle du n° 19.
ficatif. S avait supprimé, — je l’ai noté plus haut — les n° 81 et 82, incompatibles avec l’Appendix. Ils figuraient, au contraire, certainement dans l’exemplaire du groupe de Mayence que le copiste avait sous les yeux, et ce dernier, pour ne rien laisser perdre de ses deux sources, les a bravement transcrites après le et cetera si caractéristique du n° 97.

A l’aide de toutes ces indications, il n’est pas très difficile de dresser le stemma codicum du groupe de Vérone, qui exprimera les relations des divers témoins entre eux.

4 — Groupe Provençal: E F Q X.

Les deux groupes de Worms et de Vérone, que nous venons d’étudier, se rattachaient tous deux très étroitement, — quoique différemment dans chaque cas, — au prototype du groupe de Mayence (H), pour ce qui regarde l’Admonitio. Ils ne s’en distinguaient que par un nombre relativement minime d’interpolations, qui ne touchaient pas à l’allure générale du texte original. Avec le groupe provençal, que nous abordons maintenant, on assiste à un remaniement généralisé du texte de l’Admonitio (57 articles sur 80) et à une modification totale de celui de l’Appendix, qu’il emprunte à S en en remaniant toutes les phrases.

Pourquoi désigner par le terme de provençal ce groupe si particulier, vu que, sur les 4 témoins que je présente, deux sont catalans, un est français et le dernier italien ? La réponse est aisée. Lorsque au milieu du xir siècle, se déclancha la fameuse « reconquête » de la côte orientale de l’Espagne sur les Arabes par les soins des princes chrétiens, tous
les lieux libérés se virent immédiatement pourvus d’un clergé venu d’outre-monts, et très spécialement de Provence. C’est ainsi, par exemple, que Tortosa reçut des religieux venus en droite ligne de la célèbre abbaye de S. Ruf d’Avignon, et non seulement des religieux, mais encore des livres liturgiques et ecclésiastiques.\textsuperscript{23} Or, c’est précisément dans un manuscrit de Tortosa, le MS Q, que j’ai découvert le texte de notre \textit{Admonitio}, et c’est pourquoi, avec la plus grande vraisemblance, j’attribue à la Provence le prototype (p) de ce groupe si intéressant.

FQ — Ces deux manuscrits sont pratiquement identiques entre eux, ne différant que par quelques infimes variantes,\textsuperscript{24} aussi bien en ce qui concerne l’\textit{Admonitio} que l’\textit{Appendix}. Ainsi que je viens de le dire, il y a toutes chances qu’ils reproduisent fort exactement le prototype de ce groupe. Celui-ci se caractérise parfaitement par la présence des modifications suivantes :

a) 57 interpolations dans le texte de l’\textit{Admonitio}, soit 71 % des articles : n\textsuperscript{sr} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80.

b) additions d’articles nouveaux dans l’\textit{Admonitio} : n\textsuperscript{sa} 5\textsuperscript{bis}, 30\textsuperscript{bis}, 33\textsuperscript{bis}, 42\textsuperscript{bis}, 44\textsuperscript{bis}, 65\textsuperscript{bis}, 66\textsuperscript{bis}, 76\textsuperscript{bis}, auxquelles il convient d’ajouter une addition spécifique dans l’\textit{Appendix} : n\textsuperscript{de} 92\textsuperscript{bis}.

c) 4 suppressions caractéristiques des n\textsuperscript{sr} 41, 51, 81, 82 de l’\textit{Admonitio}, ainsi que des n\textsuperscript{sa} 83, 84 de l’\textit{Appendix}, ce qui démontre que ce dernier provenait apparemment d’un manuscrit comparable à J N P, du groupe de Vérone.

d) Je signale enfin deux très curieuses particularités. La première concerne le n\textsuperscript{de} 77 de l’\textit{Admonitio}, dont le texte, totalement transformé par rapport à l’archétype (H) contient, inséré dans le con-

\textsuperscript{23} Il existe de ce fait un témoignage matériel, à savoir la présence dans les archives de la cathédrale de Tortosa d’un magnifique missel (cod. 11), qui fut apporté directement de S. Ruf. L’occasion de la messe en l’honneur du saint porte ces mots: \textit{quorum reliquiae in hac ecclesia conservantur}, ce qui a donné naissance à la légende tenace, selon laquelle la cathédrale de Tortosa possédait le corps de s. Ruf!

\textsuperscript{24} Variantes propres à F: n\textsuperscript{de} 2, var. 1 — n\textsuperscript{de} 4, var. 15 — n\textsuperscript{de} 7, var. 12 — n\textsuperscript{de} 13, var. 3 — n\textsuperscript{de} 16, var. 8 — n\textsuperscript{de} 21, var. 1 — n\textsuperscript{de} 26, var. 6 — n\textsuperscript{de} 32, var. 14 — n\textsuperscript{de} 38, var. 4 — n\textsuperscript{de} 40, var. 16 — n\textsuperscript{de} 46, var. 2 — n\textsuperscript{de} 54, var. 1 — n\textsuperscript{de} 59, var. 3 — n\textsuperscript{de} 65, var. 3 — n\textsuperscript{de} 68, var. 5 — n\textsuperscript{de} 77, var. 10.

Variantes propres à Q: n\textsuperscript{de} 8, var. 7 — n\textsuperscript{de} 14, var. 2 — n\textsuperscript{de} 19, var. 9 — n\textsuperscript{de} 26, var. 6 — n\textsuperscript{de} 30, var. 6 — n\textsuperscript{de} 48, var. 8 — n\textsuperscript{de} 55, var. 3 — n\textsuperscript{de} 77, var. 10.
texte même de sa rédaction, l’article additionnel n° 76bis. La seconde intéresse l’Appendix. Je viens de signaler que, selon toute vraisemblance, le prototype du groupe provençal s’apparentait avec certains manuscrits du groupe de Vérone. Or, par un de ces petits mystères que l’on constate mais qu’on n’explique pas, le dit prototype connaissait aussi le texte complet de l’Appendix, tel que le donne le MS G. Il lui a donc emprunté les deux articles terminaux (n° 98, 99) laissés pour compte par Rathier, reproduisant le premier sans changement, — cas unique, — et interpolant légèrement le second.

Pour être parfaitement complet, j’ajoute que le MS F a à son actif une suppression (n° 14), unique en son genre et provenant selon toute vraisemblance d’une distraction du copiste, et que, de plus, il ne possède pas l’interpolation du n° 19, commune à tout le groupe, qu’il a dû corriger par contamination latérale avec le groupe de Mayence (H).

E — Ce manuscrit est, lui aussi, un témoin très fidèle du prototype du groupe provençal (p). Il possède cependant en propre une addition particulière (n° 12bis), et trois des interpolations spécifiques du groupe (n° 20, 30, 47) ont été corrigées par contamination latérale avec le groupe de Mayence (H).

X — On comprendra parfaitement que ce manuscrit tardif soit une copie moins fidèle du prototype p. C’est ainsi qu’il possède deux omissions caractéristiques, l’une dans l’Admonitio (n° 66), l’autre dans l’Appendix (n° 95), qui ne sont explicable que par une distraction du scribe. C’est cette même distraction qui explique une lacune du texte dans les n° 3-4: Nos uice XII apostolorum fungimur, [vos ad formam LXXII discipulorum estis. Nos pastores] vestri summus, vos plebi uobis commissae. C’est une autre distraction encore qui a fait intervertir les n° 14 et 15. Enfin, je signale que le MS X possède une interpolation propre, tout à fait sui genera (n° 72), et qu’il semble avoir corrigé une interpolation n° 16) par contamination latérale avec le groupe de Mayence (H).

Avant de résumer toutes les observations qui précèdent, concernant les témoins du groupe provençal, par un stemma codicum, je voudrais tout d’abord présenter le cinquième et dernier groupe, le groupe picard. Ainsi qu’on pourra s’en assurer par ce qui suit, ce groupe dérive partiellement du groupe provençal, et doit donc lui être rattaché assez étroitement.

5 — GROUPE PICARD : A.

Ce groupe est constitué par un unique manuscrit, le MS A, qui se rattache de toute évidence, par quelqu’un de ses ancêtres, au groupe
provençal. En effet, il a en commun avec le prototype de ce groupe ses 4 suppressions caractéristiques (n° 41, 51, 81, 82), 3 de ses 8 additions (n° 30bris, 33bris, 66bris) et enfin 15 de ses 57 interpolations (n° 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 36, 40, 45). Quant au vocabulaire que je lui donne, il ne signifie pas que son prototype a vu le jour en Picardie, car aucun élément ne permet de préciser tant soit peu ce point. Il est, comme celui du groupe de Worms, purement pragmatique, et il fait allusion au fait que l’unique manuscrit qui le représente appartenait à l’abbaye de Vicoigne, au diocèse d’Arras (Picardie).

Et pourtant, en dépit de ses attaches provençales, le MS A, tout au long de ses lignes, trahit une volonté de révision systématique des textes, tant de l’Admonitio que de l’Appendix. Il constitue une seconde tentative moins heureuse que la première, — celle du groupe provençal dont il est issu, — de modifier intentionnellement les textes originaux ou provençaux. C’est ainsi que le prototype dont il dépend (p1) possédait en propre 5 suppressions, une dans l’Admonitio (n° 72) et 4 dans l’Appendix (n° 86, 90, 98, 99), et surtout 39 interpolations sui generis, qui ne se rencontrent nulle part ailleurs (n° 9, 11, 18, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80).

Nous pouvons maintenant résumer toutes les remarques précédentes concernant les deux derniers groupes par un stemma codicum pleinement exhaustif.
Concluons. Du point de vue de l'Admonitio, conteneur intégralement dans nos 23 manuscrits, ceux-ci se laissent classer en cinq groupes distincts et parfaitement définis :

1 — Groupe de Mayence: H. BGK1.MRY;
2 — Groupe de Worms: CDTVWZ;
3 — Groupe de Véroné: JNPS;
4 — Groupe provençal: EFQX;
5 — Groupe picard: A.

Du point de vue de l'Appendix, seuls les trois derniers groupes le possèdent, étant entendu que le mystérieux manuscrit G n'entre dans aucune de ces catégories et doit donc être classé tout à fait à part.

— Manuscrit G
3 — S. JNPV;
4 — EFQX;
5 — A.

Rепétons-le: il semble difficile que de nouvelles découvertes, si nombreuses qu'elles puissent être, soient de nature à modifier si peu que ce soit la nomenclature et le classement que j'ai établis.

VI — LE TEXTE CRITIQUE DE L'ADMONITIO ET DE L'APPENDIX

Après toutes les précisions qui viennent d'être apportées et toutes les constatations qui viennent d'être faites, on peut affronter avec la sûreté désirable et la sérénité requise l'établissement du texte critique. Il suffira de feuilleter les pages qui suivent pour s'apercevoir que ce dernier ne comporte aucune difficulté majeure. Pour la disposition typographique, je me suis inspiré des magistrales éditions des Ordines et des Pontificaux romains du regretté Mgr Andrieu, lequel a véritablement été l'initiateur d'une méthode extrêmement nouvelle en la matière, — qui se recommande d'une parfaite clarté, — à savoir la disposition des textes en colonnes parallèles. Grâce à cet artifice typographique, la réalité des divers groupes de textes que j'ai mis en évidence saute littéralement aux yeux du lecteur le moins attentif.

Dans la colonne de gauche se trouve le texte original, imprimé en caractères ordinaires. Dans les colonnes qui sont à sa droite sont imprimés en petits caractères les mots ou phrases qui sont identiques au texte original. Sont imprimés, au contraire, en caractères ordinaires les mots ou les phrases qui en différent. D'un seul coup d'œil, on pourra ainsi mesurer la nature et l'importance des modifications apportées aux textes originaux. Quant aux articles additionnels, non seulement leurs numéros seront affectés de bis ou de ter, comme je l'ai dit, mais encore, pour rendre plus sensible leur caractère adventice, ils seront imprimés en italique.
ADMONITIO SYNODALIS

H et al. codd. prae ter NPS
1. Fratres presbiteri et sacerdotes domini, cooperatores ordinis nostri estis. 

corr. H
1. Fratres Karissimi, cooperatores ordinis nostri estis. 

AEFOX
1. Fratres (...) et sacerdotes domini, cooperatores nostri ordinis estis. 

H et al. codd. prae ter NPS
2. Nos quidem, quamuis indigni, locum aaron tenemus, uos autem locum eleazari et ithamar.

CDTVWLY
2. Nos quidem, quamuis indigni, locum aaron tenemus, uos autem locum eleazari et ithamar.

AEFOX
2. Nos quidem, quamuis indigni, locum aaron tenemus, uos (...), locum eleazari et ithamar.

H et al. codd. prae ter NPS
3. Nos uice XII apostolorum fungimir, uos ad formam LXX mur, uos ad formam LXXII disciplorum estis.

AEFOXMV
3. Nos uice XII apostolorum fungimir, uos ad formam LXX mur, uos ad formam LXXII disciplorum estis.

H et al. codd. prae ter NPS
4. Nos uero pastores uestri sumus, uos autem pastores animarum uobis commissarum.

corr. H
4. Nos uero electi pastores uestri sumus, uos autem pastores animarum uobis commissarum.

AEFOX
4. Nos (...) pastores uestri sumus, uos plebibus uobis commissae.

H et al. codd. prae ter NPS
5. Nos de uobis rationem reddirur sumus summo ihesu christo, uos de plebibus uobis commendatis.

DTVWZLY
5. Nos de uobis rationem reddirur sumus summo dominio ihesu christo, uos de plebibus uobis commendatis.

AEFOX
5. Nos de uobis rationem reddirur sumus summo dominio ihesu christo, uos de plebibus uobis commissae.

EFQX

5bis. *Nos de uobis pastoribus, uos\(^1\) uero\(^2\) de ouibus, id est de plebibus uobis commendatis.*\(^3\)

H et al. codd. praeter K.NPS

6. Et\(^1\) ideo, Karissimi,\(^2\) uidete\(^3\) periculum uestrum.

EFQX

V

6. Et ideo, Karissimi, uideamus periculum nostrum.

EFQX

6. Et ideo, filii\(^4\) Karissimi, praevideamus\(^5\) periculum\(^6\) tanti officii\(^7\) nobis commissi.

H et al. codd.

7. Admonemus\(^1\) itaque et obsecramus fraternitatem uestram, ut quae\(^2\) uobis sugerimus, memoriae\(^8\) commendetis et opere exercere studeatis.

JNPS.C

7. Admonemus\(^4\) etiam\(^5\) et obsecramus, sicut\(^8\) alibi scriptum\(^6\) inuenimus,\(^7\) fraternitatem uestram ut de communi salute nostra\(^8\) cogitantes attentius, audiatis admonitionem\(^9\) nostram, et quae\(^2\) uobis sugerimus, memoriae\(^8\) commendetis et opere exercere studeatis.
8. Inprimis admonemus ut uita et conversatio uestra in reprehensibilitatem sit, scilicet ut cella uestra sit iuxta ecclesiam, et in domos uestrae feminas non habeatis.


11. Missarum celebraziones religiosae peragite.
12bis. Nullus scaccis uel alearum ludis intendat.

13. Vasa sacra manibus propriis abluit et extergerit.\(^3\)

CDTVWZ

13bis. Nullus missam cantet solus.

13ter. Nullus ante solis ortum cantet, nisi in natale domini.

14. Nullus cantet missam nisi ieiunus.\(^2\)

15. Nullus cantet qui non communicet.\(^2\)

16. Nullus cantet sine amictu, alba, stola, fanone et casula.\(^5\)

H et al. codd. CDTVWZ JNPS EFQ

16. Nullus cantet sine lumine et sine amictu, alba, stola, fanone et planeta.\(^10\)

17. Et haec uestimenta nitida sint, et ad nullos usus alios sint.\(^7\)

H et al. codd. EAFQX

17. Et haec uestimenta nitida sint, et ad nullos alios usus sint.

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H et al. codd.

18. Nullus in alba qua in suos usus\(^1\) utitur praesumat\(^2\) missam\(^3\) cantere\(^4\).

19. Nullus in ligneo\(^2\) aut\(^3\) in\(^4\) uietreo\(^5\) calice au- deat missam can-

tare.\(^6\)

H et al. codd. praeter

NS

18. Nullus cum alba qua in suos usus utitur praesumat missam cantet.\(^5\)

19. Nullus in ligneo aut\(\ldots\) uietreo uel plumbeo uel copreio uel stagno calice au-
deat missam celebrrare.\(^8\)

CDTZ

P

A

18. Nullus cum alba qua in suos usus utitur, praesumat missam celebrrare.

19. Nullus in ligneo aut\(\ldots\) uietreo calice au-
deat missam celebrrare.\(^8\)

AEQX

H et al. codd.

20. Nulla femina\(^1\) ad altare\(^2\) domini\(^3\) acce-
dat, nec caliciem dom-
mini tangat.

H et omn. codd.

CDTW.Y

20. Nulla femina\(^1\) ad altare domini accedat, et calicem domini
contingat.

21. Corporale mundissimum sit.\(^1\)

CDTVWZ

22. Altare\(^2\) sit\(^3\) coo-
pertum de mundis lin-
teis.\(^3\)

22. Altare\(\ldots\) coop-
tum de mundis linteis.

JNPS

22. Altare sit coop-
tum de mundissimis linteis.

FQX


21. — 1. mundissimum sit] mundissimum sit sit: C; altare mundissimum sit: F.

23. Super altare nihil ponatur nisi capsae et reliquiae, aut forte quatuor euangelia, aut quinque cum corpore domini ad uitaticum infirmis.¹⁰

24. Caetera¹ in nitido loco recondantur.

25. Missalem plenarium (a) lectionarium et antiphonarium unusquisque habeat.

26. Locus¹ in secretario aut iuxta altare sit praeparatus, ubi aqua effundi possit, quando uasa sacra abluuntur.

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H et al. codd. 27. Et ibi uas nitidum cum aqua dependat, ut ibi sacerdos manus lauet post communionem.

DTVWZ 27. Et ibi uas nitidum cum aqua dependat, ibique (... manus lauet post communionem.

NPS AEFQX 27. Et ibi uas nitidum dependat cum aqua, ubi, sacerdos manus lauet post communionem.


AEFQX 28. Ecclesiae sint bene coopertae et camerate.

H et al. codd. praeter NPS 29. Et atrium ecclesiae sepe munitum.

EFQX 29. Et atrium ecclesiae sit undique munitum.

A 29. (... atrium ecclesiae undique muratum.

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(a) Missalem, plenarium. Ces deux mots apparaissent séparés par un signe de ponctuation dans 6 ms.: ADHMNY, parmi lesquels le plus ancien de tous, le ms. H, qui est le prototype de l'Admonitio. Il est hors de doute qu'il s'agit de deux livres liturgiques distincts, l'un contenant les formules proprement sacerdotales, l'autre les lectures de la messe. Tel est bien le sens du mot plenarium qui ressort des textes rassemblés par Du Cange. Le missel plenier, au sens moderne du terme, n'existait du reste pas à cette époque. La première mention qu'on puisse trouver de l'objet (et non encore du vocable) se rencontre, à ma connaissance, dans le testament du comte Heccard, seigneur de Perreyc (§ vers 873), qui léga divers objets parmi lesquels figure missale cum evangelis et epistolis (Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France, 1855, pp. 189-199). Au xi° siècle, les missels pléniers, devenus courants, étaient en passe de supplanter les anciens sacramentaires, comme en témoigne Léon d'Ostie pour le Mont-Cassin (PL 173, 735). Point n'est donc besoin de supposer la lecture: Missalem, psalterium, que suggerait Baluze (PL 132, 408), en s'appuyant bien à tort sur un texte de Gantier d'Orléans (PL 119, 734).
R. AMIET

H et al. codd.
30. Nullus\textsuperscript{1} extra ecclesiam\textsuperscript{2} per domos nec\textsuperscript{3} in locis non consecratis\textsuperscript{4} missam cantet.

JNPS
30. Nullus extra ecclesiam\textsuperscript{2} per domos aut in locis non consecratis\textsuperscript{4} missam cantet.

CDTVWZ.FQX
30. Nullus extra ecclesiam\textsuperscript{2} per domos\textsuperscript{5} nec\textsuperscript{3} in locis non consecratis\textsuperscript{4} missam\textsuperscript{6} cantet sine licentia sui episcopi.\textsuperscript{7}

JNPS.LM
30bis. Nullus solus missam cantet.

AEFQX
30ter. Nullus olus\textsuperscript{3} cantet missam.\textsuperscript{2} (a)

H et al. codd. praeter NS
31. Omnis presbiter\textsuperscript{1} clericum\textsuperscript{2} habeat\textsuperscript{3} ul\textsuperscript{4} scolarem,\textsuperscript{5} qui epistolam\textsuperscript{6} ul\textsuperscript{7} lectionem legat\textsuperscript{8} et\textsuperscript{9} ad missam respondet\textsuperscript{10} et cum quo\textsuperscript{11} psalmas\textsuperscript{12} cantet.

EFQX
31. Omnis presbiter clericum uel scolarem habeat, qui epistolam uel lectionem\textsuperscript{13} legat et ei ad\textsuperscript{14} missam respondet et cum quo psalmos cantet.

A
31. Quisque presbyter clericum habeat (...) qui epistolam uel lectionem legat eique ad missam respondeat et cum quo psalmos cantet.

JNPS.CVZ
31bis. Nullus cum calcaribus\textsuperscript{1} quos\textsuperscript{2} sporonibus rusticis\textsuperscript{3} dicimus,\textsuperscript{4} et\textsuperscript{5} cultellis extrinsecus dependentibus\textsuperscript{6} missam cantet, quia indecens\textsuperscript{7} et contra regulam\textsuperscript{8} ecclesiasticam\textsuperscript{2} est. (b)


(a) Le ms. A abrège cette phrase et la soude au n° 30: Nec solus cantet.
(b) Le ms. S\textsuperscript{3} présente de cet article le texte mutilé suivant: Nullus cum cultellis foris pendentibus nullus cum calcaribus.
31ter. Calicem et oblatam recta cruce signate, id est non in circulo et varicatione\(^1\) digitorum, ut plurimi uestrum\(^2\) faciant, sed\(^3\) strictis\(^4\) duobus digitis\(^5\) et pollice\(^6\) intus\(^7\) recluso,\(^8\) per quos trinitas innuitur:\(^9\) istud signum recte facere studete: non enim aliter quicquam\(^10\) potestis benedicere.

H et al. codd. 32. Infirmos uisitate et eos\(^1\) reconcile\(^2\) et iuxta apostolum\(^3\) oleo sancto\(^4\) inungite,\(^5\) et propria manu communicate.\(^6\)

CVWZ 32. Infirmos uisitate et ut res suas\(^1\) rationabiliter disponat\(^2\) a. amonnete,\(^3\) deinde\(^4\) os reconcile\(^5\) et iuxta apostolum oleo sancto\(^6\) inungite\(^7\) et propria manu communicate.

EFQX 32. Infirmos uisitate,\(^8\) et eos ad confessionem reconcile,\(^9\) oleo sancto ungite et propria manu communicate.

A 32. Infirmos uisitate, eosque deo reconcile, (...) oleo sancto ungite et propria manu communicate.

H et al. codd. 33. Et nullus\(^1\) praesumat\(^2\) tradere\(^3\) communionem\(^4\) laico aut feminae\(^5\) ad\(^6\) deferendum\(^7\) infirmo.\(^8\)

EFQX 33. (...) Nullus praesumat tradere communionem laico uel feminae ad deferendum infirmo.

A 33. (...) Nullus praesumat tradere communionem laico uel feminae ad ferendum infirmo.

AEFQX

33bis. Nullus sacrum crisma\(^1\) uendet.
H et al. codd.

34. Nullus uestrum pro baptizandis infantibus, aut infirmis reconciliandis, aut mortuis sepeliendis, praemium uel minimus exigi.\(^6\)

EFQX

34. Nullus pro baptizandis infantibus uel pro reconciliandis pecatoribus uel infirmis, aut pro mortuis sepeliendis, uel pro consecrandis ecclesiis praemium uel pretium siue minimus exigit, uel ecclesiis aliquorum, data pecunia uel aliquo malo ingeni, subripiat.

A

34. Nullus (...) pro baptizandis (...) uel pro corpore domini, uel pro reconciliacione, uel pro septurata, uel pro consecrandis ecclesiis praecum quaerat, uel ecclesias aliquorum, data pecunia, subripiat.

H et al. codd.

35. Videte ut per neglegentiam uestrarum nullas infanas sine baptismo moriatur.

CDW. JNPS. A

35. Videte ne per neglegentiam uestrarum nullas infanas sine baptismo moriatur.

H et al. codd.

36. Nullus uestrum sit ebrius et litigious quia serum dei non oportet ligare.

JNPS

36. Nullus uestrum sit ebrius et litigious, quia serum domini non oportet ligare.

AEFQX

36. Nullus uestrum sit ebrius uel litigious (\(\ldots\)).

H et al. codd.

37. Nullus arma ferat in seditione, quia arma nostra debent esse.

JNPS

37. Nullus arma ferat in seditione, quia arma nostra debent esse.

EFQX

37. Nullus arma portet in seditione, nisi uerum domini.

A

37. Nullus arma portet in seditione, nisi uerum domini.


38. Nullus\(^3\) canum\(^2\) aut\(^3\) auium ioci\(^4\) inseruia\(^t\).\(^5\)

\(H et omnes codd.\)

39. Nolite in tabernis bibere. \(\text{corr. } H^3\) \(\text{JN.CA} EFQX\)

39. Nulius in tabernis bibet aut\(^2\) bibat.

P

39\(\text{bis. }\) Nullus quando annuierasium diem uel tricesimum aut tercium alciuus defuncti aut quaecumque uocatione ad collectam presbiteri uenerint, se inebriare ullum tenus presumat, nec precari in amore sanctorum uel ipsius anime bibere, aut alios ad bibendum cogere uel se aliena precatione ingurgitare nec ultra terciam uicem poculum sumere, nec placus et risus inconditos et fabulas inanes ibi referre aut cantare presumat uel turpia loca, fidibus uel urso uel cerulo uel tornaticibus ante se facere permittat, nec larus demonum, quas uulgo talamascas dicunt, ibi ante se ferri consentiat, quia hoc diabolicum est et a sacris canonibus prohibitum.

39\(\text{ter. }\) In conuentu uestro alicui de diuina scriptura, quod ad edificationem pertinet, legi semper facite.

H et al. codd. praeter NPS Z AEFQX

40. Unusquisque uestrum quantum sapit plebi\(^4\) suae\(^2\) de evangeli uel\(^3\) apostolo die dominico\(^4\) uel\(^6\) festis diebus\(^8\) annuntiet.\(^7\)
R. AMIET

CVWZ

40bis. Unusquisque presbiter suum officium perfecte discat: qui autem illitteratus est ab officio suspendatur, nisi emendet. (a)

H et al. cod. praeter JNPS.AEFQX

41. Verbum domini debetis praedicare. 5

CDTVWZ

41. Verbum domini et non fabulas inanes ex corde uestro debetis praedicare. 6

H et al. cod.

42. Curam pauperum, 2 pe-reregirornm 3 et orphanorum 4 habete, et eos ad prandium uestrum inuitate.

EFQX

42. Curam pauperum, peregrinorum (...) orphanorum, 3 prebens 10 eius refectionem, 11 hospiciurn, 12 sustentationem, 13 habit.

A

42. Curam pauperum, peregrinorum (...) orphanorum habeat, eosque ad prandium inuitet.

EFQX

42bis. Discordes 3 ad concordiam reuocet. 2

H et al. cod.

43. Estote hospitales, ut a uobis alii exemplum bonum su-mant. 7

NPS

43. Viduas defendat, ut in his et in aliis huiusmodi 3 tocius 4 boni 5 exemplum capiant bonum praebant. 6

EFQX

43. Ut in his et aliis huiusmodi 3 a uobis alii exemplum capiant bonum praebant.

A


(a) Dans le ms. W, le texte de cet article est brouillé: Nullus unusquisque presbiter suum officium perfecte discat. Qui autem illitteratus est ab officio perfecte discat qui autem illitteratus est ab officio suspendatur non emendet.
44. Omni die dominico, ante missam, aquam benedictam facite, unde populus aspergatur, et ad hoc solum uas habete.

44bis. Et circa arium suum uel circa ecclesiam ad processionem eat.

45. Sacra uasa et vestimenta sacerdotalia nolite in uadimonium dare negoziatori aut tabernario.

45. Sacra uasa et vestimenta sacerdotalia nolite in pignore dare negoziatori aut tabernario.

46. Nullus uestrum minus digne penitentem cuiuscumque rei gratia ad reconciliationem adducat et ei testimonium rei reconciliatorum tierat.

46. Nullus uestrum minus digne penitentem cuiuscumque rei gratia ad reconciliationem adducat, et[om. (...) testimoniun reconciliationis ferat.}


Nullus ustrum usuras exigit, et conductor sui foenoris existat.

48. Res et facultates quas post diem ordinisationis ustrae acquiritis, sciatis ad ecclesiam matrem pertinere.

Nullus sine scientia et consensu nostro ecclesiam acquirat.}

Nullus sine scientia et consensu episcopi ecclesiam acquirat.}

Nullis sine scientia et consensu ustrae ecclesiam acquirat et obtiniet.}}

54

H et al. codd.

47. Nullus ustrum usuras exigit, et conductor sui foenoris existat.

48. Res et facultates quas post diem ordinisationis ustrae acquiritis, sciatis ad ecclesiam matrem pertinere.

H et al. codd.

49. Nullus sine scientia et consensu nostro ecclesiam acquirat.}

49. Nullus sine scientia et consensu episcopi ecclesiam acquirat.}

Nullis sine scientia et consensu ustrae ecclesiam acquirat et obtiniet.}}

(a) ad ecclesiam matrem pertinere. Le texte original de l’Admonitio (ms. H) attribuait à l’église (ad ecclesiam), sans préciser, les revenus et les acquêts dont le prêtre aurait été le bénéficiaire depuis son ordination. S’agissait-il de l’église au sens large, c’est-à-dire le diocèse, ou au contraire de l’église au sens particulier, c’est-à-dire la paroisse ? Le texte ne l’indiquait pas, et l’on comprend que les interpolations postérieures aient apporté les précisions nécessaires. Le groupe provençal, ainsi que le groupe picard, opte nettement pour la paroisse (ad ecclesiam ad quam titulati estis uel cui deseruitis), alors que le groupe de Worms, au contraire, opte pour le diocèse (ad ecclesiam matrem). L’église-mère, c’est la cathédrale de l’évêque, et, par extension, la mense épiscopale. Elle est mentionnée dans toute une série de textes contemporains, à commencer par Rathier de Vérone, qui en parle à propos de la réconciliation des pénitents le Jeudi-Saint: Quinta feria, hora nona, ad ecclesiam matrem omnes reconciliandi senite (PL 136, 566).
50. Nullus per potestatem saecULARIUM ecclesiam obtineat.  

52. Nullus ecclesiam ad quam titulatus est dimittat, et ad aliam questus gratia migret.

50bis. Nullus de quatuor portionibus aecclesiae (a) presumat dividere, nisi episcopus tussert.

50ter. Nullus presbiter sub potestate laicorum minister vel castaldio fiat.

(a) de quatuor portionibus aecclesiae. Les revenus financiers des paroisses, c'est-à-dire le casuel et le produit des dîmes ecclésiastiques, devaient être répartis en quatre parts égales, sous la responsabilité du curé, assisté de deux ou trois paroissiens éprouvés. La première alimentait la mense épiscopale, la seconde allait à la fabrique de l'église, la troisième servait à l'entretien du clergé et la quatrième constituait un fonds destiné à subvenir aux besoins des nécessiteux. Cette législation, déjà énoncée par Himenar de Reims au milieu du ixé siècle (PL 125, 779, n° XVI), a été reprise avec toute la clarté désirable par Ratcher de Véronc: ut de rebus ecclesiasticis quatuor fieri debeant partes, e quibus una episcopi, altera fabricae ecclesiae, tertia clericorum, quarta debet esse pauperum et hospitum (PL 156, 564).
53. Nullus plures ecclesiæ sunt sine adiutorio aliorum presbyterorum.

54. Nullatenus una ecclesia inter plures diuidatur.

55. Nullus alterius parrochianum nisi in itinere uel si ibi placitum fuerit, ad missam recipiat.

56. Nullus in alterius parrochia missam nullus cantet absque propriis presbiteri voluntate et rogatu.

57. Nullus decimam ad alium pertinentem recipiat.

53. Nullus plures ecclesiæ sunt sine adiutorio aliorum presbyterorum.


56. Nullus in alterius ecclesia alterius parrochia nullam missam cantet absque propriis presbiteri voluntate et rogatu.

57. Nullus decimam ad ecclesiam aliam pertinentem recipiat.
H et al. codd. 58. Nullus penitentem\(^1\) inuitet carnis manducare et\(^2\) bibere\(^3\) unim, nisi\(^4\) pro eo\(^5\) ad praesens\(^6\) elemosinam\(^7\) faciat.\(^8\)

H et al. codd. praeter B 59. Nullus praesumat\(^3\) baptizare,\(^2\) nisi in uigilia\(^3\) paschae\(^4\) et pentecostes\(^5\), nisi pro\(^6\) periculo mortis.

Z 60. Unusquise fontes lapideo\(^8\) habeat, et si lapideo habere non pos- sit, uas saltem ali- quod ad hoc paratum, in quo nihil aliud\(^8\) fiat.\(^9\)

A 60. Unusquise fontes (\(\ldots\)) habeat, et si non potest habere\(^8\) lapideo, habeat aliud uas ad hoc praeparatum, in quo nihil aliud fiat.

CDTVWZ 59bis. Nullus clericus uel laicus\(^4\) in ecclesia\(^2\) loqui audeat si non\(^3\) orat, maxime infra officium diuinum.

59ter. In sabbato pascha,\(^1\) extincto ueteri, nouus ignis benedicatur et\(^2\) per populum diuidatur, et aqua sancta\(^3\) similiter.

60. Unusquise fontes lapideo\(^8\) habeat, et si lapideo habere non pos- sit, uas saltem ali- quod ad hoc paratum, in quo nihil aliud\(^8\) fiat.\(^9\)

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59. — 1. praesumat\(\) presumat: LQ; presumat: X. — 2. praesumat baptizare: baptizare praesumat\(\) C. — 3. in uigilia\(\) in uigilia\(\): C; uigilia\(\): T; uigillia\(\): F; uigillilia\(\): X. — 4. paschae\(\) pasche: EL\(\text{PQ}\)R. — 5. pentecostes\(\) pentecosten: A\(\text{Q}\)R; penthecosten: L; pentecote: T. — 6. pro\(\) om. H\(\text{F}\)T. — 7. baptizare\(\) bati\(\text{\i}\)are: X.


59ter. — 1. pascha\(\) pascae: CT; paschae: D\(\text{VW}\). — 2. et populum... similiter\(\) om. DT. — 3. sancta\(\) benedicta: Z.

R. AMIET

R. AMIET

H² et al. codd. P A

61. Videte ut omnibus parrochianis uestris simbolum et orationem dominicum insinuetis. 61. Videte² ut omnibus² parrochianis² uestris² simbolum² et orationem² dominicum² insinuetis. 61. Videte ut in omnibus parrochianis uestris symbol et orationem dominicum insinuetis. 61. Omnibus parrochianis uestris symbol et orationem dominicum insinuete.

H et al. codd. CVWZ EFQX A


H et al. codd. corr. H³ A

63. Feria quarta¹⁰ ante quadragesimam,¹ plebem² ad confessionem³ inuitate, et ei³ iuxta⁴ qualitatem delicti penitentiam⁵ inu­ngite,⁶ non ex² corde uestro, sed³ sicut in pens­entiali scriptum est. 63. Feria que dicitur caput quadragesinum, plebem ad confessionem inuitate, et ei iuxta qualitatem delicti penitentiam inu­ngite, non ex corde uestro, sed sicut in pens­entiali scriptum est. 63. Feria quarta ante quadragesimam eos ad confessionem inuitate, ciscu­que iuxta qualitatem delicti poenitentiam inu­ngite, non ex corde uestro, sed sicut in pen­entiali scriptum est.


CVWZ

63bis. De\textsuperscript{a} illa quarta feria quae est caput ieiunii\textsuperscript{e} usque in diem resurrectionis domini, nullus manducet carnem uel (\textsuperscript{a}) sagam.

H et al. codd. JNPS.C EFQX A

64. Tribus tempoburis in anno, id est\textsuperscript{2} in natali\textsuperscript{3} domini, pascha et pentecosti,\textsuperscript{3} omnes fideles ad communiolem corporis et sauguinis domini accedere\textsuperscript{5} admonet.\textsuperscript{6}

64\textsuperscript{a} Tribus tempoburis in anno,\textsuperscript{10} id est\textsuperscript{4} in natale\textsuperscript{6} domini, et pascha et pentecostes omnes fideles\textsuperscript{11} ad communiolem corporis et sauguinis domini accedere admonet.\textsuperscript{8}

65. Certis temporibus,\textsuperscript{4} coniugatos\textsuperscript{2} ab uxoribus abstinere\textsuperscript{4} exhortamin.\textsuperscript{3}

H et al. codd. A

65. Certis temporibus, coniugati ab uxoribus abstinent.

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\textsuperscript{a} Le témoignage des ms. CVW est formel: tous les trois ont identiquement la leçon sagim, avec une barre abréviation sur le m. On ne saurait donc lire sanguinem, comme l’a fait Baronius, ce qui, du reste, offre un sens peu acceptable. Je propose de lire saginam, c’est-à-dire la graisse animale, par opposition aux huiles végétales commestibles, ce qui concorde tout à fait avec le contexte de cet article.
EFQX

65bis. Id est\(^1\) ad adventu\(^2\) domini usque ad transactas\(^3\) octabas\(^4\) epiphanie,\(^5\) et\(^6\) a septuagesima\(^7\) usque ad transactas\(^8\) octabas\(^4\) pasche,\(^9\) et\(^6\) a rogationibus\(^10\) usque ad transactas\(^8\) octabas\(^4\) pentecostes;\(^11\) preterea\(^12\) in omnibus\(^13\) sabbatis\(^14\) usque ad feriam secundam et uigilia\(^15\) sancte marie\(^16\) et sancti iohannis et apostolorum\(^17\) et uigilits indirectis aliorum sanctorum et eorum festis. \(^(*)\)

H et al. codd. 66. Eulogias post missam\(^2\) in\(^3\) diebus festis plebi tribuïte.\(^4\)

EFQ 66. Eulogias post missam dominicis diebus plebi\(^3\) tribuïte.

AEFQX.S\(^1\)

66bis. Nullus presbiter\(^4\) in itinere sine orario, id est\(^3\) stola,\(^3\) incedat.

H et al. codd. 67. Nullus uestrum\(^4\) induatuer uestibus\(^2\) laicalibus.

JNPS.A 67. Nullus (...) induatuer uestimentos laicalibus.

EPFX 67. Nullus uestrum uestimentis laicalibus\(^3\) et diuersis coloribus\(^4\) induatuer.


66bis. — 1. presbiter\] om. S\(^1\). — 2. orario, id est\] om. AS\(^1\); orario uel: G; oracio idet: X.


\(^(*)\) Le correcteur du ms. H\(^3\) avait certainement sous les yeux un modele apparente à la famille provençale, auquel il a maladroitement empreint le texte suivant mutilé: Videlisset in adventu domini, in quadragesima, in omnibus uigilis sanctorum, in ieiunis quatuor temporum, in octibus sabbatorum. L'abstention des rapports conjuguats pendant certaines periodes de l'annee liturgique est un des traits les plus caracteristiques de la morale sociale du moyen-age. On trouve des defenses semblables dans un tres grand nombre d'auteurs de l'epoque, a commencer par Rathier de Véroné, qui semble moins exigeant que notre texte (PL 136, 566).
69. Diem dominicum et alias festiuitates absque opere serulii  
a uespera in uesperam celebrari facite.

69. Domini-
cum diem alias festiuitates a uespera usque ad uesperam celebret 
inusquisque.
71. Carmina diabolica, quae super mortuos nocturnis horis uulgu facere solet, et cachinnos quos exercet, sub contestatione dei omnipotentis utetate.

72. Cum excommunicares nolite communicare.

73. Nullus illis praesumat missam cantare.

74. Sed et plebibus commissis uobis hoc annuntiate.

75. Ad nuptias nullus uestrum eat.


72. Cum excommunicares nolite communicare, neque bibere, neque manducare, neque in ecclesiis intrare.

73. Nullus praesumat missam cantare.

74. Et hoc plebibus uobis commissis annuntiate.

75. Nullus uestrum ad nuptias eat.


72. Cum excommunicares nolite communicare et communicare.

73. Excommunicatis missam ne cantetis.

74. Sed et plebi uobis commissis hoc faciat interdicit omnino.

75. Nullus presbyter ad nuptias eat.
76. Omnibus denuntiata\textsuperscript{a} ut nullus uxorem accipiat nisi publice celebratis\textsuperscript{b} nuptiis.

76bis. \textit{Et si} nuptias\textsuperscript{c} fieri prohibete \textit{ab adventu}\textsuperscript{d} domini usque\textsuperscript{e} transactas\textsuperscript{f} octabas\textsuperscript{g} epiphanie, et \textit{a septuagesima usque transactum} pasche\textsuperscript{h} clusum, et \textit{a rogacionibus}\textsuperscript{i} usque transactas\textsuperscript{j} octabas\textsuperscript{k} pente costes.\textsuperscript{l}

76. Nullus uxorem, nisi publice celebratis nuptiis, accipiat.

H et al. codd.

77. Raptum omnimosidis\textsuperscript{a} prohibete, et\textsuperscript{a} ut nullus ad proximam sanguinis\textsuperscript{i} sui accedat, et ut alterius sponsam\textsuperscript{k} nemo\textsuperscript{m} ducat.

CDTVWZ

77. Raptum omnimosidis\textsuperscript{a} prohibete, et\textsuperscript{a} ut nullus ad proximam sanguinis\textsuperscript{i} sui accedat, et ut alterius sponsam nemo\textsuperscript{k} ducat contradicite.

EFQX

77. Nullus\textsuperscript{a} sponsam alterius\textsuperscript{j} ducat.\textsuperscript{k}


78. Porcariorum et alios pastores uel dominica die admissam facite uenire.

79. Patrini filiolis et orationem dominicam insinuent aut insinuari faciant.

80. Chrisma semper sub serae sit aut sub sigillo propter quosdam infideles.

81. Volumus autem, fratres Karissimi, quatenus quae nostra perceptis traditione, quantum humana patitur infirmitas, bonis studiis operibus adimplere.
APPENDIX

S.G

83. Volumus autem scire de quolibet presbitero\textsuperscript{4} si ex ingenuis parentibus sit natus aut ex conditione\textsuperscript{4} scriuili, aut si de nostra parrochia\textsuperscript{3} aut\textsuperscript{4} de alia natus est aut ordinatus, uel ad quem locum pretitulatus.\textsuperscript{5}

84. Si scriuus fuit, ostendat cartam\textsuperscript{2} libertatis; si de alia parrochia,\textsuperscript{2} ostendat litteras commendatitias\textsuperscript{3} quas formatas\textsuperscript{4} uocant.

86. Si non, saltem\textsuperscript{3} teneat uel credat.

86. Et si non nouerit, saltem secum teneat et\textsuperscript{3} credat.


87. Orationes pro quo que missarum et can nonem bene intelli gat, et, si non, saltem memoriter ac distincte proferre ualeat.

88. Epistolam et eu angelium bene legere possit, et utinam ad litteram eius sensum posset manifestare.

89. Psalmorum urba et distinctiones regulariter exorde cum canticis consuetudinaris pronunciare sci at.

90. Sermonem, ut (a) superius dixi, athanasii episcopi de fide trinitatis, cuius initium est: Quicumque uult, memoriter teneat.

87. Orationes quo que missarum et prefaciones bene intelli gat, et, si non, saltem distincte ac memoriter ualeat proferre.

88. Epistolam et eu angelium bene legere possit, et utinam sensum ad litteram possit manifestare.

89. Psalmorum versus et distinctiones regulariter ex corde cum canticis consuetudinaris pronunciare possit.

90. Sermonem athanasii episcopi de fide trinitatis, cuius initium est: Quicumque uult, memoriter teneat et omni die cantet.

87. Orationes (***), missarum praefationem canonis, eundem canonem pleniter intelligat, ut memoriter ac distincte proferre ualeat.

88. Epistolae et euan gelii sensum saltem iuxta litteram sciat.

(b) ut superius dixi. Ces mots ne figuraient pas dans le texte original de l’Appendix, ainsi qu’en témoigne le ms. G. Ils sont de la main de Rathier de Véron, qui se réfère à un passage qui se trouve au début de sa synodique, dans lequel il est spécifié que les prêtres doivent savoir par cœur le célèbre Quicumque et soient capables de le réciter à l’évêque lors de sa visite pastorale (PL 136, 555).
91. Exorcismos et orationes ad catecumenum faciendum, ad fontem quoque conserandum, et reliquias preces super masculum et feminam pluraliter ac singulariter distincteque proferre ualeat.

92. Similiter ordinem baptizandi ad succurrendum infirmis, ordinem quoque reconciliandi iuxta modum sibi canonicum re-seruatum, atque ungender infirmos, orationes quoque eidem necessitati.

92bis. Ad infirmos quoque uisitandos et ad reconciliandum eos inuitatus spontaneus curat, et eorum necessitati non pro lucro terreno, sed pro illa caritate, qua Christus nos dilexit, subueniat et orationes et septem psalmos speciales circa eos decantare cur. 

EFQX


93. Similiter ordinem et preces in exequiis agendis defunctorum.

94. Similiter exorcismos et benedictio

95. Canticum nocturnum atque diurnum nouerit.

96. Comportum minorum, id est epactas, concurrentes, regulares, terminum paschalem et reliquis, si est possible, sapiat.

97. Martyrologium et poenitentiale habeat, ut secundum quod ibi scriptum est interroget conscientem aut confessum modo poenitentiae imponat.

93. — 1. exequis agendis agendis exequiis: V. — 2. defunctorum] defunctum: X.


G.EFQX

98. Libellum\textsuperscript{1} istum unusquisque habet et; frequenter legat,\textsuperscript{2} ne obliuioni\textsuperscript{3} tradat ea\textsuperscript{4} que\textsuperscript{5} sunt sibi\textsuperscript{6} obseruanda.

99. Quod, ut memoriter retinere et salubriter peragere ueleatis, omnipotens deus uobis concedere dignetur, cuius regnum et imperium sine fine permanet in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

EFQX

99\textsuperscript{7} Quod, fratres karissimi, ut memoriter retinere et salubriter peragere\textsuperscript{1} ualeamus, omnipotens\textsuperscript{8} deus nobis concedere dignetur, cuius regnum et imperium sine fine permanet in secula seculorum.\textsuperscript{9} Amen.

VII — Auteur de l’ADMONITIO

La lecture la plus superficielle soit-elle de notre Admonitio montre sans équivoque possible qu’elle est certainement très ancienne. Tout le suggère, depuis la nature des prescriptions qu’on demande au clergé d’observer jusqu’aux tournures de phrases et aux mots eux-mêmes. L’Admonitio est un document qui, manifestement, respire une vénérable antiquité, et c’est ce qu’avaient parfaitement vu, il y a longtemps déjà, des auteurs aussi différents que les Ballerini, Duchesne, Wattenbach et Morin.

Cependant, dès qu’on veut préciser quelque peu, on voit apparaître des difficultés et des obscurités qu’il est malaisé de dissiper facilement et qui tiennent à la nature même des choses, c’est-à-dire aux conditions dans lesquelles cette pièce est parvenue jusqu’à nous. Elle apparaît, en effet, brusquement dans le Pontifical romano-germanique du x\textsuperscript{e} siècle, où, semblablement à Melchisedech, elle est « sans père, sans mère, sans généalogie », et où, manifestement, elle fait figure de pièce rapportée et venue d’ailleurs. Il n’est pas impossible que le document utilisé par le compilateur mayençais ait porté des noms propres, ainsi que des indications de lieu et de date, mais, outre que la chose est malheureusement invérifiable, nous ne serions pas plus avancés pour autant, car ces précieux renseignements, s’ils ont jamais existé, ont été supprimés systématiquement. La pièce, telle qu’elle se présente, est non seulement parfaitement anonyme, mais encore dépourvue de toute attache avec des circonstances ou des lieux particuliers. Il est visible qu’on a voulu en faire un document possédant un certain caractère d’universalité.


Dans les siècles qui suivirent son apparition, et qui virent sa prompte diffusion dans toute chrétienté continentale, il est bien évident que toutes les copies qui en furent faites d’après le Pontifical romano-germanique, — qui est le prototype du groupe de Mayence que j’ai défini plus haut (H), — sont conformes à leur modèle, et donc strictement anonymes. Le groupe de Vérone, dont le prototype est la synodie de 966 (S) fait exactement de même, et Rathier, en y insérant l’Admonitio, n’a pas jugé utile de qualifier la source qu’il utilisait autrement que par les mots parfaitement neutres suivants: sicut alibi scriptum invenimus (n° 7). Il est probable que si Rathier a été aussi discret, c’est tout simplement parce que la source qu’il recopiait et qui provenait, — médiatement ou immédiatement, peu importe, — du Pontifical mayençais, était, comme son modèle, parfaitement anonyme.

Cependant, apparaissaient ça et là des révisions de ce texte vénérable: le groupe de Worms pour l’Admonitio seule, et le groupe provençal pour l’Admonitio et l’Appendix. Dans chacun de ces groupes, cette pièce n’apparaissait plus comme une citation d’un ouvrage plus considérable, mais au contraire, faisait figure d’un bloc erratique possédant une existence en soi, indépendamment de toute attache à une compilation quelconque, et il est tout naturel qu’on ait voulu percer l’anonymat dont elle s’entourait si jalousement, et ce pour lui donner plus de poids dans l’esprit de ses destinataires. Comme on ne possédait aucun élément d’appréciation, on fit ce qu’on a toujours fait en pareille matière, à savoir abriter la marchandise sous un pavillon célèbre, c’est-à-dire en attribuer la paternité à quelque illustre personnage.

Si je laisse de côté les titres factices, inventés par certains éditeurs pour présenter la pièce et qui n’ont en l’occurrence aucun intérêt,25

25 Il s’agit des MSS A J K M Z. A propos de ce dernier, que je ne connais malheureusement que par l’édition de Baronius, cet auteur, parlant de l’Admonitio, déclare ce qui suit: Reperimus eam in Vaticana Bibliotheca, hac videlicet inscriptione notatum: Leo quartus Romanus Pontifex homiliam conscrivit, quam quique episcoporum in synodi dioecesani recitaret ad clericos, qua edoceretur ecclesiastica officia. Reperi eam apud Anselnum Lucensem episcopum. Et il ajoute, dans une note marginale, l’indication complémentaire suivante: Lemis quarti Romani Pontificis sermo ex Vatic. Biblioth. cod. qui inscribirdt Liber censuum. Ces indications, parfaitement ambiguës, sont éclairées en partie par le fait que j’ai pu identifier l’une des deux sources de Baronius, celle d’Anselme de Luques, avec le MS C, dont le titre n’est nullement celui-là. Il semblerait donc que c’est dans le MS Z (Liber censuum) que l’Admonitio était précédée du long titre ci-dessus. A la réflexion, rien cependant n’est moins certain, d’abord parce que Baronius ne le dit pas explicitement, puis, et surtout, parce que la longueur et la prolixité de cet intitulé sont hautement suspectes. Il y a fort à parier qu’il émane, sinon de Baronius lui-même, du moins d’une main très postérieure au manuscrit qui le contient, et sa parenté avec le titre fictif sous lequel Martène a publié le MS A m’incline fortement à penser que cette hypothèse a toute chance d’être l’expression de la réalité.
je ne trouve pas moins de huit manuscrits portant un nom d’auteur. Les voici par ordre alphabétique, fidèlement transcrits.

C — Incipit sermo quem sanctus Leo papa compositum in synodo dicendum.
D — Epistola Leonis papae legenda in synodo.
E — Exhortatio ad presbyteros Euticiam papaem.
FQ — Epistola Leonis papae ad presbyteros.\(^{26}\)
P — Sermo beati Cesarii episcopi in presentia cleri.
TW — Sermo in synodo dicendus quem sanctus Leo papa compositum.

Remarquons tout d’abord que, hormis le cas de P, que je résoudrai tout à l’heure, tous ces témoins appartiennent soit au groupe de Worms (CDTW), soit au groupe provençal (EFQ). Remarquons aussi que, dans aucun d’entre eux, la pièce est désignée par le mot admonitio, qu’elle portait comme prédicat (et non pas comme titre) dans le Pontifical romano-germanique: 4 la baptisent sermo (CTW.P), 3 epistola (D.FQ), un exhortatio (E), toutes désignations particulièrement inexactes pour un document purement canonique. Remarquons enfin que 6 d’entre eux l’attribuent à un pape Léon non précisé, qu’un autre en fait l’œuvre du pape Eutychien, et qu’un autre, enfin, y voit l’ouvrage d’un saint Césaire, qu’on peut sans témérité identifier avec l’illustre évêque d’Arles. Aucun des manuscrits que je viens de citer n’étant antérieur au xi\(^{\circ}\) siècle, on est en droit de se demander la valeur qu’il faut attribuer à des indications aussi tardives.

Dom Morin a parfaitement qualifié l’attribution au pape Eutychien, de la seconde moitié du xi\(^{\circ}\) siècle, propre au MS E: “C’est tout simplement une anerie de copiste,” écrit-il, non sans malice.\(^{27}\) Quant à la dévolution à saint Césaire d’Arles, propre au MS P, elle est apparemment moins simple à résoudre, et le même Dom Morin, que taquinait sans doute déjà l’idée de rassembler, sinon de publier, les opera omnia du grand évêque des Gaules (ce qu’il fera quarante-cinq ans plus tard), la considérait d’un œil excessivement favorable: “L’origine assignée à l’admonition synodale par le manuscrit de Munich, écrit-il, n’a rien en soi que de très vraisemblable,” et il parle plus loin de “la pièce telle qu’elle a dû sortir des mains de son auteur dans la première moitié du sixième siècle.”\(^{28}\) La question est d’importance, et elle vaut que je m’y arrête un instant.

\(^{26}\) Le MS Q omet les mots ad presbyteros, mais sa quasi-identité avec le MS F permet de n’y voir qu’une simple omission de copiste.
\(^{27}\) Morin, loc. cit., p. 104.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 108.
Toute l’argumentation de Dom Morin pour appuyer cette thèse repose sur la concordance — indéniable — qui existe entre deux sermons de saint Césaire (serm. 294 et 295: PL 39, 2303 et 2307) et un article additionnel de l’Admonitio, le n° 3941, dont il est le seul et unique témoin et qui a trait à l’intemperance des clercs par rapport aux plaisirs de la table. Faute d’étude critique de la question, Dom Morin s’imaginait que cet article appartenait au texte original de l’Admonitio, et que, s’il ne figurait pas dans les quelques autres témoins, qu’il connaissait, c’est parce que « tout ce passage a été supprimé dans les autres rédactions, destinées à un usage officiel. Il n’y a pas lieu de s’en étonner, ajoute-t-il: il renferme certaines crudités capables d’effaroucher des susceptibilités respectables.” 29 M. le Professeur Chavasse a porté un premier coup à cette thèse en faisant remarquer30 que cet article, bien loin d’être original dans l’Admonitio, se retrouvait mot à mot dans le capitulum 14 de Hincmar de Reims, daté de 852 (PL 125, 776),31 et qu’il avait donc toutes chances d’être une interpolation. Ce qui n’était — et ne pouvait être — qu’une simple conjecture de sa part devient aujourd’hui l’expression même de la vérité, grâce à la présente édition critique, qui met en lumière que cet article ne constitue qu’une addition très postérieure, concernant un unique témoin, le MS P.

Mais, à cette remarque déjà fort pertinente, il convient d’ajouter un argument définitif, que ni Dom Morin ni M. Chavasse ne pouvait deviner, le premier parce qu’il s’est mépris sur le texte qu’il étudiait, le second parce qu’il n’a jamais eu sous les yeux le manuscrit en question. Il ressort clairement de l’article de Dom Morin que ce dernier croyait avoir découvert dans le MS P le seul exemplaire connu du “texte complet” de l’Admonitio, le texte qu’il déclarait “écouté de la fin” dans les diverses éditions qu’il a signalées et comparées à P. Or, l’examen attentif du manuscrit montre que, sous le vocable de saint Césaire, est contenue non pas l’Admonitio “complète,” mais bien la presque totalité de la synodique de Rathier de Vérone (§§ 6-15 de l’édition

29 Ibid., p. 107.
31 Ce texte devait avoir à l’époque quelque notoriété, car il était connu de Régimond de Prüm, qui le cite en abrégé (Inquisitio, art. 59: PL 132, 189), et il est reproduit intégralement dans le Décret de Burchard de Worms (lib. II, cap. 161: PL 140, 652). Hincmar et Burchard l’attribuent tous les deux à un concile de Nantes (Concilium Nannetense), et, de fait, il y a bien eu un concile tenu dans cette ville (Mansi, t. XVIII A, col. 165-174), mais les canons qui nous en sont parvenus ne contiennent nullement ce passage. D’ailleurs, la date de ce concile est parfaitement incertaine: Mansi la fixe à la fin du IXe siècle, alors que Hefele-Leclercq (t. III, 1re partie, p. 296-298) parlent de l’année 658! 
des Ballerini). Cette constatation absolue place apodictiquement le nom de saint Césaire sur le même rang que celui du pape Eutychien, à savoir celui d'une "anerie de copiste." 32

Reste le pape Léon, qui est patronné par 6 de nos manuscrits (C D F Q T W), et qui est réputé saint par trois d'entre eux (C T W). Aucun des six témoins ne précise de quel pape il s'agit et on aurait ainsi théoriquement le choix entre quatre personnages: saint Léon le Grand (440-461), saint Léon II (682-683), saint Léon III (795-816) et saint Léon IV (847-855), la date de l'Admonitio, que nous tâcherons d'établir tout à l'heure, ne permettant pas de descendre plus bas dans la chronologie des papes.

C'est Baronius qui, le premier (1602), a lancé dans le public érudit ce nom du pape Léon, en précisant, sur la foi du MS Z (laisse-t-il entendre) qu'il s'agissait du pape Léon IV. Faute d'avoir retrouvé ce témoin, je n'ai pu vérifier ses dires, qui, je le notais il y a un instant (note 25 ci-dessus), me paraissent quelque peu suspects, au moins sur ce point précis. Ce qu'il y a de sûr, c'est que ce nom de Léon IV a fait véritablement fortune, et que cette attribution a pendant longtemps d'autant plus passé pour certaine que Baronius avait publié l'Admonitio dans son registre de Léon IV, lui attribuant même la date précise de 855.

Cette attribution, quelle que soit son origine dans les manuscrits précités, ne tient cependant pas devant le plus élémentaire examen, et c'est Duchesne qui a démontré péremptoirement son inanité. "Je ne puis croire, écrit cet illustre critique, que cette pièce soit de Léon IV ou même d'un pape quelconque. Elle ne contient aucun trait caractéristique des usages romains. Elle suppose un diocèse séparé en un grand nombre de paroisses rurales. L'évêque qui parle se dit vicaire des apôtres et non pas de saint Pierre, etc..." 33 J'y ajoute un petit détail caractéristique. Au n° 80, il est prescrit de conserver le saint chrême sous clé à cause des païens: or, il n'y avait plus de païens à Rome à cette époque. La cause est donc entendue: l'attribution à Léon IV est purement et simplement apocryphe.

Faute de mieux, nous en sommes donc réduits aux minces indices que nous livrent la critique interne de l'Admonitio. L'exorde de cette pièce laisse clairement entendre deux choses: d'abord, qu'il s'agit d'un

32 Je n'ai pas à insister sur l'attribution hypothétique de l'Admonitio à saint Ulric d'Augsbourg, émise naguère par Velserus à propos du MS J, provenant de l'abbaye de Nereshem, au diocèse d'Augsbourg (PL 135, 1069). Comme je le montrerai dans un instant, l'archétype de l'Admonitio est antérieur d'au moins cent ans à l'épiscopat de ce saint personnage.

document épiscopal à l’usage du clergé diocésain (n° 17), puis que sa promulgation est le fait non pas d’un évêque isolé, mais bien d’une assemblée épiscopale (n° 4). Notre Admonitio est donc le fruit des délibérations d’un concile régional ou d’un synode provincial, et cette constatation ruine définitivement les conclusions qu’on pourrait tirer des titres que nous venons d’examiner, et qui tous font de l’Admonitio l’œuvre d’un unique personnage.

Je suggérais tout à l’heure que le compilateur du Pontifical mayençais avait peut-être supprimé de cette pièce, avant de l’insérer dans son ouvrage, des indications précises de personne, lieu ou date qui s’y trouvaient primitivement. La chose est bien entendu indémontrable, mais ce qu’il y a de sûr, c’est que ce même compilateur savait que le document dont il tirait parti était l’émancipation d’une réunion d’évêques: la preuve, c’est qu’il l’a insérée dans le cadre de son Ordo qualiter agatur concilium provinciale, et non pas dans celui d’un simple synode diocésain.

En toute hypothèse, il nous faut nous résigner à ignorer — jusqu’à preuve du contraire — les noms des auteurs de notre Admonitio, comme celui ou ceux de l’Appendix, pour ne rien dire des articles additionnels qui sont venus lentement l’enrichir au cours des siècles.

VIII — DATE DE L’ADMONITIO

Dès 1602, nous venons de le voir, Baronius situait notre Admonitio au ixᵉ siècle, et plus précisément à l’année 855. Je viens de démontrer qu’il parlait d’une base fausse, à savoir l’attribution au pape Léon IV, mais on sait qu’il en va des vérités comme des erreurs: une fois lancées, elles font leur chemin jusqu’à ce qu’un quidam arrive à prouver le contraire. Dès 1671, Baluze, qui, nous l’avons vu, connaissait deux témoins de l’Admonitio (F G), émettait l’hypothèse que cette pièce était plus ancienne encore. Ego puto illum Leone antiquiorem esse (PL 132, 408), sans toutefois motiver son jugement. La question de la date de notre Admonitio ne paraît pas, dans la suite, avoir beaucoup excité la sagacité des érudits, et c’est tout à fait en passant que Wattenbach, dans les quelques lignes de présentation qu’il consacre au MS L, indique incidemment que ce texte lui paraissait du ixᵉ siècle. Il avait quelque mérite à émettre cette hypothèse rien qu’au vu de la pièce, car il la croyait totalement inédite, et ignorait par conséquent les anciennes appréciations que je viens de citer. Essayons nous-même de cerner davantage ce petit problème, en examinant successivement les éléments de son terminus ad quem, puis de son terminus a quo. La réponse, on le verra, ne laisse pas d’avoir quelque intérêt.
J'ai dit plus haut que le plus ancien témoignage manuscrit de notre *Admonitio* était le Pontifical romano-germanique de Mayence, compilé aux alentours immédiats de l'année 950. Il s'en faut de beaucoup pour autant que cette pièce date de cette époque, car on peut en retrouver la trace dans toute une série de documents bien antérieurs au Pontifical.

Au début du XIᵉ siècle, le célèbre Régimon, abbé de Prüm († 915), rédigea sur l'ordre de son métropolitain, Radbod de Trèves, une collection très importante, divisée en deux livres et concernant toute la discipline ecclésiastique. Le premier livre s'ouvre par une *inquisitio*, c'est-à-dire une longue liste de 95 questions que l'évêque ou ses vicaires généraux devaient poser aux curés de paroisse et aux prêtres en général lors de la visite canonique habituelle (PL 132, 187-191). Or, sur ces 95 questions, 71 procèdent la plupart du temps ad litteram, de notre *Admonitio* et de l' *Appendix*, dont elles suivent l'ordre, à peu d'exception près. La comparaison mot à mot des questions posées avec les articles correspondants de l' *Admonitio* permet même de savoir à quel groupe appartenait le texte que Régimon avait sous les yeux. Sans entrer ici dans des détails qui alourdiraient tout à fait inutilement cet article, disons qu'il s'agissait certainement d'une copie appartenant au groupe de Mayence (H), mais possédant l' *Appendix* identique au MS G, c'est-à-dire absolument complet. On peut relever par ailleurs 3 cas de contamination latérale avec le groupe provençal (n° 36, 66**, 85) et 4 avec le groupe picard (n° 47, 52, 71, 87).

Une soixantaine d'années avant l' *inquisitio* de Régimon, Hincmar, archevêque de Reims, publiait à l'usage du clergé de son diocèse, une série de *capitula synodica*, datées très exactement du 1er novembre 852, établissant en 17 chapitres toute une série de règlements concernants la discipline ecclésiastique, auquel était jointe une *inquisitio* en 21 chapitres, du type de celle de Régimon (PL 125, 773-783). Or, si l'on examine avec soin les textes de ces deux documents, on constate qu'ils totalisent à eux deux 35 points de contact avec l' *Admonitio* et l' *Appendix*, qui, dans plus de la moitié des cas, sont cités ad litteram. Un examen mot à mot de ces textes permet même de conclure que Hincmar avait sous les yeux un exemplaire de l' *Admonitio* se rattachant au groupe de Mayence (H) avec un *Appendix* apparenté au groupe de Vérone (S), avec 3 contaminations latérales du groupe provençal (n° 3, 25, 66). Il convient enfin de remarquer que si les *capitula* font des emprunts tant à l' *Admonitio* qu'à l' *Appendix*, l' *Inquisitio* elle, n'emprunte qu'à l' *Admonitio*.

Dans le premier quart du Xᵉ siècle, donc une trentaine ou une quarantaine d'années avant les textes que je viens de citer, Hatton,
évêque de Bâle (802-822) publia un capitulaire de 25 canons concernant la discipline ecclésiastique (PL 105, 763-768). Sans que ces textes fassent aucun emprunt littéral à l'Admonitio ou à l'Appendix, il est cependant clair qu'ils s'en inspirent à 19 reprises différentes, en particulier en ce qui concerne les jeux d'animaux auxquels il était interdit aux prêtres de participer, la défense de célébrer la messe dans des lieux non consacrés, et les contacts avec les clercs gyrovagues. De tous ces témoignages, la conclusion s'impose inéluctablement, à savoir que le terminus ad quem de l'Admonitio et de l'Appendix se situe dans les deux premières décades du ixᵉ siècle.

C'est à M. le Professeur Chavasse que revient le mérite d'avoir cerné le premier le problème du terminus a quo de nos deux documents, et nous allons voir que ses conclusions rejoignent parfaitement celles que nous venons de tirer.

Au no 32 de l'Admonitio, il est prévu que le prêtre, en visitant les malades ou les mourants, devra observer une série de rites dans un ordre déterminé: d'abord, réconciliation (pénitence), puis onction, et enfin communion. De plus, dans le même article, il est prévu que c'est le prêtre lui-même qui pratiquera les onctions d'huile sainte sur le corps du malade. Telle n'était certainement pas la pratique des temps antérieurs, car, à l'époque mérovingienne, ni la succession des rites n'était la même, ni encore moins l'onticen des malades n'était un privilège sacerdotal. Saint Césaire d'Arles, lorsqu'il parle de cette onction, n'envisage même directement que son emploi par les fidèles. Le fait de réserver aux prêtres seuls le sacrement d'extrême-ontion, comme le fait d'indiquer un ordre déterminé pour la collation des sacrements aux malades sont l'une des caractéristiques de la réforme carolingienne. Ni l'un ni l'autre ne paraissent avant le ixᵉ siècle.

Au no 33 de l'Admonitio, il est formellement interdit de confier à un laïc, homme ou femme, le soin de porter la communion à un malade. Or, avant le ixᵉ siècle, aucun texte conciliaire ou synodal n'a jamais interdit cette pratique, qui semble avoir été courante aux temps mérovingiens. C'est la réforme carolingienne qui a réservé aux prêtres seuls le soin de porter l'eucharistie à domicile aux personnes qui ne pouvaient se rendre à l'église.

Il en est de même pour la prescription du no 44 de l'Admonitio, selon laquelle tous les dimanches, avant la grand-messe, le prêtre devra bénir solennellement de l'eau et en asperger les fidèles. Selon Martène,"

34 Ces canons furent reproduits ad litteram et publiés sous le titre de capitula ecclesiastica par l'empereur Louis II le Bègue en 856 (PL 138, 623-628).
35 Chavasse, loc. cit.
36 Martène: De antiquis Ecclesiae ritibus (éd. de Venise-Bassano), t. III, col. 64.
le premier témoignage connu concernant cet usage est celui du chap. 5 des capitula de Hincmar de 852, déjà cités. Aucun document antérieur ne fait la moindre allusion à cette pratique, et, de ce fait, nous voici une fois de plus ramenés aux premières décades du ix° siècle.

Au n° 46 de l’Admonitio, il est prescrit au prêtre de ne pas amener à l’évêque, pour qu’il le réconcilie solennellement, des pénitents indigènes: c’est une allusion évidente à la pratique de la pénitence publique. Au n° 63, au contraire, il est rappelé aux prêtres qu’ils doivent entendre en confession leurs paroissiens à l’occasion du début du Carême, le mercredi des Cendres: c’est la pratique de la pénitence privée. La distinction formelle que font ces deux textes entre la pénitence publique et la pénitence privée, entre les péchés publics et les péchés secrets, entre le for externe et le for interne, est, absolument caractéristique de la réforme carolingienne: rien de tel dans les siècles antérieurs.

Enfin, pour terminer cette longue liste, j’attirerai personnellement l’attention du lecteur sur la formule finale qui clôt l’Appendix, qui est tout à fait caractéristique: ... omnipotens Deus nobis concedere dignetur, cujus regnum et imperium sine fine permanet in saecula saeculorum. Elle n’est autr que le souhait final qui clôt obligatoirement chacune des bénédictions épiscopales dont le recueil a été publié par Alcuin dans son célèbre Supplément au Sacramentaire grégorien. Or, c’est un fait, elle n’apparait jamais dans les bénédictions antérieurs, appartenant à la liturgie gallicane, que j’ai consultés. Les plus récentes recherches fixent aux années 796-803 la compilation de ce Supplément, et l’insertion de cette formule dans l’Appendix, indique donc que lui aussi n’est pas antérieur au ix° siècle. Tout ce faisceau de constatations montre donc avec une très forte présomption que le terminus a quo de nos deux documents se situe dans les premières années du ix° siècle.

La conclusion de tout ce qui précède est parfaitement claire. Tous les indices que je viens de rassembler prouvent avec une véritable évidence que l’Admonitio, comme l’Appendix, sont des pièces qui sont à dater à coup sûr du début du ix° siècle. Elles sont absolument de la même veine que les grands conciles réformateurs que Charlemagne suscita dans tout son empire en l’année 813. Leur date doit être très proche de cette dernière, si elle ne se confond pas avec elle.

IX — LIEU DE L’ADMONITIO

Déjà en 1765, les Ballerini avaient émis l’hypothèse que l’Admonitio et l’Appendix avaient dû voir le jour dans les pays d’ancien rite gallican. Cum porro nonnulla disciplinae capita ibidem praescripta ex Gallicana Ecclesia originem ducant, eamden admonitionem in Galliis conditam abitamur (PL
136, 553). Si l’on compare leur hypothèse avec tout ce que je viens de dire, on conclura que leurs vues à ce sujet étaient véritablement prophétiques, avec cette nuance que nos documents sont nés, non pas tant en France que dans l’empire franc. Quelques indices, tirés des textes eux-mêmes, corroborent cette pensée.

Ainsi, au n° 16, sont énumérés les vêtements sacerdotaux dont le prêtre doit se revêtir pour la célébration de la messe. Or, deux des mots employés sont spécifiques de la terminologie franque: *fanon*, mis pour *manipule*, et *chasubie*, utilisé de préférence au vocable romain de *planetæa*.

Il est de plus à remarquer que les plus anciens témoignages localisés de nos deux documents sont tous d’une aire déterminée: Bâle, Reims; Prüm, Trèves. Cette constatation est renforcée par une autre, à savoir que l’*Admonitio* a été connue et utilisée par le rédacteur du Pontifical romano-germanique, compilé à Mayence, et que, de plus, dans 3 de nos manuscrits (D P Y), elle accompagne le Décret de Burchard de Worms. Sans vouloir le moins du monde tirer le plus du moins, on ne peut s’empêcher de penser que nos textes ont vu le jour dans un secteur déterminé de l’empire de Charlemagne, limité par les grands centres religieux que je viens d’énumérer, à savoir la Lotharingie ou la Rhénanie méridionale. On ne peut malheureusement préciser davantage.

X — Composition de l’*ADMONITIO*

L’*Admonitio synodalis* s’ouvre par un préambule solennel, quoique anonyme, qui cherche son inspiration dans la pure ligne biblique, en comparant les évêques à Aaron et aux apôtres, et les prêtres aux fils d’Aaron et aux 70 (ou 72) disciples. Les premiers, conscients de leurs responsabilités, adjurent les seconds de les entendre, de les comprendre et de leur obéir (n° 1-7). Puis, sans transition aucune, succèdent une série de prescriptions canoniques (on n’ose pas dire des canons), formant un ensemble hétéroclite, où sont déversées pêle-mêle une masse d’indications, dont la caractéristique essentielle est le manque absolu de prétention à un ordre systématique quelconque (n° 8-80). Le tout se termine abruptement par la réitération des ordres du début et une doxologie (n° 81-82). Lorsque l’*Appendix* fut ajouté à l’*Admonitio* (n° 83-98) on écourta cette dernière de ses deux derniers articles, et on munit le tout d’une nouvelle doxologie, différente de la première et la couronnant assez heureusement (n° 99).

Le texte de l’*Admonitio* défie toute analyse. Tout au plus, peut-on essayer, pour y voir plus clair, de grouper *grosso modo* les prescriptions par ordre des sujets traités:

— sainteté de vie du prêtre: n° 8-12; 36-39; 44; 67.
— droit liturgique: n° 13-27; 30-31; 59-60.
— visite pastorale: n° 31-35; 46.
— science du prêtre: n° 40-41.
— charité sacerdotale: n° 42-43.
— le prêtre et l’argent: n° 45-48; 57; 68.
— stabilité du prêtre: n° 49-54.
— devoir d’hospitalité: n° 55-56; 58.
— la prédication: n° 61.
— vie liturgique des fidèles: n° 62-66; 69; 78-79.
— abus à réprimer: n° 70-74.
— le mariage: n° 75-77.

Quant à l’Appendix, il est beaucoup plus homogène. Après de brèves indications concernant les candidats au sacerdoce (n° 83-84), il renferme de minutieuses prescriptions au sujet de la science des prêtres (n° 85-98).

Déjà la constatation de ce désordre invraisemblable invite à regarder l’ensemble comme une compilation faite en dehors de toute considération logique. Les constatations supplémentaires que l’on peut faire du point de vue littéraire consolident pleinement cette impression première. Sur les 82 articles de l’Admonitio, 61 s’adressent directement aux prêtres et leur donnent des ordres: or, sur ce nombre, 29 sont rédigés en style direct, à la 2ème personne de l’impératif: surgite, decantate, peragite, sumite, extergite, insinuate, invitante, etc.37 Au contraire, 32 sont rédigés en style indirect, à la 3ème personne du subjonctif: nullus cantet, nullus auudat, nullus praesumat, nullus exigat, nullus obtineat, nullus supplanet, etc.38 L’Appendix, lui, est plus homogène, puisque tous ses articles sont au subjonctif. Quant aux additions, 3 seulement sont à l’impératif,39 contre 15 au subjonctif.40

Il est facile de conclure de ces diverses constatations que notre Admonitio est un document hybride, qui combine maladroitement et sans aucun ordre ceux ou plusieurs sources distinctes. La chose est d’autant plus flagrante que l’on peut constater l’existence de doublets.

37 N° 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 32, 35, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78.
38 N° 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67, 73, 75.
39 N° 31bis, 31ter, 70bis.
40 N° 12bis, 13bis, 13ter, 30bis, 31bis, 33bis, 39bis, 40bis, 42bis, 44bis, 50bis, 50ter, 59ter, 63bis, 66bis.
L'adjonction massive de l'Appendix, ainsi que de 23 articles additionnels, n'est certainement pas faite pour clarifier le problème. Il serait évidemment du plus haut intérêt de confronter ces résultats avec les sources canoniques plus anciennes, connues par ailleurs, pour déterminer la part des réemplois et celle des articles propres à notre document. Les dimensions de ce travail m'obligeant à y renoncer, et à me borner à émettre le voeu que, sur sa base, un canoniste soit tenté par cet examen.

XI — Survie de l'Admonitio

Les lois, qui émanent des hommes, non seulement sont à l'image de ces derniers, mais aussi en suivent inexorablement les vicissitudes. Les lois naissent, vivent et meurent, comme ceux qui les font, alors même que leur esprit leur survivit, dans la mesure où elles touchent aux choses essentielles. Notre Admonitio, née au début du ix° siècle, était déjà vieille de 150 ans lorsque le compilateur du Pontifical romano-germanique le sauva de l'oubli en l'insérant dans son œuvre monumentale. Ce faisant, et à son insu, il lui infusa une vie nouvelle, car il la fit participer à l'extraordinaire diffusion de cet ouvrage dans toute la chrétienté médiévale des xi° et xii° siècles. Il est hautement significatif que, sur les 23 manuscrits que j'ai examinés 12, — la moitié, — appartiennent au xii° siècle. Un siècle plus tard, le vieux pontifical mayencais était définitivement démodé, remplacé avantageusement par des productions nouvelles dont je vais parler dans un instant. C'est un fait: le pontifical romain du xii° siècle, suivi de peu par le pontifical de la Curie, et, à la fin du xiii° siècle, par le Pontifical de Guillaume Durand, évêque de Mende, ont tous les trois largement puisé dans le vieux livre rhénan; aucun des trois cependant n'a repris à son compte, dans l'ordo du synode, notre vieille Admonitio, qui semblait avoir ainsi définitivement achevé sa carrière quatre fois séculaire.

Dans la première année du pontificat d'Innocent VIII parut à Rome le premier pontifical romain imprimé (1485), dont la rédaction avait été confiée à trois liturgistes éminents: Agostino Patrizi, Jean Burckhart et Jacques de Luzio. On a la surprise de constater, en feuilletant ce volume, que notre Admonitio, munie de son Appendix, y fait sa réapparition toujours incluse, bien entendu, dans le cérémonial du synode, non plus provincial, cependant, mais simplement diocésain. La comparaison minutieuse de ce texte avec celui de l'édition critique présentée ci-dessus fait apparaître que les compilateurs ont utilisé plusieurs sources, et qu'ils ont infligé au texte primitif un certain nombre de modifications.
C'est certainement le texte de H que Patrizi et ses collaborateurs ont eu principalement sous les yeux, comme en témoignent de nombreux indices, à commencer par la mention: Tribus temporibus in anno (n° 64). Mais il est non moins évident qu’ils devaient avoir en même temps sous les yeux un exemplaire du groupe de Vérone, auquel ils empruntèrent par exemple les variantes pignus (n° 45) et sedulo (n° 85), ainsi que les deux seules additions qu’ils ont utilisées (n° 31bis et 31ter), non moins qu’un exemplaire du groupe provençal, auquel seul appartenaient des variantes telles que LXXII (n° 3), choreas (n° 70), orthodoxorum patrum (n° 85) ou encore cantus ... sciat (n° 95). De plus, pour des raisons qui ne se laissent pas deviner, Patrizi a omis complètement les n° 6, 15, 18, 19, 24, 49, 51, 59 et 75 de l’Admonitio, ainsi que les n° 83, 84, 86, 88, 97, 98 et 99 de l’Appendix, et il a pratiqué arbitrairement de curieux déplacements ou interventions, par exemple la suite suivante: n° 16, 17, 11, 12, 13, 22, 20, 23, 24-29, 50-54, 30, 30bis, 55, 56, 31ter, 19, 31.

On peut également constater qu’il a remanié en l’amplifiant le texte de certains articles, par exemple les n° 26-27:

Patrizi

In sacristiis siue secretariis aut iuxta altare maius sit locus aptus ad infundendum aquam ablationis corporalium et linteorum, vasorum et aliarum rerum sacrarum ac manuum, postquam sancta christum aut oleum catechumenorum uel infirmorum tractaveritis. Ibique pendeat vas cum aqua munda pro lavandis manibus sacerdotum et aliorum qui rem sanctam et officium divinum sunt peracturi, et proprie linteum mundum ad illas abstengendum.

Admonitio

Locus in secretario au iuxta altare sit praeparatus, ubi aqua effundi possit quando vasa sacra abluantur. Et ibi vas dependeat, ut ibi sacerdos manus lavet post communionem.

Enfin, il y a lieu de noter l’introduction par Patrizi d’un article nouveau, inconnu de l’Appendix, qui se place après le n° 85 et dont voici le libellé: Introitum missae, orationes, epistolam, graduale, evangelium, symbolum et cetera non secreta, alta et intelligibili voce proferat: secreta vero et canonom morose et disincte submissa voce legat.

Ainsi modifiée par Patrizi, l’Admonitio a été réimprimée sans changement dans toutes les éditions successives du Pontifical romain: Rome 1497, Brescia (Colles Vallis Trompiae) 1503, Venise 1510, Lyon 1511, Venise 1520, Lyon 1542, Venise 1543, 1561, 1572, 1582, jusqu’au jour où Clément VIII ordonna de préparer et d’en publier une édition
typique soigneusement révisée. L'Admonitio y figure toujours dans le cérémonial du synode diocésain, mais, si l'on compare le nouveau texte à celui de Patrizi, on constate que cette pièce a été profondément remaniée, retouchée, modifiée, et surtout rajeunie, je veux dire élargie de certains articles désuets et augmentée d'articles nouveaux. Il est sans intérêt pour le présent travail de comparer ce dernier texte, qui figure encore aujourd'hui au Pontifical romain, avec le précédent et encore moins avec le texte primitif. Je me contenterai de renvoyer le lecteur curieux à l'édition des deux textes de 1485 et 1595 qu'a donnée Baluze et qui a été fidèlement reproduite en PL 132, 458-462.

XII — Conclusion

L'Église est conservatrice. Elle offre encore en plein xxᵉ siècle à ses clercs la lecture et la méditation d'un texte vieux de 1100 ans, qui a été élaboré au temps du vieil empereur Charles. Bien qu'il ait été passablement rajeuni en 1595, certaines de ses instructions ont encore un air vieillot qui ne manqueraient pas de causer un certain étonnement, si elles étaient proclamées telles quelles en plein synode de 1964. Telles sont les prescriptions concernant l'exclusion absolue des femmes de la demeure du prêtre, l'obligation de se lever la nuit pour chanter matines, la défense de recommander à l'évêque des pénitents qui n'en seraient pas dignes, le rachat d'une partie de la pénitence canonique au moyen de l'aumône faite par autrui, l'avertissement à donner aux fidèles de communier trois fois l'an, l'abstention à certaines périodes liturgiques de l'acte conjugal, la mise en demeure de célébrer le dimanche a vespera in vespem et vingt autres prescriptions du même genre, qui relèvent d'un temps à jamais révolu.

Et cependant, même à travers une présentation matérielle, antique et vieillotte, il faut dire que passe un souffle qui, lui, est toujours actuel, parce qu'il est esprit et qu'il n'a donc pas d'âge. À travers ces prescriptions, dont certaines d'entre elles datent terriblement, on voit apparaître le visage éternel de la sainte Eglise, qui veut que ses prêtres soient les plus parfaits possible pour conduire les âmes qui leur sont confiées vers Dieu le plus parfaitement possible. Et, en définitive, c'est avec émotion qu'on relit le vieux souhait terminal, de saveur gallicane, qui a été conservé par Clément VIII: Praestante Domino nostro Jesu Christo, cui cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto est honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum.

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The "Analytics"
and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure

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I

From the viewpoint of a mid-twentieth century approach, metaphysical doctrines in St. Thomas Aquinas inevitably prove difficult. They are for the most part developed in the course of theological discussions, they are nowhere systematized as an organic whole, and they are couched in professedly equivocal notions that do not readily submit to norms of mathematical logic or contemporary linguistic analysis. These factors converge with cumulative effect upon present-day efforts to understand metaphysics as a genuine science of real things, and especially as a science of what is beyond the sensible order.

Yet that is the way metaphysics is regarded in the writings of St. Thomas. It is presented not merely as an authentic science, but as the most scientific type of science, as science in the highest degree.1 Moreover, unlike logic, it is a science of real things, a science of things divine, a science concerned principally with God and directed in its entirety towards knowledge of God.2 Its purpose, accordingly, is to enable human reason to probe divine being on the strength of principles derived from sensible things. It is clearly meant, then, to bear upon things in their own real existence.

1 Text infra, n. 17. On the location of the metaphysical doctrines within the theological context, and the lack of a philosophical synthesis of them in St. Thomas himself, see Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. L. K. Shook (New York, 1950), 7-8. The "equivocal" character of a metaphysical notion means that the one notion is partly the same and partly different, in each of its instances. In this way being is called equivocal in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, tr. John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), II, 723 (Ia X Metaph., lect. 3, no. 1982). Unity is likewise called equivocal, ibid., no. 1981.

What are the sources of present-day difficulties in understanding Thomistic metaphysics in this way as a science of real things? The sources are undoubtedly many and varied. An attempt to subsume them under any one schema may be expected to turn out abortive. They are deeply ingrained, and may easily remain unnoticed as conceptions that obscure the professedly scientific character of Thomistic metaphysical investigation. A present-day student may perhaps have to rid himself of them laboriously one by one as he grapples with the Thomistic texts and tries repeatedly to place himself in the correct perspective for assessing the original intent of these writings.

One basic trouble, for instance, is the tendency to conceive the metaphysics of St. Thomas as an ontology. Ontology, in the historically established sense of the term, is a general study of being that remains in some way distinct, at least partially, from a natural theology. It is a study of being that is not primarily, from the viewpoint of method, a study of God. On the strength of a concept that is regarded as common to all beings and proper to none, it allows the investigation of being to proceed to the transcendentals and to the ultimate distinction between being and thing without having first established the nature of being as subsistent in God.

The difficulties of finding an authentically scientific object in the general notion of being, understood in this ontological way, have become only too clear in the course of philosophical thought from the time of Kant’s Critique. Being, when considered as a nature isolated by a process of abstraction in the way humanity or animality is isolated, turns out to be an empty concept that is the equivalent of nothing and is a notion incapable of serving as an object of scientific investigation.

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3 See Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, ed. Jean Ecole (Hildesheim, 1962). Where “ontology” is used indifferently for “metaphysics,” as in Fernand van Steenberghen, Ontologie (Louvain, 1946), 9-10, it may expressly include the philosophical study of God; see ibid., p. 10, n. 1. But it will treat the study of God as just one part of the whole discipline, namely as the study of infinite being that comes in order after the study of finite beings, with both subsumed under the general notion of being; see ibid., pp. 130-191. The notion of a science that through studying the primary being is thereby a science of all beings, does not seem to come at all under the scope of “ontology.” On the different meanings that the concept of ontology has taken on since its appearance in the seventeenth century, see Günther Jacoby, Allgemeine Ontologie der Wirklichkeit (Halle, 1925), I, 12-17. In contrast with ontology, Jacoby notes (p. 16), metaphysics may be understood as the investigation of the supersensible world as such. For a recent study of the Aristotelian metaphysics as basically a theology, see Giovanni Reale, Il Concetto di Filosofia Prima e l’Unità della Metafisica di Aristotele (Milan, 1961), esp. p. 314.

4 See Hegel, Logik, xo. 87; Robin G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), 15.
In regard to the Aristotelian metaphysics, in particular, a recent study\(^5\) has focused attention rather sharply on this fate of the ontological approach to the Stagirite's being \textit{qua} being. The controversies about the evolutionary development of Aristotle, from Jaeger on, took for granted that there actually was in the \textit{Metaphysics} a conception of the discipline as "a sort of ontological phenomenology"\(^6\) that differed in character from a study of separate substance. But in this perspective the Aristotelian doctrine that being is not a genus quite evidently does away with the possibility that being could function in its generality as the object of a science. In consequence metaphysics, according to this critique, remains a study only of problems, having undoubted humanistic value in a general culture,\(^7\) but lacking the possibility of ever attaining the status of a science.

However, even when Aristotelian metaphysics is recognized frankly as a study of a definite type of beings, the separate substances, according to the formulæ in the \textit{Metaphysics} that characterize it as a theology, difficulties still remain when one's glance passes over to the metaphysics of St. Thomas. The Aristotelian separate substances had been established by a process of reasoning that was based upon the eternity of the cosmic processes and that implied souls for the heavens. Both these tenets are expressly rejected by St. Thomas,\(^8\) in full realization that their acceptance is necessary for the Aristotelian way of reasoning to the separate substances. Immaterial entity, accordingly, cannot be established for St. Thomas in the same way as it was for Aristotle.

In fact, against the Greek metaphysical background, effort is required to avoid the notion that St. Thomas' reasoning to subsistent being is grounded on some permanent feature in the natures of sensible things. Before Aristotle, Plato had reasoned to supersensible forms, the Ideas, from the requirement of a stable ground for virtuous conduct and for scientific knowledge of things. Likewise, after the time of St. Thomas, Duns Scotus maintained the requirement of quidditative being as the starting point for the proof of God's existence, in order that the demonstration proceed from something necessary rather than from something contingent.\(^9\) The basing of the demonstration on


\(^{6}\) Werner Jaeger, \textit{Aristotle}, tr. Richard Robinson (Oxford, 1934), 204. This is "the theory of the various senses of 'being'," ibid., p. 202.

\(^{7}\) Aubenque, 503-505.

\(^{8}\) \textit{In XII Metaph.}, lect. 5, nos. 2496-2499; \textit{CG}, I, 13, Praedictos.

\(^{9}\) \textit{Ordinatio}, I, 2, 1-2, no. 56; ed. Vaticana, II, 161.10-162.8. Cf. "...non de existentia, sed
a contingent characteristic such as the actual existence of sensible things had to be avoided. Yet St. Thomas' reasoning is founded upon the reception of being by sensible things. The existence of sensible things, however, is not something absolutely permanent. On the contrary, it is continually perishing into the past. It is, moreover, an actuality that is accidental to the nature of any observable thing.10

The difficulties arising from this accidental character of sensible existence become more acute as they emerge against the contemporary background. For instance, all existential statements may be required to conform with the original type made about sensible things. Every existential proposition, in this framework, will have to express contingency. The notion of something that is existence by reason of its essence becomes nonsensical and appears as a violation of logic and of language. Any way of establishing existence as a nature in itself is thereby precluded. Known originally in sensible things as contingent, it has to stay contingent in any alleged application of it to something beyond the sensible order. The possibility that its full and primary meaning may be other than what is found in sensible things is not acknowledged. Against this background all metaphysical reasoning may be regarded as a trans-type procedure, passing over illegitimately from the contingent to the necessary and vice versa. Existence is accordingly ruled out as a basis for reasoning from the sensible to the supersensible world.11

de esse quidditativo," Quaest. super Metaph., I, I, 49; ed. Vivès, VII, 37a. The Scotistic proof for God's existence, based as it is upon finite nature, has to make the leap from finite nature to an infinite nature. This is called by Efrem Bettoni "il balzo fondamentale dal finito all' infinito," L'Assesa a Dio in Duns Scoto (Milan, 1943), 56.


In the contemporary situation, then, real difficulty is encountered when one endeavors to see how the existence of sensible things can set up a subject for genuine scientific investigation. Even if existence is allowed an authentic meaning of its own, it can at the most provide the ground for a description of its various modes. It may give rise to a phenomenology of being. But this will be only a descriptive metaphysics, a description of the concept of being in its multiple manifestations. It will not explain anything, however, and it will not lead to anything that is not revealed in experience. A contingent feature of things cannot hope to ground the necessities required for truly scientific reasoning. If metaphysics is to have a place among recognized human disciplines, it will have to content itself with the status of a descriptive knowledge about the most general aspects of things, and not aspire to an intellectual penetration into reality in the light of ultimate causes. This view is common enough today.

Obviously, again: the present-day background, the being of sensible things will have to exhibit some kind of necessity if it is to enable Thomistic metaphysics to function as a genuine science. Even in sensible things it will have to have enough necessity to serve as the means of reasoning to a nature that is existence itself. This can be done only by demonstration. But can metaphysical reasoning be truly demonstrative? Can the aspect of being give rise to a subject that is capable of grounding demonstrative reasoning? The nature of demonstration was studied carefully by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*, and the norms for its procedure were laid down in detail. Is a Thomistic metaphysics capable of satisfying these requirements?

II

In a way, the difficulty arising from within the traditional Aristotelian framework carries more weight than ones that spring from a modern background. In contemporary theories that restrict science to the domain of the measurable or of the verifiable, there can hardly be any regret at excluding metaphysics from scientific status. The days when metaphysics was queen of the sciences are regarded as long and happily past, if they are remembered at all. Nor could metaphysics itself remain *metaphysics*, were it fitted into a pattern of quantitative measurement. Concern about scientific status for metaphysics, then, can hardly have any serious import within the comparatively recent restriction of the notion “science” to the realm of the measurable. The relevance of the question lies rather within the centuries-long western tradition that goes back to Plato and Aristotle.
In this tradition, "science" has a much wider and richer meaning than it has in the popular understanding of the word today. It means knowledge of a thing in the light of its causes. It extends to any kind of explanation of things through the causes that account for their nature, their origin, and their functioning, whether the causes are in the sensible or the supersensible realm. In this tradition "science" or "scientific knowledge" includes mathematics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics, logic and ethics, as well as the experimental sciences.

This traditional use of the word "science" is still alive today, in spite of the way in which the term has been appropriated to the experimental sciences in popular use. Mathematicians and logicians still refer to their disciplines as "sciences" and to their procedures as "scientific." Theologians do likewise. Nor is there anything in this notion of science that could oppose its full application to the modern experimental sciences. It was regularly applied to mathematicized sciences such as astronomy and optics. They meet the requirements of the *Analytics.* The charge that metaphysics does not do so, coming from within the very tradition that developed metaphysics explicitly as a science, seems accordingly the unkindest cut of all.

Yet the charge has been repeatedly made. In general, the reason offered for the alleged failure to meet the Aristotelian requirements of a science is that metaphysics is not deductive. Sir David Ross, the outstanding Oxford Aristotelian scholar, asks if metaphysics ever proceeds "to the main work of science, the drawing of conclusions" from the definitions and hypotheses it formulates. He replies "It seems that the answer must be in the negative. The procedure throughout the *Metaphysics* never becomes deductive..." 12 Centuries earlier another Oxford scholar, John Duns Scotus, had placed the same question, though somewhat more pointedly, in regard to human

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J. F. Anderson, "On Demonstration in Thomistic Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism,* XXXII (1958), 477, excludes from philosophy only the deductive proof that is mathematical: "...deductive proof, formally mathematical in character, is unfitting in any properly philosophical context—ethical, cosmological, metaphysical,..." He acknowledges "the Thomistic *propert quaid* arguments ... as proofs according to the essential notion of proof found in the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle." Ibid., 488.
metaphysics. He asked if in the whole book of Aristotle you can find one completely demonstrative metaphysical argument.\textsuperscript{13} Duns Scotus maintained that metaphysical reasoning of this kind was impossible for the human intellect in its present state. The human intellect now has to reason from sensible things to their immaterial principles. It has no prior knowledge of the immaterial principles that could be the means of knowing sensible things scientifically.

The point in these objections is that metaphysical reasoning has to proceed from effects to causes. All it knows about those causes comes from what it knows about the effects. It therefore knows nothing about the causes that it has not gathered from the effects, and so has nothing that it can use to further its knowledge about the effects. It does not know the causes in a way that allows it to reason from them to the effects, in the manner of a genuine and complete science.

The objections become still more serious in the context of a Christian metaphysics. In a Christian outlook God is the first cause of all things. He is the supreme cause of their being. But he is an eminently free cause. There is nothing in his nature that requires the sequence of created being. In this case knowledge of the cause does not provide ground for reasoning to the existence of the effects. You cannot deduce creatures from knowledge of God's nature. In a Christian context, then, how could metaphysics hope to be deductive and so conform to the Aristotelian conception of perfect science? Moreover, against a Christian background, the being of creatures has to be considered in some way accidental to their natures. Creatures cannot be regarded as existing of themselves. But being is the viewpoint according to which metaphysics proceeds. If the accidentality of created being is taken at all seriously, does it not imply that metaphysics is proceeding from the viewpoint of something that is accidental to things? How then can it demonstrate anything about its subject? Demonstration has to start from premises that are necessary. It cannot start from a premise in which the union of subject and predicate is merely accidental. How can any investigation of things from the viewpoint of their being take on the fully demonstrative character that goes with perfect science? Here, as in the modern setting, necessity is demanded.

\textsuperscript{13} "...non tamen sic eam scimus, nec sic inventur ab Aristotele tradita; quae..." Quaest. super Metaph., Prol., no. 9; ed. Vivès (Paris, 1891-1895), VII, 6.
On the other hand, even a general acquaintance with Aristotelian metaphysics and with the various Scholastic metaphysics makes one feel that these objections are a bit too sweeping. There seems to be at least some evidently deductive reasoning, in the form of close and exact demonstration, in both Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics. For Aristotle the sublime life of separate substance, the total concentration of its thought upon its own self, the supreme pleasure that accompanies its activity, seem conclusions drawn by a strict process of deduction, once the pure but finite actuality of separate substance has been granted. The form of the reasoning is at least meant to be deductive. Among the Scholastics the reasoning that established the transcendental properties of being or the attributes of the divine nature seems genuinely and thoroughly deductive. There are sufficient prima facie indications, then, that at least in some way or to some extent metaphysics is a deductive science in the manner envisaged by the Aristotelian Posterior Analytics.

The problem quite evidently demands a close scrutiny of the requirements of the Analytics for a fully developed science. When these requirements have been made clear, they can function as the norm for determining whether Thomistic metaphysics proceeds on the level of strict and completely demonstrative science according to the Aristotelian conception.

III

What are the conditions for scientific knowledge as required by the Analytics? To have unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, one must
1) “know the cause on which the fact depends
2) as the cause of that fact...and, further,
3) that the fact could not be other than it is.”

An example used by Aristotle illustrates these conditions clearly enough. It is the geometrician’s conclusion that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. At the completion of his demonstration the geometer sees the cause of the equality to two right angles. The cause is the nature of a plane triangular figure. The geometer knows it as the cause, for the lines in his theorem show the equality of the enclosed angles to three other angles that add up to a total of one hundred and eighty degrees. He sees that the result cannot

14 Aristotle, APo., I 2.71b10-12; Oxford tr.
be otherwise, for no divergent disposition of the lines is permitted by the nature of a plane triangle.

A further requirement in the Aristotelian Analytics for complete demonstration is that an attribute or proper accident be demonstrated of a subject genus.\(^\text{15}\) In the case of the triangle, the nature of the triangular figure is the subject genus. Equality to two right angles is demonstrated as a proper consequence, a consequence that follows from that type of figure only. The force of the demonstration is grounded upon the necessary sequence of properties from a definite nature.

Finally, two kinds of demonstration are distinguished in the Posterior Analytics.\(^\text{16}\) One shows that from the very nature of some cause a certain effect immediately and necessarily follows. Such demonstration is seen in the example of the triangle. The nature of the triangular figure is the proximate reason why its angles are equal to two right angles. Its shows or “demonstrates” the complete reason for the conclusion. From that viewpoint it is completely demonstrative. By the Scholastics it was called *propter quid* demonstration. In the Oxford translation of Aristotle it provides “knowledge of the reasoned fact,” in the sense that the proximate or exactly fitting or complete reason for the conclusion is shown. Perhaps “completely demonstrative” reasoning would express the notion more precisely. The other type of demonstration was called by the Scholastics *quia* demonstration, and in the Oxford translation it gives merely “knowledge of the fact.” It demonstrates either from an effect or from a remote cause. An example given by Aristotle of demonstration from effect is that the moon is spherical because it waxes. The observable effects are the phases of the moon. From them the cause, namely spherical shape, is demonstrated. An example of demonstration through a remote cause would be “A wall does not breathe because it is not alive.” Life is not the proximate, exactly fitting cause of breathing. A tree or a worm may be alive and still not breathe, properly speaking. Breathing does not follow immediately or necessarily from life. Yet without life breathing in its proper sense is not possible. In negative reasoning a remote cause may give true demonstration, but it is not

\(^{15}\) *APo.*, I 7.75a42-b2; cf. 9.76all-13.

\(^{16}\) *APo.*, I 13.78a22-79a16. J. F. Anderson renders the technical Aristotelian terms *hoti* and *dioti* by “factual and explanatory demonstration” (art. cit., p. 478). “Explanatory,” just as “reasoned fact” in the Oxford translation, has to be understood as giving the exactly fitting or proximate reason.
complete demonstration in the Aristotelian sense because it does not make manifest the proximate, necessitating cause of the property concerned. It proves the fact by a reason, but not the reason, why.

Completely demonstrative reasoning in the conception of the *Analytics*, then, requires that the starting point of the demonstration be some nature that functions as the subject genus. A study of the nature shows that certain properties follow upon it immediately and necessarily wherever it is found, and follow upon that nature only. Those properties are the things that are completely demonstrated in the conclusion. They are the effects, the nature is their cause.

IV

Does any metaphysics conform to these requirements of the *Posterior Analytics*? There are many different types of metaphysics. Each would have to be examined in its own procedure to see if it satisfied the Aristotelian norms for completely demonstrative science. The present study confines its attention to just one metaphysics, that of St. Thomas Aquinas. There is no doubt that in the Aristotelian context St. Thomas himself understood metaphysics to be a science in the fullest sense of the word. He interprets the *Posterior Analytics* as meaning that metaphysics reasons from absolutely prior causes, and from the highest of those causes. It is therefore *maxime scientia*, science in the highest degree.\(^{17}\)

Does the actual procedure of St. Thomas in his metaphysical reasoning, though, bear out those claims? Does he actually reason, in a completely demonstrative way, from supersensible causes to sensibly observable effects? Metaphysical reasoning is abundant throughout St. Thomas' writings. On confrontation with the norms of the *Posterior Analytics*, it itself should reveal whether or not it meets the Aristotelian requirements for completely demonstrative science.

Metaphysics, for St. Thomas, deals expressly with beings as beings.

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\(^{17}\) "... Unde oportet quod talis processus sit ex prioribus et ex magis notis simpliciter... Et per consequens scientia superior erit magis scientia, quam inferior; et scientia suprema, scilicet *philosophia prima*, erit maxime scientia." *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 17, Leonine no. 5. Four criteria that establish metaphysics as a science are developed by William Oliver Martin, *Metaphysics and Ideology* (Milwaukee, 1959), 3-43, in meeting a modern challenge: "Since part of the essence of ideological criticism is that metaphysics is not a science, we shall ask and answer the question as to what would be the distinguishing marks of metaphysics if it were a science." Ibid., p. 3.
It investigates things from the viewpoint of their being. It commences with things of the sensible universe, in which all human cognition originates. In these things being is apprehended as a necessary characteristic. "Every nature is essentially a being" is one of the various ways in which this teaching is formulated. Being is not something haphazard, something that a thing may or may not possess and still be a thing. A stone could not be a stone if it were not a body. Still less could it be a stone if it were not a being. Corporeity is essential to its nature. All the more is being essential to it. So if it is a stone it is a being. In this respect, being is a characteristic that pertains to every nature in a way sufficient to constitute things a subject genus for a science of metaphysics, fully as much as corporeity constitutes sensible things a subject genus for natural philosophy, or as real quantity constitutes them a subject for quantitative physics. From this pertinently basic viewpoint, being appears as a frankly necessary characteristic of all things. There is nothing, in fact, that is more essential to a thing than its being.

The being of a thing, however, is not an added grade like corporeity that can be attained directly in a concept through simple apprehension by the human intellect. Nor, or the other hand, is the thing's being, like its individuality, known merely by indicating or pointing as it were with the finger to designated quantitative dimensions. It is more than a reference that can be symbolized by the inverted Epsilon. For St. Thomas a thing's being consists in a composing of its elements, a composing that cannot be apprehended in any simple concept but only in the complexity of judgment. It is a composing that is not expressed by a single word but requires a proposition. It is a composing that is taking place in time, and actually at the present moment alone. Most of a sensible thing's being is therefore outside itself. All the past has already vanished. None of the future has yet arrived. Only what is present actually exists. The thing's being is continually changing, as the past glides into the present and the present into the future. The thing's nature, on the other hand, even its individuated


nature, remains the same, as its being continually changes. Yet its being is what is deepest, most actual, in it. Without being, nothing else about it would matter. Nothing else about it would be there. Its being gives it its richest meaning. But its being is continually perishing into the past, while it itself remains the same thing.

A sensible thing’s being, accordingly, is not contained within its nature. You can know what a tree is, what a stone is, what a phoenix is, without knowing anything about the being these things have in reality or in some one else’s mind. Each remains the same thing whether in real or cognitional being. From that viewpoint any being that it has is accidental to its nature. But it is accidental in a altogether peculiar way. It does not follow upon the thing’s substance as do predicamental accidents, but is an accident that is prior to the substance. If it followed upon the substance, a thing would, in the priority in which it as yet has no being, be able to make itself be. It would be its own efficient cause, for to give a thing being is exactly what is meant by causing it efficiently.

As accidental, then, the thing’s being, like any other accident, has to depend upon something. As prior, it does not depend upon the thing it makes be. What it depends upon in this regard is something else, something other than the thing it makes be. In this respect, which is that of efficient causality, a thing’s being has to come from something else. It has to be caused efficiently by something other than itself.

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20 Unde sicut est idem mobile secundum substantiam in toto motu, variatur tamen secundum esse, sicut dictur quod Socrates in foro est alter a seipso in domo; ita nunc est etiam idem secundum substantiam in tota successione temporis, variatur tantum secundum esse, ... St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, 470. For further discussion of this topic, see my paper “Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas,” Medieval Studies, XXII (1960), 282-297. The distinction of abiding substance from ever changing existence requires positive status for a sensible thing’s essence, even when the essence is considered in abstraction from all being. Though completely devoid of being, the essence when considered as just in itself has the role of a positive potency. The abstraction of the notion “positive” from that of any “being” may be compared with the process by which Aristotle’s notion of absolutely formless matter is acquired. From the positive notion “subject” every formal determination of being, substantial as well as accidental, is removed (Metaph., Z 3, 1029a1-26). The notion of potency still remains as positive though entirely indeterminate. See my discussion in “Matter and Predication in Aristotle,” The Concept of Matter, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, Ind., 1963), 106-112.

For St. Thomas, accordingly, the essence is stable not only as a universal in the intellect. It is eternally stable in its absolute consideration, which abstracts from all being and yet is prior to being in the sensible world as well as to being in the human intellect (Quodl., VIII, 1c; ad 1m; ad 3m).
If that cause in turn is something whose own being is prior and accidental to its nature, the same situation will hold. The being comes ultimately, therefore, from something whose being is not accidental or prior to its nature, but coincides entirely with its nature. This is something whose very nature is to be. In technical terminology, it is subsistent being. It is something that is existence itself.

Such is the procedure of St. Thomas in reaching the first efficient cause of being. What kind of reasoning does it involve? Is it demonstrative? Yes. It starts from what is immediately known in sensible things, namely that they are. It takes their being as a characteristic necessary to them from the formal requirements of their natures, yet outside their natures in a prior and accidental order. To the chagrin of a mind trained in mathematical logic, being is a characteristic that is both essential and accidental to finite things. It is a predicate that unavoidably has both features. A thing does not possess two distinct types of being, an essential being (esse essentiae) that is necessary for it, and a further existential being (esse existentiae) that is only accidental to it. The arguments of Suarez, at the end of a centuries-long controversy, show convincingly that the two coincide in reality. The same being has both the essential and the accidental characteristics.

Along which of the two characteristics of being does the reasoning of St. Thomas proceed? If it anywhere proceeds along the accidental it cannot be demonstrative. The norms of the *Posterior Analytics*

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21 See St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV; ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (reprint, Paris, 1948), pp. 347-351. *Cf. In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 222. *CG*, I, 22. ST, I, 3, 4c. The sketch just given reproduces the stages of St Thomas' procedure in the *De Ente*. There, however, the formal and necessary sequence of being upon a finite nature is not discussed. It is merely taken for granted—the form is in its own way the cause of the thing's being (quamuis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa. *De Ente*, c. II; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 167). The subject of the *De Ente* is expressly the essence and the composite of essence and being, not the act of being itself.

22 Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.*, XXXI, 4, 46; ed. Vivès, XXVI, 235b-236b. On the way in which esse essentiae, as distinct from esse existentiae, was introduced into the Thomistic tradition, and on its incompatibility with the doctrine of St. Thomas, see N. J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960), 1-24. The thoroughgoing identity of essential being and existential being as the viewpoint of metaphysical inquiry suggests care in using the formulation "the existence itself of things is of no concern to the metaphysician"—W. Baumgaertner, "Metaphysics and the Second Analytics," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 408. J. F. Anderson express the situation neatly: "...it is by one and the same act that x is not nothing, and that it is all that it is; 'existence' is maximal act." *Art. cit.*, *The New Scholasticism*, XXXII (1958), 481. It is the contingent existence that is necessary for the thing: "A contingent thing's contingent existence is nevertheless necessary for all that it is and has..." Ibid., 494.
require necessary sequence. The only way reasoning from the viewpoint of being can be demonstrative is by rigorous and unrelenting adherence to the necessary features of being and to what follows from them in exact sequence. Does the above metaphysical procedure of St. Thomas meet this requirement? It starts from being as a common and necessary characteristic of all things. Anything whatsoever can serve as the starting point of the argument. Every nature, accordingly, is regarded in this starting point as essentially a being. As a being it manifests all the necessity required to constitute a subject genus for a science. The reasoning of St. Thomas then shows that being has to lie outside any finite nature. There is no question of may or may not. It is a question of "has to." It is an entirely necessary sequence. The same holds for the priority of being to finite essence. It is not a case of "may or may not be prior." Here the act of being, regarded in this perspective, has to be prior. The reasoning follows the necessary phases of being, and the necessary phases only. The same necessary phases continue in rigorous sequence to the conclusion that the finite thing's being depends upon another existent, and ultimately upon an existent whose very nature is to be. There is no possibility at any stage in the reasoning that some finite being may or may not be dependent on another. Dependence on another appears in every link of the reasoning as a thoroughly necessary characteristic of finite being.

From the standpoint of necessary sequence, then, this metaphysical procedure of St. Thomas is strictly demonstrative. It is indeed dealing with an act that is always accidental to finite things as well as essential to them. But the reasoning does not at any time use the accidental side as a link. It is grounded throughout its whole process on the necessary features only. In its final conclusion the accidental phase of being has disappeared completely, and the necessary characteristics alone remain in the subsistent act of existing. In a word, the procedure recognizes fully the accidental side of finite being but at no time lets the accidental phase condition any of its links. It arrives at knowledge of a cause, as cause of the effect in question, and shows that the effect could not be otherwise than dependent upon that cause. From this standpoint it satisfies the norms of the Aristotelian Analytics.

But is it completely demonstrative? Is it from cause to effect or from effect to cause? Quite evidently it is from effect to cause. It starts from creatures, the effects, and reasons to subsistent being, God, their first cause. True, from the necessities manifested in its subject genus, common being, it demonstrates the dependence of finite beings on something else. This dependence follows by way of a property, in
finite things, upon the subject genus. But the demonstration has concluded to something more than this. Its conclusion is not just something about creatures, namely that they are dependent, but something about God, namely that he exists and that he is the first efficient cause. So, while the demonstration of the dependence of creatures may be completely demonstrative in the sense of proceeding from cause to effect, the demonstration of the existence of God, no matter how cogent, is clearly from effect to cause. In this respect it does not meet the Aristotelian requirements for completely demonstrative (propter quid) science. Yet it is truly a demonstration.

Besides dependence, which is a disjunctive transcendental, a number of fully transcendental properties are shown by Thomistic metaphysical procedure to follow upon the subject genus of being. The very nature of being, even when participated as an act other than finite nature, makes its subject one, true, good, beautiful. The subject genus is here the cause from which these characteristics are demonstrated as its proper attributes. The reasoning conforms entirely with the Aristotelian requirements for completely demonstrative science. Correspondingly the attributes of God are demonstrated from his being. Subsistent being is such that infinity in all unmixed perfections, like intelligence, love, omnipotence, wisdom, and justice, follows in necessary sequence upon its nature. These attributes are demonstrated from their proper cause. They are reached therefore by a process that is completely demonstrative in the sense of the Analytics.

23 So Maxwell J. Charlesworth: "St. Thomas 'Five Ways' are, in fact, primarily an investigation of the implications of the existents about us in the world, and what they 'prove' primarily is something about those things, namely, that they are dependent." Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis (Pittsburgh & Louvain, 1959), 213. The "implications" here extend to causes outside those sensible existents. Cf.: "Sed philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse." St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 17, (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi), no. 1658.

24 For Duns Scotus metaphysical reasoning does not attain full propter quid status in demonstrating further truths about God: "Metaphysica, quantum ad illud, quod de Deo considerat, est simpliciter scientia quia; sed scientia simpliciter quia est secundum quid propter quid; ..." Rep. Par., Prol., III, 1, 10-11; ed. Vivès, XXII, 51a. This follows from the univocal concept of being that is used in Scotistic metaphysics. The univocal concept, when restricted to God by the application of the additional concept "infinite," is not able to be the source of any higher type of knowing. In St. Thomas, the nature of being that is reached by the quia argument from effects is not univocal with the acts of being that are found in sensible things. From this angle nothing prevents it from furnishing a higher type of knowledge than that obtained by reasoning directly from being as merely participated act.
But can the same be said of the sequence of creatures from God? God is a free creator. Nothing is his nature compels creatures to follow from it. Their sequence from the divine nature is not necessary but free. In that sense they are the result of free choice. They do not have to follow from the existence of God, and indeed might not have followed at all, or might have been created according to an order different from that of the present universe. The participation of being to other things by the first efficient cause is free. But in spite of that freedom, certain necessities that follow from the nature of being are always present. If being is participated, it has to be participated in a limiting essence. It has to be an act received into a subject, an act that in real things is really other than the thing it makes be. It has to remain an act other than any finite nature, even though it actuates a finite nature. These are conclusions deduced rigorously from a cause, the real nature of being. That nature, as a nature, is all-embracing. Where limited, it cannot be limited by itself, but only by some nature that remains other than it. Thomistic metaphysical procedure is not at all concerned with any attempt to prove that creatures follow from the existence of God. Rather, its study of subsistent being shows why any such attempt cannot succeed. It does not build any arguments on the freedom in the sequence of creatures from God. It builds only on the necessary characteristics of the being that is imparted in that sequence. It has before it creatures as a fact. They are the effects from which it attained its knowledge of the first cause. It does not have to prove their existence, and cannot prove it from what it knows of their cause. But from what it does know of their cause, it draws by completely demonstrative reasoning its conclusions that all finite being comes ultimately from the one subsistent being, that all creatures are really other than their being, that they are continually conserved in being by their first efficient cause and that they are moved to every one of their actions, even the free decisions, by the motion and concurrence of that first cause.

The metaphysical reasoning of St. Thomas from subsistent being to participated being, therefore, is based from start to finish on the necessities involved in the nature of being and at no stage upon the

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25 "Oportet ergo quod quaelibet alia res sit ens participative, et quod aliud sit in eo substantia participans esse, et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Omne autem participans se habet ad participatum, sicut potentia ad actum; unde substantia cuiuslibet rei creatae se habet ad suum esse, sicut potentia ad actum." St. Thomas, Quodl., III, 8; ed. Spiazzi (Turin, 1956), p. 61a. Cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 35.21-36.3.
freedom in the sequence of creatures from God. It uses its knowledge of the cause to explain the effects. It is from cause to effect in rigorous order, and so is completely demonstrative according to the Aristotelian norms.

Some hesitation, however, may still remain. Is not this process circular? It can attain knowledge of the first cause only from effects. It knows nothing more about the first cause than it can gather from effects. How then can it use this knowledge of the first cause to give further and higher-grade knowledge of those same effects? Is not that trying to make water rise above its source? Is it not a case of "knowledge of the fact" attempting to raise itself up with its own bootstraps to become "knowledge of the reasoned fact"?

No. Against the Aristotelian background, reasoning is not a series of tautologies. It is not addition, or calculation, of what is already there. It is a causal process that results in something new. It actually gives new knowledge. It enables one to know something that one did not know before. It does produce something over and above the mere sum of its premises. Starting from sensible and finite being, it gives rise to knowledge of immaterial, infinite, subsistent being. This is not just the sum of the things already known. It is knowledge of a different kind of being. In the light of the cause known through this new knowledge, created beings are understood in a different and higher way. Principles reached only through reasoning from effects become the starting points for a new knowledge of those effects, a knowledge that is completely demonstrative in its explanation of the effects by their cause. The difficulties in this regard seem to arise from a conception of reasoning as a tautology instead of the production of new and even higher knowledge.

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The metaphysical procedure of St. Thomas, accordingly, meets the Aristotelian requirements for strictly and completely demonstrative science. It demonstrates with rigorous necessity the proper attributes of its subject genus, common being. To reach the first cause of being

26 "Praeterea, effectus sensibles, ex quibus procedunt demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, sed cum per eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis apparet nobis propter quid illorum effectum, ex quibus probantur demonstrationes quia." St. Thomas, In Boeth. de Trin., V, 1, ad 9m; ed. Decker, pp. 172.21-173.2.
it has to reason from effects, but it manifests that first principle through its conclusions in a way that permits creatures to be understood in the light of their highest cause. It is the only way of understanding their being, for, in the words of St. Thomas, "being that is in created things cannot be understood except as derived from divine being, just as a proper effect cannot be understood except as derived from its proper cause." 27

His procedure, however, fully respects the accidentality of a creature's being and the entire freedom of the first efficient cause. While always aware of that accidentality and that freedom, it never introduces them as links in its reasoning. The Aristotelian description of the sciences, as pre-Christian, does not include a metaphysics that proceeds upon a trait that is accidental as well as essential to things. But it allows its requirements for scientific knowledge to vary considerably with differences in the subject matter of the various sciences. 28 When these requirements are applied to metaphysics in a Christian philosophy, they will, in conformity with the spirit of their Aristotelian origin, respect the exigencies of their new subject genus.

For St. Thomas, the new subject genus is common being, understood in a way that leaves being outside the nature of every one of its instances. 29 Yet by being it is constituted the subject of metaphysical

27 De Pot., III, 5, ad 1m.
28 See Aristotle, E N, I 3,1094b11-13. Reasoning in moral matters, for instance, comes under the sciences for Aristotle. See Metaph., E 1,1026a22-23, and the parallel passage in K 7,1064a10-18; E N, I 1,2, 1094a18-b11; Toph., VI 6,145a15-16. The ethical universal is used in this reasoning as a true universal, even though it is in no way rigid (E N, II 2,1104a4-5) and holds only roughly and for the most part. In ethics the first principles, like the first principles in other sciences, are established by dialectic. The reasoning to conclusions from these principles, however, is scientific according to the meaning of the term in the Posterior Analytics. The Aristotelian procedure in ethics, nevertheless, is frequently given an opposite interpretation, e.g.: "Hence ethical matters, which involve not only the contingency of matter and circumstance but that of choice, can be the object only of opinion based on dialectic." C. Kossel, "Aristotle on the Origin and Validation of the Moral Judgment," in Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed. James Collins (Westminster, Md., 1960), 85.
29 "Ejusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias aliius generis et genus ipsum... Unde oportet quod ad eandem scientiam pertinent considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus,..." St. Thomas, In Metaph., Proem. Cf.: "...omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continentur sub eis virtute." In De Div. Nom., c. V, lect. 2, Pera no. 660. From the viewpoint of constituting the subject of a science, being is regard as a genus by Aristotle, Metaph., I' 2,1005b19-22; 1004b22-1005a3. So St. Thomas: "Si igitur omnia entia sunt unius generis aliquo modo, oportet quod omnes species eius pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae quae est generalis..." In IV Metaph., lect. 1, Cathala-Spiazzi, no.547.
investigation. In each of its instances, however, being is found shared not through formal causality but through efficient causality. In this way the subject of metaphysics is constituted quite differently from the subject of any other science. In the others, the aspect that places things under the science is shared in the manner of a form. It consists in qualitites or quantity or substantial nature. But in metaphysics the aspect is merely that the thing has been made to be, without any quidditative addition to its nature.

This aspect is entirely the result of efficient causality, and in no way a form that can be immediately conceptualized. It cannot be isolated by any process of abstraction, as qualities and quantity and substance are isolated. It has to be traced in the order of efficient causality to the instance in which its own nature lies, namely subsistent being. But that is a process of reasoning from effects to cause. Reasoning to subsistent being is accordingly an initial stage in Thomistic metaphysical procedure. It is required in order to determine the nature of the subject genus for the discipline. It is necessary at the very beginning in order to show that being is not an empty concept or a mere frame of reference, but is, in its primary instance, a real nature in the real world. Therefore, when it is shared as an act other than the nature it actualizes, it is able to constitute the subject genus for a distinct science of things.

In a word, beings cannot be immediately seen or pointed to as the authentic subject of a distinct science in the way animals are indicated as the subject of zoology, plants as the subject of botany, or numbers and extension as subject of mathematics. They do not appear as a new kind of things, requiring a new kind of science. True, real beings are immediately known. They are known moreover as beings, for they are immediately judged to exist. In that respect the subject of metaphysics is immediately given to human cognition. Emphatically, it does not have to be established by any other science. Nevertheless considerable reasoning based on the aspect of being is required to show that being is a real nature and is participated as a real act. As a real nature, it is found only in subsistent being. That is why a process of reasoning from effects to cause is necessary before being can be understood as constituting the subject of a genuine science of real things. Only then will commence the "completely demonstrative" process of reasoning from a nature to proper attributes.

Accordingly, the initial reasoning from observed effects to the nature of being is itself not "completely demonstrative" because it does not reason from cause to effect. Yet it is true demonstration, it
has the full cogency of demonstration, it leaves no weakened link nor any lack of certitude regarding its result. It establishes the existence of a cause.\footnote{“...per effectos non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse,...” St. Thomas, ST, I, 2, 2, ad 3m. Cf.: “As a demonstrative means, factual proof is fully ‘scientific’ according to the classical notion of science as certain knowledge through causes;...” J. F. Anderson, art. cit., p. 478. As J. Bobik stresses in “Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics,” The New Scholasticism, XXXVII (1963), 427, a created thing’s being is the effect of divine efficient causality and of the formal causality exercised by the thing’s own essence. The role of proper effect of God and universally required completion of essence is what makes the being of things the ground for demonstrating God’s existence: “Et quia esse est complementum omnium, inde est quod proprius effectus Dei est esse, et nulla causa dat esse nisi in quantum participat operationem divinam;...” St. Thomas, Quodl., XII, 5c. Once being has been established in this way as a real nature, however, its role in the constitution of the subject of metaphysics is shown to be that of real actuation. As a received and finite act it is that by which or through which a creature exists: “...quaelibet res creata recipit esse finitum et inferius divino esse quod est perfectissimum. Ergo constat quod esse creaturae, quo est formaliter, non est divinum esse.” In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Contra; ed. Mandonnet, I,197-198. “...esse creatum non est per aliquid aliud, si ly ‘per’ dictat causam formalem intrinsecam; immo ipso formaliter est creatura;...” Ibid., ad 2m, p. 198. “...esse suum, receptum a Deo, est id quo subsistit in rerum natura: et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantie composite ex quo est et quod est, uel ex quod est et esse ut Boecius dicit.” De Ente, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 25.31-36.3. “...et sic esse a deo acceptum comparatur ad essentiam eius simplicem ut actus ad potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicitur quos sunt compositi ex ‘quo est’ et ‘quo est,’ ut ipsum esse intelligatur ‘quo est,’...” In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, ad 4m; ed. Decker, p. 198.18-20. “...quia per hoc esse res esse dicitur, et quia habonitatis res dicitur bona. Unde, sicut non sequitur quod ipsa substantia rei non dicatur per esse aliquod quod ipsa non sit, quia eius esse non dicitur ens per aliquod esse aliud ab ipso; ita...” De Ver., XXI, 5, ad 8m. “Omne quod est in genere substantiae, est compositum reali compositione; ...alias non posset differre secundum esse ab illis quibus convenit in ratione suae quidditatis; ...et ideo omne quod est directe in praedicamento substantiae, compositum est saltem ex esse et quod est.” Ibid., XXVII, 1, ad 8m. In St. Thomas, accordingly, a thing’s being, really other than the thing itself, is without hesitation called an “act.” Do these texts allow it also to be called a “component,” or a “constituent,” or a “principle,” or a “cause”? St. Thomas, while speaking in argumenta (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, arg. 3 & 4; ed. Mandonnet, I, 226) as though being were one of the creature’s components, seems careful in the presentation of his own teaching to reserve the notion of “component” for the parts of the essence. While every creature is composed, it is not composed “ex creaturis” (ibid., arg. 4) in its entitative constitution. Its being is not a new creature or a new reality added to it. Accordingly St. Thomas says in the vaguest way that it is composed of “two” or of “these two”: “...duo ad minus, scilicet esse, et id quod esse recipit” (ibid., a. 1, Contra; p. 226), and “...compositio horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse” (ibid., a. 2, Solut., p. 230). Similarly the use of quo, per, and secundum in the above texts for the role of the}
es the cause's nature. It is required in order to prove that being is a real nature, capable of having properties and exigencies in reality when shared as an act. Since it proves that being is a real nature by a process of strict demonstration from effects to cause, it does not at all weaken the capacity of being to constitute a subject that serves as a basis for "completely demonstrative" reasoning from nature to properties.

Why is this demonstrative nature of the discipline so important? Why does it require such careful understanding? The benefit and the necessity of a strictly scientific, and not merely descriptive, type of metaphysics for the work done by St. Thomas should be obvious. For the most part, as mentioned at the beginning of this study, he is developing his metaphysical doctrines within his theology. He is using metaphysics as a means of explaining theological truths. Perhaps nowhere is the situation illustrated more vividly than in the Prooemium of Suarez' Disputationes Metaphysicae. While writing his commentary on the third part of St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae, Suarez felt compelled to lay aside for the moment his theological work and devote himself to the elaboration of his voluminous metaphysical Discussions. He gives the reason clearly. Discussion of the divine mysteries, he had experienced keenly through some twenty years of teaching and writing in sacred theology, was wrapped in metaphysical teachings. Without metaphysical knowledge and understanding, the divine mysteries could scarcely, or rather not at all, be treated with the dignity befitting them.31

The knowledge and understanding of metaphysics that Suarez meant was emphatically a scientific knowledge. A science of metaphysics was so necessary that without it the science of theological matters would

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31 "Cum enim inter disputationum de divinis mysteriis haec metaphysica dogmata occurrerent, sine quorum cognitione et intelligentia vix, aut ne vix quidem, possunt altiora illa mysteria pro dignitate tractari..." Disputationes Metaphysicae, Prooemium: ed. Vivès (Paris, 1856-1877), XXV, 1a.
be intolerably undermined. While writing theology, Suarez had continually to explain in brief the metaphysical teachings involved in each case, and to ask his readers to accept them on mere faith. This technique was not satisfactory to anyone, least of all to himself. It rightly seemed an imposition. No existing works on metaphysics were able to fill the need. So Suarez felt obliged to interrupt momentarily his theological work until he had brought, or rather restored, metaphysics to its proper place in Christian philosophy.

The temporary interruption of Suarez' theological work gave for the first time in history a thorough systematization to metaphysical thought. It set the framework in which succeeding Scholastic metaphysics, including Neoscholastic, would be cast. The age thirsted for that systematization. Descartes and Goudin were soon, in their respective circles and in noticeably different ways, to undertake it for philosophy in general. Some one was bound to do it for metaphysics. Whether the project was feasible or not, and whatever one may think of Suarez' way of doing it, it at least focuses attention on the reason given by Suarez for leaving theology momentarily to organize metaphysics. The reason was that the divine mysteries cannot be discussed in a way "befitting their dignity" without the use of metaphysics as a science.

Why does metaphysics have to enjoy the status of science in order to make possible the discussion of divine truths with appropriate dignity? The reason should not be too hard to see. The objects of discussion in this case, because they are divine, are in the realm of the supersensible. The supersensible is expressed positively by human reason not in concepts proper to the quantitative or sensibly qualitative orders, but in transcendental notions that extend through and beyond the whole sensible or physical universe. Those notions are all metaphysical. Concepts proper to sensible natures can be used only metaphorically of the supersensible world. If pressed intellectually they result in agnosticism. On the other hand, if they

82 "Ita enim haec principia et veritates metaphysicae cum theologicos conclusionibus ac discursibus cohaerent, ut si illorum scientia ac perfecta cognitione auferatur, horum etiam scientiam nimium labefactari necesse sit." Ibid., p. lab.


84 "...adeo ut non dubitaverim illud inchoatum opus paulisper intermittere, quo huic doctrinae metaphysicae uuum quasi locum ac sedem darem, vel potius restituerem... Ita vero in hoc opere philosophum ago, ut semper tamen praec oculis habeam nostram philosophiam debere christianam esse, ac divinae Theologiae ministram." Disp. Metaph., Ad Lectorum; ed. Vivès, v. XXV, init.
are applied in their proper sense to the divine order, they give rise to anthropomorphism. In neither case is the dignity of the subject safeguarded for intellectual discussion. Only the transcendent concepts elaborated in metaphysics meet the requirement. Those concepts, however, are not immediately given in sensible experience as transcendent concepts. They are indeed given in sensible experience, but they have to be established as transcendental through reasoning. The being that is experienced in sensible things has to be understood as derived from real, supersensible being. Only then does one know with certainty that the aspect of being, already experienced in sensible things, applies also in its proper meaning to the supersensible and to the divine. But that is not intuited, nor in any way immediately known. It has to be demonstrated. The result of demonstration is scientific knowledge. The observed sensible thing is then understood as derived from its unobservable but demonstrated cause. And knowledge through cause is science.

At least, that is the way the notion of science has been traditionally formulated in western culture. Plato had shown that cognition of sensible things gives rise to opinions. The opinions may often be true. Yet until they are attached to the eternal Idea that is the cause of whatever truth they reflect, they remain only opinions. When firmly attached to the Idea, or as Plato explains, when known in function of their cause, they are changed into scientific knowledge. The knowledge they then provide is necessary and unchangeable, and holds for all particulars that mirror the same Idea. The difference between common sense opinions and scientific knowledge lay for Plato in cognition through cause. Aristotle described still more precisely the notion that science is universal and necessary knowledge of things through their causes. Metaphysics, as universal knowledge of things through their highest causes, was accordingly the highest type of science. This conception of metaphysics as a science and as the highest of sciences prevailed through the Scholastic circles of the later middle ages. It was the conception inherited by Suarez in his assertion that the divine mysteries could not be discussed in a manner becoming their dignity without the science of metaphysics.

Of course, neither Suarez nor any other Christian theological expert ever dreamt of making metaphysics a condition necessary for salvation. The use of metaphor, and appeal to the affective propensities working

35 Memo, 97D-98A.
under the impulse of grace, provide amply sufficient basis for the most fervent Christian life in the individual soul. But if one tries to discuss and integrate one's knowledge of things divine in accordance with the needs of the fully developed human intellect, the use of metaphor and the appeal to affections prove insufficient to convey the notions in the dignity that belongs to them as supersensible. God may be represented as the rock upon which sanctity is built, as a consuming fire, as a father, as a human king or judge, and under innumerably other metaphors. These figures of speech drive home their points to the believing soul, but if pressed under intellectual scrutiny they break down. The notions the metaphors express are confined in their nature to the sensible world. In their own nature they are not found in the spiritual order. For discussion on a properly intellectual plane, the dignity of divine truths calls for notions that in their own nature extend to the supersensible order.

This need, already clear to Suarez, has been intensified by modern attacks. The Kantian critique challenged the ability of all concepts of pure human reason to function outside the realm of sensible experience. In its wake some present existentialist tendencies will not extend any objectivity to the divine. Nineteenth century positivism regarded theological preoccupation as an immature stage in intellectual development. The logical positivism of the twentieth century dubbed as "nonsense" any statements about the supersensible, for the very reason that they are not verifiable in the sense order. Statements about the supersensible were relegated to the new category of the meaningless. They were not permitted to form the subject of intellectual discussion at all, either to be proven true or to be proven false. Recent linguistic analysis has not been able to make much of the ability of human language to express religious concepts, and what it salvages hardly seems worth retaining. What discussion of divine truths faces in the contemporary philosophical world is a radical challenge to the capability of the human mind to express objectively anything regarding the supersensible. The transcendent character of the required human concepts is not immediately evident. It has to be established scientifically. But no procedure based on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of sensible things, like the procedures of physics or chemistry, has any hope of ever elaborating concepts that

88 For a coverage of this topic, see M. J. Charlesworth, "Linguistic Analysis and Language about God," International Philosophical Quarterly, I (1961), 139-167.
could reach the supersensible. Quantity and sensible qualities are aspects confined to the material order, and as such cannot provide a basis for transcending it. The science required has to be different from the mathematical or experimental sciences.

Nor can natural philosophy, proceeding from the finite natures of sensible things, be expected to transcend those natures and make a leap into the positive infinity of divine objects. Nor can logic, with its procedure based upon the constructions of the human mind, attempt to provide concepts that will express the divine order. Metaphysics is the only theoretical science with procedure based on a characteristic whose nature is not finite. It works out its notions in terms of being, a characteristic not grasped originally through a finitizing concept but through an act of judgment. Known originally through judgment, being is an act that is other than any finite nature and so provides the basis for reasoning to the order beyond the finite. It enables the human mind to think in terms of transcendent concepts. It thereby furnishes the means for a discussion of the divine truths in their dignity as supersensible. But to do so, metaphysics has to be developed strictly as a science. A metaphysics having the status of a type of poetry, or of a twilight zone between poetry and prose, or of some emotional outpouring that uses prose as its medium, or of a cataloguing of general concepts, is not sufficient for this purpose. It has to have fully scientific status. A descriptive metaphysics, no matter of what kind, remains a description of what is known in the observable world. It is useless as an account of what is supersensible.

In the procedure of St. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, metaphysics is able to establish concepts of the supersensible in a way that meets the demands of the fully developed human intellect. It provides the means for discussion of divine truths in terms not of metaphor nor of anthropomorphism, but of concepts that can be used in their proper meaning with regard to things divine. To the satisfaction of

39 On the "leap" in the Scotistic procedure, see Bettoni, L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto, p. 56. For Suarez, the procedure for proving the existence of God from the Aristotelian natural philosophy cannot reach any immaterial substance, and much less an uncreated substance. See Disp. Metaph., XXIX, 1, 7; ed. Vivès, XXVI, 23a.

40 For St. Thomas the proper meaning of a transcendent notion is found in its primary instance, even though it is first known by human cognition through secondary instances. See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 196. CG, I, 34. ST, I, 13, 6c. On the philosophical background of the contemporary "ostracism of demonstrative inference" in this regard, see W. Norris Clarke, "Linguistic Analysis and Natural
the intellect's penetrating scrutiny, however, these concepts can be established only by a procedure that is truly demonstrative and that gives rise to the strictest type of science, a science that in the words of St. Thomas is \textit{maxime scientia}, science in the highest degree.

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\textit{Theology," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Ass'n, XXXIV} (1960), 114. Quite familiar to St. Thomas was the linguistic difficulty put into the mouth of the "logician" by A. N. Prior, "Can Religion be Discussed?", in \textit{New Essays in Philosophical Theology}, ed. Antony Garrow Newton Flew and Alasdair Chalmers Macintyre (London, 1955), 5: "We cannot have it both ways, and use a word as an abstract noun and a common noun at once, as you try to do in your sentence 'God is his own goodness'—that's just bad grammar, a combining of words which fails to make them mean..." St. Thomas, while admitting that specific forms cannot be predicated in this way, shows that being and the transcendent aspects that go with being call for such predication: "Sed in formis generalibus huiusmodi praedicatio recipitur; dicimus enim quod essentia est ens, et bonitas est bona, et uritas una, et sic de aliis. Cuius ratio est, quia illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens; unde oportet quod cuicumque apprehenxo per intellectum, intellectus attribuat hoc quod est ens.... Et quia quaedam sunt quae communicant rationem entis inseparabiler, ut unum, bonum, et huiusmodi; oportet quod haec de quolibet apprehenso praedicentur eadem ratione qua ens.... Et sic non oportet inquirere utrum bonitas sit bona se bonitate vel alia; sed utrum ipsa bonitate sit aliquid bonum quod sit alterum ab ipsa bonitate, sicut est in creaturis; vel quod sit idem cum ipsa bonitate, sicut est in Deo." \textit{De Ver.}, XXI, 4, ad 4m.

The metaphysician's concern with metaphorical notions already used by others to express the divine perfections is to establish the analogy on which they rest: "...finding them in existence, he is concerned only with showing how they reflect the intrinsically analogous knowledge he has previously obtained in his own way. The meaning of intrinsically analogous terms is the crucial issue." George P. Klubertanz, \textit{St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy} (Chicago, 1960), 153. On metaphor is this general context, see ibid., 145-147.
The "De contemptu mundi"
of Bernardus Morvalensis — Book Two
A Study in Commonplace

GEORGE J. ENGELHARDT

THE theme of the contemptus mundi is conversion to God. This
conversion, achieved in baptism and preserved through repentance,
Bernard is accustomed to express in Part One with an image most apt to
the commonplaces there dominant of temporal and eternal misery. Man
is summoned to rise here and now with Christ in the first resurrection,
the resurrection of the soul, so that in the second, the resurrection of
flesh, he may rise to eternal life, not die the second death.¹

This theme, dilated preceptively at the beginning of Part One,
informs much more obliquely the opening of Part Two (II.1-122).²
Here the theme is developed not with the imagery of the first resurrection
or of such Biblical alternates as the vigil, the ablution, and the

¹ Augustine De civ. Dei XX.6. This study of Book II continues the examination of the
three books of the De contemptu mundi begun with the study of Book I published in
Mediaeval Studies, XXII (1960), 108-135. For Caesar (I.59) therein identified as Julius
(p. 117) cf. Honorius Augustodunensis Eucidianum III.18 (PL 172, 1170); for ovile (I.455),
i.e., "ovile virtutem," see Anselm Homiliae xv (PL 158, 670-673).
² II.4 studium, Gregory Mor. IX.104: "bene vivendi studio." II.5, Matt. 24:12; Gratia,
Ovid Met. I.145. II.6, Ovid Met. I.111-112. II.8b-c, Ovid Met. I.90. II.9, Ovid Met. I.100.
II.11 iacet, Ovid Met. I.149. II.11e-12, Anselm Dialogus de casu diaboli ix (PL 158, 337).
II.15-18, cf. Ovid Met. I.101-110, 123-124. II.21 se for seu. II.24, Ovid Met. I.96. II.33b,
Ovid Met. I.98. II.39-42, Ovid Met. I.139-143. II.43-44, Ovid Met. I.89-93. II.47 utilis, Job
15:16, Ps. 13:3, 52:4; invariabilis, Juvenal XIII.236; alta, Pliny Natural History VII.73. II.52,
Juvenal VI.9-10, 300. II.56b-c, i.e., not without original sin but without sinful concupiscence
—see Anselm De conceptu virginali et originali peccato vii (PL 158, 440-442). II.59 Criminis
alea, so I.690b; cf. Juvenal XIV.4: "damnosa alea," cited by John of Salisbury Politicatus
I.5, ed. Clemens C. I. Webb (Oxford, 1909), I.35-38—see Ambrose De Tobia xi (PL 14,
772-774); Isidore of Seville Etymologiae XVIII.68, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1911); Yves
I.14.15. II.77 punctatae Pars quota? II.77 Jovis arbores, Ovid Met. I.106. II.79b, Ovid Met.
I.121. II.79c, Juvenal VI.5-7. II.80, Tractatus de ordine vitae v.19 (PL 184, 572-573); Juvenal
XIII.53-59. II.105, Juvenal XIII.28-30. II.113 astu, Lactantius Divinae institutiones V.18
(PL 6, 604-609). II.114 Sollicitudine, Gregory Mor. IX.105.
race or quest. Instead Bernard accommodates the ethnic legend of the golden age. This accommodation is twofold. The first age of man in the pagan myth becomes an allegory of which the historical sense is the first age of the Christian Church and the tropological sense the first or spiritual resurrection of man. These two senses are not so disparate as they might seem, because this resurrection of the soul, a resurrection of mercy, is mediated by the resurrection of Christ in His first advent, the advent of mercy that began the first epoch of the Church. The golden age is envisioned as a state of justice to which at any time the individual man can return by that conversion to God of which the primitive Church gave witness in the epoch of persecution.3

The primitive Christians were a just people because in them right reason implanted by nature and congruent with nature had been confirmed by the Word made flesh.4 So much were they strengthened not merely to know but to do good and so far reclaimed from frailty that Bernard is impelled to augment their strength or virtue hyperbolically: for them, he avers, it was sinful not only to do evil but to know evil.5 Their temples were not grandiose edifices but the man himself adorned not with jewels but with virtue.6 Their sacrifice was the virtuous soul.7 Their justice manifested itself in their fidelity to the law of God—the love of God, of neighbor, and in the proper sense of self—in their humanity and equity—that sense of the common bond and natural equality associating man with man—in their reverence for authority—the obedience of the meek conforming to that order which God implanted and pride supplanted.8 Because each of them was content with his own and with little, there was abundance for all. Their way of life is pictured as agrarian, not mercantile, the earth flowing in milk and honey, a few seeds yielding a great harvest, not because these things are literally true, but because in the primitive Church the mercenary, the venal, and the avaricious were discountenanced, and the cupiditas of no man was allowed to intercept or sequester the bounty of God sufficient to all. Neither was the prodigal suffered to waste his goods. Rather the benefits of God were to be used for the benefaction of all. There were diverse ranks and con-

3 Lactantius Div. inst. V.5-8 (PL 6, 564-575).
4 II.43-44, Lactantius Div. inst. VI.8-10 (PL 6, 659-671).
5 Lactantius Div. inst. VI.5 (PL 6, 649-652).
6 Lactantius Div. inst. V.8 (PL 6, 572-575); Jerome Epistolae, LII.10 (PL 22, 535-536).
7 Lactantius Div. inst. VI.2 (PL 6, 637-641).
8 Lactantius Div. inst. V.5,8,15 (PL 6, 564-567, 572-575, 595-598); Anselm De conceptu virginali iii, Homiliae ii (PL 158, 435-436, 595-597).
ditions but no pride of life because there was equality of spirit. Each had his own but was ready to share with another who had less than his need. It is in this sense that the Christians of the first age are said to have had all things in common except their wives. Since their bodies were temples not to be profaned and instruments to serve not self-indulgence but the ends of nature and of God, they ate and drank not riotously but soberly. Avoiding indiscriminate lust and restraining their sexual appetites to the offices of generation, they brought forth a virtuous offspring not for their own glory but for God's and not before the symbolic age of forty, the Scriptural number for self-abnegation. While they disciplined themselves from within, they were disciplined from without by the rigors of persecution. Yet to this persecution there is appropriately no allusion in the allegory of the golden age, for these pacific spirits enjoyed within themselves the peace of integrity, the simple peace that duplicity cannot simulate, the peace of the spiritually useful and frugal, who use what they have and use it in charity, whose faith is fruitful in good works and therefore rich in moral beauty—the peace that is an anagoge of the peace that surpasses understanding. One in humility of mind while diverse in rank or virtue, affluent because temperate, the first Christians pre-figured the paradoxes of the renovated world, the unity in diversity of the blest congregation and the satiety without surfeit of its unending refection.

In the elaboration of the allegory the poet anticipates a complex of contradistinctions which will be developed at the close of the poem. This complex opposes one to the other the Rome of the Caesars, the Rome of Peter and Paul, and the Rome of the Curia. In the execution of the allegory, however, the contradistinction of imperial Rome remains implicit. It must be inferred from the extension to the commonplace iniquity of formulas already applied to the commonplace vanity. These are the elegiac formulas with which in Part One Bernard had closed epiphanetically his Juvenalian register of the peerless "old men," the terrigenae of old, spiritually destitute because not reborn in Christ, but abounding, if only for vanity's brief moment, in the gifts of nature and fortune, the exemplars of a younger world's

9 Tertullian Apology xxxix; Lactantius Div. inst. V.16 (PL 6, 599-602).
10 Lactantius Div. inst. V.15-16, VI.3.6-7 (PL 6, 595-602, 641-644, 652-659); Anselm De casu diaboli xv-xvi (PL 158, 347-349).
exuberant bounty and the types of that *superbia vitae* which was to culminate in the grandeur of imperial Rome. In such a context these elegiac formulas serve to confirm *a fortiori* the vanity with which Bernard's contemporaries, the false Christians, "old men" in a now aged world, pursue the hollow gratifications of self-love. Transferred to the allegory of the golden age, these formulas epitomize that reversion to iniquity by which such Christians unite themselves with the unregenerate dead while alienating themselves from their spiritual forbears and the God in whom those now rest.

The contradistinction of apostolic and papal Rome emerges in the historical sense of the allegory as the antilogy of the first age of Christianity, the epoch of persecution, to the third, the era of the *pax Christiana*. This contradistinction between the age of justice and that of order without order is amplified through allusions to loci already familiar from Part One: the tetradic conceptualization of Christian history, the Johannine formulation of wordly love, and the Augustinian idea of peace. The tranquillity of order attained by the blest and foreshadowed in the primitive Church is denied of Bernard's contemporaries. Among them order has yielded to a malignant confusion that renders evil estimable and virtue invidious. The way of rectitude traversed during persecution with the constancy of meekness and the zeal of righteousness has long since been forsaken in the apostasy of pride, in the inordinate assertion of self, for the way of the deprived and the inconstant, which, since it leads to the ultimate privation of the *summum malum*, the second death of the eternal misery, is in truth a way that is no way. The hope in which the primitive faith reposed has succumbed to worldly solicitude. The former tranquillity has been supplanted either by the idleness of the dissolute or by the wrath of the worldly, who respond with violent impatience to anything that impedes them as they fiercely pursue the pride of life and the lust of the eyes or of the flesh. Addicted to power and vainglory, to avarice and its inverse, prodigality, to the ventral and subventral pleasures, they spurn the discipline that bound the early generations to the offices of nature and society. The first Christians in their innocence and humanity never fought against men but strove only to reduce misery and iniquity. So benign was their patience that

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13 This repetition is obscured in the text of Hoskier by the faulty reading of verse 3: *Flebilis incipit, aurea suscipit aurea metas for Flebilis incipit area, suscipit aurea metas*; cf. I.956: *Gloria finit, area transit omnis eorum*.
they wished to do good even to those who persecuted them. Their inhuman successors are preoccupied rather with brutishly destroying themselves and one another spiritually and physically. Thus the inward tranquillity of the primal age has been exchanged for the ostensible peace of the third. The persecution from without by the secular powers of the first age and the persecution from within by the heresiarchs of the second have eventuated in the peace without peace of the third age, the *pax Christiana* that is now transforming itself into the ultimate persecution of the fourth and last age. The *pax Christiana* has proved to be an illusory peace, rent externally by the schismatics, who profess the faith but reject the authority of the Church, and internally by the scandal of the false Christian. This hypocrite is the figure of his age, travelling both ways, professing the way of Christ with his mouth but in his heart living the way of the world.\(^{15}\) For him it has become expedient to join the Church Universal, which can neither flee from him as from the pagan despots nor put him to flight as it expelled the heresiarchs. Pretending to have been regenerated in Christ, he compounds with his own duplicity the Adamic breach of the original integrity.\(^{16}\) Like the nameless Dives, the nominal Christian is the proper symbol of his age, that nameless and ambiguous interim just before the advent of Antichrist when the dominical prediction is fulfilled and, charity growing cold, iniquity abounds.

Dives, the Scriptural symbol of abounding love of world consigned to eternal privation, is not expressly mentioned as the poem augments the antilogy of the first and third ages of Christendom. Instead his presence supervenes upon the repetition of terms applied to Dives in the elaboration of the first commonplace. In like fashion the *sempiternus horror* of the first commonplace, the ordered disorder of the eternal privation, is tacitly invoked for the reader as the poem now dwells upon the horror of the third commonplace, the moral debasement of that inordinate pride which, confusing good with evil and renouncing the rectitude of will that is justice, erects its own perverted will against the will of God.\(^{17}\) The antilogical formula "alter at idem," used now to signalize the divergence of the third from the first age, had been applied in the elaboration of the first commonplace to the dual aspect of Christ in His second advent and to the renovation of the world after the last judgment; the recurrence of the formula serves to link once

\(^{15}\) Gregory *Mor.* I.36.

\(^{16}\) II.97.

\(^{17}\) Anselm *Cur Deus homo* I.11 (PL. 158, 376-377); Gregory *Mor.* IX.100.
again the third age with the last age and thus the third commonplace with the first. Similarly the image of spiritual death and disease, the pestilence of iniquity resisted in the first age (II.25,56) coming together (“conveniuntibus,” II.120) now from every quarter, serves to recall the flowing together (“conflua,” I.999) of the apparitions of the dead, the prodigy of doom reported at the close of Part One.\(^\text{18}\) Besides the concordance of terms, a more overt device effects this rapprochement of the first and third commonplace. That is the juxtaposition of symbols unmistakably apposite to each: “plaga novissima,” symbolizing like the Apocalyptic seventh plague the eternal punishment of the first commonplace; “veraque lacrima,” contradistinguishing the eternal misery of the first commonplace from the temporal misery of the second; “vera vorago,” representing here as twice before in Part One the profuse confusion, the abounding iniquity of the third commonplace.\(^\text{19}\)

The moral or tropological sense of the allegory, conversion to God, becomes explicit in a short statement of theme (II.123-136) inserted between the allegory and the dilatation proper of the third commonplace.\(^\text{20}\) Besides being thematic, this insert is parmythic: it serves to forestall any censure that Bernard, bound as monk not to teach publicly but in the silence of his cloister to mourn the iniquity of man, might incur by undertaking his present task of quasi-homilist.\(^\text{21}\) He submits to his audience those signs—\textit{recte sentire, digne proloqui, vita confirmare}—by which his mission as preacher may be recognized and without which he might properly be rejected for aspiring presumptuously to that office.\(^\text{22}\) His motive is zeal, that passion for guarding the chastity of the soul, for keeping its love turned from the world and toward God which energizes the \textit{contemptus mundi} and without the ardor of which no homilist can kindle the ardor of his audience.\(^\text{23}\) This zeal is inspired by God, who in turn inspires the discretion with which Bernard speaks. It is He who prompts in a poet humbly

\(^{18}\) For the distinction between “sign” and “prodigy” see Anselm \textit{Homiliae} xiv (PL 158, 664-670), Augustine \textit{In Joannis Evangelium} XVI.3 (PL 35, 1523-1525).

\(^{19}\) II.104 vorago, Anselm \textit{Orationes} Ixxi (PL 158, 999-1004): “abyssus peccati.”

\(^{20}\) II.128 aflat, Gregory \textit{Mor.} XXVII.60-64. I.129, Gregory \textit{Mor.} XVIII.16-17. I.134b, cf. Gregory \textit{Mor.} XXXV.49.

\(^{21}\) Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{Sermon. in Cant.} I.XIV.3 (PL 183, 1084-1085).

\(^{22}\) Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{Sermon. in Cant.} XVI.2 (PL 183, 849); \textit{Commentarium in Epistolam ad Corinthios secundam} X.18 (PL 17, 319), Alanus de Insulis \textit{De fide catholica} II.1 (PL 210, 377-380).

\(^{23}\) Augustine \textit{Exortatio in Psalmum} CII.4 (PL 37, 1353), Gregory \textit{Mor.} XX.63, XXX.47.
professing to be unknowledgeable that epidictic virtuosity which might otherwise suggest indifference toward the time-honored dictum of homiletic style: *Non indiget pompa et cultu sermonis praedicatio Christiana.* He is claimed as the monitor for the “ordo atque consideratio” of Bernard’s speech, assisting at the disposition and dilatation of the poem and at the accommodation of it to the quality of Bernard’s audience. He is the warrant by which Bernard in turn demands from this audience that they should receive his work with discretion, accommodating themselves to the quality of his poem, the mode of which is satire because the subject matter is the inversion of the moral order, a mode which they must approach not with a puerile or adolescent frivolity but with the gravity of mature age. As the subject matter of Part Two—the inversion of the moral order or iniquity *δικαιοσύνη*—determines the satiric mode, it suggests that particularization of the general theme which will be appropriate to Part Two, the conversion of others to God. In the first part of his poem, Bernard had been occupied with the theme of self-conversion, dilating it from the first and second commonplaces of the *contemptus mundi*, the misery of the damned in hell and the misery of the human condition in this world. In Part Two, he addresses himself especially to those contemporaries burdened with the responsibilities of leadership, drawing from the third commonplace, iniquity, the dilatation of the theme that he propounds to them, the conversion of others. Preaching to them the necessity of preaching to others, guiding them as they should guide others entrusted to their care, he is confirming by his own example the action to which he exhorts them. Thus his statement of theme is paramythic because paradigmatic, and his entire poetic homily, emerging as an exemplar of governance, becomes its own justification. Having affirmed in this way his mission of zeal, Bernard now proceeds as quasi-homilist to lament the iniquity of man, which, when the poem is done, he will continue to mourn in private as monk.

At this juncture the process of dilatation is altered. The contradistinctive method of elaboration that had dominated the treatment of the allegory recedes before the assimilative. The contradistinction of primitive and contemporary Christendom is sustained but only to emphasize by its diminished function the remoteness of the pristine

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24 *Commentarum in Epistolam ad Corinthios primum* 1.17 (PL 17, 187-188), cited by Peter Lombard *Collectaneum in Epistolam I ad Corinthios* 1.14-18 (PL 191, 1540-1542).

25 Gregory *Hom. in Ez. Lxi.12*.

26 Gregory *In primum Regum expositiones* IV.iv.62 (PL 79, 276).
justice and the awesome contemporaneity of those affinities which the poem here insistently suggests. The primary endeavor of Bernard, then, in the passage (II.137-386) that follows the affirmation of theme is to assimilate not expressly but inferentially by the concordance of ideas and words his own age and its iniquitous state as antitype to the state of sin obtaining at the first advent and, more obliquely, to evoke the anagogy subsisting between the misery of the damned amplified in the first commonplace and the prodigies of evil that he ascribes to his own times—further, to identify these prodigies with those beginnings of sorrow which by a common tradition of Scriptural exegesis were thought to usher in the ultimate age and the second advent.27

Among these beginnings of sorrow is that aggravation of iniquity foretold in the verse of Christ—"Et quoniam abundavit iniquitas, refrigescat charitas multorum" (Matt. 24:12)—that Bernard had paraphrased in the final portion of Book One (I.1001). Its position there at the point in the taxis of the poem where the three commonplaces abut serves to emphasize its relevance to each. The culmination of sin to which this line refers may be considered intrinsically or extrinsically. As a sign of the present wrath of God, who by withdrawing His grace to requisite the long suffered waywardness of men permits them to sink to the ultimate apostasy, it belongs to the second commonplace (malum poenae): the subsequent sin punishes the prior. As a sign of the imminent wrath of God that will manifest itself on the day of wrath, it belongs to the first commonplace (summum malum). Intrinsically, it represents the ultimate state of sin, the supreme degree of the third commonplace (malum culpae), to develop which the poet once again paraphrases the dominical prediction (II.138bc; cf. II.220) as he turns to the dilatation of its intension and extension.

The extension—the diffusion and profusion of evil—is conveyed in the first member ("quoniam abundavit iniquitas"). For Bernard this diffusion has come to pass. Iniquity is claimed by him for every zone and quarter of the earth, for every rank and profession, for all ages

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27 II.181b surgit for sugit. II.212 unctio, the common paronymic opposites punctio and conjunctio are implied. II.220a, Gregory Mor. XIX.4. II.222b suggere for sugere; cf. II.223 ubera, II.224 lac, Gregory Mor. IV.51. II.228, Augustine De civ. Dei XIX.16.16-17. II.250 cerasta, Gregory Mor. XXXI.43. II.277 caret, implied by syllepsis in 277a, i.e., "Hoc probracarent judicem." II.280 Tutra for thecu: ὑφίζειν "coffin," in terminal antithesis with parma. II.308 clericus aulicus, Peter Damiani Contra clericos aulicos (PL. 145, 463-472); Bernard of Clairvaux Epistolae lxxvii (PL. 182, 191-199). II.319, read Raptus eis cibus os operit quibus os male nudat. II.349, Juvenal X.22.
and for each sex. This charge of universal evil is supported by what may be termed an ethologue—a catalogue (II.241-360) that registers in their hierarchic sequence the various grades of the social order, ascribing to each its characteristic function and malfunction. The function of the priest, for example, is developed (II.245-246, 291-304) ex notatione from the names designating his profession. He is called presbyter ("elder") not because he is venerable in years but because of the dignity he must sustain and the wisdom he must manifest. Interpreted paronymically as "praebens iter," presbyter suggests the Biblical injunctions parate viam and iter facite associated with the office of preaching. In preaching to the people the wisdom of God, in providing thus what is morally beneficial to them, the priest deserves to be called pastor ("feeder"). If, however, he is restrained by pride or greed from denouncing the sins of those upon whose offering he lives, he is aptly said to eat the sins of God's people. As pastor the priest serves the people. As sacerdos he serves God, giving to God—"sacram dans"—the sacrifice of the mass. In this daily immolation of Christ, in the consecration of the bread and wine, consists the especial dignity of the priest. As minister of the altar he must be immaculate and therefore celibate, the spiritual father of those reborn in the faith, but the concubinary priest inordinately desires to be at the same time lord and master of a woman to whom the poet with a mordant euphemism refers in terms—seror, proxima—reminiscent of the Pauline potestas mulierem sororem circumducendi (I Cor. 9:5) and the canons regulating the admission of women to clerical households. Her "assiduity" recalls more obliquely the warning of Ecclesiasticus 9:12: "Cum aliena muliere ne sedeas omnino." In illicit union with her the intemperate priest exchanges the highest good of eternity for the illusion of a temporary good; and for this pathetic travesty upon the friendship

28 The term ethologue is adapted from ethologia; see Seneca Moral Epistles XCV.65.
29 Quintilian Institutio oratoria Lix.3.
30 Cicero Topica viii.35.
31 Wisd. 4:8; De divinis officiis xxxvi (PL 101, 1234-1236); Raban Maur De clericorum institutione 1.6 (PL 107, 301-302).
32 Gregory Hom. in Ev. VII.2.
33 Hildebert Sermones lxxviii (PL 171, 751-758).
34 Jerome Epistolae XIV.8 (PL 22, 352-353).
and charity that emerge in conjugal society, he is barred like the foolish virgins of the parable (Matt. 25:1-12) from the nuptial feast of the Lord.\(^{36}\) Thus the priest who should teach his people the difference between holy and profane, clean and unclean, who should, immaculate himself, offer sacrifice for the sins of his people, sacrifices them to his infirmity, and they, pursuing his unclean example, confirm his ruin with their own.\(^{37}\)

This ethologue, repeated by epimone, serves as an ethic proof (\(\chi\)ο\(\varepsilon\)ι\(\gamma\)α\(\iota\)ς \(\pi\)\(\lambda\)\(\sigma\)τ\(\iota\)ς) to demonstrate the universal evil of the age.\(^{38}\) It is delivered with a candor curbed only by a fear of scandal, which the poet expresses in a phrase obliquely reminiscent of the pagan Areopagus.\(^{39}\) Bernard sees in mankind a universality of sin which is the antitype of that which Paul imputes to Jews and Gentiles at the first coming (Rom. 1:18-3:18). Nor is sin less profuse now before the second advent than at the first. Bernard charges his contemporaries with a plethora of evil. They are filled with all iniquity like the Gentiles in the time of Paul.\(^{40}\) They are filled with hypocrisy and iniquity like the Pharisee (Matt. 23:28), who, vain of works but empty of faith, has become the type of the false Christian, the figure of modern Christendom, who professes a simulated faith that does not live in works. As this plenitude of evil that Paul ascribes to his epoch is thus assimilated typologically to that abundance of iniquity which bespeaks the second advent and which Bernard equates with the iniquity rife in his time, so this abounding iniquity prefigures anagogically that plenitude of misery which constitutes the first commonplace. Lest the reader should become unmindful of this anagogy, Bernard twice alludes (II.145, 220) to the \textit{lex talionis} of divine justice which, assimilating the punishment to the sin, burns the fires of lust with the fires of hell and fills its profound abyss with the sinners now abounding in the world.

\(^{36}\) Hugh of Saint Victor \textit{Summa sententiarum} VII.4 (PL 176, 157).
\(^{38}\) For epimone see II.259-260 and my \textit{“Beowulf: A Study in Dilatation,”} \textit{PMLA}, LXX (September 1955), 828: For ethic proof see \textit{Rhetor: to Alexander vii: ἐγέρον δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ τῶν εἰκών ἐθος, δ κατα συνήθειαν ἔκαστος ποιόμεν.} Ethic proof may also effect persuasion by utilizing the character of the author or of the auditors; see Aristotle \textit{Rhetoric} II.267, Acts 17:21; Cato Distincta I,12.
\(^{39}\) \textit{Pi.267}, Acts 17:21; Cato Distincta I,12.
\(^{40}\) Note the radical concordance in Greek between \textit{"πεπληρωμένους πάση ἁδικίας"} (Rom. 1:29) and \textit{"τὸ πληθυνθῆναι τὴν ἁσομίαν"} (Matt. 24:12).
The intension of the commonplace iniquity is conveyed in the second member of the dominical prediction ("refrigescet charitas multorum"), in which the repugnance of subject and verb, of warmth and cold, symbolizes the essential confusion or disorder of the malum culpae. The rejection of justice or moral order by man and the recession of justice from man are the obverse and reverse of this intension. The recession of justice and the accession of evil are dramatized in members derived from the scenic verses with which Ovid depicted the advent of the iron age and Juvenal the still worse horror of his own ninth and nameless age. These prosopopeic phrases Bernard has for kinetic vigor pared down to their syntactic minima, disposing them at intervals in his dilatation like figures in a tableau. The mise-en-scène thus evoked is for the modern tragedy that has superseded the phantasies of the ancient dramatists—the tragedy of man as Christian false like the Pharisees to the religion revealed by God, of man as rational being false like the pagan contemporaries of Paul to the reason implanted by nature (II.169-170).

When man recedes from justice, he contravenes the law of God, which is justice, and the law of nature, which His justice has determined. Justice in man is that rectitude of will in which the will of the rational creature is subject to the will of God. This subjection, which manifests itself in the obedience of faith, is salutary to man just as disobedience to the divine and natural order, the iniquity or anomia of infirm or simulated faith, is destructive. The long course of human perdition is marked in Bernard’s perspective by three saliences, the advent of sin, the advent of mercy, and the advent of justice. With these he associates three manifestations of iniquity, distinguished as prototype, type, and antitype. Because the prototype is common to the iniquity of every age and because the poet wishes to assimilate the antitype and therefore the type to the iniquity of his own age, he draws upon the traditional analyses of these manifestations to elaborate the spiritual disorder of his own day. Thus he alludes to the ruina in occulto (II.160b) and the ruina in manifesto (II.160a) that Augustine had distinguished in the lapse of the first parents. He repeats (II.177-178) the tropological interpretation that links the functions of Satan, Eve, and Adam in that fall to the time-honored trichotomy of thought, word, and deed. He adverts (II.159), however, to only two of

41 Ovid Met. I.127-150; Juvenal VI.19-20, XIII.28-29.
43 De civ. Dei XIV.15.69-70.
the three grades of human sin—sensus, consensus, and audacia definitionis—that tradition had discerned in the process of the original apostasy; the first grade is passed over since it remains after baptism only as a malum poenae.  

These elicitations from the primal apostasy are interspersed—after the peribolic fashion—among the much more copious references to the universal apostasy that preceded the advent of mercy. This universal apostasy prefigured in Bernard’s view the ultimate apostasy that is to precede the advent of justice. Because Bernard conceives of his own age as a transitional phase, a nameless interval between the epoch of the pax Christiana and the era of the final apostasy, he envisions the iniquity of his contemporaries in the modes of that dynamic of sin that Paul (Rom. 1:18-3:18) had spelled out for the universal apostasy. The false Christian of the twelfth century like Jew or Gentile of the first is possessed of a perverted will that in turn vitiates every power of the soul. The rational power is given over to that reprobate sense with which Paul charged the Gentiles, to the spiritual blindness symbolized by the tropology of Sedechias, to the Pharisaic rejection of truth. The concupiscible power has been surrendered to that three-forked love against which St. John had warned especially for the last days: the pride of life or inordinate self-love, the lust of the eyes or avarice, and the lust of the flesh. The ancient idolatry has been resumed—Mammon and Venus are worshipped not in fanes but in the spirit. In this nameless interval, therefore, as in the pagan antiquity denounced by Paul, the lust of the flesh has been suffered by the wrath of God to incur the ultimate degeneracy, the nameless passions (“passiones ignominiae,” Rom. 1:26) of the sexually perverted, while venality has become so desperate that like Simon Magus it ventures to traffic in the priceless and unpurchasable gift of divine grace. The irascible power of the soul is no less disordered and confused. The false Christians resent the virtuous and without compunction exult in the practice of evil. Images of death since they are conformed to the devil, such sinners will not be regenerated through the second baptism of penance and thus conformed to Christ. Even the alms that they may give to other men, while integral to penance, are unavailing for them because they have not given themselves through repentance to God.

44 Gregory Mor. IV.49; Anselm De concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio vi-viii (PL 158, 529-531).
45 Gregory Mor. VII.37.
46 Gregory Mor. XXXIII.6.
Conformed thus to the Seducer or Misleader, sitting in the shadow of death, they are withdrawn from the way of justice and charity. They have deviated into the wastes of solitude, the domain of pride and singularity, spurning the social bond that binds all men as neighbors and brothers in Christ and on account of Christ. Rejecting the way of simplicity, they straddle the double way of hypocrisy. Because they seek not divine but human approbation, they give their goods to God in the corporal works of mercy yet withhold from Him the better gift, themselves, by neglecting the works of justice. They are well symbolized by the personification of Fraud or Guile since in imitation of the Seducer they presume to steal themselves or induce others to steal themselves from God. As if in dishonor of Him they deny Him that honor which is His due from all rational creatures, the subjection of their wills to His, and prefigure in the horror of this perverse erection of self the horror of eternal damnation. Choosing as if drunk the slippery way of perdition, they precipitate themselves through the confusion of iniquity into the confusion of hell, submerging themselves in the abyss of sin—in the pit of Venus—only to be buried at last in that abyss “ubi est nullus ordo.”

Although the assimilative mode dominates the elaboration of this passage, the method of contradistinction is maintained as the passage recurs by epimone to the opposition of the first and third ages of Christianity. To this function the poem accommodates both Vergilian and Scriptural allusions. The phrase “furor impius intus” (Aeneid I.294), with which Vergil had described the pax Romana, is emphatically extended to become “furor impius intus et extra” (II.152): the image of Strife at once confined and free symbolizes the ambiguous actuality of the pax Christiana, the peace without peace of the third age, and portends the extinction of that force which was thought to be holding back the advent of Antichrist and the fourth age, the Pauline ὁ ξατέχων (II Thes. 2:7) that a common tradition identified with the pax Babylonis, the secular peace of the city of this world, the foremost instance of which was the peace established by Augustus. A second

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47 Ps. 106:10, Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones de diversis I.2-3 (PL 183, 537-539).
48 Gregory Mor. I.36.
49 Anselm Cur Deus homo I.7 (PL 158, 367-368); Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones pro Dominica VI post Pentecostes I.3 (PL 183, 388-389).
50 Anselm Cur Deus homo I.11, De concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio vii, Meditationes iii, xi (PL 158, 376-377, 529-530, 725-729, 762-769).
52 Tertullian Apology xxxii: Augustine De civ. Dei XIX. XX.19.
phrase, “cana fides,” in which Vergil (Aeneid I.292) had personified the ancient fidelity restored by Augustus, is transferred by Bernard to the simple faith of the early Christians, the faith that justifying lives in the works of charity (II.207-208), “old” because forsaken by the false Christians of the third age, “white” but not “whitened” like the hypocritical professions of the Pharisees and their modern antitypes. Unlike those lonely disciples of Christ in whom before His resurrection and assumption and the mission of the Paraclete the spirit was willing but the flesh weak—“spiritus quidem promptus est, caro autem infirma” (Matt. 26:41)—these false Christians more than a thousand years later sheltering themselves in the Church Universal are both carnally frail and spiritually torpid (II.188-198). Useless because they are not benign, they profess the faith that is now ascendant, yet it ill becomes them to sing on the decachord (II.238) since they profess their faith in Christ while not confessing Him in good works nor their sins in the second baptism of penance. Although once regenerated in baptism as the adoptive sons of God, they are not to enjoy the salvation which the first Christians now enjoy. Since these hypocrites will not act with the Holy Spirit acting upon them (II.186; Rom. 8:14), they shall not be freed from iniquity, into which they have relapsed, or from misery, which is their eternal retribution. They shall never be received, as the first Christians have long since been, into the peace of the blest, to elaborate which Bernard returns to the images of triumph and the allegorical figures of the active and contemplative life employed in the dilatation of the first commonplace, doom.

Thus the depraved generation of the third age is contradistinguished from the righteous generation of the first, one fervid with the inordinate zeal of self, the other actuated by the zeal of rectitude and charity. The just generation is brought forth by men who have relinquished the studies of the contemplative life, which is only begun in this world, to undergo the obligations of the active life, from which they will be freed only in the next. By the spiritual works of mercy they administer to their fellow men, converting their souls

54 I Cor. 13:4: “Caritas... benigna est” (χαριστεότεραι); Rom. 3:12: “inutiles facti sunt: non est qui faciat bonum” (ἡξειδοίησαν: οὐδὲ ἔστων ποιῶν χριστιᾶται).
55 Ps. 32:1-3, Ecclus. 15:9; Sermones centum xiii (PL 171, 926-927), Epistolae CDLXII.5 (PL 182, 664-665), Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones de diversis LV.1 (PL 183, 677-678), Peter Lombard Commentarium in Psalmos XXXII.1-3 (PL 191, 325-327).
56 II.172 gens aemula, II.520 Mors aemula, II.189 ferevit; I Cor. 13:4: “caritas non aemulatur” (οὐ δὴ ἡλοί); Jas. 3:16-4:4.
from that spiritual inaction which prefigures the eternal death.\footnote{II.194 vocat, II.235 ocia.} The just generation, then, is a spiritual progeny, sons begotten for the Lord not in the flesh but in the spirit by leaders that guard the chastity of the souls entrusted to them as zealously as husbands the chastity of their wives, masters that maintain the counterpoise of charity between discipline and mildness, refusing to foster with maternal indulgence those sins which should be curbed by paternal rigor. Such leaders in their eminence do not forget the natural equality of all men—an equality of condition that is to be modified by the dominion of man over man only in the presence of sin.\footnote{Augustine De civ. Dei XIX.15. Gregory Mor. XXI.21-24.} They feel, therefore, no less bound to associate as brothers with the virtuous than to rule as if fathers the wicked. Like St. Paul they assume the offices of the active life not as an honor but as a weight, taking upon themselves with the zeal of compassion the burdens of those who are spiritually weaker.

Because the faith that confessed itself in such works, works benign in fact and beneficent in influence (II.149-150), has now been supplanted, because the faith that justifies has been superseded by the dead and simulated faith of the false Christian, the administrative life is no longer inspired by justice.\footnote{Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. LXXI.1-2 (PL 183, 1121-1122).} Justice that should assign to each his due is now defrauded of its due with a contumacy that affronts God Himself. Life as now lived is no longer to be divided between the contemplative life with its liberty and the active life with its obligation. the one informed by love of God, the other by love of neighbor in God. Rather life has been given over to the license of self-will. Such a life has no leisure for spiritual propagation or spiritual acquisition. It refuses to be occupied with either self-conversion or the conversion of others. It will not bring forth virtue in itself by the works of justice nor by the works of mercy beget for the Church sons in the faith. Spiritually it dies sonless as Sedechias, its tropological type, died in the flesh.

Bernard in his paradigmatic statements of theme opposes himself to such a life. He aligns himself to the personifications of virtue that weep in the background of this modern tragedy, because a preacher cannot bring forth spiritual offspring unless by weeping and perhaps because for the desperate the benign should not pray but only weep.\footnote{Gregory Mor. XXX.47. Bernard of Clairvaux De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae xxii (Pl. 182. 969-972).} It is the universal dearth of such a zealous solicitude for the souls of
G. J. ENGEHLARDT

others as prefigured in the offering of Aaron and his sons (II.230)—a deathur upon which Bernard insists emphatically in a series of rhetorical questions—that impels him although a monk to venture upon the function of the active life and to wield like St. Paul the sword of the spirit which is the word of God so that he may induce those upon whom this function is incumbent to rededicate themselves to this spiritual propagation, the conversion of others, which is the theme of Part Two.61

This spiritual propagation of the elect is distinguished by the poet from physical propagation and the spiritual propagation of the reprobate. The spiritual propagation of evil is elaborated next in a passage that begins and ends with the figure of Venus ignea (II.387-570).62 She stands ungirt by the golden girdle that binds with the

61 Gregory Hom. in Ex. Lxi.27-29.
chain of charity and chastity the Apocalyptic angels that symbolize tropologically the virile preachers come to announce the salvation of the just and the condemnation of the wicked. She is aflame not with the fire that glows in the eyes of such a spirit but with the inordinate concupiscence of the flesh. The nets that she spreads unlike the nets of the Apostolic fishermen are the snares of Satan. She is the embodiment of amor venerate or sensual passion, the personification of the evil woman—harlot or adulteress—whom Ecclesiastes signalized as his foremost adversary under Satan. Even her essays in virtue or ventures toward good whether well intentioned or feigned are less pleasing to God because they too eventuate in evil than the deviations of the virtuous, which are amenable to penance. She fills with iniquity the wide road to hell. Abhorring the narrow path of virtue, she bursts the confines set upon sexual exercise by the restraints of consanguinity, conjugal chastity, sacred virginity, or holy widowhood and levels with an egalitarian lust the hierarchic order of society. While fomenting confusion, she thwarts the order of charity which

both the fidelity enjoined upon the marriage bed and the restrictions imposed upon marriage within the seventh grade of kinship are designed to sustain. As she dominates man, she subjects human reason to the animal appetites, and her confused victims seek to justify their licentiousness as common and natural by resort to moral relativism. But Bernard rejects the statistical determination of morality, and since he believes the unique function of the argument from the diversity of male and female is to exclude those sexual practices which are contrary to nature, he is inclined to accept "illud impudens genitalium artium argumentum" no more as a palliative for promiscuity than as an impediment to the supranatural exercise of continence or virginity. Rather it is this very range and rifeness of iniquity in a world where as before the deluge the clamor of lust has all but drowned out the voice of sobriety that impel Bernard to undertake the conversion of others in the spiritual propagation of the just. Unlike the pusillanimous pastor he does not refrain from condemning such powerful depravity for fear of losing an earthly stipend. Yet like the meek pastor he remembers with compassion his equality in nature to those whose faults he disciplines with the rigor of zeal. In his Christian fashion he accommodates to the iniquity of carnal lust the tears of Heraclitus and the laughter of Democritus, the alternative responses of pagan satire to the vanity of human prudence: he laments the evil woman while deriding her viciousness. He mocks now not without tears, because it is still the acceptable time. The time of retribution, however, when the damned will be mocked without compassion, is at hand. The very rifeness of iniquity is a sign of its imminence. Thus, although Bernard voices the conventional disclaimer that his diatribe is directed only against evil women and only against their sins, he nevertheless proclaims in the era of the false Christian the universality of the evil woman foreshadowed in Eve and in the licentious contemporaries of Noah and Juvenal, who now takes her part in that ambience of iniquity which portends the coming of Christ in judgment as it anagogically had attended His coming in mercy.

The evil woman is the principal instrument by which the damned are betrayed to the Adversary, who will in the eternal misery rage with violence against the souls that he can now only blandish with guile. The method by which the person of the evil woman is most conspicuously developed is the satirical device of accumulating "base comparisons." Like Eve, the "os vitiorum," she is (like Lilith) the

63 Guibert of Nogen: De virginitate xii (PL 156, 600-601).
64 Peter Damiani Contra intemperantes clericos 11.7 (PL 145, 410-413).
"arma voraginis," having yielded her members as weapons of iniquity. As Satan is the enemy without, she is the enemy within, the fire in the bosom of man, whose flesh is but as straw even when he is virtuous and like rotten twigs when he is unprofitable. Yet Satan is no more than the predator of man; she is at once the predator and prey of her victims. Because Satan would preside over mankind as closely through her as God presides over the angelic Thrones, she is called the throne of Satan. Because she is coupled with him in the spiritual propagation of evil, she is compared to the fierce animals employed in Scripture as demonic symbols: she is called "lea" and "locusta" and by tropological accommodation from the story of Joseph "fera." She is likened to the viper since she kills both her physical and spiritual progeny and to the horrid owl since her work is the work of darkness. Such comparisons, in turn, are augmented when, compounding ferity with inhumanity, she is declared to exceed these animals. She is said to be of the earth earthy because she persuaded the first Adam to fall and persists in dissuading his descendants from putting off the first Adam, the old man of the earth earthy, and putting on the second Adam, the new man, Christ. She is therefore identified as "lues," "pestis," and "stercus," with the corruption which she induced and which she fosters. The insidious mode of this corruption is suggested by the image "virus" and by such stylistically emphatic oxymora as "dulce venenum" and "pulchra putredo." Some of her designations are anatomically oriented, such as "trita semita" and the "fossa notissima" accommodated from Juvenal. Among these the images of the path represent the most seductive instance of the broad road, the via lubrica common to all iniquity. The images of the pit imply analogically by the law of retaliation the abyss of the eternal misery. Such paradoxical antonomasiae as "dulce venenum" and "pulchra putredo" confront vanity with misery, the momentary illusion with the enduring deprivation—the sad exchange of those who have commerce with the evil woman. The antonomasia "foetor" is indebted somewhat to its paronymic echo of the noun foemina, and the raising of the phrase "foemina foetida" to "foemina foetor" represents a standard mode of stylistic auxesis. The antonomasias of venality, heightened by the paradox of the vicious woman to whom vice is its own reward, stem from the name meretrix. The fanciful etymology of mulier—as if mollier from mollis—combines with the Vergilian byword "varium et mutablem semper femina" and the aphorism of Samson cited by Ambrose to suggest such

95 Cf. Gregory Mor. V.41.
epithets as “mobilis,” “varium,” and “perfida” and to prompt the accommodation of the Pauline “vas fictile.” The evil woman is not like the virgin, the continent widow, or the chaste wife a vessel of gold, of silver, or of wood, but a vessel of clay, not cleansed from desire and contention but full of such filth. Unlike the good wife, the weaker vessel cherished by her husband or disciplined by God, who strives to become a virile woman, the evil woman chooses to remain all woman. Her exemplar is Eve, whom because more pliant Satan chose to seduce rather than Adam and whom in turn Satan taught to seduce Adam. She is therefore termed the “prima peremptio” to distinguish her from the second Eve, the Virgin Mother, the vehicle of man’s redemption. Thus by some antonomasiae such as “pessima portio” opposition is implied to Scriptural designations for the good wife, by others like “publica janua” opposition to the Biblical imagery of virginity (“hortus conclusus”).

The evil woman, then, is averse to that propagation by which woman shall be saved. She evades by infanticide the physical propagation incumbent upon the old dispensation and obstructs by the lust which she inspires and serves the spiritual propagation appropriate to the new. In this spiritual propagation of the elect, man is reborn in Christ as he converts himself to God through his works of justice and corporal mercy and as he is converted by others in their works of spiritual mercy. His spiritual progeny is both the good that he does and the men that he makes good. The evil woman gives herself, she gives her goods, but not to Christ in charity as does the Christian leader, who thus converts himself to God before undertaking the conversion of others. In submission not to God’s will but to her own and Satan’s, she gives so that she may subvert others to her concupiscence. She too loves her enemies but not on account of Christ. She loves them with a love that is a sign not of benignity but of confusion, the “errorque furorque” of lust. Unregenerate, refusing to rise with Christ from the corruption of fallen nature, she conforms like the Petrine ἐυδοδίδασκαλος to the irrational beast although sensuality in the beast is not penal as in man but natural. Like these venal teachers she has chosen to live as the beast, to deceive and be deceived, to snare and be ensnared. Her gain like theirs is iniquity. She is rewarded like them with the reprobate sense, the utter moral confusion of the damned, unlike the good wife, the virile woman, who

66 Ambrose Epistolae XIX.17 (PL 16, 987-988), Isidore of Seville Etymologiae XI.2.
67 Ovid Amores I.ii.35.
gains through her modest example a spiritual progeny in the conversion of her husband. In this evil woman a degenerate nature conspires with diabolic art to produce the ultimate and original instrument of perfidy. Educated to evil by Satan and his members, she makes bold to teach like Eve although woman is not permitted to teach man. She thus becomes the aggressor, seeking man when she is not sought, drawing back only to draw him on. Seeming to be his prey, she is in fact the predator. Not the giver of life, unlike Christ, who is the giver and gift of spiritual life, she is the taker of life both physical and spiritual. She is the instrument not of generation or regeneration but of degeneration. In this spiritual propagation of evil—in the evil works that she does and in the sinners that she converts to sin—she has been requited with the same fecundity with which the patriarchs were blessed in their physical propagation.

As iniquity thus abounds in the spiritual propagation of the reprobate, so the iniquitous themselves abound in the physical progeny of the reprobate. This inordinate propagation of the flesh is not so manifestly illicit as those operations of carnal concupiscence upon which the poem dilated so copiously before proceeding to the briefer development of physical propagation (II.571-600). Rather it may seem to be lawful because it appears to be acted by the principal cause for which marriage was instituted before the fall and to represent one of those goods that excuse the carnal concupiscence with which the marriage act has been attended since the fall. It is censurable, however, because it prefers the conjugal state, which is good, to the state of continence, which is better, and because it brings forth sons and daughters not for God but for itself. Those who are committed to this inordinate perpetuation and multiplication of self have chosen to ignore the diversity of times that distinguishes the old dispensation from the new. In the time of grace the pious serve in the freedom of virginity as under the law they served in the yoke of marriage. The patriarchs, continent in the spirit while married in the flesh, obeyed the precept to increase and multiply when the people of God was small so that it might grow to bring forth the prophets and in the fullness of time Him whom they foreshadowed. Now in the fullness of time when time is short and judgment is at hand, it is time not to embrace but to abstrain from embracing. It is time to fill not

the earth but paradise with the faithful people, to increase and multiply not in the flesh but in the spirit, to propagate virtue in oneself and in one's neighbors. Nor has it ever been enough in the marriage of the faithful just to procreate children lawfully and honorably. Faithful parents must nourish their offspring in the fear of God, teaching them to place their hope in God. Whom they bear in the flesh, they must educate in the spirit. The reprobate now teem with children, but they bring them forth not to the worship of God but to gratify their own pride of life. Rather than achieving the goods of marriage, they subject themselves to its miseries, and they are distracted from the pious life by the worldly solicitude with which in the tribulation of marriage one spouse seeks to please not God but the other. The pagan spirit that informs such a marriage displays itself even at the nuptial feast in the hymeneal dances that do not become a union in Christ.69

These strictures upon the revelry that mars the solemnization of marriage anticipate the diatribe against the craspulous with which Bernard ends the dilatation of the iniquity abounding ominously in the concupiscence of the flesh (II.601-644).70 The craspulous are confronted as worshippers of the stomach who—in the all too common Goliardic fashion—disregarding the admonitions of Christ and of Paul, prefer despite the bodelements of doom the tavern to the church and the glow of insobriety to the light of divine wisdom. Adapting the order of their vices to the disposition of their members, they indulge the ventral appetites to foment the subventral.71 Even though they may be free from such spiritual sins as pride and avarice, their souls are repelled by these bodily lusts from the vision of eternal peace just as according to an ancient tropology the walls of Jerusalem were once brought down by the prince of cooks.72

The dilatation of pride (II.645-828) begins with a time-honored distinction, the dichotomy of the Pauline inquinamentum carnis et spiritus.73 Through the division of spiritual and carnal sin—sin

69 Yves of Chartres Leectrum VIII.148 (Pl. 101, 617).
70 II.609-610, Petrus Cantor Verbun abbreviatum cxxv (Pl. 205, 330-332). II.613 vermis, Gregory Mor. XXI.5. II.520, Jerome Epistolae LXIX.9 (Pl. 22, 663-664). II.624 hunc Venus for haec Venus, i.e., pulenda. II.630-632, Luke 21:34. II.637-639, Phil. 3:19.
71 Tertullian De jejunis i (Pl. 2, 953-955), Jerome Commentaria in Epistolam ad Titum i. 7 (Pl 26, 566-567), Gregory Mor. XXXI.89.
72 Gregory Mor. XXX.59, Peter Damiani Epistolae VI.32 (Pl. 144, 427), Petrus Cantor Verbun abbreviatum cxxxiv (PL 205, 328-330).
73 II Cor. 7:1. II.649, Wisd. 9:15, Bernard of Clairvaux De conversione xvii (Pl. 182, 850-851). II.650, Exod. 16:3, Num. 11:5, 14; Jerome Adversus Jovinianum I.11 (Pl 23, 224-
perfected in the inordinate gratification of the spirit and sin consummated with sensual pleasure in the inordinate gratification of the flesh—pride is opposed as spiritual sin to the ventral and subventral lusts personified once again by the Juvenalian *Venus ebria.* The apostasy from God proper to each is distinguished by its own Scriptural symbol, the metaphor of the earthly habitation accommodated from Wisdom to suggest the importunate evil of pride and the longing of the children of Israel in the desert for the fleshpots of Pharaoh construed tropologically as the reversion to Satan after conversion to God.

Implicit in the reversion to Pharaoh is an image that recurs in the dilatation of pride. This is the image of the sea, foreshadowing here the marine imagery with which the second and third books of the poem are to be closed. In its implicit form, it is an emblem of divine beneficence: the Red Sea in which Pharaoh is drowned with his army while the Hebrews pass through on their way to the promised land prefigures analogically the eternal salvation of the just, typologically the ablation of sin and the conversion to God in the sacraments of baptism and penance. In its explicit form, this image is an emblem of human iniquity, the river of Egypt and therefore the river of darkness in which Pharaoh would have drowned the newborn males of Israel as the devil seeks to extinguish through false doctrine the rational sense of the newborn in Christ, a Lethean river of spiritual sloth and charity grown cold, the turbulent sea of this world, the Charybdian vortex of the reprobate sense, the abounding of iniquity that shall sweep in the ultimate cataclysm, the tumult waves of the primeval ocean to which God set His limits, prefiguring in creation the utmost bounds to which the inundation of pride should swell before the last judgment.

The image of the sea is related in medieval exegesis by an ancient concordance (*mare: amarum*) to the Scriptural theme of bitterness, that in turn has supplied a means by which the several epochs of Christian-


74 Juvenal VI.300.
ity may be graded according to the degree of adversity suffered by the Church in each.\textsuperscript{75} The first or bitter age when the Church was persecuted by tyrants from without is thus distinguished from the second and more bitter period when the Church was persecuted from within by the heresiarchs. The third or contemporary period is most bitter because the Church is now beset with enemies from whom it cannot flee as from the tyrants nor whom it can put to flight as the heresiarchs. These enemies are the false Christians, personified as \textit{Fraus}. Although members of him whose name is Death, they have in this time of ecclesiastical peace wrapped themselves in the folds of the spouse of Christ, not caring that the glory of this royal daughter is from within and rests not upon the external testimony of human fame or favor but upon the inward testimony of a good conscience. These hypocrites have already been condemned by the testimony of their own consciences in the daily private judgments of God. They have been marked already as reprobates who, if they were living in the first or second or fourth and last age of the Church—ages denied the \textit{pax Christiana}—would be no less zealous to afflict the Church with violence or guile than the tyrants or the heresiarchs or the covertly and overtly malign Antichrist. In the last judgment that ends the reign of Antichrist these hypocrites shall be publicly damned, vomited from the body of Christ like the lukewarm of Laodicea, who were not quite cold because they professed the faith but neither very warm because they failed to persevere in charity.\textsuperscript{76}

These hypocrites have yoked themselves to a burden from which the reprobate can never flee, the burden of the guilty conscience which shall afflict them throughout the eternal misery. They must forever endure this knowledge of their own evil because they rejected on earth the knowledge of divine good. Because they would rather be subjugated to their own will or the will of other men than be bound by the chain of peace, perfection, and charity that is the will of God, they must be ruled by themselves penally.\textsuperscript{77} The just have preferred to be ruled sweetly by God.\textsuperscript{78} Although the just cannot be discharged herebelow from the burden of corruption in mind and body, for they are bound by the fetters (\textit{vincula}) of infirmity so long as they have

\textsuperscript{75} Gregory \textit{Mor.} IX.11, XVIII.68, Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{Serm. in Cant.} XXXIII.14-16.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Expositio super septem visiones libri Apocalypsis} (\textit{PL} 17, 791), Bede \textit{Explanatio Apocalypsis} (\textit{PL} 93, 142).

\textsuperscript{77} Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{De diligendo Deo} xii-xiii (\textit{PL} 182, 995-997), \textit{Sermones de diversis XXVI.4} (\textit{PL} 183, 611-612).

\textsuperscript{78} Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{Epistolae} XI.4-5 (\textit{PL} 182, 111-112).
something to defeat (*vincere*), they have exchanged the burden of iniquity for the yoke of Christ, which is sweet, and for His burden, which is light to those who, acted upon by the Holy Spirit, act and suffer now with hope for the immortality of pure action that they will share with the angels.\(^{79}\)

Since both true and false Christians bear their burdens, each may be likened to a beast of burden. But the pious imitate such a beast in patience, the impious in fatuity.\(^{80}\) When the false Christian arrogates to himself the eminence of a religious leader, his likeness to the beast is extended. The laity, being sheep, are to be forgiven as they walk with the prone posture of the beast. Their eyes are fixed upon the earth, their intention is preempted by their solicitude for wife and family, because their shoulders are bent under the conjugal yoke and the tribulations of marriage. When, however, the false pastor erects himself above the sheep as shepherd and yet does not walk erect as a man but bends his gaze upon the ground below, he is deflected not merely from the superior to the inferior, but to the infernal.\(^{81}\)

The true Christian, the rectitude of whose body serves always to remind him of that spiritual rectitude in which he was created to the likeness of God, walks with unfeigned faith and good conscience in the way of rectitude, seeking constantly not what is his own and herebelow but what is above and of God.\(^{82}\) This is the narrow way in which those walk who subject their consent to the will of God where that is certain or where that is uncertain to the mandate of their superior, whom they obey as the deputy of God. Before their eyes as they walk are the fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom and that love of His law which is the perfection of wisdom. In the light of His face they walk with that simple eye which, loving the good and discerning the true, is disposed neither to deceive nor be deceived. Their way is as plane as straight, the way of peace and the way of justice in which there is no scandal.\(^{83}\) They do not take or give offense, neither do they

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79 Augustine *De catechizandis rudibus* xxv.47 (PL 40, 342-343); Gregory *Mor.* IV.68; Bernard of Clairvaux *De diligendo Deo* xiii (PL 182, 996-997), *De gratia et libero arbitrio* xiii (PL 182, 1024-1028), *In Psalmum Qui habitat sermones* XV.1 (PL 183, 243-244), *In Feria IV Hebdomadae Sanctae sermon* (PL 183, 263-270); *Epistolae* CDLXII.4 (PL 182, 664).

80 Bernard of Clairvaux *In Psalmum Qui habitat sermones* VII.3 (PL 183, 201-202).

81 Bernard of Clairvaux *Epistolae* XI.5, *De moribus et officio episcoporum* ii.5, *Sermones de diversis C* (PL 182, 111-112, 814-815; 183, 726-727), *Sermon. in Cant.* XXIV.6, XXXV.7-8, LXXX.3-4, LXXXII.5.

82 Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XXIV.

83 Bernard of Clairvaux *De praecipio et dispensatione* xiv.36-37 (PL 182, 881-882); *Sermones de diversis* XXVI (PL 183, 609-612); cf. Gregory *Mor.* XXX.51.
return evil for evil. Rather they requite evil with good, responding to the malevolence, malediction, and malefaction of their enemies as if to the benevolence, benediction, and benefaction of God. As the Master whose burden they bear is humble and mild, they are inwardly humble and outwardly mild, exhibiting thus that twofold innocence (parvitas) of spirit which is the sign of the fear of God. This fear, however, is the fear not of the sons of wrath but of the sons of adoption, who are neither under the law nor yet without the law since they are acted upon by the Holy Spirit, diffusing charity and binding in the chain of peace. Acted upon by this Spirit not of servitude but of liberty, they receive that rest from the passions of this world promised by the Master to His disciples and promising analogically that peace of the eternal Sabbath to which the elect of the Apostolic Church have long since crossed. Acted upon by this Spirit at the forks of life symbolized by the Pythagorean upsilon, the elect choose the way of rectitude, the way of the Father, in whose right hand is the fiery law of charity and at whose right hand shall sit in glory the Son, who was crowned with thorns by men.

The proud, in perverse imitation of God, aspire to be a law unto themselves. The path they choose begins not with the fear of God but with that inordinate love of self which is pride. Since they choose not to revere God, they inspire irreverence in their inferiors, and as they are not humble within, so they are impatient with others. Unlike Christ they will not bear mildly the malice of others but emulate in their malignity toward others the archdetractor or Diabolus. Their way, then, is not free from scandal like the smooth path of the just but impassable—the way of the slothful that begins with ambition and ends in the torpor and cold of spiritual despair. Since it is the path not of wisdom but of vanity, it is the way not of concord and unity but of disorder and division. It is a broad way to accommodate the false knowledge that inflates and the abounding of disorder that portends the final age—a way become so vast as to be a waste.

In these false Christians who walk thus after their desires, the illusores to whom St. Jude bore witness live on, the segregantes, the homines

84 Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. XXV.1-2, XXXIV.2.
83 Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones in conversione Sancti Pauli II.1, Serm. in Cant. XXXVII.1 (PL 183, 365-366, 971).
86 Bernard of Clairvaux Epistolae XI.4-7 (PL 182, 111-113).
87 Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. XXXVII.6.
88 Ibid.
89 Gregory Mor. XXX.70.
Animales from whose soul the spirit of God has withdrawn. As Christ was mocked by the crown of thorns, He is mocked by the tonsure emblematic of that crown which they falsely wear.\(^{90}\) Like the cross of Christ the burden that they carry has height and width, but its height is rather the self-erection that debases than the humility that exalts and its width is rather the libertinism that mocks Christian liberty than the charity that honors God and benefits neighbor.\(^{91}\) Such men, coming in the lateness of time when the age of the false Christian threatens to pass into the age of Antichrist, when the leaven of the Pharisees which is the hypocrisy and the doctrine of the false Christian so corrupts that it cannot remain hidden for its abundance and will not remain hidden for its impudence—such men are the antitypes to that universal evil which at the first advent prefigured the evil abounding and the charity grown cold that should presage the second coming.\(^{92}\) The pagan corruption that the ancient satirists exposed, the nameless passions of the Juvenalian \textit{Stoicidae}, are but the foreshadowing of their perversions, and the stiff-necked obduracy of the willfully blind Pharisees is perfected in their pride. The oneness in Christ that such hypocrites simulate bemocks as a joke that jocund dwelling together of the brethren in unity which the Psalmist likens to the anointing of the head and the falling of dew, a blessed unction that shall not anoint the falsely tonsured head, which, renewing the opprobrium of Christ, may be said to bedew His head once again with the blood of the crown of thorns.\(^{93}\)

Apostate in pride to the one true flock and the one true shepherd, to whom they perfidiously profess fidelity, these \textit{segregantes} conform rather to the sinister herds (\textit{greges}) familiar in medieval tropology: the herd within of the seven deadly sins led by pride, the demonic herd without, subject to him whose sin was pride and bent with him on the reversal of conversion, pursuing the spiritual subversion of the Christian as the hosts of Pharaoh pursued the physical subjection of the Hebrew.\(^{94}\) Thus bestialized, the \textit{homo animalis} is worse than the irrational animal.\(^{95}\) The beast subject to its passions is true to its nature. Rational man, subjecting himself to his passions, has become false to his nature. The beast consequently is at peace with its kind. Man is ever at strife with his fellows in a war suspended only when

\(^{90}\) Sicardus \textit{Mitrale} II.1 (\textit{PL} 213, 57-61).

\(^{91}\) Baldwin \textit{Tractatus undecimus} (\textit{PL} 204, 529).


\(^{93}\) II.790a, Ps. 152.

\(^{94}\) Gregory \textit{Mor.} XXXI.87-90.

\(^{95}\) Bernard of Clairvaux \textit{Serm. in Cant.} XXXV.8.
the stronger man imposes his self will by violence upon the weaker. Such was the peace maintained by the legions of imperial Rome, a peace as illusory as the pax Christiana of the third Christian epoch and as different as that from the true peace of the patient in Christ, the well ordered fellowship of the primitive Church.96

It is because the Christians of the third age refuse to martyr themselves in patience as their Apostolic forbears martyred themselves in blood that the pax Christiana, this presumed immunity from pagan attack and heretic conspiracy, is an illusion. The hypocrite of the third age has spurned patience without and humility within because through pride he has rejected self knowledge.97 Willfully ignoring himself, he has been penally ignored by God—abandoned to that spiritual confusion prefigured in the gentiles at the first advent.98 Because his spiritual leaders have chosen to emulate the elation of the Pharisees, contemning like them the law of God, they have become the blind leading the blind through the broad gate where sin abounds in the via lubrica of the false prophets where no man has the power to stand, feeding not the sheep but the goats like those false shepherds in the second age of Christianity who went forth from the true flock after the traces of the schismatic herds.99 In the pax Christiana of this third age, the false pastor is even more reprehensible than those infirm pastors who forsook their flocks in the past when persecution raged. The modern defector is to be compared unlike them not to the pusillanimous hireling that flees before the wolf but to the wolf itself. Not merely would he choose not to sustain persecution on behalf of justice, he would in his Satanic ambition rather sustain persecution than justice.1 The modern Pharisee again is more reprehensible than the ancient. Both shut against men the door which is Christ, not entering themselves nor permitting others to enter the kingdom of heaven, but those who sat upon the seat of Moses at least taught although they did not do.2 Their modern counterparts neither teach nor do. They are as dumb as the mute dogs denounced by Isaiah.3 Unlike the martyrs that withstood the pagan tyrants in the first age and the confessors that

96 Augustine De civ. Dei XIX.10-17.
97 Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. XXXVII.6.
98 Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. XXXV.9.
1 Bernard of Clairvaux De conversione xxii (PL 182, 855-856).
3 Gregory Hom. in Ev. XL.2.
stood against the heresiarchs of the second, the false pastors of the third respond only with self-serving silence, with evil taciturnity, to the clamor of tyrannic pride, spurious philosophy, and simony, the vice specific to modernity. Although as bishops they should superintend the ecclesiastic body, they are no longer the light of the world, the simple eye through which the lesser members are enlightened. Rather with two eyes they precipitate themselves toward hell, pursuing now the right path, now the left, only as their inordinate will impels. Actuated by impure intentions, they cannot kindle purity of intention or integrity of will in others, and the laity, who should be illuminated by them as the moon by the sun, find in their spiritual overseers not a way of life which they should imitate but one which they are prompted to attack with contumely and even with the sword. The table of the Lord and the cup of benediction are neglected while all the earth is inebriated with the cup of the city of confusion, the cup of demons which is pride, envy, and detraction. The votaries of this cup are the false Christians who bestir themselves about the works of disorder no less sedulously than the virtuous spouse of Proverbs attends to the economy of order. Too faithful to eat her bread in idleness, she prefigures the living faith of the true Church, which imitates Christ in the labors of patience and charity so that it may not unworthily eat His bread and drink of His cup in the Eucharist.

When the ordained do not live ordinately, the order of discipline is disrupted in the masses and the tranquillity of order is destroyed. In the internecestrate strife thus visited upon human society and in the inveterate ignorance of its spiritual leaders are to be seen some of the prodigies that foreshadow the more immediate signs of the last judgment. The final sun, which then shall be changed into shadows, and the last moon, which then shall be changed into blood, are prefigured now, as Christendom hovers between its penultimate and ultimate ages, not merely in such celestal apparitions as the prodigies of the bloody moon and the Wild Hunt but in the mundane prodigies of spiritual and secular corruption—in prelates and priests abandoned to the works of darkness, in a laity given over therefore to blood.

4 Gerhohus De corrupto Ecclesie statui cxiii (PL 194, 97).
5 Augustine De civ. Dei XIX.19; De dignitate sacerdotali vi (PL 17, 578-579).
6 Bernard of Clairvaux In Festo Sacrificii Michaelis sermones II.3-4 (PL 183, 452-454).
7 Bede De mulieris fori (PL 91, 1050), Raban Maur Exposito super Jeremiam (PL 111, 1161-1163); Bernard of Clairvaux Epistolae II.10 (PL 182, 85-86), Serm. in Cant. XXIV.3.
8 Bede De mulieris fori (PL 91, 1050).
9 Baldwin Tractatus secundus (PL 204, 415-418).
The guile and the violence of this peace that is no peace are elaborated with an imagery reminiscent of the Ovidian age of iron, which serves to emphasize the deterioration of the present age, Sisyphean in its sly hypocrisy, from the golden age of the primitive Church, Cyclopean in its monoptic simplicity. That deterioration is confirmed by means of a symptom traditional to the syndrome of cosmic senescence formulated in natural philosophy. This is the decline of human stature, the smallness of body that the proud contemporaries of Bernard have exchanged for the spiritual smallness (parvitas), the inward humility and outward patience of those who fear God.¹⁰

Bernard, although a monk and therefore one of the sheep and little children (parvuli), has undertaken to discipline the false pastors and those elders who are youths in virtue so that they may be returned to the conversion of others which is the burden of their office. Ignored by the spirit of God because they persist in ignoring themselves, they seduce those with whose salvation they are charged to the same self ignorance and perverse self obliviousness. As a satirist Bernard unMASKS their defection, but not from the spirit of diabolic malice that stirs them to detraction. He bears witness rather as a servant of Him who came to bring a sword, not peace. He is inspired by the spirit of zeal to shatter that evil peace of spiritual stupefaction in which they now slumber, to divide the evil concord that binds them in the complaisant abetment of their mutual sins.¹¹ He is eager to share the opprobrium of that Light sent by the Father who so loved the world that He gave His Son to save the world, yet hated by the proud lovers of the world, who will not come to the light that their deeds of darkness may not be exposed.¹² He benignly endures their malice to expose their deeds before they exchange the inner darkness for the outer and to bear witness to them now during the acceptable time as a surrogate conscience in the hope that they may not be condemned on the last day by the two witnesses they are now rejecting, the voice of their own conscience and the word that Christ has spoken.¹³ To these leaders of men who love the glory of men more than the glory of God, Bernard gives ironic counsel in the preceptive statements of theme with which he closes the dilatation of pride.¹⁴ If they would teach by example, they are to surpass in iniquity a world

¹⁰ Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones in conversione Sancti Pauli II.1 (PL 183, 365-366).
¹¹ Matt. 10:34, Jerome Commentaria in Evangelium Matthaei (PL 26, 67).
¹⁴ John 12:49.
abounding in iniquity. If by precept, they are not to goad (pungere) the proud with the discipline of justice nor to comfort the pusillanimous with theuction of mercy, but closing the eye that should illuminate the body, mole-like and Argus-like to indulge them (ungere) with complaisance.16

To live by alms or to give alms—to abide in material poverty so as to achieve its spiritual analogue, the humility of the poor in spirit, or to bestow an appropriate portion of one’s wealth on the deserving poor, to persevere in that work of justice or in this work of mercy—either is in Bernard’s view unwelcome to his contemporaries.16 Pride of life restrains them from the practice of voluntary poverty. The lust of the eyes withholds their hands from reaching out to their destitute neighbors.

The lust of the eyes is personified in Scripture by the man evil of eye (invidus: ἡγεμόν, Prov. 28:22) who, blinded by an infatuation with worldly goods, has chosen not to see the light of grace here and now with his spiritual eyes, which shall therefore be opened at death to the outer darkness of the eternal misery.17 To him pertains the lightless eye that renders the body dark in the metaphor of Matthew, the covetous intention that elicits only the works of darkness in contradiction to the single eye of spiritual wholeness that lights the way to the works of justice and mercy.18 This metaphor, intrapersonal in its Biblical context, had been extended allegorically to an interpersonal reference by Bernard in his dilatation of pride. In dilating upon the lust of the eyes (II.829-934), Bernard has chosen not to use this imagery.19

The dilatation of φυλασσομία is elaborated from a twofold pathognomy that distinguishes between the avaricious man and the luxurious

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15 Bernard of Clairvaux Serm. in Cant. XXXII.3.
16 II.795, Bernard of Clairvaux Sermones in conversione Sancti Pauli II.1 (PL 183, 365-366), Petrus Cantor Verbum abbreviatum xix (PL 205, 72).
17 Deut. 16:19, Job 27:15, Ps. 48:20, Wisd. 5:6, Exclus. 14:3-10.
man. The avaricious man is driven by a passion for riches that is perverse if only because in its uselessness it ignores the beneficia! rationale of wealth perpetuated in the Latin and Greek names opes and χρηματα. Such a passion, long since recognized by both Gentile and Jew as a spiritual counterpart to dropsy, transforms rational man into the timeless paradox of the divus egenus, straitened with misery while glutted with the rapine of his wide ranging greed. He is changed into a creature of passage, self-consecrated to the ceaseless quest for goods that are transient, at once goaded by lust for gain and transfixed by fear of loss. In the anxious labor with which he acquires his riches and in the no less anxious if vain solicitude with which he tries to secure his prosperity against adversity, his iniquity becomes his misery, the malum culpae the malum poenae. This misery prefigures analogically the eternal misery to which an abrupt death shall consign him like the Horatian Tantalus or the two divites of the Gospel parables (Luke 12:16-21, 15:19-31). These magnates, nameless and ignominious, have, however, in the context of Luke a pathology more appropriate to the luxurious man.

The luxurious man like the avaricious man is malignly disposed toward himself, his neighbor, and God. This malevolence toward self is perhaps more apparent in the austerity of the avaricious man than in the extravagance of the luxurious. The cupidity of the luxurious man eventuates in the opposite vice of prodigality. The cupidity of the avaricious man is autotelic: the prodigal that spends his wealth is the sneak thief, the plunderer, or the heir for whom he has improvidently accumulated his hoard. Both the avaricious and the luxurious man arrogate to themselves goods that God has created for all men. Each in his idolatry of wealth denies to God His proper worship, but for the luxurious man mammon is a secondary idol worshipped only in the service of such major deities as the stomach or magnificence. In him lust of the eyes subserves the lust of the flesh or the pride of life. Unlike the Christian who converts his body through baptism or penance into a living sacrifice to God, the

21 Gregory Mor. XV.25-27, Petrus Cantor Verbum abbreviatum xx-xxi (PL 205, 72-78), Innocent III De miseria humanae conditionis II.vi-viii, xiv.
22 Innocent III De miseria humanae conditionis II.xiv.
23 Petrus Cantor Verbum abbreviatum xxi (PL 205, 77).
24 Petrus Cantor Verbum abbreviatum xxi (PL 205, 75).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
luxurious man sacrifices himself daily to his stomach. Like the very beasts that he devours, he is the slave of his appetites—appetites, moreover, that are not limited by the instinctual needs of a beast just as they are no longer subject to the reason of man. Spiritually dead, estranged like the Canaanites and the perverse generations of wrath from that edifice of living stones that is the household of God, the luxurious man remains the unregenerate "old man" whose forbears include the men of Judah that rose up early in the morning to drink with flute and timbrel, the proverbial princes that ate not in due season for sustenance and refreshment but in the morning for riotousness amid the dilapidation of sloth, the unjust Joachim who built himself a great house of cedar and vermilion, the prosperous wicked whose seed flourishes before them, and the opulent in Zion, no more concerned for the affliction of Joseph than the contemporaries of Bernard for the poor in Christ or for Christ in the least of His brethren.27

The dilatation of the luxurious man is disposed by epimone before (II.832-846) and after (II.913-930) the dilatation of the avaricious man (II.853-908). These three presentments of character alternate with a series of sententious passages (II.829-832, 847-852, 909-912, 931-934) that deprecate the respecting of persons (acceptio personarum) and the accepting of bribes (acceptio munera) habitual to the charity grown cold of a venal generation that has forgotten the maxim of grace: "Da et accipe et justifica animam tuam."28 The last of the sententious passages prepares with its catechetic "cur" for the close of Book Two.

The conclusion (II.935-974) is built upon a sequence of questions accommodated from the first satire of Juvenal.29 This sequence leads the attention from the opportuneness of Bernard's undertaking to its difficulty. The response first urged is an augmented sense of overwhelming evil and imminent doom. Never has evil seemed so abundant, nor could it abound more even if by some unimaginable irony God were to enjoin upon men the contempt of Him as Bernard in the passage of ironic suasion closing his dilatation of pride had counseled the ambitious to conform themselves to sin. This abounding iniquity—epitomized in the concubinary priest and his proud detractor, in the reversion from the supranatural to the natural which speciously justifies that distraction and is no less speciously justified by the

29 II.946-948, Juvenal I.87-88. II.958, Juvenal I.150-151. II.962, cf. Horace Satires II.i.82-83. II.973, Ovid Ars amatoria I.772.
prevalence of the unnatural—this antitype to the universal evil preceding the first advent portends in the effrontery of its perversion the eruption of Antichrist that is to precede the second advent when the acceptable time shall yield to the eternal misery.

To recognize the importunate need for the conversion of men to God through repentance is but the inception of insight. The sequence of questions solicits a further response—the sense of human inadequacy to this ministry of zeal. The human language cannot register the supreme evil of these penultimate times. Men's law cannot redress it. Their grief cannot wash it away. This ambience of abounding evil and human inadequacy redeems from triteness the image with which Bernard closes Book Two. The poet as gubernator riding his poetic vessel at anchor—the anchor of faith—in the bounding sea of this world's iniquity, awaiting with hope the more gracious breeze of divine inspiration, prefigures for the governors of this world, whom Bernard would inspire, the image with which he will complete his poem at the end of Book Three. This is the anagogic image of the disciples storm-tossed on the Sea of Galilee and saved by the awakened Christ: so He and He only shall at the end of time save from the tribulations of the iniquitous the Church of His elect.30

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Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century *

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The history of medieval science is intimately connected with the history of medieval education. This, of course, does not mean that all medieval science developed in the universities; nor does it mean that all of what we have come to call physical science was taught in the university. A history of science would be incomplete without due recognition of the numerous guilds of the Middle Ages where technical skills in architecture, engineering, metallurgy, shipbuilding, glass work, tanning, dyeing and the other mechanical arts were developed by master craftsmen and transmitted to young apprentices eager to learn. The seven mechanical, or "adulterine" arts discussed by Hugh of St. Victor\(^1\) embrace all technical skills, many of which are included in the modern notion of physical science. However, of the seven mechanical arts listed by Hugh of St. Victor only one, medicine, was taught in the medieval university. It was in the guilds that the other mechanical arts were taught and developed. Medieval technology developed in basically the same way that modern technology develops, namely through experimentation and fortuitous discoveries. Not until relatively recent times were such practical sciences as architecture, agriculture, engineering and commerce introduced into the university curriculum. The academies of antiquity and the universities of the Middle Ages prided themselves in transmitting the liberal arts and the speculative sciences as worthy of study in their own right and as preparatory to the specialized study of theology, law and medicine. The term 'science' had a somewhat different meaning in the Middle Ages than it has today. In the Middle Ages the term was used primarily of the intellectual disciplines, such as natural philosophy,

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ethics, metaphysics and theology, and only secondarily and infrequently of the technological arts. Today the term ‘science’ is used primarily of the technological, experimental and mathematical studies of nature, and rarely of philosophy, logic and theology. The term ‘physics’ in the Middle Ages applied to the speculative study of the whole of nature; more commonly, however, it designated the general introductory study coextensive with the *Libri octo Physicorum* of Aristotle. While the medieval guilds transmitted and developed the practical, technological arts, the medieval university transmitted and often developed the speculative understanding of the physical world. In this sense the history of medieval science is intimately connected with the history of medieval education.

The technique of medieval education was also somewhat different from that of the modern university. First of all, the medieval university was never a centre of research; it had no research degrees and it had no institutes or research fellowships. The medieval university was exclusively an institution where undergraduates acquired learning from the masters, where masters of arts normally proceeded to one of the higher faculties, and where graduates of the higher faculties were anxious to secure a responsible position in society. The faculty of arts was normally a stepping-stone to higher studies or to active life. Masters who lectured in arts for many years before taking up other activities, like Roger Bacon or Jean Buridan, were few. Whatever originality there was in medieval teaching came from the industry and genius of individual masters. However, new ideas and discoveries quickly found a place in university teaching, even when those ideas and discoveries originated outside the university. Secondly, the technique of teaching consisted in lecturing upon an accepted text and in public disputations concerning difficult points of doctrine. The function of the master was twofold: to explain the texts and to resolve disputed points of doctrine. But the master had an apprentice, the bachelor, who assisted in the

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2 Bacon himself claimed that he had lectured on Aristotle more than had any other master (*Compendium Studii Philosophiae*, c. 8, ed. Brewer, p. 468); he was already a Master in Arts of Paris by about 1242/3 and he resigned his chair in 1247 to devote the next ten years to private study and experimentation. Jean Buridan is first mentioned as Master in Arts in a university document of 9 February, 1328 (*Chart. Univ. P.*, II, 306 n. 870); no doubt he had been teaching some years before this date when he was also rector of the university. He was still “naturales, metaphysicales et morales libros Parisiis legens” in June of 1342 when he was made canon of Arras (*ibid.* II, 307 note); although active in university affairs until his death in 1359, he may have resigned his chair before 1350. Cf. E. Faral, “Jean Buridan, Maître et Arts de l’Université de Paris,” *Hist. Litt. de la France*, 38, 462-479.
explanation of the text and in the public disputation. Hence, there were various types of lecture and disputations in the medieval faculty of arts. Finally, the kinds of texts used, the time devoted to each discipline and the requirements for the degree of master all show the difference as well as the similarity between the curriculum of studies in the medieval university and that of the modern university.

Before we can appreciate the place of physics in early Fourteenth Century Oxford and its importance, we must examine in some detail the curriculum of studies in the faculty of arts. It is not easy to obtain a full picture of the normal course of studies in the medieval university. Our information is particularly meager concerning the faculty of arts. Understandably the sources of information for the faculty of theology are much more numerous than they are for arts, since the theologians were more mature and influential than the young artists. Much research has already been devoted to the faculty of theology, particularly at Paris in the Thirteenth Century. But no equivalent research has been devoted to the faculty of arts. Even the studies of Denifle, Rashdall, Grabmann, Gibson and Van Steenberghen leave much to be desired in the way of showing the normal course of studies leading to the mastership in arts. Considerable research is still needed to clarify details and to rectify confusion and misunderstandings which arise from the use of technical terms. It is particularly difficult to reconstruct the Oxford faculty of arts, for the meager statutes do not present a very clear picture of the organization of studies in the early Fourteenth Century. Our concern here is not with the legislative and disciplinary aspects of the arts faculty, but only with the organization of the curriculum and the method of teaching.

The medieval university always followed legitimate custom and "the common practice in the schools." It is clear, moreover, that statutes were enacted by the university, faculty or nation only to correct abuses or to clarify obscure points then in dispute. In order to obtain a clear picture of "the common practice in the schools" we must piece together bits of information contained in a great variety of sources. Whatever may be said of the faculty of arts in the later Middle Ages, it is safe enough to assume that the general practice at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century closely resembled that of Paris, and by way of Paris that of Toulouse, Montpellier and other continental universities. Further it may safely be assumed that the practice in the early Fourteenth Century did not differ from that of the late Thirteenth Century, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Every student coming to the university in the Middle Ages had first
of all to be enrolled under some master, just as he was under some master during his studies at the grammar school. Even in the Early Middle Ages it seems to have been a universal practice for a student to attach himself to a particular master. But as early as 1215 this practice was established as law by the Parisian statutes of Robert Courson. Just how old a boy would be when he came to the university is not clear. It would seem that by the Thirteenth Century he would be about fourteen or fifteen years of age. The Parisian statutes of 1215 specify that no one is to read “de artibus citra vicesimum primum etatis sue annum.”\(^3\) That is, no one was to lecture as a master in arts before he had completed his twentieth birthday. The statutes of the English nation at Paris, dated 1252, state that one about to determine as bachelor must be twenty years old, or at least must have entered upon his twentieth year,\(^4\) that is, he must have passed his nineteenth birthday. But as one year at least, and more often two, would have elapsed between this vote of the masters and his inception in arts, the candidate would be in his twentieth year if not older, by the time he lectured as master.\(^5\) The statutes of 1215 further specify that he must have heard lectures in arts for six years “ad minus”; no mention is made of a bachelor in arts at this time. But according to the English statutes of 1252 before bachelors might be allowed to determine they must have heard the required books for five continuous years “vel quattuor ad minus” at Paris or at some other general arts studium.\(^6\) The Oxford statutes promulgated before 1350 also note that the determining bachelor must have heard certain books in the school “ad minus per quadriennium.”\(^7\) If however the candidate failed to pass this vote, or if a scholar did not wish to determine for himself, the period for attending lectures was prolonged. In the latter case a scholar must have heard the required books for at least eight years before his

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3 Chart. Univ. P., I, 78 n. 20.
4 Chart. Univ. P., I, 223 n. 201.
5 The age of “14” found in the oath of the English nation at Paris, (Chart. Univ. P., II, 673 App. 4), must be a scribal error, as the whole of this oath corresponds perfectly to the statute of the same nation dated 1252, and contradicts the accepted age in all other documents for Paris and Oxford. A. L. Gabriel, however, not only accepts the age of “14”, but he considers this to be the age for the determinatio during the fourteenth century. Cf. Student Life in Ave Maria College, Medieval Paris (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1955), 187.
6 Chart. Univ. P., I, 228 n. 201.
inception in arts. One can therefore say that the arts course at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century required from six to eight years to complete (the normal course seems to have been seven years prior to inception), and that the scholar was at least twenty years old when he incepted as a master in arts (normally twenty-one). Thus it would seem that the usual time required to complete the course in arts remained unchanged throughout the Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Century. Normally the student would begin his university studies about fourteen or fifteen years of age and he would be about twenty or twenty one years of age when he incepted as a master of arts.

I. The Course of Studies in Arts

Inception as a master was not the end, but the beginning, of full membership in the faculty of arts. At the time of inception the young master had to take an oath that he would lecture in that faculty for at least two years. Actual teaching, therefore, was an integral part of the curriculum of studies; indeed it was the most important part of the course. One who failed to fulfill his oath to teach was a perjurer and could not rightfully claim the title of master. Thus the full course of studies in arts can be divided into three distinct periods: undergraduate, bachelor and master.

A. The Undergraduate

From the time a student enrolled under a master until his examination ad gradus, he was an undergraduate. In general, he had to attend both ordinary and cursory lectures on the trivium, quadrivium and "the three philosophiae"; he had also to attend disputations, to respond de sophismatibus for at least one year, and to respond de questione at least during the summer term preceding his determination.

It is not clear whether the student studied the various subjects in any particular order which was strictly adhered to. It is certain that the

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8 According to this statute (Stat. Ant., p. 33), which Gibson tentatively dated "before 1350", it was customary that no one who determined for himself should incept in arts until the end of three years after determination, while one who determined for another could incept at the end of two years after his own determination (cf. ibid., p. xciii). Unless the bachelor determined both for himself and for another in the same Lent, the course for both bachelors would be seven years before inception—unless, of course, the one who determined for another was dispensed from the required years or books because of his ability (cf. Chart. Univ. P., I, 228 n. 201).
ideal order of studies could not be followed in seven years. Ideally one should complete the *trivium* and *quadrivium* before beginning to study the natural sciences; and moral philosophy as well as the natural sciences should be mastered before beginning metaphysics. But we know that the *libri logicales* were heard at least during the first four years of the course, and that the *libri naturales* were heard simultaneously for at least the first three years. Thus it would seem that the ideal order of study was not strictly followed in the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Century.

The faculty of arts at Toulouse decreed on April 10, 1309, that the morning lectures from the feast of St. Luke (Oct. 18) until the feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) were to be on the new logic: the first year on the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle, the second year on the *Topics* and *Sophistica Elenchi*, the third and fourth years were to be a repetition of these books, "et sic continue procedatur singulis annis alternatim incipiendo." During the summer term, from the feast of St. John until the feast of St. Luke, the first five books of the *Ethics* were to be read during the first year, the last five during the second year, and the *Liber de Anima* during the third; "deinde sicut prius, circulando procedatur predictos libros legendo complete." After the morning lectures the three books of the *logica vetus* and *Priscianus minor* were read every year from the feast of St. Luke until the feast of St. John; and at the same hour the *Liber de sex principiis* with Boethius' *De divisione* or with the first three books of Boethius' *Topics* were to be read from the feast of St. John until the feast of St. Luke. The real sciences (*physica realis*) were to be read *extraordinarie*, presumably in the afternoon, by regent masters or by other capable masters or bachelors deputed by the regent masters beginning every year on the first *dies legibilis* after All Saints. During the first year the books of the Physics were to be taught. During the second year the *Liber de generatione et corruptione*, the books of the *Parva naturalia*, the *Liber de causa motus*

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9 This will be discussed in a subsequent study on the division of the sciences.


11 The punctuation of Fournier is not followed here because it makes no sense to read "a festo beati Johannis usque ad festum beati Luce" as part of the preceding sentence.

12 Fournier reads: "secundo anno liber de Gen. et Corrup., et *primi* libri naturales qui sequuntur, scilicet liber de Sensu et Sensato, liber de Memoria et Reminiscentia, liber de Somnno et de Vigilia, liber de causis longuindinis et brevitatis Vite, liber de Morte et Vita, Respiracione et Expiratione, Juventute et Senectute, liber de causa motus animalium, liber de progressu animalium." (*loc. cit.*) There can hardly be any doubt that *primi* is a misreading for *parvi*. 
animalium, and the Liber de progressu animalium were to be lectured upon. Henceforth these books pertaining to the second year were to be required "pro forma," apparently replacing less useful books formerly required.¹³ During the third year of study the books De caelo et mundo and the Metheora were to be taught, while the whole fourth year was devoted to the Metaphysics. One can already see at Toulouse a general grouping of books into the libri logicales and the libri naturales, which were to be the two pillars of the arts course at Oxford and elsewhere in the Late Middle Ages.

Before 1431, Oxford Masters were apparently free to choose their own subjects upon which to lecture, although those lectures required pro forma would naturally be the more popular. The books required pro forma should not be identified with the full teaching of the arts faculty; they were merely set books required for the degree.¹⁴ If the number of regent masters allowed and their personal inclination so determined, lectures would be given on all the approved books of the trivium, quadrivium and the three philosophies. An examination of the writings of Walter Burley and other Oxford masters of the early Fourteenth Century makes it abundantly clear that the lectures required pro forma were not by any means the only lectures given. As we shall see, a number of new books originated at Oxford at this time and were lectured upon long before any of them were required pro forma in any university. Normally students who were not bachelors actually teaching, determining or preparing for inception were expected to

¹³ "Et isti qui spectant ad secundum annum sunt de forma, positi loci quorumdam aliorum qui modicum utilitatis videbantur habere." ibid.
¹⁴ The technical expression pro forma is somewhat difficult to translate, and modern authorities generally prefer to retain the Latin. The early fourteenth century statutes of Oxford and Paris frequently refer to the forma incepturi vel determinaturi, the forma legendi vel audiendi libros, or simply the requirements pro forma, or secundum formam; and graces were granted to determine or incept praeter formam. The term forma in this context was undoubtedly borrowed from Roman Law, and it conveys the idea of a legal norm, pattern, or standard of specification. (Cf. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, Leipzig, t. VI, under the word 'forma', col. 1080-1 and 1085-6) This is clear from the Oxford statutes of 1268 in which the masters and bachelors considered it expedient "ut certa forma provideretur sub qua baccalarii arciun determinaturi ad determinandum in futurum forent admirandem, provisa erat quedam ordinarum super predictis in forma inascripta." (Stat. Ant., 25, 19-21) The juridical meaning of forma, however, seems to have come from the Roman philosophical vocabulary; for Cicero forma was equivalent to species, i.e. similitude, figure, or exterior aspect of a model. On this point see L. Falletti, "Note sur l'emploi du terme FORMA dans les textes juridiques," Mélanges Paul Fournier (Paris, 1929), 219-232. Thus the university forma provided the norm according to which one proceeded ad gradum magistri; in this sense the forma 'specified' the honor, or degree of master or bachelor.
attend the ordinary lectures of their own masters every dies legibilis. But the Oxford statutes of this period add, "vel saltem sue questioni et ordinacioni textus complete insistant." This implies that a master could allow his student to attend the lectures of another master, although the student had to be present for all his master’s questiones and division of the text. This would be necessary to allow the student to hear all the books required pro forma.

The statutes of the English nation at Paris (1252) required that before determination undergraduates must have heard certain books ordinarie et cursorie. For example, in logic the Predicamenta and the Perihermeneias of Aristotle had to be heard “bis ad minus ordinarie” and “semel cursorie”; the Liber de sex principiis had to be heard “semel ordinarie ad minus et semel cursorie.” It would seem that throughout the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century the Oxford forma required that set books be heard ordinarie and not cursorily. However the Oxford statutes of this period make it clear that cursory lectures were given by bachelors and occasionally by masters themselves.

The distinction between ordinary and cursory lectures is an important one. It was based on the method of teaching and on the status of the lecturer. Ordinary lectures, such as those required by university statutes, could normally be given only by regent masters lecturing magistraliter. The proper function of a master was to give an official presentation and explanation of the doctrine, and naturally the best time of the day would be set aside for his authoritative teaching. It had always been customary for masters to lecture at a determined time in the morning on every dies legibilis from the resumptio magistrorum at the beginning of each term until the cessatio magistrorum at the end of the term. No bachelor was allowed to lecture during the period set aside for the master. According to the Paris statutes of March, 1255, no master was allowed to deliver more than two courses of ordinary

16 Cf. S. Gibson, Stat. Ant., p. lxxx-lxxxii. The complete academic year at Oxford in the early fourteenth century was divided into four terms. (1) Michaelmas Term: from the day after the feast of St. Denis (9 Oct.) until the eighth day before Christmas. (2) Hilary Term: from the day after the feast of St. Hilary (18 Jan.) until the vigil of Palm Sunday. (3) Trinity Term: from Wednesday after Low Sunday until Thursday before Whitsun. (4) Summer Term (arbitrary): from Wednesday after Trinity Sunday until the feast of St. Michael (14 Sept.) at the latest (Stat. Ant., 55, 13-22) These dates determine the extent of full term, or the period during which ordinary lectures were delivered by the masters. Since the summer term was optional, only the first three terms mentioned constituted the strict academic year. See also C. Wordsworth, The Ancient Kalendar of the University of Oxford, O. H. S., (Oxford, 1904), 24-5, 35-8.
lectures, or to make them extraordinary, or to deliver them at any other time than the usual time and in the usual garb. Even the older statutes of Robert Courson imply that ordinary lectures must be magisterial: "Et quod legant <magistri> libros Aristotelis de dialectica tam de vetreri quam de nova in scolis ordinarie et non ad cursum." H. Rashdall was correct in thinking that the difference between ordinary and cursory lectures was one of time, but this was not the ultimate basis for the statutory distinction. The temporal difference was based on the traditional idea that a master's function is to lecture magistraliter at the best time of the day when all are free to hear him. The ordinary, or magisterial lectures of a master would not only involve a detailed exposition of a text or of the numerous problems occasioned by the text, such as we find in Burley's early commentary on the Physics, but his decisions would be considered definitive. A master was not under anyone's supervision. Therefore his opinions could be attacked only by other masters in their own lectures and disputations, or they could be censured by a body of masters.

Apart from exceptional circumstances, bachelors were not authorized to deliver ordinary lectures, for these belonged to masters ex officio. The proper function of a bachelor was to lecture cursoric under the supervision of his master. But the masters themselves might choose to lecture cursorily on a text in the extraordinario magistrorum. Unlike magisterial lectures, a cursory lecture was nothing more than an unpretentious reading and paraphrase of the official text. The bachelor's function in the curriculum will be considered in its proper place. For the present it is sufficient to note that bachelors were authorized to give cursory lectures ex officio; they were obliged to give cursory lectures on certain books of the old and new logic before they could be admitted to inception. Under the direction of their masters, bachelors could lecture at any time not closed to them by custom or university statutes; and we may presume that undergraduates normally attended these cursory lectures of the bachelor, if for no other reason

20 This was analogous to the function of the cursor biblicus in the Faculty of Theology.
21 "...erga magistros tam pro lectionibus ordinariis quam cursoriis..." Statute of the Faculty of Arts dated Oct. 14, 1289. *Chart. Univ. P.*, II, 56 n. 561. At Toulouse this was in the late afternoon, at the same time as the tempus extraordinarius doctorum legum, which would have been about five o'clock; cf. statute of 1309. n. VII, in Fournier, *op. cit.*, p. 495.
than to hear the whole text. The advantage of cursory lectures was that they made the student familiar with the text without burdening him with the special difficulties which always arose in an ordinary lecture. It was an advantage to the student to hear the actual text of Aristotle, Boethius, Euclid, Ptolemy and Cicero, for example, and to have the text clearly paraphrased and summarized.

To insure diligent attention during ordinary lectures, the student of the arts, it would seem, was expected to repeat the master’s lecture daily and to give a weekly repetition of the doctrine acquired during the week. Information concerning these repetitiones is very meager for the Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Century.  

A late Thirteenth Century document of the Parisian proctor, Master John of Malines, defends the new practice of lecturing only once a day, and of lecturing on one book one day and on another the following day:

for we believe that this manner of teaching is more useful to the scholars than the former, since boys hearing the doctrine in one subject, before absorbing it by means of the subsequent repetition, forget what they have heard; they cannot give this repetition when another book is read immediately after the first.

The Acts of the General Chapters of the Order of Preachers suggest what probably was “the common practice in the schools”. The General Chapter of Bologna (1252) insisted that student Friars “attend the daily repetition, and that their progress in lectures and disputations be diligently examined in the general repetition.” From the Acts of the General Chapters of Genoa (1305), Metz (1313) and Brives (1346) we gather that Dominican students of natural science and logic were expected to repeat each lecture daily and to go to their master at least once a week for a general repetitio of the doctrine expressed in lectures and disputations. For lack of documentary evidence was can only

22 For information concerning a later period see Rashdall, op. cit., I, 516 note 3: “Quod statim finita lectione ad domum redeant, et in uno loco pariter conveniant ad suam lectionem repetendam; ita quod unus post alium totiens lectionem repetat, quod ipsam eorum quilibet bene sciat, et quod minus provecti magis provectis lectiones quotidian reddere teneantur” (College of Dainville, 1380) and II, 341 (Louvain, 1476); MOPH, VIII, 61 (Chapter of Claremont 1396). For an earlier period see Rashdall, I, 249 and C. Wordsworth, op. cit., 37.


24 MOPH, III, 65. The General Chapter of Valenciennes (1259) decreed “Quod fiant repetitiones de questionibus in qualibet septimana, ubi hoc commode poterit observari.” (MOPH, III, 100) But it is not clear which quaestiones were repeated.

25 “In studiis autem naturalibus et logicalibus repetantur diebus singulis lectiones et ipsas singulis septimannis studentes magistro suo reddere teneantur, et eorum magister sit ad audiendum obligatus.” MOPH, IV, 13; see also IV, 634 and 309.
surmise that the practice at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century was not vastly different.  

Besides attending lectures the undergraduate was also obliged to attend public disputations and to take an active part in some of them before he could be presented for determination, that is, before he could be presented for the academic grade of bachelor in arts. The Parisian statutes of the English nation enacted in 1252, state that the student must have attended the disputations of the masters for two years: "per duos annos diligenter disputaciones magistrorum in studio solemi frequentaverit." The disputaciones magistrorum which the undergraduate was obliged to attend were more than the morning questions presented as part of the ordinary lecture. They were the disputatio ordinaria, or soleni, which every master was supposed to hold at least once a week on a dies disputabilis in the afternoon. The ordinary lecture in the morning consisted not only of an exposition of the text, but also of a discussion (or disputation) of a question pertinent to the text previously expounded. The Oxford statutes promulgated before 1407, declare that no book can be considered as heard pro forma unless it is properly read "cum debita et sufficiemtia exposizione textus et questione pertinente, cum suis argumentis pertinentibus ad materiam libri in quo legitur et ad processum." A very clear example of this method of exposition "cum questione pertinente" is preserved in an early version of Walter Burley's Expositio omnium libro-

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26 The earliest statutory reference to the repetition at Oxford, or to the recitatio, as it was called, dates from the fifteenth century. Stat. Ant., 579, 26-28. See Rashdall, III, 398 n. 2.

27 Chart. Univ. P., I, 228 n. 201; see also II, 673, the corresponding oath to be taken by determiners in the English nation: "Item quod frequentaveritis per duos annos disputaciones magistrorum in studio soleni.

28 Stat. Ant., 192 29-31; also 194, 21-22: "et ad questionem et expositionem completam textus sequentem expectat." For Paris note the oath taken before determination: "quod respondistis magistro legenti ordinari et disputanti sollaribus presentibus." (Chart. Univ. P., II, 673) The fourteenth century Oxford statutes (probably before 1350) declare that before inception bachelors must publicly read "aliqum librum Aristotelis, textum videlicet cum questionibus" (Stat. Ant., 34, 16-17). These morning questions, strictly speaking, were not disputations in the proper sense of the word. For the Faculty of Theology the numerous Questiones in libros Sententiarum provide a good example of the bachelor's method of lecturing on the text by way of summary "cum questionibus pertinentibus." The Oxford statute of 1407 "or before" presents a good description of the accepted method of lecturing on the Sentences: "per tres anni terminos suam lecturam continuet... in legendo textum, cum questionibus vel argumentis rite secundum exigenciam materic." (Stat. Ant., 195, 4-7). These morning questions are not to be considered quaestiones determinatae, nor quaestiones disputatae.
rum Physicorum "cum questionibus optime disputatis." After a detailed exposition of a number of textus, or sections of the Aristotelian book, a pertinent question was posed with arguments favoring a negative answer, then usually one authority "ad oppositum" (for example, "Ad oppositum est Aristoteles hic"), and finally the solution of the problem. These morning quæstiones on the text are, in fact, literary productions, that is, they were dictated by the master as part of his lectio, and they do not represent solemn quæstiones disputatae. Before long, however, the pertinent questions alone were of interest to masters and students, and the literal exposition of the text ceases to appear in the reportationes and published works of the Late Middle Ages. It is most probable that the familiar Quæstiones on the various books of Aristotle and other accepted authors represent the morning disputation following an exposition of the text, and not the solemn disputation of the masters. The nature of scholastic disputations will be considered later in this chapter. Here we merely call attention to the fact that undergraduates were obliged to attend the afternoon disputations of their masters. These public disputations of the masters were of two kinds: de sophismatibus (or de problemate) and de questione. Disputations de sophismatibus pertained to logic, while those de questione pertained to mathematics, natural science, metaphysics or any other branch of scientia realis.

After about two years of attending ordinary lectures and disputations, the undergraduate was expected to take an active part in the public disputations de sophismatibus, for which reason they were known as sophistae: at Oxford they were called sophistae in parviso, from the locality of the disputations in arts. At Paris, according to the statutes of the English nation dated 1252, undergraduates had to respond, or answer objections, de sophismatibus for two years before determination.

29 Cambridge, Caius College MS 448/409, pages 172-543. This method is not so clearly preserved in the final version, which is found in the Venice editions.
30 Such quæstiones can sometimes be recognized by the small number of arguments "videtur quod non" and especially by the arguments "ad oppositum" which are usually an appeal to the authority of the author expounded or of the Commentator "hic." It is not improbable that the earlier medieval commentaries "per modum questionum" likewise represent the morning exercise which was part of the ordinary lecture.
32 Stat. Ant., 27, 18-22; cf. Rashdall, III, 148 note 3. The locality in question seems to have been the parvis, or court yard of St. Frideswide. The term sophistae, however, was frequently extended to signify any undergraduate in arts.
33 "Item det fidem quod per duos annos diligentier disputaciones magistrorum in studio solemnè frequentaverit et per idem tempus de sophismatibus in scolis requisitus
The Oxford statutes of 1268 merely state that before determination "si prius responderint in scolis, publice de sophismatibus per annum integre debent respondisse, ita quod nulla pars illius anni in quo de questione responderint in dicto anno integre computetur." 34 That is, if an undergraduate wished to undertake responsions pro forma thereby shortening his course of studies, he must answer objections in the logical disputations for a whole year; and that year must be distinct from the period of responding de questione. At Paris in 1252, the period for answering objections de questione was one year computing from the beginning of Lent until the beginning of the following Lent. 35 It is not clear how frequently an individual would be called upon for responsions during the year. These disputations were held at least once a week on a dies disputabilis. It seems that during a single disputation it was not unusual for more than one person to respond to objections raised by opposing undergraduates, bachelors or even by the master himself. The existing statutes of the faculty of arts give no hint of opponency as a special statute or even as a distinct requirement for undergraduates. Apparently there was no shortage of objectors, especially as masters themselves could pose the objections 36 before giving their definitive determination to the sophisma or questio.

It is clear from the surviving statutes that an undergraduate could without difficulty abstain from responding de sophismatibus. The Oxford statutes of 1268 require that undergraduates who have not responderit." (Chart. Univ. P., I, 228 n. 201; see also the corresponding oath for bachelors about to determine in arts, ibid., II, 673) It is not clear from the context whether "per idem tempus" means that the undergraduate attended disputations and responded simultaneously, or whether the period for attending disputations was two years, and the period of responding a further two years. This latter interpretation seems more probable. The sixteenth century statutes of Edward VI state that no one is to respond until he has completed his second year of arts (Stat. Ant., 346, 32-33).

34 Stat. Ant., 26, 10-13; the statutes of 1409 require "ad minus per annum" (ibid., 200, 14).

35 "Item per annum integrum a principio unius quadragesime ad principium alterius det fidem, quod responderit de questione." (Chart. Univ. P., I, 228 n. 201). A distinction must be made between responding in a disputation de questione and the obligatory responsio de questione prior to the vote of the four masters admitting the candidate to determination (cf. Stat. Ant., 26, 14-15; 33, 22-23; 200, 9-11; Chart. Univ. P., II, 673 "ante Natale Domini").

36 See the statute of 1407 (or before), Stat. Ant., 194, 1-13. This was very different from the custom in the Faculty of Theology where opponency was an official obligation of the bachelor. One who had been a regent master in arts could not oppose in theological disputations before his fifth year of theology or respond before his seventh year; one who had not been a regent master in arts could not oppose before his seventh year or respond before his ninth year (ibid., 48, 14-21). In theological disputations the master never posed objections; he opened the disputation and presented his closing determination.
responded publicly\textsuperscript{37} to \textit{sophismata} spend a longer time in attending lectures than sophisters, and hear the \textit{Posterior Analytics} twice in addition to the other books required before determination.\textsuperscript{38} Father Denifle noted that the obligation to respond was very frequently dispensed with at Paris, especially around the middle of the Fourteenth Century.\textsuperscript{39}

\section*{B. The Bachelor}

After four years at least of attending lectures and disputations, opposing and responding at public disputations, that is, normally in the fifth year of his course, the undergraduate was ready to be presented for his examination \textit{ad gradus}, or \textit{ad determinandum}. Before an undergraduate could determine during Lent, he had to be admitted to determination on the vote of four masters. Every year in congregation, held the week before Ash Wednesday, the proctors of the university elected four masters in arts, two \textit{boreales} and two \textit{australes}.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} To reply \textit{publice} means to answer objections in a \textit{disputatio solemnis} or \textit{ordinaria}, which was presided over by a master. This is opposed to the private responses which could be given in the morning discussion of a pertinent question (under a master or bachelor) and to the responses in a \textit{disputatio bachelariorum} (cf. \textit{ibid.}, 32, 15-21). A similar distinction is noted in the Faculty of Theology: “Statutum est, quod ad lecturam libri Sententiarum nullus de caetero sit admissus, nisi prius in disputatione solemnii, non cursoria, solemniter et non furtive respondeat.” (\textit{Mun. Acad. Oxon.} (R. 8), ed. H. Anstey, I, 272).

\textsuperscript{38} “Si autem de sophismatibus publice non responderint, omnes libros predictos iurent se audisse, hoc adiecto, quod bis audierint librum Posteriorium. Debet eciam in audiendo maiores moram fecisse quam si de sophismatibus publice responderint” (\textit{Stat. Ant.}, 26, 15-19). As the undergraduate was already obliged to hear the \textit{Posterior Analytics} once, the additional hearing would involve a delay of not more than two terms.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Chart. Univ. P.}, II, 574 note 3.

\textsuperscript{40} The Oxford statutes of 1268 present certain difficulties here: “…quod singulis annis \textit{ebdomata quinta precedente diem cinerum} eiustem anni, in congregacione magistrorum quatuor magistri arcium duo silicet boreales et duo australes \textit{vel} a procuratoribus elegantur.” (i) It seems highly improbable that “\textit{ebdomata quinta precedente diem cinerum}” means five weeks before Ash Wednesday; on the other hand the fifth week of Hilary Term (which undoubtedly was what the authors had in mind) did not always fall before Ash Wednesday, although in 1268 it happened to be the week preceding Lent. The statutes of 1409 leave no room for doubt: “singulis annis per octo dies ante diem cinerum, in congregacione magistrorum regencium …” \textit{Stat. Ant.}, 99, 56-57. (ii) It would also seem that the disjunctive \textit{vel} ought to be omitted. Grammatically the word is out of place. Anstey prints it in brackets. The Parisian statutes clearly state that the custom of the English nation at Paris around 1252 was for one Proctor to elect two electors who would then swear to elect three suitable masters as examiners (\textit{Chart. Univ. P.}, I, 227 n. 201). The Oxford statutes of 1409 also clearly state that “quatuor regentes in artibus, silicet duo australes et duo boreales, a procuratoribus assignentur” (\textit{Stat. Ant.}, 199, 58-39).
These four masters then swore that they would admit no unworthy person to determination, and that they would conduct their examination *de scientia et moribus* within three days. During this examination, at which the master presented his scholar for license to determine, both the presenting master and the young scholar had to swear that all the necessary requirements were fulfilled regarding age, knowledge and morals, and that the candidate had responded *de questione* prior to the examination. Should it happen that the young man had not heard all the books required *pro forma determinaturi* or had not heard them the required number of times, the examining masters could still admit the candidate to determination, provided that in their opinion the lectures actually heard by the student were a satisfactory substitute. But doubt in the matter of age, stature or other physical defects was reserved to the judgment of the majority of regent masters. The candidate further had to swear that he had the use of a “school” and that he would begin his determination between the vigil of Ash Wednesday and the first Monday of Lent, and terminate them between Tuesday and Friday of Passion Week. Thus far no evidence has been brought forth showing that the delegate masters actually examined the candidate “in the contents of his books,” as Rashdall assumed. If the four examiners were satisfied, they, and not the Chancellor, granted the *licentia determinandi* and the *admissio ad lecturam alicuius libri*. By virtue of this vote of the four examining masters, it would seem, the candidate was created *baccalaureus*.

41 “Et scindendum quod si aliqui determinaturi, libros, quos secundum formam supra
scriptam bis tenetur auduiisse, semel rite audierint et non omnes bis, vel non omnes
libros quos secundum formam predictam semel deerent auduiisse rite audierint, dum-
modo alios libros qui non sunt de forma ista rite audierint, qui libri secundum magistro-
rum electorum ad examinacionem estimacionem in sacramento suo fidelem, sufficien-
t ad faciendum sufficientem recompensacionem, ad officium determinatorum admittantur, sin
autem penitus repellantur” (Stat. Ant., 26, 30-39).

42 Ibid., 28, 23-27.

43 Rashdall, *op. cit.*, I, 453.

44 There is no evidence for the impression (S. Gibson, *op. cit.*, xc) that the Chancellor
granted this licence; the statutes for both Oxford and Paris clearly give this right to the
elected examiners. Gibson gives in support of his view a reference to p. 192, but this
refers to inception in the early fifteenth century: “ad honorem gradu et regencium
predictorum.”

45 It is not clear whether the candidate became a ‘baccalaureus’ by the vote of the
masters or only after determination. Rashdall (*op. cit.*, I, 441) identifies the degree of
bachelor with determination; Anstey considers determination to be the “examination” for
the degree (*op. cit.*, I, lxxxv-vi); and G. C. Boyce (*The English-German Nation* [Bruges, 1927],
80, note) believes that in the fourteenth century and early fifteenth century a student
In the medieval faculty of arts the bachelor received two main privileges: that of lecturing cursorily on certain books, and that of determining during Lent. The latter privilege was undoubtedly the more important, as these determinations were for the young bachelor his first taste of the exalted office of master. The right to determine (determinare questionem) properly belonged to a master. But in these Lenten determinations the young bachelor shared, in a certain sense, the master's function by 'determining' questions. Actually, the whole proceeding was under the direction and supervision of a master, usually his own, whose task it was to intervene whenever necessary, posing objections, reprimanding unruly objectors, and helping out in difficult responses and determinations.\(^{46}\) Theoretically the procedure of a solemn disputation would be followed as closely as possible, excepting, of course, the fact that in these Lenten exercises it was the bachelor who gave the determination to the question. But in fact because of inexperience, insufficient numbers, impertinent objections or lack of knowledge, the ideal order and dignity of a solemn disputation would very often be wanting.

As soon as the bell of St. Frideswide rang after the noon meal, probably around three o'clock, the determinatores entered the school of their master (in scolis magistri sui),\(^{47}\) or at least the school of some regent master, every afternoon in Lent on which a disputation could be held. All disputations had to be on logic, except on Fridays, when it was on grammar. We can presume that the thesis for an afternoon's disputation was, if not suggested by the master, at least approved by him beforehand. Normally the respondens would be another bachelor, and the objectors would be any member of the university interested in attending the determination. It is not surprising that determining

'\textit{duty admitted to determine}' did not become a bachelor until he had completed the determination; this also seems to be the view of P. Kibre (\textit{The Nations in the Mediaeval Universities} [Cambridge, Mass., 1948], 99-102). However, there are strong reasons for thinking that the Lenten determinations were a direct \textit{sharing} in the master's function, rather than an 'ordeal' leading to a degree. The word \textit{determination} means to give the final solution to a problem, a function which properly belongs to a master alone. In the Lenten exercises the determiner gave such a solution, although under the direction of his master. This he could not do unless he were already a sharer in the privilege. Further, as we shall see, the determiner could give cursory lectures during the same Lenten period, but this would be impossible, unless he were already a bachelor. Then, too, it was a period of great festivity despite the penitential season (the statute of 1322 revoked the earlier restrictions), but festivities would hardly be likely during a period of examination.


bachelors sometimes found it necessary to employ gifts to induce a qualified bachelor to take the respondent's chair. The Oxford statutes of this period strictly forbade any such inducement.48 A treatise such as Heytesbury's *Regulae solvendi sophismata* or his *Probationes conclusionum* would be most useful in helping young bachelors determine with greater facility. The bachelor's determination was expected to be given and the entire disputation completed by the time the bell of St. Frideswide rang for compline. The time for beginning and for terminating each day's disputation could not be altered without the consent of the Chancellor and all the regent masters; clearly such consent would not be sought without grave reason, such as the presence of great dignitaries or influential relatives wishing to arrive later or to remain longer on a special occasion.

The Oxford statutes of this period declare that bachelors should complete their determination by compline, "et quod tunc scolares possint audire cursus suos sicut antiquitus fieri consueuit."49 This means that it was customary for a determining bachelor to lecture to his undergraduates (*scolares*) after the day's determination. At that time of year determination would end around five or six o'clock, at the latest, and the bachelor would then deliver his cursory lecture. All cursory lectures given by a bachelor were under the direction of the master. That is to say, the master assigned specific books to be read cursorily by his bachelors. At Toulouse the master assigned those books of the new logic which were not being read by himself that year, and a yearly reading of Priscian and the old logic.50 At Oxford the statutes of 1340 decreed that before inception all bachelors were obliged to lecture *cursorie* on at least two logical books, one from the old logic and one from the new, or else both from the new plus one of the *libri naturales*, namely either *De caelo et mundo* or *De anima* or *Metheora* or *De generatione et corruptione* or *De sensu et sensato* together with *De memoria et reminiscencia* and *De Somno et vigilia* or *De motu animalium* together with any two books of the *Parva naturalia*.51 The

48 *Stat. Ant.*., 28, 8-20 (especially lines 17-18); see *ibid.*., 126, 23-31, regulating gifts to promoters.
51 S. Gibson edited this statute as follows: "vel librum *De motu animalium* cum duobus libris *De minutis naturalibus*" (*Stat. Ant.*., p. 32, 12-13). But this implies that there existed a work entitled *De minutis naturalibus* which contained two books. The statute, however, merely means that a bachelor might choose any two books of the 'minutis naturalibus', i.e. of the *Parva naturalia*. See *ibid*., p. 285, 2-3, where the statute for 1431 is printed correctly: "aut aliquem de minutis libris, et hoc de textu Aristotelis."
choice of books to be lectured upon would be made by the bachelor on the advice of his master. The books mentioned in university statutes, however, should not be thought to represent the full extent of the bachelor's cursory lectures; they represent only those books which were accepted *pro forma incepturi*.

The bachelor, as we have seen, could give his lectures at any time outside the *ordinaria magistrorum*, that is, the customary morning period for ordinary lectures on *dies legibiles* and the afternoon period for ordinary disputations on *dies disputabiles*. Out of term, however, bachelors seem to have been free in the choice of period. By 1409, lectures were given in college as well as in the halls,\(^{52}\) and it is not surprising that bachelors gave cursory lectures more frequently in college, perhaps because of the expense involved in hiring a hall. But sometimes it happened that a master was unable to complete his ordinary course of lectures on the *Metaphysics, Physics* or *Ethics*. If another regent master could not be found to complete the course, a bachelor could be assigned to the task and his *cursoria lectura*, or his status as *baccalauereus legens extraordinarie* would fulfill the statutory requirements for his listeners.\(^{53}\)

Even though a scholar could be given license to determine and lecture during his fifth year of study, he was expected to continue attending ordinary lectures and disputations (as well as to take part in public disputations) for three years, counting the year in which he determined.\(^{54}\) The thirteenth century statutes of Oxford note that a "noviter inceptarius" had to hear at least two or three ordinary lectures each week from his own master; undergraduate students, of course were expected to attend daily.\(^{55}\) This seems to have been the practice in the early fourteenth century as well.\(^{56}\) Besides having

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\(^{53}\) *Stat. Ant.*, p. 193, 27-42; p. 235, 8-11, where this situation is referred to as "a baccalario extraordinarie legente"; also Toulouse statutes of 1309, see Fournier, *Les Statuts*, I, 465 n. 542 sect. III.

\(^{54}\) As the determining bachelor received his licence at the beginning of Hilary Term during his fifth year of study, the rest of that year would be considered as part of his baccalaureate studies. "Consuetudo est eciam quod nullus determinans pro se incipiat in artibus ante completum finem vel terminum trium annorum post suam determinacionem" (*Stat. Ant.*, p. 107, 5-9).


\(^{56}\) The thirteenth century statute is in no way contrary to the fourteenth century *forma* requiring scholars to attend lectures daily (*Stat. Ant.*, p. 24, 3-4), since this *forma* does not regulate the activities of bachelors actually teaching, determining or preparing for inception.
attended those lectures required *pro forma determinantorum*, the bachelor must have heard certain other books to fulfil the *forma inceptorum*. The early fourteenth century Oxford *forma* required the following books for bachelors who had previous determined:57

i) *Priscianus maior*, if it happened to have been read in the schools. Presumably this might have been heard even before determination.

ii) Either Aristotle's *Politics* or his *De animalibus*, including *De progressu et de motu animalium*.

iii) The *Metheorica* and the other *libri naturales*.

iv) Aristotle's *Ethics*.

Apparently most of these books would be heard during the baccalaureate years. There is no mention of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but clearly if students heard lectures on the *Metaphysics* it would have been toward the end of their course of studies.58 The same Oxford *forma* required that all hear the following books before inception, whether they had previously determined or not:

i) Six books of Euclid.

ii) *Arithmetica* of Boethius.

iii) The *Compositus* and *Algorismus*.

iv) *De sphera* of Sacrobosco.

v) Aristotle's *Rheorica*, or at least the fourth book of the *Topica* of Boethius.59

It was not necessary to have determined in order to be presented for inception. In this case a scholar was obliged to spend eight years, instead of seven, attending lectures and disputations required *pro forma inceptorum*. The early Fourteenth Century statutes of Oxford make an interesting exception in the case of those who could have determined but did not want to be confined by the *forma determinantorum*; if they could swear that they had heard all the required lectures long before being presented for inception, "temporis breuitas, minus videlicet


58 The intrinsic difficulties of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and its position among the sciences would lead us to suspect that it was one of the last philosophical texts studied in the Faculty of Arts. According to the statutes of the Faculty of Arts at Toulouse dated 10 April, 1309, the whole of the fourth year was devoted to the *Metaphysics*, that is, after the logical, physical and moral works had been heard (M. Fournier, *Les Statuts*, I, 465 n. 542). The Paris Legatine reform for determiners in 1366 required "librum Metaphisice, vel quod actu audiat eundem", which again is after the other Aristotelian books had been heard. See Rashdall, *op. cit.*, I, 443-444 and Denillé, *Chart. Univ. P.*, II, 679 note.

59 "et saltatem uice rhetorice quartum Topicorum Boecii" (*Stat. Ant.*, p. 33, 19). This implies a choice between the two. These two works were considered as belonging to the liberal art of rhetoric, and the Oxford statutes of 1431 make this explicit: "Rethoricam per tres terminos, videlicet Rethoricam Aristotelis, seu quartum Topicorum Boecii..."
triennio completo, eorum incepicioni secundum statuta pristina non obstaret." 60 That is to say, seven years of study as a scholar would be considered sufficient, notwithstanding the ancient custom.

Besides attending his master’s ordinary lectures and delivering his own cursory lectures, the bachelor and even those who wished to incept without determining had to take part in public disputations for about two years before presentation. At Paris this obligation is very clearly stated in the English statutes of 1252. Before being presented for the licentia he was obliged to respond publicly (publice responserit) for two years, and by this was meant the task of objecting and responding to objections both in the solemn disputation of the masters and in the Lenten determination of the bachelors.61 At Oxford the ancient statutes do not specify any particular length of time, but the statutes of 1340 require every incepturus to oppose (arguat) at least four times in the public disputation of the masters, to respond at least twice in such disputations of the masters which are not de quolibet, but de questione, or at least to respond once in a disputation of the masters de questione and once de problemate.62 Moreover he must oppose and respond at least once in the general disputation of the bachelors known as ‘Austins’, held yearly at the conven of the Augustinian Friars; in May of 1346, this obligation was made a yearly affair.63

All things considered, the bachelor was very much of an apprentice in the medieval faculty of arts. He was a younger and all of his academic activities were under the direction of his master. He could not teach in the full sense of the word. Apart from the peculiar Lenten exercises, he could not determine questions in public disputations; the general disputations of the bachelors apud Augustinenses, it would seem, consisted only of opponents and respondents supervised

61 “Ad hunc articulum predictum, videlicet quod per biennium ante presentacionem publice responserit presentatus, sic intelligendum esse ab omnibus decreverunt, videlicet quod presentandus in disputacionibus magistrorum vel determinatorum in solis bachelarii exercerit officium opponendo et respondendo per duos annos, antequam ad petendum regendi licenciam presentetur” (Chart. Univ. P., I, 232 n. 202).
62 “Item ordinatum est quod arguat quilibet incepturus quater ad minus publice in disputacionibus magistrorum, et quod semel disputet vel respondet quilibet in disputacione generali bachiliariorum facultatis predicte, et hoc pertinencia argumenta aducendo tantummodo ad questionem vel problema quam vel quod eum contigerit disputare. Item, ordinatum est quod quilibet incepturus, ante licenciam suam in artibus, respondat bis ad minus magistris regentibus in disputacionibus solempnibus, que non fuerint de quilibet, et hoc de questionibus vel semel de questione et de problemate alias” (Stat. Ant., p. 32, 16-27).
63 Ibid., p. 147; see Gibson, ibid., p. xciv.
by *collatores*. If the *licentia determinandi* really constituted the bachelor's degree in arts, then not all of those who proceeded to the master's degree were previously bachelors, strictly speaking, although all had to fulfil the requirements *pro forma inceptorum* before receiving the degree of master in arts.

C. *The Master*

In early Fourteenth Century Oxford it was not customary to present for inception bachelors who had duly determined until three years had elapsed from the time of determination. Since the year in which the bachelor determined would be counted as the first year, a bachelor who determined for himself in the fifth year of his study would be presented for inception at the end of his seventh year. More capable students who undertook to determine for someone else could be presented at the end of six years; but those who had not determined at all were obliged to spend eight years in attending lectures and in opposing at public disputation. Before bachelors could be presented to the Chancellor for the mastership in arts the congregation of regent masters was required to give a favorable vote concerning the learning and morals of the candidates. At the proper time the proctors of the university convoked eighteen regent masters, if there were that many in the arts faculty, in order to vote on the worthiness of the candidates. It would seem that nine of these masters, besides the presenting master, had to have personal knowledge of the individuals upon whom they were voting. If this secret deposition of the regent masters was favorable, the candidate was ready to be presented to the Chancellor by his own master. The traditional formula of presentation at Oxford was expressed in the words, “Domine Cancellarie, presento vobis istum bachilarium facultatis arcium ad incipientum in tali facultate, quem scio ydoneum, tam in scientia quam in moribus, ad incipientum in eadem facultate, in fide prestita universitati.” After the bachelor took the oath to keep the peace, to incept within one year, to incept at Oxford, etc., the Chancellor of the

67 The statutes enacted 'before 1350' provide that should there be only twelve regent masters or less, the testimony of all is required. It is difficult to determine how many regent masters there were in the Faculty of Arts at Oxford at any given period.
university solemnly conferred the *licentia docendi*: "Ad honorem Domini nostri Iesu Christi... auctoritate mea et tocius universitatis do tibi licenciam incipiendi in tali facultate, legendi et disputandi et omnia faciendi que ad statum magistri in eadem facultate pertinent, cum ea compleueris que ad talem pertinent solemnnitatem."  

The *licentiatus* then visited the schools of all the masters, asking them to attend the solemn inception.  

The inception of a new master consisted of two separate ceremonies: ‘vesperies’ and investiture. ‘Vesperies’ could be held on any *dies legibilis* in the late afternoon, from which the name is derived, but investiture had to be held in a *dies disputabilis*, or at least on a day which was *festine legibilis.* At Oxford in the Fourteenth Century ‘vesperies’ were held at the church of St. Mildred by a regent or non-regent master under whom the bachelor wished to incept. Sometimes bachelors wished to incept under masters other than their own. At Paris regent masters were not bound to attend ‘vesperies’ held by non-regent masters, although all were invited to attend. ‘Vesperies’ began with a disputation or a series of disputations, if more than one incepted at the same time, the question to be discussed by each inceptor having been previously announced in congregation by the presiding master. From extant Fifteenth Century evidence it seems that these questions were taken from the *quadrivium* or one of the philosophies, and not *de sophismatibus.* The principal role of the inceptor at Oxford was to oppose. For the first disputation it was the task of the most recent inceptor to respond, if he had not yet responded at ‘vesperies’, otherwise the senior inceptor took the secondary role of responding. After all inceptors had opposed, the presiding master delivered a short address based on the subject of the disputation, usually with a pertinent text around which he developed his theme. This address was called a *commendatio*, because in it the presiding master commended his inceptors (*filii mei*) by name, often with puns on the name or allusions to peculiar characteristics of the inceptors. William Whetely in his

72 Ibid., p. 36, 30-36.  
74 For example, the collection of disputations contained in Lambeth Palace MS 221.  
75 This was different from the custom in the theological faculty, where the role of the inceptor in ‘vesperies’ was to respond: “preterquam in theologia, in qua bachelarii noviter incepturi solent respondere” (*Stat. Ant.*, p. 37, 15-16).
commentary on pseudo-Boethius’ *De disciplina scholarium*, written in 1509, remarks: “Videndum est quod magister illo die quo incipit habeat bonas et efficaces raciones contra suum respondentem et contra quemcumque alium, et similiter quod magister suus sub quo incipit habeat verba ornata et fructuosa in sua commendacione.”

Finally the inceptors took an oath of fidelity to the university. At the solemn vestition of a master all regent masters of the faculty were obliged to be present, for which reason all lectures were suspended in that faculty. After the celebration of Mass the presiding master bestowed on his inceptor the insignia of office, the book and cap. The inceptor then delivered a short lectio (his principium); this was followed by two questions to be disputed. It was the duty of some master, usually one who had recently incepted, to respond to the objections posed by the inceptor. Out of respect for the responding master, the inceptor determined, quasi determinatio, by repeating a single argument and declaring himself satisfied with the response of the master. The principium together with the determination constituted the first magisterial act of the inceptor, thus signifying the twofold function of a master, legere and disputare. Finally the young master took the oath to safeguard the privileges of the university, etc.

According to the university statutes a young master in arts was bound to hold public disputations for forty days after his inception. His very first disputation had to be on logic, unless it happened to be a Friday, in which case it was on grammar. The purpose of inception was to start the young master off on his teaching career. Thus to fulfil his title of ‘master’ he had to instruct others magistraliter for at least two years. At Oxford, as at other universities, anyone who did not comply with this necessary two years of regency was considered a perjuror and not a member of the university until he had fulfilled his master’s oath. During this necessary regency he could not be a scholar in one of the higher faculties, but was obliged to lecture ordinari in the

81 This was true of all medieval universities. But according to an early fourteenth century Oxford statute (*op. cit.*, p. 54, 11-16), if a master incepted shortly after Christmas, he had to continue for the rest of that academic year and for another full year. This would make an absolute minimum of one year and a half.
morning and to hold public disputation in the afternoon at least once a week after his customary forty disputation had been held.

Two years regency was only a minimum requirement of the faculty; a master could continue to teach in the schools for as long as he desired. But ordinarily a master in arts would proceed to one of the higher faculties if he had the ability and the financial means. A master in arts could, of course, study in one of the higher faculties while continuing to lecture in arts. One difficulty about this arrangement would be the question of time. Obviously if a master in arts enrolled under a master in one of the higher faculties, he would be obliged to attend that master's ordinary lectures and disputation. But this is an apparent difficulty, since as a master in arts he could lecture in *extraordinaio magistrorum*. However, the study of theology, medicine or law was a full time occupation and it has not been shown that many masters, if any, taught arts while studying theology, medicine or law. Only those masters who had a burning predilection for the arts or who were particularly capable would undertake such a burden. At any rate the normal practice, at least at Oxford, was to enroll in one of the higher faculties after completing the necessary regency.

II. The Method of Teaching

We have seen that the proper function of a master was to lecture (*legere*) and dispute (*disputare*). The curriculum of studies in the arts faculty embraced the whole of human speculative knowledge contained in the *trivium*, *quadrivim* and the three philosophies. The wisdom of the past was transmitted to students in what was considered the best pedagogical method: the best known authorities in any subject were read, explained in detail, and all points, large and small, were debated in order to understand the doctrine. It is sometimes thought that medieval teaching was nothing more than a parroting of accepted authors or quibbling about nothing in an elaborate and artificial form. But this would be a misunderstanding of the medieval method of

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83 The word 'extraordinaria' or its variants in the context of medieval teaching is sometimes confusing, as it had various meanings. It was always opposed to 'ordinaria', but this could be for various reasons, e.g. by reason of time, person or method. By reason of time a master would be said to lecture 'extraordinarie' if he lectured at a time other than his usual time in the morning. By reason of person a bachelor would be said to lecture 'extraordinarie' if he completed a course on physics, ethics or metaphysics begun by a master. By reason of method a master would be said to lecture 'extraordinarie' if he lectured cursorily on any book.
teaching. It is true that there were some masters then, as today, who were incapable of anything more than a repetition of the textbook. There were masters then, as there are today, who quibbled without seeing realities and who quoted authorities without intelligent appreciation. But the medieval method of teaching itself was well designed to present students with the best authorities available and to inculcate in them a logical and scientific manner of thinking. At least we must admit that Euclid, Ptolemy, Aristotle and others were the best authorities available at the time, and that their actual writings are worthy of study as soon as students are capable of understanding the difficult problems. Aristotle, it is true, is especially difficult to understand, even today. And it is not surprising that medieval professors relied on authorities, such as Avicenna and Averroes, for enlightenment in obscure passages. This does not imply an absence of academic freedom, nor a curtailment of originality in thought. The medieval student was introduced to logic, mathematics and physical science by means of beginners' texts, summaries and handbooks, but the medieval university never substituted a handbook for the great books of genius.

Medieval teaching consisted in lecturing on some approved text and in disputing difficult points of doctrine. In order to understand more fully the method of teaching and the curriculum of studies in the early fourteenth century, we must consider the books used at Oxford and the various types of disputations held in the faculty of arts.

A. Legere

Medieval lecturing was always based on a text "commonly accepted in the schools." These writings were universally recognized as authoritative and worth lecturing upon. Some of the more basic texts were required pro forma. It is not clear how among all the books available in the Middle Ages only certain ones were commonly accepted by the faculty of arts and others rejected. The introduction, prohibition and eventual acceptance of the Aristotelian libri naturales is sufficiently well known, and needs no repetition here. The Parisian condemnation of 1277, listed certain books which might not be read in the schools under pain of excommunication. Among these were the Liber de amore of Andreas Capellanus, a certain Liber Geomantiae,84 and any other work on necromancy. In 1389, the Parisian faculty of arts

84 Inc.: "Estimaverunt Indi..." Expl.: "...ratiocinare ergo super eum et invenies, etc." H. Denifle found this work contained in Erfurt, MS Amption. Q. 365, fol. 53-82. See Chart. Univ. P., I, pp. 543 and 557.
forbade the public and occult teaching of Ockham's works and doctrines in the schools on the grounds that his books "had not been admitted by those in authority, nor customarily taught elsewhere, nor examined by us or others to whom this might pertain." Whatever may have been the motive behind this statute, the reason alleged for not reading the works of Ockham publicly in the schools was that "we ought not to read certain books not admitted by them i.e. by our predecessors or in common use elsewhere." At Paris, it would seem, textbooks were a matter of traditional use or implicit acceptance by the masters. There does not seem to have been any official approbation of each and every book used, otherwise objectionable books could not have been introduced into the schools. There is no reason to think that the practice at Oxford was any different from that at Paris.

By the early fourteenth century the course in arts embraced the whole of the trivium, quadrivium and the three philosophies. Our meager information concerning the books commonly accepted in the schools of Oxford can be summarized briefly.

THE TRIVIUM:

1) GRAMMAR. At Oxford in the early fourteenth century grammar seems to have lost its earlier prominence and to have been largely absorbed into logic. The way for this was prepared by the grammatica speculativa, of which there is a continuous history from the school of Chartres to Oxford. The fifteenth century statutes include Donatus among the logical books.

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86 See the suggestion of E. A. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340," in Franciscan Studies, VII (1947), 113-146.

87 "Cum igitur a predecessibus nostris non irrationabiliter motis circa libros apud nos legendos publice vel occulide certa precesserit ordinatio per nos jurata observari, et quod aliquos libros per ipsos non admissos vel alias consueutos legere non debemus, et istic temporibus nonnulli doctrinam Guillermi dicti Okam (quamvis per ipsos ordinantes admissa non fuerit vel aias consuetu, neque per nos seu alios ad quos pertineat examinata, propter quod non videtur suspicione careve), dogmatizare presupserint publice et occulide super hoc in locis privatis conventicula faciendo..." (Chart. Univ. P., II, 485 n. 1023; see also Appendix n. 1185 (16), p. 680).

88 A Munich MS Cim. 4384, fol. 123v-131v, written about 1340, contains an anonymous commentary on the De suppositionibus of William Sutton, "edita a magno ceto philosoporum in Anglia." If one could be certain of the credibility of this rubric, there would be reason to suspect that at Oxford this anti-Ockhamist treatise was introduced by the congregation of regent masters in arts. But the rubric can be dismissed as idle speculation.

89 An Oxford forma found in Corpus Christi College MS 116, fol. 30v is published in Rashdall's Universities, III, 480-1; another in Worcester Cathedral MS F. 73 was published by S. G. Hamilton in the Catalogue of MSS. preserved in the Chapter Library of Worcester Cathedral, 1906, pp. 176-7; and the short forma in Merton College MS 261 was published by Sir Maurice Powicke in The Medieval Books of Merton College, Oxford 1931, p. 34.
to be heard before determinations (Stat. Ant., 200, 18-19). Of pure
grammar the early fourteenth century statutes required only two terms of
Priscian's Institutiones grammaticae, but other works were also commonly
taught.

a) Priscianus maior consisted of the first sixteen books of the institutiones.
At Paris in the mid-thirteenth century it was supposed to be covered
in about two terms; at Oxford in the early fourteenth century it was
taught at least "per sex septimas integre, non connumerando dies
festos" (Stat. Ant., 34, 5-6; also Rashdall, Universities, III, 480-1).

b) Priscianus minor consisted of the last two books, known also as the
De constructionibus. At Paris it was taught with the Barbarismus
of Donatus over approximately two terms; at Oxford in the early
fourteenth century only one term was required by statute (Stat. Ant.,
34, 7-8). This was also taught in the grammar school (ibid., 121,
15-16).

c) Donatus' two works, the Ars minor (probably studied in the grammar
school) and the three books of the Ars maior, the last book of which
was known as the Barbarismus.

d) Various classical authors who were read as examples of classical Latin
grammar. On the classical authors and curriculum of studies, cf. E. R.
Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (London,
1953), 42-61, 436-443; L. J. Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval
Universities with special reference to Grammar and Rhetoric (Cham-
paign, Illinois, 1910).

e) Speculative grammars might have been used such as the Doctrinale
of Alexander of Villeleie, the Grecismus of Eberhard of Bethune, the
Grammatica Speculativa of Thomas of Erfurt, and others. (Cf. M.
Grabmann, "Thomas von Erfurt und die Sprachlogik des mittel-

2) RHETORIC. At Oxford ancient statutory mention is made only of
Aristotle and Boethius, but the statutes of 1431 mention other alternatives
and give the required time as three years pro forma (Stat. Ant., 234,
22-34).

a) The Fourth Book of Boethius' Topica (Stat. Ant., 33, 19). This is also
mentioned in the thirteenth century statutes (Stat. Ant., 26, 3-4) as
well as in the early fourteenth century forma published by F. M.
Powicke (MEDIEVAL BOOKS, p. 34).


c) Cicero's De inventione (known as the Rhetorica vetus, or prior) and
pseudo-Cicero's Rhetorica ad Herennium (known as Rhetorica nova).

d) Various classical authors, such as Ovid and Vergil (Cf. Stat. Ant.,
234, 24), who were studied as examples of rhetorical style (cf. Curtius,
op. cit., 62-78, 148 ff.; Paetow, op. cit., 67-91), and manuals of the
well known ars dictaminis.

3) LOGIC. At Oxford the greatest emphasis was placed on the study of
logic, which occupied about half of the actual curriculum. The thirteenth
century statutes required that all the books of the old logic be heard at
least once before determinations, that the Prior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici elenchi be heard twice, and that the Posterior Analytics be heard at least once (Stat. Ant., 26, 1-6). The early fourteenth century statutes are more concerned with the number of times various books must have been read by bachelors before inception.

a) The logica vetus consisted of the Isagoge of Porphyry, the Praedica-menta and Perihermeneias of Aristotle, and, at this date, the Liber sex principiorum attributed to Gilbert of la Porrée. It would seem that the whole logica vetus was covered in three terms.

b) The first three books of Boethius' Topica and his Liber de divisione; this latter work seems to have been dropped during the first half of the fourteenth century.

c) The logica nova consisted of Aristotle's Analytica Priora and Poste-riora, Topica and De Sophisticis elenchi. The two Analytics would each have required at least two terms, while the Topica and Sophistici elenchi seem to have required one term each, although they were read in immediate succession.

d) Various texts of the parva logica.ia.

THE QUADRIVIVM:

1) ARITHMETIC. The earliest known mention of arithmetic as a require-
ment pro forma is found in the statutes probably promulgated in the early fourteenth century (Stat. Ant., 33, 18; see also Rashdall, Universities, III, 480-482).

a) The Arithmetica (or Arismetrica) of Boethius was obligatory "per tres septimanas integre, non connumerando dies festos" (Stat. Ant., 34, 1-2; see also Rashdall, loc. cit.). These two books were adopted by Boethius from the Arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa.

b) The Algorismus (or Arithmetica practica), which dealt with fractions, their addition, substraction, multiplication, division and the extracting of roots, was taught in the brief space of eight whole days (Stat. Ant., 33, 39-34; see also Rashdall, loc. cit.). The usual text was that ascribed to Sacroboisco, beginning: "Omnia que a primeva rerum origine proces-
suit racione numerorum formata...", of which there are numerous manuscripts. Paris, BN, Nouv. Acq. lat. 625, fol. 51v-53v refers to it as "algorismus novus."

c) A summary of Boethius' Arithmetic was made by Thomas Bradwardine, which seems to have been used later as a text, at least on the continent. Bradwardine's text is contained in MSS Munich, Clm. 24809, fol. 100v-106, Erfurt, Amplon. F. 375, fol. 15v-17v, 88v-92v, Amplon. Q. 23, fol. 75-81v; and a commentary is found in Vienna, NB, lat. 4953, fol. 36-61v, and lat. 4951, fol. 278-304v.

d) Books VII-X of Euclid's Elementa, which deal with the properties of numbers, was also considered as belonging to arithmetic. Cf. R. Bacon, Communia Mathematica, ed. Steele, p. 47. Probably for this reason Euclid is also mentioned under arithmetic by Alexander Nequam in his Sacerdos ad altare accessurus. Cf. C. H. Haskins, Studies in Medieval Science, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), p. 374, lines 50-51.
2) MUSIC. The study of music in the Middle Ages needs still careful research. There is no mention of it at Oxford before 1431, when the statutes require the Musica of Boethius to be heard for one term before inception. However, there was also available St. Augustine's De musica and the Musica rusticorum Parisiensium of Jean de Muris belonging to the first half of the fourteenth century. See G. Reese, Music in the Middle Ages (London, 1941).

3) GEOMETRY. Geometry and astronomy were by far the most cultivated mathematical sciences in the sense that there were numerous texts which could have been used and were used for the various branches of this science. But the only book required pro forma was Euclid I-VI, heard "per quinque septimanas integre, non connumerando dies festos" (Stat. Ant., 33, 31-32). The Oxford forma found in Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 116, fol. 30v, lists "Geometria per unam septimanam integram, non con. d. f."; this is either an error or a later regulation. See Rashdall, op. cit., III, 480-482.

a) Euclid's Elementa (or Ars geometricae), translated from the Arabic in the twelfth century by Adelard of Bath, Herman of Carinthia and again by Gerard of Cremona, contained the thirteen authentic books plus two spurious Arabic additions. The version commonly used in the schools at Oxford was the abridgement of Adelard of Bath beginning "Punctus est cui pars non est. Linea est longitudo..." (cf. M. Clagett, "The Medieval Latin Translations from the Arabic of the Elements of Euclid, with Special Emphasis on the Versions of Adelard of Bath," Isis, XLIV (1953), 16-42; see also Isis, XLV (1954), 269-277). Only the first six books seem to have been taught as geometry in the schools.

b) Other works of speculative geometry at least used, if not expounded in the schools, were Euclid's De quantitatis datis, and Jordanus Nemorarius' De triangulis. See R. Bacon, Communia Mathematica, ed. Steele, p. 42.

c) Tractatus quadrantis, usually ascribed to Robertus Anglicus, was a part of practical geometry dealing with the structure of the quadrant. The prologue begins, "Geometrie due sunt partes, silicet theorica et practica...", and the text begins, "Estigitur quadrans quoddam instrumentum..." (cf. P. Tannery, "Le traité du quadrant..." in Notices et Extraits, XXXV, pt. ii (1897), 561-640; L. Thorndike, "Who Wrote Quadrans Vetus?". Isis, XXXVII (1947), 150-153.

d) Tractatus de ponderibus, a part of practical geometry dealing with statics. The text generally used was the Elementa Jordani de ponderibus, usually with some commentary such as that contained in the De ratione ponderis. See The Medieval Science of Weights, ed. by E. Moody and M. Clagett (Madison, 1952), and review by A. Maier in Isis, XLVI (1955), 297-300.

e) Perspectiva (or Optica) was a part of practical geometry which dealt with the application of geometrical principles to light rays. A great number of texts were available, e.g. Ptolemy's Optica, Euclid's Optica, and his De speculis (Catoptrica), Alhazen's De aspectu, Roger Bacon's Perspectiva, and Pecham's Perspectiva communis. It is not clear from
university statutes or from extant manuscripts which text might have been more commonly used at Oxford in the early fourteenth century.

4) ASTRONOMY. Astronomy was greatly advanced at Oxford in the early fourteenth century by such men as John Maudith, Richard of Wallingford, Simon Breton, John Ashenden and William Reade—all Merton Fellows (cf. R. T. Gunther, *Early Science in Oxford*, II, 42-65). However only the *De sphera* and the *Compotus* were required *pro forma*, each “per octo dies integre” (*Stat. Ant.*, 33, 35-38, also Rashdall, *loc. cit.*). The principal aim of this subject was to enable students to understand the position of the planets and to calculate the variable feast days of the ecclesiastical year. The science itself covered a great variety of books, of which we mention only the more important.

a) The *Almagest* of Ptolemy was the basis of all speculative astronomy. Although a number of versions existed already in the twelfth century both from the Greek and Arabic (cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, 103-112; F. Carmody, *Arabic Astronomical and Astrological Sciences in Latin Translations* (Berkeley, Calif., 1956, 15-16), the common version was that made by Gerard of Cremona from the Arabic in 1175, at Toledo. To this was sometimes added the brief introductory work of Thābit ben Qurra, *Liber... de hiis que indigent expositione antequam legatur Almagestus* (Oxford, Univ. Coll. MS 41, fol. 26-28; see also Carmody, *op. cit.*, p. 118).

b) For astrology Ptolemy’s *Quadripartitum* (or *Tetrabiblos*), translated in 1138 by Plaeo of Tivoli, might have been used, or the abridgement by John of Seville, known as the *Centiloquium* or *Fructus Ptolomaei* (cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, 68-69).

c) *Theorica planetarum* discussed the Ptolemaic system of planetary movement and was more commonly used in the schools than the more difficult *Almagest*. There were a number of texts by this name and various revisions (cf. P. Duhem, *Le Système*, III, 216-326). But the most commonly used text at Oxford in the early fourteenth century was that beginning, “Circulus eccentricus vel egressus cuspidis vel egressis exteri...”, ascribed to Gerard of Cremona. Cf. Duhem, *ibid.*, 219-230; F. Carmody, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-8; text edited by Carmody (Berkeley, Calif.), 1942. This text ascribed to Gerard was later replaced by the *Theorica planetarum* of Campanus of Novara.

d) *De sphera* of Sacrobosco was by far the best known work of speculative astronomy in the schools of Oxford. It is a short elementary work in four chapters based on the *Almagest* and the works of al-Farghani and al-Battani. It was also known as the *Sphera materialis*. For a comparison of this text with other works of the same title, see L. Thorndike, *The Sphere of Scrobosco and its Commentators* (Chicago, 1949), 10-41.

e) The *Compotus* was a course in practical astronomy to teach students how to compute the variable feast days of the calendar, and hence the text used in this course varied considerably as efforts were made to reform the calendar (cf. C. Wordworth, *The Ancient Kalender of the University of Oxford*, [O. H. S.] 1904, 133-194). At Oxford in the thirteenth century the basic text seems to have been the *Compotus* of
Grosseteste, beginning “Comptus est scientia numerationis et divisionis temporum...” (ed. by R. Steele together with the Comptus Fratriis Rogeri in Opera hac. ined. fasc. VI, 212-267). But it would seem that the text of Sacrobosco was commonly used from the beginning of the fourteenth century; it begins “Comptus est scientia considerans...” and it was taught for eight full days.

f) The Tractatus quadrantis as a part of practical astronomy came into the schools at the beginning of the fourteenth century. This Quadrans novus was composed by Profatius Hebraeus in Hebrew at Montpellier in 1288 and translated into Latin with the help of Master Hermagaud Blasi in 1299 (cf. Duhem, Le Système, III, 306-308). The rubric of Oxford, Univ. Coll. MS 41, fol. 10-16, reads: “Tractatus quadrantis novi compositus a mag. Prophatio Hebreo anno dominice Incarnationis 1288, et correctus ab eodem A. D. 1301” (also found in London, BM, MS Harley 80, fol. 94). The text begins, “Cum stellarum scientia sine instrumentis congruus minime compleatur...” There is no reason to suppose that the Quadrans novus replaced the Quadrans vetus of Robertus Angelicus mentioned above, for the scope of these two works is considerably different.

g) Astronomical tables for Oxford were abundant in the early fourteenth century. One based on the Alphonsine tables is contained in Oxford, University College MS 41, fol. 52-77, entitled “Tabula radicum planetarum super meridiem Oxonie cuius longitudo ab occidente est 51 gradus...” In the same MS, fol. 35-36v, there are tables of the altitude of the sun for Oxford, London and Exeter. The Mathematics tabulæ written by John Maudith in 1310 and the well known Summa iudicialis (1347-48) of John Ashenden testify to the use of astronomical tables in the schools of Oxford, but we cannot ascertain how they were used in lectures.

h) The Tractatus de proportionibus was introduced some time after 1328, i.e. after Thomas Bradwardine composed his Tractatus de proportione velocitatum in motibus. There is reason to believe that Bradwardine's treatise itself was not generally used as a text at Oxford, but rather one of two simpler versions. One begins “Omnis proportio vel est communiter dicta vel propria...”; the other, which is somewhat later and less common, begins “Omnis proportio aut est communiter dicta, proprie dicta, vel magis proprie dicta...” These elementary texts will be discussed later. The treatise De proportione would probably have been considered a part of speculative astronomy, because it discusses the application of geometrical proportionality to variations of physical motion.

THE THREE PHILOSOPHIES:

1) NATURAL PHILOSOPHY included all the Aristotelian libri naturales together with certain other treatises of natural science. At Oxford, as at Paris, the greater part of the curriculum was devoted to the natural sciences and logic. By the beginning of the fourteenth century this part of the curriculum was already fully established by the traditions and
translations of the thirteenth century. Here we will merely list the more important Aristotelian books used in the schools.

a) The eight books of the *Physics* were considered the foundation and general theory of natural science. Early in the fourteenth century the revision of James of Venice’s translation seems to have been commonly used. Normally three terms were needed to cover all the books. The statutes of 1268 required that the *Physics* be heard before determination. It continued to be one of the required books, at least for inception, during the next three centuries.

b) The four books of *De caelo et mundo* discussed locomotion in the universe and the physical theory of the spheres, which conflicted with the Ptolemaic system studied in astronomy. At Paris in the middle of the thirteenth century about two and a half terms were devoted to its study. At Oxford in the early fourteenth century one term alone was considered sufficient *pro forma* (*Stat. Ant.*, 34, 9-10; also Rashdall, *loc. cit.*, 481). Bachelors could give cursory lectures on this work and satisfy the requirements in part for inception (*Stat. Ant.*, 32, 8). The version generally used was the *translatio nova* of William of Moerbeke.

c) The two books of *De generatione et corruptione* discussed the general characteristics of chemical change in elements and compounds. This was a required course for determiners at Oxford in the thirteenth century (*Stat. Ant.*, 26, 9-10), but apparently in the fourteenth century it was not required *pro forma* for undergraduates. However, bachelors could lecture cursorily on this work *pro forma inceptorum* (*Stat. Ant.*, 32, 9-10). At Paris in the mid-thirteenth century half a year was required to complete the books; at Oxford they seem to have been completed in one term.

d) The four books of the *Metheora* discussed in detail the transmutation of elements and the chemical composition of bodies. At Oxford in the early fourteenth century this course was required of inceptors, and the length of the course was one term (*Stat. Ant.*, 34, 11; also Rashdall, *loc. cit.*, 481). Bachelors could lecture cursorily on these four books *pro forma* (*Stat. Ant.*, 32, 9). In the thirteenth century when Gerard of Cremona’s translation of the first three books was in common use, there were two spurious additions taught at Paris: *De causis proprieta- tum elementorum*, added by Gerard of Cremona, and *De mineralibus, or De congelatis*, added by Alfredus Anglicus. These appendices are still mentioned in the Oxford statutes of 1431, but for the *Metheora* the version commonly used in the fourteenth century seems to have been that of William of Moerbeke.

e) The *De anima* in three books discussed the active principle of all living things. This work, translated by James of Venice and revised by William of Moerbeke, was one of the most important treatises in the middle ages. It was required of determiners at Oxford (*Stat. Ant.*, 26, 9), and bachelors could choose to read this work cursorily *pro forma* (*Stat. Ant.*, 32, 8-9). It would seem that this course was taught in one term.

f) The *Parva naturalia* included all the small treatises of psychology, namely *De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscencia, De somno*
et vigilia, De longitudine et brevitate vitae, De iuventute et senectute, De resurrectione and De vita et morte. Each of these would be read in a few weeks. (Cf. Chart. U. P., I, n. 246, p. 278.) Bachelors could choose from among the Parva naturalia for cursory lectures before inception (Stat. Ant., 32, 10-13).

g) The first ten books of De animalibus (De historia animalium) seem to have been taught at Oxford together with the two short treatises, De progressu animalium and De motu animalium (Stat. Ant., 33, 4-5; 34, 4-6; also Rashdall, loc. cit., 480-482). This was one of the acceptable courses pro forma, and the minimal length of the course is given as six full weeks “non connumerando dies festos” (Stat. Ant., 34, 5-6; also Rashdall, loc. cit., 481). The “19” books De Animalibus printed in Rashdall (ibid., 480) is clearly a typographical error. The other Aristotelian works of biology, namely De partibus animalium and De generazione animalium, were certainly known and probably taught at Oxford, but were not required pro forma. For botany the basic text was the pseudo-Aristotelian (Nicholas of Damascus) De plantis, or De vegetabilibus, translated by Alfredus Anglicus from the Arabic.

2) MORAL PHILOSOPHY embraced the three Aristotelian works of moral science.

a) The ten books of the Ethica ad Nicomachum, translated by Robert Grosseteste and later revised, was a course required of inceptors in the fourteenth century. The minimal length of the course was “quatuor menses integre, connumerando dies festos” (Stat. Ant., 33, 29-30; also Rashdall, loc. cit., 480-1). At Toulouse the first five books were read during the first summer term and the last five during the second.

b) The Economica in the two books translated by Moerbeke or in the three books anonymously translated in the early fourteenth century could have been used. (Cf. A. D. Menut, “Maître Nicole Oresme: Le Livre de Yconomique d’Aristote,” Trans. Amer. Phil. Soc., (new series) XLVII (1957), 787-8). We are certain that this work was lectured upon at Paris in the early and mid-fourteenth century, but we have no similar certainty for Oxford.

c) The eight books of the Politica, in the version of William of Moerbeke, was an acceptable course pro forma for inceptors at Oxford (Stat. Ant., 33, 4; also Rashdall, loc. cit., 480-1). The minimal length of the course is given as “sex septimanas integre, non connumerando dies festos” (Stat. Ant., 34, 5-6; also Rashdall, ibid.).

3) METAPHYSICS always meant the books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, of which only the first twelve books were read in the schools. In a marginal note to Buridan’s Questiones super Metaphysicam contained in Vienna, Dominikanerkloster cod. 187/163, we read on fol. 133rb: “Nota quod super 13m et 14m metaphisice non sunt questiones quia non leguntur illi libri.” There is an extraordinary dearth of information concerning the teaching of metaphysics at Oxford in the early fourteenth century. The first statutory mention of it is made around 1407, when only ordinary, and not cursory lectures on the Metaphysics will be accepted pro forma incep-
torum (Stat. Ant., 193, 18-24). The statutes of 1431 require three terms of inceptors who had not determined, and two of those who had (Stat. Ant., 235, 5-8). However, according to the early fourteenth century forma copied in Oxford, Merton College MS 261, the twelve books of Aristotle's Metaphysics were required for inception (Powicke, Medieval Books of Merton, p. 34). The later forma found in Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 116, fol. 30v, clearly requires "Liber Metaphysicorum per annum, connumerando dies festos" (Rashdall, loc. cit., 480).

The pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de causis was sometimes taught as a completion of the Metaphysics. St. Albert remarked, "Et haec quidem quando adjuncta fuerint undecimo (A) primae philosophiae opus perfectum erit" (De causis, II, tr. 5, ch. 24, ed. Borgnet X, 616a). At Paris in the thirteenth century it was taught "in septem septimanis" (Chart. U. P., I, n. 246, p. 278).

At first sight the amount of time devoted to the individual books may appear surprisingly short. However, it must be remembered that the time specified in the forma indicates the length of ordinary lectures; in addition to these the student heard cursory lectures on these same books and was expected to 'repeat' his master's lectures. Furthermore, the exposition of a standard text was only part of the medieval method of teaching. The other essential part consisted in a discussion, or disputation of difficult questions.

B. Disputare

The scholastic method of debating questions in strict logical form has been called the "méthode didactique par excellence." The purpose of such disputations was not only to solve new problems about which there might be a variety of views, but also to manifest more clearly the reason for accepting proven truths. It was a method of teaching by which students were led to view problems more clearly, to understand truths more deeply and to detect fallacious arguments more readily. The general order of scholastic disputations has been sufficiently discussed by Mandonnet, Grabmann, Glorieux, Gibson, Wallerand and others. While the researches of the past fifty years have added greatly to our knowledge of such disputations in the faculty of theology, much work still needs to be done for the medieval faculty of arts. Our knowledge is particularly meager concerning disputations.

in the arts faculty at Oxford in the early fourteenth century. But the few facts known are most valuable in suggesting a general picture of this aspect of education at Oxford. We are not here concerned with the morning discussion associated with the exposition of the text "cum questione pertinente cum suis argumentis pertinentibus ad materiam libri," nor with the purely logical exercises de obligationibus. But we are here concerned primarily with the solemn disputations de sophismatibus, de questione and de quolibet.

i. Disputations 'de sophismatibus'

There is some obscurity concerning the meaning of sophisma in medieval literature. This is perhaps because the word itself underwent an extension of meaning. In classical Greek and Latin usage it meant a fallacious conclusion having the appearance of true wisdom (cogita). Boethius used the term in the sense of a fallacious, or contentious argument. But, as Grabmann has shown, by the second half of the twelfth century a sophisma was an enigmatic proposition of logic or grammar which could be disputed. In the anonymous commentary on the De scholarium disciplina included among the works of Aquinas sophismata are defined as synonymous with aenigmata and obscuritates. The Impossibilia of Siger of Brabant and the Sophismata of Siger of Coutrai could be considered examples of this use of the term. But by the end of the thirteenth century the term was also used to signify any quae estio disputata in logic, even those which began with "Utrum". In the fourteenth century there are numerous examples of the use of this term to designate ordinary questions of logic determined in disputations or raised in connection with the logical books, questions such as "Utrum logica sit scientia," or "Utrum omnis propositio sit vera

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90 De doctrina chistiana, II, 31 (PL 34, 58): "Sunt enim multa quae appellantur sophismata, falsae conclusiones rationum, et plerumque ita versus imitantes, ut non solum tardos, sed ingeniiosos etiam minus diligenter attentos decipiant." For earlier uses of sophismata in this sense, see C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1855), I, 40-58, and 488-496; also G. Wallerand, op. cit., pp. (27)-(29).

91 Boethius, Topiicorum Arist. Interpretatio, VIII, 4 (PL 64, 1004): "sophisma vero syllogismus contentiousus."


93 S. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, Parma XXIV, 207 b.

94 See the list of sophismata in Vatican MS Pat. lat. 3061, quoted by M. Grabmann, op. cit., pp. 60-62. G. Wallerand, however, considers sophismata to be much more restricted in meaning. (cf. op. cit., (27)-(33).
vel falsa." In Dominikanerkloster, Vienna, cod. 160/130, fol. 96-100v, a parchment of the second half of the fourteenth century, there are “curialia sophisma super de suppositionibus magistri siffridi (erased) anglici,” that is, quaestiones on the text of William Sutton, the Merton logician. In the same manuscript an anonymous commentator on Sutton’s De consequentiis writes:

Nota quod hic verba proposicio, questio, enunciacio, problema et sophisma sunt eadem realiter, set different secundum suas raciones proprias diffinibiles et formales; eadem sunt realiter, quia una et eadem proposicio in numero potest esse omnia hec. Differunt aliquld (sic) secundum suas raciones formales, ut Boecius in Ciceronis Topiscis <PL 64, 1049> sic diffinit, “questio est dubitabilis proposicio.” Set proposicionem Aristoteles primo Priorum <24a16> sic diffinit, “proposicio est oracio significans aliquld de aliqulvel negative vel affirmative.” Set enunciacionem sic diffinit primo Periarmenias <17a1>, “enunciacio est oracio significans id (sic) quod est sicud verum.” Set problema est proposicio probabilis et improbablis alci. Set sophisma Wurley in abstraccionibus suis circa phm sic describit, “sophisma est proposicio probata argumento vel argumentis.” (fol. 100vb).

Thus in late medieval usage the term sophisma did not necessarily signify a fallacious argument or conclusion. In academic usage it signified a proposition which could be defended by logical arguments. By the beginning of the fourteenth century the word was used to designate at least two types of logical propositions. Ordinarily and properly in meant an enigmatic proposition, “Which from a logical viewpoint presents certain difficulties in virtue of its ambiguous or faulty formulation.” Such are the well known Sophisma of Heytesbury and Kilmington, e.g. “Omnis homo est omnis homo,” and “Sortes est albior quam Plato incipit esse albus.” But the term was also used to designate any quaestio disputata in logic. It is undoubtedly in this wider sense that the university statutes required disputations de sophismatibus.

C. Michalski has suggested that the novelty of the fourteenth century was the introduction of the sophisma physicalia. It is true that the fourteenth century schoolmen spoke of sophisma naturalia, or physicalia, and used the term to designate purely physical questions. For example,

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95 P. Boehner, Medieval Logic, An outline of its development from 1250-c. 1400 (Manchester, n.d.), 8 It is in this sense that Albert of Saxony meant his definition to be understood: “Sophisma dictur aliquld propositio que est argumentis probata et improbata.”

96 C. Michalski, Le Criticism et le Scepticism dans la Philosophie du xivé siècle (Crakow, 1928), 14 ff. M. Grabmann refrains from commenting on this suggestion, Die Sophismata-literatur, p. 9. A. Maie: likewise does not commit herself on this suggestion nor on the value of such a distinction, see An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Rome, 1952), 264-5.
John Dumbleton says that his *Summa* contains *dubia* of the five great natural books "cum solucione sophismatum logicalium et naturalium." The long sixth chapter of Heytesbury's *Regulae solvendi sophismata* is devoted exclusively to problems of physical motion; and many problems of physics are proposed for discussion in the other logical treatises.

However, although various physical problems were raised in the logical treatises, as Michalski correctly observed, it is clear that they were discussed under the formality of logic. Further, I suspect that the term 'sophismata' was loosely extended to cover *quaestiones* in physics. Just as *quaestiones* in logic were called *sophismata* in a wide sense, so *quaestiones* in physics were sometimes called *sophismata* in a wider sense, in the sense of 'problems,' or 'difficulties.' The *dubia* which Dumbleton raised in his extensive *Summa* are familiar questions in the physical sciences, e.g., "numquid materia prima vel forma vel compositum ex his sit subjectum immediatum et primum qualitatum primarum," "utrum substantia aliqua, puta forma substantialis, magis et minus suscipiat in abstracto," "numquid una species alia imperfectior sive perfectior in infinitum excedat vel excedatur," and so forth, throughout the whole of his work. I am inclined to believe that questions discussed in connection with physics were designated *sophismata* in a very wide sense of 'problem' and that this designation had no esoteric significance. One possible reason for such an extension of meaning is the fact that logical fallacies beget erroneous solutions to problems, even to problems of physical science. Thus, apart from the

97 Prologue, MS Vat. lat. 6750, fol. 1ra.
98 P. II, c. 13, MS Merton College 306, fol. 22ra.
99 P. II, c. 14, MS Merton College 306, fol. 22vb.
1 P. II, c. 15, *ibid*.
2 The same use of the term *sophismata* is found in the *Calculationes* of Richard Swineshead; see the following note.
3 This is suggested by the *Summulae in lib. Physicorum* attributed to William of Ockham, P. IV, cap. 11 (Venice, 1506), fol. 26vb: "Et ideo in isto sophisme: tempus est in terra; motus primus est tempus, ergo motus primus est in terra. Est fallacia amphibologie, quia maior improprie accipitur." This is also suggested by the use of the term in John Wyclif's *Dubia super materia Physicorum* found in Venice, S. Marco Cl. VI, cod. 173 (2625), fol. 2ra: "unde isti termini per se et per accidentis faciunt sophismata ex hoc quod antepositionem vel postpositionem in propositionibus..."; <fol. 6vb> "alia sophismata graviora patent alibi..."; <fol. 38rb> "et idem est sophisma si ponatur locum esse corpus locans..."; <fol. 50rb> "talia eciam sophismata possunt fieri si ponatur quod A localiter motum super pedale specium intendat motum suum a gradu ut remissum ad gradum ut duo." See also Swineshead, *Calculationes*, tr. II (Venice, 1520), fol. 9ra, 9rb and tr. V, fol. 22ab.
incidental consideration of physical problems in logic, the distinction between *sophismata logicalia* and *sophismata physicalia* is nothing more than the distinction between questions in logic and questions in physics. If this is true, then the novelty of the fourteenth century could hardly have been the introduction of *sophismata physicalia*. Perhaps Michalski was struck by the almost universal use of the tedious *argumentatio in terminis*, or *calculationes*, a method of argumentation common to all the disputations of the fourteenth century and even to commentaries on the *Sentences*.4

An examination of the thirty-two *Sophismata* of Heytesbury5 reveals that they are principally concerned with the distribution of terms and with types of propositions. The last two *sophismata*, which Michalski considered as "sophismata physicalia" because of a colophon Bibl. Nat. MS lat. 16134,6 are really concerned with modal propositions involving "necesse est" and "impossible est."7 The well-ordered *Sophismata* of Richard Kilmington reveals even more clearly the intimate connection between these problems and the new logical treatises then in use.

Since every human science must use terms, it is not surprising that the logical difficulties involved in those terms were commonly discussed in logic. In the faculty of arts undergraduates and bachelors were required to dispute *de sophismatibus* during the same years that they were studying the *libri naturales*, and hence it was natural to discuss the logical difficulties of physical problems. On the other hand, one important trend of fourteenth century physics, as we shall see,8 was to consider all scientific questions from a purely linguistic, or logical point of view. This was largely due to the nominalism of William of Ockham. Therefore problems of physical science were often discussed

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4 For a good discussion of the *argumentatio in terminis*, or *calculationes*, see A. Maier, *Studien III*, 257-288.

5 In the edition printed at Venice, 1494, fol. 77v-170v the *sophismata* are arranged differently from the order found in most MSS. The *Sophismata* of Richard Kilmington are arranged perfectly according to the order of the new logical treatises: I-XXVIII, *de incipit et desinit*; XXIX-XLI. IV, *de maximo et minimo*; XLI-XLIII, *de scire et dubitare*. MS Vat. lat. 3066, fol. 16-24v.

6 Fol. 146: "Postremo posita sunt mag. Guilliermi Hestylbery sophismata in littera anglicana... quibus addita sunt duo alia sophismata physicalia." C. Michalski, *op. cit.*, 19-20. Michalski also mentions MS Bodleian, *Canon. Misc.* 376, fol. 23-32, as other examples of 'sophismata physicalia', but these are only fragments of *De probationibus conclusionum Hentiseri*.

7 In the printed edition of 1494, fol. 155v: "Necesse est aliquid condensari si aliquid rarefiet"; fol. 171v: "Impossibile est aliquid calefieri nisi aliquid frigefiat."

in logic and works of physics often abound with purely logical and linguistic discussions. But properly speaking, disputations de sophismatibus were those concerned formally with logic; disputations de quaestione were those concerned with any of the "scientiae reales."

ii. Disputations 'de quaestione'

The method of solemn disputation is too well known to need elaboration here. We need only note that in the ordinary disputation of the masters the respondens was always a bachelor who attempted to answer the objections posed by anyone eligible to do so. The presiding master alone could give a determination to the question; in his final response to the objections he would agree with his bachelor, distinguish or disagree, as the case would require. In the peculiar Lenten "determinations" the bachelor, as we have seen, shared in the master's prerogative and had the privilege of responding and determining solutions under the guidance of his master. During the solemnities of inception, however, the new master posed objections to older masters, and in deference to their responses repeated one of their replies quasi determinando. The right to solve problems definitively belonged to the master alone, and this by reason of his magisterial office.

A certain amount of research has been done concerning the disputationes held in the faculty of arts at Bologna in the fourteenth century by M. Grabmann, B. Nardi, C. Piana, A. Maier and others. Strickland Gibson has noted a number of fifteenth century disputationes pertaining to the faculty of arts at Oxford. Unfortunately no similar work has been done for the Oxford masters of the early fourteenth century, and thus far very few disputationes de quaestione have come to light. Yet we know that regent masters were obliged to hold public, or solemn disputationes, the "disputationes magistrorum." The Oxford statutes of 1340 ordained that before anyone could obtain license to incept in arts, he had to respond at least twice in disputationes of the masters which were not de quiliber, but ordinary disputationes de quaestionibus "vel semel de questione et de problemate alias."9 Another Oxford forma required that he respond twice and oppose four times "in solemnibus disputacionibus magistrorum."10 These disputationes in arts, no doubt, lacked much of the dignity and originality which were found in theological discussions. This perhaps explains in part the dearth of extant quaestiones disputatae belonging to the faculty of arts.

10 Rashdall, Universities, III, 481, from Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 116, fol. 30v.
The *quaestiones* of John Scharpe on the eight books of the *Physics* contained in Balliol College, Oxford, MS 93, fol. 35v-91, end with the colophon: "Et in hoc finiunt questiones alique circa libros phisicorum superficialiter collecte modo quo in scholis phisicis Oxon. disputari consuerant." The structure of these questions, one on each book, strongly suggests that they are *questiones disputatae* in the true sense of the term, which were later gathered together into a single collection, "superficialiter collecte." The structure of Swineshead's *Calculationes* and of certain parts of Dumbleton's *Summa* suggest that they may have been originally disputationes *de quaestione*, and later edited in the form we know them today.

Much more research needs to be done on this aspect of the faculty of arts at Oxford. But special care must be taken to distinguish an exposition of a text "per modum quaestionum" or "cum quaestione pertinente" from true "quaestiones disputatae" actually determined in public disputationes. That is to say, not all *quaestiones* found in the manuscripts and printed editions can be assumed to have been publicly discussed in formal disputationes. We have already mentioned the explanation of an academic text "cum quaestione pertinente." Such questions were frequently edited or copied independently of the exposition or paraphrase which actually preceded the *quaestio* pertinent to the matter explained. Clearly such questions were not publicly disputed in the "solemn disputation of the masters."

iii. *Disputationes 'de quolibet'*

Relatively little is known about the quodlibet literature of the medieval faculty of arts. From the researches of P. Mandonnet, P. Glorieux, A. Pelzer and other scholars there has emerged a fairly complete picture of the theological disputationes *de quolibet*. But at present the extent of the correspondence between theological and philosophical *quodlibetae* cannot be fully determined. More facts need to be known. Some scholars have even denied the existence of disputationes *de quolibet* in the Parisian faculty of arts before 1452. Mgr. Grabmann proposed the view, now commonly repeated, that disputationes *de sophismatibus* corresponded in the faculty of arts to the quodlibets in the theological faculty. However, these views are not supported by the few facts already known.

11 These *questiones* together with the same colophon are also found in New College, Oxford, MS 238, fol. 53v-208v.
12 The editors of Rashdall's *Universities* I, 460 n. 2.
By definition a quodlibet was a public disputation about any subject whatever: *de quolibet ad voluntatem cuiuslibet*. In theology these special disputations were held twice a year, in Advent and in Lent, and the conduct of the disputation was similar to that of other solemn disputations. A question was posed *ad voluntatem cuiuslibet*, objections raised from the floor, the bachelor responded to the objections as they were raised, and finally the master presented his definitive solution to the question and objections, probably at a distinct session. Disputations *de quolibet* in the arts faculty were, no doubt, similar to those in the faculty of theology. It is certain that disputations *de quolibet* were held in the arts faculty at Oxford in the early fourteenth century. The statutes of 1340 clearly distinguish them from other disputations *de quaestione* and *de problemate*: "...respondeat bis ad minus magistris regentibus in disputacionibus solemnibus, que non fuerint de quolibet, et hoc de questionibus vel semel de quaestione et de problemate alias." Likewise the later Oxford *forma*, published by Rashdall, required that prospective inceptors take part in the public disputation of the masters "nec non disputando ad quodlibet, videlicet bis quaestioni et semel problemati." From this it is clear not only that solemn disputations *de quolibet* were held in the faculty of arts at Oxford during the fourteenth century, but also that the quodlibets concerned both logic (*de problemate, or sophismatibus*) and the real sciences (*de quaestione*). However, thus far no *quaestiones quodlibetales* belonging to the faculty of arts at Oxford in the first half of the fourteenth century have been brought to the attention of scholars.

It is clear from the Oxford *forma* that disputations *de quolibet* could be about either logic or the real sciences. However, a clear distinction is indicated between the two so that a single disputation *de quolibet* would not contain questions from both logic and the other disciplines. Walter Burley's famous quodlibet held at Toulouse was concerned with various questions of physics, *de primo et ultimo instanti*. The "quodlibet determinatum per magistrum Anselmum de Cumis 1335"

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16 Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 116, fol. 50v, printed in Rashdall’s *Universities*, III, 481.
17 The description of Corpus Christi College MS 119, fol. 1-11 as *Quodlibeta physica* is inaccurate in Coxe’s *Cet. Codicum MSS qui in Collegii Aulisque Oxon. hodie asservantur*, (Oxford, 1832), P. II, ‘Corpus Christi’, p. 41. These are merely expository questions on the *Physics* of Aristotle.
18 “Quando autem et in quibus formis est dare primum vel ultimum et in quibus non,
at Bologna involved five distinct questions drawn from physics, chemistry and psychology. Similarly a quodlibet de problemate (or de sophismatibus) would contain disparate questions of logic. The unique characteristic of quodlibet disputations is the lack of unity and order among the questions discussed at any particular session. In his determination the master evidently made some attempt to arrange the diverse problems previously discussed; but since questions were posed ad voluntatem euislibei de quolibet, a systematic unity could rarely be expected. This is vastly different from the ordinary quaestio disputata in which the master personally decided upon the problem to be discussed and the order in which discussion was to take place. A master might choose to discuss one difficult question or he might choose to divide a large question into special points, articuli, and discuss each in order. Over a period of time the master could in his ordinary disputations follow a pre-determined plan so that his collected disputations reveal a harmonious unity. No such order, however, was expected within a quodlibet disputation or within a collection of quodlibets determined by any one master. One particular advantage of quodlibet disputations was that a student (or another master) could raise questions of interest to himself, questions which would receive a definitive answer from the presiding master.

The Oxford statutes of 1340 imply that even at quodlibet disputations there was a responding bachelor who answered objections before the master give his determination: "respondeat bis ad minus magistris

patet in quolibet meo Tolose determinata questione..." Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 81ra. Michalski quotes in *La physique nouvelle...* (Cracow, 1928), 101, this passage with few variants from MS Vat. lat. 1817, fol. 215r; this is a typographical error for Vat. lat. 817. The Quodlibet determined by Burley at Toulouse was printed at Venice in 1501; MS Vat. lat. 3066, fol. 54rb, concludes, "Explicit questio disputata per Burley in suo quolibet Teolosse."

19 Vatican, MS Ottohbn. lat. 318, fol. 205v-223. For a description of these questions, see A. Maier, *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXXIII (1944), 142-147, and C. J. Emertinger, "Averroism in Early Fourteenth Century Bologna," *Medieval Studies*, XVI (1954), 43-44.

20 Many examples of this type have been noted by Grabmann, Maier, Piana and Emertinger for the Faculty of Arts at Bologna and at other Italian universities. Further examples can be found among the Canonici manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. Of particular interest is a "Questio de proportionibus motuum determinata per me Francisculum de Ferraria, Padua, ad preces quorumdam scolarum a.d. 1352, die x mensis Decemberis," in MS Canon. Misc. 226, fol. 58-70.

21 Such are the *Questiones* of John Scharpe on the *Physics*, "superficialiter collecte modo quo in scholis phisicis Oxon. disputari consuerant," quoted above. This may very well be true also of John Wyclif's *Dubia super materiam librorum Physicorum*, found in Venice, San Marco, Cl. VI, cod. 173 (2625), fol. 1-85v.
regentibus in disputacionibus solemnibus, que non fuerint de quo-\libet." This statute was enacted for bachelors before inception, and it makes no mention of opposing at disputationes. Clearly the legislators intended to exclude quodlibet responsions from counting pro forma; this implies that bachelors did respond in disputationes de quolibet, although such responsions were not pro forma. The later Oxford forma published by Rashdall mentions responding and opposing at other disputationes, then adds "nec non disputando ad quodlibet," but the meaning of 'disputando' is not altogether clear. At any rate, there can be no doubt that quodlibet disputationes were held in the faculty of arts at Oxford during the early fourteenth century and that they concerned both logic and the real sciences. Finally, it would seem that the procedure for such disputationes was not unlike that followed in theological disputationes de quolibet.\textsuperscript{22}

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In this paper we have traced the course of studies from matriculation to regent master in arts, and we have considered the scholastic method of teaching, a method consisting of various types of lectures and disputationes. The study of physics at Oxford in the early fourteenth century can best be appreciated within the framework of the whole curriculum of studies. We have tried to present a general picture of this curriculum at Oxford during a particularly outstanding period in her long and brilliant history. It was a period in which Richard de Bury could boast. "Admirable Minerva... has passed by Paris, and now has happily come to Britain."\textsuperscript{23} In the early fourteenth century the Oxford schools of logic and physics attracted the attention of the whole academic world with their "English subtleties" and "calculations". The Parisian masters according to Bury "wrap up their doctrines in unskilled discourse, and are losing all propriety of logic, except that our English subtleties, which they denounce in public, are the subject of their furtive vigils."\textsuperscript{24} These "subtleties" and "calculations" need to be the subject of further vigils.

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\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, 213.
Financial Activities of the Estates of Poitou

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It is customary to divide French provinces into *pays d'états* and *pays d'élection*. Provincial estates continued to meet in the former in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to vote royal taxes, while in the *pays d'élection* the estates were no longer summoned for this purpose and taxes were imposed arbitrarily by royal officials known as *élus*. It is not as widely known that in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries virtually every province of France had active estates that were summoned frequently to consent to taxes. The estates of these provinces that later became *pays d'élection* have been largely neglected by historians and their history remains shrouded in considerable uncertainty. One of the largest of these provinces was Poitou.¹

The first known meeting of the estates of Poitou was in 1372, and by 1390 meetings were held frequently. From then until 1435 the estates assembled almost every year, chiefly to vote taxes. In the years following 1435 the distinction between *pays d'état* and *pays d'élection* became valid, with Poitou falling into the latter category. Its estates no longer voted taxes, but continued to meet frequently until about 1470 for a variety of other reasons. After 1470 the estates met only occasionally for a few specific purposes. The last known assembly of

¹ Excellent works have been written concerning the estates of several of the *pays d'états*, such as Henri Prentout, *Les États provinciaux de Normandie*, in *Mémoires de l'Académie Nationale de Sciences, Arts, et Belles-Lettres de Caen*, Nouvelle Série, (Caen, 1925), 2 vols, and A. Rébillion, *Les États de Bretagne de 1661 à 1789* (Paris and Rennes, 1982). For many years, however, Antoine Thoras, *Les États provinciaux de la France centrale sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1879), was almost the only detailed study of the estates of the provinces that later became *pays d'élection* to which other historians could refer. While this work is sound, it is restricted to a small area and a short period of time. The estates of the *pays d'élection* have been neglected partly because their histories are not spectacular and partly because their sources are usually fragmentary. Before a definitive history of French provincial estates can be written much more research must be done on the estates of these provinces. This paper has been written after compiling many scattered fragments of information obtained by painstaking research in the town and departmental archives in Poitiers, and in the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales in Paris. It is the writer's belief that it is the first published work on the estates of Poitou, and it is hoped that it will help fill the gap in our knowledge concerning the activities of the estates of the *pays d'élection*. 
The estates of Poitou was in 1651, until the abortive attempt to revive provincial estates just before the French Revolution.

The purpose of this article is to examine in some detail the various financial functions of the estates of Poitou. This financial activity was confined almost entirely to the period c. 1390 to c. 1470, and was most important during the years prior to 1435. In addition, the role of the "flus" and their effect upon the financial activities of the three estates of the province will be discussed. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to discover why the estates of Poitou were no longer summoned to consent to taxes after about 1435.

The principal function of the estates of Poitou from the time of its origins until about 1435 was to vote taxes to its feudal lord. As Poitou reverted to the royal domain in 1422 all taxes after that date were voted to the King. Every meeting of the three estates of the province between 1382 and 1412 was for the purpose of granting a tax. At twelve of the twenty-three known meetings between November 1412 and 1435 a tax was voted. The purpose of four other assemblies

1 The only activity of the estates of Poitou after 1470 which might be considered financial in nature occurred between the years 1549 and 1553 when it met several times with the estates of neighboring provinces to protest to the king about the gabelle and other salt taxes.


cannot be ascertained, and at some of them taxes may also have been granted.\textsuperscript{4}

The amount voted varied from 10,000 livres tournois granted to the count of Montpensier in 1390, and again in 1391, to 60,000 livres tournois to King Charles VII on the occasion of his coronation in the latter half of 1429.\textsuperscript{5} In 1435 the three estates of Poitou assembled and voted a direct tax in lieu of the indirect aide that had been granted by the Estates General of Languedoc in January of that year.\textsuperscript{6} This is the last time for many years that we have definite evidence of the estates of Poitou meeting to consent to royal taxes.\textsuperscript{7} Henceforth it appears that the King imposed taxes directly in Poitou through the royal élus without consulting the three estates.\textsuperscript{8} Thomas’ contention that never, from 1418 to 1451, did Charles VII levy a direct tax without the participation of the provincial estates\textsuperscript{9} cannot be substantiated in the case of Poitou.


\textsuperscript{5} Fillon, ed., \textit{Documents pour servir à l'histoire du Bas-Poitou}, I; B. N., MS fr., 6,742; A. C. Poitiers, H 25, J 905 and J 906.


\textsuperscript{7} Only twice again, as far as can be determined, did the estates of Poitou have anything to do with voting a royal tax. In 1454 it once again voted a direct tax in lieu of aide, and in January 1464 the province was represented at a large regional assembly to grant a tax to Louis XI.

\textsuperscript{8} For the relationship between the élus and the estates of Poitou see below pp. 200 ff.

\textsuperscript{9} Thomas, \textit{Les États provinciaux}, 69-70.
A subject that merits a special study is the relationship between the voting of taxes by the Estates General and the voting of taxes by provincial estates during the early part of the reign of Charles VII. The principal question is, did the provincial estates normally meet after the Estates General had granted a royal tax to agree to their provinces' share of this tax? Some historians, such as Laferrière, believe that this was the usual procedure. The evidence in the case of Poitou is inconclusive however.

On November 1, 1424, the three estates of Poitou voted 50,000 livres tournois as that province's share of one million livres granted to the King by the Estates General at Poitiers in the previous month. This is the only occasion where it can be definitely established that this procedure was followed. Late in 1425, the three estates of Poitou met immediately following the assembly of the Estates General held in Poitiers in October and voted a small additional sum over and above the province's share of the royal tax. The document describing this meeting states that the King had ordered the main sum to be imposed as Poitou's share of the general tax. There is nothing to show whether or not the estates of Poitou was called upon to consent to this share. Royal letters of May 2, 1433 instructed the élus des aides in Poitou to impose a sum of 68,000 livres tournois as the provinces' share of a tax granted the King by the Estates General. There is no information available on this supposed meeting of the Estates General, and nothing to show that the three estates of Poitou voted their share. In September or October 1433 the Estates General of Languedoc met at Tours. Hugh, bishop of Poitiers, later acknowledged that he had received 400 livres tournois granted him by "those of the said pays (Poitou) who were at the said assembly." This sum was to be paid from Poitou's portion of the tax granted at this meeting. There is nothing to indicate whether or not the estates of Poitou had anything to say about the size of their portion of the tax. The wording of the document even seems

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13 A. N., K 63, no. 25.

14 B. N., MS fr. 20,886, fol. 113.
to imply that the money voted to the bishop was granted by the delegates from Poitou at the assembly of the Estates General, rather than by the estates of Poitou. If so, this was an unusual procedure. It is apparent then that the evidence as to whether or not the three estates of Poitou customarily voted that province’s share of the taxes granted by the Estates General is inconclusive. On at least one occasion they did, but it seems probable that this procedure was not always followed.

The next question to be examined is whether or not the estates of Poitou had anything to say about the province’s share of royal taxes after the Estates General and the Estates of Languedoc lost the privilege of voting them. In March 1438, the king imposed a taille of 200,000 livres tournois on Languedoc without the consent of the Estates General or the Estates of Languedoc. Poitou’s share was 52,000 livres. In January 1446, a taille of 226,000 livres was imposed on Languedoc. Royal letters of April 8, 1446 refer to Poitou’s portion of this tax, without specifying its amount. In January 1447, a taille of 200,000 livres tournois was imposed on Languedoc. Poitou’s share is referred to in a number of documents, without its amount being stated. There is nothing to indicate that the estates of the province was consulted on any of these occasions. It seems then that when the king imposed taxes on Languedoc without the consent of the Estates General or the Estates of Languedoc, as he did regularly after 1436 (except in 1439), he and his officials arbitrarily fixed Poitou’s share without consulting the three estates of the province.

One financial activity in which the estates of Poitou did participate during the reign of Charles VII was the voting of a direct tax on several occasions to replace indirect aides. Indirect taxes seem to have been unpopular in fifteenth century France, and direct taxes preferred. This was partly because indirect taxes were “farmed out” and then rather dishonestly collected. Also, the people preferred to know in advance precisely what they had to pay. With a direct tax which had been voted by the estates, they knew where they stood. On a number of occasions, the king yielded to popular demand and replaced indirect taxes with a direct tax in various provinces, or even in the whole of

16 Ibid., 21,428, fol. 12, and 23,909, fol. 1.
16 Ibid., p.o. vol. 2374, Précigny, doss. 53,271, no. 12.
17 Ibid., vol. 3041, Vousy, doss. 67,419, no. 6; Ibid., MS fr. 32,511, fol. 113 recto; Ibid., MS fr., n.a. 3624, no. 369; Ibid., MS fr., 6200, p. 229; A. N., KK 648, fol. 91, no. 84.
Languedoc, as in April 1426. The estates of Poitou at least three times persuaded the King to make this change. Late in 1423, it voted a direct tax of 30,000 livres tournois in lieu of the indirect aide which had been granted to the King by the Estates General at Selles in August of that year. In 1435 it voted an annual sum of 61,500 livres for four years in lieu of the aides that had been reestablished for a four year period by the Estates General of Languedoc in January of that year. In April or May 1454, the three estates of Poitou met and decided to request the King to replace the aides that had been imposed annually since 1451 by an equivalent direct tax, or taille. They decided to send a delegation to the King but delayed doing so because of a rumor that he was coming soon to Poitiers. When the rumor proved to be false they met again on July 18. On September 11, their delegation set out for Bridoré in Touraine where they presented their request to the King. His reply is not known.

So far we have been concerned specifically with the granting of taxes by the three estates of Poitou to their feudal lord. After the province became part of the royal domain, they also frequently voted an additional amount, over and above the royal tax, to be used for local expenses and to cover payments to royal commissioners, royal officials, and various other dignitaries. This sum was usually referred to in the documents as “frais outre le principal”, or simply “frais”.

From the beginning of the reign of Charles VII until the year 1435 the three estates of Poitou normally voted this additional sum at the same meeting at which they granted the main tax. For example, at an assembly late in 1423 at which they voted 30,000 livres tournois to the King in lieu of indirect aides they also voted an additional sum of 3,700 livres tournois “oultre le principal”. From this sum the estates

19 B. N., p. o. vol. 47, Amboise, no. 59; vol. 247, Beaumont, doss. 5423, no. 2; vol. 1612. Labbé, doss. 37,421, no. 3; vol. 2855, Torsay, doss. 63,456, no. 11; vol. 201, La Barre, no. 9; A. H. P., XX, 307-8; H. Imbert, Histoire de Thouars (Niort, 1871) p. 153; Régistres de Poitiers, reg. 2, fol. 51, Nov. 30, 1423.
21 Régistres de Poitiers, reg. 4, fol. 41; A. C. Poitiers, M, reg. 11, fol. 34 verso.
22 Ibid., J 1206, J 1207, and J 1211. Also MSS de la Bibliothèque de Poitiers, 385 (36), pp. 584-86.
23 Ibid.
24 B. N., p. o., vol. 47, Amboise, no. 59; vol. 247, Beaumont, doss. 5,423, no. 2; vol. 1612. Labbé, doss. 37,421, no. 3; vol. 2855, Torsay, doss. 63,456, no. 11; vol. 201. La Barre, no. 9;
stipulated that the two royal commissioners would receive specified amounts. They also decreed that a number of other dignitaries would receive amounts ranging from 100 to 500 livres to reimburse them in part for their expenses at the assembly. On November 1, 1424, the three estates of Poitou voted the substantial additional sum of 16,000 livres tournois over and above the 50,000 livres that they had granted as the province’s share of a tax recently granted the King by the Estates General.25 Out of this additional sum various amounts were to be paid to a number of dignitaries. In October or November 1425,26 and again in September 1430,27 when voting a royal tax, the estates of Poitou also voted additional frais. From these sums grants were made to a number of persons, most of them royal officials.

Several of these grants are of interest. In September 1430, Geoffrey, lord of Mareuil, counsellor and royal Chamberlain, seneschal of Poitou, was to receive 800 livres to compensate him in part for his expenses in maintaining a bastide before his castle of Mareuil, which was occupied at the time by the English. This shows that these grants were not necessarily limited to covering the expenses of royal officials and notables incurred in attending the meetings of the estates. In August or September 1434, the three estates of Poitou granted the seneschal of the province, Jean de la Roche, 4,000 livres tournois to besiege a certain fortress and to stop pillaging.28 Of this sum, 2,000 livres was to be imposed over and above the principal of a tax granted at a joint assembly in August of the provincial estates of Poitou, Saintonge, Anjou, and Touraine. The remaining 2,000 livres was to be paid from the next tax to be levied by the King in Poitou. De la Roche and his men were to cease imposing various charges on the province and return everything that they had seized. They were also to drive out various Scottish bands, as well as the men of a certain local noble,


Symmonet de la Touche. The King gave his approval to this arrangement. On November 4, 1434, de la Roche acknowledged receipt of the first 2,000 livres of this sum. During the first half of 1435, when voting a direct tax of 61,500 livres tournois per year in lieu of aides, the estates of Poitou also voted an extra sum of 1,125 livres. Part of this amount was to be used for the usual grants to the royal commissioners and other notables. The other part was to cover payments to the bishop of Poitiers, the lord of Gaucourt, Le Galois du Puy du Fou, and Jean Chastenier for their expenses incurred in a trip to impose a tax and borrow money to be used to clear various armed bands out of Poitou.

Between the spring of 1436 and the spring of 1445, only one assembly of the three estates of Poitou can be discovered. They were no longer asked to consent to the royal tax, and they seem temporarily to have ceased voting the frais as well. In March 1438, for example, the king imposed a tax of 52,000 livres on Poitou as their share of a general taille to be levied in Languedoc. He also stipulated that various additional sums were to be paid, including 2,875 livres for the queen's expenses and for payments to royal councillors, and 2,915 livres for “frais”. There is nothing to indicate that the consent of the estates of Poitou was sought. A letter from Charles VII, dated March 2, 1442, to the élus in Poitou instructed them to impose the sum of 1,650 livres tournois “over and above the principal of the next aide which is levied in our said pays of Poitou”. This sum was to be paid to Charles of Anjou to help him meet his expenses in the royal service. As the king specified the amount of the frais even before the amount of the tax itself had been decided upon, it seems unlikely that the consent of the three estates of the province was sought. Thomas found that, in the provinces he studied, the king restricted the right of the provincial estates to vote frais after about 1440, and that henceforth royal letters patent were required. In Poitou the royal policy seems to have been similar.

In March 1445, the three estates of Poitou entered upon a nine-year period of renewed activity. They do not seem to have consented to royal taxes during this period, but they did once again vote frais.

30 B. N., MS fr., 21,428 fol. 12, and 23,909, fol. 1.
31 A. N.,K 67, no. 10.
32 Thomas, Les Etats provinciaux, p. 106.
33 In 1445 the king imposed a new tax known as the taille des gens de guerre in addition to the regular taille. Both taxes were then levied annually until 1451, when the
The account of Jean de Xaincoins, receiver general of all finances for Languedois and Languedoc, for the year ending September 1446 contains a number of references to specific sums voted by the three estates of Poitou to various dignitaries, including the dauphin and Pierre de Brézé, a well-known royal advisor who was seneschal of Poitou at the time. In January 1447 the King imposed a taille of 200,000 livres on Languedoc. Although Poitou’s share of this tax was fixed arbitrarily by royal officials, the three estates of the province did vote an additional sum for grants to various notables, including the bishop of Poitiers and Pierre de Brézé.

In late 1446, or early 1447 the King agreed to free the province from a royal investigation of crimes and abuses committed by local officials. He issued letters of pardon in which he mentioned some of the crimes which were to have been investigated. One of them is of special interest. He said that sometimes certain officials had collected sums of money along with the tailles, without having express authorization to do so, and without notifying the King. They had thus raised large sums, “calling them frais or otherwise”. That the King considered this an offense showed that he was indeed attempting to clamp down upon the practice of the voting of frais by provincial estates. The three estates of Poitou continued to vote small special sums to pay royal officials, but it is likely that, henceforth, specific royal authorization was required. The account of the receiver general of Languedois and Languedoc for the year ending September 1448 shows two grants by the estates of Poitou to royal officials, one of them to Pierre de Brézé. Probably special royal consent was necessary for these grants, although the document makes no mention of it.

From July 1454 to the death of Charles VII in 1461 there is nothing to have voted the frais. Whether or not it voted frais at any of the regular taille was dropped. In some provinces the three estates voted the taille des gens de guerre. This leads one to wonder if the renewed activity of the estates of Poitou in 1445 was due to their being summoned to consent to this tax. While the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely, it must be considered improbable in view of the complete absence of references to such activity on the part of the estates of Poitou in any documents royal or local, including the detailed and valuable Régistres de Poitiers.

34 B. N., MS fr., 32,511, fols. 100-102; Gustave Dupont-Ferrier., Gallia Regia (Paris, 1942-54), IV, 469.
35 B. N., p. o., vol. 3,041, Vousy, doss. 67,419, no. 6; Ibid., MS fr. 32,511, fols. 115 r° and 115 v°; Ibid., 6,200, p. 229; A. N., KK 648, fol. 91, no. 84.
36 La Boutetière, "Rôle des tailles en Poitou", M. S. A. O., II, 502; B. N., MS fr. 20,887, fol. 1; A. H. P., XXXIX, 413-18; Ibid., XXXXI, 117-81.
37 B. N., MS fr. 32,511, fol. 124 r° and v°.
to indicate that the estates of Poitou met at all. Royal taxes were imposed arbitrarily, and the estates of the province does not seem even five assemblies held between August 1461 and August 1466 cannot be ascertained. Three brief references in the annual accounts of the receiver general for Languedoc show, however, that it did so between 1466 and 1470. In fact these three references are all that indicate the continued existence of the estates of Poitou during the four year period. The receiver general’s accounts for the years ending September 30, 1467 and September 30, 1468 show 600 livres tournois granted in each of these years to Louis de Crussol, seneschal of Poitou, by the “inhabitants” of that province. In both cases it is stated that this was with the consent of the King. The receiver general’s account for the year ending September 30, 1470 shows a further 600 livres granted to Louis de Crussol by the “Estats de Poitou”.

Apparently in the late 1460’s the three estates of Poitou still retained the right to vote these small additional sums over and above the royal taxes, even though long ago they had lost the privilege of voting the taxes themselves. Also, instead of voting these frais freely, as they had in the 1420's and 1430's they now required special royal permission. After 1470 the royal accounts make no further mention of any grants to royal officials by the estates of Poitou, leading one to believe that Louis XI finally deprived it of even this minor privilege.

Closely related to the frais were a number of special taxes voted from time to time by the estates of Poitou for specific purposes. In fact the only real difference between these grants and frais is the procedural technicality that the latter were always granted at the same time as a direct royal tax, while these special taxes were voted separately at a meeting summoned for that purpose alone.

For example, during the first half of the fifteenth century the estates of Poitou several times granted sums to military commanders for specific campaigns. In August 1404, it probably voted a fouage to constable Albret for the siege of Courbey. In March 1406, it granted a fouage to de Torsay, de Harpedenne, and other French commanders to retake Brantôme, Carlux, and Limeuil. In 1409, according to

38 Ibid., fols. 277 v° and 283 r°
39 Ibid., fol. 318 r°
40 Thomas found that in Auvergne, even after the provincial estates had lost the right to vote royal taxes, they did sometimes, with special royal consent, vote small additional sums for local use. Thomas, Les Etats provinciaux, pp. 170-71.
42 Ibid. Also Archives de la Dordogne, fonds Audierne, series E, ville de Périgueux, March 14, 1406.
one historian, it v0t3d a favour to constable Albret for a campaign in Périgord.\textsuperscript{43} In 1433, the estates of Poitou and Saintonge meeting jointly voted Jean de la Roche, seneschal of Poitou, 4,000 livres to besiege Aubeterre, which was held by the English.\textsuperscript{44} By August 1434, however, de la Roche had not received the amount promised. Hence the estates of Poitou agreed that he should receive 1,000 livres tournois from the principal of a tax just voted at a joint assembly of the estates of several provinces in Tours, plus another 2,000 livres to be imposed over and above this principal.\textsuperscript{45} Presumably the other 1,000 livres would come from Saintonge. De la Roche acknowledged receipt of 2,000 livres of this sum on November 4, 1434.\textsuperscript{46}

In the spring of 1436 the three estates of Poitou met and voted a tax to raise money for a special gift. Royal letters of April 27, 1436, state that the King had heard that “certain prelates, clergymen, nobles, bourgeois, and inhabitants of certain of the good towns of Poitou” had decided to present the dauphin with various silver dishes on the day of his marriage to Margaret of Scotland.\textsuperscript{47} To pay for this, they had voted a tax of 2,300 livres to be imposed in Poitou over and above their portion of the taille granted by the Estates of Languedoc in February. In order to be sure to have the money quickly enough, they wanted to borrow it from certain wealthy citizens, who would be repaid when the tax had been collected. The King agreed, and instructed the duc to collect the money in the manner requested. The receiver, Jean Gilier, acknowledged receipt of this 2,300 livres on June 20, 1436.\textsuperscript{48}

Another special grant of considerable interest was made by the estates of Poitou in late 1446 or early 1447. In 1446, Charles VII sent the treasurer of France, Jean Bureau, as a commissioner to Poitou to investigate “crimes and excesses” committed by various inhabitants of the province in such matters as the administration of justice and the control of finance.\textsuperscript{49} The three estates of Poitou offered the King 18,000 livres tournois to be freed from this investigation. The King agreed, and by letters patent of May 24, 1447, named three royal

\textsuperscript{43} La Martinière, “Les Guerres anglaises”, Position de thèse, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{44} B. N., Collection Clairambault, 194, fol. 7691.
\textsuperscript{45} B. N., p.o. vol. 3041, Vousy, doss. 67,419, no. 3; A. N., K 63, no. 36; B. N., MS fr. 20,886, fol. 114; La Boutetière, “Rôle des tailles en Poitou”, M. S. A. O., II, 499; B. N., Collection Clairambault, 194, fol. 7691.
\textsuperscript{46} B N., Collection Clairambault, 194, fol. 7691.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p.o. vol. 1324, Gilier, doss. 29,964, no. 22; A. N., K 64, n. 11.
\textsuperscript{48} B. N., p.o. vol. 1324, Gilier, doss. 29,964, no. 22.
\textsuperscript{49} La Boutetière, “Rôle des tailles en Poitou”, M. S. A. O., II, 502.
commissioners to raise this tax.\textsuperscript{50} They named a receiver, and his accounts show that he collected 21,649 \textit{livres}.\textsuperscript{51} The King then granted general letters of pardon, dated March 1447, to any inhabitants of Poitou for any of the carefully enumerated crimes or offenses, in return for this grant.\textsuperscript{52}

It is perhaps of interest to examine now briefly several procedural questions in connection with the financial activities of the estates of Poitou. First there is the matter of the apportionment and collection of the taxes it had voted. There the estates seems to have played no part whatsoever. These matters were entirely in the hands of ducal or royal officials. The procedure by which a tax of 10,000 \textit{écus} (about 12,500 \textit{livres tournois}) was apportioned in September and October 1412 is interesting as information of this type is rare for Poitou in the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{53} The tax had been granted to John, duke of Berry, by the three estates of the province on September 29 to meet a threatened English invasion. The duke named a receiver, Maurice Claveurier, and four commissioners. The commissioners divided the sum to be collected among four financial districts, Poitiers, Niort, Thouars, and Fontenay-le-Comte.\textsuperscript{54} Then in each of these districts local commissioners, under the supervision of the four general commissioners, apportioned the districts' share amongst the towns, \textit{châteenies}, and finally the parishes. Each parish was assessed according to a previously fixed number of hearths (\textit{feux}). The tax was to be paid by all inhabitants of Poitou except nobles, clergy, and beggars. The money was collected in each of the four main towns by a lieutenant of the receiver closely supervised by the local commissioners and by the four general commissioners. In Poitiers, Claveurier collected personally. The other lieutenants then went to Poitiers and rendered their accounts to Claveurier, who in turn rendered a general account for the entire tax to the ducal \textit{Chambre des Comptes}. Several nobles resisted the collection of the tax in their lands from their peasants as this would obviously reduce their own potential revenues. Only one, the lord of

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{51} B. N., MS fr. 20,887, fol. 1; \textit{A. H. P.}, XXXI, 117-81.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, XIX, 413-18.

\textsuperscript{53} Lacour, "Une incursion anglaise", \textit{A. H. P.}, XLVIII, 1-87. The historian of the field, constantly frustrated by the fragmentary nature of the documents available, cannot help but envy Lacour his good fortune in discovering this detailed description in B. N., MS fr. 6747 fol. 2 r°.

\textsuperscript{54} It was apportioned as follows: Poitiers, 2,384 \textit{écus}, Niort, 2,996 \textit{écus}, Thouars, 1,789 \textit{écus}, Fontenay-le-Comte, 3,268 \textit{écus}.
Montaigne, had any success, managing to keep 130 écus of the 175 écus for which his lands had been assessed. He still had not given it up when Claveurier submitted his accounts. All told, 10,272 écus was collected. From this amount, Claveurier deducted 200 écus to pay the commissioners and himself. The duke of Berry used most of the remainder to raise troops and to negotiate with the English. The estates of Poitou had nothing to do with any of this process of apportionment and collection.

In November 1424, the procedure for the collection of a tax of 50,000 livres tournois in Poitou was similar to that described above. This tax had been voted on November 1, by the three estates of Poitou as the province's share of one million livres granted to the king by the Estates General of Languedoc. Once again, four royal commissioners were appointed.53 The tax was apportioned between the same four financial districts as in 1412, and in general the entire procedure was the same. Once again the estates of Poitou played no part in the apportionment or collection.

On one or two occasions, however, the three estates of Poitou seem to have requested a special procedure for the collection of a tax. This was the limit of their participation, and, even if the king agreed to their request, royal officials handled the entire process. For example, as mentioned already, in the spring of 1436, when they voted 2,300 livres to buy a wedding gift for the dauphin, the three estates of Poitou proposed that the money be borrowed from various wealthy citizens who were to be paid when the tax was collected. The purpose was to make sure that they had the money in time. The king agreed, but royal officials handled the entire collection of this sum without any participation by the estates. It is possible that the estates of Poitou also recommended a special method of collection at one of their earliest meetings in 1383. Some years later, in a legal case before the Parliament of Paris, the viscount of Rochechouart claimed that the estates of Poitou, when voting a fouage at this assembly, had declared that each seigneur should keep one third of the amount collected in his lands.54

When voting regular taxes to its feudal lord, king or otherwise, the estates of Poitou seems to have had nothing to say about the use to which the money was put. This, of course, did not apply to special grants, such as the money for the wedding gift to the dauphin in 1436.

54 A. N., X1e 46 B, no. 207.
or the money voted to the king in late 1446 or early 1447 to free the province from a royal investigation of various crimes and misdoings.

The estates of Poitou does not appear to have played any part in the choosing of a receiver or commissioners charged with raising a tax. In September and October 1412, the duke of Berry appointed the receiver and four commissioners, and all of them were ducal officials. The receiver, Maurice Claveurier, was the duke's secretary. The commissioners, Guillaume Taveau, Anceaume le Corgne, Guillaume de Lérberie, and Jean Macé, were all ducal councillors. Taveau was at the same time his Chamberlain and Macé was his receiver of ordinary revenues (such as regular feudal dues) in Poitou.

The payment of the receiver and commissioners who collected taxes does not appear to have been a function of the estates of Poitou while the province was part of the apanage of John, duke of Berry. In November 1390, the commissioners were paid by the receiver out of the main sum voted the count of Montpensier (son of the duke of Berry) by the estates of Poitou. Following the grant of 10,000 écus to the duke of Berry on September 29, 1412, the receiver and four commissioners were paid from the main sum of the tax, without any extra money being voted for this purpose by the estates. The receiver, Maurice Claveurier, paid himself 100 écus, and paid the four commissioners 25 écus each.

During the reign of Charles VII, however, the voting of money for payments to the royal commissioners and other dignitaries seems to have become a frequent function of the three estates of Poitou. It is possible that such payments were in addition to salaries granted them by the king. As seen already, the estates developed the practice of voting additional sums over and above the principal of the royal tax for just such purposes as this. For example, in December 1423, in addition to a taille granted in lieu of indirect taxes, it voted a sum of 3,700 livres for frais. From this additional sum, it specified that two of the commissioners, Jean de Torsay, grand master of crossbowmen, and Nicolas de la Barre, royal councillor and maître des requêtes of the king's household, would receive 500 livres and 100 livres respectively.

How long the estates of Poitou continued to vote money to pay the royal commissioners cannot be established precisely. In all probability,

57 Lacour, "Une incursion anglaise", A. H. P., XLVIII, 1-87.
58 Fillon, ed., Documents pour servir à l'histoire du Bas-Poitou, I.
60 B. N., p.o. vol. 2855, Torsay, doss. 65,456, no. 11; Ibid., vol. 201, La Barre, no. 9.
it continued to do so until about 1435, when it ceased to vote royal taxes. After this the commissioners seem to have been entirely replaced by the élus in the collection of taxes in Poitou.

The role of the élus and the relationship between their appearance in a province and the activity of the local estates are matters that merit special examination. As already explained, the arbitrary division of France into pays d'états and pays d'élection is not valid until at least the late fifteenth century. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries nearly every province in France had active estates. This did not necessarily mean that they were free from the activity of the royal élus. Many provinces were what Dupont-Ferrier calls “pays d'états à élections”, and the appearance of royal élus in a province did not necessarily bring about the immediate disappearance of the estates. It is only in the latter part of the reign of Charles VII, when the estates of many provinces lost the right to vote taxes, that the élus in these areas took over completely the functions with regard to taxation previously exercised chiefly by the estates and temporarily appointed commissioners.

The earliest mention of élus in Poitou that Dupont-Ferrier could find was on November 20, 1403. They were also mentioned on March 28, 1408 and July 24, 1409. Dupont-Ferrier believes, however, that Poitou was not formally established as an élection until about 1412. He cites a document of December 16, 1412 which refers to the “clergy of the élection of Poitiers”. On March 25, 1416 Maître Jean Merichon, royal secretary, was appointed as an élu in Poitou. He was accompanied by the previously appointed élus of that province to their office and seated at their side. A letter of April 10 of the same year from the élus of Poitou has survived. There seems to be no further mention of them until October 23, 1430. After this latter date references to them become more numerous. An interesting document of May 25, 1433

63 Ibid.
64 G. Dupont-Ferrier, Études sur les institutions financières de la France à la fin du moyen âge (Paris, 1930-32), I, 73, note 1, hereafter cited as Dupont-Ferrier, Études sur les institutions financières.
65 Ibid., II, note 699.
66 B. N., MS fr. 20,594, no. 25.
definitely indicates that there has been élus in Poitou for some time.\(^{67}\)

The royal advocate declared that:

in Poitou it was originally ordained that there be two élus; later, there was a third. Thus, there were always three, and this was sufficient. Now Maître Jean Colas claims to be the fourth élus.

After 1430 the role of the élus in Poitou is fairly clear. Before 1430, however, their activity remains shrouded in uncertainty. In fact not a single document discovered by the present writer that refers to taxes in Poitou before this date made any mention of the élus. Generally the three estates voted the tax and specially appointed royal commissioners apportioned and collected it.

Perhaps the role of the élus from their appearance in the province in about 1403 until 1416 may be explained very simply. During this period Poitou formed part of the apanage of John, duke of Berry. Each tax voted by the estates of Poitou during these years was granted to the duke, and he appointed his own commissioners to collect it. The élus, being royal officials, obviously had nothing to do with this. The king, however, also levied royal taxes in the area for the conduct of the war. Charles VI imposed such taxes arbitrarily without consulting either the Estates General or local estates. Undoubtedly, the élus looked after the collection of these royal taxes.

There is another possible reason why references to the élus in Poitou are infrequent during the period 1403-1416.\(^{68}\) From 1401 to 1409, and again in 1413, 1414, and 1415, the king allowed the duke of Berry to collect and keep all royal taxes in Poitou.\(^{69}\) In 1400 it is known that the duke’s own treasurer-general collected the royal tax in addition to the ducal taxes.\(^{70}\) It is likely that this same practice was followed in other years in which the duke of Berry was allowed to keep all royal taxes. Hence, in such years, the royal élus would be rather inactive, perhaps only dealing with legal cases involving royal taxes from previous years. For example, the document which refers to them on July 24, 1409 speaks of the “appelant des esleuz de Poitou”, indicating that in this case their function was judicial.\(^{71}\)

Between 1416 and 1430 there seems to be no mention at all of the

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\(^{68}\) Of course the scarcity of documents from the period is another factor to be considered.


élus in Poitou. In fact, it is interesting to note that in a detailed work on the élections of France, in which he cites dozens of examples for each élection, Dupont-Ferrier gives very few examples of élus or élections during the 1420's for the part of France under French rule. Usually his examples skip from about 1418 to the 1430's. How can this gap be explained? In 1418, the Dauphin Charles was forced to flee from Paris. He abolished the aides in the hope of winning the support of the regions south of the Loire. For the next eighteen years he seems to have sought the consent of the Estates General or local estates for every tax that he imposed. With taxes on such a temporary, year-to-year basis, it is possible that he allowed the system of élections and élus to lapse for ten or twelve years and used specially appointed commissioners to apportion and collect the temporary taxes granted by the estates. This is the system that seems to have been followed in Poitou during the 1420's. Then, after having reestablished the precedent of annual royal taxes, Charles VII may have reinstated the old machinery of élus and élections about 1430, even although he continued to seek the consent of the estates for each tax for a few more years.

Certainly in Poitou the activity of the élus increased greatly after 1430. For a few years they seem to have shared with temporarily appointed royal commissioners the responsibility of apportioning and collecting taxes. However, the consent of the three estates of Poitou to royal taxes was still sought for another five or six years. For example, royal letters of October 23, 1430 were addressed to the "élus sur le fait des aides" in Poitou instructing them to impose a tax of 40,000 livres tournois plus 4,500 livres for frais. They state, however, that both principal and frais had been granted by the three estates of Poitou. Also, royal letters of November 17, 1430 addressed to the élus and authorizing payment of 800 livres to the lord of Mareuil, to be paid from the same frais, reiterate that this sum had been granted by the three estates. The increasing activity of the élus in Poitou is again indicated by royal letters of May 2, 1433 instructing them to impose a tax of 68,000 livres tournois as that province's share of an aide granted the king by the Estates General. This time no mention is made of the estates of Poitou.

72 Ibid., LXV and LXVI.
73 Thomas, Les États provinciaux, p. 69.
74 B. N., MS fr. 20,594, no. 25.
75 Ibid., p.o. vol. 1849, Mareuil, doss. 42,690, no. 31.
76 A. N., K 63, no. 25. No other information is available about this alleged assembly of the Estates General.
In August or September 1434 the estates of Poitou, the élus, and the royal commissioners all participated in the levying of a tax. In August a joint assembly of the estates of Poitou, Saintonge, Anjou, and Touraine voted a subsidy to the king. Royal letters of September 2 were addressed to both the élus and to the commissioners instructing them to impose in Poitou that province's share of the tax.\(^{77}\) Similarly, royal letters of September 7 were addressed to the

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\text{esleuz sur le fait des aides and to the commissioners entrusted with imposing in our pays of Poitou the aide that was granted to us at the assembly of the three estates held in this our town of Tours last August.}^{78}\]

The roll of tailles for Poitou, dated September 30, 1434, refers to this tax voted by the joint assembly of estates and declares that it was to be levied in Poitou by Maurice Claveurier, Simon Mourrault, Henri Blandin, and other "élus sur le fait desd. aides".\(^{79}\)

In 1435 the élus, royal commissioners, and the estates of Poitou all participated in the levying of a tax. On July 8 the four royal commissioners wrote to the élus sur le fait des aides in Poitou.\(^{80}\) By virtue of the powers granted them by royal letters of June 15, they ordered the élus to collect a tax of 61,500 livres tournois, which the estates of Poitou had granted the king for four years in lieu of indirect aides. They were instructed how and when to collect the tax. They were to turn over the amount collected to a receiver appointed by the king. In this case, then, the procedure is clear. The royal commissioners summoned the estates, the estates voted the tax, the commissioners then instructed the élus to collect it, specifying the procedure to be followed, the élus collected it and turned it over to a royal receiver.

This is the last time that the three estates of Poitou seem to have voted the royal tax, and this is the last occasion for many years on which the royal commissioners are mentioned in connection with the collection of a tax in Poitou. Henceforth the élus seem to have taken over completely the functions previously exercised chiefly by the estates and the commissioners. In January 1436 the élus were instructed to impose a tax of 9,000 livres tournois in the province, plus an additional 2,000 livres for frais.\(^{81}\) In the same year, on some date prior to April 27,
the élus were ordered to impose a sum of 2,300 livres tournois over and above Poitou's share of a tax granted the king in February by the Estates General of Languedoc. This extra amount had been voted by the estates of Poitou to buy a wedding present for the dauphin, but there is nothing to indicate that the three estates of Poitou had been called upon to consent to the provinces' share of the main tax. In March 1438, the élus were ordered to raise Poitou's share of a tax which had been imposed on Languedoc by the king without the consent of the Estates General. In March 1442, the élus were instructed to impose a sum of 1,650 livres tournois over and above the principal of the next tax to be imposed on Poitou. This extra sum was to pay for a royal grant to Charles of Anjou. It does not appear that the consent of the estates of Poitou was sought on any of the above occasions. In short, all evidence seems to prove that, after about 1436, the élus handled the entire process of raising and collecting taxes in Poitou without the participation of the estates or of royal commissioners.

From the above, it is clear that Thomas's assertion that the appearance of élus in a province indicates the decline and decadence of the provincial estates cannot be accepted as a valid generalization without some qualifications. It is probably true for regions where élus appeared for the first time under Charles VII, as in the provinces which Thomas was studying. In areas like Poitou, however, where they were introduced earlier, the story was somewhat different. During the reign of Charles VI and the early part of the reign of Charles VII the presence of royal élus in Poitou did not seem to restrict noticeably the activities of the provincial estates. From about 1418 to about 1430 the role of the élus appears to have been greatly restricted, not only in Poitou but in all the regions under French control. In fact, in Poitou they seem to have become virtually inactive. Once their activity was renewed (around 1430 in the case of Poitou), then indeed the local estates were destined to lose in a very few years the right to vote royal taxes. For about five years, in Poitou, the élus shared with the three estates and the royal commissioners in the levying of taxes. Then, about 1435, they took over completely the functions formerly exercised chiefly by these two latter groups.

One important point remains to be discussed concerning the financial

82 A. N., K 64, no. 11.
83 B. N., MSS fr. 21,428, fol. 12, and 23,909, fol. 1.
84 A. N. K 67, no. 10.
activities of the three estates of Poitou. This is the fundamental question of why they ceased to consent to royal taxes in about 1435. There are two aspects of this question. In the first place, why did the king cease to summon them to vote taxes? In the second place, why did the people accept this policy without any apparent protest?

The first part of the question appears to be the simpler of the two to answer. When the king began to impose taxes arbitrarily without summoning the Estates General or the provincial estates, he was merely following a policy of extending royal authority that had been going on, with some interruptions, for more than two and a half centuries. As far back as the reign of Philip Augustus, royal advisors and officials had been consistently working to increase the power of the monarch. During the years following the disaster of Agincourt, when half of the country was in the hands of the English, the royal government was in no position to continue this policy. During the 1430’s and 1440’s, however, when the tide of battle turned steadily in favor of the French, the position of the King of France became steadily stronger. In 1435 the decisive alliance with Burgundy was concluded, and in 1436 Paris was recaptured. Charles VII and his capable advisors then turned to the traditional policy of extending the authority of the royal government.86 One aspect of this policy was the imposing of taxes in many parts of France without the consent of the Estates General or of the provincial estates.

It is interesting to note that the three estates of Poitou ceased to vote royal taxes at approximately the same time as the Estates General lost this right. This is about fifteen or sixteen years earlier than the estates of Auvergne, Limousin, and La Marche ceased to consent to taxes. Perhaps the reason for this is that Poitou was one of the strongest centers of royal power throughout the entire reign of Charles VII. It is possible that the king felt strong enough to dispense with the consent of the local estates to taxation in Poitou earlier than in Auvergne, Limousin, and La Marche where his authority was slightly less secure.

The question of why the people of France accepted with little or no protest the royal policy of imposing taxes without the consent of the

86 The nature of this extension of royal authority should not be misunderstood. It is merely relative to the weak position to which the French monarchy had sunk between 1415 and 1429, and we are still far from the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. In fact, the French monarchy during the last half of the fifteenth century might be described as popular and consultative in nature rather than absolute. Nevertheless, many of the seeds of royal absolutism were being sowed.
estates is somewhat more difficult to answer. A number of factors probably contributed to this acceptance.

In the first place, it should be remembered that by the reign of Charles VII both the clergy and the nobles were exempt from regular royal taxes.\(^{87}\) Hence, numbers of the first two estates saw no special advantage in the provincial estates being called upon to consent to taxation. In fact they were probably relieved when they were freed from the expense and trouble of attending frequent assemblies for this purpose. As far as the third estate is concerned, only the larger towns were represented at assemblies of estates during the reign of Charles VII. The peasants and inhabitants of lesser towns had never been represented in these assemblies, and were in no way affected when the estates ceased to vote taxes. Hence, the only people who might have any cause for complaint were the inhabitants of the principal towns, and it is possible that many of them felt that they might be able to gain better terms by negotiating directly with the king.

In Poitou, not more than seven or eight towns were represented at assemblies of the provincial estates during the reign of Charles VII. Of these, the town of Poitiers played the dominant role and hence was the most affected when the king ceased to summon the three estates of the province to consent to taxation. Let us examine briefly taxes imposed on Poitiers from about 1435 down through the reign of Louis XII to see if the town suffered greatly from this change in royal policy.

During the last twenty-six years of the reign of Charles VII, Poitiers seems to have paid its share of the taxes imposed on Poitou without any negotiation. The town's portion was fixed by the royal élus. Two examples from other parts of the province show that it was possible to secure tax reductions by direct negotiation with the king, however. On

\(^{87}\) The question of special taxes imposed upon the clergy cannot be discussed in detail in this paper. Such taxes, or décimes, were levied occasionally by the king ever since the twelfth century. Until the mid sixteenth century special papal approval was usually sought. When these décimes became regular after 1561 they were consented to by regular assemblies of the clergy of France. Assemblies were then held by the clergy of each diocese to consent to their share and apportion it. See R. Doucet, *Les Institutions de la France au XVIe siècle*, (Paris, 1948), II, 854. Numerous examples of such assemblies in the three dioceses comprising Poitou could be cited during the years following 1561. See Archives de la Vienne, G 398-405, and Collection de Dom Fonteneau, XIV, 739. Hence, in the case of these special taxes imposed upon the clergy, the principle of consent to taxation was preserved.
November 21, 1440, the town of Saint-Maixent was granted a reduction in its share of the taille.\textsuperscript{88} On March 16, 1459, the inhabitants of Lower Poitou were granted an exemption from taxes.\textsuperscript{89}

During the reign of Louis XI, Poitiers seems to have fared better by direct negotiation with the king than it might have expected to through the medium of the estates. In fact it obtained complete exemption from all regular tailles, which were imposed elsewhere in Poitou annually and without consent.\textsuperscript{90} The town was subject to quite a few special taxes, however, and in such cases, its consent does not seem to have been sought. For example, in 1469 the town was taxed 5,000 livres to pay for the expense of transferring the Parlement from Bordeaux to Poitiers.\textsuperscript{91} In 1472 it was taxed 2,000 livres for the maintenance of the army.\textsuperscript{92} When Louis XI demanded a special tax of 4,000 livres in 1473, the town attempted to negotiate, but was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{93} It protested that it was impoverished, sent 2,000 livres, and begged to be excused from the remainder. The king's heart was in no way melted by this plea, and the town was ordered to pay a further 1,000 livres within three days. In September 1475 Louis XI ordered a tax of 2,000 livres to be imposed on all inhabitants of Poitiers, exempt or non-exempt.\textsuperscript{94} It was stated that this was for one time only and would not prejudice their privileges and exemptions. The town did escape several other taxes imposed by Louis XI on Poitou, however. In November 1472 the king imposed a tax of 64,356 livres on Poitou for the payment of one hundred and seventy-three lances.\textsuperscript{95} The town of Poitiers was exempt from this subsidy. In April 1479 Louis XI levied a tax in Poitou for the expenses of the royal artillery.\textsuperscript{96} Once again, Poitiers was not required to contribute.

Charles VIII, on occasion, also imposed special taxes on the town of Poitiers, and there is nothing to indicate that he sought the consent of the inhabitants. For example, in February 1492 he sent two commis-

\textsuperscript{88} Beaucourt, III, 461.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., VI, 378. Beaucourt does not specify exactly what types of taxes were covered by this exemption.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 128.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., pp. 128-29.
\textsuperscript{94} A. C. Poitiers, I, 11.
\textsuperscript{95} Sée, Louis XI et les villes, p. 155, note 3.
sioners to Poitiers to levy a tax of 9,000 *livres tournois* to pay three hundred foot soldiers for six months. An undated letter from Louis XII to the mayor and *échevins* of Poitiers shows that the king still occasionally sought the consent of the town for a particular tax, however. The letter stated that the king had sent commissioners to the town to ask the inhabitants to grant him a tax of 5,000 *livres tournois* to help meet his great expenses for the defense of the kingdom. After having heard their complaints, however, the commissioners had agreed to reduce this sum to 4,000 *livres*. This case proves two interesting facts. In the first place, it shows that the principle of consent to taxation was still alive. In the second place, it shows that the town of Poitiers could still, on occasion, obtain by direct negotiation a reduction in the amount of a tax that the king sought to impose.

There is also another factor that may explain in part why there was no serious protest in Poitou, or elsewhere, when the King of France began to impose taxes without the consent of the estates. As we have seen, Charles VII introduced a new tax in 1445 known as the *taille des gens de guerre*. For the next six years he imposed this in addition to the regular *taille*. By 1451 the war with the English was practically over. Consequently, the king's need for money was greatly diminished. Therefore, Charles VII abolished the regular *taille* and reduced the amount of the *taille des gens de guerre*. This substantial reduction in taxes undoubtedly made those groups of the French people whom this affected more willing to accept taxation without the consent of the estates.

Let us sum up briefly the extent to which the above factors explain the apparent lack of protest in Poitou when the king ceased to summon the three estates of the province to vote taxes. As we have seen, the only people who were affected were the inhabitants of seven or eight principal towns, and especially those of Poitiers. Between 1435 and 1451 it is very likely that there was some discontent over the new royal policy. It may have been softened somewhat by patriotic enthusiasm for the war effort and by a growing respect for the monarchy. The substantial tax reduction in 1451 almost certainly made this policy more acceptable. Then, during the reign of Louis XI, when taxes in France were very high, the town of Poitiers actually fared better by direct negotiation with the king than it could have expected to through the medium of the estates. During the reign of Louis XII, Poitiers

97 A. C. Poitiers, I. 12bis.
98 B. N., MS fr. 5501, fol. 82.
was called upon, on at least one occasion, to consent to a royal tax, and was actually able to secure a reduction in the amount demanded. Hence, it is apparent that those in Poitou who were the most directly affected when the king began to impose taxes without the consent of the three estates did not suffer appreciably by the change in policy. Perhaps, then, the lack of protest when the estates of Poitou was no longer summoned to vote taxes is not as surprising as it might appear.\footnote{It should be noted, however, that the demand of the Estates General of 1484 that they be summoned to consent to all taxes shows that the royal policy of imposing taxes arbitrarily was by no means accepted with universal enthusiasm.}

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William Flete's
"De Remediis contra Temptaciones" in its Latin and English Recensions: The Growth of a Text

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It is now adequately established that De Remediis contra Temptaciones was composed before its author, the Englishman William Flete O.S.A., left his native land on 17 July 1359 for a voluntary exile in Tuscany from which he was never to return.1 Though the work survives in its several forms, Latin and English, in numerous manuscripts, they are practically all of English provenance and conserved in the libraries of Great Britain; and the few which are now elsewhere in Europe can be shown to have been either exported from England, like those copied for Charles, duke of Orleans, during his imprisonment, or taken from exemplars demonstrably originating in England, like that now in Cologne.2 If Flete did take a copy with him to Italy, it would seem never to have been circulated there, by him or anyone else; and the resemblances which have been observed between some of its doctrine and that of Flete's own few later writings and of his spiritual daughter, St. Catherine of Siena, can be explained as ideas, traditional in the teaching of the Church, which constantly dominated his thought.

There is no doubt that Flete wrote his treatise in Latin. None of the English versions has any claim to be regarded as the original; and even though some of these versions gained a wide currency and some popularity amongst amateurs of vernacular spiritual and devotional writing, De Remediis in its earliest and purest form, stripped of its later accretions


bears none of the marks of a text intended for the audience which Richard Rolle and his school had prepared for the works of Flete's contemporaries, Hilton, the author of _The Cloud of Unknowing_ and Julian. Of them all, the Augustinian canon Walter Hilton has most in common with Flete. They are both university men, with a command of the classical writers upon ascetics and spirituality far greater than that of any mere enthusiast; and they both display knowledge and interests and, it may be, experience wider than that of _The Cloud_. But none the less, Hilton too is a man very different from Flete, who shows no ambition for that fame which came to him in later life. _De Remediis contra Tentacaciones_ is a simple work of instruction, as practical as it is learned, to be read by anyone suffering the afflictions for which it offers alleviation, whether he aspire or not to a contemplative life; and of all mediaeval English writings it has most in common with _The Chastising of God's Children_, which may well have been written, some decades afterwards, under its influence.³ This affinity seems to have been perceived by some of the later editors of _De Remediis_, who tried, by their interpolations of passages of affective or devotional prose, to transform it into another such tract as _The Chastising_, something quite foreign from Flete's intention.

What that intention was we can see from the ten Latin manuscripts, elsewhere designated as the "A" group,⁴ from a collation of which Flete's own work can be reconstructed. A i, MS Cambridge University Library II.vi.30, is closest to the archetype. It is the only manuscript which has preserved Flete's name, and although the text contains numerous errors of a mechanical kind, it is the only one which is free from interpolation. For the purpose of this study it has been collated with the best representatives of the other exemplars of the manuscript tradition of the "A"-text: St John's College Oxford, 77 (A ii), Cambridge Univ. Library Ff. vi. 44 (A iii), and Oxford Bodley 43 (A iv).

The first chapter sets out Flete's premises for his examination of the nature and function of temptation.⁵ St. Paul says that without faith we cannot please God; so the devil, His enemy and ours, attacks faith 'which is the foundation stone of the Church and origin of all the virtues,' with error and doubt and fantasy. The devil's fantasies we must treat with contempt for him and firm hope in God's mercy; and we must avoid every

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⁴ Hackett, art. cit., 396-399.
⁵ The text composed by Flete was not divided into chapters. For the sake of convenience we have adopted the divisions into chapters with rubrics which are found in MS Bodl. 43. See Hackett, "William Flete" in _The Month_, loc. cit., for a summary exposition of Flete's _De Remediis_.
kind of introspection. No man of sound faith and good disposition must
ascribe diabolical temptation to his own error or fault: temptation is not
sin, nor can it separate the soul from God, since the devil tempts man by
God’s will. Man’s will cannot be constrained: and faith is a habit of the
will; and man’s will to believe is belief, his will to hope is hope, his will
not to doubt is certainty. Sometimes a man’s reason is so obscured that
he cannot discern what is his will; but at such times we must impute to
ourselves good will unless we can be reasonably convinced that our will
is evil.

In this first chapter, Flete’s principal citations are from the Scriptures.
His opening text is from Hebr. xi. 6, “sine fide [autem] impossible est
placere Deo” and when he writes “… ipsam [fidem]… falsis missionibus
et erroneis ymaginacionibus multis ac miris modis nititur inpugnare,”
he is recalling Hebr.i.1: “multifarium multisque modis” or perhaps unconsciously echoes Augustine’s “mirs et occultis modis” which occurs
several times in the Confessions. The next quotation is from Psalm xciii.11:
“Cogitaciones hominum quoniam vane sunt,” and then, a little later,
“Omne enim peccatum est voluntarium et si non voluntarium non est
peccatum secundum Augustinum,” the source being, as the scribe of Bodl.
43 adds, the De Vera Religione. This is immediately followed by citations
from Isidore’s Sententiae: “Qui passionibus anime insidiantis adversario
cruciatur… Deum”; “Non amplius temptat electos… sanctorum deseruit”;
“Nunquam vacat diabolus… qualibet angustia torquatur”; and finally,
“Multa enim iustus adversa in anima patitur… est pena et non culpa.”
The only other citation in this chapter is from Rom.x.10: “Corde creditur
ad iusticiam.”

In the second chapter Flete tells us that there will be times when neglect
and contempt will not be sufficient to disperse the devil’s fantasies. If
these means are truly inefficacious, then man may resort to positive mea-
sures, defiance and contradiction. We may defy him as impotent, for he
can conquer no one who does not wish to be conquered, nor need we be
terrified by his ingenuity. Men are prone to different temptations, ac-
cording to their different dispositions, and the devil suits temptation to
disposition or “complexion.” It is the man of melancholy complexion who

6 Confessiones, VI.xii.22 (PL 32, 730), etc.
7 cap.xiv.27 (PL 34, 133).
8 Sententiae, III.iv.4 (PL 83,660).
will be most prone to spiritual temptations. The physiologists state that
the symptoms of melancholy are occasioned by a black smoke which rises
to the brain and obscures the reason: and these symptoms are a propensity
to sadness, timidity, pusillanimity, traits which are neither voluntary nor
culpable. Men of different complexion will be otherwise tempted, and the
devil never ceases to examine each man’s constitution, discovering his
weakness and exploiting it. Sometimes men so tempted will think that
they are at the end of their strength and they will long for death: but the
Scriptures offer us comfort and consolation.

At the beginning of this chapter there is a quotation from Rom. x.10,
“Ore autem confessione...,” and at the end a whole cluster of Scriptural
texts on the benefits of temptation and tribulation, which, as in several
other places in the treatise, have the appearance of being taken direct from
a rapiarium. But in the middle there are two long and most cogent excerpts
from other sources, obviously indicating Flete’s own studies and interests.
The diagnosis of the causes of melancholy is from a classical medical
source, Constantinus Africanus, in De Melancholia; and the passage on the
devil’s cunning in proferring temptations suited to the individual “com-
plexion” is from a sermon by Leo the Great (whereas the only acknowledgement
of Constantinus is “Dicunt naturales...,” the borrowing from Leo is
stated, and all the A manuscripts examined say that it is from a sermon
De Circumcisione Domini, whereas in Quesnel’s edition, used by Migne,
it is called Sermon VII In Nativitate Domini). Before the passage from
Constantinus there is one other quotation, a short one, from a less common
source. When Flete writes: “Et debilis est hostis qui non vincit nisi volen-
tem” he is citing the Ancrane Riwle, not the original English, “Beoð herdi of
godes helpe, and wuteð hu he is woc ðet non strençðæ haueð on us buten
þuruð us sulchen”, but the Latin translation of this, “Confidite in Dei
adiutorio et sciatis quomodo debilis est hostis qui non vincit nisi volen-
tem”. Presently we shall find the Riwle used again by Flete.

Chapter 3 begins by telling us that no man was ever more oppressed by
sorrow, by affliction, by the sense that God had forsaken him, than was our
Saviour in His Passion. The Passion, and our sufferings, were foretold by
Isaiahs when he said “For a short time I have forsaken you...,” and he goes

12 Lib. I (Opera omnia, Basle, 1536), I.280-281.
13 Sermo XXVII, iii (PL 54, 218).
Sent. II, d. vi, dub. 3 “Debilis enim est hostis qui non vincit nisi volentem” (S. Bonaventurae...
operam omnia, II (Quaracchi, 1885), 170. The Quaracchi editors refer to Gregory, Moralia, V.xxii.43
(PL 75, 702) “antiquus hostis sicut contra consentientes fortis est, ita contra resistentes debilis.”
on to prophesy the eternal reward we shall receive for these brief travails. Spiritual men should not be perturbed that they are tempted in spiritual matters: Christ told His disciples that Satan would assail them as wheat is sifted, and He added that He had prayed for Peter that his faith would not fail; and He commanded him, once he was converted, to help to strengthen his brethren. Until such strength comes, let men so tempted pray and recite the psalms, perform good works, search the Scriptures, recall the sayings of the prophets, and best of all, memorize the dicta evangelica. Should they in these exercises feel no devotion of the senses, let them still have devotion of the will. Sensible devotion will often be withdrawn from them so that there may be greater merit in their prayer.

As this summary of Chapter 3 suggests, there are two considerable clusters of Scriptural quotations. It is impossible to say whether they are also drawn from rapiaria, or whether they show, the first especially, the author's own command of the dicta evangelica. The passage in which Flete commends such memorization and other such exercises may be derived from the Latin Ancene Riuile, where we read: “Contra omnes temptaciones et precipue contra carnales sunt medicina sub Dei gracia sancte meditationse, intime, sine intermissione et anxie orationes, stabillis fides, inspectio sacre scripture, icunia, vigilia, corporales labores, consolationes verbales aliorum,”¹⁶ this last an idea which Flete later develops. When he deals with the withdrawal of sensible devotion, he cites several classical passages, with acknowledgement, Bernard's Sermo XVII in Cantica 1,¹⁷ “Beatus Augustinus de verbis Domini” (this title is used for Sermo LXI, “De Verbis Evangelii”),¹⁸ and finally, a quotation which he ascribed to Gregory: “Beatus Gregorius: Tunc sancti melius exaudientur quando non ad votum exaudientur.” It is not an exact quotation. In Gregory's Moralia XX.xxxi the passage runs: “Magis exaudientur ad meritem, quo citius non exaudientur a\c\c votum”.¹⁹ Most probably, Flete was quoting from memory. One family of the manuscripts, that represented by Bodl. 43, actually attributes the quotation to Augustine whose “Exauditus est ad salutem, qui non est exauditus ad voluntatem”²⁰ was doubtless Gregory's source, but Flete's retention of “ad votum” in place of Augustine's “ad voluntatem” is indicative of his dependence on Gregory.

In Chapter 4 it is explained that sometimes in the beginning of a man's conversion God will give him sensible devotion, and then withdraw it for

¹⁷ PL 183, 855.
¹⁸ Cap. v. 6 (PL 38, 411).
¹⁹ PL 76, 173.
²⁰ *In ep. Ioannis ad Parthos*, tr. VI, cap. iii. 6-7 (PL 35, 2023).
his greater profit. Strength comes through effort, so that what requires more effort brings greater virtue. It is sweet and easy to follow Christ in joy and peace; but it is hard and most perfect when it is done in grief of the heart and assaults upon the faith.

By way of introduction to this line of thought Flete like a good schoolman cites Aristotle: “Cum virtus sistat circa difficile secundum philosophum, illud quod difficilior adquiritur virtuosius optinetur.” It is interesting to find St. Thomas also quoting Aristotle’s words, though in a different context (Aquinas is discussing whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbour than to love God), and to discover that Flete is rather more Aristotelian on the question of virtue than Thomas, who states: “illud quod est difficilior, videtur esse virtuosius et magis meritorium, quia virtus est circa difficile et bonum ut dicitur in 2 Ethica.”21 This is not quite what Aristotle said: “περὶ δὲ τὸ μελετώτερον ἄει καὶ τέχνῃ γίνεται καὶ ἴσητι.”22 For St. Thomas, good is more in the nature of virtue than difficulty. Flete, at least at this point in his essay, stresses primarily the relationship between difficulty and virtue.

Most of the other citations and allusions in this chapter are Scriptural. Towards the close occurs this passage: “Dulce enim erat petro et suave esse cum christo in cius iocunda transfiguracione quando dixit Bonum est nos hic esse (Matt. xvi.4), sed valde durum erat et terrible petro esse cum christo in cius crudeli persecucione quando dixit Non novi hominem (ibid. xxvii.72). Et tamen qui illum voce ancille territus negaverit postea spiritu sancto roboratus in conspectu principum (cf. Acts v. 41) usque ad mortem firmiter confitebatur.” This contrast of Peter’s enthusiasm at the time of the Transfiguration with his cowardice during the Passion and his later constancy probably reflects Flete’s recollection of several Fathers, notably Gregory and Leo, treating of these texts.

Chapter 5 returns to the psychological treatment of such cases of breakdown, which are partly mental and physiological in origin and must be given appropriate treatment. Such men at such times must not be too much alone, given over to brooding and introspection. They must seek the guidance and comfort of wise counsellors (the idea, though by no means original, which we have already seen in the Ancrene Riuile), and their sadness and timidity must be countered by joy and exultation, even if enforced. If no spiritual consolation is experienced, they must accept the alleviation afforded by temporal consolations, which are useful and lawful remedies, not merely a surrender to frailty.

21 Summa Theol., II-II, 27, 8, 3.
22 Ethica Nicomachea, B.2. 1105 a 9.
Apart from two brief Biblical quotations this chapter seems to be original to Flete.

In Chapter 6 he returns to the consideration of the part which the devil plays in the affliction of scrupulosity, the devil who is so adept in suggesting that vices are virtues, errors truths. When a man is at divine office, it may be the devil who brings to mind such recollection of his past sins that he cannot praise God because of such distractions. It is the devil who tells him that sins confessed and absolved are not yet forgiven, playing upon his natural tendencies to pusillanimity and fearfulness. The devil does not want such recollection and remorse to bring a man a more perfect purgation and peace of mind: tranquillity and consolation are hateful to him. Confession and compunction are at the proper time necessary and good, but such scrupulosity is evil. Christ refused to cast Himself down into the depths as the devil challenged Him to do: He descended, and taught us to descend, gently, by the way of prudence and discretion.

This chapter opens with Paul’s classical statement of the devil’s ability to transform himself into an angel of light, and Gregory’s gloss upon this, that he does this when he presents vices under the colour of virtues, errors as truth, so that he may conquer the minds of the devout. At the end of the chapter, when Flete writes “Hoc enim bene fit quod bona intencione agitur” he may be recalling Augustine’s “Bonum enim opus intentio facit”.

Chapter 7 continues the discussion. When the devil tells us that what is lawful is illicit, what is good or indifferent is evil, he fabricates false conscience in us, makes us prefer our own erroneous judgements to the good counsel of others. This is pride and heresy. If anyone says that he cannot reject his own false conscience, he is not speaking the truth. He can wish to reject it, and so to wish is to reject it. If the devil fails to infect us with falsehood, he will try to overwhelm us with terror: and we must withstand such assaults boldly, endure them patiently.

The definition in this chapter of discretion as “auriga virtutum” is from Bernard’s Sermo XLIX in Cantica, and what immediately follows, “ut inter bonum et malum recte diiudicetur ne quis sub specie boni incaute fallatur,” is reminiscent of Isidore. There are also two quotations from pseudo-Augustine, De spiritu et anima.

23 Cf. 2 Cor.xi.14.
24 Cf. Moralia, III.xxxii.65 (PL 75,631), V.xxii.43 (ibid., 702), XXXII.xxii.45 (ibid., 76, 662).
26 PL 183, 1018.
27 Cf. Sententiae, III.v.10 (PL 83, 662).
28 Cap. xxvii (PL 46, 799).
Chapter 8 is a discussion of temptations in dreams. If the devil cannot defeat us waking, he will attack us in our dreams, and God permits this so that even our sleep is meritorious.

This is a topic very commonly discussed, and Flete would have a wide range of authorities from which to draw. He cites Gregory’s *Moralia* on the passage in Job, “Terrebis me per somnia”; and as evidence of the strange and different ways the soul of the God-fearing man is tried he refers to the hymn by Prudentius, “O tortuose serpens” which incidentally was written for recitation at bed-time. The chapter ends with the Psalmist’s words: “Multe tribulationes iustorum, et de omnibus hiis liberabit cos Dominus.”

The last three chapters are all taken *verbatim* from the *Stimus Amoris*. In Chapter 9 we are told that it is God’s goodness which permits us to be tempted, not for our ensnarement but so that we may flee to Him as to our safest refuge. God is like a loving mother, menacing a wayward child only to draw him into her loving arms. It is a blessed temptation which constrains us into the divine embrace, a loving Lord who so embraces us. Chapters 10 and 11, following the extract from *Stimus*, are in the form of direct address. If you have strayed so far from the Father that you cannot in time flee back to Him, hide yourself in the wounds of His Son, where the devil will never find you; and if you have sinned so vilely that the Son seems to be angered against you, flee to His mother, hope of sinners, and ask for her help. Ask until she gives it, for she cannot refuse you. Do not despair in your abjection, which is more pleasing to God than any presumption. Say to Him: “Lord God, it is not only that I am unworthy that You should enter under my roof: I am not fit in any way to draw near to you: but it is enough for me if You will look on me from far off with the eyes of Your pity.” Do this, and He will not merely look upon you, but He will bring you into His innermost chamber.

The text of these last three chapters corresponds exactly with that of Chapter 6 of the *Stimus Amoris* as it is given by the Quaracchi editors. The attribution of the work, now generally accepted, to the Minorite, James, lector of the convent at Milan, as *conscriptor* of the whole and author of the central portion, from which our excerpt comes, was based by Sbaralea and the others whom the Quaracchi editors followed upon MS Laurentiana 10 Plut. XIX dextr., which was written c. 1300; and though

30 *Liber Cathemerinon*, vii.141-8 (CSEL 61, 37).
31 Ps. xxxiii.20.
nothing else is known of James, the manuscript evidence indicates that his recension of the *Stimulus* was composed in the late thirteenth century.\(^{33}\) It is possible that Flete's knowledge of the work was not confined to Chapter 6, but so beautiful and therefore so famous was this particular extract that one is inclined to think that the Austin Friar copied it from an exemplar which contained the chapter detached from the main work. It exists independently of the *Stimulus* in Bodl. 57 which dates from c. 1300 and comes most probably from the priory of Augustinian Canons, dedicated to B.M.V. de pratis, at Leicester.\(^{34}\) Apart from several others, one copy occurs in C.U.L. Li.vi.30 (A i) which, as we have seen, is the only manuscript that ascribes the *De Remediis* to Flete.

One important manuscript of his work, Oxford St. John's College 77, omits this chapter from the *Stimulus* altogether and ends with the verse of Psalm XXXIII, "Multe tribulationes iustorum et de omnibus his liberabit eos Dominus," which indeed makes a perfect conclusion to Flete's exposé of the problem of temptation. None the less, the manuscript tradition exemplified by three independent families of the "A"-text outweighs the force of the single St. John's MS, and we must conclude that Flete did in fact add the chapter from the *Stimulus* to his excellent study of an aspect of the spiritual life which still awaits magisterial treatment.

One problem which we may conveniently consider here is that of the attribution of Flete's work, in some form, to Walter Hilton. In the Latin manuscripts it occurs in two in the Bodleian Library, three (related) in the Bibliothèque Nationale, and in four lost manuscripts known only from sixteenth-century catalogues.\(^{35}\) It is also found in the English text in MS Harl. 2409 which is described as "A devoute materi be p[re] drawyng of M. Waltere Hyltoun." "Drawyng" here may very well mean "editing" - Harl. 2409 belongs to the English I group, which displays considerable editorial work, and it is not by any means impossible that the false ascription of Flete's own Latin to Hilton derives from the lateral contamination of Latin by English manuscripts. But even if we accept that, we must still decide how probable it is that the first English version, or at least that in Harl. 2409, is Hilton's. Nothing can be proved conclusively in either direction, but there is one telling argument against the probability. The

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\(^{34}\) N. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain* (London, 1941), 63.

late fourteenth-century English version of the *Stimulus Amoris* survives in some ten manuscripts, and in three of them this translation also is ascribed to Hilton, an ascription for which strong probability has recently been argued.\(^{36}\) But if the language of this translation is compared with that of the English I version of Flete, it at once is apparent that they are entirely independent. So, where James of Milan wrote "O mirae benignitatis altissime, qui nos tentari permittis, non ut capiamur, sed ut timentes ad te, portum tutissimum, fugiamus,"\(^{37}\) which is translated in Flete English I as "A pi wonderful mercy almyghty lord Jesu pat suffirs vs here to be assaied with dyuere temptacions, not for pat skil pat we suld be takyn fro pe, bot at we for drede of our enmy suld more brynnandly be stird to fle vnto pe als to pe most syker hold and hauen of our hele and a syngulere refuge of our defense,"\(^{38}\) the translation of the entire *Stimulus* has "A wondurful goodenesse of god almysti hit is pat sufferip vs to be temptid, not for pat chesoun pat we shulde falle and be caust in pe feedes snare but pat we shulde for fere of fallynge fleen to hym as to a sikest hauen;"\(^{39}\) and every other passage so collated shows a similar disparity of vocabulary and style so great as virtually to rule out the possibility that they can be the work of the same man. Altogether, it seems safest to treat this ascription of Flete texts, whether Latin or English, to Hilton as being as baseless as that similar attribution to Richard Rolle which presently we shall examine.

The minor hazards of scriptoria apart, the manuscripts of the Latin A group all agree closely, with one exception, MS Cambridge University Library Il.vi.3, a manuscript of the late fifteenth century with, ff. 29r-38v, a text of *De Remediis* which has been much expanded with interpolations, the most noteworthy of them from the *Revelations* of St. Bridget of Sweden, beginning: "Item legitur quod cum sancta Brigitta dieresis cogitacionibus et invitilibus turbaretur et afficeretur quia eas amouere non potuit, dixit illi dominus Iesus: Hec est vera iusticia. Sicut prius delectabaris in affeccionibus mundi contra velle meum, sic nunc permittuntur tibi cogitaciones contra velle tuum. (f.35v) Tamen time cum discretionem...."\(^{40}\)

Although this and others of these interpolations are not incongruous, they interrupt the sequence of thought and destroy the balance of the whole without adding to its force. But this particular attempt to remodel Flete’s work evidently remained a sport, without offspring.


\(^{38}\) B. M. Harl. 2409, f. 66v.

\(^{39}\) Harl. 2254 (c. 1400), ff. 55*-56v.

\(^{40}\) *Revelations*, ed. Durante (Munich, 1680), 185.
There is however another very clearly-defined form of the Latin text, represented by the nine surviving manuscripts of the B group, which is of early origin (one of these manuscripts is considered to be of the late fourteenth century, three of the early fifteenth) and enjoyed wide circulation. The following brief description of the B text is based upon MS. Bodleian Library Oxford Laud misc. 497, collated with and where necessary silently emended from MSS Trinity College Cambridge R.14.1 and British Museum Add. 34763.

This B text is somewhat shorter than the original, and an appearance of greater concision has been achieved, often at the expense of the logical sequence and careful illustration of Fletē’s thought, by much re-arrangement and summarizing. There are several long omissions, notably of the whole of Chapter 5 in A. Except for a few more exact identifications of sources and one or two additional Scriptural quotations there are only two major interpolations. The first occurs in the opening chapter, where, instead of “Talis igitur non separatur a Deo set coniungitur qualibet angustia torquetur,” the B-text reads:

Talis igitur non separatur a Deo, set pocius coniungitur dum tali tribulacione et angustia torquetur. Permittit enim Deus hominem quandoque multis temptacionibus et tribulacionibus molestari ut sciat homo quod sicut sine conditore non potuit fuisse, sic nisi Deus habeat defensorem non potest subsistere. Nam cum deficit homo subvenit Deus, iuxta illud psalmi: *Ad Dominum cum tribularer clanavi et exaudi me.*

41 Et alibi: *Invoca me in die tribulationis et eruam te.*

42 Ait enim psalmista: *Iuxta est Dominus hiis qui tribulato sunt corde.*

43 Et alibi in psalmo: *Cum ipso sum in tribulacione et sequitur, eripiam eum et glorificabo eum.*

44 Hinc est quod ait Bernardus: Da michi Domine semper tribulacionem ut semper sis mecum.

After this the text in B continues as in A with the quotation from Isidore’s *Sententiae*: “Multa iustus adversa in anima patitur....” 46 The other large-scale interpolation, a passage from pseudo-Bernard, *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis,* 47 occurs in chapter 7 after “nittitur eam timorem falsum... amaricare.”

The first of the three main families of vernacular translations, English I, survives in two recensions. One is represented by Harl. 6615, ff. 109v-123r

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41 Ps. cxix.i.
42 Ps. xlix.15.
43 Ps. xxxiii.19.
44 Ps. xc. 15.
45 Cf. *In psalmon “Qui habitarat”* (Ps. xc), Sermo XVII (ad v. 15) in PL 183, 252.
46 *Sententiae*, III. v. 37 (PL 83, 667).
47 Cap. xiii (PL 184, 504-5).
(a text of English II is also contained in this manuscript, ff. 142r-152r); the other by Harl. 2409 and Bodl. 131, both of the first half of the fifteenth century. Of the two English versions, Harl. 6615 is nearer to the Latin A iii (Ff. vi.44; Harl. 4887). As yet, no English version of A i or A ii has come to light. Harl. 2409 and Bodl. 131, on the other hand, are derived from an A iv text. Since Harl. 2409 ascribes the English text to the "drawyng" of Walter Hilton, we shall confine ourselves here to illustrating the dependence of this version on a Latin manuscript of the type of Bodl. 43, which indeed attributes its Latin text to Hilton. If it can be established that there is a definite, almost verbatim, connexion between the Harl. and Bodl. texts, then there can be little doubt that the "drawyng" in Harl. was not a translation by Hilton but a version of a Latin text which ascribed to Him the authorship of the De Remediis itself. The following extracts are significant, especially when compared with the Flete manuscript, C.U.L., ii.vi.30:

**Flete**

(Temptacio) est enim homini fidelis omnino involuntaria et displicens et ideo penalis et nullius peccati. Omne enim peccatum est voluntarium, et si non voluntarium non est peccatum secundum Augustinum.

**Bodl. 43**

Est enim huiusmodi temptacio homini fidelis et bene disposito omnino involuntaria et displicens et ideo penalis et nullius peccati set anime purgacio,pacienzie roboracio, humilitatis attraccio, et ad spem viteternae instigacio. Augustinus in libro de vera religione ait: Omne peccatum est voluntarium et si non sit voluntarium non est peccatum.

**Harl. 2409**

For swilk temptation ben to swilk man vsnerly vnwillful and displesyn and therfor it es pynful to him and no synne, but it es a purching and a clensynge of pe soule and a strenghe of paciens and a kepyng of meknes and a stirrung and a raisting vp of pe soule to end<1>es lyfe. Saint Austin sais in a buke de vera religione pat al maner of synne es ful willful, and if it be not willful it is no synne.

And again, towards the end of the treatise, where Flete is dealing with diabolical fraud:

**Flete**
nititur cam timorem falsum incuiciendo et fureorem sue nequie infulendo penalitier amaricare. Autem oportet deotoriji suggestionibus sub specie boni inmissis omnino recisere.

**Bodl. 43**
nititur saltem eam nimio timore flectere, falsum et terrible incuiciendo et venenum sue nequie infulendo penalitier intolerabili gravadine amaricare ut aut sic a bono incepto trahiendo deludat <aut..... ?>>. Oportet ergo suis deotoriis sugi

**Harl. 2409**

Neuerbeles he enforces to cast it doun be ouer mykildrede, schewand to it fals illusions and fierful and hydus thoghtis, and thurgh inzattyng of venum of his wickidnes for to mak it pyneful and bitter thurgh vsnouerly heynes pat it feles, to pat extent to
gestionibus sub specie bon-inmissis quantum vis humana gracia dei mediante suppetit omnino resistere. mak him sese and leue of his gud purpos þat he has begun. And þper for him behoues on al wyse in als mykel as freylte suffres with helpe of grace agaynstand his dissayueable sugestions.

Harl. 2409 does not reproduce the chapter divisions and rubrics of Bodl. 43, which can hardly have been therefore the immediate exemplar used by the translator; but it is clear that the so-called ‘Hilton’ English version of the De Remediis was based on a Latin text such as Bodl. exemplifies (a text which is, moreover, much interpolated), and not on a text deriving directly from Flete’s autograph.

It is evident, too, that the Harl. text of English I also followed a manuscript of the family of Bodl. 43 by quoting more of “O tortuose serpens” than these, the first three words of Prudentius’s hymn. The English text reads: “þis beres wytnes haly kirke in ane ympne sayand þus: o tortuose serpens qui mille per meandros fraudesque flexuosas agitas quieta corda: he sais: A þou crokid nedder þat thurgh a thousand wyles styrs and trobles restful hertes.” At this point the translator decided to turn the second stanza into verse, and although he departs somewhat from Prudentius’s quatrains he achieved a neat rendering of the unhelpful Latin of Bodl. 43 which has: “discede, lique sce, christus nobiscum est. O impie zabulon, signum crucis dampnat tuam catervam.” This is how the translator of the Harl. text renders it:

Go þi way and melt to noȝt,
Crist es with vs þat has vs boȝt.
þou wickid fende withoutyn light,
Crist cross þe dampnys and al þi myght.

What Prudentius wrote was:

Discede, Christus hic est
hic Christus est, lique sce!
signum, quod ipse nosti
dammat tuam catervam.48

The additions of the Harl. English I to its Latin exemplar are few and immemorable, inspired by piety rather than learning or percipience. Where C.U.L. Ti.vi.30 has “tamen est pena et non culpa, Isidorus,” Bodl. 43 in the first chapter adds: “Hec Isodorus ubi supra sparsim capitulis

48 See Note 30.
4o et 5o." This appears in Harl. 2409 as "it is only pyne and no synne. Hec Ysidorus ut supra sparsim. capitulo. 43o. Et alibi dicitur. Si in te agitur et non agis et cetera," a statement which it has not been possible to identify in Isidore or elsewhere. At all events, the translator, or perhaps the scribe of Harl., misread '4o et 5o', as '43o.' This sort of mistake, a mechanical one, further confirms what has been established above, namely the close connexion between the Latin A iv (Bodl. 43, etc.) and English I (Harl. 2409 and Bodl. 131).

Often the additions in the manuscripts of English I are mere glosses and expansions. So the Harleian text reads:

"Perfor says pe apostil pat with our hert, pat es with our wil., we trowe," and, in the next sentence "And perfor in our wil... standis al oure meryt or demerit, pat es to say mede or blame," and again, a little later, "And so pe curt enmy beholde and aspye every man astate and complexion how he man deceye him and overcomme him." Sometimes the additions take on a devout colour, as when we read "Peror no man sal think heuy no be anyrde or greud for he sees pe fend on dyuers manere tempe and diseese chosyn saules, for thurgh many temptacions and tribulacions nedis vs for to enter pe kyngdom of heuen."

Very often, too, the translator makes what seem to be additions which in fact are transferences and repetitions of material found elsewhere in its original context.

Before we leave the group English I, two further, aberrant manuscripts must be mentioned. In MS British Museum Royal 18 A X, a compilation of the early fifteenth century, ff. 10r-15r contain a treatise, "A good remedie a3ens spirituel temptacions," much of which consists of a rearrangement of material derived from some manuscript of Group I. It is cast in the form of replies to a letter about her spiritual problems from a "dear sister." The form, the dependence on I and the type of interpolation found here can all be illustrated from the opening:

"Dere sister, I haue in partie vnderstonde by thyn writyng of diuerse temptacions and taryagis that thu hast suffered and hit sufffrist, fourmed and maad be malice of the olde serpent, enemy to mankynde, agaynes the w(heche) temptacions I write the here some remedies, the wheche I haue fownde in the writynges of holy doctours. If thu wilt leue thynne owne fantasies and do after this writyng, I trowe to god thu schalt ben esed of alle thynne deseses. Amen. Touchyng that temptacioun that o(ur) enemy poteth vnto the of thyn beleue, thou schalt vnderstonde that for as mekyl as it is impossible, as the apostel seyth, for to plese god with outhen beleue, therfore the deuil oure aduersarie, knowyng that feyth is ground of al holy kirke and begynnare of alle vertues, enforsith hym with alle hese mybtes in manie wunderful maners with false inpotynges and diuerse eronye ymaginaciouns for to impugne it and for to distroie it; for he wot wel that euery biggyngne were lyhtly to nouthe that has an vnsadde and an vnsaker ground. And whom that he may nat caste down from the stabilnesse and the s(te)dfastnesse of the beleue..."
Another English Flete text is found in the manuscript owned and probably commissioned by Abbess Sybil Felton of Barking, which was recently in the possession of the late W. A. Foyle, of Beeleigh Abbey, Maldon. This manuscript belongs to Group I, in the sense that it does derive from a Latin A text, but it is impossible at the present time to say whether it is an independent translation, or a reworking of the original English I so fundamental that its relations to the other I manuscripts are now wholly obscured. One example of their disparities must here suffice:

Harley 2409

And thynk also what ysai þe prophete sais in þe person of our lord þus: A litil while haf I forsakyn þe, and in short tym of my wrath I turned and hid my face fro þe, but in mynd endles mercy I haf mercy on þe. A litil thynge and a short es al þat we suffre here, 3a ðif we war in tribulacion and temptacion and disese al our lyfe tymen in regard of endles blis whilk we sal haf for sufferin of swilk disece. For aþ aþ apostil sais: Al þe passyons, angwys, payns, tribulacion and al þe temptacion þat we may suffre al our lyfe tymen ar not worthi to þe endles ioy and biys þat we sal haf here aftir.49 No man maruaile ne wondir...

Beeleigh

Loke also he bryngge to hys mynde þe woord þat ysaye seip in goddis bihalve: As for a litel stounde I haue ylef and for a litel moei(n)gg of myn vnsettyng by of þe, þat haue a litil hidde my face fro, but in my greet mercy and forgyyung I schal gedere þec to me aȝeyn. It is but litil and passyng what so we suffre here, bouȝ it were lastyng al oure lijf, in reward of þe peyn þat synful man disservyng to han in an ðoper world safe þe mercy of god. Ne wondre no man...

In comparing Beeleigh with the Group I manuscripts, it is a constant problem whether the occasional correspondences of vocabulary are fortuitous, or whether the wide divergences result from a determination, perverse, one might think, to depart as far as possible from an English I exemplar.

The second vernacular version, English II, as has already been stated elsewhere,50 is not a recension of English I but a wholly new translation, working also from a Latin A-group text. It survives in six or seven manuscripts, and in a printed text by Wynkyn de Worde. Probably the oldest of these is Glasgow Hunterian V.8.23, written c. 1400. British Museum Add. 37049 is of the early fifteenth century, Cambridge University Library Hh. i.11, ff.61r-68r (like Harley 6615, this manuscript contains two Flete texts, this time II, here, and, later, III) is c. 1430, Longleat 29 is c. 1450, Harley 6615, ff. 142v-152v, is late fifteenth century, the Worde

49 This addition is an expanded translation of Rom.viii.18.
edition is given various dates in the 1490’s, and Leeds University Library Brotherton 501 is of the fifteenth century. In the following description of II, the manuscript used is Hh.i.11, collated with and where necessary corrected from Hunterian V.8.23 and Longleat 29.

The independence of I and II could be illustrated from any passage taken at random. Let one example be sufficient here. Where, in Chapter 2 of Latin A, Flete counsels those whom dissimulation does not help to resort occasionally to abjuration of the devil, I and II translate this as follows:

**English I (Hart. 2409)**

But if þis forsaiid temptacion sese not be þis wile and þis dissimulation before said, but euer dwelles stil and thurgh malice of þe fends is euermore iangelyng his fantasys þat he moves and stirres in þi saule, proferand to þe falsnes vnder coloure of sothfastnes, or ouerlaies þi soule and blyndis it be way of þi complexion and continuely angers þe and disese and trobles þe, þou sal sumtyme bot noȝt bot seldom, als it ware be maner of abiuacion and vtterly forsakyng and contrary affermyng schew þi faith and þi beleue with þi mouth and þi word, agaymsaying þe fends temptacions. And þat þou wil for nothing consent to his erroure and his falsnes þat he profers to þe and swilk othir, þof al þe fals consait þat þou felis in þi soule agayn þi wil be contrari and noȝt fully acordying vnto þi saying, for þe apostil sais þat confession of mouth and aknowlege- gyng of þi beleue be wordis is helfule and profitable.

**English II (Hh.i.11)**

Now if it be so þat a man do as I haue tauhte, þat is to seyne tak non maner heed at his traualiys, and deme verrili as I haue lerid, þat he\textsuperscript{51} ben non synne but mater of gret meede, and neuerþeles þe temptacions cseyn nouth but alwayis waxyn more and more,

þanne it is good sumtyme but seldom in dispit of þe fend

to ben aknowe his beleue and his hoope with his mouth, and

henkyn of sceyt Powlis wordis, þer he seith þat knowynge of mouthe is doom to helthe of soule.

These extracts may well illustrate the greater concision of style of II and the relative absence of additions to this second English text; but the recension in fact represents a drastic rewriting of Flete’s own composition and can hardly be compared with English I, which on the whole is a tolerably faithful version of the Latin A iv.

Though English II is far removed from Flete, only one major interpolation occurs. It appears in the translation of the first chapter of the Latin,

\textsuperscript{51} Sc. “they,” from OE “his,” an archaic feature remarkable in so late a manuscript, and not found in the III text which occurs later in the same MS, Hh.i.11, which is by a different scribe.
where, after translating Paul’s Corde creditur ad iusticiam, the English continues “...vp quiche wordis seyth þe glose, Alone in a manmys wil, þe quiche may not be constreyneyd, is bothe mede and gilt” (which reminds one of the Summa, I-II, 6, 4, “Voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum,” but is probably the editor’s elaboration of Walafrid in the Glossa ordinaria on Rom. x,10, “Cetera potest nolens, sed credere non potest nisi volens.”)

Then, a few sentences later, the editor is moved by Flete’s remarks upon how difficult it sometimes is for a man in times of mental disturbance to determine what is his own will to add a completely new idea of his own:

“Qwerfore þat man þat doth in deede þe seruice of god, þat man hath a good wil to god, þowh his traulious herte deeme þe contrarie. And also a man owith not for non weerous fantasys deemyn his euene cristene but if he haue a verray opyn knowyng of þat thyng þat he schal demyn, for it is a gret synne a man to demyn euyl of his neybore for a thyng þat is in weer. Rith soo it is euyl and nouth skilfulliche don a man to demyn his soule in euil plyt and partid fro god for any werous fantasies. And if it falle þat a man knowe apertly certeyn poyntes in quiche he hath grewyd god, of þo poyntes he owyth to crie god mercy and mekyn hym to þe sacramentes of holy chirche, and anoon owyth he to leeuyn trostlyche þat he is resseywyd to þe grace of god...”

The rest of this passage elaborates ideas elsewhere suggested by Flete, and it ends “...for as I haue oftyn seyd, god takith oonly heed at a manmys wil...” Whether this alludes to Flete’s insistences, wholly Augustinian, on the supremacy of the will, or whether it indicates that this is an excerpt from a longer work abstracted from its context and inserted into this version of Flete, it is impossible to say: in any case, this positive sacramental teaching is something he might have incorporated in his work to good effect. So, too, might St. Bernard in his De consideratione.

A few of the manuscripts of English II exhibit peculiar features worthy of notice. The text of II contained in Harl. 6615 is in general as inferior and corrupt as that of I and, indeed, as are the whole contents of this most eccentric volume, but there are no major interpolations. Add. 37049, generally supposed to be the work of a Mount Grace Carthusian, which enjoys some celebrity for its crude and lurid drawings, done by the scribe, of the Imago Pietatis, the Sacred Heart, etc., contains, ff. 91r-93r, part of II, which merges, after “Jesus says in þe gospel: Blyssed ar þai þat suffer perseverucion for ryghtwysnes, for þairs is the blys of heuen...” into legends of St. Guthlac, of the Blessed Virgin, and then, f. 94, “...If any thought creep into your mind of the predestination or the prescience of God, answer to the fiend who makes such suggestions and say: Whatever may be-

52 PL 114, 504.
come of me, it is certain that you are damned...”, a locus classicus, which is ultimately from the Stimulus Amoris. Brotherton 501 is relatively close to the archetype, apart from a few additional identifications of Scriptural quotations, but it has many notable corrupt readings.

The relations of MS Bristol 6 to the other II manuscripts may be compared with that of Beceleigh Abbey to the I group. It is a little more probable that Bristol is derived, however indirectly, from the II archetype, and it seems to have affinities closer to C.U.L., Ff. vi.44 than to any other; but it is so much paraphrased and expanded that these relations are largely obscured. It contains only one major interpolation, ff. 123r-124r, where, to the counsels in the original Latin Chapter 2 on the inadvisability of striving violently against diabolical suggestion, the Bristol editor adds an elaborate simile, comparing such thoughts with a dog barking at a man. If the man fights with him, that only enranges the dog and attracts other dogs to the scene to join in the attack, whereas if the man walks quietly on, the dog will soon leave him in peace. This simile may have been suggested by Walter Hilton’s Scale of Perfection, Book II chapter 38.

The last and most expanded version of Flete is English III. Since an account and a text of this version will shortly be published elsewhere, it need be only briefly mentioned here. It survives in five manuscripts derived from a common archetype, a printed text closely related to one of the five, and in three manuscripts of the version made by Augustine Baker from the printed text. The five manuscripts are (1) Trinity College Dublin A.6.12, c. 1400; (2) Hh.i.11, ff. 100r-116r; c. 1430; (3) Worcester Cathedral F. 172, post 1447; (4) Oxford Bodleian Holkham Misc. 41, c. 1450; and (5) British Museum Harl. 1706, post 1450. The Worde text, The remedy agenst the troubles of temptation, is dated 1519.

In the Worde text, as in Dublin, the Flete treatise is preceded by extracts from Richard Rolle’s Form of Living, and further extracts from The Form follow in Dublin. In Worde and Dublin the Form extracts are ascribed to Rolle, and it is this ascription in Worde which misled Augustine Baker into ascribing the Remedies also to him, a false ascription repeated by the modern authority on Baker, the late Abbot Justin McCann. Throughout, Worde and Dublin show close affinities: they constitute one sub-group,

54 Colledge and Chadwick, “Remedies against Temptations: the third English version of William Flete,” in a forthcoming number of Archivio italiano per la storia della pistola.
the other four manuscripts another. The following description is based on the text in Hh.i.11, a remarkably good copy requiring singularly little correction.

Chapter 1 begins with the analogy found, among other places, in the Ancerné Riwle, derived from the Riwle in *The Chastising of God’s Children*, and in the *Stimulus Amoris*, between God and the loving parent chastising children for their betterment; and this chapter then proceeds straight to the assault of the devil and the appropriate strategems. In Chapter 3, the passage at the beginning, urging the despairing sinner to recall David, Peter and Mary Magdalene and the mercy shown to them, though it is a commonplace, may possibly have been suggested by *The Chastising*. Chapter 4 begins by following Flete, but at the beginning of f. 103r in Hh.i.11, with the words “For trusteth weel þerto...,” a very long interpolation is made, extending as far as f. 106r, “...And þou3 it seme ȝou somtyme þat ȝe feele a discord betwyn god and ȝou, be not þeþere discom-fortid,” dealing with remedies against the despair of those who are sure that they have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost and those others who are convinced of their own eternal damnation. The end of Chapter 4 and the beginning of Chapter 5 follow Flete, but then, on f. 106r, with the words “But parauenture quan þe stonden scharpily tempted...,” another long interpolation begins, developing the theme briefly touched on by Flete, the difficulty sometimes of knowing whether one has consented in the will to temptation. This is partly borrowed, with adaptations, from passages in Book II of *The Scale of Perfection*. English III says that in times of severe temptation men may think that this comes from their own spiritual sloth, and deceive themselves that they have succumbed by desire; but this is not so, for in every man there are two wills, an evil will deriving from his “sensuality,” always prone to sin, and a good will deriving from grace and always aspiring to virtue. Hilton, in Book II chapter 11, uses Rom. vii.23, *Iveni legem in membris meis repugnament legi mentis meae et captivum me ducentem in legem peccati*, and expounds it in just this sense, to warn men against despair, especially of doubt whether sin has been assented to or not. Exactly as in this interpolation, we are told that the test will be whether a man’s reason, not his sensuality, has preserved unbroken the intention not to sin against the will of God. This is illustrated, in English III, by the simile of the sun (man’s good will) which does not cease to shine if we cannot see its light because of the rain-clouds (man’s sensuality): and this simile too is probably suggested by *The Scale*, Book II chapter 16, where a soul blinded by mortal sin is compared with a blind man who

stands in the light of the sun but cannot see it (a figure which Hilton uses again in Book II chapter 32). 58

The next major interpolation in English III is in Chapter 7, beginning, f. 109v, with the words "The secunde gyle vndir colour of goodnesse bat the fend tempteth with is pis." (The "first guile" is in Flete, the scrupulous man’s obsessive fears that sins already confessed are not forgiven). This second temptation, to neglect the recitation of the office, to which one is canonically bound, so as to follow one’s private devotions, is dealt with at length in The Chastising of God’s Children, and, inspired by The Chastising, in the early fifteenth-century Syon Mirror of Our Lady; and the editor of III may well have had one of these in mind, although there are no obvious verbal parallels. The third temptation, scruples about taking lawful recreation, is found in earlier Flete versions, but the long discussion of such scruples which occupies the rest of the chapter is new. Chapter 8 follows Flete, but with the beginning of Chapter 9 we have again fresh material. The opening, the conviction one should preserve that the devil’s temptations are no danger to one’s own soul but "shame and confusion" to him, is probably inspired by the passage, already mentioned, in the Stimulus Amoris, perhaps as it is quoted in The Chastising. Then follows a long and somewhat tedious elaboration of the theme of the chastising mother; and this leads to the involved and curious story of the squire, John Honeleis, who was persuaded for his soul’s comfort by an angel to throw dice with him, a typical exemptum for which, however, no source has been found.

Chapter 10 replaces the missing epilogue from the Stimulus Amoris with a comparable piece of affective writing, in places very fine. At the end, where the editor recommends devotion to the Holy Name, he may well have had Rolle’s Commandment in mind, 59 and a little later, where the editor advises the recipient (the stock “sister” figure), even though she may experience no consolation in her devotions, not to seek to gain consolation as it were by force, this may have been suggested by The Scale, Book II chapter 35, when Hilton says that a love for God cannot be gained by human effort, as many think, and that those who attempt to drag God down to them by violence must temper their fervour with humility and discretion. 60

The only major interpolation in any individual manuscript of English III is in Dublin, ff. 41v-46v, beginning “The first is when he counsellys vs...” and ending “...pen doutes I holde Ṕe blessed and hye in Ṕe syght of

60 The Scale, ed. cit., 367-388.
swet Iesu.” By this interpolation, the “three guiles” of this chapter, already, as has just been noticed, expanded from two, become four, and this new first guile warns the reader against a variety of kindred temptations: against taking too much bodily ease, against trying to outdo others in penances and mortifications. The remedy, the editor says, lies in the mean, and his advice is for the young religious to harbour his strength and become settled in his way of life, and then, later, to undertake a more penitential way, so long as it is performed in secret and only for God. This interpolation is not found in Worde, and not, consequently, in Baker.

Readers of this account of the ramifications of the text of De Remediis will have noticed one feature which all its various states have in common. Whatever their re-arrangements or accretions, none of their editors have lost sight of Flete’s prime object, the bringing of comfort and counsel to souls in distress. We can be sure that when he left England to undertake a new way of life, he was already a practised and wise spiritual director, and his qualities, which in Italy Catherine was so to esteem and revere, continued for centuries to attract readers, to provide pastors with doctrine which experience showed to be fruitful. The enduring vitality of this treatise is a most striking tribute to a man who was himself a true and worthy son of St. Augustine, and his Order’s most notable figure in the history of medieval English spirituality.

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Religious Despair in Mediaeval Literature and Art

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Religious despair in Christian experience does not spring from the recognition of a dualism between God and the world or between God and matter but between God and fallen spirits. Its focal point lies in Adam's transgression, in the sense that its opposite, saving hope, concentrates upon the atonement of sin in Christ's sacrifice. The phrase "Christian despair" is self-contradictory, the central tenet of Christianity being its remedy for despair, its ability to counteract the disease and hopelessness man brought upon himself through disobedience, but the disease and the remedy make no sense apart from each other. Salvation can occur only where there is a need to be saved. The essence of religious despair is thus the personal experience of a contradiction between the deity and the finite spirit, an antagonism between the infinite and the finite will. Its mainspring lies in the Old Testament insistence on human depravity, creaturliness or inadequacy (e.g., in Psalms, Job and many of the Prophets) and in the Pauline and Augustinian formulations. In its extreme form it involved a personal loss of trust in supernatural salvation, a criminal lack of hope seen as springing from pride and implying an absence of faith. Marlowe's Faustus may be regarded as an exemplification of such despair.

In the present essay I propose to discuss some of the evolutions of the idea of religious despair in mediaeval and Renaissance art and literature. Its recurrence in both is to be attributed to its absolutely fundamental role in the elementary mediaeval view that the spiritual sphere contains two realms, the realm of God and the realm of Satan, the kingdom of heaven and the empire of sin, guilt and damnation, and that the most important question facing the soul is whether its proper habitat is the one or the other. In the former belong the angels who have not fallen and the men whom God has chosen for his grace. In the latter, together with the evil spirits, are the reprobate, all those condemned to be punished for their sins and for the sin committed by the father of our race. In the frame of mind proper to the former is Hope, that proper to the latter is Despair. And the quintessence of despair lies of course in the devil himself: his desper-
ation, no less than his pride and his madness, is a chief constituent in his mentality. Dante sees "Lo imperador del doloroso regno" in the Last Circle, "...con sei occhi piangeva, e per tre menti / gocciava il pianto e sanguinosa bava." 1 In Milton's Satan "conscience wakes despair that slumbered," and he later cries "Which way shall I fly Infinite wrath and infinite despair? / Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell." 2 Examples may be multiplied from earlier literature, 3 for the connection between diabolical pride and diabolical despair is absolutely fundamental in all the literature we shall examine; in hope lay submission to the object of hope, whereas despair implied rebellion. The desparer placed himself outside the divine order in precisely the way Lucifer had rejected his honoured post in God's ordered kingdom. He who despaired of his salvation was regarded as being in the psychological and theological state of discordia, disturbed, disordered, isolated, cut off from the source of his being, and consequently desiring universal discord and alienation.

St. Augustine constantly stresses the connection between pride, rebellion, disbelief and despair. Desperatio Deo est contumeliosa. Despair of God's mercy involves a doubt concerning God's power, for it implies a belief that there is more strength in sin than virtue in God to annul it by forgiveness:

Nullus itaque tantum unquam possit peccare, quod poenitens velit desperare. Quid enim aliquid est desperare, quam Deum sibi comparare? Nam qui de Deo non praesumit veniam, non animadvertit plus peccato suo Dei posse clementiam. 4

This insistence on God's mercy as a manifestation of his glory and omnipotence may be traced to such Old Testament promises as Isaiah's "Though your sins be scarlet, they shall be as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool." 5 Hope, humility and faith come to the same thing, for to believe in His all-powerful mercy is to trust in Him. Conversely, despair, pride and lack of faith may equally be identified.

Augustine also insists that despair can be a motivation for further sin; having despaired of eternal salvation, the desparer must wish

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1 Inferno, XXXIV, 28, 53-4.
2 Paradise Lost, IV, 234, 73-6.
at least to enjoy his temporal existence, and this desire will drive him to voluptuousness. The personification of despair seen as sweetly reasoning with its victim (which was later to become so vivid in the works of writers like Spenser and Bunyan) appears already in the writings of Ambrose and Augustine:

Desperatio dicit, Quae et quanta commissisti, quam gravia crimina, quam numerosa delicta, et pene in melius necdum vitam mutasti, necdum conversationem utiliter correxisti! ecce enim, ut cernis, mala semper consuetudine obligatus teneris. Conaris exsurgere, sed peccatorum oneribus praegravatus relaberis. Quid ergo agendum est, quando de praeteritis certa damnatio imminet, de praesentibus emendatio nulla succurrit; nisi ut non amittantur rerum temporalium voluptates, dum consequi nequeunt futuri saeculi oblectiones? 4

Having fallen into sin, some people perish rather because of the recklessness of their despair: "Quidam enim in peccata prolapsi desperatione plus pereunt;" 7 and the idea is further elaborated in the Sermons:

Sunt homines qui cum cogitare coeperint mala quae fecerunt, non sibi putant ignosci posse; et dum non putant posse sibi ignosci, dant animam jam perire, desparatione pereunt, dicentes in cogitationibus suis: Jam nulla nobis speces est; neque enim tanta illa quae commissimus donari nobis aut ignosci possunt; quae ergo non satisfacimus cupiditatibus nostris? Implena- mus saltatem praestentis temporis voluptatem, quia nullam habemus in futuro mercedem. 8

Finally, despair of salvation may culminate in "the transcendent sin" of suicide, the one transgression which cannot, in the nature of the case, be pardoned. 9 Despair thus became, as Harrington put it,

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4 Augustine, de vera et falsa poenitentia, cap. V, PL 40, 1116-1118.
5 Isaiah, I, 18.
6 Augustine, de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum, cap. XV, PL 40, 1098. Cf. Ambrose, de vitiorum virtutumque conflitu, cap. XV, PL 17, 1066:
Quae et quanta in Deum et in animam tuam comisisti, quam gravia crimina, quam innumera delicta, et in melius nec jam vitam mutasti, nec conversationem utiliter hactenus correxisti (etc.)
7 Augustine, de natura et gratia, cap. XXXV, PL 44, 266.
8 Augustine, sermo LXXXVII, PL 38, 535.
9 Augustine had no explicit scriptural authority to fall back on in his condemnation of suicide, and his initial argument is that the Sixth Commandment covers suicide no less than murder. See De Civitate Dei, I, XX et seq: "His igitur deliramentis remotis cum legimus, Non occides, si popterea non accipimus hoc dictum de fructetis esse, quia nullus eos sensus est, nec de interationalibus animantibus, volatilibus natalibus, ambulatilibus reptilibibus, quia nulla nobis ratione sociantur, quam non eis datum est nobiscum habere
“the damnablest thing that may be by the rules of the Christen religion.”

In Patristic literature, the most acute (and influential) diagnosis of the states of mind that make men prone to such despair was given by John Cassian (c. 360-435) in his Institutes. Two temptations in particular lead to despair according to Cassian, to each of which he devotes a separate book. The first is Tristicia, which “destroys the heart’s steadfastness... makes the feelings almost mad and drunk, and crushes and overwhelsms them with penal despair;” for “dejection eats into the heart like the proverbial worm.” Dejection may result from concrete causes, he remarks, such as the frustration of some particular desire or hope, but he is primarily concerned with the variety that attacks with no apparent cause or reason. This mysterious, seemingly causeless melancholy is, of course, due to the machinations of the crafty Enemy, who uses it to make men forget their vocation and their trust in God’s mercy. It may finally bring about truly damning despair, the extreme state of mind which prevented Cain from repenting after having murdered his brother, and which made Judas, after the betrayal, instead of “hastening to relieve himself by making amends,” hang himself in despair. But in addition to Tristicia, and easily distinguished from it, there is another “seed of despair” which Cassian discusses at length in a separate book. This is Accidia, a “listlessness and weariness of heart” which produces general dissatisfaction and sloth. The Greek word ἀθνηδία, literally a “non-caring state,” had already appeared in its general sense several times in the Septuagint, but in Cassian’s use it comes to signify that peculiar ennui, sluggishness and paralysis of will from which

communem... restat ut de homine intellegamus, quod dictum est, Non occides, nec alterum ergo nec te. Neque enim qui se occidit alius quam hominem occidit.” City of God against the Pagans, text and trans. G. McCracken (London, 1957), I, 93-5.


12 Proverbs, 25, 20: “As the moth injureth the garment, and the worm the wood, so dejection the heart of man.”

13 Cassian, IX, iv, 265.

14 Ibid., IX, ix, 265.


16 He translates it as toedium and anxietas cordis.
many of the desert monks suffered and which they recognized as their main spiritual fault.\textsuperscript{17}

The "Spirit of Accidia," Cassian writes, makes a monk oversleep, overeat and pay no heed to his holy duties. He is always complaining, restless, and prone to lustful thoughts. Accidia may end in despair, and this in turn frequently culminate in suicide.

After Cassian the meaning of Accidia was somewhat modified. As a technical term, it came to figure as one of the capital vices in the lists of mediaeval spiritual writers, frequently used as the proper term for the fourth cardinal sin. As such, its reference was enlarged to include the temptation Cassian had listed after it (Tristicia), as well as Pusillanimity, a kind of mental halting culminating in a total paralysis of moral activity, and Sloth, the general term for the absence of spiritual zeal. St. Gregory gives the concept of accidia-tristica an abundant progeny; from it come Malice, Rancour, Pusillanimity, Despair, Negligence (concerning divine precepts) and the evagatio mentis circa illicita, the abandonment of the spirit to the influence of forbidden things\textsuperscript{18} which was to serve as a central theme in the Christian literature of later generations, from Spenser, through Thomson's \textit{Castle of Indolence} to Dr. Johnson's concept of "Imagination."\textsuperscript{19}

Patristic writers seem to have agreed that one of the great dangers of both Accidia and Tristica lay in their tendency to lead men to irrevocable despair. The dejected state came to be identified with the state in which the sinner, feeling his sins lying heavily upon him, could no longer believe that he would gain pardon. Symptoms of melancholy were taken to imply both a paucity of belief and a sign of reprobation. The very fact that the sinner doubted God's mercy

\textsuperscript{17} "There are some of the elders who declare that this is the 'midday demon' spoken of in the nineteenth psalm," Cassian, X, i, p. 266. On the subject of beat-accidie see J. Brémond, \textit{Les Pères du Désert}, II, 318-327.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Moralia in Job}, XXXI, xiv, quoted in P. Alphandéry. "De Quelques Documents Médiévaux relatifs à des états Psychasthéniques," \textit{Journal de Psychologie} (XXVI), 767-8. Cf. M. W. Bloomfield, \textit{The Seven Deadly Sins} (Michigan, 1952). Bloomfield discusses the two basic lists of Cardinal Sins, the Cassianic and the Gregorian, which were both influential at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Though the Cassianic was popular for a long time, especially in penitential literature, the Gregorian finally predominated.

\textsuperscript{19} On the strong mediaeval element in Johnson's moral and religious thought, see my essay "Dr. Johnson on Idle Solitude and Diabolical Imagination," which is to appear shortly in \textit{English Studies}, and cf. my articles "Dr. Johnson on the 'Vacuity of Life'," \textit{Studies in English Literature}, III (Summer, 1963), 345-65, and "Reason and Unreason in Johnson's Religion," which is soon to appear in the \textit{Modern Language Review}.
was forthcoming to him implied that it was not. Once men had ceased to believe in the possibility of forgiveness and personal salvation, there was nothing to stop them from the most horrible crimes, since they felt it could make no difference in the end.

Among the literary evolutions of the themes of accidia and despair perhaps the first to notice—since they are the most primitive—are the records of actual cases of despair and suicide among the religious, diligently compiled to edify the elect with examples of reprobation. This particular genre flourished especially during the Reformation, for obvious reasons, but the horror-stories of Calvinist homiletic literature had their mediaeval forerunners. Perhaps the most remarkable among these is the work of the Cistercian monk Caesarius of Heisterbach who in the early thirteenth century devoted a large portion of his *Dialogus Miraculorum* to tales of accidia, despair and suicide. One of his stories concerns a nun who "was so much troubled by the vice of melancholy, and so much harassed by the spirit of blasphemy, doubt and distrust, that she fell into despair," came to disbelieve the basic articles of the faith, and as a consequence of this intellectual doubt fell into complete despair of salvation. She became so convinced that she was "one of those appointed to eternal ruin," that she finally attempted to drown herself in the Moselle.20 Another tale is about a certain lay brother who "by some incomprehensible judgement of God" grew melancholy and became so obsessed with fear for his sins that he despaired of eternal life. "Not that he was troubled with any lack of faith, but rather that he lost hope of salvation; by no authority of scripture could he be lifted up, by no examples restored to the hope of pardon; though it is believed that he had never been a great sinner. When his brethren asked him what it was he feared, and why he despaired, he would reply: "I cannot say my prayers as I used, and so I am afraid of Hell!" He finally went to the fishpond near the monastery and drowned himself.21

Tales of accidia occupy a separate section of the *Dialogus*, in which appear such stories as that of the lay brother who was sleeping in church, full of accidia; on his head a cat (one of the devil's common guises) was seen sitting; "and as soon as it placed its paws upon this brother's eyes, he began to yawn."22 Another went to sleep in the

choir and was struck in the face with a filthy wisp of straw, such as grooms use for rubbing down horses, by the devil who appeared to him in his dream as "a tall and mis-shapen man." Recoiling from the blow, he awoke in terror, and struck his head sharply against the wall. 23 Other tales concern a sleepy monk round whom some hogs were seen crowding, and whose grunts were heard, 24 and another who frequently slept in the choir, and who was smitten on the cheek with so much force by the Crucified One that within three days he died. 25 A curious instance of the way God's Justice and infernal malediction were sometimes identified in the mediaeval mind.

At first sight it appears from these stories that when Caesarius spoke of accidia he had in mind a rather literal and simple conception of sloth, not very different from the modern notion. This is not the case. Indeed, the combination of sloth and melancholy leading to despair which is implied in the composite idea of Accidia as Caesarius conceived it is one of its most important characteristics. He leaves us in no doubt about this:

Novice. — I remember that you said above that accidie and melancholy were the same vice.

Monk. — It is true, because accidie is melancholy that is born of malice and despair. 26

Accidia, in short, is "a depression born from a troubled mind; or a sense of weariness and excessive bitterness of heart, by which spiritual happiness is cast out, and the judgement is overthrown by a headlong fall into despair." 27 Caesarius derives the word from acid, because "it makes all spiritual exercises bitter and insipid to us" 28—a typical attempt at etymology in terms of analogical significations. The progeny of accidia or depression are malice, rancour, cowardice, despair, reluctance to obey, and the straying of the thoughts into forbidden places. It is a common temptation, we are told, "a vice very apt to tempt the Religious." 29 Its connection with Pride, on both the theological and the psychological levels, is made obvious.

23 Ibid., IV, xxxiv, 231.
24 Ibid., IV, xxxv, 232.
25 Ibid., IV, xxxviii, 234.
26 Ibid., IV, xxviii, 234.
27 Ibid., IV, xvii-lxi, 223-54.
28 Ibid., IV, lii, 254.
29 Ibid., IV, xxviii, 223-4.
Apart from this edifying "true tale" genre, the great locus of Despair in mediaeval literature, as in its art, is as a personification in the elaborate listings of the Sins and Virtues and the myriad more or less allegorical variations upon the theme of the *psychomachia*. The earliest pictorial representation of Despair appeared, in fact, with the illustrated manuscripts of Prudentius' *Psychomachia*, the early fifth century work which turned the traditional idea of the battle between the virtues and vices in the soul into a full-blown allegorical epic, and which remained extremely popular and influential throughout the Middle Ages.\(^{30}\)

Moral allegory and personification were not new in Latin poetry when Prudentius wrote. In classical murals abstract qualities are frequently personified, and as in Prudentius, these concepts are given the forms of women, due to the feminine gender of most abstract nouns in Latin. Even more fundamental was the deification of abstract conceptions (e.g. the goddess Fortuna). Plautus had made use of personifications (especially in his Prologues), and it was part of the stock in trade of the poets, especially the satirists.\(^{31}\) Quintilian writes of *prosopoeia* as a rhetorical "embellishment".\(^{32}\) In the tale of Cupid and Psyche which Apuleius had included in his *Metamorphoses* such figures as Solicitudo, Tristies,\(^{33}\) Sobrietas and Consuetudo\(^{34}\) appear. But with Prudentius, what had been an occasional device or indeed a mere "embellishment" in classical poetry and rhetoric becomes an independent genre, and the theme of the Holy War between Good and Evil, which appears in the earliest writings of Christianity\(^{35}\) (and is far older than Christianity) gains the full dimensions of a continuous and diversified Virgilian battle.

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\(^{30}\) More than three hundred manuscript copies of the *Psychomachia* have survived, attesting to this popularity. See the Introduction to Prudentius' *Works*, trans. H. J. Thomson, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1949-53), I, xiv-xvi.


\(^{32}\) See B. Spivack, *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil* (New York, 1958), 78.

\(^{33}\) Apuleius, *Metamorphoses*, vi, 9.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., v, 80.

\(^{35}\) Cf. Ephesians, 6, 14-7: Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and
In Prudentius' poem it is Ira who commits suicide—as she was still doing in Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* eleven hundred years later—after having failed to kill Patientia. But frequently the illustrators showed the *Psychomachia*’s five other vices (Superbia, Luxuria, Idolatria, Avarititia, Libido) following Ira’s example and killing themselves in turn.\(^\text{36}\) A late manuscript of the *Psychomachia* shows Tristica sitting with her hands resting idly on her lap; she is called Desperatio because she personifies the condition of the soul that allows despair to enter. Her satellites are Death wielding his scythe, as well as goblins and demons.\(^\text{37}\)

In the original version of the poem the suicide is limited to the third encounter of the battle, the clash between Wrath and Long-Suffering. Wrath attacks, “showing her teeth with rage and foaming at the mouth, darts her eyes, all shot with blood and gall,”\(^\text{38}\) and hurls pikes and javelins at the virtue. The weapons are rendered harmless by Long-Suffering’s three-ply corselet of mail. The monster then hits the virtue over the head with a sword, but the blade rebounds from the virtue’s helmet of forged bronze. Wrath is beside itself. It flings away the shattered sword and is fired by a wild passion to slay itself. It picks up one of the missiles it had scattered before so ineffectually “for an un-natural use,” fixes the shaft in the ground, and stabs itself with the upturned point.\(^\text{39}\)

Throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries Despair was continually depicted, accompanied by allied vices and vanquished by the opposite virtues, on stained glass windows, candlesticks, church portals and illuminated manuscripts. The earlier representations generally having on the breastplate of righteousness; And your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.” Spivack discusses the literary evolutions of this martial image in Sts. Augustine, Tertullian and Cyprian. (pp. 77-8).


kept close to the Prudentian text: it was Wrath that committed suicide and in doing so combined in itself the characteristics later conventionally ascribed to Despair. Examples may be seen at Lyons, where a stained glass window shows Wrath piercing its stomach with a sword,\footnote{Reproduced in E. Mâle, *L'Art Religieux du XIIIe siècle en France* (Paris, 1902), fig. 45, p. 142.} on a capital in the Ste. Madeleine at Vézelay,\footnote{Reproduced in R. Van Marle, *Iconographie de l'art profane au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance* (La Haye, 1932), Vol. I, fig. 85.} and again in Notre-Dame-du-Port at Clermond-Ferrand.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. II, fig. 1.} Gradually, however, Desperatio seems to have achieved its autonomy from Ira. The transference of the traditional attributes may be traced in France. The Lyons window shows Ira killing itself opposite the figure of Patientia, but at Auxerre it is Desperatio that commits suicide, also with a sword and with precisely the same gesture, and also situated opposite Patientia. In Notre-Dame-de-Paris, the sculptor, more logically than the painter at Auxerre, places Desperatio opposite Spes, but represents it in the attitude which has formerly been associated with Ira.\footnote{The difficulty mediaeval writers and artists had in pairing the lists of virtues and vices is probably due to the independent origin of the two lists. For these origins see Bloomfield, *Seven Sins*, Ch. II.} By the thirteenth century Despair had become an independent figure in religious art. It survives, opposite Spes, in a glass-painting in the west choir of Naumburg Cathedral.\footnote{Katzenellenbogen, *Allegories*, p. 20, n. 1.} In twelfth-century Vezelay Despair had already appeared on one of the portals, but only as the inevitable concomitant of the sin of Luxury, which was depicted as a woman devoured by serpents. Despair stands near this woman, its hair on end, like a curious halo of flames, its mouth wide agape in a stylized expression of terror, holding a sword to its throat. Both figures, Luxury and Despair, are engulfed in carefully sculptured waves of infernal fluid.\footnote{Rep. in E. Mâle, *L'Art Religieux du XIIe siècle en France* (Paris, 1947), fig. 216, p. 374, described p. 376.} But in the thirteenth century Despair took its rightfully autonomous place in the great virtue-and-vice cycles of N.-D. d'Amiens, N.-D. de Paris and N.-D. de Chartres. In Paris, in bas-relief on the façade of the cathedral, the virtues are personified as grave, immobile and majestic ladies bearing noble emblems. They are no longer struggling; indeed, they seem to have won the battle. The vices, on the other hand, are studied for their effects rather than as static personifications.
Avarice is shown counting money, Luxury making love, Discord beating its wife and Despair piercing itself with a sword, falling backwards.\(^46\)

The greatest example of the Despair allegory in early Renaissance art is Giotto's medallion in the Chapel of the Scrovegni at the Arena in Padua. Desperatio, a woman hanging by her neck from a rod extended across her cell, throws her hands sideways in a hopeless gesture, fists clenched, while from the upper left hand corner of the picture a black fiend descends, obviously intent on grabbing her soul.\(^47\) In Renaissance art, on the whole, despair is depicted as no less diabolical than in the early allegorical portrayals.

In the fourteenth century Breviary of Charles V the miniature of Hope and Despair shows an old man on his death bed. On his right, Hope, a haloed woman, is offered two crowns by angels and stretches out her hands to receive them. On the left we see Judas hanging from a tree, clutching at the rope with one hand, rendered in a most realistic fashion.\(^48\) An illumination in a late fifteenth century manuscript of Laurent de Premierfait's translation of Boccaccio's De Casibus\(^49\) uses Antony and Cleopatra to portray a study in criminal despair. Cleopatra's face merely registers this emotion as she holds the serpents to her bare breasts. Antony, however, who energetically pierces himself with a huge sword, is a pure personification of abstract Evil. His face is set in a determined expression of malice. His overgrown black hair gives him an extremely diabolical look. He strongly resembles the conventional Roman soldier in Renaissance paintings of the Crucifixion, who was always portrayed as an epitome of pure, unadulterated Evil, and it is clear that in the painter's mind Antony's suicide places him in exactly the same category. The picture's message is clear: "This is the Devil's work." It is interesting to contrast the attitude

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\(^{46}\) The Hope and Despair medallions at Amiens are reproduced in Mâle, L'Art du XIII\(^{e}\) siècle, p. 141, fig. 44. The entire Amiens cycle is reproduced in Katzenellenbogen, pl. 76, as well as the Paris cycle (pls. 72a, 72b, 73a, 73b). The Chartres porch is described in Mâle, L'Art du XIII\(^{e}\) siècle, p. 131, and the Hope-Despair portal is reproduced in Van Marle, Vol. II, fig. 100.

\(^{47}\) The expression on the woman's face is somewhat effaced; both she and the devil have been scratched up by some later zealot. The picture is nevertheless very vivid. A collotype reproduction of the fresco may be found in C. Carrà, Giotto: 192 Reproductions in Collopyè (London, 1925), pl. LXXXII.

\(^{48}\) Rep. in E. Mâle, L'Art Religieux de la fin du Moyen Age en France (Paris, 1908), fig. 164, p. 112.

\(^{49}\) Br. Mus.; MS Royal, 14 E V; the picture is reproduced in W. Farnham, The Medieval Heritage in Elizabethan Tragedy (Oxford, 1956), opposite p. 112.
towards love-suicide exhibited here with the ambiguous glorification of it as somehow establishing the transcendence of love in Shakespeare, a glorification that became possible only through disregarding the axioms of mediaeval Christianity.

The imagery of despair in the works of Hieronymus Bosch, a painter concerned with witchcraft, the diabolical and the heretical perhaps more than any other, is one conventional element among others that are still taken to be products of an entirely independent imagination. I shall mention only one instance. The right wing of the *Temptations of St. Anthony* altarpiece in the Lisbon Museum of Fine Arts, when closed, shows the Carrying of the Cross, Christ's sufferings being the high parallel and point of Anthony's. The lower right hand corner depicts what can be nothing but a composite allegory of Despair. On the bank of a shallow, muddy river, a half-dressed man lies cowering. It is difficult to tell whether he is dead or alive, his hair is overgrown and dishevelled, his face haggard, his body curiously contorted in an impossible (and yet most vived) combination of utter listlessness and twisted panic. Between his legs he holds a long pole shaped like a gallows from which both a rope and a dagger dangle separately. The rope has been cut but its lower section is visible, for it is attached to the man's neck. His clothes are carelessly strewn on the opposite bank. Near them lies a dismembered hand. Down the stream a single shoe floats. What Bosch was obviously trying to do in this detail of his *Temptations* was to give us a composite visual representation of Despair, in which the various conventional methods of suicide and the usual associations with it were combined. Drowning, mutilation, piercing and hanging are all hinted at. The man's facial expression, his dishevelled hair and the contortions of his body leave no doubt as to who the murderer is. On the gallows pole, close to the man's knee, a complacent blackbird sits, connecting Despair with the ideas of witchcraft, heresy and diabolical interference which were inseparable from it in the Christian mind.50

Despair in mediaeval and Renaissance literature, as in art, occupies an important place in the sin lists and in the innumerable metamorphoses of the *psychomachia* theme. I use this term here in its widest reference, for surely many major works may be regarded as

examples of the Holy War tradition—much of Spenser's *faerie Queene*, all the morality plays, and full-fledged Elizabethan dramas like *Doctor Faustus* and *Richard the Third*. Familiarity with the conventional associations of the Despair allegory in the early works is frequently indispensable for a full elucidation of the central significance and intention of the later ones.

In mediaeval sin-lists and psychomachies Despair and Suicide frequently form an integral part of the general heading of Sloth or Accidia, but as with other notions connected with the Deadly Sins, the schematization varied and sometimes Despair was granted its independence or treated as something inseparable from the abstract concept of sin in general. In the *Ancrene Riwle* (c. 1225), which treats the Cardinal Sins from many points of view, Despair is described as the "deadliest" cub of the Bear of sloth: "pe eihtedoe is. unhope. Pes laste boreneolp is grimmest of alle. uor hit to cheowes 3 to ured godes milde milce. 3 his muchele merci. 3 his vnmete grace." A meditation upon Christ's "diligence" is recommended as the best antidote. In the *Ayenbite of Inwit* Despair appears both independently and as an aspect of sloth. By itself Wanhope is listed as one of the six sins against the Holy Ghost. First comes Overweening, and after it Wanhope,

\[
\text{thet benimth God /his merci/}
\text{ase overweninge: his riz[t] uonesse}.\]

In its connection with Sloth, Despair is treated at much greater length, for it is one of

The 6: Poyns of Sleute: thet brengeth Man
to his Ende.

These six points are Disobedience, Impatience, Grutching ("Grochyne", murmuring against good advice), Sorrow and Weariness of Life, Desire of Death, and Despair. Despair, we are told, is the devil's deadly stroke, which causes a man to commit suicide:

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51 The first English writer to translate *accidia* as sloth was Aelfric in his sermon on the Nativity, A. D. 996 or 997 (see Bloomfield, *Seven Sins*, 112:3). "Sloth" became the popular appellation for the sin, "accidie" being reserved for learned usage; e.g., *OED*, s.v. "Accidia," *Ryall Book* (1484), A5: "The fourth heed of the best of hell is slouthe, whychye is calyd of clerks accidye."


53 Ibid., p. 115.

Efter alle thise zorvuolle poyns
of sleuthe / him yeth the dycvel /
thane strok dyadlich / and deth him
in-to wan-hope. therefore he porchaceth /
his dyath / and him-zelve / slayth.\textsuperscript{55}

In \textit{Piers Ploughman} the warning against Wanhope is again given in the context of “Sleuthe”, here personified as an extremely vivid slimy character.\textsuperscript{56} In Chaucer’s \textit{Parson’s Tale} we get the old Augustinian observation, which was later to prove so predominant a motivation of villains like Faustus: “This horrible synne [despair of the mercy of God] is so perilous that he that is despeir’d, ther nys no felonye ne no synne that he doueth for to do; as shewed wel by Judas.”\textsuperscript{57} Despair, the Parson reminds his audience, is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and it frequently results from \textit{fear}—a connection we shall discover in the sequel to be essential both in its psychological significance and in its allegorical manipulations:

Now cometh wanhope, that is despeir of the mercy of God, that cometh someynne of too much outrageous sorwe, and someynne of too much drede, ymagynynge that he hath doon so mych synne that it wol nat availen hym, though he wolde repenten hym and forsake synne ... which dampnable synne if that it continue unto his ende, it is cleped sinning in the Hooly Ghost...

Certes ther is noon so horrible sinne of man that it ne may in his lyf be destroyed by penitence, thurgh vertu of the passion and the Crist. Alas ! what nedeth man than to bene despeir’d, sith that his mercy so redy is and large? Axe and have.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Accidia}, according to the Parson,

maketh [a man] hevy, thoughtful, and wraw... Thanne is Accidie the angwissh of troubled herde; and Seint Augustyn seith, ‘It is anoy of goodness and loye of harm.’\textsuperscript{59}

Now certes, this foule synne, Accidie, is eek a ful great enemy to the lifelode of the body; for it ne hath no purveaunce agayn temporeal necessitee; for it forlesweth and forsluggeth and destroyeth alle goodes temporeles by reccheleenesse... Accidie is lyk hem that been in the peyne of helle.

If Chaucer’s \textit{Parsons Tale} provides us with the straight homiletic approach, in Spencer we find the allegory of despair full-fledged, a

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, 334.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}, II. 692, 694.
\textsuperscript{59} For the original in Augustine see his treatise on Psalms, 104. 25, \textit{PL}, 87, col., 1599, cited by F.N. Robinson.
personification which represents a thorough reworking of the traditional material. Janet Spens' remark that "the quality of the despair passage lies in this, that while the whole scene is intentionally hideous and repellent, yet the general effect is overwhelmingly beautiful" surely describes the essential quality of the passage, but she is wrong. I think, in her interpretation of Despair's argument that

The longer life, I wote the greater sin,
The greater sin, the greater punishment.

These lines, she says, mean that "though we are helpless, we shall be held responsible and right and wrong are utterly confused." This is to give an unnecessarily modern and confusing twist to a perfectly clear-cut and conventional mediaeval idea about despair. The lines should be understood quite literally, since they represent a very common aspect of the Temptation. One of despair's traditional arguments in favour of suicide is that Sin is part of the very definition of present existence, that to live means to sin, and that therefore to cut life short can only mean less sin in the final account. The argument is put in this form because of its obvious untruth. The reader is supposed to know that all sins may be "destroyed," as Chaucer's Parson put it, through proper repentance and an appeal to God's forgiving nature, whereas suicide cannot be repented. The argument is merely another example of the devil's insidiousness in perverting truth.

The Cave of Despair episode in the Faerie Queene occurs in Book I, Of Holinessse. The Redcrosse Knight has set forth as the champion of Una to slay the dragon which devastates her father's lands. He vanquishes Error, but is later led by the deceiving Archimago (Guile and Fraud) to distrust Una and take Duessa in her stead, thus falling into the trap of false religion. He defeats the knights Sans Foy and Sans Joy but falls prey to the Giant of Pride, Orgoglio. Una enlists the divine strength of Arthur in his aid, but the Redcrosse Knight, suffering remorse for his sinful pride (that is to say, the doubt or temporary despair which results from a proper consciousness of sin but which is dangerous in that it makes the soul more prone to sinful, "final" despair), encounters Sir Trevisan, who is fleeing the Man of Despair. The Redcrosse Knight perceives Trevisan's head

To be unarmed, and curl'd uncombed heares
Vsparing stiff, dismayd with uncouth dread;

80 Spencer's Faerie Queene; an Interpretation (London, 1934), 137.
81 Ibid., 135.
Nor drop of blood in all his face appears
Nor life in limbe: and to increase his feares,
In fowle reproach of knighthoodes fayre degree,
About his neck an hempen rope he wears,
That with his glistening arms does ill agree.\footnote{62}

Sir Trevisan serves Spenser as a vehicle for a partial personification of the mental state of despair, leaving other characteristics, which we shall come to later, to the Man of Despair himself, who is of course a \textit{persona} of the devil. The victim-aspects of the personification, which Spenser gives to Sir Trevisan, and which we have already seen in Bosch's \textit{Temptations of St. Anthony}, is—we shall see in a moment—taken up by Spenser's imitators and ascribed to the victimizer. It is perhaps relevant to point out here that what C. S. Lewis says of the Allegory of Love is true also of the Allegory of Despair: by the fourteenth century the personifications of moral allegory had in many cases become independent and purely conventional. They could be treated in a literary way without reference to the moral and psychological realities from which they had originally been abstracted. In the mediaeval imagination the virtues and the vices had become autonomous figures.\footnote{63} Despair occupied a place of honour, or rather dishonour, among these figures.

In the case of Spencer, as Dr. Spens points out, despair was probably not a mere abstraction but had a very personal significance; but with his imitators, one feels, the presentation may well have been purely conventional. Their portrait of despair adheres closely to Spenser's description of Sir Trevisan's appearance. In Phineas Fletcher's \textit{Purple Island} we read of

\begin{quote}
black Despair
Bred in the dark wombe of eternall night:
His looks fast nail'd to Sinne, long sooty hair
Fill'd up his lank checks with wide staring fright:
His leaden eyes, retir'd into his head,
Light, heaven, and earth, himself, and all things fled:
A breathing coarse he seemed, wrapt up in living lead.\footnote{64}
\end{quote}

Accompanying him are

\begin{quote}
many a fiend and ugly sprite
Armed with ropes and knives, all instruments of spight.\footnote{65}
\end{quote}

\footnote{62} \textit{The Faerie Queene}, I, ix, \textit{Works}, ed. E. Greenlaw et al. (Baltimore, 1932-57), 125 f.
\footnote{63} C. S. Lewis, \textit{The Allegory of Love} (Oxford, 1936). See p. 86 on this point.
\footnote{64} P. Fletcher, \textit{The Purple Island}, XII, xxxii, \textit{Works}, ed. A. B. Grossart (Blackburn, 1869), IV, 329.
\footnote{65} \textit{Ibid.}, 330.
In Fletcher's *Appolyonists* we get the same portrait with slight variations:

Despaire, sad, ghastly spright,
With staring looks, unmov'd, fast nayl'd to sinne;
Her body all of earth, her soule of fright...
Pale, pined cheeks, black hayre, torne, rudely dight;
Short breath, long nayles, dull eyes, sharp-pointed chin. 66

These are the conflicting conventional characteristics of the personification. To make Despairo both wan and dark Fletcher gives it pale cheeks and black hair. And the overgrown hair and terrified-terrifying visage reappear in Giles Fletcher's *Christ's Victory and Triumph*:

His black uncombed locks dishevell'd fell
Aboue his face, through which, as brands of hell,
Sunk in his skull, his staring eyes did glowe,
That made him deadly looke. 67

In Wither's *Abuses Stript and Whipt* Despaire, the "impious brat of Feare," again stands "ready to doe hurt", armed with "poysons, ropes or poin yards," so that——

one step, no more
Reaches from hence unto damnations dore. 68

The conventional personage of Spenser and his followers appears also in Sylvester's translation of Du Bartas: "Sorrow," we are told, is the first of the four diseases of the soul that comprehend all the rest, the others being Excessive Joy, Fear, and Desire. Sorrow is

Accompanied with selfe-consuming Care
With weeping Pittie, Thought, and mad Despairo
That bears about her, burning Coales and Cordes,
Aspes, Poysons, Pistols, Halters, Knives and Swords. 69

Having briefly noted some of the appearances of Despairo in art and literature, we are now perhaps in a position to see the conventional characteristics attributed to the personage Despairo in the mediaeval (and Renaissance) mind. He is stark, raving mad. His face is contorted in an expression of fright and is therefore frightening. His proper colour is black, and he is, of course, one of the devil's many disguises.

67 G. Fletcher, *Christ's Victory and Triumph in Heaven, and Earth, over, and After Death* (Cambridge, 1610) II, xxv, 33.
The devil is "the principal agent and procurer of this mischief [Despair]", wrote Burton, and Shakespeare's Henry VI prays:

O, beat away the busy meddling fiend
That lays strong siege unto this wretch's soul
And from his bosom purge this black despair.

Spenser's Man of Despair "creep[s] close as Snake in hidden weeds"; Giant Despair's metamorphoses in the Pilgrim's Progress are Appolyon, Beelzebub, the Barking Dog, etc. In the conventional allegories he is portrayed as a man whose face is contorted with terror, his hair and nails overgrown. He is frequently accompanied by misshapen monsters of the imagination, armed with every conceivable instrument of death. Frequently, in both art and literature (e.g., the Fairie Queene) he himself is depicted as committing or trying to commit suicide. He combines in himself the characteristics of deceiver and deceived, and though he is completely mad he reasons sweetly with his victims, always trying to achieve his aim—their damnation—by making them put an end to their lives. As Samuel Bolton remarked in his Instructions, "In that... terrible temptation to Self-murther... the Adversary deals by way of argument... and presses reasons, such as they are, upon the tempted." This is perhaps his most universal trait, these sweet arguments he is capable of, though of course this is one of the chief traits of the devil in his more general role.

Despair's arguments were fixed and conventional. From the writings of the early Fathers to the Calvinistic tracts of the seventeenth century, we find him repeating the same doubtful syllogisms. They may be schematized as follows:

a) God's Justice is unshakeable. It will not permit Him to show you Mercy. Despair.

b) If you do not die now you will inevitably multiply the sum-total of your sins, since life without sin is impossible. Kill yourself and ensure at least that your sins will not increase. Despair.

c) Life, as you well know, is full of hardship, frustration and misery.

71 II Hen. VI, III, iii, 21.
72 Fairie Queene, I, ix, 127, p. 123.
73 Pilgrims Progress, OSA ed., pp. 140-6, 335.
74 Ibid., 72, 282, 109.
75 Ibid., 33, 75, 109, 110, 230, 231, 273.
76 Ibid., 225, 229.
77 S. Bolton, Instructions for a Right Comforting afflicted Consciences, 2nd ed (London, 1665), 579 f.
Suicide may be painful, but the pain is of short duration and is followed by quiescence and Ease. Despair.

d) You know as well as I do that you are reprobate. You feel it in your bones and your certainty is increased each time you review your past life. So play the game. Despair.

e) Religion is a pack of lies anyway. We both know you have no faith. You may as well give up. Despair.

f) Let me show you the fires in my hell. They burn eternally—there is no respite. Surely the prospect is sufficiently terrifying to make you want to give up the fight? Despair.

g) Do it gradually. You will find it much easier that way. First abandon yourself to the delightful fantasies of Sloth. You need to escape reality, to lose contact with it, to give your Imagination free rein. First you will find yourself growing deliciously melancholy, then bitter, finally desperate. Give up. Despair.

h) Look at this dagger, this rope, this poison, this asp, this sword. Are they not tempting? Don’t you find they tempt you to use them on yourself? Despair.

i) Would you like more power? Fame? Knowledge? Sex? All you have to do is be mine and I’ll give it to you cheerfully. Despair.

j) Why be an abject slave of God? Does your own noble Self deserve no attention? The way to liberty is simple. Despair.

k) God cannot love an ugly, odd creature like yourself. You are deformed, illigitimately conceived, a stranger in God’s ordered creation. The only logical thing to do is to despair of ever becoming part of it. You must recognize your status as one of my subjects, for I am sole master of deformity and illegitimacy. Despair.

These and other subtle variations are Despair’s habitual sophistries. Some of his arguments contradict others, some may seem peculiar to the modern mind but are taken for granted in the early literature. The one I have listed as f) for example: time and again we find that Despair paradoxically uses the very prospect of damnation to tempt men to kill themselves, the point being that fear of hell implies an obsession with God’s Justice which excludes all faith in his Mercy, hence a kind of atheism and an inability to repent deserving damnation. An overdeveloped sense of guilt leads to an absolute conviction that the soul is headed for hell, too much concern for one’s sinfulness brings about a horrible fear of punishment, and this obsession itself is a motive for additional sin in one case and a direct cause of suicide in another. “Fear” and “doubt” therefore are tricks of Despair, traps in
which it ensnares unwary souls. As Sir Thomas More put it in his *Dyalogue of Comfort agaynst Tribulacyon* (1534), "this feare cometh by the devill's drift" and in the *Faery Queene*, when "the miscreant" Despair wishes to clinch his long argument and provide the final touch, he shows the Redcrosse Knight, whose conscience is already in a state of "trembling horror":

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painted in a table plaine
    The damned ghosts, that doe in torment waile,
    And thousand feends that doe them endlessse paine
    With fire and brimstone, which for ever shall remaine.^
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Like Faustus, Clarence and Richard Crookback after him, the Redcrosse Knight is thoroughly dismayed by this sight. He becomes obsessed with the image of death and damnation. His mind is so filled with God's "burning wrath" and the "righteous sentence of His Law," that he is about to kill himself, and is saved only at the last moment by Una's reproaches. Like Faustus, it is the prospect of hell and in particular the *eternal* aspect of its tortures that he finds most conducive to despair. Like all the prototypes of despair, he interprets it as a sign of God's "Judgement" or "Law." This again is entirely conventional. In the *Ars Moriendi* we find the devil coming to the deathbed bearing a great book in which all the sins of a lifetime are inscribed. He uses the thought of these sins and the prospect of eternal damnation opened up by them to tempt men to die in despair. The devil reads out the catalogue of sins to the dying man, listing them under the headings of the seven Mortal Sins, and tries to persuade the dying man that he is necessarily damned, "elles god sholde not be a true Juge".

On the other hand we find the devil commonly arguing that death is pleasant. It is an easy and obvious solution for life's ills. "The Devil hath power / To assume a pleasing shape" says Hamlet, and although I am quoting out of context, it will be remembered that the entire play has this tempting ease of death as one of its root-images. The formulation in the *Faerie Queene* is the typical one: Despair tells the Redcrosse Knight that Sir Terwin (whom he has succesfully tempted to commit suicide and whom the Redcrosse Knight wishes to avenge)

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does now enjoy eternal rest
    And happy case, which thou dost want and crave.^
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78 Ed. Antwerp, 1573, p. 77.
79 I, ix, p. 133.
80 *Ars Moriendi*, that is to saye the craft for to dye for the healthe of mannes soule (Westmynstre, 1491), fol. liii in Cambridge University Copy Syn 5. 60. I.
82 I, ix, p. 130.
What if a little pain must accompany the act? The pain is of short duration, whereas the respite from pain that follows is everlasting:

Sleepe after toyle, port after stormie seas,
Ease after warre, death after life does greatly please.

The idea recurs in many writings concerned with countering despair. Bolton, after the passage I quoted in connection with Despair's addiction to argument, quotes the devil as saying "It is soon done, and the paine quickly past: thou art like to languish and lie in misery all thy life long." 83 This is Despair's conventional siren-song, his fascinating offer of quiescence to men torn by the "stormie seas" of life.

But if to modem man the siren-song, the argument from the attractions of death's ease and the total liberation from the stresses of life would be the first to occur, in the early writings it is far less common than the argument from sin, which follows the old Augustinian formula. Whenever Despair appears and indulges in his deceitful reasonings, this is one argument he is sure not to miss. In Skelton's Magnyfycence the character Dyspare addresses the protagonist with the argument that

It is to late nowe thy synnys to repent
Thou hast bene so waywarde, so wrangling and so wrothsome,
And so fer thou art behynde of thy rent
And so ungraciously thy days thou hast spent
That thou art not worthy to loke God in the face,

to which Magnyfycence responds with

Nay nay man I loke never to have parte of his grace
For I have so ungraciously my lyfe mysusyd
Though I aske mercy I must needys be refusyd. 84

Spenser's Man of Despair similarly tops his offer of the rest and relaxation of death with what, in the last analysis, is his basic argument:

Why then doest thou, o man of sin, desire
To draw thy dayes forth to their last degree?
Is not the measure of thy sinfull hire
Against the day of wrath, to burden thee? 85

Nearly as common in allegorical literature as this traditional argument is the symbolic gesture implied in the offer of actual weapons and the concentration on their hypnotic effect. We have already seen

83 Instructions, loc. cit.
84 J. Skelton, Magnyfycence (London, 1533), fol. XXVII.
85 Faerie Queene, I, ix, p. 132.
it in the work of Bosch, Spenser, the Fletchers, Wither and Du Bartas, and it reappears in other writings, as when Mephistopheles offers Faustus weapons, or when Bunyan's "Giant Despair" tells his prisoners that they may as well make an end of themselves and does not forget to add that they may do it "either with Knife, Halter or Poison." 86 Mediaeval man probably reacted with more horror to the enumeration and presentation of such instruments than his modern counterpart—though one can imagine suicide being suggested even to our own contemporaries by a pistol in the desk-drawer or some particularly gruesome sight. It seems to be part of human nature that sometimes an object "puts toys of desperation, without more motive, into every brain." 87

An important point to notice about the early conceptualization of despair is its association with madness. Just as Hope implied conformity to the divine universal order and, therefore, Reason, so Despair implied a lack of such conformity, and, therefore, Unreason. Sixteenth and seventeenth century psychologists were particularly insistent on this point, and they were merely expressing the traditional view. J. Sym, in his Life's Preservative against Self Killing points out that "of motives to self-murder there can be none warrantably sufficient" because all such motives represent "preverted judgement" and "abused reason." 88 Sir William Denny in his Pelicanidium insists that all men who "make such a Wonder of the Miseries of the World" and fall into dejection and despair "have laid by, as useless, the Reason of Man." Rational deduction should have convinced them that misery in this world is not surprising, and Faith should have provided them with the "certainty of Hope" for the "Rejoycings of Hereafter"; lack of hope in a man attests therefore to a total dislocation of his reason. 89 Burton too remarks that when a man despairs of his salvation "the mind is eclipsed with black fumes" 90 and elsewhere in the Anatomie places despairing persons in the same category as non-believers and "superstitious" (i.e., mad) people—a category that includes all superstitious idolaters, Ethnicks, Mahometans, Jewes, Hereticks, Enthusiastics, Divinators, Prophets, Sectaries and Schismatics ... all Epicures, Libertines, Atheists, Hypocrites, Infidels, Worldly, secure, impenitent, unthank-

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86 Pilgrims Progress, p. 142.
87 Hamlet, I, iv, 75.
88 Ed. London, 1637, 189 f.
90 Anatomie, 3:4:2:3.
ful, and carnall minded men, that attribute all to natural causes, that will acknowledge no supreme power, that have cauterized consciences or live in a reprobate sense; or such desperate people as are too distrustful of his mercies.\textsuperscript{91}

The mediaeval world, in short, was very clearly divided into two camps, Good and Evil, Evil by its very nature being always proud, desperate and mad in the same measure as the Good was submissive, orderly, hopeful and rational. The conventional view of despair as implying madness is apparent also in the distracted soldier’s argument in Charleton’s \textit{Ephesian Matron}, that “to vindicate ones self from extream, and otherwise inevitable Calamitie, by sui-cide, is not (certainly) a Crime, but an act of Heroique fortitude.”\textsuperscript{92} His case is presented as an edifying example of “the vicissitudes of contrary Passions, which keep their turns in agitating and perplexing the unsettled mind of Man.”\textsuperscript{93}

An important aspect of this connection between despair and madness is the fact that desperate persons were supposed to be particularly prone to nightmares. Scences of diabolical horror arose from their disturbed conscience, or, conversely, delicious visions of criminal pleasure; for the devil usually appeared in extremes of either pleasure or pain.\textsuperscript{94} Such people’s reason having tottered, their “imagination” was supposed to hold sway, providing them with hallucinatory objects of “fear.” Wither, for example, remarks that men in despair

\begin{quote}
\textit{extremely feare
Some monstrous shapes which seeme for to appeare
Through their imaginations ... the Divell
[i8] the author and chief cause of this evil,}\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

and Giles Fletcher emphasizes the connection between despair and “vain” nightmares:

\begin{quote}
A thousand wilde Chimeras would him cast:
As when a fearfull dreame, in mid’st of night,
Skips to the braine, and phansies to the sight.\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

There is one more conventional association of Despair (one might note in passing that the patterns of the mediaeval mind were of course

\textsuperscript{91} 3:4:1:1.
\textsuperscript{92} W. Charleton, \textit{The Ephesian and Gimmerian Matrons} (In the Savoy, 1663), p. 73.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{94} R. H. Robbins, \textit{Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology}, (London, 1959), under the heading “Sexual Intercourse with the Devil” gives some striking illustrations of this fact.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Abuses}, I, ii.
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Christ's Victory}, II, xxvi, p. 33.
much more associational than ours’) that merits discussion in this context—the historical association of Despair with Judas’s “Sale of Christ.” Thus, when the Calvinistic Bunyan finally gave in to this supreme temptation, he thought in his heart “let him go, if he will!” and remarked “Oh, the diligence of Satan! Oh, the desperateness of man’s heart!... New was the battle won, and down fell I, as a bird that is shot from the top of a tree, into great guilt, and fearful despair.” To understand this we must go back to the historical figure who more than any other was popularly associated with despair. Historical exemplifications of despair abounded: Achitophel, Pilate, Nero and Saul frequently served to point its evil, “final” aspect; Job (and Christ) to show its temporary character as a diabolical attack upon the Good. But more than any others, Cain and Judas were the great archetypes of despair; especially Judas, so much so that Despair of Christ’s Mercy was equated with an abstract “sale of Christ.” There is hardly a writer on despair who does not mention Judas. In Cassian’s Institutes he is the supreme example of Accidia. In The City of God, Augustine remarks that when Judas hanged himself, “he increased rather than expiated the crime of that accursed betrayal, since by despairing of God’s mercy, though he was at death repentant, he left himself no place for a saving repentance,” and in one of the Sermons says:

Judam traditorem non tam scelus quod commitis, quam indulgentiae desperatio fecit penitus interire. Non erat dignus misericordia, ideo ei non fulsit lumen in corde, ut ad eis indulgentiam concurret quem tradiderat, sicut illi qui eum crucifixerant; sed desperando se occidit, et laqueo suspendit se, suffocavit se,... sic illi qui desperant de indulgentia Dei, ipsa desperatione intus se suffocat, ut eos Spiritus sanctus visitare non possit.

Vincent of Beauvais mentions Judas as the great example of the kind of despair that leads to suicide. Chaucer’s Parson remarks that “there nys no felowe ne no sinne that [a man in despair] douthe for to do; as shewed wel by Judas.” In the Divine Comedy, the Last Circle of the Inferno, containing Lucifer himself, takes its name from Judas. In the

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97 *Grace Abounding*, secs. 133-140.


3 Chaucer, *loc. cit.*
Giudacca, Dante's guide points out Judas in person, being bitten by one of Satan's mouths: "Quell'anima lassù che ha maggior pena... è Giuda Scariootto,/ che il sapo ha dentro, e fuor le gambe mena." In Reformation tracts on despair the old Augustinian diagnosis is elaborated. W. Willymat, in his *Physicke, to Cure the Most Dangerous Disease of Desperation*, remarks that despairing Christians may be induced by the devil to "shorten their lives, by killing and murthering themselves, by poisoning, by stabbing, by throatcutting, by drowning, by Judas-like hanging of themselves". Burton points out that the same devil who in our youth persuades us that our sins are not grievous (in order to make us sin the more) in later life "aggravates on the other side, and telleth thee that it is a most irremissible offense, as he did by Cain and Judas, to bring them to despair." Similar remarks may be found in many Reformation tracts and collections of *exempla*.

It is important to realize that the doctrinal significance of Despair precedes all specific psychological diagnoses and classifications. Despair

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4 *Inferno*, xxxiv, 61-3. Dante meets those who have sinned by Accidia in the Fifth Circle of the *Inferno*. They are plunged in the same black bog as those who are guilty of Wrath, and their sobs come bubbling to the surface. The Seventh Circle contains both those who have committed violence against their neighbours and those guilty of suicide—thus confirming the Augustinian and Thomist identification of the two as infractions of the same law. Dante and Vergil pass through a gloomy forest. The foliage is heavy, the branches intertwine, and horrid harpies hide in the shadows. When Dante breaks off a branch from one of the trees, the tree bleeds. A plaintive voice is heard, which Dante recognizes to be that of a minister of Frederic the Second's court, who, having been calumniated by that prince's mistress, had committed suicide. The voice tells them about the fate of a suicide; when his soul is separated from his body, Minos sends it to the Seventh Mouth of Hell. It falls into the forest without having any special place assigned to it. It is to stay where it has fallen, for it forms a seed from which a tree grows. Throughout eternity the soul remains enclosed in the plant, and the harpies feed upon it, causing it great pain. (*Inferno*, xiii). The irony of this punishment is obvious: suicide, the action symbolic of the greatest Pride and ultimately of irrevocable rebellion against God's Will, is properly punished by an eternal incapacity to act, the total helplessness of a plant.


6 *Anatomie*, 3:4:2:3.

must in general be understood as the other face of Pride and as a
description of the forces of evil in the world in the widest sense, for
to despair of mercy implied a nihilistic independence, an assertion of
the individual will in the face of divine authority. In the thirteenth
century poem *Li Turnoienmez anticrist* (c. 1235) by Huon de Meri the
devil’s forces are besieged in the city of *Désespérance* by the army of
Christ, who comes from the city of *Espérance*. This is a commonplace
of allegory, showing how the *sine qua non* of all evil in the mediaeval
Christian ethos is its despair. The suicidal mania of Ira in the original
Prudentian epic was transferred to all the sins in later manuscripts,
and in many literary works it is portrayed quite apart from its connec-
tion with Accidia, as the inevitable culmination of abstract Sin. In
Hilton’s fourteenth century *Scale of Perfection*, for example, the coat of
Havkyn (the active man), which is soiled with all manner of sin, finally
involves him in wanhope. The belief in hell was inextricably tied to
the belief in the damming state of despair. The inscription on the gate
of the inferno, “Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrare” points to the
despairing terror which the prospect of hell must instil in the hearts
of those who are to enter, but perhaps it might be interpreted in a
wider sense as well: no one could suffer damnation who had not
despaired, for the abandonment of hope is the very condition of
entrance into the devil’s domain.

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8 Bloomfield, p. 134.
9 Ibid., p. 200.
10 *Inferno*, iii, 9.
The "Insolubilia" of Roger Nottingham O.F.M.

EDWARD A. SYNAN

Roger Nottingham, O.F.M., is known to have been the author of two brief works, both produced while he was a bachelor at Oxford; these are his Introitus ad sententias,¹ and the present treatise on the solution of those logical puzzles termed "insolubles" in the mediaeval schools. Both works have been transmitted in a single manuscript, British Museum Harleian MS 3243. This very extensive codex contains two longer, anonymous works with some relevance for an understanding of Roger's two efforts. One of these parallels his Introitus in that it raises the question: Utrum "deum non esse" summam includat contradictionem? (fol. 27r-42v), a crucial theme in the development of the argument of the Introitus.² The other, a treatise De insolubilibus, more complete than is that of Roger, examines and refutes four received opinions on how insolubles ought to be resolved, as well as the unnamed author's proposal and examination of yet another opinion in an extended disputation (fol. 47r-56v).

Given that the two treatises on insolubles have been included in the same collection, the longer work is a witness to the doctrinal context within which Roger contrived his more summary solutions. Too, the longer treatise provides a description of the insoluble that is far more helpful than the doctrinaire definition Roger formulated. According to the unnamed author:

Finis autem hujus scientiae est scire solvere sophismata ex quibus, non rea-
liter, sed apparenter, sequitur utraque pars contradictionis, propter quam
apparentiam talia sophismata insolubilia dicuntur, id est, difficili solubilia
(fol. 47r a, ll. 6-10).

Roger opened his discussion with a somewhat involuted expression of his disdain for various attempts made by others to unravel insolubles and, out of deference to "the usual way of considering the insoluble"

¹ For an edition of this text, with notes and introduction, see my "The 'Introitus ad sententias' of Roger Nottingham O.F.M.," Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963) 259-279; for information available on Roger Nottingham and on the manuscript of these works, see p. 259, nn. 1 and 2 of that introduction.

² Ed. cit., pars. 33-39, pp. 278, 279; for a discussion of Roger's reasoning, see pp. 268, 269 of the introduction.
(\textit{v. infra}, par. 1), followed this graceless introduction with a definition that tells more about his conviction that insolubles are, without exception, false statements than about what their intelligible structure might be (par. 1). Because he was to argue that all insolubles are false affirmations (pars. 4, 5), he defined them in terms of objective truth; then, careless of the order of discovery, he proceeded without ceremony to four conclusions on this intricate problem. The first of these states his view on what renders a true proposition true (par. 2), the second, what renders a false proposition false (par. 3), the third that no purely negative proposition can be an insoluble (par. 4), and the fourth, that every insoluble whatever is a false proposition (par. 5). The first two conclusions are the subjects of explicit demonstrations. According to his analysis, the truth of a true proposition is related as a posterior effect to a twofold cause which is prior to that truth. What causes truth in a proposition is a coincidence between, first, reality "as it is," \textit{sic esse}, a state of affairs which obtains "antecedently by nature," \textit{antecedenter naturaliter}, to the proposition and its truth, and second, the primary signification of that proposition. Priority and posteriority here are not chronological, but causal: from a temporal point of view, the two sources of truth must hold simultaneously, that is, the fact must be as stated precisely "when it is signified through what is said," \textit{quando per ipsum significatur}. This conception of the relation between a truth expressed verbally and the being of nature as an instance of the essential subordination Algazel had assigned to the caused with regard to its cause (par. 15), Roger ascribed to Aristotle and Averroes, the sole authorities adduced to reinforce his reasoning (pars. 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 39).

But the third and fourth conclusions, Roger thought, would more easily be grasped in the presence of actual sophisms, and it is to this conviction that we owe his examination of 19 sophisms, including 3 not generally admitted to be insolubles. In compensation, he argued that 8 of the 19 are not insolubles at all (par. 20 ff.).

Roger's last word is that he expected no quarter from those who disagreed with him: detractors would surely speak ill of his efforts. He had every reason to surmise that their critique of his treatise would be as acidulous as his own opening remarks with respect to other writers on the same perplexing subject; in any case, he could hope that he had written enough to match the disclaimers of the man who had provoked his attempt to deal with the issue (par. 65).

With the exception of the colophon and the marginalia, both reproduced as they stand in the manuscript with no change other than
the expansion of the scribe's abbreviations, spelling, punctuation, and paragraph division (to which Arabic numerals have been added for convenient reference), represent an editorial procedure intended to make the text more intelligible by bringing 14th century usage into conformity with more familiar norms. Two details thus submerged may have some interest for students of mediaeval Latin pronunciation: forms of persuadere appear as persuasis (par. 1) and persuadebo (par. 20); Cicero was written Cichero (par. 60). Despite the essential role of its casus, only the proposition proposed for discussion in each instance as an insoluble has been italicised. Beyond this, however, italics have been used with considerable freedom wherever their emphasis seemed to contribute to clarity. Instances of this are the merely copulative and the existential uses of est (par. 9), the emphasis on non in the description of the reality expressed by the proposition: Homo non est asinus (pars. 18, 19), and quod (pars. 31, 32, 36), as well as for terms and phrases to which Roger has devoted particular attention owing to their importance in his argument: significare aliqualiter primario and esse verum (par. 8), sic esse in re (par. 16), significare aliter quam est as equivalent to esse falsum (par. 37), and decipi as equivalent to concedere falsum (par. 46).

The following table of all the sophisms discussed with an indication of the paragraph in which each is introduced is based on the numbers given either by Roger's text or by marginal notation; where both fail, the number has been supplied:

1. .a. est falsum  par. 21
2. Socrates dicit falsum  36
3. .a. significat aliter quam est  37
4. Homo est asinus et utraque pars hujus copulatiae est falsa  40
5. Homo est asinus vel utraque pars hujus disjunctiue est falsa  42
6. Aliquod tibi propositum nescitur a te  44
7. Socrates decipitur  46
8. Plato dicit falsum ... Solus Socrates dicit verum  48
9. Omnis propositio est vera  51
10. Hoc est verum  51
11. .a. est propositio  51
   (propositiones quae conceduntur esse insolubilia et tamen non sunt...)
12. Socrates habebit denarium  53
13. Socrates non transibit pontem  55
14. ... se esse aegrum ... ipse non est sanus  56
15. Omnes propositiones verae sunt .a. et .b.  57
16. Tantum Socrates dicit verum  59
17. Tantum duo sunt vera  60
18. Nullus praeter Socratem dicit verum  61
19. Tu es .a.  63
<C>irca diversorum, frustra intuentium, deliramenta, qui de solvendorum insolubilibum recta positione scripsertur somnia, cum ipsorum positiones sufficiant semetipsas deseruere, sine plus intendo, tamquam ipsis destructis, pro recta insolubilibum solutione brevius insistere.

1 Primo igitur, juxta communem modum sumendi insolubile, supponenda est insolubilis definitio, quae est ista: Insolubile est propositio, ex cujus primario significato, cum casu insolubilis, sequitur ipsum insolubile fore falsum, vel sic non esse, quando per ipsum primario significatur. Hac definitione praemissa, ponam quatuor conclusiones, quibus persuasis, estimo quod satis plane patebit qualiter insolubile quodlibet perfecte sit solvendum.

2 Prima conclusio sit ista: Omnis propositio vera eatenus est propositio vera quatenus ipsa aliquid iter primario significat, et naturaliter antecedenter sic est quemadmodum ipsa propositio primario significat.

3 Secunda conclusio: Quaelibet propositio falsa eatenus est propositio falsa quatenus ipsa aliquid iter primario significat, et non est sic naturaliter antecedenter quemadmodum ipsa propositio primario significat.

4 Tertia conclusio: Nulla propositio pure negativa est insolubilis.

5 Quarta conclusio: Quodlibet insolubile est falsum.

6 Prima conclusio probatur quia, data propositione quacumque sumpta, aliquid iter primario significat, et naturaliter antecedenter sic est quomodo ipsa primario significat, tunc ista propositio est vera et, istis conditionibus non positis, non est ipsa propositio vera; igitur, quaelibet propositio vera etc. Ista consequentia patet de se.

7 Et alias arguo sic: Et sit .a. una propositio vera, et arguo sic: Prius naturaliter est quod .a. aliquid iter primario significat quam quod .a. sit propositio vera, et prius naturaliter est sic esse qualiter .a. primario significat quam quod .a. sit propositio vera; igitur, cum esse illud quod est alio posteriorius naturaliter, secundum illud quod est posteriorius naturaliter, dependet a suo priori naturaliter quatenus ipsum est tale, sequitur quod .a., quatenus est propositio vera, dependet tamquam a priori naturaliter ab .a. aliquid iter significare primario et ex sic esse quomodo .a. primario significat et, per consequens, .a. eatenus est propositio vera quatenus ipsa aliquid iter primario significat et naturaliter prius et antecedenter sic est quando .a. primario significat.

8 Et consimiliter arguo de qualibet propositione probanda. Quod autem .a. in esse veri dependet, ut a priori naturaliter, ex .a. antecedenter primario

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1 The treatise carries no title in the manuscript; this heading has been borrowed from the colophon, see below, par. 65; the treatise begins at the top of fol. 57r a.
significare, et ex sic esse qualiter a. primario significat. Manifeste patet quod primam partem, eo quod significare aliqualem primario est per se superius ad esse verum et, per consequens, a. esse verum est naturaliter posterius quam sit a. aliqualem primario significare.

9 Etiam patet pro eo quod non convertitur consequentia, et intendo per significatum primario illud quod correspondet totius compositioni, ut haec propositio: Homo est animal significat primario quod homo est animal, et non quod homo est.

10 Item, quod sic esse quando a. primario significat naturaliter antecedit ad a. esse verum probatur tamquam a causa ad effectum; probo per Philosphum. 9 Metaphysicae 22, ubi Commentator: "causa." inquit, "in hoc," c. quod hoc est verum: Hoc est album, demonstrato ligno, "est quia albed extra animam componitur cum ligno, et dicere quod: Dynamester est symmert costae est falsum. et causa falsitas est quia ista sunt divisa extra animam." Unde, ista auctoritas, cum simili argumento quale adducitur pro conclusione, sufficiunt ad probationem secundae conclusionis.

11 Item, pro eisdem conclusionibus, 3 De anima commento 21, ostendit Commentator quando veritas et falsitas se habent in compositione propositionis mentalis, et dicit quod: "si ... compositio" in intellectu "fuerit convenientis enti, tunc erit vera, sin autem, erit falsa." 3

12 Item, 6 Metaphysicae commento ultimo: "Vera affirmatio habet compositionem in entibus, et vera negatio di<visionem;" sumit> 4 Philosophus ens pro significato primario propositionis, unde sequitur ibidem. contra ponentes duo contradictoria, sermocinatio: (57° a/b) Contradictoria simul esse falsa, et dicit: "Et quia idem ens impossibile est" ut "sit compositum et divisum... ideo, si affirmativa fuerit vera, negativa erit falsa" et e contrario.

13 Et idem, 2 Periermeneias 6 et primo Priorium 7 et multis aliis locis.

14 Et si arguerit contra positionem per hoc 8 quod a. aliqualem primario significare et naturaliter prius sic esse quando a. primario significat, inferunt a. esse verum et e contra et, per consequens, a. esse verum non est posterius naturaliter etc., ad illud, negatur consequentia. 9

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2 Averrois commentaria et introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione latina (Venice, apud Iuntas, 1562-1574), VIII, fol. 248° E.
4 Text obliterated, possibly by water damage.
5 Venice ed., VIII, fol. 152° D, E.
6 Ed. cit., I, fol. 92° A-38° L.
7 Ed. cit., I, fol. 1° K-2° E.
9 marg. Contra.
15 Et causa est quia _a. esse verum_ infertur ab illis sicut a priori et a causa, et _a. esse verum_ infert illa sicut effectus infert suam causam, et naturaliter posterius suum prius, quia, sicut declaratum est, _a. esse verum_ dependet ex _a. aliquamiter primario significare_ et _naturaliter antecedenter sic esse_ quando ipsum primario significat, et per Commentatorem ubi supra, compositio in re est causa veritatis propositionis, et secundum Algazelem, primo _Metaphysicae_ capitulo 10: “Inter causam et causatum est ordo naturalis”\(^1\) et solvitur instantia.

16 Item, arguitur ad primam conclusionem sic: Sìt _a._, ut prius, una propositio quae taliter significando primario sit vera; tunc formaliter sequitur: _a. taliter primario significat et sic est in re_ qualiter _a._ primario significat; igitur, _a._ est verum, et e contrario non sequitur; igitur, _taliter significare et sic esse in re_ naturaliter antecedenter antecedit _a._ _esse verum_, quod est propositum.

17 Item, nulla propositio est ex se formaliter vera; igitur, cum omnis propositio vera sit formaliter vera per aliam veritatem, sequitur quod omnis propositio vera, ipsa veritate qua est formaliter vera, est naturaliter posterior ut sic; consequentia patet per Philosophum et Commentatorem, primo _Physicorum_ commento 2 et 3,\(^1\) ubi ostendunt quod forma naturaliter est prior composito cujus est forma.

18 Praeterea, talis propositio aut est vera ex se aut ex re, prout loquitur Commentator ubi supra, 9 _Metaphysicae_ commento 22; si primo modo, tunc sequitur quod ipsa sit necessario vera, quod est falsum. Si secundo modo, igitur accipit veritatem a re et, per consequens, illa veritas rei naturaliter antecedit. Unde universaliter est notandum quod prius naturaliter sic est quod homo _non_ est asinus quam talis sit vera: _Homo non est asinus_ sic significando; et similiter est estimandum de omni propositione vera.

19 Similiter, etiam prius naturaliter sic _non_ est quod homo est asinus quam quod alia talis sit falsa: _Homo est asinus_ sic significando; et consimiliter est estimandum de omni propositione falsa.

20 Et haec pro declarazione duarum priorum conclusionum sub brevitate ista sufficiant; ut autem posteriores conclusiones facilius appareant, in respondendo ad sophismata insolubilium plenius ipsas persuadebo.

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\(^1\) Ed. cit., IV, fol. 6\(v\) K-7\(r\) D; especially, comment 2, fol. 6\(v\) L: Et via ad illa, id est, via inducens ad cognitionem causarum rerum naturalium, est de propositionibus acceptis ex rebus posterioribus in esse, quae sunt notiores et manifestiores apud nos, ad conclusiones priores in esse, quae sunt notiores, et manifestiores apud naturam, et latentiores apud nos... comment 3, fol. 7\(v\) C: Dicit et illa, quae sunt cognita apud nos primo de rebus naturalibus, sunt composita causata ab elementis, et illa, quae sunt ignota apud nos naturaliter, sunt causae compositorum...
Sit igitur hoc primum sophisma: \( a. est falsum; illud sophisma sit \( a. \) et sic unde, \( a. \) esse \( a. \), et significet sophisma primario et principaliter quod: \( a. est falsum \). Istis positis, arguo quod sophisma sit falsum quia \( a. \) aliqua aliter primario significat et non est sic naturaliter antecedenter quando \( a. \) primario significat; igitur, \( a. \) est falsum. Ista consequentia patet ex secunda conclusione et ejus probatione, et alias patet ex casu quoad primam partem.

Et quoad secundam partem, probatur sic: Quia, si naturaliter antecedenter sic est quando \( a. \) primario significat. igitur, sive \( a. \) foret sive non foret, non minus esset sic, significato ipsius \( a. \) determinato; consequens manifeste falsum quia, si \( a. \) non esset, vel non sic significaret, non sic esset significato ipsius \( a. \) determinato, scilicet, quod \( a. est falsum \). Et consequentia patet quia, si naturaliter antecedenter sic est, significato ipsius \( a. \) determinato cum omne illud quod naturaliter antecededit, sit independens simpliciter \( a. \) suo posteriori, ut sic sequitur quod sic esse, significato \( a. \) determinato, simpliciter est independentis ad \( a. \) esse: consequens falsum, ut probatum est. igitur illud ex quo sequitur et, per consequens, sophisma est falsum.

Vel potest esse brevior forma ad idem sic probando, scilicet, quod non est sic naturaliter antecedenter quando \( a. \) primario significat, casu stante, quia, si sic esset naturaliter antecedenter, igitur tunc sic esset quod \( a. est falsum \) et, si ita est quod \( a. est falsum \), igitur non est sic naturaliter antecedenter quando \( a. \) primario significat; quod fuit probandum et consequentia patet ex probatione secundae conclusionis.

Item, tertio probatur breviter quod \( a. est falsum \) quia, si non est falsum, et \( a. est \) \( 57° b/57° a \) propositio aliquid aliter primario significans, igitur primario naturaliter sic est quando \( a. \) primario significat, igitur \( a. est verum \), igitur sic esse quando \( a. \) primario significat naturaliter praecedet \( a. \) esse verum; igitur, sic esse, quod \( a. \) est falsum, est prius ad \( a. \) esse verum et causa quare \( a. \) est verum; consequens falsum et contra primam conclusionem et ejus probationem.

Unde, generaliter est advertendum pro regula quod\(^{13}\) omnis propositio vera, ideo est vera, quia prius naturaliter sic est in re. quando ipsa primario et principaliter significat.

Secundo est notandum quod, quia propositio vera, ideo verificatur, quia, scilicet, sic est in priori naturae pro qua ipsa componit vel dividit, quando ista primario significat, et proposito falsa, ideo falsificatur, quia non est sic in priori naturae, quando ista primario significat. igitur, omnis propositio vera vel falsa pro aliquo priori naturae componit vel dividit. Unde, si ita est in tali priori, quando talis propositio primario et principaliter significat, tunc est vera et, si non est ita, tunc est falsa. Sic enim esse in illo priori antecededit naturaliter ad illam esse veram, et sic non esse in tali priori antecededit naturaliter ad illam esse falsam, ut est supra probatum. Per hoc ad sophisma: Admitto casum et dico quod sophisma est falsum, sicut quodlibet alius insolubile.\(^{14}\)

\(^{12}\) marg. sophisma 1m.
\(^{13}\) marg. Nota regulas.
\(^{14}\) marg. Respondio ad sophisma. contra.
27 Sed arguitur quod non, quia. si \( a. \) est falsum et \( a. \), ut supposito. habet contradictorium, igitur contradictorium \( a. \) est verum; sit illud \( b. \). Tunc \( b. \) est verum et \( b. \) praecise et primario significat quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum; igitur verum est quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. igitur nullum \( a. \) est falsum.

28 Ad illud dico\(^{15}\) quod, sicut patet ex praemissis. ideo falsificatur \( a. \) quia componit et affirmat suum significatum pro determinato priori naturae in quo non est sic qualiter pro illo componit et affirmat.

29 Consimiliter cico de \( b. \) quod ita verificatur quia. scilicet. pro eodem priori negat et dividit quod \( a. \). \( \langle \text{componit et}\rangle^{16} \) affirmat.

30 Et tunc ad argumentum. concedo quod \( b. \) est verum quae primario significat quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. et cum infertur: igitur verum est quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. nec consequens. cum illa conjunctione. quod non convertitur cum \( b. \). nec etiam negat vel dividit pro illo priori naturae dato. sed pro mensura in qua est \( a. \). quod non facit \( b. \).

31 Sed adhuc contra hoc arguo sic:\(^{17}\) Probatur quod omnes tales: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum convertatur cum \( b. \). vel quod quaelibet similis \( b. \) sit contradictorium \( a. \) contingit cum \( b. \) sit verum. sic significando quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. sequitur quod verum est quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum.

32 Ad illud admitto casum et nego ultra consequentiam:\(^{18}\) non enim sequitur quodlibet tale: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum et verum. sic significando: igitur verum est quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. et propter causam dictam.

33 Sed contra stet casus ulterior:\(^{19}\) scilicet. quod quaelibet talis: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum convertatur cum \( b. \). et proponatur tunc: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum. illud potest concedi quia convertitur cum \( b. \); et si illa inferatur tunc: igitur ita est quod nullum \( a. \) est falsum. vel aliud consimile. cum illa conjunctione. quod neganda est consequentia propter causam dictam.

34 Aliter etiam potest responderi\(^{20}\) negando illam si proponatur: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum. Et tamen concedo quod hoc est verum: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum nec sequitur quodlibet tale est verum. sic significando: Nullum \( a. \) est falsum. igitur est concedendum: utraque responsio sufficit.

35 Hoc tamen est notandum\(^{21}\) quod \( b. \) falsificetur \( a. \) quia non est ita sicut ista significat pro tali mensura priori secundum naturam: non tamen est (57°

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\(^{15}\) marg. Responsio.

\(^{16}\) em. MS illegible erasure.

\(^{17}\) marg. contra.

\(^{18}\) marg. Responsio.

\(^{19}\) marg. contra.

\(^{20}\) marg. alia responsio.

\(^{21}\) marg. Nota.
a/b) .a. falsum in ista mensura a priori. sed in mensura posteriori secundum naturam, quia sic non esse in illo priori secundum naturam sicut .a. significat pro tali priori est causa falsitatis .a. et. per consequens. falsitas .a. et .a. est falsum non est in illo priori secundum naturam. sed in posteriori; per haec ad omnia alia insolubilia.

36 Ad illud commune.22 Socrates dicit falsum. posito casu communi. patet quod illud est falsum quia ex eo sequitur quod prius naturaliter sic esset quod Socrates dicit falsum quam illud sophisma foret falsum. vel illud dicitum Socratis foret falsum. et quia sic affirmat sophisma pro tali priori naturae. Socratem dicere falsum. in quo nullum dicitum Socratis est falsum. ut patet ex casu cum aliis praemissis. ideo sophisma est falsum et suum contradictorium est verum. ut ex praecedentibus apparat: et consimiliter respondentum est ut prius.

37 Consimiliter dicitur ad hoc sophisma23 .a. significat aliter quam est. quod sophisma sit omne .a.. posito quod significare aliter quam est et esse falsum convertantur. Tunc patet ex dictis quod .a. est falsum et quod .a. significat aliter quam est. et verum est quod .a. significat aliter quam est. et quod omne .a. est falsum: similibet concedendum est oppositum sophismatis. sic. hoc: Nullum .a. significat aliter quam est. Et si arguatur sic: Sit .b.. .a. contradictorium et convertantur omnes propositiones similis. tunc arguatur sic: Nullum .a. significat aliter quam est: .a. est sophisma:igitur. sophisma non significat aliter quam est.

38 Ad illud dicitur24 quod non est syllogismus. nec valet consequentia. eo quod .b.. scilicet. major assumpta. solum esset tunc pro sophismate quod ipsemet non significat aliter quam est in illa mensura pro qua sophisma significet se significare aliter quam est. Et hoc est verum quia. in illa mensura. ipsum sophisma non est. ideo tunc non significat aliter quam est. verum tamen. quam cito sophisma se significat. sophisma fuit falsum et significabat aliter quam est respectu. scilicet. prioris mensurae naturaliter.

39 Unde patet quod discursus non plus valet quam hic. posito quod heri fuisset illa vera: Nullus homo est albus. sic significando. et posito quod illa eadem proposicio. nullus homo est albus. praeclam sic. et non aliter. modo significet quam heri significabat. et posito ultra quod Socrates hodie sit albus. Si tunc arguatur sic: Nullus homo est albus: Socrates est homo:igitur. Socrates non est albus. patet intuenti quod consequentia non valet. Dicitur enim. tertio De anima commento 22. quod "Si intellecta... fuerunt rerum, quae natae sunt esse aut in praeterito tempore aut futuro. tunc intellectus componens intelligit. cum illis rebus. tempus in quo sunt et componit cum eis."25 Ex quo patet quod cum illa proposicio. nullus homo est albus. solum componit et affirmat pro tempore quod fuit heri. et illa proposicio. Socrates est homo. solum affirmat pro praesenti; constat. igitur. quod consequentia non valet. nec est discursus.

22 marg. Instantia.
23 marg. 3. sophisma.
24 marg. Responsio.
Sic, in proposito, cum arguitur ex contradictorio sophisticatis, *nullum a. signi-
ficat alter quem est*, illa propositio negat pro illa mensura prioritatis naturalis
pro qua sophisma affirmat, sed cum subdicitur in minori, *sophisma est a.*, fit
affirmatio pro mensura naturae posteriori in quo ipsum est sophisma; ideo illa
non valet, nec est discursus, cum oporteat tam affirmacionem quam negationem
non solum esse pro eodem secundum tempus, sed pro eadem mensura secundum
naturam, ut patet ex dictis.

40 Quartum sophisma\(^{26}\) sit de copulativis: Ponatur quod tantum sit illa
copulativa: *Homo est asinus et utraque pars hujus copulativa est falsa*, et
demonstro istam copulativam et significet tam copulativa quam utraque ejus
pars sicut principaliter praetendunt, et sit secunda pars *a*.; tunc proponatur:
*Utraque pars hujus copulativa est falsa*. Si conceditur, cum *a. praeclasse sic*
significet, igitur illa est quando *a. principaliter significat*, igitur *a. est verum,
igitur non utraque pars copulativa est falsa; si negatur, igitur altera pars*
copulativa est vera, non prima, igitur *a. est verum, et a. (57\(^{b}/58\(^{f}\) a) prin-
cipaliter significat quod utraque pars est falsa, igitur utraque pars est falsa.

41 Ad illud dico quod *a. est falsum; non enim prieus naturaliter sic est sicut*
*a. principaliter significat quam a. sit falsum, ideo a. est falsum, et concedo
quod utraque pars copulativa est falsa. Et per sophismata primum et tertium
patet ad omnes reductiones.

42 Quintum sophisma sit illud: *Homo est asinus vel utraque pars hujus*
disjunctivae est falsa, et demonstro istam eadem disjunctivam, et significet
tota disjunctiva et utraque ejus pars sicut principaliter termini praetendunt.
Tunc proponatur: *Utraque pars hujus disjunctivae est falsa*; si concedetur, sit
*a. secunda pars, tunc a. est falsum. Contra: Si utraque pars disjunctivae est*
falsa, et *a. principaliter sic significat, igitur sic est quando a. principaliter
<significat,>,\(^{27}\) igitur, *a. est verum. Sed contra: Si *a. est verum, igitur ita*
est quando *a. principaliter significat, igitur est ita quod utraque pars disjuncti-
vae est falsa, igitur *a. est falsum.*

43 Ad istud conceditur quod utraque pars disjunctivae est falsa, et quod
*a. est falsum, propter causam superius tactam, et respondendum est ut prius.

44 Sextum sophisma sic: Proponatur tibi hoc: *Aliquod tibi propositum*
nescitur a te, quod sit *a. ad.*, et sit *a. omne propositum; tunc, vel *a. scitur a te,
vel nescitur a te. Si *a. scitur a te, et a. est omne propositum, igitur omne*
propositum scitum a te, igitur hoc scitur a te: *Aliquod tibi propositum nescitum*
a te, igitur scitur a te quod *a. nescitum a te et, per consequens, a. nescitum a te.
Si negatur *a. sciri a te, tunc a. nescitur a te, et a. est omne propositum;
igitur, nullum propositum scitum a te, igitur *a. nescitur a te, et ultra; igitur,
*Aliquod tibi propositum nescitum a te.* Consequentia illa est bona et antecedens
est scitum a te, igitur: consequens est scitum a te, et consequens est *a.*; igitur,
*a. est scitum a te.*

\(^{26}\) marg. sophisma 4.

\(^{27}\) om. MS.
45 Ad illud dico admittendo casum et dico quod \( .a. \) signicat pro aliqua mensura quod aliquod propositum est nescitum in qua nihil est propositum nec aliquod propositum est nescitum. Ideo, \( .a. \) est falsum, et concedo quod \( .a. \) nescitur a te, et quod nullum propositum scitur a te. Et cum arguitor: *Nullum propositum scitur a te, .a. est propositum; igitur, .a. nescitur a te, concedo conclusionem.* Et cum arguitur hujus conclusione: Antecedens est scitum a te et consequens similiter, igitur consequens est scitum a te, concedo conclusionem quia consequens non est \( .a. \), sed istud: \( .a. \) nescitur a te. Et si arguitor: \( .a. \) nescitur a te, igitur aliquod propositum nescitur a te, concedo consequentiam et conclusionem; haec tamen conclusio non est \( .a. \), sed sibi similis in voce, unde ulterior est respondendum sicut ad primum sophisma.

46 Septimum sophisma: Ponatur quod isti termini convertantur *decipi* et *concedere falsum*, et sit unus Socrates omnis Socrates, et concedat istam: *Socrates decipitur*, et nullam aliam. Tunc, aut Socrates decipitur, vel non; si decipitur, et concedit se decipi, igitur concedit praecise sicut est, igitur non decipitur; si non decipitur, et concedit se decipi, igitur concedit falsum, igitur decipitur.

47 Ad illud dico quod Socrates concedit unam propositionem falsam significantem Socrate decipi pro aliqua mensura in qua Socrates nullum falsum concedit; ideo concedo quod Socrates decipitur. Et cum arguitor: Socrates decipitur, et concedit se decipi, igitur concedit sicut est, igitur ita est sicut Socrates concedit; nego istam consequentiam quia, quamvis ita sit quod Socrates decipitur, non tamen ita est sicut per istam significatur quam Socrates concedat quia illa est falsa, et alia similis vera.

48 Octavum sophisma: Sit tantum unus Socrates et tantum unus Plato, et dicit Socrates istam: *Plato dicit falsum*, et Plato istam: *Solus Socrates dicit verum*, quae sit \( .b. \) et sit dictum Socratis \( .a. \), et significat \( .a. \), \( .b. \) praecise, sicut termini principaliter prætentunt. Tunc proponatur: *Socrates dicit verum; si conceditur consequentia, igitur Plato dicit falsum et, per consequens, Socrates non dicit verum; si negatur consequentia, igitur non est ita sicut Socrates dicit, igitur non est ita quod Plato dicit falsum et, per consequens, Socrates dicit verum.* Eodem modo argui potest proponendo: *Plato dicit verum*, et sequitur contradictoni ut videtur.

49 Ad istud dico quod uterque dicit falsum, nam \( .a. \) significat Platonem dicere falsum pro mensura in qua Plato non dicit falsum quia, si in illa mensura Plato diceret falsum, tunc prius naturaliter foret sic non esse sicut Plato dicit quam Plato diceret falsum, et tunc prius naturaliter foreret quod Socrates non dicit verum et quod Socrates dicit falsum, et tunc prius illo naturaliter foreret sic non esse sicut Socrates dicit, scilicet, quod Plato dicit falsum. Et ex hoc cum casu sequitur quod prius naturaliter foreret Platonem dicere \( 58^\circ \ a/b \) falsum et ita, ex casu, Platonem dicere verum naturaliter antecedenter Platonem dicere falsum, et esset ejus causa.

50 Consimiliter potest deduci quod \( .b. \) est falsum, ideo dico quod uterque dicit falsum. Et tunc ad argumentum, cum proponitur: *Socrates dicit verum*, negatur, et cum arguitor quod tunc non est ita sicut Socrates dicit, concedo, et cum ultra infertur: igitur non est ita quod Plato dicit falsum, negatur conse-
quentia quia, licet non sit ita sicut denotatur per istam: *Plato dicit falsum, quam. scilicet, propositionem Socrates dicit <verum>.* tamen ita est sicut denotatur per aliam sibi similem. et ideo, ita est quod *Plato dicit falsum, et respondendum est sicut ad primum sophisma. Ex praemissionis patent tam tertia quam quarta conclusio.

51 Ex praedictis etiam patet quod multae sunt propositiones quae communi- niter pro insolubilibis non admittuntur. et tamen insolubilia sunt, cujus sunt illae propositiones: *Omnis propositio est vera, posito quod non sit alia praeter istam quae sic principaliter significet: similiter illa: Hoc est verum, ipsamet demonstrata; similiter illa: *a. est propositio*. tamen nomen istius quae praecise significet quod *a. est propositio.* Tunc proponitur: *a. est propositio.* Si concedatur consequentia. *a. pro alia mensura significat. a. esse propositionem in qua non est ita quod *a. est propositio.* igitur haec est falsa: *a. est propositio et. per consequens. a. non est propositio.* Si negatur consequentia. *a. aliquali- ter primario significat et non est ita naturaliter antecedentem quadmmodum ipsa primario significat. igitur. *a. est propositio falsa. igitur *a. est propositio.*

52 Ad illud dico quod *a. est propositio falsa et. per consequens. est propositio.* Et cum proponitur: *a. est propositio concedo. et ultra concedo quod haec est propositio falsa: a. est propositio. demonstrato *a., et cum inferitur: igitur a. non est propositio. negatur consequentia quia *a. est falsa et una similis vera et ultra respondetur sicut ad primum.*

53 Et tantum pro recta solutione insolubilium nunc ultra notandum quod multae sunt propositiones quae conceduntur esse insolubilia; et tamen non sunt. cujus est ista: praed:catur quod quilibet dicens falsum habebit denarium et solum talis, et dicit Socrates quod ipse habebit denarium: tunc proponitur: *Socrates habebit denarium.* Si conceditur, tunc Socrates dicit falsum et, per consequens, non est ita sicut Socrates dicit et, per consequens. non habebit denarium: si dicitur quod non habebit denarium. tunc sequitur quod dicit falsum et, per consequens. habebit denarium.

54 Ad istud dico quod in casu isto non est aliquo insolubile. sed patet ex tertia conclusione. Unde, pro argumento dico. cum proponitur: *Socrates habebit denarium, dubito. Et si dicatur quod hoc sequitur ex utraque parte contradictionis. dico quod non. Et si arguitur: Socrates habebit denarium. igitur dicit falsum. nego consequentiam. Et si dicatur quod iste est casus. dico quod si casus ponat istam esse conclusionem: Socrates dicit falsum. igitur habebit denarium, vel e contra. tunc casus est simpliciter impossibilis et negandus. Et si dicatur quod satis est possibile quod omnis dicens falsum

28 om. MS.
29 marg. 9o sophisma.
30 marg. Responsorio.
31 marg. Nota.
32 marg. 10o sophisma.
33 marg. Responsorio.
34 MS repeats ponat; cf. below, par. 64, n. 39, where scribe has written ponatur twice.

55 Simile est: Posito quod omnis dicens verum pertransibit pontem, et solum talis, et sit tantum unus Socrates qui dicit istam: *Socrates non transibit pontem*, quae propositio principaliter significet ut termini primario praetendent.

56 Similis est hic: Sit quod omnis dicens falsum sit aegret, et solum talis, et omnis dicens verum sit sanus, et solum talis, et dicit Socrates praecisive *se esse aegrum*, et dicit Plato praecise *ipse non est sanus*; pro ipsis et consimilibus patet quod partes casus sunt impossibiles et quod casus ponit unam impossibilem consequentiam.

57 Item, aliae sunt propositiones quae admittuntur tamquam insolubilia, et tamen non sunt, quorum una est talis propositio: *Omnes propositiones verae sunt a. et b.*, quae propositio sit *c.*, sic principaliter significando, et sint *a.*, *b.*, duae propositiones verae, et non sint plures propositiones quam *a.*, *b.*, *c.* Sit *a.*, gratia exempli, ista propositio: Deus est; *b.* ista: Homo est animal, sic significando principaliter. (58° b/58° a) Tunc proponitur: *c.* est verum; si conceditur, igitur non omnes propositiones verae sunt *a.*, *b.*; si negatur, igitur omnes propositiones <verae> sunt *a.*, *b.* Consequentiae patent ex casu.

58 Ad istud dico quod *c.* est verum, non tamen est verum pro ista mensura pro consequentia *a.* vel *b.* est verum, nam *c.* componit pro ista mensura qua *a.* et *b.* sunt propositiones verae et, per consequens, *c.* est naturaliter posterior verum quam sunt *a.* vel *b.* Ideo, cum proponitur *c.* est verum, concedo, et cum arguitur: *c.* est verum, et *a.* et *b.* sunt propositiones verae, igitur non omnes propositiones verae sunt *a.*, *b.*, concedo conclusionem, et dico quod illa conclusio non est oppositum *c.* Concedo etiam quod tres sunt propositiones verae et tamen, illa propositio est vera quae principaliter significat quod omnes propositiones sunt *a.*, *b.* Et notanda est hic responsio ad tertium sophisma.

59 Aliud sophisma de exceptivis: Sit tantum unus Socrates qui praecise dicit istam: *Deus est,* sic principaliter significando, et dicit Plato illam: *Tantum Socrates dicit verum.*

60 Item simile: Dicit Socrates istam: *Deus est,* Plato istam: *Homo est animal,* Ciceron istam: *Tantum duo sunt vera,* et habeant sua primario significata.

61 Item simile de exceptivis: Dicit Socrates istam: *Deus est,* et Plato istam: *Nullus praeter Socratem dicit verum,* et non sint plures loquentes.

35 om. MS.
36 marg. Responsio.
62 Ad haec tria sophismata dico quod sunt vera, et etiam eorum exponentes sunt verae, quia solum componunt et dividunt, id est, affirmant et negant, pro mensura pro qua ipsa propositio principalis componit vel dividit. Hic tamen est advertendum quod cuilibet negativae exponenti de ipsis potest esse alia similis in voce quae, tamen, eit falsa quia non negabit pro eadem mensura pro qua negat exponens. Et per responsionem ad tertium sophisma patet ad argumenta. Notandum etiam est quod nulla propositio pure negativa est insolubilis, ut patet ex dictis.

63 Aliud sophisma: Sit .a. nomen cujuslibet respondentis, vel responsuri, aliter quam affirmative, scilicet, concedendo; tunc proponitur: Tu est .a.

64 Ad illud patet quod ista dubitanda quia, quando proponitur, tunc non respondet aliter quam affirmative, et tunc est dubium si respondebit aliter quam affirmative. Et si arguat: Tu dubitasti, igitur respondisti aliter quam affirmative et omnis talis est .a., igitur tu es .a., ad illud conceditur conclusio, scilicet, illud ultimum ponatur in casu, et pro ulteriori deductione, satis patet responsio per priora.

65 Haec, absque studiosorum praedicto, quamquam non sine detractorum obloquio, ad instantiam tuam simili sermone pro solutione insolubilium me scripsisse sufficiant.

Expliciunt Insolubilia data a fratre Rogero Nottingham, Oxoniensi bachelario, completa anno domini m°.ccc°.xliii, circa festum sancrorum apostolorum petri et pauli

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

37 corr. MS earum.
38 marg. nota.
39 MS repeats ponatur; cf. above, par. 54, n. 34.
Thierry of Chartres and Dominicus Gundissalinus

NICHOLAS M. HARING, S.A.C.

It is well known that the author of the Metamorphosis Goliae describes Thierry of Chartres as a man “whose sharp tongue cuts like a sword.” Generally speaking, this description applies also to Thierry’s writings, for he appears in them as the powerful and independent thinker of whom Clarendon of Arras says: “Unable to handle the scythe, I gathered the ears that fell to the ground under the strokes of that robust reaper.” The same Clarendon was sincere when he called Thierry “the foremost of all Europe’s philosophers.” There are indeed numerous witnesses to Thierry’s outstanding scholarly achievements. For instance, the Latin translation made in 1143 of Ptolemy’s Planisphere is dedicated to “Thierry the Platonist”. The translator, Hermann of Carinthia, calls Thierry “Latini studii Patrem”. And the philosophical poem: De Mundi universitate, composed during the Pontificate of Eugene III (1145-1153), is submitted to the approval of “the most famous teacher”, Thierry. A close study of Thierry’s sources generally confirms the impression that he was indeed a keen thinker, an original writer, and by no means a plagiarist.

However, there is at least one exception to this rule in his Commentary on Cicero’s De Inventione. A fragment of this commentary preserved in MS Leyden, B. P. L. 189, fols. 42-47, was published as early as 1834 by W. H. D. Suringar who, ignorant of the author’s name, concluded from its preface that the work must have been written shortly after 526. He arrived at this conclusion in view of the reference to Theodoricus whom he took to be Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths (d. 526).

3 Ibidem.
5 De Mundi universitate; ed. C. S. Barach and J. Wrobel (Innsbruck, 1876), 5.
6 Historia critica Scholasticarum latinorum 1 (Leyden, 1834), 213-252.
7 Ibidem, 213: Quis hujus commentarii auctor sit, incertum est.
The commentator, so Suringar surmised, must have been a ludi magister. Peerlkamp’s fanciful paraphrase of Thierry’s preface adds nothing to Suringar’s assumptions.

The publication, it seems, created no stir and remained forgotten for many years. Without ever referring to Suringar, Robinson Ellis edited Thierry’s preface because of a quotation from Petronius found in it. The transcription was made from MS Cheltenham, Phillipps 9672, now Berlin, Lat. Oct. 161. Ellis prudentely refrained from speculating about the author: “Who is the author? My reading is not sufficient.”

In 1883, Franz Buecheler reported on Ellis’s publication in an article entitled: ‘Klage eines ostgotischen Professors’. He notes that the edition of the preface serves to correct Suringar’s text and that L. Friedländer had already welcomed the improvement. Buecheler cared little for the commentary. He calls it “pretty infertile” and describes the author as an Ostrogothic grammarian, famous in his day but inflated with a rather high opinion of himself.

All these philologists fail to mention the Belgian historian Paul Thomas whose discovery of Thierry’s commentary in MS Brussels, Bibl. Roy. 10057-62, fols. 2"-30" was first recorded in 1877. In the following year, P. Thomas published two texts from the jurisconsult Paul quoted by Thierry. A more comprehensive, rather unsympathetic, study of the entire commentary was published by P. Thomas in 1884. He makes no mention of Suringar, Ellis and others. But his verdict on the work is devastating: “Au point de vue de l’interprétation, rien de plus stérile que ce fastidieux fatras rédigé en un latin barbare”. Knowing the entire commentary, especially Thierry's
digression on the malicious rumours about him and his teaching, Thomas rightly concluded that a certain Theodoricus (Brito) was the author. In the very same year (1884), B. Hauréau proved that this Theodoricus Brito was no other than Thierry of Chartres.\textsuperscript{20}

The first student to notice a relationship between Thierry and Dominicus Gundissalinus was Prof. Richard McKeon. He writes: "The \textit{De Divisione Philosophiae} of Gundissalinus contains a section on rhetoric which not merely asks the same ten questions as Thierry of Chartres but is identical, apart from slight variations, with the introduction to his commentary".\textsuperscript{21} Although McKeon admits that "the question of priority is difficult to decide", he notes that "some of the sections contained in Thierry but omitted by Gundissalinus seem rather in the nature of additions to than omissions from an original text, and the references seem better suited to the \textit{Commentary} than to the \textit{De Divisione Philosophiae}".\textsuperscript{22} "On the other hand", McKeon goes on to say, "the supposition that the work of Thierry was prior runs into the grave difficulty that all of the sciences in the \textit{Divisione Philosophiae} are treated by means of the same ten questions here applied to rhetoric".\textsuperscript{23}

We shall see that Thierry copied the entire section on rhetoric in Gundissalinus with the exception of the final paragraph in which Gundissalinus points out that rhetoric should be learned after poetics.\textsuperscript{24} Such a clarification makes good sense in its context. Its need would be much less obvious in Thierry's commentary on Cicero.

The problem was taken up again by R. W. Hunt\textsuperscript{25} who approaches it "by considering the evidence provided by the prologue to the \textit{Summa super Priscianum} of Petrus Helias".\textsuperscript{26} Hunt stresses the importance of the distinction between \textit{ars extrinsecus} and \textit{intrinsicus} made by Gundissalinus in the section on grammar.\textsuperscript{27} L. Baur, the editor of the \textit{De Divisione philosophiae}, was convinced of the Arabic origin of this distinc-


\textsuperscript{21} "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages", \textit{Speculum} 17 (1942), 17.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{23} "Rhetoric", 17, note 2.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{De Divisione philosophiae}; ed. L. Baur, \textit{Beiträge} 4 (1903), 68, line 18 to p. 69, line 7.

\textsuperscript{25} "The Introductions to the \textit{Artes} in the Twelfth Century", \textit{Studio Mediaevalia} in hon. R. J. Martin (Bruges, 1948), 85-112.

\textsuperscript{26} "The Introductions", 86.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{De Div. phil.}, 43, lines 10 ff.
tion, but Hunt shows that “it goes back to the commentary of a Latin rhetorician, Marius Victorinus, on Cicero's De Inventione”.

The distinction is described by Victorinus as follows:

Omnis ars duplex est, id est, duplicem faciem habet secundum praeceptum sententiamque Varronis qui ait esse artem extrinsecus unam, aliam intrinsecus. Ars extrinsecus talis est quae nobis scientiam solam tradit; intrinsecus quae ita cat scientiam ut illud ipsum, quod scientia dat, quibus orationibus faciamus ostendat... Ergo et ars rhetorica duplex est; nam est extrinsecus et intrinsecus. Intrinsecus autem illa est quae nobis ad actus praecptae artis insinuat; extrinsecus porro quae nobis quid sit rhetorica demonstrat...  

Thierry knew and used the Victorinus commentary, but his exposition is in almost literal agreement, not with Victorinus, but with Gundissalinus. The fact that Petrus Helias “does not mention the distinction between ars extrinsecus and intrinsecus” is sufficient to remove him as a possible source for Thierry despite the fact that, as Hunt notes, Petrus Helias has certain passages in common with Gundissalinus and, to a lesser degree, with Thierry.  

Concerning the question of priority, Hunt seems to waver. “We have seen”, he writes, “that Thierry of Chartres took over from the Commentary of Victorinus on the De Inventione of Cicero a distinction between ars extrinsecus and intrinsecus”. Speaking of this distinction he says in the same context: “Thierry takes this over in his Summa, but does not elaborate it... Gundissalinus takes it over, and connects it with the division of knowledge into theoretical and practical”. These statements may convey the idea that both Gundissalinus and Thierry made direct use of Victorinus. But at least with regard to Gundissalinus and Petrus Helias Hunt posits a common source: “The

28 Ibidem, 274 ff.
29 “The Introductions”, 87.
81 See no. 2 in Thierry’s text at the end of this paper.
32 “The Introductions”, 88.
33 Compare nos. 8 (materia), 13 (officium), and 14 (finis) in Thierry’s introduction with the text transcribed by Hunt on pp. 88 f.
34 “The Introductions”, 98.
35 Ibidem. Though in different words, Thierry also distinguishes between theoretical (ars loquendi) and practical (doctrina agendi) knowledge.
most probable explanation is that they were both drawing on some common school tradition".36

It goes without saying that the problem is related to the date of Thierry's commentary. Hunt holds that "the Summa of Thierry is in all probability his earliest work".37 However, with due respect for his views in such matters, I consider it more likely that Thierry wrote the commentary at an old age and that he copied from the De Divisione philosophiae of Gundissalinus.

Let us assume that Gundissalinus copied Thierry's introduction. If such was the case, he must have taken the following steps: First Gundissalinus copied the series of ten heads, added one and rearranged them according to the general scheme announced by him at the end of his prologue: (1) quid (2) genus (3) materia (4) species (5) partes (6) officium (7) finis (8) instrumentum (9) artifex (10) quare sic vocetur (11) quo ordine legenda sit.38

The scheme proposed and followed by Thierry is: (1) genus (2) quid (3) materia (4) officium (5) finis (6) partes (7) species (8) instrumentum (9) artifex (10) quare. By placing genus before quid, namely before the definition of rhetoric, Thierry's order undoubtedly lacks in logic. The position of partes and species is also contrary to the order announced and generally followed by Gundissalinus. The omission of (11) quo ordine by Thierry or its addition by Gundissalinus is sufficiently explained by its context.

Then Gundissalinus copied Thierry's paragraph (no. 2) on ars extrinsecus and intrinsecus, enlarged it slightly, and inserted it into his section on grammar, not into the section dealing with rhetoric.39 Passing over Thierry's remark concerning the author's intention and the book's usefulness (no. 3), he copied the three paragraphs on genus (nos. 4-6) with the exception of Thierry's statement that, since logic deals with a thesis40 and rhetoric with a hypothesis, logic and rhetoric are clearly distinguished (no. 6).

He then copied the quid or definition of rhetoric (no. 7) and placed it before the paragraphs on genus.41 After dropping Thierry's transitional phrase ("Nunc de materia artis") he transferred the next sentence

36 "The Introductions", 91.
37 Ibidem, 93.
40 See, however, De Div. phil., p. 71, line 14: Thesis igitur non est materia logice.
41 De Div. phil., p. 64, lines 3-10.
to the section on grammar.\textsuperscript{42} The succeeding paragraphs on \textit{materia} (nos. 8-12) were then placed after \textit{genus}, not after \textit{quid}. In the process of transferring, Gundissalinus changed Thierry's sentence: "in sequentibus melius dicetur" (no. 11) into: "in Tullio dicetur".\textsuperscript{48} The change was again called for by the difference of context.

After that, Gundissalinus transferred the introductory sentences of nos. 13 (\textit{officium}) and 14 (\textit{finis}) to his section on grammar\textsuperscript{44} and placed the chapters on \textit{officium} and \textit{finis} after \textit{partes} and \textit{species}.\textsuperscript{45} He ignored Thierry's clarification of the meaning of \textit{finis} (no. 15) but copied his note on the \textit{intentio artis}.\textsuperscript{46} Then Gundissalinus dispensed with Thierry's explanation of \textit{partes artis} as being analogous with \textit{partes integrales} or he rather transferred the idea to his chapter on grammar.\textsuperscript{47}

In copying Thierry's paragraph on \textit{instrumentum} (no. 19) Gundissalinus\textsuperscript{48} found that according to Thierry the \textit{oratio rhetorica} consists of six parts, only three of which are listed by Thierry; Gundissalinus changed it to five. The rest of the material copied by Gundissalinus (\textit{artifex} and \textit{quare}, nos. 20-21) shows two additions in Gundissalinus: first the sentence: "Huius autem discipline perfecta cognicio oratorem facit";\textsuperscript{49} then a paragraph ten lines long: "Vir bonus consistit... usu assiduitate."\textsuperscript{50} In keeping with his announced plan, Gundissalinus finally explains the place of rhetoric among the other sciences. Such an explanation was hardly required in Thierry's introduction to the \textit{De Inventione}.

The process just described was complicated, partly not easy to justify, but hardly impossible. And if we assume that Thierry copied Gundissalinus, we have to account for the same number of modifications or adaptations, though it would seem easier to justify the transferring of certain general principles from grammar to rhetoric.

In order to solve the question of priority, we must examine some personal elements found in Thierry's commentary. The criticism voiced by Paul Thomas and others may sound harsh and unfair. Although the verdict passed by some critics is exaggerated, it must be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 47, lines 10-11.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 66, line 2.
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 50, lines 7-8, and p. 51, lines 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 67, lines 4-16. \textit{Partes} and \textit{species} come later in Thierry's sequence (nos. 16-18).
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 67, lines 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 47, lines 16-18.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{De Dis. phil.}, p. 67, lines 17-21.
\item \textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 68, lines 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 68, lines 5-10.
\end{itemize}
admitted that the commentary is not an inspiring piece of work by any means. We know that Thierry taught rhetoric in the late thirties when John of Salisbury was among his students. Yet there is no reason to assume that Thierry ceased teaching rhetoric in later years. In fact, the extant text of Thierry’s commentary does not reflect the bold and vigorous thinker we encounter in his commentaries on Boethius.

The Thierry of our commentary is a disappointed, frustrated, obviously elderly man who broods over the rather unpleasant vicissitudes of his past and present life. The introduction or preface opens with a note of dissatisfaction and rebellion: “As Petronius says, we masters shall be left alone in the schools unless we flatter the multitude and trap them into listening. But I do not accept this state of affairs... I have so limited my class that I exclude the common herd (vulgus profanum) and the hotchpotch audience of a school”.

At the end of the fourteenth chapter of the first book Thierry suddenly interrupts his comment and, in the form of an address by Invidia to Fama, launches a bitter and scathing attack on certain critics. The description of Thierry given by Envy is not at all flattering and may even contain some kernel of truth: “Ecce Theodoricus Brito”, Envy says to Fame, “Homo barbaricae nationis, verbis insulsus, corpore ac mente incompositus, mendacem de se te vocat...” Envy indulges in bitter sarcasm: “Behold Thierry, the Breton, a man from an uncivilized land, a man who bungles his words, a man disorderly of body and mind. That man claims that you, Fame, lie about him”.

Obviously, Thierry was already famous but his fame was no unmixed blessing. Even while he is speaking or writing he can see how “prodced by Envy, Fame begins to spread her wings, makes more noises, and, guided by Envy, travels through cities and countries, fills


them with rumours, accuses Thierry everywhere, calls him ignominious names." 54 Thierry tells us that his critics denounced him as "a stupid Boeothian" who did not want to learn the truth about himself and who changed the subject as soon as people began to talk about him. They went so far as to call him "a necromancer and a heretic". 55

These words are the confession of a man who once enjoyed and apparently still enjoyed a great name but was no longer the object of universal admiration. Even his scholarly activities were ruthlessly attacked: "In scolis vero et scolarium conventibus mentes commutat ut ignorantiam eius lucretur; Platonem ei concedit ut rhetoricam auferat; rhetoricam vel grammaticam quasi per hypothesin donat ut dialecticam subripiat." 56

It is quite apparent that Thierry's tongue could still cut like a sword. But those are not the words of a young man standing at the beginning of a career. They are the confession of failure by a disillusioned scholar whose public image was tarnished not only at home but also abroad: "(Fama) urbes et nationes duce Invidia peragrat."

L. Baur maintains that the De Divisione philosophiae was written "towards the middle of the twelfth century". 57 Since some time must have elapsed before the book reached Thierry, the year 1150 would seem to be a safe terminus a quo for Thierry's commentary. At that time Thierry was advanced in age. And since it is now believed that he died or rather retired to a monastery about 1155, the terminus ad quem is likewise reasonably established. At that age it was no doubt understandable that Thierry should lean on others more heavily than in his younger years. And he may not have known the name of the author of the De Divisione philosophiae from which he copied with such complete abandon. 58

54 Ibidem: Talibus Invidiae verbis Fama permuta alas concutit, sonos multiplicant, urbes et nationes duce Invidia peragrat, rumoribus implet, Theodoricum ubique accusat, ignominios nominibus appellat.

55 Ibidem.

56 Ibidem.

57 De Div. phil., 164: "gegen die Mitte des xii. Jahrhunderts".

58 The oldest (MS Vat. Lat. 2186; s. xiii) of the five manuscripts used by L. Baur is anonymous and only one rather late manuscript (MS Oxford, CCC 86; s. xv) bears the author's name in the original text. No twelfth-century manuscript is known to exist. In one copy (MS Digby 76. s. xiv) the explicit reveals that Alfarabi was also considered its author: Explicit liber Gundisalvi De Divisione philosophiae; alii putant quod sit Alpharabilii. In fact, the work was traditionally ascribed to Alfarabi.
But why did Thierry change the order found in Gundissalinus? Although it is perhaps impossible to propose an answer to this question, it can be said with some degree of certainty that the different sequence is not due to a standardized *accessus ad rhetoricam* used as a common source by Gundissalinus and Thierry. We have seen that Thierry copied almost the entire section on rhetoric and borrowed several passages from the section on grammar. All the passages borrowed from the section on grammar are of a general nature and may be called definitions applicable to all the individual topics discussed by Gundissalinus. For that reason one might expect to find them in the prologue to the *De Divisione philosophiae*. But Gundissalinus wrote his prologue and dealt with three sciences (*sciencia naturalis*, *mathematica*, *sciencia divina*) before writing his section on grammar in which he makes the general statements found there and copied by Thierry.

In other words, neither Gundissalinus nor Thierry copied a common source or standardized *accessus*, for in that case Gundissalinus would also have those general statements in the same context, namely in the section on rhetoric. One should hesitate to assume that he found them in a common tradition and separated them from the respective paragraphs in rhetoric and transferred them to grammar. If any such changes were made by Gundissalinus, those statements should have appeared in an earlier section, preferably in the prologue or in the *sciencia naturalis*.

Thierry could not help making certain adjustments. Thus in no. 5 he changed "sicut Tullius ostendit" to "quod in sequentibus Tullius ostendit." After all, he was about to comment on Cicero; Gundissalinus was not. We have seen that for the very same reason Thierry (no. 11) changed: "Set quid sit circumstantia in Tullio dicetur" to "Sed quid sit circumstantia in sequentibus melius dicetur." These references are, as R. McKeon puts it, "better suited to the commentary" though they do not by themselves decide the question of priority.

Gundissalinus was considerably younger than Thierry. He was one of the group of translators gathered together by Raymond, Archbishop

59 *De Div. phil.*, 19-27.
60 *Ibidem*, 28-35.
62 Nos. 2, 8, 13, 14, 16.
63 The prologue ends with an enumeration of eleven topics to be considered in each section. *De Div. phil.*, p. 19, lines 6-10.
64 "Rhetoric", 17, n. 2.
of Toledo (1126-51), and was still alive in 1181. The year 1110 has been suggested as the date of his birth. He may have studied at Chartres, for certain elements in his De Processione mundi, written about or shortly after 1150, point to Thierry. It is, of course, also possible that Gundissalinus had read Thierry's works but not attended his lectures. The prologue to the translation of Ptolemy's Planisphere, cited above, shows that Thierry was not unknown in Spain. Hence it should not surprise us to see Thierry use a work forwarded to him from the Spanish peninsula.

To establish Thierry's text all available sources have been used, namely Suringar's edition, MS Brussels, Bibl. Roy. 10057-62, fols. 2*-30*, MS Cheltenham, Phillips 9672, now Berlin, Lat. Oct. 161, fols. 1*-36*, and MS London, Brit. Mus. Arundel 348, fols. 102-179*. The text is not abbreviated but no variants are listed. It is understandable that preference has been given to those variants that are in closer conformity with Gundissalinus. The corresponding texts from Gundissalinus are taken from L. Baur's edition.

66 S. D. Wingate, The Mediaeval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus (London, 1931), 39, writes: "Thierry of Chartres (fl. 1140-1150) seems to have been acquainted with the contents of the Physica and the De Caelo, but this knowledge may have been derived from the versions of Avicenna by Gundisalvi and Avendeath." P. Duhem, Le système du monde 5 (Paris, 1917), 237, to whom Wingate refers, is much more reserved. In fact, in vol. 3, p. 188, Duhem declares that Macrobius (Comm. in Somn. Scipionis) accounts sufficiently for Thierry's "Physique péripatéticienne". See also H. Bédoret, "Les premières versions tolédanes de philosophie", Rev. néosc. de philos. 41 (1938), 396 ff. It may here be noted that, according to R. W. Hunt, "The Introductions", 103, note 2, in the Gloss on the Anticaudatus by Ralph of Longchamp "nearly all Ralph's comments on the heads of rhetoric are drawn from the prologue of Thierry of Chartres".
67 Historia critica Scholostarum latinorum 1 (Leyden, 1834), 215-252; MS Leyden, B.P.L. 189, fols. 42-47.
THIERRY OF CHARTRES, Commentarius in Ciceronis De Inventione:

1 Circa artem rhetoricam decem consideranda sunt: quid sit genus ipsius artis, quid ipsa ars sit, quae eius materia, quod officium, quis finis, quae partes, quae species, quod instrumentum, quis artifex, quare rhetorica vocetur.

2 Artem diffiniendi haec et dividendi et rationibus comprobandi antiqui rhetores artem extrinsecus vocant eo quod extra et antequam ad doctrinam agendi perveniat oportet ista prescire. Intrinsecus autem appellant ipsam artem eloquendi quia ad cam prior scientia introductoria est.

Non tamen idcirco haec distinguimus quod duae artes sint sed quoniam his duobus modis una et eadem ars docetur.

3 Deinde circa librum Tullii quem exposituri sumus consideranda duo sunt: quae sit in ipso auctoris intentio et quae libri utilitas. Horum unumque eo ordine quo proposuimus ostendendum est.


GUNDISSALINUS, De Divisione philosophiae; ed. L. Baur, p. 63, lines 21-24:

Circa artem quoque rhetoricam hec eadem consideranda sunt, scilicet: quid sit ipsa, quod genus eius, que materia, que partes, que species, quod officium, quis finis, quod instrumentum, quis artifex, quare sic vocetur, quo ordine sit legenda.

(p. 43, lines 10-18)

Scienciam diffiniendi hec et dividendi et rationibus comprobandi antiqui artem extrinsecus vocant eo quod prius extra, antequam ad agendi doctrinam perveniat, oportet ista prescire; intrinsecus autem appellant ipsam doctrinam regularum et preceptorum quibus hominem ad agendum secundum artem informant ad quorum noticiam istorum cognicio necessaria est. Non autem ista sic distinguimus quasi artem extrinsecus et intrinsecus duas artes esse velimus sed quod hiis duobus modis una et eadem ars doceetur.

(p. 64, lines 11-18):

5 Nam sapiencia i.e. rerum conceptio secondum earum naturam et rhetorica civilis scientiam componunt. Etenim nisi quis sapiens et eloquens fuerit civilis scientiam habere non dicitur. Maior vero pars civilis scientiae dicitur rhetorica quoniam magis operatur in civilibus causis quam sapiencia etsi sine sapiencia nihil prosit. Maximam enim virtutem habet eloquentia in civitate si sapientiae sit iuncta quod in sequentibus Tullius ostendit.

6 Item secundum Boetium genus artis rhetoricae est quod ipsa est facultas i.e. facundum efficienti quod est esse maiorem partem civilis scientiae. Dicitur enim una eademque scientia et etsi in magistro, quoniam regulis artat discipulum, et facultas in oratore quoniam eum efficit facandum.

Non est autem dicendum rhetoricam aut logicam esse aut eius partem idcirco quod logica circa thesin i.e. circa generaliter proposita tantummodo versusatur, rhetorica vero circa hypothesin solam i.e. circa particulariter proposita tantummodo versusatur.

7 Diffinitio artis rhetoricae apud antiquos rhetores varia et multiplex est. Nam quidam hoc modo diffinuint: Ars rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia. Alii vero sic: Rhetorica est scientia utendi in privatis et publicis causis plena et perfecta eloquentia. Sunt alii qui hoc modo eam diffinuint: Rhetorica est scientia dicendi apposita ad persuasionem de causa proposita.

Diffinuint etiam philosophi rhetoricae alios modos. Quos modos qui scire desiderant, legent Quintilianum De Institutionibus oratoris.

8 Nunc de materia artis. Materia artis cuiuslibet est id quod artifex debet secundum artem tractare.

(p. 64, lines 18-25):

Nam sapiencia i.e. rerum conceptio secondum earum naturam et rhetorica civilis scientiam componunt. Nisi enim quis sapiens et eloquens fuerit civilis sapienciam habere non dicitur. Maior vero pars civilis scienae dicitur rhetorica quia magis operatur in civilibus causis quam sapiencia etsi sine sapiencia nihil prosit. Maximam enim virtutem habet eloquentia in civitate, set si sapiencie sit iuncta sicut Tullius ostendit.

(p. 65, lines 1-5)

Item secundum Boecium genus artis rhotorice est quod ipsa est facultas i.e. facundum efficienti quod est esse maiorem partem civilis sciencae. Dicitur enim una eademque scienca et etsi in magistro, quoniam regulis artat discipulum, et facultas in eodem quoniam cum efficit facandum.

(p. 64, lines 3-10):

Quid igitur ipsa sit, multis diffinicionibus ostenditur.

Quidam enim sic eam diffinuint: Ars rhotorica est scienca bene dicendi. Alii vero sic: Rethorica est scienca utendi in privatis et publicis causis plena et perfecta eloquentia. Sunt alii qui eam hoc modo diffinuint: Rethorica est scienca dicendi apposite ad persuasionem de causa proposita. Diffinuint eciam philosophi rhotoricae alios modos. Quos modos qui scire desiderat Quintilianum De Instructionibus oratoris legat.

(p. 47, lines 10-11)

Materia vero artis cuiuslibet est id quod artifex tractare debet secundum artem.
Materia igitur artis rhetoricae est hypothesis quae a Latinis causa dicitur quoniam illam orator secundum artem rhetoricam tractare debet. Hypothesis vero sive causa est res quae habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam de certo dicto vel facto alcius certae personae ut haec controversia: an Horestes iure occiderit matrem an non.

9 Non autem dico homicidium aut furtum aut adulterium aut aliquid huiusmodi esse materiam artis rhetoricae sed rem in controversia positam qua probabilibus argumentis aut vera aut falsa esse ostendi potest: ut argumentis probabilibus osienditur an Horestes iure occiderit matrem an non. Quae res causa dicitur eo quod causari dicitur de aliqua re aliquem impetere et in litem adducere.

10 Vel ideo causa dicitur quod antiqui dicebant causari de aliqua re querelare. Inde causa dicitur quasi de aliqua re querela. Hypothesis vero i.e. suppositum dicitur quoniam sub thesi continetur.

11 Dicitur eadem quaestio implicita circumstantiis i.e. certis determinationibus personarum, factorum, causarum, locorum, temporum, modorum, facultatum. Quae circumstantiae hoc versus designantur:
   Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.
   Sed quid sit circumstanzia in sequentibus melius dicetur.

12 Civiles autem controversiae aut de iusto ante iudices esse solent et tunc illae controversiae causae iudiciales dicuntur; aut de utili apud rei publicae aut privatae procuratores et (p. 65, lines 6-11)

Materia autem artis rethoric est hypothesis que a latinitis causa dicitur quoniam illam oratum secundum artem rethoricam tractare debet. Hypothesis vero sive causa est res que habet in se controversiam in dicendo positam de certo facto vel dicto alcius certe personae ut hec controversia: an Horestes iure occiderit matrem suam.

(p. 65, lines 11-17)

Non autem dico homicidium vel furtum vel aliquid huiusmodi esse materiam artis rethoric set rem in controversia positam que probabilibus argumentis aut vera aut falsa esse ostendi potest ut cum argumentis probabilibus ostenditur an Horestes iure matrem suam occiderit. Que res causa dicitur eo quod causari dicitur de aliqua re aliquem impetere aut in litem ducere.

(p. 65, lines 17-20)

Vel eo causa dicitur quia antiqui dicebant causare de aliqua re querelare; inde causa dicitur quasi de aliqua re querela. Hypothesis vero i.e. suppositum dicitur quoniam sub thesi continetur.

(p. 65, lines 21-24)

Dicitur eadem questio implicata circumstanciis i.e. certis determinacionibus personarum, factorum, causarum, locorum, temporum, modorum, facultatum: que circumstancie in hoc versiculo designantur (p. 66, lines 1-2):
   Quis quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.
   Set quid sit circumstanzia in Tullio dicetur.

(p. 66, lines 3-10)

Civiles autem controversiae aut de iusto ante iudices esse solent et tunc ille controversiae cause iudiciales dicuntur; aut de utili apud principem aut private per procuratores fiunt et tunc
tunc causae deliberativae dicuntur; aut de honesto apud populum in con-
clionibus et tunc causae demonstrativae dicuntur. Sunt igitur haec tres res i.e.
justum, utile, honestum, fines omnium causarum ex quibus omnes causae nas-
cuntur i.e. civiles controversiae. Haec igitur causa triplex artis rhetoricae
materia est.

13 Officium autem cuiuslibet artis
est id quod artifex debet facere secun-
dum artem.

Officium igitur artis rhetoricae est
id quod orator debet facere secundum
artem rhetoricae. Id autem est dicere
apposite ad persuadendum i.e. dicere
eae quae conveniunt et sufficient ad
persuadendum, etsi oratur non persua-
deat. Unde Aristotes in primo Topi-
corum: Orator non semper persuadebit
sed si ex contingentibus nihil omiserit
sufficienter eum habere propositum
dicemus.

14 Finis artis cuiuslibet est id ad
quod artifex tendit secundum officium.

Finis igitur artis rhetoricae est id
ad quod tendit orator secundum suum
officium. Id autem est persuadere dic-
tione quod est persuadere quantum in
se dicente est etsi in auditoribus re-
maneat. Et hunc finem semper ars
consequitur.

15 Est autem alius finis artis quem
non semper consequitur i.e. auditori-
bus persuadere, ut supra monstratum
est. Non est autem idem finis artis
quod eius utilitas; nec officium quod
intentioni eius; propterea quod eius utili-
itas varia est multiplex est. Finis vero
id solum quod praediximus.

Similiter intentioni artis est sive orat-
oribus movere auditores ut sibi credant;
officium vero id solum quod praec-
diximus.
16  Partes autem artis rhetoricae sunt quae convenientes oratorem efficient et quorum si una defuerit non est orator. Dictae partes a similitudine partium integralium quae si conveniunt totum existit; si autem una defuerit, totum non est. Hae autem partes quinque sunt: Inventio, dispositio, pronunciatio, memoria, elocucio. Siigitur haec quinque res in aliquo conveniunt, orator est. Si autem una defuerit, non est orator. Et hac similitudine dicuntur partes cum sint officia oratoris.

17 Species autem artis rhetoricae sunt genera causarum. Genera vero causarum sunt qualitates causarum generales secundum ipsarum fines. Nam fines causarum sunt, ut superius dictum est, aut iustum aut honestum aut utile. Inde igitur omnes causae qualitatem hanc recipiunt quod aut iudiciales aut demonstrativae aut deliberativae dicuntur. Generales vero ideo dicuntur sicutmodi qualitates causarum quoniam unumquodque istorum generum omnes constitutiones continet.

18 Bene autem dicuntur genera causarum quoniam ex qualitatibus supra dictorum finium omnes causae gignuntur. Species vero artis rhetoricae dicuntur genera causarum non quod rhetorica de ipsis praedicetur sed hac similitudine quod omnibus partes rhetoricae in singulis causarum generibus exercentur sicut genus totum singulis speciebus inest.

19 Instrumentum autem artis rhetoricae est oratio rhetorica quae constat ex sex partibus: exordio, narracione, particione et caeteris. Quae oratio idcirco instrumentum dicit quoniam per eam orator agit sicut aliquis artifex per instrumentum agit in materia.
20 Artifex vero huius artis est orator.

Orator vero est vir bonus dicendi peritus qui in privatis et publicis causis plena et perfecta utitur eloquentia. Rhetor vero et orator in hoc differunt quod rhetor quidem artis est doctor, orator vero qui secundum artem causas civiles tractare novit. Et saepe contingit quod neque rhotores sunt oratores neque oratores rhetores.

21 Ars autem ista rhetorica dicitur a copia loquendi. Rhotores enim Graece, copia loquendi Latine dicitur. Inde rhetorica dicitur haec scientia quod eloquentem faciat.

Ostensis illis quae circa artem rhetoricam consideranda sunt, nunc quae circa librum hunc Tullii inquirenda sunt dicendum est.

22 Intentio Tullii in hoc opere est unam solam partem artis rhetoricae, scilicet inventionem, docere. Utilitas vero libri est scientia inveniendi rationem rhetoricam.

Nunc accedamus ad Prooemium.

(p. 68, lines 1-4 and 11-14)

Artifex vero huius artis est orator. Huius autem discipline perfecta cognicio oratorem facit.

Orator autem est vir bonus dicendi peritus qui in publicis et privatis negotiis plena et perfecta utitur eloquentia. .... Rethor vero et orator in hoc differunt quoniam rethor quidem doctor artis est, orator autem qui secundum artem causas civiles tractare novit. Et saepe contingit quod nec rhotores sunt oratores nec oratores sunt rethores.

(p. 68, lines 15-17)

Ars autem ista rethorica dicitur a copia loquendi. Rethores enim Graece, copia loquendi Latine dicitur. Inde rethorica dicitur hec scientia quod eloquentem faciat.

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Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause

WILLIAM DUNPHY

ETIENNE Gilson's long study of Western philosophical experience has convinced him of the decisive role played by the Judaeo-Christian revelation in its development. One area of particular interest to him has been revelation's role in the development of the notion of efficient causality from the Aristotelian cause of motion to a creative cause of existing. In a recent article,¹ Professor Gilson cited texts of Peter of Auvergne, a late thirteenth century magister in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris, in which Peter points to Avicenna as the source of a distinction between two kinds of efficient causes: a cause of motion (unde principium motus), and a cause of being (unde principium esse)²

Avicenna devotes the entire sixth treatise of his Metaphysics to the different types of causes and their definitions. In the first chapter, he says that an efficient cause (causa agens) is one which gives being (esse) to a thing separate from itself. It does so in such a way that, according to its primary meaning as agent, its essence is not the subject of the being given, nor informed by it, but possesses the power (potentia) of that being in a non-accidental way. An agent gives being, not simply in virtue of being an agent, but in virtue of being a certain kind of agent, namely, a creator who gives being without motion. The only being, according to Avicenna, that a natural agent, qua agent, gives to a thing is one of the modes of motion. That which gives being to natural things in this way is called the principle of motion and it is studied by the philosophers of nature. Substantial being, however, is given by natural agents only accidentally, in so far as they dispose a matter for the reception of its being which comes from that agent, namely the creator of the world, which is studied by the "divine philosophers", that is, metaphysicians.³

² See below the text of Quaestiones in Metaphysicam III,3.
³ Avicenna, De Philosophia Prima, VI,1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91 r-a.
Peter of Auvergne develops this Avicennian distinction between efficient causes in his *Quaestiones* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where Aristotelian *aporiae* are treated against a background of creation. This brief note has as its immediate objective to provide a textual foundation for those citations of Peter in Professor Gilson's article and also to serve as a base for future studies of this witness to the influence of revelation on the development of a philosophical notion.

I have chosen two texts from Peter's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* in which he makes this distinction between efficient causes and uses it to solve *aporiae* from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* β:

1) Whether there is an active cause for immobile beings?
2) Whether there is a final cause for immobile beings?

There are seven manuscripts known to us that contain the *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*. We have designated a key letter to stand for each of these manuscripts to facilitate the listing of the variants in our edition of the two questions. The manuscripts and their abbreviations are as follows:

- Rome, Bibl. Vat. *Otto* 1145, fol. 1r-50v: O
- Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, 3498, fol. 1r-104v: Z
- Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, 3481, fol. 133r-216r: M
- Vienne, Nationalbibl., 2330, fol. 60r-98v: A
- Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fol. 129r-224v: C

The above-listed manuscripts fall into two main groupings or families. Manuscripts P, O and Z form one main group, while M, A, C and V form the second group. This second group has only a tenuous unity. Manuscripts C and V, while sharing many readings with M and A, are very close to the first group in the matter of the number and order of the questions. Manuscript M, which is early fourteenth century (before 1323), has so many additional questions and different treatments of the same questions that it seems to indicate another redaction by the author. We have edited the texts of M of the two questions separately for the sake of comparing the two traditions.

Manuscript A bears little resemblance to the other manuscripts. It follows M in its ordering of the questions in the first two books of the *Quaestiones*, and it is generally in agreement with the other manuscripts for the order of questions in the other books. However, Books VI and X are completely different. This manuscript gives one the impression that the scribe had before him a number of copies of
Peter's work and attempted to collate them. A marginal note in which the scribe mentions that he is taking certain questions from an *antiqua reportatio* bears out this impression.

Manuscript V has a poor text. The scribe shows his complete lack of understanding of what he was copying by the numerous and continuous misreadings in his manuscript. More than half the variants in my edition are from this manuscript. There seems to be no point in recording the great number of his scribal lapses.

Readings from the first group, namely P, O and Z, were chosen as the basis for the present edition. Within this group, the readings of P seem preferable most of the time. This, plus the fact that P is the oldest manuscript in the group (it was willed to the Sorbonne in 1310 by Nicolas de Bar-le-Duc), determined its selection as the base. Where P has obvious scribal errors, corrections have been taken from O or Z.

*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* III,3

[Utrum in immobiles sit causa activa?]

Quaeritur¹ circa partem illam, *Primum ergo in primis,*² etc., ubi Philosophus incipit disputare quaestiones prius enuntiatas,³ et primo quaestiones⁴ pertinentes ad considerationem causarum. Dicit autem ibi Philosophus, quod in immobiles non est finis quia nec⁵ est ibi motus. Finis autem⁶ videtur esse terminus alicujus⁷ actus. Circa quod quaeratur⁸ primo, utrum in immobiles sit causa activa.

Et⁹ videtur quod non, ratione Philosophi.¹⁰ [1] In quibus non invenitur motus,¹¹ nec¹² unde¹³ principium motus,¹⁴ Sed in immobiles non invenitur motus, ut dicit etiam nomen 'immobiles',¹⁵ Ergo¹⁶ in eis non invenitur unde principium motus.¹⁷ Sed unde¹⁸ principium motus est causa activa. Quare, etc.

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ⁱ Consequenter quaeritur A.
³ Om. ubi Philosophus...enuntiatas PZ.
⁴ Om. prius...quaestiones A.
⁵ non A.
⁶ enim A.
⁷ Add. motus seu A.
⁸ quaeritur A.
⁹ Om. FZAC.
¹⁰ For ratione Philosophi, read hoc patet primo per rationem Philosophus sic A.
¹¹ Om. P.
¹² Om. PZ.
¹³ unum P.
¹⁴ Om. P.
¹⁵ For ut dicit...'immobiles,' read secundum quod hoc nomen 'immobile' sonat A.
¹⁶ quare A.
¹⁷ Om. Sed in immobiles...principium motus PZ.
¹⁸ unum P.

Oppositum arguit: In quibus inventur demonstratio per causam efficientem, in illis inventur principio activum seu efficiens. Sed in immobiles inventur demonstratio per causam efficientem. Nam medium in demonstratione, si sit definitio subjecti, manifestum quod non est forma passionis demonstranda; unum enim non est de essentia alterius. Item nec est finis nec materia, ut patet de se, qua neutrum inventur in immobiles. Quare necessario est causa efficiens.

Item, si unum accidens est causa demonstrandi aliquid, unum non est finis nec forma alterius. Sed si sit causa, solum est efficiens. Quare, etc.

Intelligendum, sicut Avicenna dicit, principium efficiens vel causa est illud per quod acquiritur esse alii discretu ab ipso, ita ut agens, secundum intentionem agentis, non sit recipientis illius esse. In quantum autem efficiens est illud per quod acquiritur esse alii, ipsum convenit cum forma cujus

19 similiter A.
20 et P.
21 For patet V Metaphysicae, read dicitur secunda hujus A.
23 enim O.
24 inventur A.
25 Om. C.
26 Add. etiam A.
27 activo O.
28 Om. Z.
29 inventur A.
30 Om. nec activum...principium passivum P.
31 Om. A.
32 non reperitur A.
33 videtur A.
34 For principio activum, read causa activa A.
35 medium A.
36 passionum PZC.
37 Quia Z.
38 Add. cum Z.
39 sit C; om. Z.
40 principio AC.
41 aliquid C; add. quod A.
42 Om. A.
43 Add. causa A.
44 Avicenna De Philosophia Prima VI,1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91 r<sup>a</sup>b.
45 Add. quod A.
46 aliquid quaeritur P.
47 quod O.
48 (?) P.
49 alterius A.
Proprium est dare esse. In quantum vero efficiens alius est ab eo cui est causa esse, differt efficiens a forma. Forma enim secundum essentiam non est alius ab eo cujus est forma. Item, efficiens acquirit esse non cuicumque, sed discreto ab ipso. Nam idem sibi non est causa in aliquo genere causalitatis. Aliquid autem est principium acquirendi esse alii per motum, sicut contingit in naturalibus, et universaliter in transmutationibus. Aliquid etiam principium est acquirendi esse alii per simplicem eductionem et emanationem, sicut contingit in immaterialibus. Efficiens vero primo modo dictum, quod non agit nisi mediante motu, dicitur unde principium motus, sed secundo modo dicitur unde principium esse. Primum efficiens usitatur in naturalibus, secundum autem in mathematicis et divinis.

Quod vero aliquid sit principium activum esse, manifestum est ex hoc, quia cujuslibet entis causati per se, est aliqua causa per se. Forma vero,
quaeratur ad quem terminatur motus, est aliquid causatum per se. Ergo
habet causam per se producentem. Et quod est unde principium motus non
est causa per se. Nam illud per se est causa motus, solum per accidentes.
igitur est causa ejus ad quod terminatur motus. Praeter igitur causam quae est
unde principium motus, est alia causa activa quae est principium esse.
Si igitur quaeratur utrum causa activa unde principium esse reperiat
in immobiles, dico quod sic. Reperitur enim in immobiles quae separata
sunt secundum rationem a motu, licet non secundum esse, et iterum in immo-
bilibus qua secundum esse simpliciter et secundum rationem separata sunt.
Primum patet sic. Medium enim in immobiles secundum primum modum, puta in mathematicis, per quod demonstratur passio de subjecto, oportet
habere rationem causae efficientis unde unde principium esse. Nam ipsum medium et passio demonstrantium de subjecto unius rationis non sunt, immo alius et
aliud. Et ideo medium non potest esse forma ejus quod demonstratur, item
 nec materia, quia hoc in immobiles non invenitur, cum sit principium transmutationis et motus, principio scilicet ex quo fit quod fit. Sequitur
ergo quod est finis vel efficiens. Sed finis non habet rationem medi, saltem
 nec in omnibus nec in pluribus; quare ipsum erit causa efficiens. Et iterum
finis rationem causae efficientis habet. Unde si quae ratur quaest quae est causa habere tres de triangulo, assignabo causam ejus activam, et non aliam.

Similiter in immobiles quae sunt omnino separata a motu reperitur efficiens isto modo. Si enim omnes substantiae immateriales procedunt ab una immateriali prima, oportet unam habere rationem efficientis et agentis respectu aliarum, a qua dependeant in esse.

Causa autem unde principium motus non est in ipsis mathematicis, quia in his non est motus, nec aliquod mathematicorum habet virtutem et potestatem movendi aliud. Et ideo in his non reperitur causa motus.

In substantiis vero immaterialibus est unde principium motus, quod non accidit in mathematicis. Non tamen est ibi principium motus ipsorum immobilium, sed mobilium et sensibilium. Unde et Philosophus omnes vel quasdam substantias immateriales posuit habere ordinem ad motum, et se habere sub ratione moventis ista materialia et sensibilia.

Philosophus ergo intendit quod in immobiles non est motus, quia non est ibi causa activa ut principium motus, sed solum ut principium esse. Maxime autem in mathematicis rationes procedunt suis viis.
The same question as it appears in MS Paris, Mazarine 3481 (M), fol. 149v.-149v.

Consequenter, circa illam partem Primum ergo ex quibus in primis,\(^1\) etc., in qua Philosophus disputat quaestiones superius annuntiatas. Et primo de quaestionibus circa genera causarum subjungat in quadam ratione quod in immobilius nec est finis nec bonum. Ideo primo quaeritur utrum in immobilius sit aliqua causa activa.

Dictur quod non, per rationem Aristotelis.\(^2\) [1] In quibus non est motus, nec unde principium motus, quia motus est effectus principii motivi. Principium et principiatum se concomitantur, ita quod si non est unum, nec alterum. Sed in immobilius non est motus, ut dicit nomen ‘immobilis’; quare nec motus. Sed causa activa est unde principium motus. Ergo in immobilius non est causa activa.

[2] Praeterea, activum relative dicitur ad passivum; similiter agens ad patient, et egisse ad passum fuisset, sicut patet quinto hujus.\(^3\) Ubi ergo non est principium passivum, nec principium activum, quia relativa sunt simul natura, ut dicitur in Prae dicamentis.\(^4\) Sed in immobilius non est principium passivum motus, quod est ipsum mobile: immo magis immobile, ut nomen sonat. Quare nec principium activum. In immobilius ergo non est causa activa.

Oppositum arguitur. Demonstratio omnis est per medium concludens passionem de subjecto. Medium autem, cum forte sit quod quid est subjecti, est causa efficiens passionis. Quare demonstratio est per causam efficientem. Tunc arguitur: In quibus universaliter est demonstratio, in illis est causa activa. Sed in immobilius est demonstratio, sicut in mathematici, quae sunt immillia, demonstrationes potissimae. Quare in immobilius est causa activa. Quod autem medium sit causa efficiens patet, quia est aliqua causarum. Sed non est forma passionis, quia forma passionis et passio sunt unius rationis; sed medium et passio non unius rationis, quia passio est accidens, medium autem est quod quid subjecti, quod est substantia, substantia et accidens non unius rationis. Item, nec materialis, ut patet de se. Nec etiam finis, quamvis alquio modo moveat agentem. Relinquitur igitur quod sit causa activa. In immobilius igitur est causa activa.

Intelligendum secundum Avicennam,\(^5\) quod efficiens est illud per quod acquiritur esse alli discretum ab ipso, ita ut agens secundum intentionem non sit ipsius esse receptivum, quia idem non est activum sui ipsius, ut superius\(^6\) visum est. Dicitur autem aliquid causa activa quia est causa motus et esse per transmutationem. Motus ipsius enim est causa per transmutationem, esse autem per simplicem productionem. Prima autem activa causa dicitur unde principium motus, secunda unde principium esse. Prima reperitur in naturalibus, secunda in divinis, quae sunt immobilia. In naturalibus autem non tantum est principium motus, sed etiam principium esse.

4 Aristotle, *Categories* 7 (7b 15).
5 Avicenna, *De Philosophia Prima* VI.1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91 r\(^a\).
6 *Cf.* Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* II.13.
Quod autem sit aliquod principium motus per se ostenditur, quia cujuslibet causati est aliqua causa per se. Forma autem rei est terminus motus. Motus autem in aliquo prius non fuit in eo; ejus autem quod prius non fuit et postea est, est aliqua per se. Quare cum motus non sit prius, aut in quibusdam non fuit, cujus erit aliqua causa per se quae erit unde motus principium.

Si ergo quaeratur utrum in immobilius sit causa activa unde principium essendi, dicendum quod sic in omnibus immobilius, et in mathematicis et in divinis, quae sunt entia simpliciter separata secundum esse.

In mathematicis quidem patet ratione adducta. Demonstratio omnis per medium concludens passionem de subjecto. Medium autem, cum forte sit quod quid subjecti, est causa efficiens passionis, quia medium est aliqua causarum. Sed non est formalis causa passionis, quia forma passionis et passio sunt unius rationis, sed medium et passio non sunt unius rationis, quia passio est accidens quoddam, quod quid autem subjecti substantia. Substantia autem et accidentes non sunt unius rationis. Item, non est causa materialis, ut patet de se. Nec enim finis, quamvis aliquo modo moveat agentem. Et tamen causa est; si enim quaeratur quid est causa conclusae passionis de subjecto, respondetur quod medium. Relinquitur igitur quod sit causa efficiens. Item arguitur: In quibus universaliter est demonstratio, in illis est causa efficiens esse passionis de subjecto. Sed in mathematicis est demonstratio; immo in esse potissimo. Quare in mathematicis est causa activa unde principium esse.

Item, in simpliciter separatis a materia est causa activa unde esse. Cujus ratio est supponendo quod omnia separata sint ab uno principio separato causata, ita quod unum ab alio, et unum ab alio, usque ad primam causam.7 Cum ubi non sit motus, non erit causa unde motus ita quod moveatur, sed unde principium esse, cum tamen istis duobus modis causa activa distinguatur. In separatis igitur simpliciter est causa unde principium esse.

Si autem quaeratur utrum in immobilius sit causa activa unde principium motus, in mathematicis certum est quod non per se causa activa ut unde principium motus sui ipsum nec aliorum. Cujus ratio est: In quibus non est motus principium, nec ipse motus; principiatum enim praesupponit principium. Sed in mathematicis, cum sint immobilia, non est principium motus, ut sonat nomen 'immobiliis'; quare nec motus, nec principium motus. Principium autem8 motus est principium activum; quare in eis motus activum.

In separatis autem simpliciter, puta in divinis, non est unde motus principium sui ipsum, sed aliorum materialium inferiorum. Unde et intelligentiae separatae causa motus in istis inferioribus sint, quamvis tamen de se sint immobiles passivae motui proprioe dicto, quia de se indivisibles, non habentes partem et partem, cujus oppositionem per se rationi mobilis per se competit per se. Apparet igitur quod ir. mobilius est causa unde principium motus et esse; in immobilius autem non per se.

Et appareat ad rationem in oppositum, quia verum est quod medium est causa essendi passionis conclusae de subjecto, non tamen unde motus principium. Ideo, etc.

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7 MS reads causans.
8 MS reads item.
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam III,4

[Utrum in immobiles sit finis?]

Quaeritur1 utrum in immobiles sit finis.

Et2 videtur quod non. [1] Finis est terminus actionis, et omnis actio est cum motu. Unde omnis actio3 in motu et omnis motus in actione firmabitur, ut dicitur4 libro Sex Principiorum.5 Ubi ergo, non est motus, ibi non est finis. Sed in immobiles non est motus, quare nec5 finis.

[2] Item, finis vel est operatio, vel res operata. Sed in7 immobiles non est8 operatio nec res operata.9 Quare, etc. Major10 patet11 primo Ethicorum.12 Minor declaratur,13 nam14 immobilia non sunt principia operationum, ut patet in mathematicis. Quare, etc.15

Oppositum arguitur: Forma et finis coincidunt in idem numero, ut patet secundo Physicorum.16 In quibus ergo est ponere formam, et finem. Sed in immobiles est ponere formam. Quare, etc.

Item, esse, secundum quod hujusmodi, rationem boni habet. Propter hoc17 enim 18 omnia appetunt19 esse. In quibus igitur20 reperitur esse,21 et bonum. Sed in immobiles reperitur esse, quare et bonum. Finis autem rationem boni habet.22 Igitur23 etc.

Intelligendum, quod finis proportionatur principio activo vel24 causae25 agenti. Omne enim agens agit propter finem. Impossibile namque26 est agens

1 Consequenter quaeritur A.
2 Om. AC.
3 Om. cum motu . . . actio A.
4 Add. de C; add. in Z.
6 videtur P.
7 Om. O.
8 Om. motus quare . . . non est A.
9 comparata P.
10 Add. primo O.
11 Add. in A.
12 Aristoteles Ethicorum I,1 (1094a 1-20).
13 videtur probabilis A.
14 quia A.
15 Om. Quare, etc. A.
16 Aristoteles Physics II,8 (198a 25).
17 quod A.
18 Om. A.
19 apparat Z.
20 Om. A.
21 ens A.
22 For sed in immobiles . . . habet, read etiam quod habet rationem finis A.
23 Quare A.
24 seu A.
25 causa O.
26 enim A.
absolvi ab intentione finis. Item, agens est causa finis, et e converso. Finis autem est causa non substantiae agentis, sed causalitatis agentis, ut scillicet, agens sit causa. Agen\textsuperscript{80} autem\textsuperscript{31} est causa finis ut sit,\textsuperscript{32} Et ideo finis et efficiens se habent ad invicem ut causa et effectus. Causam autem et effectus operarent esse proportionales, ut\textsuperscript{33} causae\textsuperscript{34} universali correspondant effectus universalis, et particelli, effectus\textsuperscript{35} particularis. Finis ergo proportionatur agenti; quare\textsuperscript{36} secundum\textsuperscript{57} quod\textsuperscript{58} agens\textsuperscript{39} dicitur, sic et finis. Agens autem dupliciter\textsuperscript{40} dicitur;\textsuperscript{41} quoddam enim est activum esse, et quoddam activum motus.\textsuperscript{42} Et ideo\textsuperscript{43} similiter\textsuperscript{44} dicerendum est de fine, quod quidam est\textsuperscript{45} finis qui\textsuperscript{46} est terminus in\textsuperscript{47} esse, et quidam\textsuperscript{48} est terminus motus. Et finis primo modo\textsuperscript{49} proportionatur agenti quod est unde\textsuperscript{50} principium esse.

Si, ergo, quaeratur utrum\textsuperscript{51} in immobilius sit finis qui est res producta in esse actu, activa dante sibi esse, dico quod sic, quia si omne\textsuperscript{52} agens agit propter finem, in quibus inventur agens, inventur et finis\textsuperscript{53} proportionalis. Si, igitur, in immobilius inventur agens unde principium esse, quare\textsuperscript{54} et\textsuperscript{55} finis\textsuperscript{56} proportionalis. Unde finis in mathematicis est aliquid productum in esse a causa
agente quae\textsuperscript{57} est causa activa esse. Et quia iste finis est idem quod\textsuperscript{58} forma,\textsuperscript{59} ide\textsuperscript{60} non distinguitur a quibusdam inter causam\textsuperscript{61} formalem et finalem\textsuperscript{62} in mathematicis. Et idem erit\textsuperscript{63} demonstrativum\textsuperscript{64} per causam formalem et finalem,\textsuperscript{65} quia idem sunt.

Simili\textsuperscript{66} modo\textsuperscript{67} reperitur finis in divinis et separatis. Si enim sit operatio aliqua quam agens aliquod operatur, illud\textsuperscript{68} quod\textsuperscript{69} productum est\textsuperscript{70} dicitur finis illius operationis. Adhuc autem in divinis est ponere finem\textsuperscript{71} secundum modum alium\textsuperscript{72} quam sit\textsuperscript{73} in mathematicis. Separata enim a materia non sunt\textsuperscript{74} tantum sicut\textsuperscript{75} causa,\textsuperscript{76} sed\textsuperscript{77} habent aliquas operationes sibi proprias. Unumquodque autem\textsuperscript{78} habens\textsuperscript{79} operationem\textsuperscript{80} est aliquo modo propter suam operationem;\textsuperscript{81} et ideo operatio propria istorum est finis ipsorum.\textsuperscript{82} Finis ergo, secundum quod est terminus motus,\textsuperscript{83} non est\textsuperscript{84} in mathematicis. Non enim\textsuperscript{85} in eis est\textsuperscript{86} principium operationum.\textsuperscript{87}

Intelligendum est\textsuperscript{88} ulterior, quod causa agens dicatur duobus modis praedic-tis. Modus ille, secundum quem dicitur agens ut unde\textsuperscript{89} principium motus, magis

\textsuperscript{57} autem Z.
\textsuperscript{58} cum A.
\textsuperscript{59} Om. O.
\textsuperscript{60} ratio P.
\textsuperscript{61} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{62} For formalem et finalem, read finem et formam A.
\textsuperscript{63} eris P.
\textsuperscript{64} Emendation. Demonstrativus OPZC; demonstrare A.
\textsuperscript{65} Om. in mathematicis... finalem C.
\textsuperscript{66} Hoc A.
\textsuperscript{67} Add. etiam A.
\textsuperscript{68} ipsum A.
\textsuperscript{69} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{70} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{71} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{72} Add. finem A.
\textsuperscript{73} Om. AZ.
\textsuperscript{74} Om. Z.
\textsuperscript{75} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{76} causae A.
\textsuperscript{77} Add. etiam A.
\textsuperscript{78} enim A.
\textsuperscript{79} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{80} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{81} suas operationes A.
\textsuperscript{82} istorum A.
\textsuperscript{83} Add. in divinis A.
\textsuperscript{84} For non est, read nec etiam A.
\textsuperscript{85} Om. A.
\textsuperscript{86} Add. terminus A.
\textsuperscript{87} operationis A.
\textsuperscript{88} Om. C.
\textsuperscript{89} unum P.
manifestus est nobis; et hoc ideo quia causa motus magis est manifesta qua causa esse. Unde per prius dicitur agens de agente ut est principium motus quam de agente ut est principium esse. Unde et Commentator super III Caeli et Mundi, dicit quod in separatis a materia non inventur agens nisi secundum transumptionem. Unde et nomen primo impositum est principio activo motus. Sicut autem est de agente, similiter est de fine qui correspondet duplici agenti. Primo enim et principaliter dicitur finis de fine qui est terminus motus. Unde quia in immobiliis non inventur talis finis, ideo dicimus, absoluto sermone, quod in immobiliis non est finis.

Per hoc apparat solutio ad rationes, procedunt enim viis suis.

The same question as it appears in MS Paris, Mazarine 3481 (M), fol. 149r-149v.

Consequenter quia sibiungit Philosophus quod in mathematicis non est finis nec bonum, ideo de hoc quaeratur. Et primo utrum in mathematicis sit aliquid quod possit habere rationem finis et bonum.

Videtur quod non. [1] Quia finis universaliter est terminus actionis. Omnis autem actio est cum motu. Finis est terminus motus. Quod autem omnis actio sit cum motu patet per auctorem Sex Principiorum dicentem quod omnis actio in motu, et omnis motus in actione firmabitur. Ubi igitur non est motus, nec actio; nec per consequens terminus actionis nec motus, et ideo nec finis. Sed in immobiliis, vel specialiter in mathematicis, non est motus, quare nec finis nec bonum.

[2] Item, finis rei vel est operatio ipsius rei vel est ipsa res operata, sicut scribitur primo Ethicorum. In quibus igitur nec operatio nec res operata, in eis nec est finis nec bonum. Sed in immobiliis non est operatio nec res

90 non O.
91 Om. CP.
92 unum P.
93 Cf. Averroes, De Caeo I, t.e. 20 (Venice, 1574), vol. V, fol. 14 I-K.
94 separatus Z.
95 quid A.
96 Om. Z.
97 primum P.
98 sic A.
99 autem A.
100 principaliter A.
101 For in immobiliis... finis, read absolute (i) vel sermone non est talis finis in mathematicis A.
102 ab aliquo O; absolute A.
103 Om. P; est Z.
104 Om. Z.
105 For quod in immobiliis non est finis, read finis non esse in mathematicis A.
106 For Per hoc... viis sui, read Rationes autem procedunt sui viis A.

1 Liber Sex Principiorum, c. 2 ed. cit.
2 Aristotle, Ethics I,1 (1094a 1-20).
operata. Quod non operatio patet, quia non est ibi motus. Quod non res operata, probo, quia non est ibi operatio quae praesupponitur ad rem operatam. Quare in immobiliis nec est finis, nec est bonum.


Sed dupliciter est agens. Quoaddam enim est unde principium esse, et quoddam est unde principium motus. Quare finis qui est terminus ad quem terminatur actio agentis dicitur multiplicant, quia si unum oppositorum multiplicat dicitur, et reliquum cícetur, in quocumque genere oppositionis, sicut patet primo *Topicorum*. Erit igitur finis dupliciter, quidam terminans motum, vel operationis agentis unde principium motus...?

Quando igitur quaeritur utrum in immobiliis sit finis et bonum, dicendum quod si quaeratur de fine qui est terminus ipsius esse, quod in immobiliis est finis ipsius esse, et hoc tam in mathematicis quam divinis. Quod in mathematicis probatio, quia si agentis, quodlibet est propter finem. Item, agentis et finis sunt proportionalia. Ubi est ergo agentis et finis, et eo modo quo agentis et finis, quia agentis non absolvit ab intentione finis. Sed in mathematicis est agentis propter esse, ut ostensum est in praecedenti quaestione. Quare et ibi erit finis quae est terminus esse. Et quia terminus vel finis agentis propter esse non est alius quam ipsa forma, ideo in mathematicis finis et forma intrinsecus non distinguuntur. Et ideo eadem demonstratio subjecto in mathematicis est per causam formalem et finem. Et codem modo in divinis est finis qui est terminus ipsius actionis agentis propter esse, cum agentis nullum a fine frustretur.

Si tamen quaeratur utrum in immobiliis sit finis qui est terminus agentis unde principium motus, dico quod non, quia inter agentis et finem cadit proportion. Ubi igitur non est agentis unde principium motus, nec erit finis terminates

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7 The phrase, quidam terminans (?) actionis agentis unde principium esse, is partly legible in the margin.
actionem agentis unde motus. Sed in mathematicis, sicut nomen sonat, cum immobilia sint, non est causa unde motus principium, quia nec finis ei proportionalis. Sed in divinis unde motus principium reperitur sub alia ratione quam in mathematicis, quia divina omnia separata sunt. Omnia autem separata aliquid habent operationem propriae sibi debitam, secundum naturae suae exigentiam. Omne autem aliquam habens, propter illam operationem, sicut dicitur secundo Caeli et Mundi.\(^8\) Ista autem operatio propter formam entis est separata, ita quod forma propter operationem est, quae quidem operatio est causa motus in aliis materialibus. Et ideo eis ut sic debetur finis qui est terminus formae quae est ipsa operatio. Non sic autem in mathematicis; immo sub alia et alia ratione, quia forma per operationem est. Quicquid autem ultimum est in mathematicis rationem formae obtinet quae est terminus actionis agentis unde principium esse. Et ideo demonstratio per formam et finem in mathematicis cadem est subjecto, ut dictum est.

Et appareat ad rationes. Ad primum, cum dicitur finis est terminus actionis, dicendum quod verum est. Et cum dicitur quod omnis actio est cum motu, verum est omnis actio quae est agens unde principium motus. Et cum dicitur quod in mathematicis non est agens unde principium motus, verum est; et ideo nec finis qui est terminus actionis illius agentis; quoniam tamen sit finis qui est terminus actionis agentis unde principium esse non\(^9\) convict ratio.

Dicendum ad secundum. Concedo enim quod in immobilibus non sit actio agentis unde motus principium, ideo nec finis. Quoniam tamen finis actionis agentis propter esse, ratio non convict. Propter quod dicit Commentator, secundo Caeli et Mundi,\(^10\) quod agens et finis non dicitur nisi secundum transumptionem de agent et de fine primo modo dicto; secundo autem modo proprie et secundum nominis significationem principaliorem. Ideo, etc.

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\(^8\) Aristotle, De Caelo I.II (286a 8).

\(^9\) MS reads haec.

\(^10\) Averroes, De Caelo I, t.c. 20 (Venice, 1574), vol. V, fol. 14 I-K.
Godfrey of Fontaines’ Abridgement of Boetius of Dacia’s “Quaestiones supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis”

BRUCE BRASWELL

Among the more interesting and better known manuscripts containing medieval philosophical writings is the one now preserved at Paris in the Bibliothèque nationale under the classification, fonds latin 16297. Much of the manuscript is in the hand of Godfrey of Fontaines, whose student notebook it was; however, the interest of the collection extends beyond its association with a distinguished theologian of the late thirteenth century. For the historian of the movement generally known as Latin Averroism the manuscript has preserved important works of Siger of Brabant. It is, to take a single example, one of four known manuscripts containing Siger’s Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The same philosophical movement is also represented in the collection by works of Siger’s colleague, Boetius of Dacia. It is one of the latter’s treatises, the Questions on the Topics of Aristotle, that I shall consider in this paper.

Since the manuscript as a whole has been carefully studied by P. Glorieux and J. J. Duin, it will not be necessary to consider the larger aspects of the collection. Rather I shall concentrate on two texts in the manuscript. The first is found on fol. 110’b-116’b. Duin correctly identified this text as an abridged version of Boetius of Dacia’s Questions on the Topics. The identification was complicated by the


3 Duin, La doctrine . . ., 130-135.

4 Duin, La doctrine . . ., 195-198. Previously Glorieux, “Un recueil scolaire . . ., 39, had pointed out that the correct pagination is 111, 113, 114, 112, 115-117. The text of Boetius ends, however, at fol. 116’b, as Duin observed.
fact that in Godfrey’s notebook the treatise is preceded by a prologue quite different from the one found in other manuscripts of the work. Moreover, the first question in Godfrey’s version, *Utrum dialectica sit scientia*, does not come immediately after the usual prologue in the other manuscripts. Nevertheless, Duin was able to make the correct identification by comparing part of the following question, *Utrum <dialectica> sit scientia communis*, with the fuller text of the same question in MS Bruges, Bibliothèque de la ville 509. He did not, however, pursue the problem further.

The second text that I shall consider occupies fol. 140a14-b. Duin rightly surmised that this was a work of Boetius of Dacia but wrongly suggested that it might be the prooemium to a commentary on the *De sophisticis elenchis*. This text is to be linked with the first, for it is in fact an abridgement of the first section of Boetius’ *Questions on the Topics*. My own collation of Godfrey’s version with the fuller text of the eight known manuscripts of the ordinary version has shown that the only important differences are occasional shortenings.

5 Duin, *La doctrine...*, 133, and especially 200, n. 70. Duin seems to have been led to this attribution by the division of logic which Boetius makes, the last member of which is the subject of the *liber Elenchorum*. The next section, however, makes it clear that the author’s interest is in dialectical and not sophistical arguments.

6 The collation is embodied in my unpublished M.A. dissertation, *The Nature of Dialectic according to Boetius of Dacia: An Edition of his Unedited Questions supra librum Topiconum, Book I, Questions 1-4*. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 1961. Until the full text of these questions is published Godfrey’s abridgement included in the present study may be consulted as a guide to the contents of this section of Boetius’ work. Mention should be made of three works that have become accessible to me after this article was already in proof sheets. The first is the revised edition of Boetius of Dacia’s *De aeternitate mundi: Boetii de Dacia Tractatus de aeternitate mundi*. Edito altera auctoritate quinque codicum manu scriptorum revisa et emendata. Edidit Géza Sajó. *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4. Berlin, 1964. In an appendix (pp. 65-70) the editor has published an “Abbreviatio opusculi Boetii de Dacia De aeternitate mundi confecta a Godefrido de Fontibus (Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15819, ff. 300-301†).” This abridgement of another of Boetius’ works by Godfrey gives us a further example of his method of procedure in making such shortened versions. Cf. Dr. Sajó’s comments on pp. 67-19, 22.

The second is Heinrich Roos’ “Das Sophisma des Boetius von Dacien ‘Omnis homo de necessitate est animal’ in doppelter Redaktion,” *Classica et Mediaevalia*, 23 (1962), 178-197. In a footnote (p. 189, n. 7) Roos corrects Duin’s surmise that MS Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 16297, fol. 140a-b, is the prooemium to a commentary on the *Sophistic Refutationes*; he points out that “Es handelt sich aber um ein Exzerpt des Godefroid de Fontaines zu der ersten Quaestio des Topikkommentars des Boetius de Dacia.”

The third is an article by R.-A. Gauthier reviewing a number of recent works on Averroism: *Bulletin Thomiste*, 9 (1954-1956), 917-935. He lists (p. 929, n. 2) three additional manuscripts of Boetius’ *Questions on the Topics*: (1) Salamanca, Univ. 1859 (formerly Madrid, Royal Palace 494), fol. 39a-68a; (2) Sienna, Bibl. com. H, 9, 1, fol. 40r-62r.
The identification of this second text raises a problem regarding the literary form of Boetius' *Questions on the Topics*. To pose this problem we must first examine the form of the work as it is usually found. Since a printed edition is not yet available, I shall refer to the text in the manuscript which I regard as the oldest (apart from Godfrey's) and the most reliable, Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 214 (Irmscher 380), fol. 95'-140'.

The work begins with a short prologue that occupies fol. 95"1-18: "Cum honorandi viri, videlicet patres nostri ... ad communem studientium profectum exponamus." Martin Grabmann, who printed the prologue in two different studies, described its contents as "ein grosses philosophisches Arbeitsprogramm." It is just that. However, before Boetius enumerates the steps of his programme he states a theme that is familiar to us from his opusculum, *De summo bono*: the men who are worthy of our esteem are those who philosophize and, in particular, those who first devoted their lives to the study of wisdom despising all temporal things. Boetius then says that he will follow the order observed by the first *philosophantes* and treat first logic, second moral philosophy, third natural science, fourth mathematical science, and fifth metaphysics or divine science. Whether or not Boetius subsequently adhered to his programme, and we have no evidence either way, we may assume that the *Questions on the Topics* as a logical work is relatively early.

(incomplete at beginning); (3) Zwettl 338, fol. 95'a-109'b, along with two manuscripts of a set of questions on the *Sophistic Refutations* which he attributes to Boetius of Dacia: (1) Salamanca, Univ. 1839, fol. 68'b-94'a; (2) Florence, Bibl. Med. Laur., Cod. Plut. 12. Sin. 3, fol. 39'a-49'.


10 The chronology of Boetius' writings is yet to be studied. Indeed it will be impossible
After the prologue comes a long introduction that covers fol. 95’a18-96’bl of the Erlangen manuscript. In the table of contents (in a later hand) for Book I, which is found on fol. 94’, this introduction is listed as question 1 with the title: “Utrum logica sit de ente et de cujusmodi ente.” Although the other manuscripts agree in listing it as question 1, the introduction is not in fact in the form of a quaestio disputata. There are no objections raised initially, no statement is made to the contrary, and finally there are no replies to objections. Rather the introduction is a treatise on the nature and parts of logic. Six points are made initially, which may be summarized as follows. First, logic has some being (ens) as its subject. Second, logic has as its subject not the thing (res) itself but its mode (modus rei). Third, logic depends upon the thing itself from which it is derived; hence, a knowledge of logic involves a knowledge of the causes of the thing upon which logic depends. Fourth, and in conclusion to the first three points, logic is determined by the thing and its properties, because the parts of logic derive from the thing itself. This order corresponds to the threefold operation of the intellect in apprehending, composing, and reasoning. Fifth, two consequences are drawn: (1) the person who discovered logic was not a logician but a philosopher who observed the natures and properties of things; (2) the person who does not study the natures and properties of things can never learn logic or any of the other sciences. With the sixth point the author shifts to the second person singular (debes scire — fol. 95’b10-11) which he employs for the rest of the introduction. The sixth point is that each thing through its property or mode of being (modus essendi) determines its mode of knowing (modus sciendi). Then follows a sketch of the threefold operation of the soul, which was referred to earlier but is now treated in some detail. Each operation is assigned to one or more books of Aristotle’s logic. Apprehension forms the subject-matter of the Categories. Composition, which is treated in the Peri hermeneias, is itself threefold: in the things themselves, in the intellect, and in speech. Reasoning is dealt with by the Prior Analytics, if the middle term is considered in abstraction, by the Posterior Analytics, if the reasoning possess necessity, by the Topics, if the reasoning is by means of commonplaces, and by the Sophistical
Refutations, if the reasoning involves error. With this division of logic the first section (or sections) of the introduction is concluded.

The author then announces that he intends to treat dialectic. Six points are elaborated in turn, each preceded by the formula, *primo debes scire, secundo* ..., etc.¹¹ These may be summarized as follows. (1) Those things which the dialectician uses in his argument are not the cause of the conclusion; hence, the result is opinion, not science. (2) The dialectician does not consider truth itself. (3) If a proposition involves any degree of probability, it will pertain to the dialectician and not the *demonstrator* who is concerned with truth, necessity, and cause. (4) Another aspect of the study of language is rhetoric which treats the art of persuasion. (5) Each common intention corresponds to a particular property *in re* from which it is derived. (6) Since properties *in re* from which common intentions are derived differ in species, so also do common intentions and all the rest that in turn depend upon them. It is with these matters, the author concludes, that dialectic is concerned.

After the introduction the form of the ordinary scholastic question is used for the rest of the work. The first question proper (fol. 96'b2-"a3"), which we may count with the manuscripts as the second, discusses whether dialectic is a science. The third question (fol. 96'a4-b1) treats whether dialectic is a common science, while the fourth (fol. 96'b2-25) discusses whether dialectic is a single science. Since Godfrey's abridgment clearly consists of omitting everything in the question (objections, *sed contra*, and replies) except the solution, it will not be necessary to outline each question here. The text of Godfrey's abridgement of questions two to four has, however, been included for reference.

We are now in a position to compare Godfrey's version with that found in the Erlangen and the seven other manuscripts. Instead of the prologue described above ("Cum honorandi viri..."), we find a quite different one which is remarkable in having the same incipit ("Cum in omni specie entis sit aliquod summum bonum possible...") as the *De summo bono*¹² and the *Quaestiones super librum De Generatione* (in *Clm* 9559), which have recently been attributed by G. Sajó to Boetius of Dacia.¹³ Although the text soon diverges from the other two works,

¹¹ Of the six points made earlier only the third was numbered.

¹² *Ed. cit.*, p. 209, l. 1 (see note 8).

the prologue in Godfrey's version is in agreement with the thought of the De summo bono. We may compare the following statement from the prologue with three from the opusculum:

Summum autem bonum quod est homini possibile est quod debetur ei secundum virtutem intellectivam, quod nihil aliud est quam scientia...

Optima autem virtus hominis ratio et intellectus est. (p. 209, l. 9).

Summum autem bonum, quod est homini possibile secundum potentiam intellectus speculativi, est cognitio veri et delectatio in eodem. (p. 210, ll. 5-7)\textsuperscript{14}

There is no doubt that the thought is authentically Boetian, as is that of the usual prologue. Godfrey's version of the prologue goes on to distinguish between two species of being. The first is that which does not initially possess all the good of which it is capable but which acquires it gradually. The second is that which fully possesses all the good of which it is capable from the very beginning. These are beings in which no potency precedes their act, and, hence, they are incapable of change. The author does not make further use of this distinction\textsuperscript{15} but simply states that the highest good possible for man ought to be in accordance with his intellectual capacity, which is what is meant by "science". The prologue goes on to locate dialectic among the sciences. It is one of the useful sciences which serves as a way for arriving at the scientiae honorabiles, the sciences deserving of honor. In the ordinary prologue Boetius referred to grammar and logic as "useful sciences" and placed them at the bottom of a progression that leads on to moral philosophy, natural and mathematical sciences, and finally metaphysics, the scientia honorabilis par excellence. The remainder of the prologue to Godfrey's abridgement is concerned with dialectic as a mode of knowing, its relation to other sciences, and the fact that, while logic as a whole teaches every possible mode of knowing, dialectic as a part of logic teaches a special mode of knowing, namely, that which is ex probabilitibus et signis. It should be noted that the prologue to Godfrey's version is written in the unfilled portion of fol. 110\textsuperscript{r} of MS 16297

\textsuperscript{14} Ed. cit., (see note 8).

\textsuperscript{15} We may suspect that the text has been abridged by Godfrey at this point.
which is otherwise in a different hand. The text fills the rest of the second column and the whole lower margin. The fact that it is continued in the lower left margin of fol. 111' rather than at the top of the column is a strong indication that the prologue was added after the rest of fol. 110' and 111' was written. Fol. 111' begins with an abridged version of question two (*Utrum dialectica sit scientia*) and continues with questions three to six and part of question seven, all of which are likewise shortened. The questions beyond the fourth do not concern us here.

The introduction to Boetius' *Questions on the Topics*, which I have numbered with the manuscripts as question one, is found in isolation, as noted above, on fol. 140' (after the first fourteen lines). We are now in a position to pose the problem regarding the literary form of the work and to seek an explanation of it. First of all, we may ask whether the form as found in the Erlangen and the seven other manuscripts is the original version of the work. Secondly, if we answer the first question affirmatively, how are we to explain the other prologue in Godfrey's abridgement and the isolation of the introduction (question one)? If we keep in mind the early date of Godfrey's notebook, almost certainly before the condemnation of 1277 and, hence, before the end of Boetius' teaching career, a possible explanation may be found in successive editions of the work.

I should like to suggest the following explanation. The original version of Boetius' *Questions on the Topics* began with question two. These questions were at least in part literary versions of questions actually disputed, traces of which remain even in the final version. Godfrey made an abridgement of them which is found on fol. 111'-116'b3 of his notebook. Godfrey then added an abridged prologue ("Cum in omni specie...") later either because he did not bother to write it down in the first instance or because it was not in the earliest version of Boetius' work. The introduction (question one) is found separately because it was originally a short independent treatise on logic. Later Boetius added it to his *Questions on the Topics*, suppressed the old prologue ("Cum in omni specie..."), the incipit of which was again used in his *De summo bono*, and added a new prologue ("Cum honorandi viri..."). Alternatively we may argue that the introduction (question one) was never an independent treatise but was added by Godfrey to his notebook when Boetius issued his revised edition which included the introduction as the first question. If this alternative is chosen, it is not clear why Godfrey did not include the new prologue from the revised version. The only points I should care to insist upon
are (1) that the existence of the two prologues to the work and the separation of the introduction (question one) make it unlikely that the version we have in the Erlangen and the other seven manuscripts is the original one, (2) that the prologue in Godfrey's version was later suppressed and the incipit used for the De summo bono, and (3) that the introduction (question one) was not in the original version. It is quite possible that the original version which I postulate was never in general circulation but was restricted to Boetius' students and perhaps others in the Arts Faculty at Paris. This would explain why other manuscripts of the earlier version have not come to light. Still the evidence, I am convinced, points to the existence of an original version which is reflected in Godfrey's abridgement.

In the text that follows I have printed Godfrey's abridgement of questions one to four of book one of Boetius of Dacia's Questions on the Topics in the order they are found in the manuscript (Paris, Bibl. nat., fonds latin 16297):

(a) Prologue (Cum in omni specie...), fol. 110' b41—lower margin of fol. 111'.
(b) Question 2 (Utrum dialectica sit scientia), fol. 111' a1-14.
(c) Question 3 (Utrum <dialectica/> sit scientia communis), fol. 111' a14-29.
(d) Question 4 (Utrum <dialectica/> sit scientia una), fol. 111' a29-37.
(e) Introduction to Logic (= Question 1 of the later version): (Omnis scientia est de aliquo ente...), fol. 140' a14-b.

The orthography of Godfrey's version has been normalized throughout to conform to the practice of the journal. Punctuation and capitalization have been changed for the convenience of modern readers. The following sigla are used in the notes to designate the manuscripts of the revised version of the work:

A — Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 367, fol. 2'-8' (Books I-II only).
B — Bruges, Bibliothèque de la ville, Cod. 509, fol. 1'-30'.
E — Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. 214 (Irmischer 380), fol. 95'-140'.
F — Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Cod. Plut. 12. Sin. 3, fol. 15'-27'.
O — Oxford, Merton College, Cod. K. 16 (296), fol. 47'-83'.
P — Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, fonds latin, Cod. 16170, fol. 54'-82'.
T — Tübingen (earlier Berlin) = former Preussische Staatsbibliothek Berlin (now Öffentliche Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek
Cum in omni specie entis sit aliquod summum bonum possibile, ... quia constat quod cuilibet speciei entis est aliquod bonum possibile.\textsuperscript{1} Si ergo in illo ad finem non continget devenire ut esset aliquod summum et ultimum bonum cujuslibet speciei, tunc esset aliquod bonum possibile speciebus entis ad quod impossibile esset ipsas devenire. Sunt quaedam species entis quae in sui prima productione non habent omne bonum quod eis est possibile, scilicet proficiunt paulatim quantum ad quantitates, virtutes et operationes, et in talibus possibilis est proficiens deventus, scilicet rei\textsuperscript{2} ad aliquid sibi possibile cujus privationem prius habebat; salus, scilicet conservatio rei in suo bono;\textsuperscript{3} et defectus, scilicet declinatio rei extra suo bono, et ista tria ostendunt possibilia rebus transmutandisibus. Aliae sunt species entis quae in sui prima productione habent quidquid est eis possibile secundum suam speciem, et ista sunt entia in quibus nulla potentia precedit actum. Et ideo in eis non est possible aliqua transmutation cuius sunt entia sempiterna quae semper sunt in dispositione optima quae eis est possibleis. Sumnum autem bonum quod est homini possibile est quod debetur ei secundum virtutem intellectivam, quod nihil aliud est quam scientia inter quas dialectica est una utilium, quia est via pervenienti ad scientias honorabiles, quae licet comparata ad alias scientias sit quidam modus scienti co quod docet modus per quem sciri habent res quas docent aliae scientiae, ipsa tamen in se est scientia et certa habet principia per quae procedit. Et sic unum et idem esse scientiam et modum scienti co respectu diversorum non est inconvenienti. Est autem dialectica, de qua ad praesens intendimus, quaedam\textsuperscript{4} pars

\textsuperscript{1} The sense is: In omni specie entis est aliquod summum bonum possibile, quia constat quod cuilibet speciei entis est aliquod bonum possibile. The opening \textit{cum}-clause, since it is an incipit and employs the subjunctive, can hardly be impugned. Likewise the \textit{quia} is necessary as a logical connective, though grammatically it is impossible as it stands. We may surmise that a clause has been omitted from the original, probably deliberately, in making the abridgement. It is unlikely that Godfrey would have considered grammatical concinnity of much importance in his student notebook.

\textsuperscript{2} In left margin.

\textsuperscript{3} Beginning of text written in lower margin.

\textsuperscript{4} Beginning of text written in lower left margin of fol. 111\textsuperscript{r}.
Boetius of Dacia on the Topics

logicae eo quod sicut logica docet omnem modum cognoscendi qui est possibilis rebus, sic dialectica docet unum modum <cognoscendius> speciale, scilicet ex probabilibus et signis.

<Quaestio 1>⁶

Utrum dialectica sit scientia

Sic. <Dialectica est scientia>⁷ qua scitur quomodo quodlibet praedicatum est construendum et destruendum in qualibet materia et signis et probabilibus quae habilitant subjectum ad participationem praedicati et non necessitant. Unde licet conclusio per syllogismum dialecticum <con>clu<s>a⁸ inquantum hujusmodi non sit scita et necessaria sed opinata, ars tamen per quam scitur syllogizare dialectice ex signis et probabilibus est necessaria et certa scientia ex principiis necessariis.

Unde⁹ dialectica docens procedit ex principiis necessariis, sed utens et ad opus applicans, scilicet ad ali<quam> materiam speciale<mi> pro<di>cidit ex probabilibus illius materiae. Et ideo dialectica de rebus specialibus facit opinio<mi>nem et non certam scientiam.

Sed ipsa principia ex quibus docetur dialectica non faciunt opinionem sed scientiam.

Est autem dialectica de aliquo ente, scilicet de modo quo cognosci potest res per probabilias et signa illius rei. Et iste modus cognoscendi est aliquod ens extenso nomine entis.

<Quaestio 3>

Utrum <dialectica> sit scientia communis

<Dialectica> quantum ad scibile quod docet est <scientia> specialis, quia docet modum argumendi dialectice. Quia tamen modus argumendi, quia¹¹ communis est omni materiae, hoc modo est scientia communis.

Dialecticus enim per se habet considerare rationes quae omnibus rebus accidunt, scilicet communes intentiones in quibus habitudines locales fundantur et per quas dialecticus confirmat suas argumentationes. Et ideo dialecticus

⁵ The corner of the page containing the first part of the abbreviation (cogn-) is missing.
⁶ Fol. 111ᵃ.
⁷ om. MS, but cf. codd.: Solutio: dicendum est quod dialectica est scientia qua scitur . . .
⁸ In left margin, cf. codd. for restoration. Two or three more words are illegible. They could possibly be read: in <scientia> specialibus; however, it is not clear where in the text the words should be inserted, possibly after ars tamen (see text below). To this sentence from the solutio the final three words, ex principiis necessariis, which are not in the codd., have apparently been added from a rather similar sentence in the unabridged text of the ad primum. In the latter the phrase, in scientias specialibus, does occur.
⁹ add. and del. sci.
¹⁰ scilicet . . . speciale: in upper left margin. Part of the abbreviation for aliquam appears from the photostat to have been lost through a tear.
¹¹ In left margin.
potest arguere in omni arte et in omni materia. Quia tamen istae communes intentiones non sunt causa conclusionum quas concludit in scientiis specialibus sed signa, ideo de illis conclusionibus scientiam certam facere non potest sed opinionem. Sine causis enim non contingit scire, sed opinari contingit. Et hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles quod dialecticus circa omnia litigiosus. Est enim circa omnia, quia in omni scientia et in omni arte arguere potest. Et est litigiosus, quia non arguit ex propriis principis conclusionum quas concludit in scientiis specialibus. Une ex communibus procedit ad propria quotiensemque arguit in aliqua materia speciali.

<Quaestio 4>

Utrum <dialectica> sit scientia una

Sic. <Dialectica est scientia una> propter unitatem scibiliis quod docet, quia docet modum argumendi dialectice, et propter unitatem finis, quia finis ejus est opinio. In multis enim etibus faciior est opinio de eis quam scientia, cum difficile sit ad causas eorum pervenire. Melius est autem de talibus opinionem habere quam ea penitus ignorare.

Licet ergo dialectica doceat multa, illa tamen attribuuntur alicui uni quod principaliter docet, scilicet modo argumendi dialectice.

<Bætii de Dacia Introductio ad logicam>

<== Quaestio 1 alterius editionis ==>

Omnis scientia est de aliquo ente, quia de eo quod omnino nihil est non potest scribi quid ipsum est ut chimera et hujusmodi.

Omnem autem ens aut est res aut modus rei. Illud de quo est logica non est res, quia tunc logicus esset artifex realis, sed logicus nec considerat naturalia nec mathematica nec divina.

Omnem autem modus ad rem ipsam reductur sicut in suam causam et ex ipsa acceptus est, quia non est purum figmentum intellectus; ergo illud de quo est logica ad rem ipsam reductur, et qui non potest ostendere in re ipsa causam propriam cujuslibet eorum quae in logica docentur, ille nescit logicam.

Manifestum enim <quod> logica a re ipsa et ex proprietatis ejus regulatur, quod etiam partes logicae habent ordinem ex re ipsa et intellectus in

12 add. dialecticus codd.
13 I have not found this statement in the works of Aristotle, cf., however, Top. I, 1 (100a18-21), 2 (101a29-b2), Soph. Elen. 1 (172a11-b4), Rhet. I, 1 (135a1-3) and (135a8-10). It has the appearance of one of the Aristotelian dicta which, though close to Aristotle’s thought, are not found as such in his own writings.
14 om. MS, but cf. codd.: Solutio: dicendum quod dialectica est scientia una propter unitatem....
1 corr. in MS from omnes.
2 mathematica (sc. res) codd. In abridging this passage Godfrey has modified it considerably.
3 Manifestum enim quod: Manifestum enim MS, cf. Est igitur manifestum quod E.
Boethius of Dacia on the Topics

apprehendendo et componendo et ratiocinando. Et quia res et proprietates sive modi essendi ejus consimiles sunt apud omnes et mutari non possunt eo modo quo sub arte cadunt, ideo eadem est logica apud omnes et mutari non potest. Per eandem enim causam concludit extremum de extremo Graecus et Latinus et syllogismo eodem in specie, aliter logica translata ex lingua Graecorum non esset eadem in specie.

Ex his sequitur quod qui logicam invenit logicum non fuit sed philosophus rerum causas et proprietates considerans. Ante inventionem enim logicae non fuit logica, ergo nec logicus. Et similiter qui diligenter naturas rerum et proprietates non inspicit4 logicam et etiam alias scientias ignorabit.

Res etiam quaelibet per suam proprietatem et modum essendi sibi determinat modum scienti et diverse diversos. Et si homo secundum illum modum non procedat, impossibile est quod rem sciat, ut si quis quaearet demonstrare quod non est demonstrabile aut solum5 topice scire quod demonstrabile est. Prudentis enim est in unoquoque exquirere certitudinem quantum natura rei permittit.6

Et ex tali modo essendi in re acceptus est ille modus sciendi, et scientia, quae logica est, in communi illum modum sciendi docet. Sed in principiis scientiarum particularium modus proprius illi scibili, de quo est unaquaeque, tradi debet.

Circa rem autem est triplex operatio animae, scilicet apprehensio quae debet esse similis rei quia intellectus in intelligendo sequitur rem in essendo et quia modus essendi et apprehendi substantialia, quantitatis et aliorum praedicamentorum et eorum proprietatum sunt eadem apud omnes. Ideo scientia libri Praedicamentorum7 etiam est eadem apud omnes.

Alia8 operatio animae est compositio. Est9 autem triplex compositio: prima in rebus ipsis, secunda apud intellectum, tertia apud sermonem. Et posterior semper sequitur priorem et sibi conformatur in differentiis suis. Sicut enim in re ipsa componitur res rei essentialiter cum pertinet ad essentiam et definitionem ejus; quandoque accidentaliter et cetera. Sic etiam est et in compositione intellectios et sermonis quae ex hujusmodi compositionibus in re existentibus accipitur.10

Tertia operatio animae est ratiocinatio. Ratiocinari autem est extremum de extremo concluendae vel ex ipso removere per medium ad utrumque copulumat. Sed ratiocinari aliquid de aliquo simpliciter abstrahendo a medio quod est causa vel signum et per antecedentia, consequentia et extranea, simplici et

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4 rerum et proprietates non inspicit: corr. from rerum non inspicit et proprietates. The earlier order corresponds with AEOPTV, while the corrected order agrees with BF. This may indicate that Godfrey had at least two MSS before him, one from each tradition; however, B and F do no: otherwise agree very often against the other MSS (B is often unique and F is generally in agreement with V), so the agreement here may be accidental. Nevertheless something must have made Godfrey alter the order, and we shall probably be right in assuming that it was a second MS.

5 om. codd.


7 i.e., Aristotle’s Categories.

8 fol. 140r b.

9 Inserted in MS above the line.

10 Sic etiam ... accipitur: cf. Et ex ists compositionibus in re existentibus accipitur compositio apud intellectum et sermonem codd.
mixta generatione syllogismorum, ostensive\textsuperscript{11} et ad impossibile, circulariter et conversive ad librum \textit{Priorum} pertinet. Sed ratiocinari aliquid de aliquo necessario demonstratione propter quid et quia pertinet ad librum \textit{Posteriorum}.

\begin{verbatim}
<Sed ratiocinari aliquid de aliquo>\textsuperscript{18} per communes intentiones et habitudines locales ad librum \textit{Topicorum} \langlepertinet\rangle.\textsuperscript{14} Sed ratiocinari aliquid de aliquo apparenre, cum defectu et ex parte cujus accipitur motum et ex parte cujus defectus, de hoc est liber \textit{Elenchorum}.
\end{verbatim}

Dialectica ergo argumentatur per ea quae non sunt causa\textsuperscript{16} conclusionis, et ideo non faciunt scientiam sed opinionem. Licet enim de necessitate sequatur: \textit{Sor est homo, ergo Sor est animal}, tamen habitudo speciei ad genus et communis intentio non est causa hujus necessitatis sed identitas essentialis rerum.

Dialecticus autem ipsam veritatem non considerat, quia ipsa veritas ortum habet ex ipsis naturis rerum quam dialecticus non considerat. Sed in eis considerat communes intentiones, ut in calido et frigido contrarietatem, in homine et animali intentiones generis et speciei. Sed non in omni materia speciali est eadem veritas, ergo et cetera. Sed docet modum quem artifex specialis debet aplicare\textsuperscript{19} materiae speciali ad inquisitionem veritatis.

Quaelibet autem intention communis in re habet propriam proprietatem a qua accepta est et quam designat circa rem de qua praedicatur, et cuicumque rei non debetur illa proprietas, sibi illa communis intentio non debetur. Quae quidem dicitur communis, quia se extendit ad omnem materiam et ad omnem artem, sicut et proprietas a qua sumitur ad eadem se extendit. Et ideo dialectica quae considerat tales communes intentiones circa omnia est, et quia hujusmodi communes intentiones sunt respectivae, quia una debetur rei in comprehensione ad aliam et e converso. Intentio enim generis non competit alciui rei absolute sed in comprehensione ad alteram rem cujus est genus, et sit de alii. Ideo habitudines locales quae fundantur in illis communibus intentionibus respectivae sunt. Numquam enim habitudo localis in aliquo absuluto fundatur, et quia habitudo non est nisi unius ad alterum. Ideo in habitudine fundatur consequentia. Intentio autem communis ideo est respectiva et per consequens habitudo localis,\textsuperscript{17} quia proprietas quaelibet in re qua sumitur communis intentio est respectiva, et ideo ista sunt principia argumendi dialectice.

Et sicut proprietates in re a quibus accipiantur communes intentiones in specie differunt, sic et illae intentiones quae fundantur in proprietibus rerum, et per consequens habitudine\textsuperscript{s} locales quae fundantur super communes intentiones et consequentiae dialecticae quae per habitudines locales confirmantur.

\textit{Toronto, Canada}

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{corr.} in MS \textit{from} \textit{ostensiva}.

\textsuperscript{12} Sed \textit{ratiocinari} \ldots\textit{Posteriorum}: Sed ratiocinari aliquid de aliquo necessario ita quod impossibile est hoc alter sc habere, demonstrative, propter quid et quia, de hoc est ars libri \textit{Posteriorum}, \textit{codd}.

\textsuperscript{13} Sed \ldots\textit{aliquo}: \textit{om. MS}, but in \textit{codd}.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{om. MS}.

\textsuperscript{15} Inserted in MS above the line.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{corr.} in MS \textit{from} \textit{implicare}.

\textsuperscript{17} et per \ldots\textit{localis}: in right margin.
The Function of the Martyrology of Tallaght

JOHN HENNIG

IN Dom Quentin's edition of the Martyrologium Hieronymianum (H),\(^1\) apart from readings from various MSS, excerpts from the early tradition of that work are offered. Among the latter is the Martyrology of Tallaght (T),\(^2\) which in Dom Quentin's introduction was briefly described as follows: Nominibus excerptis ex Hieronymiano subdita sunt Hibernorum sanctorum nomina. (In the twelfth century Book of Leinster MS of T the paragraph containing the non-Irish entries for the day is followed by a further paragraph containing about an equal number of Irish entries). Dom Quentin felt that only the non-Irish entries in T should be added to his edition of H. Thus, e.g., on February 1st he offers the entries from the Rice-march martyrology starting with the words: In Scotia depositio sanctae Brigidae but no entries from T, because February 1st is in one of the sections missing in the Book of Leinster MS of T; from the seventeenth century copy, which confined itself to the Irish entries, we know however that the Irish entries of T started on that day with the words: Dormitatio\(^3\) sanctae Brigidae.\(^4\)

There are a few more instances where the Irish entries of T would be of interest to the early tradition of H. With regard to the entry for St. Brigid, the omission is particularly regrettable. For March 17, both the non-Irish and the Irish entries of T are preserved. The former—as stated by Dom Quentin—start with the words Patricii episcopi. This sober entry and its position among the non-

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2 H. B. S. LXVIII (1931).

3 The word dormitatio is not found in entries for St. Brigid elsewhere; it also occurs in T in the first of the non-Irish entries for January 18: Sanctae Mariae matris Domini. hoc die eius dormitatio in Roma audita est, which was discussed in my paper in Ir. Ecd. Rec., LXXVI (1951) 97-104. The present paper will suggest that at least the second part of this entry was a later addition.

Irish entries shows that this entry was found by the compiler of \( T \) in an \( H \) source. The wording of the entry for St. Brigid, on the other hand, which we shall have to recognise as unusually lavish by the standards of \( T \), and its position at the head of the Irish entries suggests that this entry was not derived from a (non-Irish) source. I.e., we can draw the conclusion that while St. Patrick was inserted into the tradition of \( H \) outside Ireland, the insertion of St. Brigid into that tradition took place later and can be attributed to Irish influence.

The edition of \( T \) by R. I. Best and H. J. Lawlor was published a few weeks before Dom Quentin’s edition of \( H \). The latter could refer to the former, but unfortunately the former not to the latter. Dom Quentin did not refer to the fact that one of the points by which \( T \) occupies furthermore a position unique in the tradition of \( H \) is that the development by \( H \) of the earlier martyrlogies into what in 1908 Dom Quentin had termed *le martyrologe historique*, i.e. a narrative, was, as it were, totally reversed by \( T \), this being essentially a list of names of persons in the genitive case. Best-Lawlor said (p. XXIII f.):

“In every list of BEW [the three oldest MSS of \( H \)] we find cities or districts, each following the names of one or more saints commemorated on the day. This method is to a large extent discarded in \( T \). It seems obvious that the scribe desired to do away with the numerous place-names in BEW. He wished to record the names of the saints, but not their dwellings.”

In actual fact, right from what is known as St. Jerome’s letter to Chromatius and Eliodorus which prefaces \( H \), the place where the martyrdom took place was considered as one of the basic points on which a martyrlogy was to give information.\(^5\) In the vast majority of the entries in \( H \), the place-name *precedes* the name of the martyr(s). In the non-Irish entries \( T \) discarded the place-names not only ‘to a large extent’ but completely, and this procedure is particularly remarkable when we consider the large number of (Irish) place-names mentioned in the Irish entries of \( T \). Along with the place-names practically all other narrative matter contained in \( H \) was discarded\(^6\) with the exception of the ‘categories’ of saints in some


\(^6\) E.g., in the entry for St. Thecla (Sept. 23) the word found in a source (*quae Romae igne deposito* *evast* was converted into *Evasit*, apparently considered as the name of a further Saint! The Irish entries in \( T \) abound with ‘ appellations’ (see my paper in *Medieval Studies*, XIX (1957) 227-233).
cases (December 25: virginis, 26: protomartiris... episcopi... episcopi... etc.). Finally the place-names recorded in H can scarcely be described as relating to the "dwellings" of the saints.

In the *Depositiones episcoporum* by the Chronographer of 354 each name of a saint is followed by a place-name. In the *Martyrology of Carthage* the name of the saint is preceded by his category (mostly sancti), no place-name being mentioned. In the Syriac martyrology each entry starts with a place-name. These three texts have only one entry per day and not an entry for every day. They should be described as calendars.\(^7\)

A distinction between 'calendar' and 'martyrology' has been attempted on two lines.\(^8\) A calendar (or better: *kalendarium*) serves a liturgical purpose: It records commemorations actually observed in a particular place; it therefore has not got an entry for each day, the liturgy being essentially based on the distinction between stressed time and unstressed time. The martyrology, on the other hand, records virtually as many commemorations as it can gather, from various places, without essential reference to the place of its compilation or destination, and even without reference to the fact whether a commemoration continues to be observed (liturgically). It serves a historical purpose. Moreover a calendar is a list to be looked up, while the martyrology is meant to be read right through, at least the entries for one day.

Best-Lawlor rightly recognised that the fact that an index of place-names could be compiled to the non-Irish entries of T (their edition p. 191 and 192, whereas the index of place-names in the Irish entries occupies 16 pages) is due to the entries in T not relating to martyrs. Such entries appear in T in the nominative case (December 25: *Nativitas DNJCh.*, 27: *Johannis apostoli et evangelistae assumptio et ordinatio* etc.). It may be argued that with the names of the martyrs in the genitive case the word *commemoratio* (depositio, martyrium etc.) is understood. I shall revert to this point later on.

I am not satisfied with Best-Lawlor's statement: "He (T) wished to record the names of the saints, but not their dwellings." Why then the abundance of place-names in the Irish entries?

The compiler of T obviously did not realise any more that H was a combination of several kalendaria or of quasi-calendric entries and successfully eliminated all traces of this origin of H by

\(^7\) H. Lietzmann, *Die drei ältesten Martyrologien* (1911).
\(^8\) See above, note 5.
omitting place-names and other narrative matter. The same de-historization takes place when in a Mass—in the Roman liturgy now only on a few days, in the Ambrosian liturgy on a larger number of days sometimes with a preface proper of the day combining the two commemorations—saints far apart in space and historical time are commemorated as an anniversaristic unit.

Proposing an explanation of the de-historization of H by T, I am fully aware of the fact that the evidence I can offer is circumstantial rather than direct. But then, where can we offer direct evidence in a field so devastated as the early Irish liturgy?

Since my theory advocated for the past twenty years that the basic characteristic of the old Irish liturgy was the absence of a Sanctorale and the meagerness of a Temporale has now been adopted by at least one eminent expert on the early Latin liturgy, I may assume that the reader is familiar with my arguments:9 I have tried to show that this feature was expressive of a distinctive consciousness of history, of sacred history in particular and of time in general, which I have described as circular (or at least rhythmical) rather than linear (as in our chronology).10 This is one of the many points in which the Irish liturgy has preserved—far beyond its extinction—spiritual and intellectual strata the loss or at least oblivion of which will be regretted, especially in our days, by those who appreciate their importance. This regret has some topical significance in so far as the old Irish conception of the relations between liturgy and history is closest to that maintained to this day in the Eastern Churches.

Furthermore I have shown that the absence of a Sanctorale is of course not to be interpreted as a lack in (liturgical) devotion to the saints. I am glad that Leclerq11 has arrived at the same conclusion as I12 that at least the date of the feast of All the Saints is to be attributed to Irish influence. More lately I have shown that Ireland has played an equally important part in promoting devotion to the choirs of saints.13

11 DACL, XV (1950), 438 f.
12 See my paper "The meaning of All the Saints" in *Medieval Studies*, X (1948), 147-161.
13 To be published in *Archiv f. Liturgiewissenschaft*, 1964; the Irish tradition has been treated in my contribution to the *Transactions of the Fourth International Conference on Patristic Studies*, 1963.
Among the basic texts for the history of the commemoration of All the saints we have several passages of the Liber Pontificalis. I quote in extenso their discussion by D. V. Maurice:  

Comme on le lit au Liber Pontificalis (ed. Duchesne I, 417 et 422), à deux reprises, avec quelques variantes, ce pape fit construire dans la basilique de St-Pierre un oratoire en l’honneur du Sauveur et de sa sainte Mère, où il fit déposer des reliques des Apôtres, des saints martyrs et confesseurs, reposant dans tout l’univers; il organisa en leur honneur un service liturgique de vigiles et de messes à célébrer chaque jour, par les moines des trois monastères annexés à la basilique, avec cette ordonnance spéciale, concernant le canon de la messe instituens in Canone, ita a sacerdote dicendum: “Quorum solemnitas hodie in conspectu tuae majestatis celebratur, Domine Deus noster, toto in orbe terrarum”. La suite de la notice nous apprend que le pape fit graver ce règlement sur les tables de pierre, Quam institutionem, in eodem oratorio, tabulis lapideis conscribere fecit (ibid. 422-23)... Ce même règlement donne la formule spéciale à insérer au canon de la messe, mais elle est plus explicite que celle du corps de la notice, et comporte des variantes, dans la partie commune aux deux formules: Et infra actionem “inprimis gloriosae semper virginis Mariae Genitrices Dei et Domini nostrri I.C.” et quae sequuntur usque “et omnium Sanctorum” sed et diem natalicium celebrantes sanctorum tuorum, martyrum et confessorum, perfectorum justorum, quorum solemnitas hodie in conspectu gloriae tuae celebratur” quorum merits preciosusque concedas etc.

The decisive “varianter” between these two texts is that the first text related only to all the saints commemorated hodie toto in orbe terrarum, while the latter relates to all the saints in general (as celebrated throughout the year) and all the saints of the day in particular. The connection between those règlements and the Mass of All the Saints is that the Collect for the feast says nos omnium Sanctorum merita sub una celebriteae venerari: (lectio IV of the Office: hodie omnium Sanctorum sub una sollemnitate laetitia celebramus festivitatem—words which make it clear that this passage is not by Bede). The reason usually given for this overruling of the usual anniversaristic veneration of the Saints is that provisions must be made for venerating also those saints in whose honour no individual feast can be celebrated (or who are not known by name, indeed some

15 Geographical universalism in devotion to the saints is most strongly claimed in the Irish prayer Atoch frit (sec. ix?), see C. Plummer, Irish litanies, (H. B. S. LXII (1925), 30 ff. and my papers quoted above, note 13.
16 The Irish word for ‘east’ (féil), to be discussed later on, is derived from vigilia.
17 I have assumed that the inverted commas inserted here by Maurice are a misprint.
18 This is an adjective qualifying martyrum et confessorum rather than the chorus Justorum. For perfecti see the meaning of Irish ág (see below, note 23).
say: who are no longer known or have never been known—see the passages to be quoted presently from the end of the Stowe diptychs and of T). However, the Collect of the Votive Mass of All the Saints shows that this reason is to be supplemented: The term "all the saints" is specified by the invocation of the main categories and the petition is that their intercession nos ubique laetificet. We may say that the words sub una point to completeness in time, the word ubique to completeness in space.

In the Stowe Missal the commemorations of all the saints both in general and of those of the day in particular are represented. We have on the one hand the diptychs starting with 38 Old Testament Saints (Ablis etc.) followed by the Holy Innocents, John the Baptist and the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles and Evangelists, Stephen, Cornelius and Cyprian et ceterorum martirum, Paul, Anthony et ceterorum patrum heremi sciti specimen episcoporum martini, grigori, maximi, felicis, a commemoration elegantly leading over to 34 Irish saints from the two Patricks down to Maelruain (specially venerated in Tallaght, an illustration of the association of the Stowe Missal with that monastic establishment) item et sacerdotum (12 further Irish names) et omnium pausantium qui nos in dominica pace precesserunt ab adam usque in hodiernum diem quorum deus nomina nominavit et novit. Ipsis et omnibus in Christo quiescentibus locum refrigerii, a conspicuous illustration of the close relations between prayers for the benefit and prayers in honour of and between prayers for the dead in general (forefathers, superiors and benefactors) and for the saints in particular. The final words of the Stowe diptychs are obviously related with the final words of T: et sanctorum ceterorum quorum Deus nomina nominavit et quos prescivit et predestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui in vitam aeternam in Christo Jesu, the theological significance of which, to my knowledge, has scarcely been expounded.

By its Lectio and Gospel the main Stowe Mass is what we would now term a Votive Mass of the Blessed Eucharist. For December 25, January 1, January 6, Easter, Low Sunday, the Ascension and Pentecost


20 In the Irish prayer Atoch frit (above, note 15) the words 'in the whole world' are added even to this choir.


22 See the epilogue to Féilire Oengusso (H.B.S. XXIX [1905]) v. 64.
the Stowe Mass has brief variants for the Communicantes. The Collect for the feast of St. Peter’s Chair is found in that Mass under the curious title in sollemnitatis petri et christi. That is all that the Stowe Missal offers as a Temporale and Sanctorale. It has however a Misa apostolorum et martirum et sanctorum et sanctatarum virginum (the last four words are to be translated “the holy virginal ones, male and female”—the Irish word óg meaning ‘young, perfect and virginal’ and relating to both women and men).\(^\text{23}\)

The first prayer proposed for this Mass invokes God by the various choirs of saints specialiter autem per sancta sufragia sanctorum vel sanctorum virginum quorum hodie sollemnis a nobis celebratur\(^\text{24}\) ut haec oblatio plebis tuae quam sanctae trinitate (for: trinitati) in honorem eorum N. offerimus... The special position here accorded to the virgins is puzzling, the more so, as the virgins were already mentioned before (between the confessors and the anchorites). While it is obvious that the words used in that instance: per sanctitatem virginum refer to the saints in heaven, it could be suggested that the words per sufragia... refer to prayers of the religious on earth. The virgins on earth (in the restriction, predominant in Latin, to the female sex) are mentioned in the Supplications of the Stowe Mass: pro virgini, viduis et orphans—as to this day in the Preces for the first, third and fifth Sunday in Lent in the Ambrosian liturgy; in contrast to the Good Friday prayer offered in the Roman liturgy for the hierarchy, the reference to the orphans shows that here virgins and widows in general rather than as ecclesiastical states in particular are prayed for.

The suggestion that in the passage per sufragia the virgins on earth could be meant, is of course quite untenable, not only on account of the words sanctorum et sanctorum (which might still have the original wide meaning which the corresponding Irish word preserved), but on account of the words quorum hodie sollemnis a nobis celebratur. The double reference to the virgin-saints can only be explained by the fact that while the words per sanctitatem virginum clearly refer to female Saints (here inserted in the place where the Litany of all the Saints later inserted ‘priests and levites’), the words specialiter etc. refer to the specifically Irish connotation of the word óg to both women and men. The position of the female virgins in a place,

\(^{23}\) See above, note 18.

\(^{24}\) Cf. quorum sollemnis; hodie... celebratur in the passage quoted above from Liber Pontificalis (Maurice).
most appropriate for material reasons, between choirs of male saints might indicate that the Irish preferred the systematic arrangement of the choirs of saints to the usual arrangement of (predominantly or exclusively) male (choirs of) saints before the (choirs of) female saints (a point which may be regarded as illustrative of the fact, to be proved in many places, that in Ireland the idea that women are inferior to men was unknown).

The prominence given to the choir of virgins through the double reference shows that virgins, i.e., men and women completely dedicated to God, were regarded as the most important choir of saints. We should say: the choir of saints most important to Ireland. The Irish raised such saints to the same level as the martyrs, by speaking of their "white" martyrdom in contrast to the "red" martyrdom of the latter. "Red" martyrs were practically unknown in the old Irish Church, while Ireland in the Golden Age was described as a land of virgins, a term understandable through the connotation of the word óg. Through Christianisation Ireland truly became Tir na-nÓg, not the land of eternal youth dreamt of in the fables, but the land where full dedication to God was recognised as something highly positive—an idea which, had it been adopted elsewhere, would have saved us from many misunderstandings regarding virginity.²⁵

In the first prayer of the Stowe Misa apostolorum we have the commemoration of all the saints in general combined with that of all the saints of the day. This combination is found in the Roman liturgy to this day, since right from the Confiteor every Mass is in honour of all the saints, while commemoration of the saint(s) of the day is made through the variable texts from the Sanctorale. Moreover we have the special prayer per merita Sanctorum tuorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt et omnium Sanctorum said at the beginning of every Mass. Outside the Stowe Missal I know of no instance in the Western liturgy where in a prayer for all the saints general provision is made for the insertion of the saints of the day. Warren²⁶ refers to the Ordo

²⁵ See my paper on man and woman in the liturgy in Geist und Leben, 1963. In my investigation of the entry in T for the feast of All the Saints of Europe (Speculum, XXI (1946), 49-66), I had suggested that the words sanctorum et virginum should be rendered by 'martyrs [saints kat' exochen] and non-martyrs ["white martyrs"]. However, these words may also be interpreted as "male and female saints" (virgins being the chief choir of female saints, as Oengus concluded his list of the categories of saints with "the noble saints of Ireland under Patrick" and "the virgins of Ireland under Brigid" (ep. 277-284). Restriction of the term virgines to female saints was an important feature in the assimilation of Irish hagiological conceptions to Continental ones.

²⁶ Liturgy and ritual of the Celtic church, (1881), 257.
Missae Flacii Illyrici (Mart. I p. 158): Memento... animabus famulumorum
famularum que tuarum, videlicet omnium orthodoxorum, quorum com-
memorationem agimus et quorum corpora hic et ubique (see the Collect of the
Votive Mass of all the Saints)\(^27\) requiescant, vel quorum nomina hic in
libro vitae scripta esse videntur... (hic recites nomina quorum velis), but this
of course is a prayer for the dead rather than the saints. The nearest
to which the Roman liturgy comes are the occasional prayers Ad
poscenda suffragia Sancrorum (the very words used in the Stowe Missal)
where between the reference to the Princes of the Apostles and the
reference to all the saints the name of the patron of the church, where
these prayers are said, is to be inserted. Here however only one name
is inserted and there is no combination between the votive comme-
memoration of all the saints (in general, on virtually any day, i.e. a
Votive Mass of all the saints) and the anniversaristic commemoration
of all the saints (of the day).

The decisive distinction is that the Stowe Misa apostolorum envisages
an anniversaristic commemoration of all the saints (of the day) and
not only of one Saint or a few Saints in any particular calendarium.
In fact, the combination between votive and anniversaristic com-
memorations would be incongruous, if the latter did not envisage all
the saints of the day.

Félire Oengusso (FO), the old-Irish metrical version of T,\(^28\) had to
select from the many entries of T a few fitting into one quatrain for
each day within the rigid rules of Irish versification (rinnd). Oengus
expressed the idea of the saints, not mentioned, unnamed or even
unknown, to be commemorated with the few saints enumerated by
words such as 'host', 'crowd', 'train', etc., the idea being strongly
maintained that saints who died on the same day (in whatever year)
have so much in common that they can be described as 'going up
together into heaven'; the astrological background of this idea has
been expounded elsewhere.\(^29\) One of the significant changes made by
Oengus by comparison with T is that T started with December 25
(see above), while FO starts with January 1st. Here again T agrees
with the Stowe Missal, where the first of the variants for the Com-
municantes mentioned above is that for Christmas. If there was a
liturgical calendar in the old Irish Church, it started definitely with

\(^{27}\) See above, note 15.

\(^{28}\) See above, note 22 and my paper on FO and the Megas Kanon of Andrew of Crete
in Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), 289-293.

\(^{29}\) 'Versus de mensibus', in Traditio, XI (1955), 65-90.
December 25th, while January 1st (described in both the Stowe Missal and in FO as "the kalends") was the beginning of the astronomical (secular, devotional) year.

The uniqueness of the combination of votive commemoration of all the saints in general with the anniversaristic commemoration of all the saints (of the day) is emphasized by the repetition of the provision for the insertion of names of the latter in the further prayers of the Stowe Missa apostolorum. Its second prayer, which expounds the symbolism of the number 12 with regard to the Apostles, concludes with the words *per horum patrocinia N. quorum festivitas Hodie colitur*. The third prayer enumerates the choirs of saints (placing again the virgins between the confessors and the anchorites). The Preface contains the words *dehenumus gratulari cum gudio spiritus sancti solemnitatem apostolorum N. sive sanctorum vel sanctarum N... per merita ac commemoratione(m) sanctorum iurorum N. in quorum honore haec oblatio Hodie offertur*\(^{30}\) (follow again references to the choirs of saints concluding with the words *confessores virgines et omnes sancti*). The subsequent prayer refers to the Apostles and all the saints *qui placuerunt Deo ab initio saeculi*\(^{31}\).

My contention is that in the places where the Stowe Missa apostolorum provides for the insertion of names, the complete list of names found in T was inserted and that this original purpose of T accounts for its reducing H to a bare list of names of persons in the genitive case.

It has been shown that the expansion of the devotion to the choirs of saints was expressive of a trait of Iriish devotion.\(^{32}\) There was a desire to make sure of the most complete intercession of the saints. While it was recognised that explicit enumeration was impossible (Oengus speaks in his epilogue 28 of "more than thousands of thousands"), invocation of all the saints as such appeared as it were as an address too vague. The invocations of choirs and their connotation as *drong*\(^{33}\) or *slóg* (an army unit under a leader, see Oengus's epilogue 233 ff.) provided that minimum of definiteness which seemed to ensure that the petition for intercession was heard. This whole idea originated from the fundamental conception of the precariousness of life without the assistance of the saints or, conversely, is expressive of an extremely realist conception of the efficacy of the intercession of saints.

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\(^{30}\) The expression *oblationem offerre* points to the Irish word for Mass *ciffrend*, FO ep. 177).

\(^{31}\) See G. Manz, *Auszdrucksformen der lateinischen Liturgiesprache*, (Beuron, 1941), 379.


\(^{33}\) Lat. *drungus*, a loan-word from the Celtic languages.
THE MARTYROLOGY OF TALLAGHT

The desire for anniversaristic completeness in the commemoration of saints accounts for the peculiarities of T which Best-Lawlor attributed to ignorance or carelessness, such as the interpretation of place names and other narrative matter as names of persons and the host of two, three and more repetitions of the same entry. The compiler of T was haunted by the fear of overlooking the name of any saint; he dreaded the revenge of heaven for such an oversight, an idea which fits in with the well-known picture of early Irish monasticism.

If my contention that T is to be regarded basically as a supplement to the Stowe Misa apostolorum and the anniversaristic counterpart to the votive diptychs of the general Stowe Mass, in T the martyrology for the first time attained to a liturgical status, and that to an extent exceeding in eminence that which the martyrologe historique attained in the monastic office: T was read at the altar between the Canon, whereas the narrative martyrology was mostly read in the chapter-room.

It may be argued that my interpretation of the function of T fails right from the first words of T: Nativitas DNJC, but these words clearly refer to the first of the instances where the Irish liturgy had a selective Temporale: The corresponding passage in the Communicantes of the Stowe Mass is entitled In natale domini. The same applies to the beginnings of T’s entries for January 1st: Circumcisio Domini (Stowe Communicantes: kalendis) and for January 6th: Epifania Domini (Stowe Communicantes: stellae).

It may be further argued that then at least the beginning of T’s entry for December 27: Johannis apostoli et evangelistae assumptio et ordinatione destroys my theory, but these words clearly point to the provisions made in the Preface of the Stowe Misa apostolorum for the insertion of the name of an apostle if there was one to be inserted on the day (H is prefaced by a special list of the feasts of the Apostles). There remain to be explained several other entries in the nominative case not only at the beginning of the non-Irish paragraph (January 11: Eductio Christi ex Egipto etc.), but also between the entries (e.g. January 19 second last entry: Nativitas Sancti Germanici). However, I can confidently claim that all these entries can be explained as later additions (see in particular the entries for August 29 to 31).

There can be no doubt that in its present form T is no longer what it was originally intended to be. It is generally recognised that FO is based on T, but so far as I know, no one has yet explained how this can be so, since FO is assigned to the end of the eighth century, while T is generally assigned to a later period. Dom Quentin was right in confining his extracts from T to the non-Irish paragraphs in
so far as these are the original body of T, and this is the book which was used to supplement the Stowe *Misa apostolorum*. It contained also entries in the nominative case, e.g., with reference to the feasts of the Lord and of the Apostles, as found in the early tradition of H on which T drew. These kalendaric entries led to the insertion of other such nominative entries, which of course could not consist any longer of one word only, but returned to the narrative trend in the development of the martyrology, which trend during that time had been vigorously followed up elsewhere (Bede, *Martyrologium poeticum*, *Florus*, etc.). The insertion of these entries already shows that by that time T had ceased to have its original function, an important point in the dating of the Stowe Missal. The complete cessation of this function is marked by the addition of the Irish sections, which are patently unsuitable for liturgical purposes from the mere fact that they are largely in Irish. The difference between the non-Irish and the Irish entries in T as regards their content in place-names has been discussed above.

The growth of T can be illustrated also by the few instances in which separate paragraphs were inserted, either between the paragraphs devoted to non-Irish entries and to Irish entries:

- **January 13**: *Hilarii episcopi Pictaviis* (an entry to be considered together with that for *Naevitas Sancti Germanici* mentioned above)
- **April 1**: *Erectio tabernaculi*
- **April 24**: *Ecbrichti saxonis Uldrihi*,

(the contents of which can be easily shown to account for this later insertion) or after the paragraph devoted to Irish entries:

- **January 17**: Antonii monachi apud Tebaidem Egipti (see the Stowe dip-tychs). *Molasse Cilli Malassi depositio. Sanctae Micae* (an appendix mixing non-Irish and Irish entries), or
- **October 18**: *Salutatio Mariae ab Elizabeth matre Johannis*.

Indeed the appreciation of the straightforward list of entries to be used in conjunction with the Stowe Missal gives us a fairly reliable key to distinguish the historical strata in T, a key for which we had so far been looking in vain.

The Stowe Missal shows us two ways in which the old Irish Church circumvented the Sanctorale: Either in a general Mass (e.g. that of the

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35 See my paper on Britain’s place in the early Irish martyrologies in *Medium Aevum*, 1957, 17-24.
Blessed Eucharist) the list of names of Saints from Abel to Maelruain was inserted—a votive commemoration of all the saints, though in a form and extent not found in any other part of the Church—or in a special (Votive) Mass of all the saints the paragraph of non-Irish entries as found in the basic form of T was inserted at the points where the prayers made provision for the insertion of such a list of names (note that in none of these instances is there the slightest indication that one name only, as usually found in a kalendarium, would be inserted). This explanation of the function of T not only is in keeping with everything we find in the sources of the old Irish liturgy but in fact is the first reasonable explanation of what could have been the function of such an apparently barren list of names.

The type of liturgical devotion to the saints represented by the combination of T with the Stowe Misa apostolorum is unique. My contention—now fortunately supported by Gambr—that the traditional description of the ‘Celtic’ liturgy as a ramification of the Gaulish liturgy was superficial, was based on the evidence of the many links of the Irish liturgy with that of the Eastern Church. One of these links is the absence of a Sanctorale.35a In the Holy Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom and St. Basil the main commemoration of the Saint of the day is made by the insertion of his name at one or two points in a general prayer for the intercession of all the saints, but here only the name of the one kalendaric Saint of the day (if any) can be inserted. The insertion on every day (because from a martyrology rather than from a kalendarium) of all the saints known to be commemorated anywhere (ubique) and at any time (ab initio saeculi... usque in hodiernum diem)—as listed in the martyrological sources—is unique. Here the distinction between martyrology and kalendarium is really overthrown: A martyrology achieves a liturgical function in the highest sense, yet is a mere list of names. However, this list, barren only when considered outside its functional context, is to be read right through, a fact clearly indicated by the frequent use of the sign bis when the same name has to be repeated because two saints of the same name had to be commemorated (whether historically or owing to T’s scrupulosity, is immaterial).

T therefore should be accorded its place among the liturgical books

35a The palimpsest sacramentary in Munich Clm 14429 (ed. A. Dold and L. Eizenhofer (Beuron, 1964) would appear to represent an abortive attempt made in connection with the Paschal controversy to introduce a Continental Sanctorale into the Irish Church (see Professor Bischoff’s remark p. 31*).
of the old Irish Church. Its liturgical use had fallen into disuse when Oengus converted it into his fēilire; at that time the Irish entries had been added. Still he remembered its liturgical use, when claiming that the recitation of his work was an arraeum of seven Masses or of a whole day’s Office (150 psalms) or of “a festival, of all the fēil”\textsuperscript{37};\textsuperscript{38} above all, however, through the words of his epilogue v. 21: “The full crew of each day... may attend us... what has gone to heaven every day... each day’s fair host.” H provided the Irish with the knowledge that no kalendarium could possibly do justice to this desire.

I have long been puzzled by Oengus’s use of the word fēil, traditionally translated by ‘feast’ (Colgan rendered the Irish term fēilire by the linguistic horror festilogium).\textsuperscript{38} In FO every day is fēil and therefore—I had argued—this work is not a calendar (as the first edition in 1880 by W. Stokes had suggested). Of course every day is fēil on which a Mass is offered up in honour of the saints of the day. The Irish Church had no Sanctorale kalendarium, but celebrated the commemoration of all the saints and indeed all the commemorations (available) of all the saints. This custom precluded the establishment of a Sanctorale. It may be described as maximalism in the liturgical veneration of the saints. By comparison with this maximalism we may well describe the development in our days as one towards minimalism in this respect. This minimalism may be demanded, e.g. by the need of concentration, but we might like to consider whether it can compare in realism with the maximalism of the old Irish Church.

It was in respect of the liturgical devotion to the saints more than in respect of other features traditionally described as distinctive (computation of Easter, tonsure, double-monasteries, etc.) that the Irish Church differed from the Continental Church. This feature can be derived from a trait in Irish devotion—for better or worse—to this day. The assimilation of the old Irish Church to the Continental Church in its liturgical devotion to the saints was historically inevitable and indeed necessary, but the appreciation of the significance of old Irish veneration of the saints opens up a view on a conception of the relations between history and liturgy which enlarges our knowledge of the Christian mind.

Basel, Switzerland

\textsuperscript{36} See my review of Gamber’s Codices (above, note 9) in Z. f. Kirchengeschichte, 74 (1963), 371 ff.
\textsuperscript{38} H. B. S. LXVIII; p. x and my paper listed in note 25.
An Ambry of 1299 at San Clemente, Rome
LEONARD E. BOYLE O. P.

Introduction

At the right-hand side of the apse in the basilica of San Clemente, Rome, there is an ambry (aumbry) or wall-tabernacle of 1299 which rarely commands more than a casual moment of interest, possibly because of its proximity to the splendid and compelling mosaic in the apse. Even so distinguished and thorough a guide-book as that of Cecchelli mentions this ambry only in passing, and then merely in relation to the nearby frescoes of Our Lady and the Apostles under the mosaic.¹

Yet, originally, as a place of reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, the San Clemente ambry had been placed in isolation at the side of the main altar precisely in order to attract the attention, and it had been faced down into the church at a height above the chancel screen and choir ambos that allowed it to be seen from any part of the nave (Fig. 1). For although the term ‘ambry’ meant in church usage a recessed cupboard or repository (armadium) for sacred vessels, missals, etc., there was nothing hidden about an ambry which housed the Blessed Sacrament; nor was such a wall-tabernacle, as it occurs in Italian or Roman churches, an embodiment of the cold ‘Roman’ resistance to Northern eucharistic devotion with which Dom Gregory Dix erroneously credited a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. This Lateran provision was that the Chrism and the Reserved Eucharist should be kept under lock and key, ‘out of the reach of profane hands’.² Taking these words to mean ‘locked away in an

¹ C. Cecchelli, San Clemente (Le Chiese di Roma Illustrate, 24-25), Roma [ca. 1930], p. 46.—My best thanks are due to Miss Georgina Masson for Figures 1 and 2 (copyright reserved), and to Fr. Ambrose McNicholl, O.P., for the details of the sculptures in the tympanum.

² 4 Lat. c. 20: Statuimus ut in cunctis ecclesiis Chrisma et Eucharistia sub fidelis custodia clavibus adhibitis conserverentur, ne possit ad illa temeraria manus extendi, ad aliqua horribilia vel nefaria exercenda. Conciliorum Ecumenicorum Decreta, ed. J. Alberigo, P. P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1962), 220; cf. Decretales Gregorii IX, §44.1. This is the decree which Dix and others quote as Sane.
ambry', Dix thereby invented the myth of the 'Italian ambry', according to which Northerners in general, and the English in particular, made the Reserved Sacrament an object of tender devotion outside of Mass, while Southern Catholics, more sober in this respect, locked it up in a cupboard or ambry in a wall, sometimes in a remote place. However, as Fr Stephan van Dijk and Mrs Joan Walker have shown recently, what the Lateran decree ordered was simply a locked vessel of some kind, leaving untouched the common method of reserving in a portable vessel which was placed openly and directly upon an altar or suspended above it; further, as these same critics have observed, the theory of the 'Italian ambry' does not deal fairly with evidence that ambries are, if anything, more common in Northern countries, particularly England, than in Southern and devotionally warmer regions.

If the San Clemente ambry more than punctures Dix's theory, it is no less an example of what the Lateran decree really had in mind. Set into the wall some 1.70 m. (5' 7'') above the ground and protected by a ledge which projects some 23 cms. (9'') below the cupboard, the ambry was thus well out of the reach of the 'profane hands' of the Lateran decree. Yet it was clearly to be seen, and, indeed, was simply an open cupboard in which a locked pyx or some other form of vessel would be as visible to the public as any receptacle on, or hanging over, the main altar; the present door, with its crudely-set hinges, is a makeshift of the 17th century, and there are no marks in the opening of the cupboard to suggest that the ambry originally was sealed with a door, a grille or a fenestrella. Clearly, then, the ambry of 1299 at San Clemente made the Reserved Species as prominent a focus of attention as possible while respecting to the full the decree of 4 Lateran some eighty years earlier. What is more, the ambry was sited with deliberation, and it was designed to blend perfectly with its surroundings: in relation to the church as a whole, to the Schola Cantorum, to the apse, and to the wall into which it is set, the ambry's proportions are just right, and the location scarcely could be bettered. As a result the tabernacle is as arresting as it is unobtrusive.

Altogether, from supporting brackets to pinnacle, the ambry (Fig. 2) takes up a space of 2.35 × 1 m. The tabernacle proper (the cupboard,
2. The Ambry (Masson).
that is) is sunk into the right supporting-wall of the triumphal arch, and is shaped irregularly, the width (about 48 cms.) and depth (about 35 cms.) varying; the walls are roughly plastered. Below the cupboard, and supported by two scrolled brackets, there is a mensa or ledge projecting some 23 cms., from which two columns, inlaid with mosaic, twist upwards for 95 cms. to support the tympanum and two flanking statuettes, one of which is now missing; the capitals of the columns are Corinthian with the usual acanthus. The tympanum has a depth of 22 cms., being composed of an outer tympanum with pointed trifoliated arch and an inner tympanum formed by a drop or lancet arch which is sunk about 6 cms. into the wall above the cupboard; in the recess, against a background of gold mosaic, four figures are set in relief. The spandrels also are covered with mosaic, while above the arch there is a bas-relief of 'The Lamb of God' within a circle worked in blue mosaic. The outer bands of the tympanum carry a number of scrolled crockets leading to a fleur-de-lis which crowns the whole ambry.

As the inscription set in mosaic above the ambry intimates, the tabernacle was presented to S. Clemente in 1299 by the Cardinal of the church, the Franciscan Giacomo Caetani Tommasini, a nephew of Pope Boniface VIII. A son of Boniface's only sister, Tommasini was created Cardinal of S. Clemente on 17 December 1295, on the death of William Ferrier, S. Clemente's first Cardinal for one hundred years, and some six months in fact after Boniface had ordered the consecration (or reconsecration) of the basilica.5 At this same creation of Cardinals, Boniface appointed another nephew, Francesco Caetani, a married man separated from his wife, to the title of S. Maria in Cosmedin, and made a distant relative, Giacomo Caetani Stefaneschi, Cardinal Deacon of S. Giorgio in Velabro.6

Very little is known about Tommasini who, as it happens, has been confused on occasion with the better-known Giacomo Stefaneschi, not least by Heinrich Finke, the great historian of Boniface's pontificate.7 Tommasini subscribed papal letters at Anagni on

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6 C. Eubel, Hierarchia catholica medii aevi, 2nd ed., (Münster, 1913), I, 12.
17 July 1296 and at St Peter's in Rome on 15 May 1297. In 1296 he was instrumental in obtaining from various legacies to the papacy a sum of 100 marks for the Franciscans of Paris; in 1298 he procured a canonry in the diocese of Rodez for his private chaplain. After the death of Celestine V (19.5.1296) he commissioned an account of the miracles attributed to Celestine (Pietro Murreone) from the Celestine monk Thomas of Sulmona, by whom he is called 'Dominus Thomas Cardinalis'; he was present at a public consistory in St. Peter's on 30 June 1298 when Boniface spoke of peace and concord between France and England. After this date the only thing we know about him is that he gave the amby to S. Clemente in 1299 and that he died on 1 January 1300. The tabernacle, therefore, is not, as it might appear at first sight, a gift to commemorate the Holy Year of 1300 which, in any case, was not proclaimed until February 1300. Possibly it is yet another witness to the impression created by the miracle of Bolsena in 1263, and to the consequent wave of devotion to the Eucharist which had caused, for example, the Duomo at Orvieto to be begun in 1290 to commemorate the event and to house relics of the miracle. For what it is worth it may be noted that on Sunday 3 November 1297 Boniface and his curia visited Bolsena on their way back to Rome after the long Summer villeggiatura at Orvieto. The tabernacle could have been commissioned as a result of the stay in Orvieto and the visit to Bolsena, perhaps in early 1298, and then set up in S. Clemente in mid-1299 or at least some months before Tommasini's death at the end of that year.

9 Ibid., nn. 1232, 2702.
10 A. Frugoni, Celestiniana (Istituto storico italiano per il medioevo, Studi storici, 6-7), Rome 1954, 38.
11 Les Registres, n. 2836.
12 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Obligationes et Solutiones I, fol. 11r; see also Eubel, Hierarchy, I.12.
13 See R. Morghen, Medioevo cristiano (Bari 1958), 296-298.
14 D. Bartolan, "Cronaca romana dall’anno 1288 al 1301", Archivio Veneto 33 (1887), 430: a prosaic account of curial events by a procurator of the Comune of Vicenza.
(i) The Inscription

Apart from Cardinal Tommasini’s coat of arms set in mosaic on the side-wall of the ambry next the apse, the best-known detail of the Tommasini tabernacle to date has been the inscription in the wall directly above the ambry. This is made up of five hexameters written somewhat irregularly in gold mosaic lines measuring 21 × 5 cms. each, and separated from each other by thin strips of marble (1.5 cms.) into which the generic superscript omission-siglum has been cut deeply above the abbreviæd parts of the words Domini, nonaginta, novem, quem and nepotem:

EX ANNIS DOMINI DILAPSID MILLE DVCENTIS
NONAGINTA NOVEM · IACOB COLLEGA MINORVM
HVIVS BASILICE TITVLI PARS CARDINIS ALTI ·
HOC IVSSIT FIERI · QVEM PLASIT [CAR]DO NEPOTEM:—
PAPA BONIFACIVS · OCTAVUS · ANAGNIA PROLEM:—

If, however, the inscription is well-known, this does not mean that it has always been rendered faithfully or consistently, or that the tabernacle has likewise been an object of study. In fact, interest in the inscription has generally had little or nothing to do with the ambry as such. The first known attempt to transcribe the inscription is that of the Augustinian O. Panvinio in a manuscript list of Popes and Cardinals compiled about 1550. It is remarkably good, correctly reading ‘dilapsis’, ‘hoc’, ‘quem’, ‘nepotem’, ‘prolem’ where later writers would give ‘elapsis’ or ‘prolapsis’, ‘hic’ or ‘huic’ or ‘haec’, ‘quo’ or ‘qui’, ‘nepote’, and ‘proles’, but mistakenly rendering ‘tituli pars’ as ‘titularis’ and leaving a blank where all others would read ‘plausit Roma’.

As it happens, the inscription was not included in Panvinio’s Romanii Pontifices et Cardinales when published in 1557, so that the version in his notes has had no influence on other writers. The credit for making the inscription generally known must be given to Pompeo Ugnio in his Historia delle Stazioni di Roma published at Rome in 1588. Without stating to what the inscription was attached Ugnio wrote: ‘A lato manco della Tribuna, vi si vedono certi versi

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15 Two lions (gold mosaic) rampant on a field of red mosaic. See the design in A. Ciaconius, Vitae et Gesta Summorum Pontificum (Rome, 1601), col. 646, or in the later editions by Victorrello, Olduinio, etc.

16 ‘Summarium Vitarum Pontificum Maximorum... a beato Petro usque ad Paullum III’: MS Vat. lat. 3938, fol. 265v.

17 O. Panvinio, Romanii Pontifices et Cardinales... usque ad Paulum IV (Venice, 1557), 177.
scritti a lettere d’oro difficilissimi da intendere, i quali per quanto si è potuto raccogliere, dicono così:

Ex annis Domini elapsis mille ducentis
Nonaginta novem Iacobus collega minorum
Huius basilice tituli pars cardinis alti
Huic iussit fieri quo plausit Roma nepote
Papa Bonifacius octavus Anagnia proles.  

This version, with changes from ‘elapsis’ to ‘prolapsis’ in line 1 and from ‘huic’ to ‘haec’ in line 4, was taken over in 1628 by the great Irish Franciscan Luke Wadding in the second volume of his *Annales Minorum*. It goes without saying that Wadding was interested in the inscription because Tommasini was a Franciscan; and in fact he set a pattern which would not be shattered for some 250 years when he associated the inscription with the mosaic in the apse and attributed the mosaic to Tommasini: ‘quam ecclesiam restauravit [Iacobus] et musivo opere pro illius tempore dignitate magnifici decoravit; uti obscura et obsoleta haec carmina musivo etiam charactere, et deaurato, in tribunae fronte exarata testantur: Ex annis Domini prolapsis... Anagnia proles’  

Two years later Ugonio’s version was adopted once more, with a single change of ‘huic’ to ‘hic’ in line 4, by the Roman antiquarian Fioravante Martinelli, in a note published in the second edition (1630) of the *Vitæ* of the Popes by the Spanish Dominican Alonso Chacón. In the original edition of the work, published posthumously in 1601, Chacón (or Ciaconius) himself, who died in 1598, does not give the inscription, saying only: ‘Iacobus Thomasius, Hernicus, Anagninus, sororis pape [Bonifacii], ordinis fratræm minorum, presbyter cardinalis tituli S. Clementis. Huius mentio extat in tabernaculo marmoreo, quo olim asservabatur Corpus Christi in titulo S. Clementis, versibus musivis, sic cum hisce insignibus’.

In fact Chacón knew the inscription, for he had copied it word for word from Ugonio into a volume of his acquarelli of various apostles, popes, saints, etc. in various churches in Rome, which is now preserved in manuscript in the Vatican Library.

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20 A. Ciaconius, *Vitæ et Gesta Summarum Pontificum a Christo Domino usque ad Clementem VIII* (Rome, 1601), col. 647. The work is almost a continuation of Panvinio’s volume of 1557, on which it relies very much.
21 MS Vat. lat. 5407, fol. 102.
Martinelli, too, when contributing his signed version of the inscription to the 1630 edition of Chacón, was writing out of some familiarity with S. Clemente, as we know from his evidence in a case arising out of the publication in this second edition of an inscription in S. Clemente which was of dubious origin. Yet he simply copied Ugonio, with the exception of the change given above from 'huic' to 'hic'. Further, he does not bear out Chacón's correct interpretation of the purpose of the inscription, confessing instead to a failure to locate Chacón's 'marble tabernacle': 'Tabernaculum marmoreum, de quo hic auctor, nullum extincte vidi in Titulo S. Clementis, sed eiusdem partem reor esse illum quae cernebatur in apside à dextris cum parvo lapide, ac hisce lectu difficillimis versibus: Ex annis Domini elapsis... Hic iussit fieri... proles. Floravantes Martinellus.' Martinelli did not know Wadding's Annales when he composed this note, but later editions, when reprinting Martinelli's criticism of Chacón, were to introduce in support Wadding's assertion that the inscription referred to the mosaic in the apse. Thus an influential editor of Chacón, the Jesuit A. Olduino, wrote in the edition (3rd) of 1677: 'Quae carmina olim rescripta in Tabernaculo marmoreo eiusdem tituli, in quo asservabatur Corpus Christi, affirmavit Ciaconius, sed, ut bene notat Martinellus, nullum extat in titulo Sancti Clementis marmoreum tabernaculum: pro abside, ut dicemus infra, Tabernaculum Ciaconius per errorem scriptum'. He then goes on to accept Wadding's attribution of the mosaic to Cardinal Tommasini, and prefers to print Wadding's variant on Ugonio's version of the inscription (... prolapsis... haec...) rather than that of Martinelli (... elapsis... hic...). This is rather a pity, for in between 1630 and 1677 the inscription had been studied freshly by two perceptive scholars, with whose work, it seems, Olduino was not acquainted. About 1650 G. A. Bruzio had correctly read 'quem' for 'quo' in line 4, while some ten years later B. Millini had corrected 'nepote' to 'nepotem' in the same line; more importantly, perhaps, Millini had disagreed with Wadding and Martinelli, saying that the inscription referred not to the mosaic in the apse but to a marble tabernacle which, as Chacón had stated, really did exist at S. Clemente.

22 Vatican Library, MS Barb. lat. 4885, fols. 37r-49v.
25 G. A. Bruttius, 'Theatrum romanze urbis': MS Vat. lat. 11885, fol. 200v.
26 B. Millini, 'Dell'Antichità di Roma': MS Vat. lat. 11905, fol. 22r; cf. Barb. lat. 4318, fol. 229.
However, the Wadding version of Ugonio as printed by Olduinio, and the Wadding theory of the relation of the inscription to the apse, became generally accepted, and over the years were taken over by such influential writers as Rondinini (1706), De Burgo (1762) and Mullooly (1873). It was only in 1874 that a writer broke away from the accepted rendering of the inscription when Forcella correctly gave 'hoc', 'quem' and 'nepotem' in line 4, although he read 'elapsis' in line 1 and retained 'proles' in line 5. A few years afterwards De Rossi struck forcefully at those who had for long read 'haec' for 'hoc' in line 4 ('l'uno dell'altro ciecamente fidatasi') and accordingly had applied the inscription to the mosaic in the apse; in his opinion the proper reading 'hoc' could only refer, as Millini had pointed out two centuries earlier, to the tabernacle in the style of the Cosmati. Still, the old ghosts were not laid completely. Forcella's influential Iscrizioni had retained 'proles' and De Rossi himself had kept 'prolipsis' where Forcella had preferred 'elapsis'. In 1881 Adinolfi introduced the correct 'dilapsis' as an alternative to 'prolipsis', but produced a rather unfortunate last line: 'Papa Bonifacius octavus anagnia proles (alias proveniens)'. Marucchi, however, really put the clock back in 1902 when he reproduced the Wadding-Olduinio 'haec' and 'nepote' in line 4 and then gave a new and impossible twist to the line by abandoning their 'quo' and the Forcella-De Rossi 'quem' for an unheard of 'qui': 'Haec iussit fieri. Qui plausit Roma nepote, Papa Bonifacius Octavus Anagnia proles'. Finally, to complete a picture of confusion, when Cecchelli printed the inscription about 1950, he gave 'prolipsis' with De Rossi-Adinolfi-Marucchi against Forcella's 'elapsis', and then 'proles' with Forcella-Adinolfi-Marucchi against De Rossi's 'prolem'; yet he cited these four authors without comment, leading one to think that they agreed with him, if not with one another.

28 V. Forcella, Iscrizioni delle chiese ed altri edifici di Roma dal sec. XI fino ai nostri giorni, IV (Rome, 1874), 504 n. 1245.
29 G. B. De Rossi, Musaei cristiani (Rome, 1899), n. XXIX, fol. 3v. De Rossi began publishing the fascicules of his Musaei in 1872; the last (27th) appeared in 1896, two years after his death. In 1899 the fascicules were brought together into one volume.
30 P. Adinolfi, Roma nell'età di mezzo, I (Rome, 1881), 311 n. 1.
31 O. Marucchi, Basiliques et églises de Rome (Paris-Rome, 1902), 304 n. 2.
From Ugonio (1588) onwards many writers have complained that the inscription is hard to follow. This is especially true of lines 4 and 5 in which, as we have noted, certain words have been juggled over the centuries: 'haec' or 'hoc', 'quo' or 'quem' or 'qui', 'nepote' or 'nepotem', 'proles' or 'prolem'. However, where all writers from Ugonio to De Rossi and Cecchelli have read 'plausit Roma' in line 4 (e.g., Millini-De Rossi-Ceccelli: 'Quem plausit Roma nepotem') the present writer has to confess that it is very difficult to conjure up 'Roma' out of the letters between 'plausit' and 'nepotem'; understandably, if not wisely, Panvinio, our earliest copyist (ca. 1550), left a blank at this point.

Of course, since the five lines are undoubtedly hexameters, it must be admitted that 'plausit Roma nepotem' does at least allow line 4 to end correctly. However, the four letters in question appear to be RNDO or BNDO, and certainly the two last letters are DO, so, regrettably, 'Roma' has to be jettisoned. Obviously, BNDO or RNDO suggest an abbreviated word, but in fact there is no siglum whatsoever in the marble strip above these four letters; and even if there were, 'Reverendo' for RNDO or 'Benedicto' for BNDO would throw the metre out considerably. Therefore, in order to keep the metre intact and to allow for the unmistakable DO at the end of the word, I am inclined to suggest, for want of anything better at present, that word should be CARDO. The whole inscription would therefore run, as already given above:

EX ANNIS DOMINI DILAPSIS MILLE DVCENTIS NONAGINTA NOVEM • IACOB COLLEGA MINORVM HVIVS BASILICE TITVLI PARS CARDINIS ALTII • HOC IVSSIT FIERI • QUEM PLATUS CARDO NEPOTEM:—
PAPA BONIFACIVS • OCTAVVS • ANAGNIA PROLEM:—

This version does seem to admit of a smoother translation than any of the other versions we have already noted, and it does bring out a certain balance in the last two lines which was wanting. What it says is that 'In the year of the Lord 1299, James, a member of the Friars Minor, of the Title of this Basilica, a part of the high hinge [the Roman Church], ordered this [tabernacle] to be made: whom the hinge praised [as a part], Pope Boniface VIII as a nephew and Anagni as a native'—a roundabout way, by any measure, of stating that to the tabernacle and inscription only in passing, and in fact gives 1285 instead of 1299 as the date of the gift of the tabernacle.
James, O. F. M., Cardinal of the Title of S. Clemente, a native of Anagni and a nephew of Boniface VIII, had this tabernacle made in 1299.

At first sight it could be objected that ‘cardo nepotem’ is a false ending since ‘cardo’ is really a spondee. In medieval versification, however, the final ‘o’ of nouns often was shortened in the nominative.33 Thus the poet-historian Cardinal Giacomo Stefaneschi, a relative of Boniface VIII, treats ‘cardo’ in this manner on occasion in his opus metricum, for example, when describing Boniface’s election: ‘O cardo Benedicte sacer levitaque quondam’; ‘cardo manens, Benedictus herus, nunc culmine summo’.34 It must be noted, too, that the use here of ‘cardo’ as the etymological root of ‘cardinalis’ does not conform to the original concept of ‘cardinalis’ (= ‘incardinatus in’ or ‘seconded to’ a church other than that for which one was ordained and by which one was ‘entitled’); but it is the usage which was common from the middle of the eleventh century.35 The Roman Church, it was thought, was the ‘hinge’ on which everything else swung,36 and the Cardinals were so designated because they form part of this hinge which ‘culminates’ in the Pope. This is the imagery here in the S. Clemente inscription: Giacomo Tommasini is a part of the hinge that is the Roman Church, and it is as a part of the hinge that he is now of the Title of San Clemente and that he decorates the church with a tabernacle; hence it is that the ‘Cardo’ or Roman Church is said to praise him, as we have suggested. This does not mean, however, that a Cardinal will not be called a ‘cardo’ on occasion, by synecdoche, that is, of a transference of the whole to the part. Thus Stefaneschi, who really plays around with ‘the hinge’, will write in his Opus metricum that the cardinals are ‘cardinei proceres’ or ‘cardinei apices’, while Boniface VIII (as Cardinal) is a ‘sacerdos cardineus’ and ‘cardo sacer’ who succeeds ‘ad culmina cardinis’ on his election as Pope.37

34 Ed. F. X. Seppelt, Monumenta Coelestiniana (Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte hsg. v. d. Görresgesellschaft XIX), Paderborn 1921, 87, line 36; 89, line 84.
36 See the letter of Leo IX to the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1054: ‘Et sicut cardo immobils permanens ducit et reducit ostium, sic Petrus et sui successores liberum de omni ecclesia habent iudicium... unde clerici eius cardinales dicuntur, cardini utique illi quo cetera moventur vicinius adherentes’ J. B. Mansi, Amplissima collectio, 2nd ed., (Florence-Venice, 1759-1798), XIX, 653B.
37 Opus metricum, ed. Seppelt, pp. 98,28; 90,129; 103,327; 87,36; 145, 290-1.
Since his name and *Opus metricum* have been introduced, it is indeed tempting to sense here in the Tommasini inscription the devious hand of Stefaneschi himself who, at this very time (1299), was engaged in composing his valuable metrical accounts of the election and pontificate of Celestine V (Pietro Murrone) and of Boniface's succession and coronation. As we know from his *Opus*, Stefaneschi had been fascinated from the moment of his return from the Faculty of Arts at Paris by the ceremonial of the curia. As early as 1291, indeed, he had begun a metrical description of a papal coronation, availing himself later of the elections of Celestine V (1293) and Boniface VIII (1294) to make the account more real and topical.\textsuperscript{38} The whole *Opus* was finished by 1303,\textsuperscript{38a} but after the canonization of Pietro Murrone in 1314 Stefaneschi added an account of his life and miracles, revising also some earlier parts of the work. In spite of his studies at Paris, Stefaneschi's considerable literary leanings were fostered, as he admits himself, 'absque instructore'.\textsuperscript{39} The result, both in his *Opus metricum* and the metrical narrative of the Holy Year of 1300, is an involved and pedantic style, full, as Gregorovius has put it, of 'stretches of hieroglyphs and entanglements of barbarisms';\textsuperscript{40} sometimes, indeed, words are switched around like so many checkers, but without any regard to position or sense, for the sake of his not always happy hexameters.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} See A. Frugoni, "La figura e l'opera del Cardinale J. Stefaneschi," *Radicenti della Accademia dei Lincei, Classe morale-storico-filosofico*, ser. viii, 4 (1950), 403-410. Stefaneschi was of a Trastevenian family and is generally presumed to be a distant relative of Boniface VIII. However, it is quite possible that he took the name Caetani out of devotion to Boniface, 'protector noster', as he calls him: see Frugoni, *ibid.*, 397-399.

\textsuperscript{38a} Frugoni, *art. cit.*, says 'by 1305' (p. 406), and is of the opinion (p. 410) that Stefaneschi's literary efforts were unknown to Boniface. In fact, as Miss Annalie Maier has just discovered, that part of the *opus* dealing with Boniface's coronation was in Boniface's library. See F. Ehrle, *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum tam Bonifationae quam Avignionensis*, I (Rome, 1890), 31 n. 52; *Addenda et Emendanda*, ed. A. Pelzer (Rome, 1947) 88. This copy from Boniface's library, probably that which Stefaneschi presented to Boniface, is now MS Vat. lat. 493; it contains some fine miniatures, particularly one of Boniface's coronation (fol. 7v). See A. Maier, 'Der Katalog der päpstlichen Bibliothek in Avignon vom Jahr 1411', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* I (1963) 97-179.

\textsuperscript{39} Ed. Seppelt, p. 6, 24.

\textsuperscript{40} F. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*, 3rd ed., V (Stuttgart, 1878), 596-7.

\textsuperscript{41} Stefaneschi was aware of his lack of skill and of the obscurity of some of his phrases. See the letter from Avignon in 1319 to the Celestines of Sulmona (ed. Seppelt, pp. 3-4) which accompanied the final version of the *Opus*; in this he explains that his metre is not always perfect and that he has therefore added glosses here and there over certain words.
It is, I am inclined to think, this same curial poet who composed the inscription for the Tommasini inscription in S. Clemente. Apart from the internal rhyming, generally two-syllabled, which occurs in the first four lines of the inscription after the second and fourth feet (dilapisis—ducentis; novem—minorum; tituli—alti; quem—nepotem) and is also to be found spasmodically in the opus metricum, there are clear echoes, especially in the last three lines, of Stefaneschi’s phraseology (‘cardo’; ‘Anagnia prolem’) and curious ordering of words, as in this sketch of Boniface’s career:42

Clara domus genuit, quam nutrivit Anagnia colle

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

Omnia pertractans, clarus dictamine, quondam,
Cardineo prefusit rubeo levita, sacerdos
Cardo manens Benedictus herus, nunc culmine summo
Imperat...
Fluctibus in mediis. Ortus Campania talem
Eddidit, ac tantam produxit Anagnia prolem.

Indeed, granting that Stefaneschi really wrote the draft of the inscription which the mosaicist then copied on the wall above the tabernacle, a reason for the presence of BNDO or RNDO instead of CARDO may now be suggested. For the hand, presumably that of Stefaneschi himself, that wrote the interlinear notes in the copy of the coronation poem presented to Boniface VIII,43 uses a shallow C and a gothic R, both of which could easily lure the mosaicist into writing BNDO or RNDO for CARDO, especially if CARDO were written in the cramped fashion in which some of these interlinear notes are written.

(ii) The Sculptures in the Tympanum

Whether Stefaneschi composed the inscription or not, Pope Boniface VIII was pleased, as the inscription says, at his nephew Tommasini’s gift of the tabernacle.44 Indeed, as we shall note immediately,

42 Ed. Seppelt, pp. 88, line 66; 89, lines 82-5, 96-7.
43 MS Vat. lat. 4925: sec n. 38a, above.
44 Tommasini was not Boniface’s favourite nephew. That honour was reserved to Cardinal Benedict Caetani, who was made a Cardinal early in 1295; to Boniface’s great grief Benedict did not live very long. See L. Mohler, Die Kardinalle Jakob und Peter Colonna (Paderborn, 1914), 263. It is interesting to note that among the many benefactions of Boniface to St. Peter’s, Rome, there is a legacy in 1301 for an anniversary Mass for Cardinal Benedict, but no mention of Giacomo Tommasini, who had died just a year


5. St. James (?) (McNicholl).
This ruby surmounted the single-crowned regnum or corona or frigium which Boniface inherited from his predecessors in 1294 and which is surely that which he is wearing in this statuette of 1299: 'Item, regnum sive corona in qua sunt xlviiij balassi... in quibus sunt aliqui rubini, et lxxij zaffiri, et xlv inter praxinas et smaragldos, ...In summitate autem habet unum rubinum grossum; in inferiori autem parte habet unum circulum cum esmaltis; caudas vero habet nigras cum viij esmaltis per quamlibet. pond. xij m. et v. unc.'

Altogether, this tiara, which is most vividly, perhaps, to be seen on the statue of Honorius IV in the Aracoeli church in Rome, was studded with 48 balas-rubies, 72 sapphires, 45 emeralds and 66 large pearls; on each of the tags (caudae) there were eight pieces of enamel finish. When one adds the great ruby to all this the whole regnum weighed some 81½ lbs. It was of this 'ancient sign of empire' that Stefaneschi wrote when describing Boniface's coronation:

Tunc senior levita manu diadema, vetustum
Imperii signum, pavonis cortice candens
Pennarum, intexo gemmis radiantibus aurum
Vallatum in gyrum, cui summno in vertice carbo
Evomit, et cubito gemmarum maxime flamas,
Imposuit capite, spere cubicique figuram, ...

However, as the procession made its way from St. Peter's past S. Marco, the Colosseum and S. Clemente to the Lateran, Boniface had changed this heavy headgear for a mitre, which itself was not much lighter, perhaps:


50 Molinier, op. cit., 71, n. 667.


52 Ed. Seppelt. p. 98, 141-146.
Hos linquens, qua et sacra via est, qua templam coluntur
Marci, quaque ferox iuvenisque Adrianus in armis,
Romulei qua templum iacent, celsusque colossus,
Quaque pius colitur Clemens, qui dexter eunti est,
Progresiens princeps Lateranum summus in orbe
Appulit, sump frigium, mitram sed vertice gestans,
pondere confectus nimio...\[53\]

When one remembers that Boniface’s tiara in the S. Clemente
statuette measures only 5 cms. (the present photograph—fig. 6—is a shade larger at 7 cms.), one cannot expect too much detail. Yet
substantially the description of the corona or regnum in the inventory
of 1294 is borne out, although there is no sign of Stefaneschi’s peacock
feathers. Apart from the great ruby (rubinum grossum) on the top,
the lower part of the tiara certainly has only one circle, while the
‘lozenges’ there are presumably the ‘enamels’ of the inventory. The
rest of the front of the tiara is composed of three ridges going across
and three up and down; various strokes fill the spaces left by the
intersections, possibly representing the sapphires, emeralds, pearls, etc.
These multiple ridges (‘vallatum in gyrum’, as Stefaneschi has it) are
also clearly visible in other statues of Boniface: in the great statue over
the Porta Maggiore at Orvieto (1297-8), in the Giotto fresco in the
Lateran of the proclamation of the Jubilee of 1300, and, most clearly
of all, in Giotto’s fresco of Honorius III (with Boniface VIII’s features)
listening to St. Francis preaching (Assisi, S. Francesco); they are also
visible in the Fiammingo table-portrait of Boniface, painted possibly
at the time of the promulgation of the Sextus Liber in 1298.\[54\]

A more interesting aspect of the Boniface statuette in the S. Clemente
ambry is that Boniface is portrayed with a halo. This means, of course,
that it is not Boniface who is presenting Giacomo Caetani Tommasini
to the Madonna and Child but rather a saint with Boniface’s features.
It is too much to suppose that this saint is Peter and that the support-
ing saint on the other side is Paul, although one is tempted to think
of this possibility since the mosaic which Boniface had caused to be
placed over his monumental tomb in the old chapel of St. Boniface
in St. Peter’s had precisely this tableau: St. Peter presenting a kneeling
Pope Boniface to Our Lady and Child, with St. Paul on the other

\[53\] Ibid., p. 105, 305-311.

\[54\] See F. Hermanin, “Tre ritratti dei Pontefici”, Rendiconti d. Pontifica Accademia di
Archeologia, 18 (1941-42), 137-169.
side.\textsuperscript{55} It is more likely, however, that we have here St. Clement, of whose church Giacomo Tommasini was Cardinal, while the supporting saint is possibly St. James the Apostle, since Tommasini's Christian name was James.\textsuperscript{56}

As is well known, Boniface's features were used extensively by Giotto to portray Innocent III, Honorius III and Gregory IX in various frescoes dealing with the early history of the Franciscans;\textsuperscript{57} further, the practice of placing the features of living persons on saints and Madonnas was to become quite usual later on. All the same, a representation of a living person with a halo such as we have here in the S. Clemente statuette must have shocked some of Boniface's contemporaries. Possibly it gives point to some of the criticisms of Boniface which were made during and after his pontificate: accusations which ranged from magic and impious practices to simony and inordinate pride.\textsuperscript{58} Most of these are as baseless as they are repelling. If some possibly have their origin in Boniface's understandably brusque or cynical replies to inordinately silly questions, many of these accusations were the result of corrosive propaganda on the part of the Franciscan Spirituals and the Celestines. All those who had revered Celestine for the saint that he was, and those whom Celestine had favoured so singularly during his brief pontificate, could never forgive Boniface for having been the chief architect of Celestine's resignation; their contempt of Boniface, and of his single-minded devotion to the aggrandizement of the Caetani, was openly and vociferously expressed, perhaps most viciously in the jingle of the Franciscan poet Jacobone da Todi which begins: 'O papa Bonifacio mult'aj jocato al monno'.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} See the design in Grimaldi's 'Instrumenta authentica...', MS Barb. lat. 2733, fols. 46v and 47r; and in J. Ciampini, \textit{De sacris aedificiis a Constantino Magno constructis Synopsis historica} (Rome, 1693), 65.

\textsuperscript{56} Were it not for the halo there would be no hint that the 'St. Clement' was anything other than Pope Boniface VIII. 'St. Clement' has been suggested because this is his church; in fact, Pope 'St. Boniface VIII' could be any Pope-Saint, although, if he were Peter, one would expect a beard at least. The 'St. James' is clearly an Apostle (Fig. 5), and possibly, for the reason given above, St. James. An unpointed beard is not at all usual for St. Paul.

\textsuperscript{57} See Sibilia, 'Iconografia...', 33-35 and fig. 12-15.


\textsuperscript{59} G. M. Monti, "Una satira di Jacobone da Todi contro Bonifazio VIII", \textit{Miscellanea in onore del Card. Francesco Ehrle, III} (Rome, 1924), 67-87. The satire was composed probably between the Anagni incident of 7 September 1303 and Boniface's death on 12 October following.
Boniface's quite tactless treatment of Philip the Fair of France, a not illogical consequence of the heady successes of the Papacy over the Hohenstaufens in the 13th century, and his relentless pursuit of the Colonna Cardinals, family and dependents, many of whom fled to France, made him generally detested in that country. Ultimately, indeed, Philip conceived the idea in 1303 of calling a General Council, before which Boniface would answer the many charges in circulation. By this time Stephen Colonna was in the king's counsels, and the Colonna had collected in Paris, placing all their grievances and their experience at the disposal of the French; Charles of Valois, too, Philip's brother, had just returned from Rome with all the gossip of the curia. As a result of a meeting with his leading advisers at the Louvre on 12 March 1303, Philip on 24 March sent out letters appealing for a General Council. And when Boniface, out of the security of his triumphant rapprochement with the German Empire of 30 April, retaliated on 31 May with a letter urging all subjects of the empire to throw off any allegiance to France, Philip formally published at Paris on 14 June a list of 29 charges against Boniface. Most of these are so ludicrous and unlikely (e.g., 'Item habet daemonium privatum cuius consilio utitur in omnibus et per omniam') that they really make a mockery of any case Philip may have had, and, for all the pious disclaimers then and afterwards, place him in a very unhealthy position. However, these charges were solemnly witnessed by five archbishops, twenty one bishops, eleven abbots, etc., and within the following weeks were supported by seculars and religious from all over France.

Among the charges of heresy, natural and unnatural vice, cruelty, sorcery and murder (that of Celestine V), there is one (n. 9) which may have some bearing on the S. Clemente statuette: 'Item ut suam damnatissimam memoriam perpetuam constituat, fecit imagines suas argentaeas erigi in ecclesias, per hoc homines ad idololatrandum inducens'. Undoubtedly Boniface seems to have had no deep objection to statues of himself or to perpetuating his own memory: there is, for example, his remodelling of the chapel of Pope St. Boniface in St. Peter's to include an elaborate tomb with a reclining statue of himself, and the

62 *Registres de Boniface VIII*, ed. Digard, etc. n. 5353.
63 Dupuy, *op. cit.*, 102-109, 112-120, etc.
mosaic already mentioned, and, for good measure, a bust. 65 Then there is the curious episode of Boniface's order to the Bishop and Chapter of Amiens, who were at loggerheads, that the Bishop should erect 'unam ymaginem argenteam deauratam... papalem' and the Dean and Chapter a statue to the Blessed Virgin. 66 Again, there are the two statues over the gates of Orvieto placed there by the people of Orvieto because Boniface had 'deigned' to select that city for the villeggiatura of 1297. 67

As we know from revised articles drawn up for the formal process against Boniface at Avignon in 1310 under Pope Clement V, the main exemplification of the above accusation of idolatry was taken from these Orvieto statues: 'Item, ut suam damnatissimam memoriam conservaret fecit imagines suas argentaeas erigi in ecclesiis, per hoc homines ad idololatrandum inducens. Huius articuli veritas ex ipsa oculorum inspectione probabatur. Item probabitur manifeste, quod non solum in ecclesiis, sed etiam extra ecclesias, quod magis ad inducendum idololatriam eum habuisse animam, suspicicionem induct, in portis civitatum, et supra eas, ubi antiquitus consueverunt idola esse, suas imagines marmoreas erigi fecit, sicut patet in civitate Urbevetana, et aliis locis pluribus.' 68 No examples are given of statues inside churches, but presumably the accusers would have had in mind the Vatican statues, the most obvious ones, and others such as the more blatantly 'idolatrous' statuette at S. Clemente of 'Pope St. Boniface VIII' (for thus it must have seemed to the malicious). Indeed Philip of France and his counsellors could have heard of the 'St. Boniface' from Charles of Valois, the King's brother, when Charles returned from Rome in the Spring of 1303 just as they were beginning to collect the charges against Boniface which would form the basis of the 29 articles published in June. It is unlikely that the tabernacle and the statuette escaped the notice of Charles during his sojourn in Rome. For, as it happens, his very first lodging in Rome in February 1302 had been at S. Clemente itself. 69

65 See Ciampini's remark, De sacris aedificiis (Rome, 1693), 65: '...Ciborium cuspiditatum erat germani operis, sub quo sepulcrum marmoreum sibi vivens, cum suis insignibus gentilitiis, coaptavit, ita ut dum Sacerdos Missae sacrificium perageret, tumulum ipsius Bonificii consipiceret....'


67 L. Fumi, Codice diplomatico della Città d'Orvieto (Florence, 1884), 397.

68 Dupuy, op. cit., p. 351; see also p. 354.

69 H. Finke, Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII, p. XLII, quoting the diary kept by Laurentius
(iii) The Ambry and Arnolfo di Cambio

By way of concluding this first attempt to describe the S. Clemente ambry a further aspect may be suggested. The presence of a statue with Pope Boniface's features during his lifetime brings to mind at once the great Tuscan sculptor and architect Arnolfo di Cambio who executed the famous sculptures of Pope Boniface for the chapel of St. Boniface in St. Peter's.

The composition of the present ambry does indeed suggest the influence if not the hand of Arnolfo, particularly when one compares it with Arnolfo's tomb of Adrian V (S. Francesco, Viterbo) and of Cardinal de Braye (S. Domenico, Orvieto, 1276) and with the ciborium at St. Paul's in Rome (1285). In the Cardinal's monumental tomb at Orvieto the twisted mosaic columns, with their capitals, on either side of the seated Madonna and Child, are exactly those of our ambry, while the ‘orante’ attitude of the kneeling figurette of de Braye, who is being presented by St. Paul to the Madonna and Child, is precisely that of Cardinal Tommasini at S. Clemente, who is being recommended to the Virgin and Child by Pope St. Clement in the guise of Boniface. The tympanum of the ambry has the pointed trifoliated arch of the ciborium in St. Paul’s, with much the same scrolled crockets on the outer bands; and these same features, with the twisted columns, may be noted in the ciborium above the tomb of Adrian V.

All this, however, does not amount to anything more than that the S. Clemente ambry has the appearance of works attributed to Arnolfo. The issue is further complicated by the fact that historians of art are by no means agreed on what is Arnolfo's personal contribution to composite works such as tombs or ciboria. Thus the great German authority H. Keller would have it that most, if not all, of the works associated with the name of Arnolfo are really the product of his

Martini on behalf of bishop Raimund of Valencia: 'XI Kal. Marci. [1302] Karolus veniens de Tuscia ex mandato pape intravit curiam et rex Carolus exivit ei obviam ad Insulam, et ibi cum eo fuit pransus. Et viso Papa ad sanctum Clementem remisit (blank) Karulo, sed familia ipsius Caroli espitatur in santa Sabina'. Charles of Naples (Carolus) had been in Rome for some days before Charles of Valois (Karolus) arrived. The blank here is unfortunate, but the sense seems to be that Charles of Valois (and possibly Charles of Naples also) lodged at S. Clemente.

The best-known account of Arnolfo is that of A. Venturi, Storia dell'arte italiana, IV (Milan, 1906), 73-167. See also V. Mariani, Arnolfo di Cambio (Rome, 1943), where there are some fine illustrations of his work, and P. Toesca, “Arnolfo di Cambio”, Enciclopedia italiana, IV (1929), 554-556.
workshop, whether at Viterbo or Orvieto, Rome or Florence. In effect Keller would restrict Arnolfo’s own personal work to the reclining figure of Cardinal de Braye at Orvieto, and a few other pieces, over a period of thirty years. In the ciborium at St. Paul’s, for example, there is nothing of Arnolfo other than the design. According to Keller, the Roman workshop was in fact responsible, both before and after Arnolfo’s departure for Florence about 1294-96, for most of the ‘Arnolfian’ work in Rome: the Charles of Anjou (about 1277) now in the Capitoline Museum; the whole of Boniface VIII’s tomb and the famous bust; the ‘orante’ statue of Boniface now in the chapel of the Crucifixion in the Lateran.

Clearly there is much in the various ‘Arnolfian’ sculptures which is the product of the workshops, but, as G. de Francovich, Keller’s best critic, has observed, it is still possible to pick out the mature hand of Arnolfo from that of a workshop craftsman in many pieces with which Keller would credit the workshop. In the de Braye monument at Orvieto, for example, the Cardinal and the two deacons who are holding back the curtains are certainly the work of Arnolfo, while the figures in the composition above the tomb (Madonna and Child, St. Paul and a kneeling de Braye, St. Dominic) are just as certainly from the workshop. Again there are clearly two hands in the ciborium at St. Paul’s in Rome: that of a quite superior artist who executed the external sculptures (e.g. the David, and the four flying angels on the tympanum), and that of a lesser craftsman who produced most of the decorations, with some assistance here and there from Arnolfo on the figures inside the tympanum. On the other hand, as de Francovich admits, there is very little of Arnolfo in the rather gaudy ciborium in S. Cecilia in Trastevere.

What is clear is that there was a Roman workshop which took care of the material execution of a ciborium or tomb ensemble designed by Arnolfo while the Master and an exceptional assistant busied themselves with the major sculptures. This workshop continued after Arnolfo left for Florence; Boniface VIII’s tomb, for example, was not completed until 1301-1302, some five or six years afterwards. Keller is inclined to think that the workshop was by and large independent of Arnolfo during those years, but de Francovich more reasonably

supposes that Arnolfo did not leave the bottega untended; perhaps he made sorties from time to time from Florence, or, indeed, executed some of the statuettes for Boniface’s tomb there, leaving it to the workshop to incorporate them into the monument. However, it is difficult to imagine that the two-crowned and three-crowned tiaras in the Vatican sculptures of Boniface (tomb and bust) were executed at a distance from Rome. Since these are after the one-crowned tiara at San Clemente, and Boniface seems to allude to a similar tiara of one crown when excommunicating the Colonnas on 9 October 1299, Arnolfo must have visited Rome at least in 1300 and 1301 when the two-crowned, and later the three-crowned, tiara had been introduced.

Perhaps the S. Clemente ambry, too, occasioned at least a visit of inspection. The design and execution have so much in common with the forms of the upper part of the de Braye monument at Orvieto, and with the ciboria over Adrian V’s tomb in Viterbo and the altar at St. Paul’s in Rome, that the tabernacle must have come from Arnolfo’s Roman workshop, possibly to his design. There were, of course, Roman imitations of Arnolfo’s work, chiefly by the Cosmati family, but these fall short even of the products of his workshop. Thus the ciborium commissioned about this time by Cardinal Francesco Caetani from Deodato Cosmati for S. Maria in Cosmedin is organized so much along the lines of Arnolfo’s ciborium at St. Paul’s that it could have been assembled to the same design, but the weak ornamentation and complete absence of sculptures make it only a material shadow of that fine creation.

The presence of sculptures in the S. Clemente ambry is, indeed, the surest sign that we have here an Arnolfian and not a Cosmatesque product. However, the only piece that is possibly by Arnolfo himself is the angel on the left pinnacle (the right angel is missing). This is

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73 *Registres de Boniface VIII*, ed. Digard, etc., n. 3410.

74 For the emergence of these tiaras see Ladner *art. cit.* (above, n. 47).


76 See G. B. Giovanale, *La basilica di S. Maria in Cosmedin* (Rome, 1927), 157-166, and plates XVI, XVII.

77 How long the statuette has been missing I cannot say. It is not present in the photograph in J. Mullol, *Saint Clement Pope and Martyr and his Basilica in Rome*, 2nd ed. Rome, 1873), facing p. 337. The artist of the sketch of the tabernacle in F. Raible, *Der Tabernakel einst und jetzt* (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1908), 173, fig. 38, has supplied the missing angel.
a firm and mature work, on a level with which the sculptures in the tympanum cannot be placed, and it has the distinctiveness of the two deacons on the de Braye monument, and of the David and flying angels at St. Paul's. The marble has been polished, as at Orvieto and St. Paul's, and a fold of the angel's tunic sweeps away from the form of the knee in that wide-angled manner which is observable in these undoubted pieces of Arnolfo. Of course one could argue that the figures in the tympanum at San Clemente (St. Clement-Boniface VIII presenting a kneeling Tommasini to the Madonna and Child, with St. James on the other side) are faithful echoes of the group at Arvieto (St. Paul — De Braye — Our Lady and Child — St. Dominic); and, further, that the kneeling Tommasini, in common with the 'orante' Boniface VIII in the Lateran, is sculpted in the same prayerful and slightly less than right-angled posture as Arnolfo's De Braye, thus providing, it might seem, an excellent example of that 'gesture of prayer' with the translation of which from painting to sculpture Arnolfo has rightly been credited. 78 Yet in these San Clemente sculptures, as in the Lateran Boniface and the Orvieto statues, the distinctive touch of Arnolfo himself is wanting, particularly in the hang of the garments from the shoulders and in the set of their lower folds. In fine, for all its apparent resemblance to creations of Arnolfo di Cambio, the ambry at San Clemente as a whole is at best a typical, though not undistinguished, product of Arnolfo's Roman workshop.

San Clemente, Rome and
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

A PROPOS DU DICTON "CLAUSTRUM SINE ARMARIO, QUASI CASTRUM SINE ARMAMENTARIO"

La présente note ne vise pas à résoudre un problème, mais seulement à le poser. Ce problème, le voici: le dicton bien connu, reproduit ci-dessus dans le titre, apparaît-il à l'arsenal des proverbes médiévaux dont l'origine est inconnue, ou, au contraire, est-il dû au chanoine régulier de Normandie, Geoffroy de Breteuil († 1194)?

La plus ancienne attestation qui ait pu en être repérée jusqu'ici paraît se trouver dans une épître dudit Geoffroy, mais c'est là une constatation d'un caractère tout à fait précaire et provisoire, car il cuit été bien difficile, sinon impossible, de l'assecor sur les résultats d'une enquête systématique et exhaustive. C'est à l'expérience des médiévistes sous les yeux desquels cette note tombera qu'il convient de faire appel pour décider s'il existe ou non des attestations antérieures à celle de Geoffroy. Les droits de celui-ci à la paternité de l'adage ne pourront jamais être établis de façon indiscutable, car on ne sera jamais assuré d'avoir dépouillé tous les textes, et au surplus combien d'écrits ne sont-ils pas perdus. Mais le silence des sources ferait cependant jouer en sa faveur une présomption raisonnable. Par contre, il suffirait évidemment d'une seule attestation antérieure à la seconde moitié du xiième siècle pour ruiner définitivement ses prétentions.

Dans la notice consacrée à Geoffroy de Breteuil dans l'Histoire littéraire de la France, plusieurs pages sont dévolues à l'analyse et à l'appréciation de la correspondance de Geoffroy. En citant la 18ème lettre, on a eu soin d'en extraire le dicton qui nous occupe ici. Les quelques lignes qui introduisent cette épître aident à la replacer dans son contexte historique, et méritent à ce titre d'être reproduites ici:

"Dans la septième <lettre>, Gregofo propose à l'abbé de Baugerais d'acheter une bibliothèque qui était à vendre à Caen. Cette acquisition était importante pour un nouvel

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2 La lettre, adressée à un certain Pierre Mangot, bienfaiteur de l'abbaye cistercienne de Baugeais, est imprimée dans la PL 205, 844-845. Migne reprend l'édition de Martène et Durand dans Theaurus anecdotorum, 1 (Paris, 1717), 510-512, édition basée sur un manuscrit de l'abbaye de Lyre (actuellement La Vieille-Lyre, canton de Rugles, Eure), et non St. Lyre(!) comme dit Manitus.

3 Jean était abbé de Baugerais (1173-1193), en Touraine (arr. Loches, Indre-et-Loire). On
établissement, mais les fonds manquaient. Geoffroi, dans la lettre dix-huitième, s'adresse à un certain Pierre Mangot, qui avait déjà beaucoup contribué à l'établissement des cisterciens à Baugeras; il lui représente que, pour compléter son ouvrage, il est essentiel de leur procurer une bibliothèque, parce qu'un monastère dépourvu de livres ressemble, dit-il, à un château fort sans munitions: Claustrum sine armario quasi castrum sine armamentario. Enfin tout s'arrange pour le mieux, et l'abbé écrit à son ami qu'il peut arrêter la bibliothèque pour son compte avant qu'elle soit vendue à un autre. C'est l'objet de la lettre vingt-unième. ⁴

A propos de la lettre elle-même, il convient de préciser qu'elle est constituée en majeure partie par une comparaison ample et détaillée entre une forteresse et un monastère. Notre formule assimilant l'armarium à l'armamentarium s'y insère tout naturellement.

Parmi les érudits postérieurs qui ont cité le dicton, on compte Fr. Cramer. Dans sa Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts in den Niederlanden während des Mittelalters (Stralsund, 1843), p. 74, cet auteur, après avoir énuméré quelques grandes bibliothèques de l'époque carolingienne (Tours, Chartres, Fulda, Reichenau, etc.), illustre cette constatation en remarquant: "denn es war förmlich sprichwörtlich geworden: ein Kloster ohne Bibliothek sei wie ein Schloss ohne Rüstkammer." Le texte latin est cité en note, mais il est dépourvu de toute référence.


Plus près de nous, en 1935, Jean Gessler a choisi le dicton pour le mettre en exergue à son édition d'Une bibliothèque scolaire du XIe siècle d'après le catalogue provenant de l'abbaye d'Anchin (Bruxelles, 1935, cfr. p. 9). La seule référence fournie est "Gaufredus, c. 1170." ⁵


⁴ Cfr. Hist. litt. de la France, 15 (Paris, 1820), 74. Comme l'a bien remarqué E. Martène (cfr. PL 205, 845), il s'agit plutôt de la Bible que d'une bibliothèque: "Bibliothecae nomine hoc loco et infra in fine epistolae vicetur intelligere Bibliorum sacrorum codicum, ut indicant duo versiculi ultimi epistolae subjecti.

Tout récemment Antonio Altamura l’a reproduit, avec la référence au *Thesaurus* de Martène et avec la mention “Gothifridus de S. Barbe († c. 1180)”, dans une note illustrant le début du c. XVI du *Philobiblon* du célèbre bibliophile anglais Richard de Bury (1287-1345).6 Voici ce début de chapitre:

*Sicut necessarium est reipublice pugnaturis militiaibus arma providere vulcania et congestas victualium copias preparare, sic Ecclesie militanti contra paganorum et hereticorum insulatas operis precum constat esse sanorum librorum multitudine communiri, etc.*

On le voit, Richard recourt à un image analogue à celle du dicton. Connaissait-il celui-ci, ou avons-nous affaire à une coïncidence ? Chi lo sa ?

Bien d’autres érudits, à coup sûr, ont cité notre dicton.7 L’un d’entre eux a-t-il repéré une attestation antérieure à la seconde moitié du xiiie siècle ? C’est la question à laquelle il importe d’apporter une réponse. Le but de la présente note est de la susciter.8

*Léopoldville, Université Levanium.*

Hubert Silvestre.

PIERRE D’AILLY AND PAPAL INFAILIBILITY

It has long been recognized that Pierre d’Ailly’s teaching on the locus of infallibility within the Church contains certain difficulties, and they have been underlined by the persistent failure of scholars to agree about the exact import of his teaching.1 That he can be claimed, on the one hand, as a believer in papal infallibility,2 and be portrayed, on the other as having toyed with the idea that the Papacy was not really essential to the Church,3 is scarcely reassuring, and it gives rise to the suspicion that his various statements on the subject may simply be inconsistent.

Modern scholars, it is true, have shown a tendency to agree in stressing d’Ailly’s scepticism and radicalism on the whole issue,4 and the texts they usually cite would seem to justify their approach. They reveal a d’Ailly who is completely certain on

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8 Les mots _armarium_ et _armamentarium_ avaient déjà été associés de façon suggestive par des lexicographes et des grammariens anciens (e.g. Varron, 5, 128), et Isidore de Séville (*Etym.* 15, 5, 4) leur avait emboîté le pas. Voir à ce sujet le *Thes. L. L.*, _sub v. armamentarium_ L’adjonction du jeu de mots _castrum-claustrum_, par contre, est typiquement médiévale.

1 See, for example, the conflicting judgements of the following: Bishop Bossuet, *Defensio declarationis conventus cleri Gallicani*, Part III, Bk. 10, ch. 12; (Amsterdam, 1745), II, 203-4 — and also Appendix, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 19-20; Coelestino Sfondrati, *Galilia Vindicata* (St. Gall, 1702), Diss. IV, § 2, 776-7; L. Salembier, *Petrus de Alliaco* (Lille, 1886), 237-49; Aimé-Georges Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet* (Paris, 1953), 23-30; Ray C. Petry, “Unitive Reform Principles of the Late-Medieval Conciliarists,” *Church History*, XXXI (1962), 171.
only two things relating to infallibility in the Church: that the Universal Church enjoys this privilege, and that the Pope does not. On these points he is quite clear and wholly unambiguous. On everything else — even including what is meant in this context by “the Universal Church” — he is extremely hesitant, prefacing his most timid claims with statements to the effect that he is arguing simply *probabiliter or probabilitat disputativa or non tam... assertive, quam probabiliter et collative, and punctuating even these emasculated assertions with a cautious *secundum aliquos or ut isti dicitur.*

Some, he says, have asserted that Christ’s promises to the Church would be fulfilled if only a single adult remained true to the faith or even if all adults lost the true faith and it was retained by baptized infants alone. On the other hand, though this is not impossible, it is probable that there will always be some adults adhering to the true faith. Again, “according to some,” general councils cannot err since they are guided by the Holy Spirit and represent the Universal Church; but, on the other hand, they certainly err on matters of fact, if not on faith, and, *secundum quosdam magnos doctores*, they can probably err in matters of faith as well. The most d’Ailly himself is willing to assert is that it may be held as a matter of pious belief that a general council cannot err — that is, *quando ininititur divinae Scripturae, vel authoritas quae a spiritu sancto inspirata; alias saepe errasse legitur.* And a similar hesitancy governs his statements on the matter of the infallibility of the Roman Church. Some, he says, extend the guarantee of infallibility which Christ made to the Universal Church to the Roman Church as well but he himself seems unwilling to go along with


6 “Universalis ecclesiae, a Christo et non a papa hoc privilegium authoritatis habet quod in fide errare non potest; ...sed tales autoritatem non habet papa, cum errare possit in fide” — *Tract. de ecc. pot.*, *Du Pin*, II, 953 (see also 958-9); cf. *Tract. de mat.*, ed. Meller, 330; *Utrum Petri eccles. leg. reg.*, *Du Pin*, I, 670; *Utrum Petri eccles. reg. gub.*, *Du Pin*, I, 689 — though in this last instance the argument, admittedly only a probable one, is ascribed to “aliquis” and d’Ailly is, in fact, quoting Ockham.


10 *Utrum indeoctus in iure divino*, *Du Pin*, I, 661.


PIERRE D’AILLY AND PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

355

this, for, having twice insisted that he is arguing only disputative or recitative and non assertive, he comments that it seems possible that the Roman Church, being only a particular church, should err, nor would such a deviation be contrary to anything contained in Holy Writ.\footnote{Utrum Petri ecc. reg. gub., Du Pin, I, 690-92.}

Few modern scholars would take issue with this brief presentation of d’Ailly’s views, and it should be noted that, unlike other modern analyses,\footnote{E.g. that of Tschantz, Peter von Ailli, 23-32.} it is based not only upon those scholastic disputations which have recently been dismissed as “early dialectical squibs,”\footnote{Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, p. 115, n. 1; cf. Martimort, Bossuet, p. 30, n. 1.} but also on those later tracts in which he sets forth his mature views. Nevertheless, the question is by no means a closed one. The above analysis, like so many others, completely ignores the texts upon which earlier writers based their claims that d’Ailly was in fact a believer in papal infallibility. These texts, however, still remain, and, of late, it has been asserted that they contain d’Ailly’s controlling teaching.\footnote{By Martimort, Bossuet, 29-30.}

What, then are these texts? And do they contain any assertion incompatible with his better-known statements on the infallibility of the Church?

The texts in question are two in number and both occur at the start of discourses which d’Ailly delivered at Avignon in 1387 in the presence of Pope Clement VII. They were directed against the Dominican, John of Montesano, who had had several of his propositions condemned at Paris, and who had appealed to the Pope, arguing, among other things, that “those matters which touch the faith are major ecclesiastical causes which must be deferred for examination and decision to the Sovereign Pontiff alone.”\footnote{Ch. Duplessis d’Argentré, Collectio Judiciorum de novis erroribus (Paris, 1728), I, 82 (second pagination).} In both cases, d’Ailly was speaking as a representative of the Faculty of Theology at Paris, and the first text — to which henceforth we shall refer as Text A — goes as follows:

Igitur pro vestris humilibus filiis Universitatis praedictae, et pro nobis eorum nuncius, qui suis in hac parte obsequium mandatus, et documentis innitium, corde et ore unanimiter protestamus, quod quidquid hac tensus in hac causa pro cos actum est, et quidquid in ea nunc, vel aliam, pro cos acturi, aut dicturi sumus, totum correctioni et judicio Sedis Apostolicae, et sedentis in ea Summi Pontificis humiliter submittimus, dicentes cum B. Hieronymo, 24.q.1 ‘Haec est fides, P[ater] B[eatissimus], quam in Catholica Ecclesia didicius, in qua, si minus perite, aut parum caute forte aliud positum est, emendari petimus a te, qui Petri fidem et sedem tenes.’ Non ignoramus enim, sed firmissime tenemus, et nullatenus dubitamus, quod sancta Sedes Apostolica est illa Cathedra Petri, supra quam, codem Hieronymo teste, fundata est Ecclesia... De qua sede, in persona Petri Apostoli in ea sedentis, dictum est: ‘Petre rogavi pro te ut non deficiat Fides tua.’ Luc. xxii, 31. Haec est igitur ad quam determinatio Fidei, et approbatio veritatis Catholicae ac haereticie impietatis detestatio, maxime pertinet.\footnote{Propositio facta in consistorio per eumdem [Petram de Alliacon] contra M. Joann. de Montesano, Du. Pin, I, 702-3.}
And the second text, which we shall designate as B:

Prima ergo conclusio est quod ad sanctam Sedem Apostolicam pertinet auctoritate judiciali suprema circa ea quae sunt fidei judicialiter definire. Et haec probatur, quia ad illius tanquam ad supremi Judicis auctoritatem pertinet in fide judicialiter definire, cujus fides nunquam deficit. Sed sanctae Sedis Apostolicae fides nunquam deficit. Igitur etc. Major est nota, sed minor patet quia de hac sancta Sede, in persona Petri Apostoli in ea praesidentis, dictum est: 'Petræ rogavi pro te, ut non deficiat fides tua.' Luc. 22... Et ideo in principio hujus operis protestamur, quod quidquid in eo dicturi sumus, huic sanctae Sedì et sedenti in ea summo Pontifici, ac ejus judicio et correctioni humiliter subjiciemus...

Though Soardi and Sfondrati unhesitatingly assumed that these texts clearly indicated d’Ailly’s adhesion to the doctrine of papal infallibility, it is by no means certain that in them he is ascribing infallibility to anyone. On this point B is perhaps less ambiguous than A, and, as Martimort rests his whole case upon it, we, too, will limit ourselves to it. But even assuming that B does contain an assertion of infallibility, is it to the Apostolic See itself or to the popes who preside over it that infallibility is being ascribed? An unreal distinction, perhaps? Sailembier clearly thought so, even if Bossuet did not, and certainly Martimort does not trouble himself with it. Yet it is a distinction which d’Ailly himself draws later on in the same tract, and this fact may serve to underline the importance of reading these seemingly uncharacteristic statements in their proper context.

That context is provided by the two claims of Montesono: namely, that “it is a prerogative of the Apostolic See alone to declare, condemn, and reprove,” and that “those matters which touch the faith are major ecclesiastical causes which must be deferred for examination and decision to the Sovereign Pontiff alone.” Now d’Ailly rejects these claims on the grounds that they contain “manifest heresy.” He argues, in the first place, that “the Apostolic See” can be taken to mean more than one thing. It may mean either the Universal Church, or some general collegiate body representing it, or the Roman Church, the particular church over which the Pope presides. Thus the Pope and the Apostolic See are not to be identified and Montesono’s two claims are contradictory. For if to the Supreme Pontiff alone pertains the right of examination and decision on matters of faith, then it cannot pertain to the Apostolic See alone, and vice versa. In the second place, to suggest that the Pope alone has the right to decide on matters of faith is to exclude the authority of the Universal Church and the general council representing it, and this is clearly heretical, since, as the canon law proves, it is possible on matters of faith to appeal from the Pope to a general council. In the third place, the same sugges-

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20 Tractatus ex parte Universitatis Studii Parisiensis pro causa fidei, contra quemdam Fratrem Johannem de Montesono, D’Argentré, I, 76 (2° pag.).
21 See above, n. 1.
22 Sailembier, Petrus de Alliaco, 247-8; Bossuet, Defensio, Part III, Bk. 10, ch. 12, pp. 203-4.
23 D’Argentré, I, 82 (second pagination).
24 These and the arguments which follow are all to be found in the Tract. ex parte Univ. Stud. Paris., D’Argentré, I, 84 (2d pag.).
25 Martimort, Bossuet, 25-6, claims that what d’Ailly has in mind here is not decisions of the Pope in his official capacity, but merely the case of a pope heretical in his personal faith. D’Ar-
tion would exclude the Apostolic See from an authoritative say in matters of faith — just as, in the fourth and fifth places, it would also and in the same way exclude Catholic bishops and doctors of theology — again clearly an heretical proposition.

It is his own conclusion, then, that while to the Apostolic See and to its incumbent the Pope pertains suprema jurisdiction seu judicialis definitio in such matters of faith, this in no way deprives theologians and bishops of that authority which it is their prerogative and duty to exercise in these matters — provided only that it is realized that this authority is subordinate and inferior to that of the Apostolic See.26

Such arguments taken as a whole, scarcely constitute a very promising basis for assertions in favour of papal infallibility, and it is surely absurd to suggest that d’Ailly intended Text B, which prefaces them, to be taken as such an assertion. The facts are perhaps not quite so complex, and the source of the confusion lies, I would suggest, in the way in which Martimort and his predecessors have read this particular tract. For despite the ambiguities of Text B, the fundamental concern of the tract as a whole is not with the question of infallibility at all, but rather with protecting the right to pronounce on matters of faith of such subordinate ecclesiastical authorities as bishops or Doctors of Theology, and, in particular, the Faculty of Theology at Paris.27 D’Ailly himself indicated that this was the case in a sermon which he delivered at Constance nearly twenty years later, and in which he defends the right of bishops to pronounce condemnations on matters of faith within their own dioceses — provided they realize that such condemnations are subject to the superior judgment of the Supreme Pontiff. This, he says, is the meaning of those laws which ordain that major causes relating to matters of faith are to be referred to the see of Peter or to the Supreme Pontiff, for they could not easily and generally be terminated in any other way. And for proof of his assertions he refers us to the arguments contained in quodam tractatu universitatis Parisiensis.28

It would seem safe, then, to dismiss Text B and its uneasy ambiguities as no more than an oratorical flourish, a gesture in the direction of papal authority made in the presence of the Pope but at the beginning of a discourse in which it was d’Ailly’s

gentré, I, 129 (2d pag.), himself makes a somewhat similar claim. But d’Ailly’s subsequent arguments surely indicate that what he wants to establish is precisely that the Pope, even in his official capacity, possesses no exclusive and monopolistic authority to pass sentence in matters of faith. In this tract, as elsewhere, d’Ailly does admit that Peter deviated from the true faith and was rebuked for this by Paul, but he does so in a completely different context and to prove a wholly unrelated point. See d’Argentré, I, 120 (2d pag.).

27 D’Ailly himself describes as follows the purpose of the chapter in which the whole discussion occurs: “In primo ad fundamentum processum factum contra dictum [Fraterm Joanne de Montesonon] per dictam Facultatem Theologica [i.e. of Paris], ac etiam processum inde secatum coram Domino Episcopo Parisiensi, ad instantiam Universitatis praedictae, declarabitur qualiter ad dictos Episcopum et Facultatem Theologiae pertinet assertiones haereticas vel in fide erroneas, contra asserentes eas Parisius condemnare.” Ibid., 75, (2d pag.).
28 Sermo in die Pentecostes factus in concilio generali, in Tractatus et Sermones (Argentine, 1490), fol. y 3 recto. This interesting passage has previously been overlooked, but there seems no reason to doubt that the reference is in fact to D’Ailly’s own Tractatus.
29 Salembier regards it as no more than that, though he does think it contains an assertion in favour of papal infallibility; Petrus de Alliaco, 247.
purpose to deny to the Pope and to the Apostolic See any monopoly of jurisdiction in matters of faith. Speaking of this text, to which he attaches so much weight, Martimort says: "On ne peut objecter sérieusement, contre ses affirmations, aucun autre texte du Cardinal," but the reverse would seem to be closer to the truth.

Williams College, Mass.        Francis Oakley.

THE OLD ENGLISH "SEASONS OF FASTING"

The text of the O. E. poem 'Seasons of Fasting' survives only in a transcript made by Laurence Nowell in 1562. The manuscript Nowell copied, Othere B XI, was largely destroyed in the Cotton fire of 1731, and there remains only the incipit recorded by Wanley (Catalogue p. 219) with which to check the accuracy of Nowell’s transcript.

In his discussion of the poem Kenneth Sisam suggests that it is unlikely that Nowell was responsible for the substantial corruptions in the text, but that his errors 'are more probably to be found among the examples of letter-confusion.' He quotes the bad spelling gelered for gelered as an example, and points out that gelered is the reading found in Wanley’s incipit. He concludes: 'In [Wanley’s] quotation of the incipit there are three other minor differences in the first four lines: Israehela, onlyht, heofana for Nowell’s Israehela, onlyht(?), heofna, and in every case Wanley's is the spelling one would expect.' The implication is that Nowell is less to be trusted than Wanley, and that in details of orthography he is hardly to be trusted at all.

Wanley himself provides evidence that goes far towards encouraging faith in the accuracy of his incipi; and the soundness of Mr. Sisam’s judgement. In 1709 he undertook to collate for Edmund Gibson three manuscripts of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle in the Cotton Library. After carrying home the three manuscripts Wanley decided to collate only two of them — and unfortunately set aside Othere B XI. In describing to Gibson how he intends to proceed in the work Wanley says:

My Method in Collating, is to take Notice of every Reading (which occur’s in the first Hand; for of those patt down by Josselyne, from books still remaining, I am not mindful;)

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10 Martimort, Bosuet, p. 30 and n. 1.
1 Now B. M. Addit. MS 43703 ff. 257-60a.
2 Studies in the History of Old English Literature (Oxford, 1953), 45-60. See particularly p. 59 and note 1 for the present discussion; all quotations from Mr. Sisam are taken from this page and this note.
3 Gibson was contemplating a second edition of his Chronicon Saxonice (Oxford, 1692). The three manuscripts were Tiberius B I, Tiberius B IV, and Othere B XI — the very manuscript that Nowell had transcribed. See the letter from Wanley to Gibson d. 25 January 1708/9. This letter (at f. iv) and the one quoted below are inserted in the interleaved copy of Gibson’s 1692 edition of the Chronicon actually used by Wanley for his collation — B. M. Addit. MS 44879.
4 His reason was that Gibson had 'used a Transcript of it at Oxford' (B. M. Addit. MS 44879 f. vi). This was presumably Nowell's or a copy of it; if Gibson had an independent copy of the MS made it does not seem to have survived.
5 He is referring to Tiberius B IV which has readings imported by Joscelyn from four other
purpose to deny to the Pope and to the Apostolic See any monopoly of jurisdiction in matters of faith. Speaking of this text, to which he attaches so much weight, Martimort says: "On ne peut objecter sérieusement, contre ses affirmations, aucun autre texte du Cardinal," but the reverse would seem to be closer to the truth.

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10 Martimort, Bossuet, p. 30 and n. 1.
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lelt such Readings be never so trivial, as an a for o; a y for i or vice versa. Nay, faither, where the MS is manifestly in the fault, & you have Printed the true Reading already. For my design is to present you (as it were) copies of these MSS. And I leave it to your Judgement to alter as you shall find meet.  

Wanley's example of a for o as a 'trivial' reading of the sort that he will take notice of is especially interesting since an a/o confusion in onlyhit accounts for one of the differences between Nowell's transcript and Wanley's incipit. And it is also interesting to notice that (although the incipit provides no example) Wanley's careful distinction between y and i is matched by Nowell's carelessness: Mr. Sisam declares that 'Nowell's corrections show a tendency to confuse i and y.' There can be no doubt that this evidence supports the judgement implicit in Mr. Sisam's remarks, that Wanley is more accurate than Nowell, and supports his conclusion that in Nowell's transcript careless copying makes close consideration of its abnormal forms and spellings unprofitable.  

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P. L. HEYWORTH.

CONSTANTINE-CYRIL AND THE BASILICA OF SAN CLEMENTE, ROME

In 1963 there occurred the 11th centenary of the mission of the Greek brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius to Greater Moravia. Consequently, many gatherings and congresses were held all over the world, from Rome to Toronto and from Salzburg to Sydney. Preparations for some of these celebrations had been begun four or five years previously. In 1960, for example, a proposal was made to Cardinal A. G. Cicognani, then Titular Cardinal of San Clemente, Rome, that excavations should be made in that church, where St. Cyril had been buried in 869, in a hope of solving some or all of the mystery of the location of his remains. Similar excavations at San Clemente a hundred years earlier had incidentally revealed the original, fourth-century church in which Cyril had been buried; but although what seemed to be his burial-place of 869 had been found, there was no trace of his remains. After this failure the consensus of opinion was that the remains had been transferred about 1106 to the present church then constructed on the filled-in shell of the old one; and that the chances were that the shrine had been despoiled during the First Roman Republic of 1798-1799, when San Clemente had been suppressed for a time.


6 Wanley to Gibson d. 19 April 1709; B. M. Addit. MS 44879 f.iii.

7 It may be argued that Wanley's accuracy in 1709 is no guarantee that he was as careful when he transcribed texts for his Catalogue ten years earlier. But there is abundant evidence extant to prove that his standards of accuracy were firmly established fifteen years before this letter was written. See e.g. his note prefacing a transcript and dating from the early nineties in B. M. Harley MS 6466 f.l.: 'Out of an old Manuscript belonging to the Company of Tilers & kept at St Nicholas's Hall. N.B. that I spel every word as it is written in y° said MS.'

8 See V. Tizzani, "Relazione all'Accademia di Archeologia", as reported in Correspondance de Rome, 1865, n. 233, 47-8; D. Bartolini, Memorie storico-critiche archeologiche dei Santi Cirillo e Metodi (Rome, 1881), 198.
The outlook, therefore, for the proposed renewal of excavations was not at all promising. Unless some preliminary historical work were done on the presence of St. Cyril’s remains from 869 onwards excavations could be a waste of energy. The Cardinal therefore commissioned an historical inquiry along those lines, the result being a report which was first read at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome in May 1963, and then in the following July at the International Congress of Slavonic History in Salzburg. The following is a summary of that report.²

There can be no doubt that Cyril’s remains were transferred from the original to the present church about 1100. The first reference, however, to the exact location of the body ‘doying many miracles’ (John Capgrave’s phrase in his Guide-book to Rome in 1450)³ does not occur until 1575 when del Sodo, a canon of S. Maria in Cosmedin, noted in his Compendio delle Chiese di Roma that the body of Cyril was ‘nella cappella di S. Cirillo vescovo e martire nel entrare a mano destra.’ This information is made more precise by Pompeo Ugioni in his Stazioni di Roma of 1588, who notes that the body is ‘under the altar’ of this chapel by the entrance to the sacristy.⁴ An interesting piece of evidence, too, is furnished by Angelus Rocca, O.S.A., in 1589-90, and by Baronius in 1593, both of whom state that these remains of Cyril ‘recently had been found’ under the altar of a ‘very old chapel’ in San Clemente;⁵ possibly the reference here is to a burial chapel beside the sacristy which was dismantled about 1570⁶ and from which the newly-recovered remains were moved to the ‘chapel of St. Cyril’ known to del Sodo, etc.

At all events we may feel sure that remains which were reputed to belong to those of Cyril were, by 1600, under the altar of a chapel of the Saint by the entrance to the sacristy. After that date there is little of note before 1770. By 1667, however, this chapel was now called ‘of St. Dominic’;⁷ a consequence of the presence in San Clemente since 1645 of Italian Dominicans who, in 1677, would give way to Dominicans of the Irish Province. It is, indeed, to one of the latter that we owe some important evidence. For when Thomas de Burgo, O.P., Bishop of Ossory, published a Supplement in 1772 to his famous Hibernia Dominicana of ten years earlier, he printed an emended description of the chapel of Dominic (Cyril) in which it was noted that ‘intra praebaturum Divi Dominici altare, per cratem aeneam rotundam, veluti loco antependium, videre est urnam marmoream justae molis,’ which he believed to contain the remains of St. Cyril.⁸

In the light of the crucial evidence provided by records of events during the Roman Republic of 1798-1799 this mention of a ‘bronze grille’ and a ‘white marble

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² The full report may be found in “The Fate of the Remains of St. Cyril” in Cirillo e Metodio, i Santi Apostoli degli Slavi (Rome, 1964), 158-194.
⁴ Rome, Bibliotheca Vaticelliana, MS G. 33, fol. 171r.
⁵ Historia delle Stazioni di Roma (Rome, 1588), 125.
⁶ A. Rocca, Opera omnia (Rome, 1719), II, 250; C. Baronius, Martyrologium Romanum (Rome, 1593), 108.
⁷ Vatican Library, MS Barb. lat. 4885, fol. 40v.
⁸ See B. Mellini, Della antichità di Roma, MS Vat. lat. 11905, fol. 19r.
⁹ Supplementum Hiberniae Dominicanae (Kilkenny, 1772), 847. The author had lived at San Clemente for many years before becoming a Bishop. The Supplement was written after a journey to Rome in 1770-1771.
urn’ is of exceptional value. By May 1798 San Clemente was a suppressed church,\textsuperscript{10} and as we know from the invaluable diary of G. A. Sala suppressed churches were not treated with very great respect by the troops and government of the Republic. Because of this, Sala reports, some unsuppressed churches obtained permission to take over the remains of saints or more notable reliquaries in the less fortunate churches. Among others Sala notes that permission was granted to the Chiesa Nuova of the Oratorians in the person of a certain Lorenzo Agostini.\textsuperscript{11} As it happens, a diary of these years of the Roman Republic written by the sacristan of the Chiesa Nuova is extant, and it contains many entries relative to the activities of Padre Agostini. Thus we find that on 17 August 1798 Agostini was granted leave ‘to go to the suppressed church of San Clemente’; in fact he went the following day, and on his return the sacristan observes ‘Alle ore 16 tornò il P. Agostini dalla chiesa suddetta di S. Clemente, e portò dentro un’ urna due corpi de Santi Martiri, cioè S. Metodio e S. Cirillo.’\textsuperscript{12}

Now, a notary public named Francesco Parchetti usually accompanied Agostini on these errands to suppressed churches. His papers are extant in the Archivio di Stato di Roma, and among them there is a copy of the instrumentum of the removal of the urn from San Clemente. This not only confirms de Burgo’s emended description of the chapel of St. Dominic but also — and more importantly — describes what was in the casket under the altar.\textsuperscript{13}


Ten days later these ‘Bones mixed with earth’ thus extracted from under St. Dominic’s altar were authenticated in the presence of the Vicegerent of Rome; and Parchetti records that they were then returned to San Clemente.\textsuperscript{14} Possibly he is

\textsuperscript{10} F. Fortunati, Avvenimenti nel Pontificato di Pio VI dal 1775-1800, MS. Vat. lat. 10730, fol. 210v.
\textsuperscript{12} C. Gasbarri and V. E. Giuntella, Due Diari della Repubblica romana del 1798-1799 (Rome 1958), 101-2.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., fol. 156r.
mistaken about this return, for, as the Sacristan’s diary shows, the remain were still in the Chiesa Nuova on 4 July 1799 when a certain Monsignor Lorenzo Mattei, Camerlengo of the Lateran, claimed them on behalf of the Canons of the Lateran:

Alle ore 12 essendo stata ceduta la chiesa di S. Clemente al Capitolo di S. Giovanni Laterano, ed in conseguenza noi che avevamo un’ urna di marmo con dentro de Corpi de Sti Martiri fu riconsegna con il consenso di nostra Congregazione nelle mani di monsignore Cammerlengo di detto Capitolo, Monsignore Mattei, per ricollocarlo nella medesima chiesa sotto l’altare maggiore de dove ne fu estratta.\textsuperscript{14}

There are difficulties in this entry — in the mention of ‘Martyrs’ and of a ‘return to the High Altar, from which the relics were extracted’ — but they are not insurmountable. More importantly, there is the problem of Mattei’s order to hand over the casket ‘because San Clemente had been ceded to the Lateran.’ However, a search in the Lateran archives has shown that Mattei was perfectly justified. For in fact Mattei and his vice-camerlengo, Callisto Marini, had conspired with some government officials to save San Clemente, then scheduled for demolition. In an ingenious petition to the Republic, Mattei and Marini listed the various authors (chiefly French) who had sung the beauties of the church, and they suggested that any tampering with San Clemente would not be judged lightly by posterity.\textsuperscript{15} The petition was not immediately successful; but at last on 30 June 1799 the Canons of the Lateran were granted permission to take over San Clemente.\textsuperscript{16} It was in virtue of this concession that Lorenzo Mattei appeared at the Chiesa Nuova four days later to take possession of the marble urn containing the reputed remains of St. Cyril.

The diarist of the Chiesa Nuova states that these remains were taken for restoration to San Clemente. There is not, however, any record that they ever reached San Clemente or, for that matter, the Lateran. Fr. John Connolly (later second Bishop of New York, 1814-1823), the Irish Dominican noted by Parchetti as present at the translation of August 1798, never mentions St. Cyril — nor, indeed, the cession of the Church to the Lateran — in the many letters he wrote from Rome during and immediately after the Roman Republic. Perhaps the key to the mystery lies with the last person known to have handled the marble urn: Lorenzo Mattei. For he was no mere canon of the Lateran, but rather the Duca Mattei, the last indeed of the great Mattei family whose palazzo stands just off the Largo di Torre Argentina and not very far from the Chiesa Nuova. When he died in 1833 at the age of 85, after some sixty years of devoted service to the Lateran, the family rights passed by papal mandate to the Antici family of Recanati in the Marche.\textsuperscript{17}

In a hope of finding some personal documents or a diary of Lorenzo Mattei for the years 1798-1799, permission was obtained from the Antici-Mattei family to examine the family archives at Recanati in early July 1963. The search in the archives was fruitless. However, the discovery in the family chapel of a simple but sturdy gilded reliquary which contained some six cms. of bone labelled ‘ex ossibus S. Cirilli M.,’ is not without possibilities. For although there is no documentation accompanying the reliquary, it is tempting to think that we have here in these six

\textsuperscript{10} Gasbarri-Giuntella, \textit{Due Diari}, 154.
of bone a portion of the 'Bones mixed with earth' which were once under St. Dominic's altar in San Clemente and were later appropriated by Lorenzo Mattei in the name of the Lateran. Certainly the reliquary seems to belong to that period since it bears the arms of Cardinal Alessandro Mattei, Lorenzo's brother, who had returned from exile in France in late 1799. The presence of M(artyr) is not all that surprising, since, as we have seen above, Cyril and Methodius are described more than once as 'Martyrs' in the sources examined, particularly in the Chiesa Nuova diary.

If then, one were to hold that the Antici-Mattei fragment comes from the casket which once held some reputed remains of St. Cyril, it might also be possible to infer that on 4 July 1799 Lorenzo Mattei did not proceed from the Chiesa Nuova to San Clemente or the Lateran with the casket, but simply deposited it in his own family chapel a few hundred yards away from the Chiesa Nuova, later transferring the 'Ossa mischiate con terra' to some reliquaries, one of which was given to, or at least authenticated by, Cardinal Alessandro Mattei. On the other hand it is always possible that the urn from the Chiesa Nuova was opened not by Mattei on his own initiative but rather by, or at the request of, the Lateran Chapter in whose name Mattei had taken possession of the casket.

Whatever the explanation, it may be taken for granted now that the casket was not returned to San Clemente. This is neither surprising nor shocking. Some writers on the period and on St. Cyril possibly have a point when they attributed the despoiling or sequestration of relics and reliquaries to the unruly Republican soldiery of 1798-1799; but one must always bear in mind that in the opinion of the contemporary Giorgantone Sala much of the damage was done by those ecclesiastical commissioners who had been licensed to remove relics for 'safe-keeping' from suppressed churches: Molte però (reliquie) ne sono andate disperse, o sono rimaste di nessun uso per colpo di quei commissarii, che o ne dissero a loro capriccio, o ne ruppero i sigilli per estrarle dai reliquarii.10

San Clemente, Rome, and Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Leonard E. Boyle O.P.

GUILLAUME DE CONCHES AND THE ELEMENTS: HOMIOMERIA AND ORGANICA

The De philosophia mundi of Guillaume de Conches develops a definition of the elements the philosophic significance of which, though often enough considered by modern historians, is only now coming to be properly understood.1 One of the overt marks of that significance is lexical: engaged as it is in making distinctions unusual in its time, the definition employs terms not found, or easily found, elsewhere in

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10 Sala, Diario, II, 106 (25.viii.1798). — In passing it may be noted that the Antici-Mattei family graciously restored the Recanati reliquary, the only known if fragile physical link with St. Cyril, to the church of San Clemente on 17 Nov. 1963.

the Latin West. Thus Guillaume seems to be the first to use, if indeed he did not invent, *elementum-elementata* as a noun to designate the four basic kinds of matter as they normally occur, impure, in nature and are perceptible to physical sense. These he distinguishes from the more primary, pure and minimal particles out of which they are formed, the *elementa*. *Elementa* proper, in contrast to the *elementata*, are not perceptible to the senses, only to the mind by the intellectual act of division.²

But this is not the only point of lexical interest in Guillaume’s discussion. In working out his argument he uses also the distinctions from general physiology between elements, humors, homogeneous (similar) parts, and instrumental parts. These distinctions occur in the medical treatise *Pantegni* by Constantinus Africanus, which Guillaume cites, as *elementa*, *humores*, *similia* (*consimilia*) *membra*, and *officialia membra*. Guillaume’s names, however, for the last two parts are not only *consimilia* (*partes consimiles*) and *officiales partes*, but also *homiomeria* (*homiomera, homiomerae partes*) and *organica* (*organicae partes*), incorporating in his account two Greek words that do not seem to appear in Constantinus, whose book came to Latin by way of the Arabic; nor in the Latin text of Johannitus evidently also known to Guillaume. But they do occur associated with an account of the elements in the *Preamnon physicron*, a contemporary Latin version by Alfanus, archbishop of Salerno, of the Greek book attributed to Nemesius of Emessa.³

In an article elsewhere suggesting that Guillaume de Conches knew the *Preamnon physicron* or a body of Casinensian and Salernitan medical lore of which it was a part, I have also indicated the need for a lexical history of *homiomeria* and *organica* in medieval Latin in the senses that Alfanus and Guillaume intend.⁴ In Galenic tradition, going back to Aristotle but reflecting also the language of Anaxagoras and his followers, ὁμοομερής, ὁμοομέλεια, and similar terms, refer to the simple and primary parts of the body (bones, flesh, nerves, veins, etc.), those basic parts that are like the stones and bricks of which a building is made. The terms διγανον, διγανικός, and so on, specify members that are composite and secondary in character, that is, instruments formed of the various simple and primary parts.⁵ These precise meanings of *homiomeria* and *organica* none of the Latin lexicographers from Du Cange to Arnaldi and Turriani and to Niemeyer distinguishes nor suggests that they had a Western history before the twelfth century. *Organica* in particular, which, together with other noun and adjectival variants of it, appears frequently in Latin texts, yields everything but the significance that we want: aside from the Classical uses referring to machines and musical instruments, it functions largely

⁴ “Guillaume de Conches and Nemesius of Emessa,” esp. nn. 17-19 and their context. This article, written some four years ago, will appear shortly in a *Festschrift* to a colleague.
⁵ In contexts contrasting them with the ὁμοομερή of which they are composed Aristotel calls the organs ὁμοομοερή. This word is used by Nemesius throughout the significant passage in his treatise (ed. Mattheaei [Halle, 1802], pp. 145 ff.), but in one sentence he brings both terms together: Πάν δὲ ἀνομοομερῆς ἐκ ὁμοομερῶν συνέστερην, ὡς ἡ κεφαλή ἐκ νεόφυων καὶ σαρκῶν καὶ ὄστεων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων . καλούσιδε ταῦτα καὶ διγανωκα. Cf. Alfanus (ed. Burkhard, p. 60): ‘Omne vero non homiomeron ex homiomeneris constat, ut caput ex nervis et caribus et ossibus et similibus, vocantur autem et haec *organica* id est officialia.’
in contexts which specialize it to the voice, breathing and singing, to the eye, and to various figurative extensions of these applications—all of them irrelevant to our present purpose. It would therefore seem that the examples in Alfanus and Guillaume have particular interest as being uncommon in their day. But have they in fact no medieval Latin predecessors? Since the very distinctions which they represent have been neglected, it is not surprising that their history in these meanings has also escaped the unfocussed eye.

I should like to contribute a point to such a history by calling attention to some relevant uses of *homiomeria* and *organica* that take us back some three centuries before Guillaume de Conches and may be a clue to a Latin tradition that is considerably older. They occur in the prologue to an anonymous commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates which survives in the well-known Casinensis Codex 97 and was printed many years ago by De Renzi. The relevant portion of the prologue, which spells out unmistakeably the meanings of the words, is this:

"elementa sunt quattuor: focus, aqua, aer, terra: humores sunt iiii: sanguis, flegma, colera rubea, et melancholicus humor: naturae sunt ixx. simplices quattuor, et una temperata: quattuor simplices sunt calida, frigida, sicca et humida: et quattuor compositae calida et sicca, calicis et humida, frigida et sicca, frigida et humida: membra alia onymyre, idest duricia membra, alia organica, et onymyre vocantur ipsa dura membra, per quae corpus constat: idest venas, arterias, nervi, ossa et quae his similia sunt, et ut simpliciter dicamus quorum pars cum nominata fuerit, totius nomen vocabulum vocatur. Organica enim dicuntur quae ex istis composita sunt membra, idest manus, pes, cutis, et quae his similia sunt, quorum pars non vocatur totius vocabulum..."

In contrast to his initial opinion which placed it earlier, De Renzi soon came to hold that the manuscript of this text had to be dated after 1085, on the ground that other texts in its collection showed, as he believed, the influence of Constantinus Africanus. But the script is Beneventine minuscule of the early tenth century, and further examination of the collection has failed to satisfy everybody that there is anything distinctly Constantinian or Gariopontian in it. More than this: Beccaria's recent catalogue of pre-Salernitan medical manuscripts lists what seem to be six further copies of the commentary containing the same prologue. They date from the ninth to the eleventh centuries and among them, together with Casinensis 97, four are Italian in origin. A further codex of the late eleventh century con-

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7 *Collectio Salernitana*, ed. S. De Renzi, I (Naples, 1852), 87-88.

8 Cf., among others, *Bibliotheca Casinensis seu Codicum manuscriptorum qui in tabulario Casinensi asservantur series*, II (Monte Cassino, 1875), 365. For the character and date of the handwriting see Augusto Beccaria, *I codici di medicina del periodo pre-salernitano* (Scritti IX, X e XI) (Storia e letteratura: Racolta di studi e testi, no. 53 Roma, 1956), p. 297, and its reference to Lowe, *Table XXXVI*.

9 (1) Karlsruhe, Cod. Reichenau CXX, fols 120v ff. (ix c.: Beccaria, pp. 214-17); (2) Paris, Bibl. Nat. Cod. lat. 7027, fols. 66r ff. (mid ix c.: Beccaria, pp. 151-52); (3) Glasgow, Hunterian, Cod. V.3.2, fols 34v ff. (beg. x c.: Beccaria, pp. 243-46); (4) Einsiedeln, Stiftsbibli., Cod. 313, fol. 1 (end x c.: Beccaria, pp. 361-62); (5) Vatican, Cod. Barberini 160, item 16 (xi c.: Beccaria, 324-31); (6) Montpellier, Bibl. de la fac. de méd., Cod. 185, fols 1v ff. (xi c.: Beccaria,
tains a commentary whose language indicates some similarities to these seven, but it does not appear to contain the significant prologue. Since it is attributed to Oribasius, as the anonymous commentary also has been, it suggests the need to trace the tradition of Latin commentary well behind the ninth century, possibly to Roman and earlier monkish sources. It should be observed, moreover, that our anonymous commentary itself also occurs in some places without the prologue and that its language is sufficiently different from the prologue’s to suggest that the two may be of divergent origin. The commentary proper, for example, as it appears in the printed edition of Joannes Guintherius in 1533, calls the primary parts of the body, not homiomeria or consimilia, but solidae partes and solida, using both a phrase descriptive of their quality for their name, as it were, and a variant phrase at that from the prologue’s duricta membra and dura membra:

In tria principala corpus nostrum dividitur, in spiritum, humida, & solidas partes. Humida sunt humeres, per quos nutrimur: Spiritus, per quem viuimus: Solida, per quae conservatur corpus atque sustentatur, id est arteriae, nerui, venae, ossa, et alia id genus.

That the prologue is of the ninth century at the latest seems now to be established, but any other firm conclusions about the commentaries, their previous and subsequent histories, ever: their simple character and relations to one another, must await that basic study of their texts which the bibliographical work of Diels, Beccaria and others has by now well facilitated.

Meanwhile we may note that the use of homiomeria and organica by Allanus, distinctive as it is, and by Guillaume de Conches, influential as he was, did not establish the common habit of the period that followed them. Organica does not appear in Burgundio of Pisa’s translation of Nemesius in the mid twelfth century, though homiomeria does. Among other texts of the later twelfth or early thirteenth century the Latin version, perhaps by Michael Scot, of Averroes’ Middle

P. 135). Nos 3 and 5 are in Beneventine minuscule and no. 1 is North Italian in origin. The prologue begins ‘Medicina partitur secundum minorem portionem in partes duas,’ and ends, ‘Haec est portio medicinae.’ See the studies listed for each MS in Beccaria, and esp. Sudhoffs Archiv, II (1909), 23; J. Eceg, ‘Pseudodemokratische Studien, ’Abhandlungen der k. Preuss. Akad. der Wissensch., Phil.-hist. Kl., no. 4 (1913), 5-7; and Thondike and Kibre, A Catalogue of Incipits of Medieval Scientific Writings in Latin (Med Acad of America, Publ. no. 29 [1937]), col. 404, which gives the prologue as of the eleventh century in the Montpellier MS. Heeg, pp. 12-13, notes the prologue as also occurring in a xvi-c. codex in Munich, Lat. 16487, fol. 1r.

10 Vandome, Bibl. Munip., Cod. 172, fols. 11r ff. (end xi c.: Beccaria, pp. 188-89).
11 For homiomeria (homoeomeria) in Oribasius see Bussemaker-Daremberg, Oeuvres d’Oribase, VI (1876), 90; in Lucretius, I,830; and in Servius, ed. Thilo and Hagen, I (1881), 573.
12 E.g. Paris, Bibl. Nat., Cod. lat. 7021, fols 18r ff. (ix c.); and Rouen, Bibl. Munip., Cod. 0,55, fols 195r ff. (xi c.).
Commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione* speaks of *consimilia* and *officialia*; and this is true of the Salernitan physicians, whose language reflects Johannitius and Constantinus rather than Guillame in this respect. Thus a treatise on diseases and their cures in a twelfth-century codex in the Biblioteca Angelica, which cites Johannitius directly in its text. And more notably still, thus the famous versified treatise of Salerno, the *Regimen sanitatis*, whose account of the parts of the body goes like this:

*Art. I. Partes similares.*

Nervus et arteria, cutis, os, caro, glandula, vena,
Pingueilo, cartillago, et membrana, tenantos:
Haec sunt *consimilia* in nostro corpore *partes*.

*Art. II. Membra officialia.*

Hepar, fel, stomachus, caput, splen, pes, manus et cor,
Matrix et vesica sunt *officialia membra*.

*Alia lectio.*

Officiis animae sunt septem, membra decemque:
Cor, hepar, et cerebrum, testes, splen, pulmo, renes, pes,
Dorsum, vesica sunt *officialia membra*.

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Theodore Silverstein.

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16 Piero Giacosa, *Magistri Salernitani nondum editi* (Turin, 1901), 178. For MS and date see p. 369. Cf. also the fragment of general pathology in Biblioteca Angelica Cod. 1506, fol. 96v (xii-xiii c.): Giacosa, pp. 169-71 and (for date) 402.

17 De Renzi, V (1859), 45. Cf. V, 45, n. 1, and I, 483:

Os, nervus, vena, caro, cartilagoque, corda,
Pellis et axunigia tibi sunt *simplicia membra*:
Hepar, fel, stomachus, caput, splen, pes, manus et cor,
Matrix et renes et vesica sunt *officialia membra*. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

I Articles listed by Authors 1
II Principal Subject Matters 25
III Texts edited 37
IV Manuscripts and Archival Material 41
V Place Names 59
VI Names of Persons 69
VII Subject Index 135-202

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