All correspondence regarding articles, subscriptions or orders should be addressed to

T. P. McLaughlin, C.S.B., Managing Editor
Mediaeval Studies
59 Queen's Park
TORONTO 5, CANADA
CONTENTS

ARTICLES

St. Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics: Some reflections on "Summa Contra Gentiles" III, 44, § 5 . . . . ANTON C. PEGIS 1
Interpretations of the Origins of Medieval Heresy . . . . . . JEFFREY RUSSELL 26
The Unity in a Thomistic Philosophy of Man . . . . . . . . JOSEPH OWENS C.SS.R. 54
Lot and Pellinore: The Failure of Loyalty in Malory's "Morte Darthur" . . CHARLES MOORMAN 83
Kingship and Feudalism according to Fulbert of Chartres . . . . FREDERICK BEHREND 93
Anagrams in Froissart's Poetry . . . . NORMAND R. CARTIER 100
Canon Law in England on the Eve of the Reformation . . . . R. J. SCHOECK 125
Chaucer and the Dido-and-Aeneas Story . . . . LOUIS BREWER HALL 148
Chaucer's Pardoner as Entertainer . . . . PAUL E. BEICHER C.S.C. 160
A Mediaeval "Tractatus de coloribus", together with a Contribution to the Study of the Color-vocabulary of Latin . . . . MILLS F. EDGERTON JR. 173
Hugh of Honau and the "Liber de Ignorantia" . . . . NICHOLAS M. HARING S.A.C. 209
Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination . . CHARLES B. SCHMITT 231
The Introitus ad sententias" of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M. . . . . EDWARD A. SYNAN 259
The "Megas Kanon" of Andrew of Crete and the "Félire" of Óengus the Culdee . . . . JOHN HENNIG 280
The Lives of the Saints in Old Norse Prose:  
a Handlist . . . . OLE WIDDING, HANS BEKKER-NIELSEN, L. K. SHOOK C.S.B.  294

Al-Kindi’s Discussion of Divine Existence  
and Oneness . MICHAEL E. MARMURA AND JOHN M. RIST  338

MEDIAEVALIA

The Sources of “The Book of the Duchess”  J. BURKE SEVERS  355
Guillaume de Palerne, a Source for Tristan  K. V. SINCLAIR  362
de Nanteuil . . . .

Chaucer and the Unnatural History of  BERYL ROWLAND  367
Animals . . . .

Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Stockholm “Gloss  WALTER H. PRINCIPE C.S.B.  372
on the Sentences”: An Abridgment  
rather than a First Redaction .
St. Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics:  
Some Reflections on 
"Summa Contra Gentiles" III, 44, § 5

ANTON C. PEGIS

I

ST. THOMAS' well known habit of solving one problem at a time, 
of using authorities to his own purposes even when, as he knew, 
the thinkers in question originally did not have these purposes in view, 
can often make the reading of his texts a baffling experience. We ask 
ourselves whether he intends to say what he does and, if so, how he can 
possibly do it. Sometimes, at least, this means that we have not quite 
succeeded in seeing him behind his tactical use of the texts of others. 
A case in point, no less perplexing for all its notoriety, is St. Thomas' 
handling of the Nicomachean Ethics, and especially of that famous 
discussion in book X, chapter 7, in which Aristotle dealt with the 
problem of man's highest felicity.¹ In the SCG, St. Thomas uses the 
text to more than one purpose, and we are left to wonder what he 
thought about Aristotelian felicity apart from his own purposes. 

SCG III, 44, § 5 is an example of a managed discussion in which 
St. Thomas says enough to enforce his main point but not all that he 
thinks about Aristotle and the problem at hand, the ultimate felicity of 
man in the Ethics. Here is the text:

«Patet autem quod nec Aristoteles, cuius sententiam sequi conantur prae-
dicti philosophi, in tali continuacione ultimam felicitatem hominis opinatus 
est esse. Probat enim in I Ethicorum quod felicitas hominis est operatio ipsius 
secundum virtutem perfectam : unde necesse fuit quod de virtutibus deter-
minaret, quas divisit in virtutes morales et intellectuales. Ostendit autem in X 
quod ultima felicitas hominis est in speculatione. Unde patet quod non est in 
actu aliquius virtutis moralis ; nec prudentiae nec artis, quae tamen sunt 
intellectuales. Relinquitur ergo quod sit operatio secundum sapientiam, 
quae est praecepta inter tres residuas intellectuales, quae sunt sapientia, 
scientia et intellectus, ut ostendit in VI Ethicorum : unde et in X Ethicorum

¹ Nicomachean Ethics (=EN) X, 7.117a12 ff. The Summa Contra Gentiles (=SCG) will 
be cited by book, chapter and paragraph number.
sapientem iudicat esse felicem. Sapientia autem, secundum ipsum, est una de scientiis speculativis, caput aliarum, ut dicit in VI Ethicorum: et in principio Metaphysicae scientiam quam in illo libro tradere intendit sapientiam nominat. Patet ergo quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod ultima felicitas quam homo in vita ista acquirere potest sit cognitio de rebus divinis qualsis per scientias speculativas habeti potest. Ille autem posterior modus cognoscenti res divinas, non per viam scientiarum speculativarum, sed quodam generationis ordine naturali, est conflictus ab expositoribus quibusdam»².

The location and purpose of the paragraph seem clear enough. St. Thomas is in the midst of a polemic against Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avempace, and especially Averroes, whose main point is that we do not know separate substances nor does our felicity consist in some presumed divinizing union with the agent intellect.³ And even were it the case that continuatio hominis ad intellectum agentem, in the manner of Averroes, were possible, it would still not be human felicity. For very few men reach such a goal and none admit that they have done so: the wisest of men, including Aristotle, rather acknowledge that they do not know many things in heaven and on earth. Now felicity is a certain common good to which most men, unless subject to some defect, can come. This fact is in general true of every natural end belonging to any species: for the most part, the members of that species reach it. Thus, man's ultimate felicity cannot lie in any Averroistic continuatio.⁴

Nor was Aristotle of this opinion. He did not think that ultimam felicitatem hominis was to be found in tali continuatione. St. Thomas is now in the presence of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle proves in the first book of the Ethics that man's felicity is an operation that he performs with perfect virtue. This conclusion opens up the problem of virtue, and Aristotle, dividing the virtues into moral and intellectual, and locating the highest felicity of man in speculation, concluded that felicity resided in the operation of the virtue of wisdom. That is why it is the wise man who is happy. Now wisdom for Aristotle is one of the speculative sciences; indeed he calls it their head, and in the

² SCG III, 44, § 5. The references to EN in the text are, in order: I, 13.1102a5; X, 7.1177a18; VI, 6.1141a3; X, 8.1179a32. On wisdom, see EN X, 8.1179a32 and Metaphysics I, 1.981b26.


⁴ SCG III, 44, § 4; Aristotle, EN I, 9.1099b19.
beginning of the *Metaphysics* he applies the name *wisdom* to the science
that he intends to set forth in that work. From this result St. Thomas
infers that the highest felicity that man can acquire in this life rests
on that sort of knowledge of divine things which is available to him
through the speculative sciences. In turn, this conclusion enables
St. Thomas to reach his main and immediate point. The view that we
know divine things (in this life, of course), not by way of the speculative
sciences, but by a progressive generation of a union with the agent
intellect as a result of growth in knowledge and truth, is a fabrication
of certain commentators—and chiefly of Averroes himself, so far as
St. Thomas is concerned.

Where are we? We have proved against Averroes that metaphysics is
the highest knowledge that Aristotle grants to man in this life and that
human felicity is to be found in this wisdom. We have proved, in
other words, the point involved in the main issue: there is no
*continatio* in Aristotle. But what has happened to ultimate felicity?
Granted that, for Aristotle, it does not lie in *continatio*, we can still
ask: where does it lie? If we take St. Thomas' text strictly, we are driven
to conclude that, since it lies in *speculatione*, of which the highest form

---

5 See note 2.

6 See SCG III, 43, §§ 1-3 for a description of felicity in Averroes, and §§ 4-5 for a
critique. Averroes' own account can be seen in *In De Anima* III, Comm. 36, ed. F. S.
Crawford, 499-500. It is to be noted that there are two aspects to the doctrine of
*continatio* in Averroes. (1) There is the *continatio* or union of man with the possible intellect which
is intended to explain his abstract knowledge of material things. This aspect Averroes
sets forth in *In De Anima* III, Comm. 5 (ed. F. S. Crawford 387-413). St. Thomas follows
this discussion in the SCG and attacks the position on two principal counts: *continatio*
ruins the fact to be explained, namely, that *man* and not a separate possible intellect has
knowledge; the unicity and community of the separate possible intellect in fact deny that
the individual man is a man. See SCG II, 59, 60, 61, 73, 75. (2) There is *continatio*
with the agent intellect which is intended to explain how, by thus uniting himself to an
intellect that knows separate substances, man comes to possess the same beatifying
knowledge (Averroes, *In De Anima* III, Comm. 36, ed. F. S. Crawford, 479-502). This
discussion, which includes Averroes' historical examination of the question among the
Aristotelians as well as his personal conclusions, is summarized and examined by St.
Thomas in SCG III, 41-45.

The relation of the possible (i.e. material) intellect to the agent intellect in Averroes is
a difficult question because the texts are not entirely harmonious. Are these two intellects
in reality one? See: *In De Anima* III, Comm. 18 (pp. 438.46-440.98); Comm. 19 (pp. 440-
442); Comm. 20 (pp. 450.215-451.230); Comm. 36 (p. 495.463-472). The question has
been answered affirmatively in B. H. Zedler, "Averroes on the Possible Intellect"
(*Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 25, 1951, 164-178, especially
p. 171).
is wisdom, the highest felicity of man in this life is to be found in metaphysical wisdom. Where, then, are we? We began the paragraph by saying in the name of Aristotle and against Averroes that ultimam felicitatem hominis did not lie in continuatione. After a synoptic glance at the Ethics, we infer, still against Averroes, that according to Aristotle the ultima felicitas quam homo in vita ista acquirere potest is a metaphysical knowledge of divine things. No doubt, the argument holds against Averroes. If there is no continuatio in Aristotle, then Averroes’ teaching does not represent the Aristotelian position on man’s ultima felicitas. What does? We are not told. When we began the paragraph, we thought that the issue at stake was ultima felicitas. And so it was, as between St. Thomas and Averroes. But when Aristotle entered the debate, then St. Thomas proved, against the pretensions of Averroes, that ultima felicitas quam homo in hac vita acquirere potest is a speculative science and therefore excludes continuatio. Had we been able to read the clause “quam . . . potest” in a non-restrictive sense, then we would know Aristotle’s ultima felicitas, as seen by St. Thomas. But this would be a forced reading of the sentence: the sentence, in other words, means to speak of the ultimate felicity of this life. We do not know, consequently, what St. Thomas thought on the point: the paragraph before us says nothing about how Aristotle conceived man’s ultima felicitas. But the paragraph raises a question. According to St. Thomas, does Aristotle have a doctrine of ultima felicitas? The teaching of Ethics X, 7 is not ultima but ultima in hac vita: so St. Thomas told Averroes. The answer is adequate to the purpose at hand, namely, the elimination of continuatio. The answer is not adequate when St. Thomas has to say what Aristotelian ultimate felicity in fact is or when he wishes to use Aristotle to a different purpose.

By way of example, consider another setting for Ethics X, 7, namely, SCG III, 25, last paragraph. Here St. Thomas has finally proved that, since all creatures are directed to God as to their last end, intellectual creatures are directed to Him in the sense that intelligere Deum is their end. This includes man, so that to know God is the end of all human knowledge and activity. Indeed, since man has a natural desire to know the cause of universal being, which is none other than God, not any sort of knowledge will bring his natural desire to rest: for human felicity, which is the ultimate end, only divina cognitio . . . terminat naturale desiderium sicut ultimus finis. Let us note, in passing, that felicity or beatitude is another name for the ultimate end of man or of any other intellectual creature. In other words: Est igitur beatitudo et felicitas ultima cuiuslibet substantiae intellectualis cognoscere Deum. In the
words of St. John: "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God". Who can object that a Christian theologian should think of quoting St. John, not to mention St. Matthew, at this point? But it also occurs to St. Thomas to quote from *Ethics* X, 7 at this same point. Having closed his argument in *SCG* III, 25 with St. John, he concludes the chapter by a reference to *Ethics* X, 7. With this view, he says, Aristotle is likewise in agreement. For Aristotle says in the last book of the *Ethics* that the ultimate felicity of man is contemplative or speculative, being the contemplation of the highest object! 8

It can be argued, certainly, that St. Thomas has not yet determined in what knowledge of God *ultima felicitas* consists and therefore that the text of *Ethics* X, 7 can be associated with a purpose that Aristotle did not have in mind. But, once more, it is a question to know what precisely he did have in mind. St. Thomas, in spite of managing the texts of Aristotle to his own purpose, must have felt the burden of this question, and his emotion is nowhere more visible than when he comes to the moment when he can no longer pull Aristotle toward the true meaning of *ultima felicitas* either by denying to his advantage what he had not said, without determining what in fact he did say, or by making him say what his words could say even though, by St. Thomas' own account, they did not. That moment is reached in *SCG* III, 48 where St. Thomas must finally conclude that, whatever be the knowledge of God in which *ultima felicitas* consists, it does not belong to the present life.

To reach this crucial transition in his argument St. Thomas had not only passed by all the claimants considered by the ancient moralists for the title of *sumnum bonum* and the cause of human felicity, from bodily pleasure and glory, across wealth and power, to moral virtue and finally to the contemplation of God, 9 he had also asked: in what knowledge of God did the ultimate felicity of the intellectual creature consist? 10 He had rejected the idea that man's ultimate felicity consisted in the confused awareness of God that all men have, for such awareness is liable to error, even gross error; so, too, he had rejected the idea that this felicity lay in a demonstrative knowledge of God, for that knowledge is negative, within the reach of very few men, and

7 *John* 17.3.
8 *NE* X, 7.177a18 ff.
9 *SCG* III, 27-37.
10 *SCG* III, 38, § 1.
subject to many errors and vicissitudes; finally, he had rejected knowledge by faith as the ultima felicitas on the ground that the believing intellect did not see what it believed and, far from being at its journey's end, was away from the Lord while still walking by faith.\footnote{SCG III, 38-40; St. Paul, II Cor. 5.6.7.}

It was at this juncture, when he had seemingly exhausted all the candidates of this life for the title of ultima felicitas, that St. Thomas inserted the episode with Averroes on continuatio. If true, the Averroistic thesis would have been a claimant of this life to the title of ultima felicitas.

We come, then, to that ultimate moment when, with all the claimants of the present life rejected,\footnote{SCG III, 48, § 1.} St. Thomas must conclude that, since man's highest felicity is to be found in some knowledge of God, it cannot belong to this life. Nothing illustrates the temper of St. Thomas more dramatically than his procedure in SCG III, 48. The truth he wishes to enforce is that man's highest felicity is to be found, not in this life, but in the next. But, having won his victory, he manifests no desire to defend this truth against Alexander or Averroes, even though he has disagreed with both on the way to his own conclusion. Indeed, he manages to see something true in their position on the very point on which he had found them wrong, and Aristotle right, namely, the highest kind of knowledge available to man in the present life. For, now that the issue at stake is finally ultima felicitas in itself, and not the highest form of human knowledge in the present life, it is Aristotle who is wrong and Alexander and Averroes who, though wrong, are seen as trying to overcome a dilemma within Aristotelianism. For if metaphysics is the highest wisdom that man can reach in this life, what share does he have in ultima felicitas?

Man's final felicity cannot belong to the present life. There is neither finality of knowledge, nor repose, nor freedom from error in this life. We are all subject to passion and deception, to fear of death, to the prospect that illness may keep us from the life to which we have dedicated ourselves and in which we find our present happiness. Will it be said that man, having only a share in intellectual nature, should expect only a share in perfect and true felicity? As St. Thomas sees it, this was in fact Aristotle's view, according to whom men in this life are happy as men, not absolutely.\footnote{SCG III, 48, §§ 1-9.} In reply, St. Thomas does not say that Aristotle's argument applies to the present life; instead, he here
argues that Aristotle’s reply does not remove his own main contention. Man may be less perfect in nature than are separate substances, but he is more perfect than the things around him. Heavy things find their natural places and animals fulfill the desire of their natures. All the more, then, should it be true that when man reaches his ultimate end, his natural desire is fulfilled. By a scarcely veiled implication, therefore, St. Thomas is saying that we cannot follow Aristotle and condemn man to only a share in felicity. In other words, and to return to the main line of the argument, felicity as the proper end of man is not to be found in this life. With St. Thomas let us put this result in terms of Ethics X, 7. The human pursuit of truth is an endless occupation. If, then, the highest felicity of the present life consists in the contemplation of truth such as it is found in metaphysical wisdom, we must conclude that man will not gain his last end in this life. There is no ultimate felicity for man in the speculative sciences of the present life.14

It was understandable, therefore, that Alexander and Averroes should have looked beyond the speculative sciences, and specifically metaphysics, for the location of man’s ultima felicitas. This beyond consisted in continuatio with separate substances in the present life; its merit was that it transcended the order of the speculative sciences in which men were always struggling toward the truth and never reaching final repose therein. Yet, however understandable, continuatio is not a possible answer. By default, then, we fall back on the alternative of Aristotle. “But because Aristotle saw that man has no other knowledge in the present life than by way of the speculative sciences, he held that man did not acquire perfect felicity, but a human one”.15 This time St. Thomas does not say “a human one in the present life,” for the issue, being one of man’s ultima felicitas, concerns his present life only by default: there is no other available location for such a felicity, as St. Thomas finally says in his own inimitable way. For if a continuatio that in spirit better suits ultima felicitas does not exist, and if a felicity humano modo exists but is an endless pursuit, is not Aristotelianism at an impasse? It has no location for ultima felicitas. And if St. Thomas knows the answer to this dilemma, which plagued Aristotle and his illustrious commentators, let us also notice that he chose this precise moment, at the peak of his disagreement with them, not to disagree

14 SCG III, 48, §§10-12.
once more, but with compassion to straighten the path of philosophical truth before them.

«In quo satis appareat quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimus si ponamus, secundum probationes praeissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente, in quo statu anima intelligit per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, sicut in Secundo huius Operis ostensum est».  

We, then—that is, we who follow in the wake of the Aristotelian tradition—shall be freed of the frustrating and confining limitations that hemmed in the bright genius of Aristotle and his commentators if, as St. Thomas has proved, the human soul is immortal and we can therefore place ultima felicitas in the next life. Then, as St. Thomas has likewise proved, the soul will know in the manner of separate substances. We have thus transcended both the present life and the speculative mode of knowing proper to it. We have also given to the Aristotelians the answer they were looking for: the doctrine of an individual intellectual soul that is neither an Aristotelian separate form nor an Aristotelian form in matter but an intellectual creature, existing by an act of being subject only to the creative presence of God, and raising the body to share in its own spiritual existence. In this revolutionary extension of Aristotelianism, the true mystery is not: how can the soul be immortal? Nor is it any longer: how can the intellect be personal and immortal? It is: what is man the composite if in his existence and economy of life he is a spiritual creature?

This same transforming perspective enables us to see how St. Thomas has managed his relations to Aristotle throughout the second and third book of the SCG. We are not told explicitly until II, 48, § 15 that Aristotle did not know the doctrine of personal immortality. But in Book Two he strenuously defended the idea that for Aristotle the intellectual soul was the substantial form of the body, and he energetically opposed the Averroistic teaching of a separate possible intellect as un-Aristotelian. For all St. Thomas has said to the contrary, the Aristotle of Book Two believed in a personal intellectual soul. The only thing that seems to have interested St. Thomas was to enforce and safeguard his application in SCG II, 56 of the Aristotelian conception.

16 SCG III, 48, § 15.
17 SCG II, 61, §§5-7. For further precisions see Summa Theologiae I, q. 89, aa. 1 and 3; QD De Anima, aa. 15 and 18.
18 SCG II, 59-61, 73.
of a substantial form to the soul already defined as an intellectual
substance whose subsistence and incorruptibility had been established
in II, 46-55. That an intellectual substance can be joined to matter
as a substantial form is not an Aristotelian notion; but by posing the
issue in this way St. Thomas was suppressing an Aristotelian dilemma,
namely: how can the intellect, which is separate, be part of a soul
which is not? What is today clear in this transposition, and in part
explains its very possibility, is that the whole machinery of continuatio,
so exploited by St. Thomas to his own advantage in Books Two and
Three of the SCG, is absent from the De Anima and the Ethics. But
this is a negative point and a negative victory over Averroes. What is
not clear is how St. Thomas interpreted, or at least managed, the text
of Aristotle in order to reach this result.

After SCG III, 48, § 15, St. Thomas' view of the historical Aristotle
is more overt and in keeping with the conclusion reached in this text.
In part, this situation is the result of St. Thomas' immediate occupation,
namely, to determine in what knowledge of God, in the afterlife,
ultima felicitas consists. He establishes in III, 50-51 that it consists in the
direct vision of God, and he then examines the nature of the vision
itself, leading to the concluding reflection that it will complete and
perfect man's natural desire. In the vision of God, intellectual substan-
ces will gain a true felicity, in which they will find absolute repose
for their desires and an abundance of all those goods necessary to a life
of felicity. Here, before turning from God as the end of all creatures
to a concrete study of the movement of the divine providence, St.
Thomas makes one more reference to the problem of felicity and the
philosophers.

Nothing in the present life, we are told, is so like man's final and
perfect felicity as the life of those who contemplate the truth, to the
extent that this is possible here and now. Therefore: "The philoso-
phers, who were not able to have a complete knowledge of that
ultimate felicity, located the ultimate felicity of man in the contem-
plation that is possible in this life: Et ideo philosophi, qui de illa felicitate
ultima plenam notitiam habere non potuerunt, in contemplatione quae est
possibilis in hac vita ultimam felicitatem hominis posuerunt." 20 The text is
unambiguous on one precise point. The philosophers—these are surely
Aristotle, Alexander and Averroes—placed the ultimate felicity of man

19 See A. C. Pegis, "Some Reflections on SCG II, 56," in An Etienne Gilson Tribute,
20 SCG III, 63, § 10.
in this life. Why they did so St. Thomas does not here say. It is not too much to suppose in his name that he has already explained himself, briefly but still clearly enough, in SCG III, 48. But what is it for the philosophers not to have had a *plenam notitiam* of ultimate felicity? It is surely not that they did not have a full knowledge of the mystery of the beatific vision, since they did not know it, nor could they have known it, at all. Nor is it that they knew the imperfect or merely human felicity of this life: to know the felicity of this life is to know something that is not ultimate; it is not to have a less than *plenam notitiam* of what is ultimate. Had the philosophers known the immortality of the soul, which was perfectly possible for them, they would have taken the one step that was absolutely necessary to a proper realization of ultimate felicity, namely, the step of locating it beyond the limits of this life. In this way they would have broken through the impasse of an ultimate felicity confined by the limitations of the present life. The philosophers would still not have known the mystery of the beatific vision, and they would then have been faced with an awesome and almost impenetrable problem, the destiny of an intellectual substance in the afterlife; but, at least, they would have removed the barrier that, more than any other, crippled historical Aristotelianism from the time of its founder onward.

II

In SCG III, 25-63, St. Thomas took three different directions in interpreting *Ethics* X, 7. In III, 25 he associated its teaching, however distantly, with the notion of eternal life. In III, 44 he decided against Averroes that *Ethics* X, 7 had to do with the felicity of this life which is, not *continuatio*, but the contemplative knowledge of divine things in metaphysics. But in III, 48 St. Thomas had to cross from this life to the next in order to find the true location of man’s ultimate felicity. In doing so, he had finally to acknowledge that the Aristotelians (Aristotle included) could not take this step because for them the human soul was not incorruptible and did not survive the body. From this point on, the ambiguity in III, 44, § 5 between *ultima felicitas* and *ultima in hac vita* is gone: *ultima in hac vita* becomes *ultima* without reservation, and St. Thomas finally says so in so many words in III, 63. The mortality of the soul cuts across these three directions in a decisive way, and we can only wonder how St. Thomas could have associated Aristotle with the felicity of eternal life. It is much easier to understand that he should have undertaken to stabilize as his own the interpretation of *Ethics* X, 7 contained in SCG III, 44 § 5. For, though after this
decision he had still to acknowledge that the felicity of this life was for Aristotle ultimate, it was nonetheless the felicity of this life. St. Thomas could thereby locate the *Ethics* as a whole within his own framework of *felicitas viae*.21 This was to use the *Ethics*, not without accommodation, but certainly without distortion. The point is worth our attention, since St. Thomas has explicitly recognized that there was more in the *Ethics* than he was accounting for when he interpreted its teaching as being directed to the felicity of this life.

Two notions, in particular, made it impossible for St. Thomas to incorporate the *Ethics* with complete success within his own teaching on the *felicitas viae*. These were the doctrine of the first book of the *Ethics* that felicity was a perfect good and the doctrine of the tenth book that the intellect was in some sense separate and divine. The first point made it impossible for Aristotle to press felicity entirely into the present life, and St. Thomas was not unaware of the fact. The second point made it impossible for St. Thomas to be unaware that in limiting the felicity of the *Ethics* to this life he was prescinding from a problem that decisively affected his interpretation, namely, the relations between the intellect and divinity.

In *Ethics* I, St. Thomas has followed Aristotle step by step in his delineation of felicity as a *perfectum quoddam bonum* or, as Aristotle himself had called it, a τέλειον ὑγιής.22 The implications of this view are far-reaching, as St. Thomas has quite clearly recognized. Felicity is the *ultimus finis hominis* or the *bonum humanum*.23 As the *ultimus finis*, it is a *bonum perfectum*, and as the end of man’s desire it is *per se sufficiens* or a *bonum integrum*. In this sense, it is *perfectissimum bonum* and thereby the *ultimus et optimus finis* of man.24 From another point of view, felicity is something continuous and perpetual: *de ratione perfectae felicitatis est continuas et perpetuitas*.25

This description of felicity and its conditions leads to two decisions, one reached by Aristotle himself and the other added by St. Thomas. Such an ideal of felicity man can realize only in a human way, and then only in a complete life. Moreover, he can best realize it by

21 See *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 1, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), 7-8; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4; a 6, ad 1; q. 4, a. 8; also: *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 2.
24 *In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 9, nos. 107 and 111.
25 *In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 9, no. 129.
leading, as much as possible, the immortalizing life of intellectual contemplation. In the end, Aristotle acknowledged that this life was more than human or, at least, that it was human only in the sense of being the life proper to what was best and divine in man, the intellect. But Aristotle did not explain in what sense “the intellect is a divine thing in comparison with man: θεῖον ὁ νοῦς περὶ τὸν ἁθρόγος.” He simply said it, and he went on in the same sentence to add that, similarly, “the life according to the intellect is divine in comparison with human life”.

In his commentary, St. Thomas noted that in book one of the Ethics Aristotle “is speaking of the felicity that is possible in this life,” for, he added in explanation, “the felicity of the next life is beyond all investigation of the reason”. But the basic question is not whether Aristotle knew anything about the afterlife: he did not, and he could not; the question is: how is the definition of man’s felicity as a bonum perfectum reconcilable with a human and limited participation in it? Clearly, it is not, and the Aristotelian way out of the difficulty is to let man fall short of perfect felicity on the ground that it is incompatible with the present life. St. Thomas knows this position very well. “Et ideo de ratione perfectae felicitatis est continuitas et perpetuitas, quam tamen praeens vita non patitur. Unde in praesenti vita non potest esse perfecta felicitas”. One should not imagine that St. Thomas is satisfied with this answer. The felicity of this life is, undoubtedly, human and not perfect. But what about felicity defined as man’s bonum perfectum? Is to argue that the felicity of this life is human thereby to deny the claims of the self sufficient and most perfect good that both Aristotle and St. Thomas thought felicity to be? If the felicity of this life does not do justice to the notion of felicity in its perfection, what happens to man’s most perfect end? At least once, while commenting on the text of the Ethics, St. Thomas has added a personal answer to this question.

Having followed Aristotle in bringing together all the conditions of felicity, St. Thomas sums up the results in one sentence. “Ad rationem autem felicitatis, cum sit finis ultimus, videtur pertinere omne id quod est perfectum et optimum”. But when you add together all the

26 NE X, 7.1177b24-8.1178a8.
27 NE X, 7.1177b30-31.
28 In Eth. Ar. I, lect. 9, no. 113; also IX, lect. 9, no. 1912.
29 In Eth. Ar. I, lect. 9, no. 129.
30 In Eth. Ar. I, lect. 16, no. 201.
felicity of this life, down to the very last day, it does not measure up to the conditions that, as we have seen, make up the bonum perfectum that felicity is. It is perfectly legitimate to argue that, whatever else is true, those who are subject to the mutability of the present life cannot attain a perfect felicity; they are happy as men. The only question is: is there anything else that is also true? St. Thomas thought so. If to attain happiness as men is not to attain fully to the conditions of felicity, what then? To this question Aristotle had no answer, but St. Thomas did. Since the desire of nature is not in vain, he wrote, it can rightly be surmised that perfect beatitude is reserved for man after this life: et quia non est inane naturae desiderium, recte estimari potest quod reservatur homini perfecta beatitudo post hanc vitam.\(^{31}\) Being a pure addition to Aristotle's text, this comment is as remarkable as it is gratuitous. But, even so, it is a fitting answer to an extraordinary Aristotelian dilemma, provoked by a no less extraordinary Aristotelian notion, the ideal of human felicity as a bonum perfectum.

St. Thomas is no less bold in his commentary on the tenth book of the Ethics, but there his boldness is tactical and obviously commanded by controversial considerations. The issue at stake is precipitated by the opening remarks of Ethics X, 7. Felicity as the activity that is in accord with the highest virtue must belong to what is highest in man. What is this highest in man? Aristotle’s answer was oblique and not exactly unambiguous:: “Whether this is the intellect or something else, which by nature is taken to rule and direct us as well as to be mindful of what is exalted and divine, and whether it is itself divine or the divinest part in ourselves, its activity according to the virtue proper to it is assuredly perfect felicity”.\(^{32}\) In keeping with this sentence, throughout chapter 7 Aristotle never says categorically how man is related to the intellect or how the intellect is divine. This attitude gives St. Thomas the occasion to propose a commentary that is equally elliptical, save on one precise point on which he says exactly what he thinks. What is it that is highest in man? In truth, it is the intellect: et hoc quidem secundum rei veritatem est intellectus.\(^{33}\) Aristotle himself left


\(^{32}\) NE X, 7.1177a13-18.

\(^{33}\) Dicit ergo primo, quod cum felicitas sit operatio secundum virtutem, sicut et in primo ostensum est, rationabiliter sequitur quod sit operatio secundum virtutem optiman. Ostensum est enim in primo quod felicitas est optimum inter omnia bona humana, cum sit omnium finis. Et quia melioris potentiae est operatio, ut supra dictum est, consequens est quod operatio optima hominis sit operatio eius quod est in homine optimum. Et hoc quidem secundum rei veritatem est intellectus. (In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 10, no. 2080).
it an open question whether the intellect is what is be\textsuperscript{2} in man; but, according to St. Thomas, he did not do so without adding certain signs indicating that the intellect was that reality. However, St. Thomas continues, some have argued that the human intellect is something eternal and separate and on this score something divine. Others, however, have held that the intellect is part of the soul: such was Aristotle. In this view, the intellect is not absolutely something divine; it is the divinest part in us because of its greater likeness to separate substances, insofar as its operation takes place without a corporeal organ.\textsuperscript{34} And now St. Thomas sums up the situation. "Whatever the truth of the matter," he writes, "it is necessary to say, in keeping with what has already been said, that perfect felicity is the operation of such a highest reality according to the virtue proper to it. For perfect operation, which is something required for felicity, can belong only to a power perfected by a habit that is its virtue, in accord with which it renders its operation good."\textsuperscript{35}

This tactical management of Ethics X, 7, in which St. Thomas chooses to bracket the whole problem of the divinity of the intellect, leads to a discussion of human felicity that is, if not embarrassed by its self-imposed limitations, at least strained by them. On the one hand, St. Thomas emphasizes that human felicity consists in speculative wisdom and not merely in the exercise of moral virtue. On the other hand, he emphasizes that the felicity of the Ethics is limited to the present life. Both discussions, however, remain unfinished since in both

\textsuperscript{34} Sed quia circa hoc diversimode sunt aliqui opinati, nec est nunc locus talia discussiendi, sub dubio ad praesens reliquit utrum optimum hominis sit intellectus vel aliquid alium. Ponit tamen signa quaedam ex quibus potest cognosci quod intellectus sit optimum eorum quae sunt in homine. (In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 10, no. 2081). The signa (the intellect, because of its excellence, rules the appetites and the bodily members, and alone knows the divine and has an affinity for it) are listed, ibid., nos. 2082-2083, and the commentary then continues with the conflict on the intellect: Quidam enim posuerunt intellectum humanum esse aliquid sempiternum et separatum. Et secundum hoc ipse intellectus est quodam divinum. Dicimus enim res divinas esse quae sunt sempiternae et separatae. Alii vero intellectum partem animae posuerunt, sicut Aristoteles. Et secundum hoc intellectus non est simpliciter quodam divinum, sed est divinissimum inter omnia quae sunt in nobis, propter maiorem convenientiam quam habet cum substantiis separatis secundum quod eius operatio est sine organo corporeo (ibid., no. 2084).

\textsuperscript{35} Quocumque autem modo se habeat, necesse est secundum praedicta quod perfecta felicitas sit operatio huicmodi optimi secundum virtutem propriae sibi. Non enim potest esse perfecta operatio, quod requiritur ad felicitatem, nisi potentiae perfectae per habitum qui est virtus ipsius, secundum quam reddit operationem bonam. (In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 10, no. 2085).
instances St. Thomas stops short of the problem of the separateness of the intellect.

On the first point, the position of St. Thomas is perfectly clear. On the ground of its continuity, autonomy, and self-sufficiency, felicity is to be found in the activity of wisdom, or in contemplation. The activity of the moral virtues is not its own end, whereas the life of intellectual contemplation is blessed, being self-sufficient and free. To the extent, indeed, that man lives according to the activity of the intellect, he is living according to a life that is most proper to him. For what is best in him is most proper to him, as well as most enjoyable; and if this best in him is the intellect, its life will be most enjoyable and most proper to him. Such a life is above man’s composite nature, but it is not above man so far as man is what is best in himself, the intellect, which, though found in separate substances perfectly but in man only by participation, is greater in its smallness than everything else in man. On this score, we may call the felicity of the moral life human since it arises from the life of the composite of soul and body, whereas the felicity of the speculative life, being proper to the intellect, is separate and divine. But as to what “separate” and “divine” here mean, “this is a larger issue than is pertinent to the present discussion: est aliquid maius quam pertineat ad propositum.” Aristotle deals with it in

36 In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 10, nos. 2096-2097.
37 In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 11, nos. 2102-2104.
38 Et sic dum homo vivit secundum operationem intellectus, vivit secundum vitam maxime sibi propriam... Illud enim quod est optimum secundum naturam in unoquoque est maxime proprium sibi: quod autem est optimum et proprium consequens est quod st delectabilissimum quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sibi convenienti. Sic ergo patet quod si homo maxime est intellectus tamquam principalissimum in ipso, quod vita quae est secundum intellectum est delectabilissima homini et maxime sibi propria.

Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secundum hominem sed supra hominem: non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissimum in homine; quod quidem perfectissime inventur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative. Et tamen istud parvum est maius omnibus aliis quae in homine sunt. Sic ergo patet quod ille qui vacat speculationi veritatis est maxime felix, quantum homo in hac vita felix esse potest. (In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 11, nos. 2109-2110).

39 In Eth. Ar. X, lect. 12, nos. 2112-2115, especially the last paragraph: Unde patet quod tam virtus moralis quam prudentia sunt circa compositum. Virtutes compositi, proprie loquendo, sunt humanae inquantum homo est compositus ex anima et corpore. Unde et vita quae est secundum has, scilicet secundum prudentiam et virtutem moralem, est humana, quae dicitur vita activa. Et per consequens felicitas quae in hac vita consistit est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa, quae est propria intellectus, est separata et divina. (no. 2115).
the *De Anima*, “where it is shown that the intellect is separate: *ubi ostenditur quod intellectus est separatus*.” And St. Thomas calmly concludes: “therefore it is thus clear that speculative felicity is greater than what is composite and human”.

After this remarkable conclusion it is not difficult for St. Thomas to make his second point. “It is evident,” he says, “that Aristotle locates the highest felicity in the activity of wisdom, as he had determined in Book Six, and not in a continuation with the agent intelligence, as some fancy.” Moreover, St. Thomas adds, “it must be observed that he (Aristotle) does not posit a perfect felicity in this life, but only such as can befit a human and mortal life.” We are therefore back in the exegetical framework of SCG III, 44, § 5. But it is no less certain that our return has been managed along the way. By prescinding from the question of the separateness and divinity of the intellect, St. Thomas proves without controversy that the life of intellectual wisdom is the highest human life. Within the area of controversy he maintains that man’s highest felicity is, not *continuatio*, but contemplation; it is a human felicity, such as is proper to the life of participation in blessedness that Aristotle had posited for man from the first book of the *Ethics*. Nothing, consequently, prevents St. Thomas from thinking of the *Ethics* as dealing with the *felicitas viae* or with *beatitudo imperfecta*. That is, nothing prevents him from taking such a step except what he himself knowingly left out of account in his own exegesis.

The *Ethics* deals with the *felicitas viae*? It does, if you take out of it the notion of felicity as a *bonum perfectum*. The pressure of such a notion led St. Thomas to think it not unreasonable to look to the afterlife for the location of such a felicity. Similarly, while it was legitimate for St. Thomas to refer to the *De Anima* as the appropriate place in which Aristotle discussed the separateness of the intellect, was it not a tactical manoeuvre on his part to leave the separateness and

---

40 Et tantum dicere ad praesens de ipsa sufficit. Quod autem magis per certitudinem explicetur est aliquid maius quam pertinet ad propositum. Agitur enim de hoc in tertio *De Anima* ubi ostenditur quod intellectus est separatus. Sic igitur patet quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa quanto aliquid separatum et divinum est potius quam id quod est compositum et humanum. (*In Eth. Ar. X.*, lect. 12, no. 2116).

41 Ex quo patet quod ultimam felicitatem humanam ponit Aristoteles in operatione sapientiae, de qua supra in sexto determinavit, non autem in continuatione ad intelligentiam agentem, ut quidam fingunt. Attendendum etiam quod in hac vita non ponit perfectam felicitatem sed talem quals potest competere humanae et mortali vitae. Unde et supra in primo dixit beatos autem ut homines, etc. (*In Eth Ar. X.*, lect. 13, nos. 2135-2136).
the divinity of the intellect an unsettled question and then to decide, against Averroes, that *Ethics* X, 7 dealt with contemplative wisdom, which is the highest felicity of the present life? By whatever name we call this move, its effect is clear enough. What St. Thomas has knowingly set aside from Aristotle's text he has replaced with his own doctrine. The result is a conception of "this life" that is not closed within itself and that begins to have the character and the direction of a *via*. Within the perspective of the *Ethics*, however, "this life" has nowhere to go. It has only to be itself, and the question for Aristotle is: what is the best way, absolutely speaking, to be a human being? But, in asking this question, the Aristotelian man is not a *viator*, nor is his life a *via*. His ideal is perfect felicity—the life of pure intelligence—and he earns as much of it as he can by immortalizing himself, here and now, as much as he can in the contemplative life of intelligence. Immortality is for him an experience in the present: it is the work of immortalization; it visualizes no future beyond this life. The *Ethics* knows no such future state for man and takes none into account. How, then, can such a life be a *via* when its problem is to end as well as possible within itself?

It required considerable management on St. Thomas' part to make the *Ethics* serve as a philosophical account of the *felicitas viae*. The undertaking was in itself perfectly possible, and in the presence of Averroism it was absolutely necessary. To emphasize that Aristotle was speaking of the imperfect or human felicity of "this life," and to think of such a felicity as realized in the highest speculative wisdom of this life, was certainly to be true to an essential truth in the *Ethics*. It did not prove difficult for St. Thomas to argue that there was no trace of *continuatio* in the *Ethics*. The only question is whether the imperfect felicity of this life was for Aristotle both terminal and imperfect. Judging by the direction of the argument in *SCG* III, 44-63 we must say that, in St. Thomas' eyes, it was. He was conscious that both Aristotle and Averroes limited man to this life and therefore to its felicity. The doctrine of the personal immortality of the soul was a Thomistic innovation within Aristotelianism and its effect was to open man—and his felicity—to the world of the afterlife. If this innovation suppressed the dilemma of the divinity of the intellect in the tenth book of the *Ethics*, it nevertheless gave a possible location to an ideal that Aristotle had left unrealized, namely, the notion of human felicity as a *bonum perfectum*. Moreover, this result was accomplished on the basis of an Aristotelian principle: the non-futility of the desire of nature, in this instance, the desire of an intellectual nature for its final good.
Aristotle as transformed by St. Thomas is certainly not the Aristotle of history, nor is he the Aristotle of modern scholarship. St. Thomas had no suspicion of an evolving Aristotle, who began his career as a Platonist, went through a transitional phase of research and biological discovery, and reached his own maturity as a sort of positive scientist. Nor did St. Thomas know that the Aristotelian writings fell into three phases of development, corresponding more or less to his first stay in Athens, his sojourn in Asia Minor, and his second Athenian period. In particular, St. Thomas did not know that Aristotle wrote the *Nicomachean Ethics* toward 334-330 B.C. on his return to Athens, but within the second phase of his development, and the *De Anima* perhaps as late as 325-324 B.C., in his third and final stage when he became master of his own intellectual household. As a result, though St. Thomas wrote commentaries on both of these works, he was completely unaware of the view recently canonized by R. A. Gauthier on the basis of the evolutionary theses of Jaeger and more particularly Nuyens, namely, that the psychology contained in the *Ethics* is not the same as the teaching of the *De Anima*, and that Aristotle never wrote the ethical doctrine that belonged with the *De Anima*.  

The fundamental point of difference between the two works is held to be the following. Although Aristotle was an experienced biologist when he returned to Athens, and though he had already formulated the doctrine of matter and form, there was one thing that he did not do until he wrote the *De Anima*: he did not formulate a general doctrine of the soul as a substantial form, nor therefore did he face until then the difficulties of this doctrine as applied to man. But when he wrote the *De Anima* he finally saw and taught "that every soul—the human soul included—is in its totality a substantial form: there are no longer for him two things, two substances, soul and body, but one thing alone, one substance, man, composed of two principles, which have no

---

existence apart from one another, but which exist only in their union, or, better still, in their substantial unity.” When he wrote the *Ethics* Aristotle was still in a transitional stage. He had still to realize the implications of thinking of man as a true composite substance, and especially he did not realize the conflict between the mortality of the soul as a substantial form and the immortality of the intellect. In the *Ethics*, “Aristotle had as yet neither united the soul to the body, nor separated the immortal intellect from the mortal soul.” In this transitional psychology of the *Ethics*, which is an ethics of this life, the body is the instrument of the soul, and Aristotle gives a primacy to intellectual contemplation that a coherent hylomorphism would have rendered impossible. In short, in the *Ethics* man is still what is best in him, the intellect, although he must ultimately accept a mixed existence of contemplation and action.

Admittedly, a psychology in which the soul is united to the body as an intellectual substance to its instrument is different from one in which it is united as substantial form to matter. Indeed, the difference is so enormous that one wonders how St. Thomas came to miss it, particularly when it involved issues that were of crucial importance to his own relations to Aristotle, namely, the unity of man, on the one hand, and the immortality of the intellectual soul, on the other. It is surprising enough that Aristotle did not realize until the very end of his life, when he wrote the *De Anima*, a notion whose elements he had had in his hands for some twenty years before he came to write this work. To formulate a general notion of the soul as form, Aristotle had only to think of a living body as a true composite, on the analogy of non-living bodies; that is, he had only to apply his own physical doctrine of matter and form to the living bodies that he was studying in biology. How is it that he did not do so? But, in any case, as concerns St. Thomas, the question is why he did not see the sort of difference between the *Ethics* and the *De Anima* that modern students are proposing. The reason is simple enough. Instead of seeing this difference between the *Ethics* and the *De Anima* he saw another one between their psychologies. According to St. Thomas, in the *Ethics* Aristotle is using psychology, whereas in the *De Anima* he is formulating it; and the difference between these two attitudes is exactly the difference between dealing with life, and specifically human life, morally and dealing with it psychologically. As a result, St. Thomas can think

---

of the Ethics and the De Anima as complementary to one another in their psychological teaching.

To distinguish between psychology as used in an ethical framework and as developed in itself, let us notice with St. Thomas that, while "to live" is the act of the soul, which is the form of man, when you ask in ethics: what is the proper operation or activity of man? "to live" means a certain work of life (understanding or sensing); "to live" does not then mean (as it does in the De Anima) "the to be of the living thing." 45 The moralist is dealing with life as operation, and he wants to know what operation man has which is proper to him and in whose fulfillment his final good, or felicity, will consist.46 For this reason, namely, that he is looking for the proprium operatio of man, the moralist is interested neither in all living things nor in all aspects of man's life; he is interested solely in that opus vitae in which felicity consists. Not the life common to plants and animals, nor the goods appropriate to such a life, therefore, are what we are now seeking; we are seeking the life that man leads in accord with reason, for man is man in virtue of his rationality. But rational life—that is, rational living—in man is either life conducted according to reason in itself or life conducted according to reason as regulating what shares in its government, appetite. Of these two modes of rational life, the former, as consisting essentially in the work of reason, is more principally a life of felicity than the latter or active life, in which the work of reason consists of regulation rather than contemplation.47

All the relevant points on which the psychology of the Ethics differs from that of the De Anima are to be explained, following St. Thomas' interpretation, by the concern of the Ethics with the life of man as a moral whole and with the unity of man, not as a substantial reality, but as an integral rational living. From the point of view of ethics, the essence of man is rationality, the unity of human life is effected by the government of reason, and man is man so far as he lives in reason or in

45 Manifestum est autem quod ipsa operatio est uniuscuiusque rei quae competit ei secundum suam formam. Forma autem hominis est anima, cuius actus dicitur vivere; non quidem secundum quod vivere est esse viventis, sed secundum quod vivere dicitur aliquid opus vitae, puta intelligere, sentire. Unde manifestum est quod in aliqo opere vitae consistit hominis felicitas. (In Eth. Ar. I, lect. 10, no. 123). On vivere as esse and operari see Sum. Theol., I, q. 18, a. 2, where the De Anima and the Ethics are located with reference to the notion of life. Cf. also De Veritate, IV, 8. For vivere as the esse viventis see Aristotle, De Anima II, 4,415b13-14.

46 In Eth. Ar. I, lect. 10, no. 119.

47 On the principle that "felicitas quaeritur sicut quoddam proprium hominis bonum"
its light. The psychology behind such a view of man interests the moralist only in a limited way, namely, so far as he can ground the governmental whole that man is for him in some account of the constitution of man. Man is not all reason, nor is the life of which the human soul is the source all rational: some part of man’s life is entirely beyond the rule of reason, and some (the life of sense appetite) needs to be ruled by reason. Such a situation presupposes some sort of theory of the parts of the soul, of the type formulated by Aristotle in *Ethics* I, 13. In this text, according to St. Thomas, Aristotle does not adopt a specific psychology: he needs only a theory that in some sense admits parts in the soul, without determining whether these parts are distinguished *subjecto* or *solum secundum rationem*,\(^48\) whether appetite belongs to the rational part of the soul (as obeying reason),\(^49\) or, in general, what psychology of the parts is correct: here in the *Ethics*, as St. Thomas points out, we are called upon to *use*, according to our present needs, what Aristotle discusses in the *De Anima*; we do not need to enter into questions that are not immediately relevant.\(^50\) What is relevant is that there is a purely irrational part of the soul, the nutritive, which is entirely beyond government; there is a purely rational part, the reason or intellect; there is an irrational part that becomes rational in its activity by participation in the government of reason, appetite.\(^51\) How we eliminate from the life of man nutritive and animal life, and we conclude that, at the level of rational life, proper to man, felicity consists “more principally” in the life (that is, the activity) that is rational essentially than in that which is rational in the sense of following the rule of reason: *In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 10, nos. 124-126; also I, lect. 19, no. 226.

\(^48\) Of St. Thomas’ two guesses on the true meaning of the expression “exoteric discourses” in Aristotle’s text (*NE* I, 3.1102a26-27), the second is in his own eyes the better one. “*Exteriores sermones vocantur,*” he writes, “*qui sunt extra propositam scientiam.*” Here in the *Ethics*, Aristotle aims to *use* rather than to consider the view that a certain part of the soul is rational and another part irrational, as discussed in the *De Anima* (*In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 19, no. 229). The effect of this attitude can be seen in the following decision to leave unresolved as immediately not pertinent a disputed point in psychology: *Movet quamdam dubitationem esse in proposito praetermittendam: utrum scilicet haec duas partes animae rationalis et irrationalis sint distinctae adinveniendum subjecto loco et situ, sicut Plato posuit rationale esse in cerebro, concupiscibile esse in corde, et nutritum in hepat; vel potius haec duas partes non dividantur secundum subjectum sed solum secundum rationem, sicut in circumferentia circuli curvum, id est convexum et concavum, non dividuntur subjecto sed solum ratione. *Et dicit quod quantum pertinet ad propositum non differt quid hoc - horum dicitur. Et ideo praetermittit hanc quaestionem ad propositum non pertinente.* (*In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 19, no. 220).

\(^49\) *In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 20, nos. 240-242.

\(^50\) See note 48.

\(^51\) *In Eth. Ar.* I, lect. 20, no. 242.
these parts belong to one and the same soul, what parts they are and in what sense, this is a question that the moralist can leave to the student of psychology. Without entering psychology, but merely using its data up to the point that is relevant to him (there are parts in the soul), the moralist can formulate the sort of conception of the unity of man that occupies him, namely, the notion of man as a rational or governmental whole; and, within man so viewed, he can work out a theory of the role and location of human virtue considered as the bridge of rationality built by man within himself in his search for felicity.

As St. Thomas sees things, therefore, the psychology of the Ethics and that of the De Anima are complementary rather than incompatible. Chronology had nothing to do with this problem. It may be that Aristotle never formulated a general theory of the soul as substantial form until the De Anima. Whatever reasons can be adduced for this conclusion they cannot include the view that the psychology of the Ethics, and specifically that of I, 13, is Platonic. According to St. Thomas, it is not Platonic for the reason that it is not psychology at all. The notion that the intellect is the center of man, being the supremely human level of his life and the ruler of the life of appetite within him, using the body itself as the instrument of its rational activity, is a moral conception of the unity of man; it is not a psychological doctrine of the substantial unity of the human composite. Moreover, it is a view of man that presupposes some sort of psychology of the parts of the soul and that, on its own level, is compatible with more than one such doctrine. In Ethics I, 13, so St. Thomas thinks, Aristotle used some psychological notions concerning the parts of the soul without prejudice, neither fully examining them nor directly considering them or their merits. Most important of all, Aristotle used such notions to deal with a moral view of the unity of man. Morally speaking, what is man? He is reason governing the life of appetite and using the body itself for the sake of what is highest within him. This is not Platonism, not even a disenchanted Platonism: it is a definition of man in the order of the good, and under the primacy of finality. Such is the position of St. Thomas on the supposed transitional psychology of the Ethics. For him the problem itself does not arise because there is no psychology in the Ethics: there are only psychological notions undefended in themselves but used by Aristotle within the perspective of the moral examination of man.

What is at stake in this outlook is St. Thomas' belief that as between the Ethics and the De Anima, Aristotle did not have two psychologies.
The psychology of the Ethics is not a sort of this-worldly Platonism on the way to the full and mortalist this-worldliness of the De Anima. St. Thomas rather invites the student of Aristotle to recognize the moral context and employment of the psychological ideas that he is looking at in the Ethics. Such a contextual approach to Ethics I, 13 explains why between man the rational or governmental whole of the Ethics and man the composite substance of the De Anima St. Thomas sees, not two psychologies in a state of opposition to one another, but the difference between an ethical and a psychological conception of human unity. This difference locates both the Ethics and the De Anima in a common problem, the immortality of the human soul, manifesting itself in the former as a completely this-worldly view of man's ultimate felicity, and in the latter as a conflict between the mortality of the soul as substantial form and the immortality of the intellect.

Although St. Thomas is very slow to reach such a conclusion openly or frequently, there can hardly be a question that this is the interpretation of Aristotle's psychology that governs SCG III, 44-63. St. Thomas does not disclose all at once all that he thinks on this point. In III, 44, § 5, we know only that metaphysics is the highest form of knowledge, and the highest source of felicity, in this life. We learn the full story when the discussion requires us to look in the direction of the afterlife in order to find a possible location for ultimate felicity. Now St. Thomas must finally pass judgment on Aristotle, and if he does so with charity he does so no less definitely. But St. Thomas' very procedure should not go unnoticed. The immortality of the soul opens a new intellectual highway before Aristotelianism. It enables the Aristotelian philosopher, as well as the theologian who has such a philosophical doctrine in hand, to argue that man's ultimate felicity is to be sought in the next life.

The reason why St. Thomas can think that, in some recognizable sense, he is extending the vision of Aristotelianism into the afterlife is to be sought in his own complete transformation of the psychology of the De Anima. "Transformation" may even be too weak a word to express what St. Thomas did with the Aristotelian conception of man in SCG II, 56 ff. Where Aristotle had speculated all his life on how to include the intellect within the perspective of a biological conception of life, and had not succeeded, St. Thomas suppressed the Aristotelian difficulty by following the opposite course: he undertook to explain the inclusion of animal life within the world of intellectual life. When he asked in SCG II, 56 whether an intellectual substance could be joined to matter, he began that triumphant Christianizing of Aristotle
that is still a marvel today. But it is a Thomistic marvel, in which the 
*De Anima* was embarking on a new age of conquest only because it was 
now living on new capital. If a certain kind of intellectual substance 
can be the origin and sustaining cause of animal life and activity, then 
the teaching of *De Anima* II, 1-2 can successfully define the unity of 
man as a composite substance even though Aristotle never knew the 
reason for this success. Can the notion of *soul*, as developed out of 
biology by Aristotle himself, come to include *intelligence* within itself in 
a coherent way? Aristotle had never answered the question.\(^{52}\) In a real 
sense, neither did St. Thomas, who asked and answered another 
question: can an intellectual substance be a soul? The answer did more 
than transform the psychology of Aristotle; it took the notion of the 
human composite out of the world of living bodies and located it 
within the world of living intelligences, intellectual substances. It 
therefore gave coherent philosophical sense to the notion of man as a 
rational animal by grounding that coherence in the much more difficult 
and extra-biological notion of man as an incarnated intellectual 
substance.\(^{53}\)

This view of man dominates the second and third books of the *SCG*, 
just as it lends its own revolutionary perspective to St. Thomas' 
handling of both the *De Anima* and the *Ethics*. The Aristotelian psychology of *SCG* II, 59-90 is a creation of St. Thomas' mind, but a creation 
that could perform a service of inestimable value to the cause of 
philosophy in the Christian world. In *SCG* II a managed Aristotle, 
speaking for philosophical truth, could successfully show how an 
intellectual substance could be an incorruptible form of corruptible 
matter. The same managed Aristotle could be in *SCG* III a philo-
sophical spokesman for the *felicitas viae*. But it was the doctrine of the 
soul as an incorruptible substance that gave to the teaching of the 
*Ethics* the sense and direction of life as a *via*, just as it was the Thomistic 
transposition that made the notion of substantial form applicable to 
the human composite.

That, as managed by St. Thomas, Aristotle spoke more truly than he 
knew is perhaps less important than the extraordinary care that St.

\(^{52}\) On the general problem of the immortality of the soul in Aristotle, which is destined to remain a question without an answer, see the thoughtful book of Giacomo Soleri, *L'Immortalità dell' Anima in Aristotele* (Turin, 1952) and the lengthy discussion of Augustin Mansion in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 51, 1953, 444-472.

\(^{53}\) I have tried to explain this transposition elsewhere (*At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man*, New York, 1963).
Thomas took to base his management on truths that Aristotle had expressed and that he himself was anxious to defend. There is no continuatio in the Ethics, there is only a human contemplation and felicity. St. Thomas is concentrating on this limited point against Averroes in SCG III, 44, §5. Within its own limits the point is both correct and enforceable, and that is why Aristotle can speak as a philosopher for the felicity of this life. The procedure of St. Thomas suggests therefore that, in his overall approach to Aristotle, he was more concerned to save a truth from its errors than to acknowledge the attending presence of the errors in the truth. This attitude was double-edged, and if St. Thomas adopted it his purpose was, as much as possible, to identify Aristotle with true philosophy; it was not to limit philosophy to Aristotle. If the other edge of his attitude was to show up among his followers, he himself exercised a prudential judgment that was fully justified in his own world, namely, the decision to make the widespread Aristotelianism of his age, not the disastrous conflict between Christianity and a pagan philosophy that it was threatening to become and did become, but a vehicle for the creation of an authentic intellectualism within the Christian world. To condemn Aristotle was to jeopardize his truths; to manage him was to make his truths available to Christianity at the price of purifying them of their errors. St. Thomas chose to follow the dynamic intellectualism of Aristotle, to remain true to his intuitions, and especially to give a more adequate realization to that most magnificent of Aristotelian ideas, the affinity between intelligence and divinity. To this end, St. Thomas chose not to reveal Aristotle's shortcomings except when it became absolutely necessary, and, even then, only a little at a time. This is the attitude of a man who was more than an impersonal student of the past, and more than an objective philosopher; it is the attitude of a theologian who openly recreated the truth of the past in the light of revelation in order to save the present.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies*
Interpretations of the Origins of Medieval Heresy

JEFFREY RUSSELL

A close study of the history of medieval heresy can yield answers to some interesting questions, such as what role medieval heresy had in the development of Christian doctrine, what its relation was to the intellectual and moral movements of the Middle Ages, especially to the great reform movement, how closely it can be correlated to social and economic unrest, and what kinds or groups of people were likely to be heretics. These problems have been investigated to one degree or another by historians, but there is one area that has been explored only casually: the area of the origins of medieval heresy. This area lies at the watershed of the whole domain, and we cannot fully understand the rushing streams and currents of later religious revolt unless we know where the location of the source is, and what the topography of its surroundings. It is usually assumed that medieval heresy “arose” towards the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth century. Far too little attention has been granted to establishing exactly what medieval heresy was, how it was heresy and how it was medieval, whence it arose, when it arose, and under what conditions.

Though this region has not been thoroughly explored, it has been visited, passed through hurriedly, as it were, by historians eager to reach the more fertile and luxuriant plain below, and it is their maps and their observations that I present here in order that we may learn from their achievements and from their errors.

This study of the interpretations of medieval heresy is limited to post-Reformation writers who have concerned themselves particularly with heresy, although I have also included a few of the most important general works on church history. The number of books and articles dealing with the particular subject of heresy is so great that, though I hope this study is very nearly complete, there are no doubt omissions. Further, a classification of authors and attitudes has evident dangers and limitations in itself. I have treated independently those authors whose interpretations are particularly sophisticated and original; unfortunately,
however, much of the work in this field lends itself to pigeonholing without being unduly forced.

Medieval writers on heresy, their minds formed by a study of the Fathers and trained to believe that there was nothing new under the sun, simply viewed the medieval sects as extensions of ancient heresies without troubling themselves as to how this purported longevity was accomplished.

The tradition of assuming the identity of the new with the old sects or of asserting at least that all heretical groups are recurrent examples of a blight that appears now and again and needs no other explanation than the folly of man and the wickedness of the Devil, persisted long past the end of the Middle Ages. Again and again dictionaries of heresy were compiled where each error was assigned its own compartment, and no pretense at explanation or synthesis was attempted.\(^1\) Other devout Catholic writers down to the end of the nineteenth century, while employing the narrative rather than the dictionary, shook their heads at the human pride and ignorance that lay at the basis of religious dissent.\(^2\) As late as 1865 Cesare Cantù could attribute the rise of heresy to the wiles of "l’antico serpente."\(^3\)

---


3 *Gli Eretici d’Italia*, Turin, 1885.
Catholic writers were not the only historians to impose ideological patterns upon the history of heresy. Protestants were equally partisan. To them, medieval heretics were precursors of the truth, of the spiritual awakening that was to come into its own in the sixteenth century, and formed a bridge between the apostolic Church and the Protestant Reformation. The Protestants adopted such a view not only because they were guilty of the human failing of reading into medieval heresy what they wanted to find there, but also, specifically, to provide themselves with a defense against the Catholic sneer: "Where was your religion before Calvin and Luther?" Catholics, too, accepted the idea of medieval heretics as precursors of the Reformation, although attaching the opposite value-judgment. To them, the medieval dissenters were the mad predecessors of the insanity that was the Protestant Reformation.

The Waldensians, with their emphasis on apostolic purity, were particularly favored by Protestant writers as heroes of the resistance against popery. In their interpretation, the medieval Church, under the leadership of the pope, had turned away from the simple and virtuous Christianity of the Apostles and had become a sink of corruption. The medieval heretics, scandalized, rose in revolt against this monstrosity. So eager are many of the Protestant writers to crown with laurels the head of any rebel against Rome, that they lump together all the heretics as apostolic reformers and sometimes go to considerable pains to show that the Catharists, for example, were not dualists at all but either Waldensian in origin or at least motivated by the same principles.

But the medieval heretics were not praised merely because of their revolt against Rome: their piety was viewed as the piety of the Apostles,
their faith the faith of the early Church that had been perverted by Rome. The Apostles did not commit their faith into the hands of the bishops through so-called apostolic succession; rather, their faith was handed down from generation to generation among a small, almost hidden group of believers, a doctrine that one still finds taught by the Mormon Church, for example. Again and again, the Protestant writers of the seventeenth to the early years of the twentieth century repeat this interpretation of the Waldensians. Most of them trace the origins of the sect to an alleged crossing of the Alps by Saint Paul on his way from France to Italy. Paul preached to his guides, who in turn spread the good news to their neighbors, and true Christianity was preserved in the valleys of Piedmont while it was perverted in the rest of the world. A variation of this interpretation is that the sect was founded in the ninth century, when Bishop Claudius of Turin, angered at what he considered the idolatrous decisions of the Second Council of Nicea, attacked the authority of the papacy. His followers, persecuted by Rome, fled to the Alps. Some writers maintain that the Ambrosian church was always independent of papal pretence and maintain that the emigration to the obscure alpine valleys occurred as early as the fourth or fifth century.

In any case, the antiquity of the Waldensian church was much greater than was maintained by the Catholic writers, the argument continued, and the name and origins of the group did not derive from Valdes but from the fact that they were valley-dwellers (Vallenses). The Waldensians, then, represented the one true church in the middle ages, and Protestant writers who avoided the error of identifying Albigensians with Waldensians at least claimed as members of this true church all the other reform-oriented heretics, Arnold of Brescia and Pierre de Bruys, for example. This true church, obscure and persecuted as it was, held the torch until the truth broke out in the great blaze of the Reformation, and thus the Protestant churches of the modern world have a real succession from apostolic times as against the supposititious apostolic succession claimed by the papists.8

7 See the works of Dondaine cited below for this spelling. It now seems clear that the man usually referred to as Peter Waldo was not even named Peter. See also Giovanni Gonnet, "Waldensia," Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, XXXIII (1953), pp. 240-247.
8 Writers maintaining this position include those cited in note 6 above and also the following: Anon., The Waldenses: Sketches of the Evangelical Christians of the Valleys of Piedmont (Philadelphia, 1853); Peter Allix, Some Remarks upon the Ecclesiastical History of the Ancient Churches of Piedmont (London, 1690); J. J. Altmeyer, Précurseurs de la réforme aux Pays-Bas
These pious constructs, even when fortified by the scholarship of A. Hahn, did not long withstand the skepticism of more critical historians, and in less than ten years after the appearance of Hahn’s work two writers, A. Wilhelm Dieckhoff and Johann Jacob Herzog, affirmed that it was impossible, for lack of adequate evidence, to press the origins of the Waldensians any farther back than the preaching of Valdes. More recent historians concur, especially after the relegation of La Nobla Leyçon, formerly supposed to have dated from the year 1100, to the thirteenth century. All scholars, even Waldensians, now agree that the sect was not founded before the activities of Valdes at the end of the twelfth century. Since there were other groups of apostolic-minded

(Brussels, 1886); Amadeo Bert, I Valdesi, ossiano i Christiani secondo la chiesa primitiva (Turin, 1849); Sophia V. Bompiani, A Short History of the Italian Waldenses (New York-London, 1897); Pierre Boyer, Abrégé de l’histoire des Vaudois (The Hague, 1691); J. Bresse, L’Histoire des Vaudois (London, 1827); Jacques Brez, Histoire des Vaudois, ou des habitants des vallées occidentales du Piedmont... (Lausanne, 1796); Joseph Frederick Berg, The Old Paths (Philadelphia, 1845); W. C. Brownlee, Sketch of the History of the Western Apostolic Churches from which the Roman Church Apostatized (New York, c. 1850); Ludwig Flathe, Geschichte der Vorläufer der Reformation (Leipzig, 1835-6); Pierre Gilles, Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées recueillies en quelques vallées de Piedmont (Geneva, 1644); J. Goll, “Die Waldenser im Mittelalter,” Mittheilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichisches Geschichte, IX (1888); Ludwig Keller, Die Reformation und die älteren Reformparteien (Leipzig, 1885); William Jones, History of the Waldensians... (London, 1812); Jean Léger, Histoire générale des églises réformées (Geneva, 1644); Alexis Muston, Aperçu de l’antiquité des Vaudois des Alpes (Pignoroli, 1881); Albert Henry Newman, “Recent Researches Concerning Medieval Sects,” Proceedings of the American Society of Church History, IV (1892); Hill Dawe Wickham, An Historical Sketch of the Italian Vaudois (London, 1847); Jane Louisa Willyams, A Short History of the Waldensian Church (London, 1855); James A. Wylie, History of the Waldenses (Edinburgh, 1880). For a list of popularized histories, see the bibliography in the Bollettino della Società di Studi Valdesi, 1953. Emile Tron, “Pierre de Brouze” Bol. Soc. Studi Valdesi, nos. 57 (1931), 62 (1934), 63 (1935) offers the curious but unconvincing suggestion that Valdes never existed at all and that his work was in reality done by Pierre de Bruys.

9 Christopher U. Hahn, Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1845-47).
10 Die Waldenser im Mittelalter (Göttingen, 1851).
11 Die Romanischen-Waldenser (Halle, 1853).
13 Antoine Charvaz, Recherches historiques sur la véritable origine des Vaudois... (Paris-Lyon, 1836), represents the traditional Catholic attack on the antiquity of the Waldensians. De Stefano, op. cit., and Giovanni Gonnet, “Il Movimento valdese in Europa secondo le più recenti ricerche,” Bol. della Soc. di Studi Valdesi, no. 100 (1956); Gonnet, Il Valdismo medievale (Torre Pellice, 1942), are among the moderns taking this position.
heretics, this does not, of course, in itself invalidate the idea of the continuity of Protestantism from apostolic times.

This idea cannot help but be attractive to the Protestant historian, and there are still some who accept it uncritically.14 Most serious Protestant scholars, however, now maintain that it is unlikely that any filiation to the apostolic period can be asserted for the medieval heretics. These writers maintain that a spiritual union links the Protestants of the Reformation with their medieval forerunners and these in turn with the Christians of apostolic times. The connection is the Holy Spirit, working upon souls in every age to bring them to the true practice of the Christian religion.15 This theory may or may not be true, but in any case it is not historical, and it is unfortunate that it should be confused with history. Its truth or falsehood cannot be demonstrated by history, since history is incapable of examining the mind of the Holy Spirit. It is in part actually obstructive to history, since, in assigning causation directly to God, it interferes with the search for historical causation.

The imposition upon the study of medieval heresy of concepts derived from beyond the historical evidence is not limited to the influence of Protestant or Catholic theology. Nineteenth-century liberal writers viewed the medieval sectaries as martyrs to freedom of thought.16 In the twentieth century, Nazi romanticism developed its own theories of Catharism, deriving it from the religion of the ancient Germans.17 It is only to be expected that Marxist writers should have their fling at impressing the medieval heretics into the ranks of socialism. To them the history of medieval heterodoxy is a chapter in the class struggle.18

15 Ernesto Comba, for example, in his *Storia dei Valesi* (Torre Pellice, 1950) 4th ed., claims that though the Waldensians descend from Valdes in the strictly historical sense, in the spiritual they descend through "una gloriosa catena di precursori" from the purity of the apostolic church.
The doctrines of nineteenth-century liberals and of twentieth-century Nazis in regard to the heretics now seem so far-fetched that no comment upon them in necessary. The Marxist writers, on the other hand, command, when they are not at their most extreme, a degree of respect. Their interpretation appeared at a time when religious history had long been dominated by writers entirely under the sway of idealism, interpreting ideas in terms of other ideas as if history took place in an intellectual test tube. Benedetto Croce\textsuperscript{19} and L. Sommariva\textsuperscript{20} have effectively criticized the more evident excesses of the Marxists, yet the Marxists, in bringing to the fore the problems of economic and social causation so long neglected, rendered the historiography of medieval heresy a service.

Under the influence of Marxism and of Weber and Troeltsch, a good many recent writers have undertaken to explain medieval heterodoxy in terms of economic, social, and political motivations. In 1938, for example, Antonino de Stefano presented a thoroughgoing materialist interpretation of heresy.\textsuperscript{21} To him, the rise of the Church in political power paved the way for a politico-economic revolt against her influence, a revolt spearheaded by the rising communes. Medieval heresies were heresies of laymen and heresies of the masses. De Stefano ignored the fact that medieval heresy began a good many centuries before the masses or even the middle classes became politically or economically conscious, as well as the fact that the heretical movements involved priests as often as not. He goes so far as to state in summary that “at bottom, the economic argument must have constituted, more than any dogmatic or religious discussions, the principal motive of the preaching of heresy.” \textsuperscript{22} Luigi Zanoni, in his important work on the Humiliati, affirmed that at least the reform-oriented heresies were rooted in a popular movement among the lower classes.\textsuperscript{23}

Among writers considering materialist factors without imposing upon the facts the ideology of dialectical materialism are Austin P. Evans\textsuperscript{24} and Marvin Becker, who in a recent article in *Speculum* ably exposed the connections between politics and social groupings at Florence and the

\textsuperscript{19} “Il Materialismo storico e le eresie medievali,” *Quaderni della Critica*, II (1946).
\textsuperscript{20} “Studi recenti sulle eresie medievali,” *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXIV (1952).
\textsuperscript{21} *Riformatori ed eretici del medioevo* (Palermo, 1936).
\textsuperscript{22} De Stefano, *op. cit.*, 368. This represents exactly the position he took twenty years earlier in *I Tedeschi e l'eresia medievale* (Rome, 1916). See especially pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{23} Luigi Zanoni, *Gli Umiliati nei loro rapporti con l'eresia, l'industria della lana, ed i comuni nei secoli 12 e 13* (Milan, 1911) 19 ff.
occurrence of heresy in that city.\textsuperscript{25} Popularizers like Monsignor Cristiani\textsuperscript{26} now automatically tip their hat to the economic and social interpretation by giving it a place among their explanations.\textsuperscript{27}

In quite recent years many writers have begun to reject materialist explanations of the origin of heresy. In a skillful article appearing in 1955, Herbert Grundmann called for a return to the explanation of the occurrence of heresy by religious factors, and denied that there was any economic or social basis for medieval religious dissent.\textsuperscript{28} In 1947 Ilarino da Milano had already taken an equally firm position,\textsuperscript{29} while in the same years Alcantara Mens,\textsuperscript{30} summing up the question, made the following five points: Medieval religious movements are simultaneous with the rise of towns and of commercial activity, and there is certainly some connection between heresy and the weavers. But the occurrence of heresy cannot be attached to any particular class or classes, although from time to time heresy was exploited by one or another of the classes for its own purposes, as in the case of the aristocracy in Languedoc.


\textsuperscript{26} L. Cristiani, Brèze histoire des hérésies (Paris, 1957).


\textsuperscript{28} "Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte der religiösen Bewegungen im Mittelalter," Archiv für Kirchengeschichte, XXXVIII (1955).

\textsuperscript{29} "Le Eresie popolari del secolo xi."

\textsuperscript{30} "Innerlijke drijfveer en herkomst der kettersche bewegingen in de Middeleeuwen. Religieus of sociaal oogmerk?," in Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen, (Brussels-Paris, 1947).
Mens concludes that the heretics of the eleventh through the first half of the thirteenth century were a part of the spiritual awakening of that period. His position seems quite tenable. If social and economic forces are to be postulated as causes of the appearance of medieval heresy, relationships between those forces and heresy must be shown, not only here and there and here and again, but persistently, and especially in the eleventh century and earlier, when medieval heresy first arises. Most modern writers implicitly reject the materialist explanation in passing it over in favor of an intellectual or a moral one.31

Some historians, in beating more than one drum at once, have produced composite explanations for the rise of medieval heresy. Gaston Bonet-Maury, for example,32 in the good anticlerical spirit of fin-de-siècle Paris, would have the medieval heretics be proto-martyrs of the Reformation and at the same time crusaders for freedom of conscience. This naive confusion of the goals of Protestantism with those of intellectual liberty does not, of course, surprise anyone brought up on a diet of English Whig historians. It is Carl Heath, perhaps, who serves up the most extraordinary porridge of ideas;33 his heretics are all proto-Protestants or neo-apostolics, seeking a simpler and purer religion, the religion of Jesus. At the same time, they are battling for the freedom of the mind, and, finally, they represent the "Common Man" (the capitals are his) struggling against the "tyrannous ruling of the master classes." 34 In short, they represent whatever Mr. Heath likes locked in battle with everything he dislikes.35 An amiable scholarly example of reading into medieval heresy what you would like to find there is provided by Norman Cohn,36 who would like most of the sectaries to be devotees of the chiliasm that occupies the center of his attention.

31 Other direct attempts to refute the materialist position are: Rufus M. Jones, The Church's Debt to Heretics (New York, 1925); A. H. M. Jones, "Were Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?", Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. X (1959); Herbert Grundmann, Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1955); E. Dupré Theseider, Introduzione alle Eresie Medievali (Bologna, 1953).
32 Les Précurseurs de la Réforme et de la liberté de conscience dans les pays latins du XIIe au XVe siècle (Paris, 1904).
34 Ibid., 31.
35 Alexandre Berard, Les Vaudois (Lyons, 1892), combines liberalism with socialism: his heretics fight the class struggle and the struggle against bigotry at one and the same time; Nita de Pierrefeu, "Le Rayonnement du néomanichéisme en Italie médiévale," Cahiers d'études cathares, no. 35 (autumn 1958), views the rise of heresy as a triple movement, combining purely religious activity, civic activity (the communal movement), and economic and social activity (movements of laborers and farmers). See page 142 ff.
Historians of the Inquisition have, for the most part, whether writing Protestant polemic or Catholic defenses of an indefensible institution, been occupied with a study of heresy only from the twelfth century, when the inquisition began (taking the Council of Verona as its inception) and when the most famous heretical groups gained prominence. They usually, therefore, quite naturally accepted the existence of heresy as a given factor and turned their attention to the machinery of repression without attempting to offer explanations for the occurrence of religious dissent.

Other writers, whose interest was more particularly directed at the study of heresy, also neglected the problem of causation without having the reason for doing so that historians of the Inquisition had. Taking the existence of medieval heresy for granted, leaping without explanation from the heresies of the early centuries to those of the twelfth, or identifying, without explanation, medieval groups with the ancient heretics, they make no contribution to the study of the question.37

Many historians have thought to account for the rise of the Catharist variety of medieval heresy in assigning it an eastern origin. The Catharists derived, according to this position, from the Manichaeans or from other Near Eastern dualist groups through a series of intermediaries, the number and variety of which depend upon the writer. From Bossuet through Farlati and Matter to Léger, the theory that linked the Catharists to the heretics of Bulgaria and through them to the ancient Manichaeans or Paulicians was maintained.38 Other writers, such as Schmidt,39

37 C. U. Hahn, op. cit.; Ignaz von Döllinger, Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters (Munich, 1890), in other respects an excellent book; Walter Nigg, Das Buch der Ketzer (Zurich, 1949); Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm (Oxford, 1951), primarily concerned with later period, of course; Herbert Lathe, "The Attitude of the Historic Creeds Towards Heresy," Bibliotheca Sacra, XLII (1885); Luis Carlos Ramirez, La Controversia eucharistica del siglo XI (Bogotá, 1940); S. Reinach, "Les Survivances européennes du Catharisme," Compte Rendu du V e Congrès international des sciences historiques (Brussels, 1923); Albert Freystedt, "Der Ausgang des Prädestinationssstreits," Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, XLI (1898).


accepted the derivation of the Catharists from the Balkan heretics without necessarily assuming that the tradition went back beyond the latter to the teaching of Mani: dualism was not necessarily Manichaean or Paulician dualism. The consensus was certainly clear, however, that the Balkan dualists were influential in occidental heresy. A. Lombard went so far as to say that Catharism owed its existence to the presence of Bulgarian missionaries in the west from the end of the tenth century. At last the derivation from the Manichaeans of the Middle East to the Paulicians of Asia Minor to the Bogomils of Bulgaria to the Patarenes of Bosnia and Illyria, and thence to the Catharists of Italy and then Southern France, as set forth by Steven Runciman in 1947, became classical. Aside from differences in detail and aside from increasing refinement in distinguishing the different sorts of Catharists, notably the absolute and the mitigated dualists, this theory has been overtly or tacitly accepted by a great many modern historians. One of the finest of the contemporary writers on the Catharists, Father A. Dondaine, flatly sums up the position: "The occidental Cathari were sons of the Bogomils, who were themselves the heirs of ancient Manicheism." Dondaine seeks to prove the point once and for all by presenting a detailed table demonstrating that the Catharists of the eleventh century held doctrines identical to those of the Bogomils. This chart, though very informative, does not, in spite of what the author intended, dispel all doubt about the connection between the two groups in the eleventh century, when medieval heresy was gaining notoriety and when Catharism was, apparently, making its first great inroads. The uncertainty it leaves behind is worth mentioning since it lies at the heart of the interpretation of the origins of Western heresy in terms of currents from the east.

42 Emile G. M. J. De Stoop, Diffusion du Manichéisme (Ghent, 1909).
43 The Medieval Manichee (Cambridge, 1947).
47 Ibid., 59 ff.
In the first place, the evidence of the chart is overwhelming only if all the Catharists of the eleventh century are lumped together as one group. If they were in fact one group, the almost exact correspondence of the doctrines of this group to those of the Bogomils would indeed leave little room for doubt. But the Catharists did not have, especially as early as the eleventh century, any unified body of doctrine, and each of the groups called Catharist must, it seems to me, be treated separately. When this is done, it is seen that a certain number of doctrines similar to those of the Bogomils is found in the case of each group, greater in some, smaller in others. All that one can safely conclude from this is that almost all the doctrines held by the Bogomils were also held at one time and place or other in Western Europe in the eleventh century, a conclusion that leaves the door open for a parallel development of dualism in east and west. In the second place, in order to demonstrate the affiliation of one group to another, it is always necessary to produce not only internal evidence, that is, similarity of doctrine, but also external evidence, a demonstration of how, physically, the ideas of one group were made known to and accepted by another group. The problem of the transmission of ideas from the Balkans to Italy and Southern France and, indeed, to Northern France, where they may have appeared earlier than in the south, has never been entirely resolved.

The closest to the final answer that has yet been offered is a paper given by Henri-Charles Puech at the Convegno di scienze morali, storiche, e filologiche at Rome in 1957.47a Puech offers a closely-worked out argument that demonstrates finally that there was influence on medieval Catharism from the East. First dealing with external evidence, Puech notes that the Balkan heretics were early noted for their missionary zeal, that trade routes and diplomatic connections between west and east had never ceased to be important, and finally, that the Tractatus de Hereticis recently edited by Dondaine, along with several more well-known documents, such as the letter of Euvrinus of Steinfeld to St. Bernard, offer proof positive of such a connection. Turning to the internal evidence, Puech admits that Dondaine's chart (mentioned above) is unconvincing, but he observes that from a comparison of Bogomil and Catharist doctrines one can hardly fail to draw the conclusion that the two groups were connected. Puech concludes, however, by warning that this connection is demonstrable only from the 1160s and

that it is well to be very skeptical of any assertions of dualist influence in the Occident before that time.

One danger of the explanation of the rise of medieval Catharism by doctrines imported from the east is that it has led some historians who have adopted it to leave it as an explanation sufficient to itself, while in fact it leaves unanswered the question of why such foreign ideas should have taken root and grown in western soil. And in order to answer that question we must know, again, when and under what circumstances medieval heresy developed in the west. It is precisely this knowledge that has been lacking.

Some theories as to how eastern influences were imported into the west are somewhat bizarre. H. J. Warner48 denied Manichaean, Priscillianist, and Donatist influences in the Catharist makeup but believed that the Catharists were strongly influenced by Paulician theories that reinforced an indigenous western dualism. "National characteristics" 49 are invoked to explain the influence, as he points out that the Gauls and Galatians have the same racial background, and that therefore the French would be receptive to ideas from Asia Minor. Even more fantastic, he cites certain purported common characteristics of the French and the Slavs, such as bibulousness and volubility, as an explanation of how the French might have been receptive to dualist ideas imported from the East.

Reginald Lane Poole offered some explanations as to why dualism might, after having been imported from the East, have taken root in the occident, though one might wish he had gone further. According to Poole, the west was prepared for the heresy by a situation with two faces. The corruption of the clergy turned people against the Church, and attempts to reform the Church, emphasizing asceticism and mortification of the flesh, only played into the hands of dualism.50 One wonders, with this explanation, what the Church might have done to escape Catharism.

A surprising number of historians, asserting that the theory of importation from the East has too little evidence to back it up, have wielded the knife with too much vigor and denied all influence from that quarter. The bases of their position are, however, far more insecure than those of its opposite. In 1885, Charles Pfister,51 puzzling over the

49 Ibid., vol. i p. 21.
50 Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2d ed. (London, 1920), 81-82.
51 Etudes sur le règne de Robert le Pieux (Paris, 1885).
apparent inconsistency of the fact that Catharism appears to have occurred at least as early in northern France as in southern with the theory of its derivation by way of Italy from the east, rejected that theory. In its place he constructed one that, although possible, has no evidence to support it. The vast complex of medieval Catharism was, he claimed, the result of the teachings of an “illustrious” scholar of the tenth century, whose very name, illustrious though it was, was forgotten by the ungrateful sectaries. Pfister might have added that not only the name but all traces of the hypothetical heresiarch have been lost to history.

In the 1920’s Paul Alphandéry exposed his own theory of dualistic survivals in the West. In the visions of the mystics, in the symbolism of medieval literature, in the peculiar hierarchies constructed by such heretics as Eon de l’Etoile and Tanchelin, he found ancient dualistic concepts preserved, often deep in the communal unconscious, which were to burst out into the open air as heresies in the eleventh century. In these somewhat arcane speculations, influenced perhaps by Jung, he was eagerly seconded by E. Anichkov, who maintained rather vaguely that Catharism was simply “in the air,” bringing forth in testimony such legends as that of the Grail.

With less soaring an imagination, but with no more evidence, Lucie Varga attempted in two article in the 1930’s to establish a connective chain from the ancient Gnostics and Priscillianists of Spain to the Catharists. Esnault and Puech, also failing to produce adequate evidence, returned to the idea that the Catharists were not merely gnostic, but specifically Manichaean. They asserted, however, as the others did for gnosticism, that the Manichaean tradition continued in the Occident from ancient to medieval times.

Dufourcq postulated a Manichaeanism lying dormant in the West

52 And thereby also that of Johann Carl Ludwig Gieseler, Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte, 6 vol. (Bonn, 1831-35), who claimed that dualism had lain dormant for centuries in Italy.
53 Pfister, op. cit., p. 327.
57 R. Esnault, “Tracce ereticali nel medioevo francese,” Ricerche religiose, XIV (1938).
from the seventh through the tenth centuries and finally being revived as the population grew weary of the decadence of the Catholic clergy. Hubac implied\textsuperscript{60} that the Manichaean tradition was preserved in Visigothic Spain, where traditional anti-Catholicism permitted it a peaceful home. Then, since much of the population of Southern France was of Visigothic origin (!), these doctrines rapidly permeated the Midi. L. Julien differs from his colleagues of the Western survivals school in that he offers some evidence for his assertions.\textsuperscript{60a} Julien claims that several churches in Spain have Manichaean sculptures, and he presents us with sketches of what he claims to be a dualist sculpture of a seventh-century sarcophagus in Narbonne. The difficulty with such evidence is first, that it is difficult to prove that the rather obscure figures in these representations really are dualist symbols, and second, that even if they are, it is difficult to prove that they are not simply copies of earlier representations made by the craftsmen without understanding of their meaning.

Thus the theory of Western survivals lacks adequate supporting evidence. There is no difficulty in tracing dualistic survivals in the West as far down as the sixth century,\textsuperscript{60b} but after that the path wanders in the vague territory of speculation. Moreover, the Western theory answers no more thoroughly than the Eastern the question of why these ideas should suddenly have leapt into prominence in the eleventh century.

A number of historians, beginning with Broeckx,\textsuperscript{60c} have sensibly considered both theories and thereby lent greater depth to their explanations. Broeckx accepted the persistence of dualism in the West, though he was unable to cite clear instances after the sixth, and before the tenth, century. This residual dualism, however, was strengthened by the arrival of Bogomil ideas in the eleventh century and obtained adherents because of current resentment of clerical corruption and feudal rapacity.

H. Söderberg, while adding three possible instances of dualism in the West between the sixth and tenth centuries,\textsuperscript{61} maintains, like Broeckx,

\textsuperscript{60} Pierre Hubac, "Aux origines du catharisme," Cahiers d'études cathares, no. 28 (Winter 1956-7), 199.
\textsuperscript{60a} "Les Centres manichéens du Graal en Occitanie et en Espagne," Ibid., no. 22 (summer 1955).
\textsuperscript{60b} Edmond Broeckx, Le Catharisme (Hoogstraten, 1916).
\textsuperscript{60c} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} La Religion des Cathares, Étude sur le gnosticisme de la basse antiquité et du moyen âge (Uppsala, 1949).
that it is likely that the rise of Catharism was due to the revival of dormant Western dualism by the arrival of active dualist thought from the Balkans. Arno Borst\textsuperscript{62} concurred in this interpretation, as did J. Lindeboom,\textsuperscript{63} who, however, held that the West ran to meet the East more out of a general tendency to revolt in the eleventh century than from a latent tendency to dualism.

This tendency to revolt, which undoubtedly did exist and which expressed itself certainly in part against the many abuses existing in the church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, has been strongly stressed by many historians with more or less of a Protestant bias. It is undeniable that the corruption of the time was very great, but it is a gross oversimplification to make of it the sole cause or even the “root-cause”\textsuperscript{64} of medieval heresy. In the first place, as we shall have occasion to state elsewhere, the study of medieval heresy ought to begin with the eighth rather than with the eleventh or twelfth century. There was certainly enough corruption in the eighth to tenth centuries to please the adherents of this theory, but it was no worse than it had been for at least two centuries before, just as it was no worse in the sixteenth than it had been in the fifteenth or fourteenth. We must go beyond this simplistic and only partially correct explanation if we are to understand the public revolt of medieval heretics and Protestant Reformers.

The overemphasis upon the corruption of the clergy, sometimes stated a bit luridly,\textsuperscript{65} began with the classical work of Henry Charles Lea, \textit{The History of the Inquisition}, though it had its roots in earlier Protestant polemic. Lea portrayed the medieval Church as a monolithic structure compelling everyone to obedience until at last its corruption forced people to revolt. Lea was too good an historian to stop at a simplistic solution and went on to suggest that the great intellectual activity of the twelfth century gave people the understanding and the means to revolt. He did not, however, consider whether such activity and its consequences might have existed in earlier centuries as well. Théodore de Cauzon\textsuperscript{66} followed the trail blazed by Lea, essaying an explanation of the resent-


\textsuperscript{64} A. L. Maycock, \textit{The Inquisition} (London, 1926), 31.

\textsuperscript{65} Charles T. Gorham, \textit{The Medieval Inquisition} (London, 1918), states, for example, that medieval heresy was a rebellion against “this festering mass” (medieval Catholicism) and asserts that “for many hundreds of years the Church was an open sore.” (p. 19).

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Les Vaudois et l’Inquisition} (Paris, 1908).
ment against the abuses of the clergy in the twelfth century by maintaining cryptically that at times the reform party in the Church comes to the fore and at other times not, a position doubtless true but in need of amplification. Another writer on a more popular level saw in what he considered the fragmented nature of medieval society and in popular ignorance causes of heresy in addition to corruption in the Church, also hinting at the influence of repressed paganism and of exotic currents of thought from Judaism, Islam, and even Buddhism. Finally, in 1938 an historian highly imbued with Protestant prejudices, G. G. Coulton, returned to Lea’s conception of heresy’s being the result of the awakening of the eleventh and twelfth centuries to revolt against the religious and political degradation of the Middle Ages. “As the world revives,” he affirmed, “so does heresy.” The explanation of heresy arising as rebellion against corruption has much in common with that tying it to a movement of reform, as we shall see below, as well as with the old Protestant position.

The connection that seems to exist between the cultural élan of the eleventh through the thirteenth century and the occurrence of heresy was closely examined by several historians of the nineteenth century. Dealing with the entire period from the eighth to the fourteenth century, Reuter placed the intellectual dissenters, such as Berengar of Tours and Abelard, firmly in the context of the wide intellectual dialogue that was taking place throughout the period. J. J. Altmeyer, although erroneously placing the rise of heresy in the twelfth century, attributed it to the leaven of the Crusades in conjunction with the “dogmatic agitations which had taken place since the eleventh century.” The great historian of Christian dogma, Adolf Harnack, was even more explicit. As a Protestant, Harnack believed that Christian doctrine after a certain point developed erroneously but that it did nonetheless develop. In the mere fact of writing a cohesive and chronological history of doctrine he assumed such a development, and the assumption is explicit throughout the book. Again, as a Protestant, Harnack devoted by far the greater part of his work to the history of the Church before and after the Middle Ages, moving quickly through our period and slowig

70 H. Reuter, Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1875-77).
72 Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 vol. (Freiburg, 1888-90).
down again only with the Fraticelli. Nonetheless, in the portion of his work that does deal with the earlier Middle Ages he observed that the intellectual heresies, such as Adoptionism, Gottschalk’s predestination, Berengarism, and the doctrines of Abelard, were part of the history of the development of Christian doctrine. Some Catholic writers, too, saw the connection between the intellectual movement and the rise of heresy. Reginald Lane Poole and Jean Ebersholt correctly noted that the connection did not begin in the twelfth or even eleventh century, but went back at least as far as the Carolingian renaissance.

Felice Tocco was somewhat skeptical of this position. The introduction to his standard work on heresy dealt with “the intellectual movement contemporary with heresy,” and he therein maintained that what he called the three periods of scholasticism, the growth of the twelfth century, the triumph of the thirteenth century, and the decay of the fourteenth century, were bound up somehow with the occurrence of heresy. He did not make clear how this connection worked, however, and in his conclusion he noted that heresy had really very little to do with what he considered the three most important aspects of the intellectual ferment of these centuries: the movement toward liberty of thought, the building of the autonomy of the State, and the rehabilitation of life upon rational values (Tocco was a good citizen of the last century).

Other historians in increasing number have emphasized the connection of heresy in our period with a general movement in society toward reform. This connection was already observed in 1865 by Cantù. Hauck, placing Berengar of Tours in his proper context as part of the general intellectual movement, also made the connection between heresy and reform. “One might say,” he observed, “that it was chance that Waldes became a heretic instead of a saint.” Müller, while not exposing at length the relationship between heresy and reform, made a similar observation: that the movement for poverty among the Waldensians was singularly like the movement preached by Saint Francis and

---

75 L’Eresia nel medio evo (Florence, 1884).
76 Ibid., 557.
77 Cesare Cantù, op. cit.
his followers.\textsuperscript{79} Beuzart\textsuperscript{80} also observed that the desire to reform and thereby return to apostolic simplicity was at the heart of much of the heretical agitation.

Some of the writers who have linked heresy and reform have been unwilling to admit that the movement toward reform existed inside the Church as well as out. To them, the medieval Church was a bad tree and therefore could bear no good fruit.\textsuperscript{81} A reform of the medieval Church would be a contradiction in terms: the thing must be pulled down from the outside. Since the papacy is, in this view, the root of the evil, whatever is done by Rome must be bad. This leads Philipp van Limborch\textsuperscript{82} and Robert Breyer\textsuperscript{83} into a curious, though natural in the light of their views, error. Instead of perceiving that the Gregorian papacy was, like the apostolically-minded heretics, moving in the direction of reform, they saw it as striving for a more tyrannical stranglehold on the church. Heresy then arose in opposition to the pretensions of the renovated papacy. It is true that the reform papacy helped “cause” medieval heresy, but it was by \textit{encouraging} the urge to reform, not by increasing the need for it.

Sometimes this obvious fact had to be admitted; when it was, it was done so with surprise. Both Breyer\textsuperscript{84} and Adolf Hausrath\textsuperscript{85} use the same expressions of astonishment that orthodoxy could make any gesture in the direction of virtue.

Most recent historians, however, have correctly identified the orthodox reform movement and the heterodox search for purity as cut from the same bolt of cloth. Father Dondaine, publishing in 1946 two texts essential to the origins of the Waldensians, shows us in Valdes the type of a reformer who begins his career as perfectly orthodox and then, confronted with stupidity and hostility on the part of the hierarchy, gradually becomes more and more extreme until he is clearly a heretic.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{80} Paul Beuzart, \textit{Les hérésies pendant le moyen âge et la réforme jusqu'à la mort de Philippe II, 1598, dans la région de Douai, d'Arras, et au pays d'Alleu} (Paris, 1912).
\textsuperscript{81} So Gaston Bonet-Mauzy, \textit{Les précursseurs de la réforme et de la liberté de conscience dans les pays latins du XII\textsuperscript{e} au XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle} (Paris, 1904); Jean Jalla, \textit{Histoire des Vaudois des Alpes} (Torre Pellice, 1908); Georges Guibal, \textit{Arnaud de Brescia et les Hohenstaufen} (Paris, 1868).
\textsuperscript{83} “Die Arnoldisten,” \textit{Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte}, XII (1891).
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, 401-2: “Ja, selbst Gregor VII...”
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Arnold von Brescia} (Leipzig, 1895), p. 4: seit die Agitatoren Roms ihr selbst die Augen geöffnet hatten für die Unwürdigkeit ihrer Priesterschaft.
\textsuperscript{86} Antoine Dondaine, “Aux origines du Valdéisme,” \textit{Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum}, XVI
Knox, Marthaler, and Ottonello noted that only the width of a hair separated a Valdes from a Francis of Assisi, though the one was condemned and the other canonized, and observed that it was very easy indeed to cross over from orthodoxy to heresy without being fully aware of what one was doing. Medieval theological boundaries were sometimes left as unguarded as medieval political boundaries.

Gerhart Ladner observed the connection between moral and doctrinal reform within the Church and reform heresies without, J. B. Valvekin noted the connection in regard to the Premonstratensians specifically, and Zanoni placed the Humiliati in their proper position as part of the mainstream of reform. Späling included all the sects dedicated to a return to apostolic purity in this mainstream, and Arno Borst stretched a case and admitted even the Catharists, whom he called ein Ferment der Komposition between reform Christendom on the one hand and oriental dualism on the other. Herbert Grundmann likewise maintained the connection of heresy with the whole religious movement of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and emphasized, perhaps a bit too strongly, the influence of the New Testament upon the heretics. Antonio Suraci makes perhaps the best summary. He deals with Arnold of Brescia but his words can be applied to the other reform heretics as well: “Arnaldo è il precursore e il martire, non ‘del libero italiano pensiero,’ ... ma di un largo movimento di rinnovamento spiri-


84 Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit (Baden-les-Vienne, 1956). Professor Ladner has more recently investigated the importance of the concept of reform for the history of the Church as a whole in The Idea of Reform (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). See also his “Die mittelalterliche Reform-Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Idee der Renaissance,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung, LX (1952).

85 Haereses ac sectae ineuntis medi dieae aevi et Praemonstratenses,” Analecta Praemonstratenses, XXXIII (1957).


89 “Neue Funde,” p. 3; M. Grisart, “Le Catarisme dans le Nord de la France,” Cahiers d’études cathares, 1959 (2d series), was entranced by the apostolic reform emphasis of the heretics at Arras in 1025 without suspecting that they were not Catharists at all.

tuale che muove da un evangelismo profondamente e integralmente sentito e sbocca poi in due sensi opposti nel metodo, ma sostanzialmente identici nel fine: il francescansimo di Assisi e il valdismo di Lione, due correnti riformistiche, una ortodossa l’altra eterodossa, che si basano però sul Vangelo e vogliono ricondurre la comunità cristiana... alle pure fonti della Chiesa nascente attraverso la povertà, la carità, l’austerità dei customi del clero e del popolo.”

This increasing understanding of the links between orthodox and heterodox reform represents a great step forward in explaining the origins of medieval heresy. Nearly all writers, however, relying upon the unwarranted assumption that heresy and the reform movement both spring up in the eleventh century, have failed to investigate the not inconsiderable evidence that these phenomena not only existed, but also displayed their characteristic connection, as far back as the eighth century. L. Sommariva has called for a more thorough study of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in order to explain the occurrence of medieval heresy, rather than concentrating on the thirteenth. He is quite correct, but that study must also be carried out for the tenth, ninth, and even the eighth century as well.

The research of the past seventy years has produced many other valuable suggestions. Long before, Sharon Turner had already noted that heresies, however extreme they may be, can act as salutary correctives to orthodoxy. As the idea of the development of Christian doctrine, derived from Newman, gained more strength, other historians began to investigate the relationship existing between heresy and orthodoxy in the Middle Ages. Pettazoni believed that the history of Christianity was a continual movement of oscillation between dogma and dissent. E. Dupré Theseider worked out a kind of formula for the development of doctrine by means of heresy. Orthodoxy encounters a body of heterodox opinion that is potentially heresy. It then formulates a new dogma in order to deal with this heterodoxy, thus creating a new orthodoxy, to

---

96 Arnaldo da Brescia (Asti, 1952), 8.
97 I mention the following in this connection because I have not had cause to cite them before; but almost no historian has been interested in the general development of heresy before the eleventh century. H. Köhler, Die Ketzerpolitik der deutschen Kaiser und Könige in den Jahren 1152-1254 (Bonn, 1913); Henry C. Vedder, “Origin and Early Teaching of the Waldenses according to Roman Catholic Writers of the XIIIth Century,” American Journal of Theology IV (1900).
which heterodox opinion must now submit or else be branded formally a heresy.²

Attempts were made to create new classifications for medieval heresies. J. Lindeboom thought he could discern three: the intellectual, the mystical, and the socialist.³ G. Welter also postulated three, of which only two, however, are accidental, the third category being the "byzantine." The two classifications of occidental heresy according to Welter are the dogmatic heresies, among which he includes Bogomils and Catharists, and the antisacerdotal heresies, among which he includes those of Arnold of Brescia, Tanchelin, Valdes, and others.⁴ Welter maintained, not entirely correctly, that heresy from the fifth to the fourteenth century consists solely in isolated individuals, with the lone exception of the Catharists.⁵ Welter also fails to observe the connection between heresy and reform.

Fernand Lequenne's _Le Drame cathare_,⁶ an earnest defense of the Albigensians by a sympathetic amateur, offers no new interpretation of the rise of heresy. But the preface to the book, by Robert Kanter, states the problem in a perceptive manner. Heresy is, he says, essentially a question, or rather questions, posed to the Church from time to time, forcing it to take account of new ideas. In other words, though Kanter did not express the concept in exactly these terms, heresy is forever the antithesis to the dogmatic thesis, providing in the end the new dialectical synthesis. Kanter is not content, however, to leave the explanation of heresy on such a highly metaphysical plane. We must ask, he says, why and how such questions are asked of the Church at some times and not at others. We must look for explanations beyond the working of an internal dialectic. Kanter thinks that the explosion of heresy in the twelfth century (he does not go farther back) is only partially accounted for by injections of ideas from the East and by a certain degree of affiliation in the West to more ancient doctrines, and he called for a more thorough study of the problem.

² _Introduzione alle eresie medioevali_ (Bologna, 1953); see esp. p. 19.
³ _Stiefskinderen van het Christendom_ (The Hague, 1929); see esp. p. 6.
⁴ _Histoires des sectes chrétiennes des origines à nos jours_ (Paris, 1950); see esp. p. 71.
⁵ _Ibid._, p. 70.
Raoul Manselli addressed himself to this problem.\(^7\) Warning that Catharism is varied rather than homogeneous and that, therefore, we cannot adduce one simple cause for its appearance in the West, he went on to attack Runciman and the classical interpretation in terms of currents from the East. Currents there were, but they did not reach the West until the council of Saint-Félix de Caraman, and therefore other explanations must be sought. Manselli finds them in part in the general motion toward heresy in this period, which motion he attributes to the effects of the great reform movement in encouraging people to criticize the faults of the Church and to think about doctrine.

Père A. Dondaine in an article appearing in 1949-1950, took the revolutionary position that Catharism did not exist at all in the west until the twelfth century.\(^8\) Although he seems to have modified his position since the appearance of this article,\(^9\) it may be quite true that at least some of the purported cases of Catharism in the Occident before the middle of the twelfth century may actually be cases of reform heresy instead. The Council of Arras of 1025, for example, which has always been supposed to have dealt with Catharism, appears to have been concerned rather with heretics of an apostolic nature. Dondaine admits that there may have been isolated cases of dualist heresy in the West before the second half of the twelfth century, but the movement really got under way only then. It seems to be generally agreed that Catharism did not attain great power until then and that it was not until then that absolute dualism was introduced by the Bulgarian missionaries. In any case, Père Dondaine's work on the Catharists as editor and interpreter has been in the forefront for many years.

E. Vacandard\(^10\) was perhaps the first to suggest that the Catharists were not all adherents of one huge sect with an organized body of doctrines: he warns us, for example, to beware of attributing to the Catharists of the Midi doctrines derived from St. Bernard's sermons about Catharists in the north of France. Recent research has found this suggestion to be quite valid, at least for the period before the latter half of the twelfth century.

A. S. Turberville\(^11\) offered in his summaries of the causation of medie-

---

9 See above, p. 36.
val heresy a composite theory in which the importation of ideas from the East as well as the revolt against the corruption of the clergy played a part, as did the stimulation of the intellectual fermentation of the twelfth century. Turberville also assumed that there was a degree of social causation in that heresy was in part a reaction against the bad living conditions of the Middle Ages. The original part of his theory is that heresy arose partly because of the too great ascetic purity of the Church. There is perhaps no contradiction in maintaining that heresy sprang in part from the corruption and in part from the asceticism of the Church. Simonists, Nicolaitists, and the grosser heretics left the high ideals of Christianity for sensual indulgence, while the more spiritual heretics left the corrupt practice of the Church for a heterodox puritanism. Finally, Turberville recognized, without, however, exploring its possibilities, the existence of heresy in the Carolingian period.

Christine Thouzellier\textsuperscript{12} theorized that heresy was imported into the West by the Crusades. Making the division between absolute and mitigated dualism, she stated, offering insufficient evidence however, that the mitigated dualists held sway in southern France, while the absolute dualists held the field in Germany and along the Rhine. Thouzellier explains this purported absolutism (which a study of Rhine-land Catharism does not establish) by claiming, this time with no direct evidence at all, that the soldiers of Conrad III brought it home from the Second Crusade. She leaves unasked the question of why, in this case, the soldiers of Louis VII proved immune to its wiles. Far more solidly based is her alternative theory, that absolute dualism was introduced into the West from the Balkans in the 1160's.\textsuperscript{13}

Adolf Hausrath also investigated the influence of the Crusades. The pilgrims and, thereafter, the Crusaders, were impressed with the humble environment in which the apostles lived and compared it with the luxury and incontinence of the European clergy. This initiated a movement of reform, which manifested itself on the one hand in the efforts of the papacy toward reform and in the new monastic orders, and on the other hand in reform-minded heretics such as Arnold of Brescia.\textsuperscript{14} The trouble with this explanation is, again, that it does not seek the roots of heresy or reform farther back than the eleventh century, for there were reform heresies and efforts on the part of the Church to reform both the secular

\textsuperscript{12} "Hérésie et Croisade au xii\textsuperscript{e} siècle," \textit{Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique}, XLIX (1954).

\textsuperscript{13} See above, pp. 47-48.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Arnold von Brescia} (Leipzig, 1895), esp. pp. 2-4; see also his \textit{Die Arnoldisten} (Leipzig, 1895).
and the regular clergy long before the first pilgrimages were taken to the Holy Land or even to Santiago de Compostella.

Richard Chenevix Trench made one of the few attempts to answer one very serious problem: is there such a thing as “medieval heresy?” That is, is there anything about heresy in the Middle Ages that makes it distinctive? Trench answers that, whereas ancient heresy questioned one doctrine or another in a speculative manner, medieval heresy questioned the whole existence of the Catholic Church, its whole right to exist. The Catharists were operating on the farthest frontiers of Christianity and sometimes on the other side of the border entirely; reform heretics like Arnold of Brescia and Valdes questioned the authority of the pope and the bishops and thereby the organization, doctrine, and authority of the entire Catholic Church. Such particular doctrinal controversies as that centered around Berengar, for example, Trench considers anachronisms, survivals from the ancient pattern of heresy and not really medieval at all.\(^{15}\) Though these distinctions are not the only ones that can be made between ancient and medieval heresy, and though they may be misleading if they are maintained too rigorously, they remain, I think, quite helpful.

De Stefano made some useful additions to Trench’s distinctions. He distinguished medieval from ancient heresy by pointing out, like Trench, that it was not doctrinal primarily, but moral. It was often inspired by the Gospels, De Stefano continued, many laymen were involved, in contradistinction to the ancient heresies, and they often commanded considerable popular following.\(^{16}\) De Stefano avoided the simplistic error of some other historians in classifying medieval heresies as “lay” and opposing them to ancient “clerical heresies.” Though medieval heresies were popular, and though there were many laymen involved in them, the heresiarchs were often members of the clergy. De Stefano compares this phenomenon with that of the aristocrats who were sympathetic with the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and with the middle-class origins of many of the Communist leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth.\(^{17}\)

Raffaello Morghen,\(^{18}\) who has been mentioned already, also noted that

---


\(^{16}\) Antonino de Stefano, “Saggio sull’ eresia medievale nei secoli XII e XIII, Bihynnis (1914), 164.

\(^{17}\) “Saggio,” 174.

\(^{18}\) “Osservazioni critiche su alcune questioni fondamentali riguardanti le origine e i caratteri dell’ eresia medievale,” Archivio della Società Romana di Storia della Patria, 1944,
the theological nature of ancient heresies was reduced to a very elementary and minimal content in the ideas of the medieval heretics. The motivation of the latter was primarily moral, Morghen said, and he rejected out of hand any materialistic explanation for the rise of medieval heresy. Medieval heresy had its origins and its being in the reform movement of the times.

Morghen read an extremely important paper at Rome in 1957, at the same convention at which Puech presented his paper on the connection between the Catharists and the Bogomils. In this paper, Morghen asserted, in agreement with Puech, that the so-called Catharists in the Occident before the 1160s were not dualists in the least; their doctrines derived from orthodox Christian asceticism and from a study of the New Testament rather than from any kind of eastern influence.

Ilarino da Milano, as has already been noted, took a firm position against the influence of economic and social factors in the creation of medieval heresy. According to him, heresy arose partly in protest against the moral deficiencies of the Church and partly "as the result of an individualistic, libertarian, undisciplined spirit." This latter interpretation, though somewhat too harsh for some of the heretics, is perhaps just when applied to others, Abelard for example, whose love for the truth may have been secondary to their pride and personal ambition.

The importance of the work of Grundmann has already been noted. While admitting that occasional and superficial interaction undoubtedly occurred between religious dissent and material factors, he insisted that heresy be explained in religious terms. Reform and the apostolic life are "das Hauptmotiv der Ketzelei bis in den Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts." Like Morghen, Grundmann believes that not only the general movement toward reform within the Church, but also the increasing study of the New Testament, had much to do with forming the medieval heretics. In accordance with this interpretation Grund-

which article expresses much the same position as the chapter on heresy in his later Mediocrer cristiano (Bari, 1951).


21 Herbert Grundmann, op. cit. See also his Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1935), and his “Eresie e nuovi ordini religiosi nel secolo XII,” in Storia del Medioevo, vol. 3 of the proceedings of the tenth international Congress of Historical Science (Florence, 1955).

22 Religiöse Bewegungen, 21.
mann, while recognizing the presence of dualism in Catharism, postulates a broader common background for Catharism and reform heresy than is usually admitted.

Having thus concluded a survey of the interpretations of the origins of medieval heresy that have up till now been presented, we can see that the main lines of interpretation have been the following: Catholic and Protestant writers often, until the present century, interpreted medieval heresy either as an evil manifestation of religious infidelity or as the inspired forerunner of the Reformation. Nazis, liberals, and Marxists have all, at one time or another, interpreted it in the light of their own ideologies. Some writers, influenced by Marxism and by sociological thinkers, have emphasized the political and economic factors in their explanation of the rise of heresy, and this interpretation brought with it a certain amount of truth that has been, and still can be utilized. Since most writers on medieval heresy have considered Catharism the center of the study, it is important to note the main interpretations of this phenomenon. Catharism has been explained as deriving from the east in a series of stages from ancient Manicheanism or gnosticism, or, conversely, as deriving from gnostic survivals in the ancient Occident. The latest writers have affirmed the connection with the east, but have cautioned against placing the origins of Catharism in the West before 1160. If they

23 I have not thought it necessary to discuss such wild interpretations as that of F. W. Bussell, Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages (London, 1918), who connects medieval heresy with Far Eastern religion, the more extreme folkloric theories or Paul Alphandéry, "Notes sur le messianisme médiéval latin, xie et xiiie siècles," Rapport sommaire sur les conférences de l'école pratique des hautes études (Paris, 1912); "La Glossolalie dans le prophétisme médiéval latin," Revue de l'histoire des religions, CIV (191), of Hugh Ross Williamson, The Arrow and the Sword (London, 1947), or of Montague Summers, The History of Witchcraft and Demonology (New York, 1926); nor books that betray ignorance of the facts of medieval heresy, such as that of Henry Hallam Sauderson, The Way Called Heresy (Boston, 1956). Books that might have been useful but that I have been unable to obtain include: Delio Cantimori, Appunti sulle eresie dei secc. XI-XIII (Pisa-Rome, 1945); C. F. Sairo, Valdesi, catarì, templari, Turin, 1957; J. Benoist, Histoire des Albigeois et des Vaudois ou Barbets (Paris, 1691); C. Wilde, "De Strijd tegen de Katharen tot de invoering der pauselijke Inquisiti- sition," Studien, LXX (1908); Ferdinand Bender, Geschichte der Waldenser (Ulm, 1850); Pio Bondioli, "San Francesco e le eresie medievali," Vita e Pensiero, XII (1926); R. Manselli, "Il Monaco Enrico e la sua eresia," Bollettino dell' Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano, LXV (1953); Ph. Pouzet, "Les Origines lyonnaises de la secte des Vaudois," Revue de l'histoire de l'église de France, XXII (1956); H. J. J. Wachters, "Petrus Waldes en de Waldenzen," Kerkelijke Geschiedenis, no. 580, (Nimwegen, 1939); L. van der Essen, "De Ketterij van Tanchelm in de xii eeuw," Ons Gelooi, II (1912); W. Mohr, "Tanchelm van Antwerpen," Annales Univ. Saraviensis, III (1954).
are correct, it will henceforth be impossible to explain the origins of medieval heresy in general by even a partial influence of dualism. Lea and others stressed in their explanations a reaction against the corruption of the clergy; this interpretation clearly has some merit, but it is equally clearly not sufficient to explain the rise of medieval heresy as a whole. The influence of the development of doctrine and of the intellectual revival of Europe, emphasized by some writers, also deserves credit for part of the explanation. Most convincing are those historians who have called attention to the close connection of the great reform movement of the Middle Ages and religious dissent. Finally, I have devoted a few pages to some of the more recent historians of medieval heresy, men like Lindeboom, Manselli, Dondaine, De Stefano, Morghen, Ilarino, and Grundmann, who have made particularly original and interesting contributions to the study.

Keeping in mind the interpretations and suggestions that have been offered up till the present time, we may now advance on a thorough study à l'allemand, proceeding diocese by diocese and case study by case study, testing these theories, until we arrive at a clear understanding of religious dissent in the eighth through eleventh centuries, of the origins of medieval heresy.

*University of California (Riverside)*
The Unity in a Thomistic Philosophy of Man

JOSEPH OWENS C.Ss.R.

I

According to Nicholas Malebranche, writing midway through the latter half of the seventeenth century, "the most beautiful, the most pleasing, and the most necessary of all our knowledge is without doubt the knowledge of ourselves." So, "of all human sciences, the science of man is the most worthy of man."¹ In the following century the notion was stated succinctly by Alexander Pope in the well-known line "The proper study of mankind is man,"² and with Immanuel Kant it received full philosophic systematization. For Kant, metaphysics answered the question what can I know, ethics the question what shall I do, religion the question what may I hope. All these questions, however, bore upon a fourth, what is man. In consequence, metaphysics, ethics, and religion culminated in an overall science called anthropology.³ Philosophical anthropology, demanded in this way by Kant and developed by subsequent German thinkers, has become a prominent and interesting achievement in contemporary philosophy.⁴

¹ "La plus belle, la plus agréable et la plus nécessaire de toutes nos connaissances est sans doute la connaissance de nous-mêmes. De toutes les sciences humaines, la science de l'homme est la plus digne de l'homme." De la Recherche de la Vérité, Préface; ed. Geneviève Lewis (Paris, 1945), I, xiv. On Malebranche's enthusiastic reaction to Descartes' treatise L'Homme, see Henri Gouhier, La Vocation de Malebranche (Paris, 1926), 49-50.
² An Essay on Man, II, 2.
³ "Das Feld der Philosophie in dieser weltbürgerlichen Bedeutung lässt sich auf folgende Fragen bringen: 1° Was kann ich wissen? 2° Was soll ich thun? 3° Was darf ich hoffen? 4° Was ist der Mensch?
⁴ Martin Buber's Das Problem des Menschen (Heidelberg, 1948) is a history and discussion of this development. Cf.: "That self-knowledge is the highest aim of philosophical inquiry appears to be generally acknowledged." Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New York, 1956), 15. However, as regards a thorough and satisfactory coverage, what Cassirer wrote in 1944 still holds: "The history of the philosophy of man is still a desideratum." Op. cit., 21, n. 5.
UNITY IN A THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MAN

There need be little surprise, then, at the appearance in Neoscholastic circles of books under such titles as "The Philosophy of Man," "The Philosophy of Human Nature," "Philosophical Psychology," "Reflective Psychology," and so on. Upon examination the contents of these works will be found taken from the traditional sciences of natural philosophy and metaphysics, and often, in the more recent writings, from ethics, with perhaps a certain amount of theology and experimental psychology included. The conclusions from the different philosophical procedures are neatly focused upon a common subject "man." From this pertinent viewpoint they present a unified body of philosophical knowledge. In method the project fits quite readily into the general framework established by the four Kantian questions. But it has also an unquestioned sanction in Christian tradition. The deliberate focusing of philosophical knowledge upon the single subject "man" goes back to Nemesius' influential treatise at the end of the fourth century A.D. True, Nemesius' discussion was primarily theological in aim. Nevertheless its procedure required it to bring the available philosophical and other knowledge to bear upon the one subject "man." But need the theological background be any obstacle here? Even within the later Kantian framework, in which religion is presupposed by philosophical anthropology, the elimination of theological sources from an integral philosophy of man seems to be, if not a priori untenable, at least impossible in practice. The necessity of

---

5 E.g., for George P. Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature (New York, 1953), 397, this unity is possible because a particular scientific habit can use materially different types of demonstrative procedure. For Wm. Oliver Martin, "The Philosophy of Human Nature," The Review of Metaphysics, VII (1954), 460, the philosophy of human nature is hybrid in character, born of metaphysics and experimental psychology: "PHN is a mixed, hybrid discipline, formed by bringing together M (and of course MM) and EP to arrive at conclusions, which are the propositions of PHN." Cf. Martin's The Order and Integration of Knowledge (Ann Arbor, 1957), 286-301. For Roberta Snell, The Nature of Man in St. Thomas Aquinas Compared with the Nature of Man in American Sociology (Washington, D.C., 1942), vii-viii, "because the study of man is not complete without consideration of the defect in man which is sin, and the supernatural factors in his perfection, which are grace and the infused virtues, this work goes into theology."


7 "Diese philosophische Anthropologie musste, um ihre philosophische Grundlage zu gewinnen, der theologischen Voraussetzung entsagen. Das Problem war, ob es ihr gelingen würde das zu tun, ohne auch die metaphysische Voraussetzung der Verbundenheit des konkreten Menschen mit dem Absoluten zu verlieren. Das ist ihr, wie wir sehen werden, nicht gelungen." M. Buber, Das Problem des Menschen, 92-93. "In its existential form,
drawing upon revealed truths and upon their development in sacred theology, then, should not constitute any prima facie objection to a genuine philosophy of man. Accordingly, the fact that the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas containing extended discussions on man as such are given in a fully theological framework need not hinder their use in building a unified science of man on an authentically philosophical level.

Not so easy to obviate, however, are the difficulties that arise from the effort to make a philosophy of man fit into St. Thomas’ overall conception of the sciences. Except for the introduction of sacred theology, his conception followed strictly the lines laid down by Aristotle of Stagira in the fourth century B.C. In it, no place was formally assigned to a philosophy of man. As a composite of matter and soul, human nature, like anything else composed of matter and form, should at first sight quite obviously come under the range of natural philosophy. But the human soul is capable of existence apart from matter. As a spiritual principle, therefore, does not the human soul fall rather under a different theoretical science? Should it not come under the science that investigates things capable of existing in separation from matter, that is, under metaphysics? But as form of a body, even the human soul should be studied in natural philosophy. As a spiritual form, nevertheless, how can it be dealt with by the science of mobile beings? It seems to require the principles of metaphysics for the explanation of its spiritual characteristics, and those of natural philosophy for the examination of its role as form of a body. Does the Thomistic conception of the sciences, then, allow a way in which principles from metaphysics and principles from natural philosophy may be combined in a single scientific treatment of the one

the doctrine of human self-making has been driven to the conclusion that a reality other than man has a share in the constitution of human being qua being and qua human: a reality which cannot be either nature which is less than human, or historical action which is only human. But this is a view which the classical doctrine of human nature has held or implied all along.” Emil L. Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity (Milwaukee, 1961), 99.


subject? Or are the boundaries of the two realms drawn so strictly that no passing over from one to the other is permitted within a unitary scientific procedure?

Further, can religious and ethical considerations be excluded from an authentic philosophy of man, against its present background? In point of fact, questions of human destiny play an essential role in the philosophy of man as it has been historically developed. Yet in the traditional Aristotelian schema of the sciences, as it was taken over by St. Thomas, moral questions belong to practical, not to theoretical, science. Is there any way of mixing the two disparate ways of proceeding, namely, theoretically and practically? Or must the one exclude the other in the Thomistic conception of the sciences?

These queries, in conjunction with the importance of the philosophy of man at the present moment, suggest a brief re-examination of the traditional Aristotelian schema of the sciences. There can be no doubt that an integral philosophy of man will have to cut across the Aristotelian divisions. Are the lines, then, drawn so rigidly that they prevent any single discipline from passing over from one to the other realm in the course of its procedure? Or are they flexible enough to permit a single science to overlap into two or more of the fields? Or do they, rather, allow room for a science whose subject is in Kantian fashion above or in some way beyond the traditional scientific objects, and which can therefore draw freely upon all the other procedures? Does human nature, as such, present this type of subject for man's scientific investigation? Is "man" a subject with sufficient unity and intelligibility for treatment by a single science with either an overlapping or a comprehensive range, in the fashions just outlined? If so, how is such a science, the philosophy of man, to be located in relation to the framework of the overall Thomistic conception of the sciences?

II

For Aristotle, the truly basic division of the sciences was between theoretical sciences on the one hand, and practical and productive

10 "Das Pathos der anthropologischen Frage war bei Augustin, bei Pascal und auch noch bei Kant darin begründet, dass wir an uns selbst etwas wahrnehmen, was wir nicht aus der Natur und ihrer Entwicklung allein zu erklären vermögen." M. Buber, Das Problem des Menschen, 72-73. Similarly among Catholic writers man may be found regarded as "...a being who has to integrate (spiritually) what is already one (ontologically)." Jean Mouroux, The Meaning of Man, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1948), 268. "The person is existent and yet to be achieved." J. F. Donceel, Philosophical Psychology (New York 1955), 347, in 2nd ed. rev. (1961), 454.
sciences on the other. These different types of science proceeded from radically diverse kinds of principle. The principles of theoretical science were found in the things that were being studied. The principles were already there, in the real things that lay before one’s gaze. On the other hand, the principles of productive science were located not in the things to be produced, but in the mind of the artist or artisan. Correspondingly, the principles of practical science were found in the choice of the free agent. Accordingly, neither productive nor practical science was concerned with something that already existed, but only with things that were to be. Theoretical science, on the contrary, had its attention fixed upon things that already existed.

This basic Aristotelian division of the sciences is certainly clear-cut. It is between types of object and types of principle that seem at first sight entirely disparate, especially if approached with the Kantian notions of pure and practical reason. In any case, the procedure of a theoretical science on the one hand, and on the other the procedure of a practical or productive science, remain essentially different. But with Aristotle himself, did this condition prevent a practical science or a productive science from drawing upon the conclusions of theoretical sciences for the data it might require? In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (I 13,1102a18-b33), for instance, moral philosophy has to draw heavily upon natural philosophy for knowledge of the soul. In so doing, it does not itself become speculative in its procedure. It takes only the knowledge required for its own practical purposes. It has no interest in developing the knowledge for the sake of the knowledge itself, that is, in theoretical fashion. In this way it does not become theoretical when using theoretical conclusions. The knowledge it takes from the speculative sciences, however, may deeply influence its whole progress, without at all making the procedure speculative. The ultimate goal of human activity, as the most outstanding example, is described as the “first principle” of moral action. That this is intellectual contemplation, however, is not immediately evident to all. A different and speculative science is required to show that by nature intellectual life is what is proper (*E N*, X 7,1178a5-7) to man. When for St. Thomas the beatific vision is posited as man’s ultimate end, and not just the

---


12 *E N*, VI 2,1139b5-9; *P A*, I 1,640a3-4.

13 *E N*, I 7-12,1097a15-1102a4. In another sense, of course, the “first principles” of moral science are the prudent judgments of the correctly habituated man. See *E N*, I 4,1095a30-b14; 7,1098b2-8.
Aristotelian metaphysical contemplation, ethical procedure is affected in its very first principle. Correspondingly, the science of medicine is free to use the findings of chemistry or physics or biology for its own purposes, and even revolutionize itself on the occasion of discoveries like that of Pasteur. It does not thereby become chemistry or physics or biology, but remains the practical science of medicine.

The moral philosopher, accordingly, may for his own purposes draw freely upon the conclusions of any theoretical science whatsoever, without thereby becoming a theoretical philosopher. By the same token, he may in a Christian culture make use of the findings of sacred theology, to the extent to which they are necessary for his work. He does not thereby become a theologian. If there is only one supreme end for human action in the real world in which men actually live, and if that end can be known only through revealed faith and sacred theology, will not the moral philosopher, as moral philosopher, have to draw upon the higher source of knowledge for what is in this all-important sense the "first principle" of his science?

In the foregoing way, then, the traditional Aristotelian schema of the sciences does allow a strictly controlled communication between the practical and theoretical sciences. In the communication, though, there is no mingling of the two different procedures—speculative and practical—into a single scientific process. The practical science, while retaining strictly its own procedure, just makes use of conclusions already drawn independently in the speculative science. The consideration does not seem to be of any immediate help, therefore, for the combination of the practical and theoretical into the single procedure required by a genuine philosophy of man. Remotely, however, it shows that the spheres of the different sciences are not hermetically sealed off from one another in the Aristotelian conception, and that cooperation among the various procedures is not a priori impossible.

Further, from the opposite angle, the good at which any practical science aims is, as good, a subject of metaphysical investigation.\(^\text{14}\) For St. Thomas, the good is a transcendent property that follows upon being. It is accordingly a property to be demonstrated in metaphysics. Likewise the consideration of the virtues as habits and qualities, and the general assessment of ethics as a science and its procedure as scientific, pertain frankly, in the Aristotelian setting, to metaphysics.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{14}\) On the impossibility of separating "fact" and "value," a separation presupposed by the problem of the "naturalistic fallacy," see Henry B. Veatch, \textit{Rational Man} (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), 188-203.

\(^{15}\) With Aristotle the dividing and ranking of the sciences pertains to metaphysics
From this viewpoint, likewise, the traditional schema allows a common meeting-ground for the radically different sciences. Objects treated scientifically by one type may be brought under the scope of the other.

Again, though, is this consideration of any help in the project of a philosophy of man? In the instances mentioned, it is always the one science that is doing its own type of work, even though it is assessing, according to its own principles, the findings of the others. Can this ability be of any aid in regard to a philosophy of man? In a philosophical anthropology the question is not about one of the traditional sciences discussing data taken from another, but rather that of a new science, over and above the traditional ones, uniting the procedures of the different sciences into a single discipline. This possibility is not yet apparent in the foregoing examples. But at least the basic division of the sciences into speculative and practical shows a flexibility that allows some kinds of passing over from one realm to another in the course of a science’s procedure. The cleavage between the practical and the speculative does not appear so drastic as it does in Kant’s critiques.

Within the order of theoretical science itself, there were for Aristotle three main divisions: the philosophy of nature, mathematics, and the primary philosophy, later known as metaphysics. The basis for these divisions was set down by the Stagirite in definite lines that emerged from fundamentally different characteristics in the objects available for man’s theoretical consideration. Natural philosophy treated of things that for the most part were not separate (traditional text, E 1,1026a14) from sensible matter. Because essentially dependent on this kind of matter, such things were mobile in their very nature. On the other hand, mathematics, at least in some of its branches, dealt with objects that were immobile but not separate from matter in their own proper being. In the mathematician’s mind, however, these objects could be separated from sensible matter and thereby be considered in abstraction. Thirdly, the primary philosophy treated of things that were both separate and immobile. In doing so, it treated of being from the standpoint of being, and was accordingly the science of beings qua beings.

rather than to logic, and accordingly is dealt with in detail in the metaphysical treatises. The reason is that the distinction and gradation of sciences follows upon the distinction and gradation of beings; see Metaph., f’2,1004a3-6.

16 Metaph., E 1,1026a18-30: K 7,1064b1-14.

17 A discussion of the meaning of this much disputed formula, against the background of the literature that has appeared on it during the past decade, may be found in the “Foreword” to the second edition of my study The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’ (Toronto, 1963), 16-22. Cf. 35-66.

18 The use of the plural, “beings,” in the formula may be seen in Aristotle, Metaph. f’
This meant, briefly, that in the theoretical order sensible things furnished three different types of scientific principles. They had substantial principles, matter and form,19 that made possible the changes from one form to another. They were thereby constituted essentially mobile beings, and, as mobile, they were the subject for a special scientific study, the philosophy of nature. Secondly, they had their quantitative principles, namely points, lines, surfaces, and numbers. In the light of these principles they were susceptible of mathematical investigation. Finally, they had principles of their being,20 through which they were dealt with in the primary philosophy. However, in the wording of natural philosophy’s object with the restriction “for the most part only as not separable from matter,”21 some provision seemed made for the possibility of an immaterial principle in some material things. A principle of this type would obviously come under the scrutiny of metaphysics. It is identified in the text as something pertaining to soul, for to the natural philosopher belongs the study of “even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.”22 Similarly, in the wording “some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable,”23 allowance was made for the application of mathematical knowledge to mobile things, as in astronomy, optics, harmonics, and mechanics.24

In all these cases of overlapping, however, there is no question of combining into a single scientific procedure the methods of specifically different sciences. It is still a question of treating one and the same thing by different sciences, each of which retains its own proper method without any intermingling with the procedure of another science.

Taken in its broadest outlines, Aristotle’s general conception of the sciences has stood the test of centuries in the Peripatetic tradition. Apart from the adding of a provision for sacred theology, it was accepted without hesitation or change by St. Thomas Aquinas. It was

1,1003a31; b15-16; 2,1005a27. See also St. Thomas, In IV Metaph., lect. 1, no. (ed. Cathala-Spiazzii) 533; In VII Metaph., lect. 13, no. 1576; In XI Metaph., lect. 4, no. 2209.
20 Aristotle, Metaph., P 1,1003a26-32; St Thomas, In Metaph., Prooemium; In IV Metaph., lect. 1, no. 533.
21 Metaph., E 1,1025b8; Oxford tr. Cf. 1026a12, where natural philosophy is said to deal with “certain movable things.”
22 E 1,1026a5-6; Oxford tr.
23 E 1,1026a14-15; Oxford tr. Cf. a8-10.
24 See Ph., II 2,194a7-15; APo., I 13,78b87-79a2.
able to adapt itself readily to the new Thomistic doctrine of abstraction from singulars, and to the fundamentally different principles of Thomistic metaphysics and ethics. It can expand just as easily with the massive development of the sciences in the progress of Western culture. It is fully capable of bearing the huge superstructure of the experimental sciences familiar to mid-twentieth century man, far removed as this is from anything a thinker of the fourth century B.C. could envisage. The quantitative procedures that constitute the highly developed physical sciences of today fit neatly under the Aristotelian mathematical category. Existential trends in metaphysics, similarly unknown to the Stagirite, fall into the realm designated as “Being qua Being.” The newer arts and crafts find their places under his general division of productive science. The basic Aristotelian structure of the sciences is open to all these developments. Neither against the background of the Thomistic texts nor in the setting of modern knowledge, therefore, does there appear any serious reason for abandoning the age-old Aristotelian framework for one's overall conception of the sciences.

Yet the notion of a “philosophy of man” not only fails to manifest itself in this division of the sciences, but at first sight seems to cut across the basic dividing lines in a way not permitted in the traditional overlapping of objects. Does it not blur the Aristotelian distinction of the sciences by combining ethical and theoretical procedures? Does it not mix natural philosophy and metaphysics in an unprecedented way? Or may the flexibility of the Aristotelian schema be extended beyond the ways already considered? Is the traditional conception of the sciences pliable enough to allow the procedure required today in an integral philosophy of man? A close examination of “man” as a subject for scientific treatment, in confrontation with the Aristotelian schema of the sciences, is evidently called for by these questions.

III

What kind of scientific subject, then, does man as such offer in the texts of St. Thomas? In them man presents at once an aspect that should bring him unmistakably under the traditional philosophy of nature. Man is a corporeal substance. He is of a nature constituted

---

25 Quantitative investigation of sensible things constituted for Aristotle “the more physical of the branches of mathematics, such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy.” Ph., II 2,194a7-8; Oxford tr. These are called “scientiae mediae” by St. Thomas, In Boeth. de Trin., V, 5, ad 5m, 6m, & 7m.
by matter and form. He is therefore a mobile being in the full
technical sense of the "mobile" as subject of natural philosophy. In
fact, though not the whole truth, it is literally correct to say that in the
doctrine of St. Thomas man is a body. "Body" has here a generic sense.
Man is a body, just as he is an animal and a substance. Since he has
but the one substantial form, that is, his spiritual soul, he has in his
substantial nature only this spiritual soul and the entirely potential
matter. Together the matter and the soul constitute the body. The
matter alone is not man's body. It becomes a body only when informed
by the soul. Accordingly the spiritual soul is a part of the human
body. The body is a composite of the matter and the soul. Conse-
quently the man, who is the composite, is literally a body. He is
clearly a subject for consideration by natural philosophy, just as is
any other body in the visible universe.

Against this background, though, how is any thoroughgoing contrast
of soul with body possible? Soul may be contrasted with matter, as act
with corresponding potency. It is really distinct from its matter. But
if the soul is already contained within the body, how can soul and
body be contrasted in any other way than as part with whole? Yet in
the ordinary way of speaking about soul and body, they are set apart
as though they were two different principles of the composite "man."
The process by which this contrast is brought about is carefully
explained by St. Thomas. To speak of the body in contrast to the
soul is not to speak of two different physical principles like matter
and form. Rather, in the confrontation the notion of body is obtained
through a process of abstraction different from the abstraction in which
body is regarded as a generic whole including both soul and matter.
In the technical language of St. Thomas, the abstraction by which the
generic notion of body is obtained is abstraction without precision.
When body is contrasted with soul, however, the notion "body" is
obtained by taking the composite in an abstraction that prescinds from
all vital aspects. In this way everything vital is conceptually excluded
from the composite. The composite, considered in that precision, is
contrasted with the soul taken just as precisely as the principle of man's
vital activities. 26 The body, as a substance capable of extension in the
three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, is contrasted with
its single form insofar as that one form is the principle of vegetative,
sentient, and spiritual activities. The precision, however, may just as
easily be exercised at the point where the sentient is distinguished from

the spiritual. In this way the contrast, so familiar in ascetic literature, of spiritual soul with body is set up. The contrast is brought about by conceptual abstraction, with precision. As an object for consideration by a science of the real, therefore, man appears first and foremost as a mobile being that comes under the range of natural philosophy. Only by subsequent abstraction with precision is there isolated in him a spiritual principle that requires investigation by a different science.

When the soul is considered precisely as a principle of spiritual activities, however, it brings man just as definitely under the scope of metaphysics. The demonstration of the soul's spiritual nature and consequent immortality is of paramount importance in the philosophical knowledge of man. The Thomistic demonstration shows that the intellectual operations of man rise above the whole corporeal order. They are not subject to the limitations a corporeal nature imposes. They can attain all corporeal natures, including the nature of the man of whom they are the activities. They are capable of reflecting. They attain the necessary and the universal.27

This reasoning, it is true, commences in the realm of natural philosophy. It takes the conditions of corporeal activity and shows, negatively, that they cannot explain intellection. The positive force of the argument, however, proceeds from considerations beyond the philosophy of nature. Natural philosophy, like every other science, is of course of the universal.28 But like every particular science, it merely takes the universality as given in its knowable object. It does not examine the universality critically, nor does it base its demonstrations upon it. An argument based upon the superiority of the universal to the particular is hardly a physical argument. In the proof of the human soul's spirituality from the starting point of its universal manner of cognition, the operative feature is that the universality apparent in human intellection is above the whole order of the particular. It is above the order of material being and corporeal activity, and consequently above the order with which natural philosophy deals.


28 "Tertia secundum eandem operationem quae est abstractio universalis a particulari; et haec competit etiam physicae et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in scientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est et accipitur quod per se est." In Boeth. de Trin., V, 3c(5); ed. Decker, p. 186.18-21. Cf. V, 2, ad 1m & 2m.
In knowing a thing universally, the human mind knows it through its essence, and not just according to accidental manifestations. In this way the mind has necessary knowledge of the thing. It has the basis for demonstrative reasoning. Further, it perceives relations not just in the particular aspect of one thing pointing to another, but in the notion of what a relation is. Language and other conventional symbolism are thereby made possible. Rational discourse and human language, accordingly, require knowledge of things through their essences. But considerations arising from essence and being pertain, in the Aristotelian framework, to the science of metaphysics.  

The final step in the demonstration of the soul's immortality is even more pointedly metaphysical. The nature of intellection has shown that the soul is the principle of activities above the material order. Since activities proceed from substance, the substance from which these activities arise is to the same extent, therefore, beyond and superior to the sensible. The substantial principle of such activities is spiritual. The most important step in the argument, however, is yet to come. Considerations like those in the Phaedo, no matter how eloquently presented, fail to achieve decisive convictions in regard to the soul's immortality. The argument of St. Thomas, on the other hand, passes over to the relations of being and essence. To the extent to which the human soul is the principle of intellectual operations, it is not intrinsically dependent on matter. To this extent it is a substance that has in itself no potency to not-being. Since being, according to St. Thomas, follows per se upon form, it has to actuate the human soul in a way that allows no possibility of its ceasing to exist, at least in the ordinate power of God. The human soul can no more be separated from its being than it can be separated from itself. Conversely, its being cannot be separated from the soul, and for the same reason.

This demonstration is squarely in the order of being. It follows from considerations of essence and the actuation of essence by being. It is based upon a principle of Aristotelian metaphysics that St. Thomas, in an entirely novel way, defends against Avicenna. The principle is that being is not an accident but is essential to every nature. Where

29 See Metaph., E 1,1025b3-18.  
30 Phd., 70C-106E. As presented, the arguments are described as failing to produce entire conviction, 107AB.  
31 ST, I, 75, 6c.  
32 Q. de An., a. 14c.  
33 De Ver., I, 1c; ed. Spiazzi, p. 2b. Cf. XXI, 1, arg. 1; 5, arg. 2.
there is no essential principle of change, accordingly, the being is necessary. The demonstration, obviously, is metaphysical.

Further, the problem of free-will holds an important place in a philosophy of man. But how can free-will be approached on the level of natural philosophy? Natural philosophy explains its subject in terms of principles that are finite in actuality. Its principles are matter and material form. A form that is the form of any matter is finite, and limits the matter and the agent constituted by the composition of the two principles. Free choice is an action, and is not determined by any finitizing principle that precedes it. It can be approached only in terms of being, for being is an act that of its own nature is absolutely unlimited. The ultimate source of the activity of free choice has to be infinite being, which is above the categories of necessity and contingency. Only in terms of being can an explanation be given of a cause that moves a finite agent to free activity without infringing upon the agent’s freedom.

These considerations are certainly in the order of being. But they arise from the spiritual nature of man, and not immediately from his being. They present a scientific subject other than being, yet requiring investigation in terms of being. The case seems unparalleled. It indicates a special status for man as a subject of scientific consideration. From the aspect of man’s being, of course, there arise questions that are common to all corporeal beings. These spring from the conditions that locate man, like any other finite being, under the subject of metaphysics. But some of them have an exceptional pertinence to the study of man, and are given special prominence in Neoscholastic coverages of the topic. For instance, the distinction of the human faculties from the essence of man is based upon sheer metaphysical principles. Act and potency divide being and every genus of being. A finite essence has its immediate actuation through being, not through operation. Where operation is accidental, or of specifically different kinds, therefore, the potency it actuates is an accident really distinct from the thing’s essence. This demonstration is clearly metaphysical, and is not limited to the subject man. It applies to every composite of essence and being, that is, to everything that comes under common being, the subject of metaphysics. Yet, though a general metaphysical demonstration, it is an important and prominent requisite in a philosophy of man.

34 De Pot., V, 3c; cf. ad 7m. Cf. In IV Metaph., lect. 4, nos. 555-558.
Likewise, the unity of the soul in man is proven through the principles of being. Being follows per se upon form. Once a substantial form is actuated, a being is already there. Any further form can be only accidental. The being that is entailed by the first form excludes all other substantial forms from the thing. If the spiritual soul in man were a different form from the vegetative or sentient soul, or from the corporeal form, it could enter into a merely accidental union with the body.37 —Again, this is a general metaphysical argument, holding for every substance that is other than its own being.

Further, the explanation of cognition, sentient as well as intellectual, has to be given basically in terms of being. To know is to possess forms of other things as other. The forms do not undergo any change in the process, as far as their nature is concerned. They merely acquire new cognitional being. Cognition means that forms, remaining exactly the same in their status of form, acquire intentional being in a knower. The same nature, unchanged as a nature, is actuated by another existence. This is one of the basic propositions in the development of a metaphysics in the path mapped out by St. Thomas.38 The further details of the process of cognition, such as the impressed and the expressed species, have to be explained in accordance with and in function of the basically metaphysical doctrine of cognition as the intentional being of a thing in the activity of a knower.

Even alone, these general metaphysical considerations that are required in a thoroughgoing philosophy of man indicate basic problems to be solved in terms of being. Still more crucial, though, is the fact that man as a nature, and not just as a being, is a subject for metaphysical study.39 Man as man is not only a corporeal nature susceptible of treatment by natural philosophy, but has also spiritual or “separate” aspects that make his nature as a nature come under the range of metaphysics.

Finally, what is to be said about human nature as a subject of practical science? Is a philosophy of man complete without some consideration of the things a man is meant to do? Can this philosophy today undertake to view man simply as an object of theoretical consideration and not as an agent shaping his own life? Is it possible for a genuine philosophy of man as man, of man as a whole, to proceed as though it had a completed object, an object without history and

37 See ST, I, 76, 3 & 4.
38 See De Ente et Essentia, c. III; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 25.9-29.30.
39 Cf. supra, n. 9.
without a future and a destiny? Is its subject fully determined by nature, and not pre-eminently by free action? After the emphasis placed upon the latter viewpoint by a century and a half of German thought, and especially after the developments of the notion of subjectivity in contemporary existentialism, is it possible to close one's eyes to the part that practical considerations play in the philosophical knowledge of man? Is a philosophy of man at all justified in restricting itself to the theoretical order? Will not what man is meant to do, how he is to set up his conduct, how exactly as man he has to be regarded as a moral agent, come under the scope of an authentic philosophy of man? Yet these are considerations of the practical order. If man as man is a subject that requires this practical study, then at least some considerations from the sphere of ethics have to enter into the philosophical knowledge of human nature as a specific subject for scientific treatment.

As the subject of a special philosophy, then, man will have to be dealt with not just as something that already is, but as a person who has to become himself and live himself. He will have to be regarded as a person who achieves himself by going, through his free conduct, beyond what he was. In a proper philosophy he cannot be treated as a nature closed and complete. He has to be viewed as a nature open to a higher destiny.

The conventional philosophy of man in a Neoscholastic coverage, for instance, deals with man as a subject to be habituated by moral virtue. His practical intellect and his will are to be perfected by good habits. But what is the signification of "good" in this context? The significance is moral. It is based upon considerations of the practical order. One is already drawing upon conclusions established in ethics, and is bringing an ethical procedure into the study of man. Similar is the case with the problem of man's ultimate end. This question calls for treatment in the philosophy of human nature, for nature as nature is a principle of operation. But man is not determined by his nature to any definite final end. His nature, no matter what it requires for its completion, leaves open for him the problem of determining his supreme destiny. His ultimate goal, as such, is set up through his free choice and not by his nature. No really existent good can be the end of his free actions unless it is freely chosen by him. One may show that his will attains things under the universal aspect of goodness, that only an infinite good can fully satisfy his desires, that only direct

40 Cf. supra, n. 10.
intuition of the first cause of all things can be the culmination of his thirst for knowledge. But in all this, one has not yet shown that this infinite good is attainable by man, nor even that he actually wants to reach it. He can set up other things, like material goods or worldly fame, as the final end of his conduct. He is not rigidly directed to any one supreme destiny by his nature. He determines his own final goal by his free choice. This is a problem of the practical order.41

The same situation is found in regard to man as a social and political being. Discussion of man under these aspects enters prominently into a philosophical anthropology. But the social and political status of man follows from his free activities. It concerns man as an agent. Man is not definitely determined by his nature to live in society. Having attained his maturity, he can live as a hermit if he so chooses. This may not be a wise choice in the vast majority of cases, but it is a possible choice. The problem of the "wise" choice is a question of prudence, and one is straightforward in the practical order. Man is actually constituted a social and political being not by the nature already given him but by his free choice, no matter how much his nature may incline him to live in society. The philosophical considerations of man as political and social are located in the practical order.

The foregoing observations, then, may be summed up in the conclusion that the philosophical knowledge of man as man is of three different orders. Knowledge of man as a mobile being, and of his activities that proceed from the composite of soul and matter, is on the level of natural philosophy. Knowledge of man as a spiritual being, as well as an object that comes under common being, is metaphysical in character. Finally, knowledge of man as an agent shaping his own destiny is practical knowledge. A merely psychological treatment of man would deal with the composite nature and operations as given, and would accordingly remain theoretical. A strictly metaphysical treatment of man would likewise remain in the theoretical order. But a genuine philosophy of man is wider. It has to extend beyond the speculative, for it bears

41 "The nature of man is naturally endless. Since, in fact, no created good can terminate his intellectual desire, short of the vision of the divine essence there can be no termination of man's desire." Anton Pegis, "Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXIII (1949), 73. The supernatural habituation required for man's free choice of the beatific vision as his final destiny is, of course, the infused virtue of charity. Cf. St. Thomas, *ST*, I-II, 5.5, ad 1m.
upon man as a whole. It has as its subject a person whose nature is freely to become himself. Man as man presents a scientific subject that requires combined investigation by the three traditional procedures of natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics.

But is the unity in man as a subject for scientific consideration capable of specifying a single science that requires these combined procedures? Is there anything about the nature of man that enables it to be the subject of one special science, even though the science will have to proceed from viewpoints so diversified? Is human nature a knowable subject that grounds a unified treatment through principles developed in the philosophy of nature, in metaphysics, and in moral philosophy? How can a unitary scientific subject require an investigation that sinks its roots into such different philosophical soils?

In the Thomistic framework, human nature, because of its unitary being, is undoubtedly a specifically distinct substance. Man is not a combination of two different natures, one of which would be material and the other spiritual. He is not a union of one being that is material and another that is spiritual. Body and soul in man constitute but one nature, human nature. Human nature, accordingly, is specifically different from merely material nature, and specifically different from purely spiritual nature. It is a nature by itself, a nature that has both material and spiritual aspects but is specifically identified with neither.42

The material side of man’s nature, if it did not really include the spiritual soul, would not even be a body, or something living, or something sentient. It would be merely prime matter, unknowable in itself. Accordingly it would not be the human body, were the spiritual soul excluded. In man, then, there is but one nature, not two. From this standpoint human nature, or man, should present a specific unit for philosophical consideration, different from anything in the order of merely material things, and likewise different from anything in the order of entirely separate or purely spiritual things. In the scale of essences, apparently, man holds a unique position.

Viewed in this way, though, is human nature as such a subject specifically knowable to human cognition? True, it is unitary as a specific nature. But is it knowable to man in its specific differentia? St. Thomas is emphatic in his declaration that the specific differentiae of sensible things remain unknowable to man. Far from making the differentia "rational" an exception to this norm, he gives it expressly as an example. 43

Consider what the knowledge of the specific differentia "rational" would mean. It would give knowledge of the human form that would be comparable to man's knowledge of the essence of a triangle in geometry or to the knowledge obtained from the blueprint of a house. To learn the details about the house, you do not need to see it in its completed state. You can study the blueprint and thereby come to understand it as an artifact down to the last item of its construction. In this fashion Aristotle described the method of knowing the works of nature. 44 From the specific nature so known, one could demonstrate why man is erect, why his organs differ specifically from those of other animals, why he has his special type of bodily formation and no

43 "...formae substantiales per se ipsas sunt ignotae; sed innotescunt nobis per accidentia propria. Frequenter enim differentiae substantiales ab accidentibus sumuntur, loco formarum substantialium, quae per huismodi accidentia innotescunt; sicut bipes et gressible et huismodi; et sic etiam sensibile et ratione ponuntur differentiae substantiales." De Spir. Creat., a. 11, ad 3m; ed. Calcaterra-Centi, Quaest. Disp., II, 411a. "...secundum Philosophum in VIII Metaph., quia substantiales rerum differentiae sunt nobis ignotae, loco earum interdum definientes accidentalibus utuntur, secundum quod ipsa designant vel notificant essentiam, ut proprii effectus notificant causam: unde sensibile, secundum quod est differentia constitutiva animalis, non sumitur a sensu prout nominat potentiam, sed prout nominat ipsam animae essentiam, a qua talis potentia fluit; et similiiter est de ratione, vel de eo quod est habens mentem." De Ver., X, 1, ad 6m; ed. Spiazzi, Quaest. Disp., I, 193a. See ST, I, 77, 1 ad 7m. Cf.: "Eine einheitliche Idee von Menschen aber besitzen wir nicht." Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Darmstadt, 1930), 13-14.

44 "...begin with the phenomena presented by each group of animals, and, when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the cause of those phenomena, and to deal with their evolution. For elsewhere, as for instance in house building, this is the true sequence. The plan of the house, or the house, has this and that form; and because it has this and that form, therefore is its construction carried out in this or that manner. ...Thus we should say, because man is an animal with such and such characters, therefore is the process of his development necessarily such as it is; ...and after a like fashion should we explain the evolution of all other works of nature." Aristotle, P A, I 1,40a13-b4; Oxford tr. Cf.: "...c'est un même élan qui porte le philosophe de la nature depuis le premier livre des Physiques jusqu'au fait et au pourquoi de la trompe de l'éléphant." C. de Koninck, "Les sciences expérimentales sont-elles distinctes de la philosophie de la nature," Culture, II (1941), 474.
other, and so on. Clearly one does not possess such a knowledge of man. Knowledge of one's own nature has to come from observation of human activities, not from any prior knowledge of human nature. The specific differentia of man remains unknown to himself. The act of reasoning, from which the conventionally accepted differentia "rational" is named, gives no further knowledge of the form than is manifested in that one type of activity. It shows clearly enough that the nature from which it proceeds is capable of drawing conclusions from premises, and therefore is endowed with intelligence and judgment. But it does not make manifest why that nature is the principle of an erect body, for instance, or of the specifically human type of bone-formation and organs. Such conclusions cannot be deduced from the human essence as it is known to man.

The procedure on the specific level, then, has to be from activities to essence in the case of man, and not vice versa. The activities do not yield a knowledge of essence that would enable it to function as the principle of scientific knowledge. No activity furnishes a knowledge of the human form from which, for instance, the conclusions of biology could be deduced, or those of physiology. The differentia "rational," in its function as a differentia, remains impervious to human knowledge. In this respect human nature is on a par with all other sensible natures. They do not directly provide human cognition with knowledge of their specific essences.

The nature of man, then, is not a starting point for scientific reasoning. It is a nature that can be known only through reasoning from other starting points, namely from human activities. But are not man's own activities known by himself in a privileged way? Has he not, through reflexion, a cognition of them that is notably different in character from his cognition of the activities of any other nature? Does he not know them from within, through consciousness? The activities of other things he knows only by observation from without, that is, by perception of their effects. He has no means of knowing those activities in themselves. He can understand the growing of plants, as well as the seeing and hearing and appetite of brute animals, only by observing their effects and interpreting the effects through the analogy of what he experiences in his own vital processes. The observable effects, just in themselves, appear merely as qualitative and quantitative phenomena subject to the general treatment of natural philosophy and to the particular investigations of the experimental sciences. But man interprets them according to the model of what he experiences internally in himself and classes them as the effects of vegetative and sentient activity. In his own consciousness he is aware
that the whole complex of his vital activities is proceeding from a single agent, himself. From this awareness he is able to reason to his specific nature and its unitary character, because of its one act of being, in a way very different from and quite superior to the manner in which he forms his knowledge of any other specific natures. All other species in the corporeal world he knows, as far a essence is concerned, only in their generic nature as bodies. About their specific natures he pieces together as best he can knowledge obtained through the effects he observes from without. About himself and his specific unity as an agent he has on the contrary an awareness from within.

St. Thomas explains this privileged position of man's self-knowledge through the habitual presence of the soul's essence to its cognition. For cognition of things other than himself, man requires habitual determination by impressed species. For his own self-knowledge, however, his soul is habitually present to itself:

Sed quantum ad cognitionem habitualem, sic dico, quod anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praeens, est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius; ... ad hoc sufficit sola essentia animae, quae menti est praeens: ex ea enim actus progrediuntur, in quibus actualiter ipsa percipitur.\textsuperscript{45}

Accordingly, the human mind knows itself in some way through its own essence: "Sic igitur patet quod mens nostra cognoscit se ipsam quodammodo per essentiam suam,..."\textsuperscript{46} Its reflexive cognition gives it a knowledge of itself that is unparalleled by knowledge through species, the type of knowledge that it has regarding all other things. Yet it knows itself actually only in its operations, operations that have other things as their direct objects. Of these operations, moreover, it is not the immediate principle, but only the remote principle. The immediate principle is an operative power. Hence no operation provides immediate knowledge of the soul's nature:

Sed anima non est principium actuum per suam essentiam, sed per vires suas; unde perceptis actibus animae, percipitur inesse principium talium actuum, utpote motus et sensus; non tamen ex hoc natura animae scitur.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{De Ver.}, X, 8c; ed. Spiazzi, I, 207b. Cf. ad 11m, and a.9, ad 1m.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, 8c; I, 208a. Cf. ST, I, 87, \textit{1c}, where the doctrine is likewise explained by the notion of the mind's presence to itself.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{De Ver.}, X, 9c; ed. Spiazzi, I, 212a. Cf.: "Si igitur anima per seipsam de se cognoscit quid est, hoc erit per se notum, et per consequens primo notum et principium cognoscendi alia. Hoc autem patet esse falsum: nam \textit{quid est anima} non supponitur in scientia quasi notum, sed proponitur ex alii quaerendum." CG, III, 46, Amplius, In quolibet. For this reason Malebranche was forced to alter profoundly the Cartesian \textit{cogito}, since it showed
The principle whose nature is known in any activity of man is the power from which the operation proceeds. The nature of the soul is not thereby made manifest, but has to be investigated through reasoning. The way in which a science of the soul is developed makes this only too evident:

Unde mens nostra non potest se ipsam intelligere ita quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat; sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem; ... Quod patet intuendo modum quo philosophi naturam animae investigaverunt. 48

In the Thomistic doctrine of cognition, then, man's self-knowledge has an altogether special status. It is knowledge of himself through his own essence. It is a cognition of his specific nature in a way that no other nature in the sensible world is knowable to him. Human nature, then, provides him with a special subject for scientific consideration, though no other specific nature does. Within the Thomistic framework, accordingly, a philosophy of man is possible, while a philosophy of eagles or of oak trees is not.

Yet the conditions under which a philosophy of man may be developed in this framework are of a stringently limiting character. Excluded is the freewheeling that would be set in motion by direct knowledge of one's nature, as in Descartes' philosophy. For St. Thomas man knows himself actually in the cognition of material things. He has no other natural way of actually knowing himself. 49 As a subject for scientific consideration, therefore, human nature cannot be ranged alongside other natures in a schema of scientific objects. It will provide no new knowledge that is not attainable in the objects of the other sciences, but only a specifically different approach. It cannot be regarded as an essence through which proper attributes are demon-

the soul had no idea of itself but only a consciousness or interior sentiment that left a man entirely unintelligible to himself. "Mais si nous voyions en Dieu l'idée qui répond à notre âme, nous connaîtrions en même temps qu'on nous yaurions connaitre toutes les propriétés dont elle est capable; comme nous connaissions [ou nous pouvons connaître] toutes les propriétés dont l'étendue est capable, parce que nous connaissons l'étendue par son idée." Recherche, III, 2r partie, c. 7, no. iv; ed. Lewis, I, 257. "...bien loin de trouver en ma substance les idées de toutes choses, je n'y trouve pas même l'idée de mon être propre. Car je suis entièrement inintelligible à moi-même,..." Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion, II, 10; ed. Armand Cuvillier (Paris, 1948), I, 93.
48 De Ver., X, 8c. Cf. Q. de An., a. 16, ad 8m.
49 "...esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam." ST, I, 89, 1c.
strated of a subject. It is rather a nature known in a way that allows a special concentration of other scientific procedures upon its own problems. From that viewpoint it has the unity and the knowability required for an authentic philosophy of man.

IV

How, then, is a Thomistic philosophy of man to be developed? It is not found developed in the works of St. Thomas. It can receive from the text of St. Thomas merely the conditions and the principles for its development. It has as its subject human nature specifically known, through consciousness, in its activities but not intuitively in itself. So known, human nature presents itself first and foremost as something corporeal, attained reflexively in the knowledge of sensible things. Man appears to himself first of all as a living body, a finite continuum, mobile, in place, in time, subject to the play of cosmic forces, contrary qualities, chance, and death. In this way the intrinsic unity of his nature is assured, even though it means that the initial procedure in a philosophy of man is undertaken with the principles of natural philosophy.

To Malebranche, this seemed a decidedly pagan approach to the problem of man. Aristotle and the Scholastics, according to the seventeenth century Oratorian, instead of viewing the fundamental direction of the soul as tending towards God, with its most essential and only immediate union with God, debased man’s nature by regarding the soul as fundamentally a form of a body.50 For Malebranche, this was the philosophy of the serpent.51 It is still a scandal for some personalist and existentialist philosophies, since by making man appear to human cognition first and foremost as a body, it firmly establishes man’s fundamental status as a thing. In this way, while introducing man on

50 “Je ne m’étonne pas que le commun des hommes, ou que les philosophes païens ne considèrent dans l’âme que son rapport et son union avec le corps, sans y reconnaître le rapport et l’union qu’elle a avec Dieu; mais je suis surpris que des philosophes chrétiens, qui doivent préférer l’esprit de Dieu à l’esprit humain, Moïse à Aristote, saint Augustin à quelque misérable commentateur d’un philosophe païen, regardent plutôt l’âme comme la forme du corps que comme faite à l’image et pour l’image de Dieu, c’est-à-dire, selon saint Augustin, pour la vérité, à laquelle seule elle est immédiatement unie.” Recherche, Préface; ed. Lewis, I, vii.

51 “Ce n’est point la philosophie que l’on a reçue d’Adam qui apprend ces choses, c’est celle que l’on a reçue du serpent, car depuis le péché l’esprit de l’homme est tout païen.” Recherche, VI, 2e partie, c. 3; ed. Lewis, II, 204-205.
the level dealt with by natural philosophy, it presents him as a being and therefore as capable of investigation by the principles of traditional metaphysics. Through the application of metaphysical principles to the reflexively known data regarding cognition, the elaborate doctrine of the faculties, with their impressed and expressed species, is built up, and the spiritual character of the soul established.\textsuperscript{52} The corporeality of man appears as evident. His spirituality, on the contrary, has to be demonstrated in the course of the science. But the demonstration has left the plane of natural philosophy and has taken place through metaphysical principles. Yet it is a demonstration not meant merely to explain the being of man, as could be the case with any other corporeal thing, but to explain man's nature. It is a process that is being carried out in a science of man, and not exactly in the science of beings in general, even though it belongs also in that universal investigation of beings, metaphysics.

The very starting point in a Thomistic philosophy of man, therefore, requires the interplay of principles from both natural philosophy and metaphysics. It is not a question of taking an object that belongs to natural philosophy and investigating it metaphysically. That can be done with anything corporeal, for everything corporeal is a being. It is a question rather of a single scientific subject, known through the data of reflexive consciousness, that of its own nature demands scrutiny on both levels. This seems amply sufficient to constitute it a scientific subject different from the objects of both natural philosophy and metaphysics, and entitle it to investigation by a special procedure combined from principles taken from both disciplines.

In point of fact, has not the traditional Scholastic treatise on the soul been built up in exactly that way? Is not Aristotle's \textit{De Anima} difficult to range neatly under his conception of natural philosophy, even though in the highly artificial systematization of later Scholasticism the study of the soul is classified as the fourth part of the philosophy of nature?\textsuperscript{53} Aristotle himself, it is true, does assign the investigation to the philosopher of nature,\textsuperscript{54} while leaving any immaterial features it may encounter to the consideration of the primary

\textsuperscript{52} "Unde actio intellectus nostri primo tendit in ea quae per phantasmata apprehenduntur, et deinde redit ad actum suum cognoscendum; et ulterior in species et habitus et potentias et essentiam ipsius mentis." St. Thomas, \textit{De Ver.}, X, 9c(A 1); ed. Spiazzi, I, 212a.


\textsuperscript{54} \textit{De An.}, I 1.403a27-28; \textit{Metaph.}, E 1.1026a5-6.
philosopher. But does not this reservation indicate something peculiar about the view that the science of the soul pertains to natural philosophy? True, the phenomena perceived by consciousness present themselves as activities of a mobile nature. Even the intelligible species has to be explained as a result of combined activity of agent intellect and imagination, and therefore as an operation of the one mobile being who is using two different faculties. Yet the whole explanation of cognition and of its processes and principles is based upon immateriality. Even though the immateriality in sensation does not involve separate existence, to the extent that it is at all immaterial it is raised above the domain of natural philosophy. Where it involves separate existence, it pertains of course, as Aristotle saw, clearly to metaphysics.

Moreover, the subject of natural philosophy, mobile being, is known by direct observation. This subject consists in the bodies that are seen in motion in the external world. The phenomena from which the soul is studied are seen in a different way, namely by reflexion. True, they are seen as mobile, and from that aspect invite examination in natural philosophy. But unlike the external things that specify natural philosophy, they are of a nature that requires a strong mixture of metaphysical principles for their investigation even as specific phenomena. An indication of the rupture with natural philosophy's proper way of proceeding may be seen in the extension of the reflexively gained knowledge of one's soul to other souls. Knowledge of the proper object of natural philosophy is commensurately universal. What is known through it of one body, for instance composition of matter and form, holds in exactly the same way for all bodies. But what is known reflexively of one's own sentient and intellectual processus is not known at all in the same way with regard to others. It is extended only by analogy. Descartes' tenet that animals are merely elaborate machines, though extremely unlikely, is not a priori absurd. In the last analysis, however, the answer rests upon an analogy with one's own vital processes, and not upon any immediate cognition of sentient data in the one way in which they can be immediately known by man, namely by reflexive consciousness.

How, then, could Aristotle believe that the De Anima belonged essentially to natural philosophy? The answer seems to lie in the characteristic of Aristotelian thought that brought it into such bitter conflict with the beginnings of modern science. From what is observable in corporeal things, Aristotle wished to proceed as though he had a

---

knowledge of their specific essences, just as man has in the case of artifacts or of geometrical figures. By discovering the *purpose* of each activity or organ or anatomical structure, Aristotle maintained that he had thoroughgoing knowledge of its final cause. But the final cause he considered to be identical with the formal. Knowing the form in this way, he held that he knew the thing's specific nature in a way that made it the source of explanation for the thing's properties.\(^{56}\) It was as simple as that, unbelievable as such an attitude may appear today.\(^{57}\) The trust in final causes for the manifestation of specific differences was rightly rejected by modern science. But the alleged insight had been rejected just as decisively by St. Thomas Aquinas several centuries earlier.\(^{58}\) However, it explains Aristotle's stand that the specific nature of the soul, known through its operations, pertains like any other corporeal nature to the subject of natural philosophy.

Further, the Thomistic doctrine that being is other than the nature of any finite thing opened a metaphysical understanding of cognition that had been denied to Aristotle. Aristotle had indeed seen that in cognition a thing has being in an immaterial way.\(^{59}\) But through lack of any entitative distinction between being and essence he was prevented from bringing this observation to metaphysical fruition. For the same reason, no real distinction between powers and substance could be established in the *De Anima*. From this angle alone there was no possibility in the *De Anima* of establishing the agent intellect as an operative power of a corporeal substance.

In the doctrine of St. Thomas, accordingly, the pertinent mixture of metaphysical principles with those of natural philosophy in the treatment of human nature is much more manifest than in Aristotle. But besides the combining of these diverse speculative principles, as it actually took place in the later Scholastic treatises on the soul, the

---

56 See supra, n. 44.

57 Even those who would like to have the experimental sciences continuous with natural philosophy today, are obliged to find some other explanation than that of an intuitive knowledge of the real essences of sensible things; e.g., De Koninck's dialectical extension of natural philosophy into the experimental sciences: "Voilà pourquoi nous ne pouvons même pas avoir en ce domaine une science 'quia,'" "Introduction à l'étude de l'âme," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, III (1947), 60.

58 See supra, n. 43. Numerous other texts may be found listed in Roland-Gosselin's edition of St. Thomas' *De Ente et Ententia*, p. 40, n. 2. The unknowability of the specific essences is likewise brought to the fore, though against a Nominalistic background, by Locke's distinction (*Essay*, III, 3-6) between the nominal and the real essences of things.

59 *De An.*, II 12.424a18-19; III 8.481b21-492a3.
modern developments call also for the inclusion of principles from ethics. The fact that in the starting point of the science man is known in action as freely determining himself and perfecting himself, and directing his own destiny, calls for treatment of him as something that is becoming. The character of his perfection and his completion is not decided by his specific form but by his deliberate action. In this investigation the essential stability of human nature, as it is actuated by substantial existence in its first actuality, is fully respected. Likewise respected, however, is the freedom by which it works out its own destiny. It has to be treated as in history, as making itself what it may be.

Ethical principles, accordingly, have to be combined in the procedure that treats of man as man. They introduce into the science their own type of universality, a universality that is not rigid like that of speculative objects. It is a universality that holds only roughly and for the most part, and as a mean between two ever varying extremes. For St. Thomas himself, a theological framework provided ample opportunity to discuss the problems of man in the light of principles taken from the various philosophical sciences. In the historical circumstances of his time, he experienced no need for a special science of man on the philosophical level. In his division of the philosophical sciences he could follow rigidly the traditional Aristotelian schema, and leave all knowledge obtainable by the principles of natural philosophy to natural philosophy itself, all knowledge obtainable by metaphysical principles to metaphysics, and all knowledge obtainable through moral principles to ethics. Against the mediaeval background, there was no pertinent need for any other way of proceeding. After the emphasis on introspection as a starting point in philosophy, an emphasis that has been increasing in momentum from the time of Descartes to the present, the situation is different. To see in self-knowledge the sole starting point for all philosophical reasoning is of course an extreme to be avoided. But is that a legitimate excuse for closing one's eyes to the privileged position given by consciousness to human nature as the subject of an authentic philosophy of man?

The keen interest of man in himself as a special subject of study, emphasized as it is by modern existentialism, is even more noticeable at present than in the centuries whose dividing line was crossed by Malebranche. There seems a distinct advantage to be gained from exploiting this interest when one is presenting Thomistic philosophical doctrine today. Take for instance the proposition that no finite being is immediately operative. Approached from that baldly metaphysical formulation, what interest can it be expected to arouse in the average
contemporary reader? Presented from the viewpoint of his own faculties, however, does it not become for him a much more actual and vivid problem? From his childhood he has been hearing about his intellect and will. Now he is brought to ask himself what his intellect really is, what his will is, and how he knows anything about them. Curiosity is aroused, and serves as a spur to investigation. Similarly the consideration that every nature is essentially a being may seem flat and pointless when approached in a purely metaphysical context. But when it is studied as part of the demonstration of the soul's immortality, in fact the ultimately convincing part of the demonstration, it may take on a pertinent and striking interest for anyone seeking philosophical proof of a tenet hitherto held on religious faith. Ethical questions, likewise, take on a new life in a context of human destiny. So, while the modern notion of a philosophy of man does not arise from Aristotelian or Thomistic traditions, but has its origins for its advocates in the type of thinking found in St. Augustine and Pascal, it is in no way opposed to the doctrine of St. Thomas. On the contrary, the doctrine of St. Thomas provides a special status for human nature as subject of reflexive consciousness that leaves it open to all the advantages accruing from the development of an integral philosophy of man.

V

These considerations show, in conclusion, that the unity in a Thomistic philosophy of man arises from the specific unity of human nature as known through reflexive consciousness. In consciousness man is aware of himself as a unitary agent, and not as a combination of two different kinds of agent, material and spiritual. Knowing himself immediately in his activities, however, man does not know his essence in a way that allows it to be the source from which his proper characteristics might be demonstrated. His essence is not intuitively seen in this manner. But because it is habitually present to his mind it is known as a specifically distinct scientific subject that requires investigation through a special procedure combining principles from natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics. As a specifically distinct subject it offers no new data that could not be treated separately in the traditional sciences of the Aristotelian schema. The consciousness by which it is known reveals nothing that is not a body or a being or a moral action. But it does present a nature known in an altogether privileged way that gives rise to a specifically new science, the philosophy of man.

Against this background, the failure of the Aristotelian schema to provide a place for a philosophical anthropology may be readily
understood. Anything treated of in such a science had already been ranged under the Aristotelian divisions. Aristotle's optimistic confidence in man's understanding of specific essences felt no need of assigning a privileged role to man's reflexive knowledge of himself, and St. Thomas' theological treatment of man satisfied the exigencies of the situation without the requirement of a philosophical anthropology. After Descartes, however, the need for an authentic philosophy of man has become prominent. It does not fit into the Aristotelian schema. Any attempt to force it into the Aristotelian grooves is doomed to failure. Offering nothing that has not already been taken care of by the traditional Aristotelian sciences, it has no aspect that could ground a new division in the schema. It is rather apart from the schema, though not at all opposed to it. It is not above the schema, in Kantian fashion, for it does not present man as the highest of knowable objects. It presents him as a mean, a specifically unitary nature that is situated between the merely material and the purely spiritual, without being specifically either the one or the other. Accordingly it leaves unchallenged the primacy of metaphysics among the philosophical sciences, while at the same time combining metaphysical and ethical treatment because of the spiritual features of its subject, and treatment on the level of natural philosophy because of its subject's material characteristics. But it does not thereby become a metaphysics or an ethics or a natural philosophy, any more than its subject "man" becomes something specifically spiritual or something specifically material because of the mixing of both aspects in a unitary nature.

A philosophy of man, then, does not do the work of an ethics. It is not interested, for instance, in probing the fundamental problem of the ethical universal. It does not do the work of a metaphysics. It does not undertake, for example, to establish the distinction between being and essence. It does not do the work of a natural philosophy. It is not concerned with problems like those of the infinity of space or the causality involved by chance. Still less does it undertake any work of the experimental sciences. It offers no knowledge of human nature from which anatomical, biological, or physiological conclusions could be deduced. Accordingly it does not dispense with any of the traditional sciences. But it does offer a fruitful and pertinent study of man

60 See J. Endres, Der Mensch als Mitte, pp. 11-66.
61 On this primacy in St. Thomas, see texts in A. Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, Appendix III; 3rd rev. ed. (Toronto, 1968), 90-92.
known as a specifically-distinct scientific subject through reflexive consciousness. As a science of this specifically distinct subject, however, it has to be conscious of its own peculiar and privileged unity. It will not masquerade as a philosophical psychology, or as a metaphysics of man, or as a moral science. It will present itself for what it is, a genuine philosophy of man, a specific study of a thoroughly unitary nature known in an altogether special way through reflexive consciousness.

It will, nevertheless, be mindful of its limitations. It will realize that it can never make its initial knowledge of man into an object comparable with the directly known objects of the traditional sciences. It grasps its subject only in the internal awareness of activity, and not of directly intuited essence.\(^{62}\) It explains the specific unity of its subject not through any conceptual penetration into a combined material-spiritual essence, but on the basis of a unitary existential act, an act that belongs immediately to the soul while synthesizing matter and form in the one existence. It does not start from corporeal essence and attempt the impossible project of introducing, on the basis of essential considerations, a spiritual soul into a material nature. Rather, in explaining objectively the unity of which man is subjectively conscious, it bases its reasoning on the unitary character of a spiritual existence immediately specified by the subsistent soul, a soul that is a substance in its own right and at the same time by its nature a substantial form of matter.\(^{63}\) In this way the philosophy of man accounts for the specific unity of its subject without claiming any new objective status for its initial privileged knowledge.

*Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.*

\(^{62}\) "Puisque la méthode réflexive étudie la pensée agissante, en tant qu'elle se saisit elle-même agissante, la pensée, qui réfléchit sur son acte, peut et doit rester elle-même en acte. Même lorsqu'elle s'objective, pour parler de soi, elle a toujours dans sa propre conscience de soi et sa présence d'esprit, de quoi corriger sa métamorphose en objet et se reconnaître comme sujet en acte." André Marc, *Psychologie Réflexive* (Paris, 1948-1949), II, 407.

Lot and Pellinore: The Failure of Loyalty in Malory's "Morte Darthur"

CHARLES MOORMAN

The structure of Sir Thomas Malory's *Morte Darthur* can be shown to be perfectly suited to the theme that the book conveys—the rise, flowering, and decay of an almost perfect secular civilization. Stated as simply as possible, Malory, in order to present that theme and to insure the unity of his book, so constructs his narrative as to disengage from the great mass of his sources three plot lines, the Lancelot-Guinevere affair, the quest of the Holy Grail, and the feud between the houses of King Lot and King Pellinore, each of which conveys one of the causes of the collapse of the Round Table civilization—the failure in love, the failure in religion, the failure in loyalty.

The third of the great failures of Arthur's court, its inability to maintain the ideals of loyalty and knightly service demanded by its own definition of chivalry, is emphasized by a number of means throughout Malory's book. Indeed, we are so prone to concentrate our attention on this aspect of the *Morte Darthur* that we are apt to neglect the other equally important themes with which the book deals. But while it is misleading to oversimplify the theme of the *Morte Darthur* as "primarily a conflict of two loyalties...: on the one hand, the heroic loyalty of man to man...; on the other, the blind devotion of the knight-lover to his lady," it is nonetheless true that Malory is greatly attracted towards, indeed almost drawn passionately to the theme of "the mutual love of warriors who die together fighting against odds." And it is precisely because Malory is so devoted to the ideal of chivalry that he is able to see so clearly and record so accurately its decline and ultimate failure in Arthur's kingdom.

But before that chivalry can be destroyed, it must first be established,

---


and it is part of the function of the early books of the *Morte Darthur* to affirm the kind of knighthood that Arthur's court embodies and upholds. Book II, "The Tale of Arthur and Lucius," probably the first part of the *Morte Darthur* to be composed, concentrates almost entirely upon the elevation of the young Lancelot to a position above all the other knights of Arthur's court, and although the relation of Books I and III to Malory's general scheme of characterization is less clear than that of Book II, these tales nevertheless perform an equally necessary task in defining the nature of the chivalry which Lancelot represents, the new Arthurian chivalry with its emphasis on fairness, courtesy, and devotion to the Round Table as opposed to the older, more barbaric code of brute strength and clan loyalty.

But the chivalry defined in these early books cannot long be maintained, and the most important symbol of the decay of the new chivalry is the bitter feud between the houses of King Lot of Lowthean and Orkney, the husband of Morgause, half-sister of Arthur and mother of Gawain, Galahad, Agravaine, Gareth, Mordred, and, as Lamerak remarks, "modir to many other" (579), and of King Pellinore, King of the Iles and father of Tor, Lamerak, Aglovale, and Perceval. Malory's handling of the growing bitterness between these two families and its frequent eruption into the most hideous violence not only serves as another indication of the unity of his book, but also demonstrates several important facets of his technique and theme.

Like the Grail quest and the courtly affair of Lancelot and Guinevere, the Lot-Pellinore feud is prophesied early in the *Morte Darthur*, but works towards its culmination slowly and gradually, and although it seems clear that he singled out this conflict quite early as an important thematic and structural device, Malory does very little with it in the early books. Just as in his handling of the Grail quest (though unlike his more positive handling of Lancelot and Guinevere), Malory adds almost nothing to the early prophecies of the Lot-Pellinore feud, though, significantly, he deletes nothing, as he almost certainly would have done had he, as Eugène Vinaver, Malory's latest editor, maintains, regarded each book as a separate work. What he does do is to disengage these important plot strands, the Grail quest and the Lot-Pellinore feud, from

---


the surrounding undergrowth of quest and tourney, by pruning carefully
the digressive elements of the French plot. Thus the Lot-Pellinore feud
is not invented or even added to by Malory, but it does emerge, much
as a bas-relief emerges, by means of his careful planing away of the
irrelevancies that obscure it in the French. One has only to compare
the sheer bulk of the Suite du Merlin and Prose Lancelot with Books I
and III of the Morte Darthur to see the point. By the very act of choosing
to keep an incident or a speech, Malory is giving it an importance and
an emphasis in his own work far beyond that which it claimed in the
source.

But Malory in these early books nevertheless does make subtle changes
in his source and thereby declares something of his intent to use the
Lot-Pellinore feud thematically. He thus specifically names Morgause
when she first appears upon the scene (10) and Pellinore when he kills
Lot (77) not only because he seemingly has a passion for naming the
anonymous characters of the French book,5 but because he wishes to fix
the names of these characters quickly and firmly in the reader's mind
because of the roles they are to play later on. Again, in an important
addition, Merlin foretells the birth and accomplishments of Perceval
and Lamerak, and incidentally the coming of Lancelot (52), and so
points forwards both to the Grail quest and to the tragedy which
surrounds Lamerak.6 Malory emphasizes the adultery of Arthur and
Morgause, and so thematically forecasts the tragedy of Lancelot and
Guinevere, by having Lot's principal grievance against Arthur stem
not, as in the French, from Arthur's drowning of the children in his
attempt to kill Mordred, but from his having taken Morgause in
adultery.

The main events of the tale, however, he finds perfectly suited to his
projected scheme and so leaves unaltered. Lot, an implacable enemy
of Arthur even before Arthur pulls the fateful sword from the stone, is
married to Morgause, Arthur's half-sister. Arthur, after he has become
king, takes Morgause to bed, not realizing that she is his half-sister, and
begs Mordred on her. Lot in retaliation wages yet another war
against Arthur, but is killed in battle (77) by King Pellinore, one of
Arthur's trusted advisors (130) who had previously devoted himself to

5 See the various articles by R. H. Wilson on Malory's handling and naming of his minor
characters.

6 There are other foreshadowings of Gawain's revenge on Pellinore, taken by Malory
from the French, on pages 77 and 81.
the pursuit of the Questing Beast and whose only crime had been that he had unwittingly caused the death of his own daughter.

But the killing of King Lot brings tragic consequences. The fierce pride of the house of Orkeney has been offended and imagining their father to have been killed feloniously, Gawain, Gaheris, and Agravaine pledge themselves to avenge their father's death. Events, moreover, serve to increase their rage rather than to assuage it. Torre, Pellinore's illegitimate son, is knighted before Gawain, and Pellinore himself is asked by Arthur to fill the one available empty seat (the Siege Perilous remaining vacant) at the Round Table. Gawain, furious, swears to kill Pellinore "for he slew our fadir kyng Lott" (102) and is only dissuaded from taking immediate action by Gaheris.

We are not given a direct account of the death of Pellinore, though his widow years afterwards, in a passage of Malory's own composition, tells her remaining sons, Aglovale and Perceval, that their father was "shamefully slain by the hondys of sir Gawayne and hys brothir, sir Gaherys" (810). After the death of Pellinore, however, Lamerak indulges in an illicit love affair with Morgause, the widow of Lot and mother of Sir Gawain and his brothers. She must be, of course, years older than her lover, and Lamerak's motives are surely mixed, to say the least. Gawain, as would be expected, believes that "for the deth of kyng Pellynore sir Lameroke ded us a shame to oure modir" (608), and though, on the other hand, Malory tells us that "ayther lovid other passyng sore" (612), Lamerak certainly intends his action to disgrace the Orkeney family. At any rate, Gawain and Gaheris (in what surely must be a foreshadowing of their device for trapping Lancelot later on) arrange for a meeting between Lamerak and Morgause, and Gaheris "kills his mother while she lies with Lamerak (612), though to Gawain's chagrin he allows Lamerak to go free."

At this point, Lamerak makes a statement of great interest. To Gaheris's accusation that Pellinore killed Lot, thus initiating the feud, Lamerak relies that his "fadir slew not Gaheris's fadir: hit was Balyn le Saveage!" (612). Yet the rather full description of the death of Lot (77)

---

7 The passage on page 613 is somewhat ambiguous: "Wyte you well sir Gawayne was wrothe that sir Gaherys had slayne his modir and lete sir Lameroke ascape." There is, of course, a possibility that Gawain is sorry for both deeds, but since Gawain himself had helped arrange the rendezvous, he must have known what Gaheris intended. The coordinate "and" thus seems to me to have the same sense as "but," as it frequently does in such expressions as "I'm sorry that you went to London and didn't see the queen."
makes it quite clear that Lamerak is totally mistaken and that Pellinore did indeed kill King Lot. Now then, Lamerak's startling announcement is one of Malory's rather infrequent additions to this section; he has, in fact, been occupied in consciously deleting material of all sorts in an effort to reduce the great bulk of the Tristan source. Vinaver, always quick to find fault with Malory's knowledge of the legend, maintains that Malory here confuses Pellinore with King Pellam, the Grail keeper, whom in fact Balin did wound. Yet this explanation really avoids the problem for (1) Malory, despite Vinaver's undocumented statement that there are many examples of "confusion between Pellinore... and Pellam," (1481), is very careful in handling the Lot-Pellinore material and goes to great lengths to emphasize Lamerak's role in the feud, hence his "sourceless repetitions of the murder of Lamerak by Gawain"; (2) Malory would hardly add to his source a passage containing such an obvious error, especially one concerning the "Tale of Balin" which he had already written and which even Vinaver would admit that he was familiar with; and (3) Balin did not in fact kill King Pellam, but instead wounded him. Also Lamerak has some small reason for confusing the issue since Balin did fight against Lot in that very battle (77).

The point is, I think, that Lamerak and his brothers may very well at this point be ignorant of the circumstances of King Lot's death and believe their father to have been slain by Gawain and his brothers without cause, a belief substantiated by the Orkeney's reputation for indiscriminate killing. Indeed, Lamerak himself, in what may be one of Malory's additions to his source (670), states that he cannot trust Gawain, "nothir none of his bretherne," even though King Arthur may charge them with keeping the peace. Certainly such ignorance on Lamerak's part goes a long way towards excusing the disgraceful conduct of an otherwise valiant and courteous knight, and it also enhances, one feels, both the tragedy of his death and the blackness of Gawain's crime.

The murder of Lamerak is one of the great turning points in the Morte Darthur in that it clearly divides the household of Orkeney and its supporters from those knights, friends of Lamerak mostly, who after his death look to Lancelot for leadership. The death of Lamerak is reported three times, first by Palomides (688) who states simply that Lamerak, after a successful tournament, was slain "felounysly" (the word is Malory's addition) by "Gawaine and his bretherne"; next, in a much

---

8 R. H. Wilson, "How Many Books Did Malory Write," University of Texas Studies in English, XXX (1951), 15.
fuller account (691) added by Malory, in which Tristan directly accuses Agravaine and Gaheris of the murder and adds that he wishes that he had been present to defend Lamerak; and finally, by means of a long conversation, all of which is of Malory’s composition, between Tristan, Dinadan, and Palomides in which all agree that were not Agravaine and Gaheris Arthur’s nephews “they sholde dye for hit, all that were conceintynge to [Lamerak’s] dethe” (698). In the same conversation, Palomides also specifically names Mordred as the knight who “gaff [Lamerak] his dethis wounde byhynde hym at his bakke...” (699), and Gareth declares that “for cause that [he] undirstonde they be murtherers of good knyghtes” he has left his brothers’ company.

There can be little doubt that Malory’s additions to his source’s account of the death of Lamerak not only add greatly to the dramatic interest of the event, but contribute tremendously to the unity of the book. The death of Lamerak in Malory’s hands becomes the focal point of the Lot-Pellinore story and more significantly the point at which that story attaches itself firmly to the main narrative line of the Morte Darthur.

The consequences of the murder of Lamerak are immediately obvious in the relations of the knights, who quickly begin to align themselves either behind Mordred, obviously the most villainous of the Orkeneyys, all of whom “hateyth all good knyghtes of the Rounde Table for the moste party” and who “prevaile... hate my lorde sir Launcelot and all his kyn” (700), or behind Lancelot, who from the weight of his position at court becomes the natural rallying point for the loyalists. And it is interesting to note that though Lancelot here, as in his dealings with Guinevere, realizes perfectly well the dangers of the situation, he can apparently do little about it. As with Guinevere, he is cautious and “that causyth hym the more to have the good knyghtes of his kynne aboute hym” (700).

The Grail quest temporarily delays the plans of the Orkeney group whose hatred for “all good knyghtes” and for Lancelot will not now rest content with the death of Lamerak. But immediately the quest has ended, they are once more at work, and their malice finds a tool ready at hand—Lancelot’s love for the king’s wife. This lever they ply unmercifully for their own ends; Agravaine cunningly spreads the vilest rumors of the queen’s misconduct “for he was ever opynne-mowthed” (1045). And luck—the same malevolent, though perhaps not wholly unwarrant-

---

9 Vinaver (1582-1583) attributes this detail of characterization to a mistranslation, but whether accidental or purposeful, it is a brilliant stroke.
ed, fate that has dogged Arthur's court from the beginning, in Arthur's ignorance of Morgause's identity, in the failure of Merlin to destroy Mordred—this same luck operates to the advantage of the Orkeneyes now.

Not only does Guinevere innocently play into their hands by refusing to let Lancelot go his way, but in attempting to spite Lancelot for his lack of attention, she arranges a dinner party for the most prominent knights of the court and sets the stage for the poisoning of Sir Patryce.

Malory makes one intensely interesting alteration to his source's account of Sir Pynel's poisoning of Sir Patryce at Guinevere's dinner, and it is the sort of alteration that clearly demonstrates the technique Malory most liked to use in twisting together into a solid cable the loose strands of his source. Like Malory's best source additions and changes, this one costs him nothing—it detracts nothing from the established story line—but provides unifying links backwards and forwards in the narrative. Here a clause does the work: "and thys sir Pyonell hated sir Gawayne because of hys kynnesman sir Lamerakes dethe" (1049). This linking of the "poisoned apple" episode with the Lot-Pellinore feud is a brilliant stroke. Not only does it properly motivate Pynel's action, but it provides yet another tragic consequence of the feud and so points forward to the dissolution of the court.

The first two paragraphs of Book VIII are Malory's own, and they contrast perfectly, and with sharp irony, the two states of chivalry. We are told that the time is May, the time "whan every harte floryshyth and burgenyth," but a May which shall witness the destruction of "the flore of chyvalry of the worlde" (1161). And then immediately Malory strikes the dominant note, the enmity of the houses of Gawain and Lancelot:

And all was longe uppon two unhappy knyghtes which were names sir Aggravayne and sir Mordred, that were brethren unto sir Gawayne. For thys sir Aggravayne and sir Mordred had ever a prey vite unto the queene, dame Gwenyver, and to sir Launcelot; and dayly and nyghtly they ever waxed uppon sir Launcelot. (1161)

It is in these final passages also that the active leadership of the Orkeney plot falls by Gawain's default to Agravaine and, after his death, to Mordred. Gawain and Gaheris join Gareth in renouncing their brothers' plan to trap Lancelot with the queen. This is Gawain's great moment of sanity and nobility and though Malory has systematically blackened Gawain's character throughout the book in preparation for his final unreasoning attacks upon Lancelot, he here allows Gawain, for a single moment in order to achieve a supurb dramatic effect, his great speech:
"Also, brothir, sir Aggravayne," seyde sir Gawayne, "ye muste remembrir how ofteynymes sir Launcelot hath rescued the kyng and the quene; and the beste of us all had bene full colde at the harte-roote had nat sir Launcelot bene bettir than we, and that hathe he preved hymself full ofte."

The situation is, we remember, tremendously tense. Gawain could, one feels, exert his influence as head of the clan and as one of the great lords of the kingdom and simply forbid Agravaine and Mordred access to the king. But Gawain, "light in life and light in death," cannot rise to the occasion and in a single breathtaking line, revokes his gallant words and retreats into his habitual surliness: "[But] do as ye lyste," he says, "for I woll layne it no lenger" (1162). Agravaine and Mordred go to the king, and the die is cast.

The catastrophe comes swiftly and inevitably nearer. Lancelot, trapped with the queen, kills Agravaine and escapes, but in rescuing the queen from the stake to which she has been sentenced, he accidentally kills Gaeris and Gareth and so through the malevolent luck which still haunts him, brings on the raging emnity of Gawain. These last sections, which contain Malory's most accomplished writing as well as his most original use of sources, are filled with additions and alterations that bring home the terrible effects of the Lot-Pellinore feud upon the Round Table civilization. Arthur's premonition that "the dethe [of Gaeris and Gareth] woll cause the grettist mortall warre that ever was" (1183), Gawain's disbelief that Lancelot could ever have harmed Gareth (1185): details such as these reinforce the contribution of Gawain's unwavering wrath to the total tragedy. And Gawain's farewell to Arthur and his touching letter to Lancelot emphasize here at the very end of the story with an intensity and conviction which the French cannot approach the final outcome of that tragic day, years before, on which Pellinore in the midst of battle slew King Lot of Orkeney.

The Lot-Pellinore feud is thus one of the great structural foundation stones upon which Malory builds the many-arched Morte Darthur. Yet it is more than a mere structural device, for it also encompasses and defines Malory's attitude towards chivalry and relations among men in

---

10 Vinaver here, it seems to me, exceeds his editorial authority. He prints in his text Caxton's version of the passage which attributes this last line to Agravaine and which does not contain the vital linking conjunction "but." Gawain's dramatic reversal is quite clearly intended in the Winchester manuscript, but it is forever denied the reader who has only the one-volume edition of the text or the scholar who does not trouble to inspect Vinaver's apparatus or note on the passage.
the same way that the Grail quest defines his concept of the relation of religion and society and the Lancelot-Guinevere affair his notion of the proper relations between men and women.

The usual definitions of chivalry, and indeed Malory’s own early concept of the convention, include and emphasize the articles sworn to by Arthur’s knights at the founding of the Round Table. There Arthur charges them:

“... never to do outerage othir morthir, and all wayes to fle treson, and to gyff mercy unto hym that askith mercy, uppon payne of forfiture [of their] worship and lordship of kynde Arthur for evimore; and allwayes to do ladyes, damesels and jantilwomen and wydowes [socour:] strengtehe hem in hir ryghtes, and never to enforce them upon payne of dethe. Also that no man take no betayles in a wrongfull quarell for no love ne for no worldis goodis. (120)

Yet, this is a new and peculiarly Arthurian idea of conduct. The new knights, particularly Lancelot, accept it readily enough, but the older families, such as that of King Lot, are slow to change and hold tenaciously to an older, more barbaric code of clan loyalty.

In time, then, the Arthurian code must come to include not only the prohibitions against treason, murder, “outerage,” and false quarrels and the injunctions to show mercy and respect women sworn to yearly by the knights, but also a new idea of loyalty and fidelity to the Round Table which is in very fact, though most historians would deny that it could have existed much before Malory’s own time, a kind of nationalism.

In short, this chivalry, in Malory’s book, entails a new concept of patriotism and loyalty, loyalty not only to the family or even in the feudal manner to the person of Arthur the king, but to the Round Table, to the whole order and state. Thus a crime against any knight must be counted not only as a personal outrage against a particular sworn brother, but also as a crime against the order of chivalry and against the whole Round Table. Lancelot’s failure in the Grail quest is not his alone; it stems from the worldliness of the kind of chivalry he himself stands for, and it involves, tragically involves, since he “fogate the promyse and the perfeccion,” the whole company of knights. The love affair of Lancelot and Guinevere cannot remain a private matter, for it runs counter to the code to which Lancelot and the others swear yearly, and it eventually forces Lancelot to betray those most solemn articles of his oath which forbid treason, murder, and wrongful quarrels.

And so it is with the feud of the families of Lot and Pellinore.
Gawain and his brothers cannot conduct their family affairs with such violence without harming the fabric of their whole society. Thus, before what he considers proper retribution can be made, Gawain discovers that all his brothers are dead along with the sons of Pellinore and that his anger has split the court and destroyed the very civilization that he had yearly pledged himself to help sustain.

So the third failure is in loyalty. Like the failures in love and in religion, it stems from the inability of the Round Table to live up to its own proper standards and ideals, to place true love, sincere religion, chivalric loyalty above passion and expediency. Had not Gawain..., had not Lancelot..., had not Arthur... But they did.

*University of Southern Mississippi*
Kingship and Feudalism according to Fulbert of Chartres

FREDERICK BEHRENDTS

MODERN authorities on feudalism have frequently referred to Bishop Fulbert of Chartres (ob. 1028), for the most part praising his exposition of the obligations arising from the oath of fealty. On the other hand, scholars have tended to ignore other evidence concerning medieval feudalism and kingship contained in Fulbert’s writings, nor has anyone yet attempted to consider Fulbert’s ideas on these subjects in their entirety. Fulbert never developed these ideas into a unified treatise; yet there is much to be gained from a synthesis of the relevant statements found in his letters and in his less-known Tractatus Contra Judaeos.

* I should like to express my gratitude to Professor L. C. MacKinney, who kindly read this paper and offered valuable criticisms and suggestions.


2 In citing Fulbert’s letters, I have followed the numbering used in the Migne edition (PL 141, 189-264); but I have emended the text where necessary from the principal manuscripts. The Tractatus Contra Judaeos (PL 141, 305-318) is based on Genesis xlix. 10. In his commentary on this text, Fulbert followed the interpretation given by St. Augustine (De Civitate Dei XVIII, 45-46 [PL 41, 606-609]; Contra Faustum XII, 42 [PL 42,276]; Enarr. in Psalmoi 44, 75 [PL 56, 505, 957-958]) and essentially repeated by later authors including Isidore of Seville (PL 83, 280, 464-465), Julian of Toledo (PL 96, 545-546, 551-560), Alcuin (PL 100, 560), Remigius of Auxerre (PL 131, 127), Rabanus Maurus (PL 107, 656), and the Glossa Ordinaria (PL 113, 178). On the Tractatus, see B. Blumenkranz, “A propos du (ou des) Tractatus Contra Judaeos de Fulbert de Chartres,” Revue du moyen âge Latin VIII (1952), 51-54. The event with which Blumenkranz connects the composition of this work is correctly dated 1015 according to the accounts of Hugh of Fleury and Clarius (RHF X, 221, 230).
Fulbert distinguished three essential elements in a kingdom: the land in which it is placed; the people who inhabit that land; and an elected king, who protects the land and rules the people. A kingdom stands in relation to these elements as a house does to its parts: foundation, walls, and roof. Just as a house cannot exist if it lacks one of these parts, so there can be no kingdom which lacks one of its requisite elements.  

The king’s obligations are to maintain justice and peace, the well-being of the kingdom, and the honor of the Church. He is the highest head of justice and has power to punish malefactors for the good of the state. The king is charged with ruling the Curch and with aiding her prelates. He should command his subjects to carry out God’s business in a suitable manner. Moreover, it is his duty to help Christians and to condemn heretics; and by properly performing the duties of his office, he works out his own salvation.

---

3 PL 141, 307-308: Tria ergo sunt sine quibus regnum esse non potest, terravidelicet, in qua regnum sit; populus, qui terram ipsum inhabitet; et persona regis electi, qui terram vindicet, et populum regat. ...Sicut ergo domus constat partibus, id est fundamento, parietibus et tecto, ita regnum illud partibus suis... et sicut non est domus si desit fundamentum, aut parietes, aut tectum, ita non est regnum si desit terra, aut populus, aut rex. PL 141, 316: Et, sicut domus quaelibet propriis partibus constat, id est fundamento, parietibus et tecto, quarum si una defuerit, domus esse non possit, ita regnum Juda partibus supradictis. Nam sive patria, sive populus, sive rex desit, regnum esse non possit. The italicized words in the first citation are an emendation made from the manuscripts by Blumenkranz (op. cit., 52).

4 Ep. 68: Si ergo de justitia, de pace, de statu regni, de honore Ecclesiae vultus agere [viz., as topics for discussion in the royal council]...

5 Ep. 17: Dominus noster rex, cujus summum justitiae caput incumbit... Cf. Count Odo of Chartres’s letter to King Robert (possibly written by Fulbert): ...officii tui radicum et fructum, justitiam loquor et pacem. (Louis Halphen, “La lettre d’Eude II de Blois au roi Robert,” Revue historique XCVII [1908], 288). Ep. 38: ...juris sit ad utilitatem reipublicae cuncios punire maleficos...

6 Ep. 30: ...sparsam Christi sanctam Ecclesiam vobis regere commissam... Ep. 31: ...ad vos... nostri adjunctii summa redit.

7 Ep. 101: ...negotium Dei mandasti mihi tractare ut expediat. Talia denique te regem praecipere decus est, subditosque tibi capescere tutum.

8 Ep. 24: ...rex Robertus benefacit cum Christianos adjuvet et haereticos damnat. Et ad
The king receives the Church's blessing, and he should be pleasing to God and to good men. By virtue of his royal authority, he may issue commands which have a sacred character. A serious breach of fidelity against the king constitutes the crime of majestas; and the culprit may be punished by excommunication, loss of possessions, mutilation, or even death. Yet the king is bound by the laws, since whatever be obtains contrary to these is considered invalid.

hoc debent cum confortare et adjuvare mecum omnes sui fideles, quia hoc est ministerium ejus, per quod salus esse debet.

9 Ep. 102: Spero enim illum Deo et bonis hominibus placitumur. On the death of his eldest son (Hugh) in 1025, Robert designated the next oldest (Henry) as king. However, Queen Constance and many of the nobility opposed Henry's coronation and advanced the claims of a younger son. According to a letter which Fulbert received from Hildegar, his deputy at Poitiers, the Queen's party attempted to discredit Henry by claiming that he was "...simulatores... segnum, mollem, in negligendo jure patristaturum..." and consequently unfit to rule. In ep. 102, Fulbert is obviously refuting these charges and claiming that Henry is suitably qualified inasmuch as he "...Deo et bonis hominibus placitumur." In his letter, Hildegar also stated that Fulbert's fellow bishops opposed making either one king as long as Robert was alive (cf. Burchard of Worms, Decretum XV, 25 [PL 140, 961]); however, if this were necessary, the selection of the best qualified should be left to Robert himself "...patre vivente nullum regem sibi creari; quod si acritus sitistiner in vita patris hoc fieri, quem meliorem senserit, ad regem debere sublimari [PL 141, 253]." On this controversy, see Schramm, op. cit., I, 98-99; J. Dhondt, "Election et héritéité sous les Carolingiens et les premiers Capétiens." Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire XVIII (1939), 938-948. Both authors follow the text printed in RHF X, 504, in attributing this letter to Bishop Odolric of Orleans. The manuscripts give only the initial H, which is most probably to be identified with Hildegar. Also see the Tractatus Contra Judaeos, in which Fulbert lays special emphasis on the sacred anointing of the Jewish kings as an essential element of their kingship and speaks of the Jewish priests as the cause effectiva of the king inasmuch as they alone are qualified to anoint him (PL 141, 308, 316-317).

10 Ep. 30: ...vestra regali auctoritate... imperando... Ep. 80: Sacra vestra monitis sum... Ep. 101: ...tuisque sacris ordinationibus... Ep. 54: ...nec sacram tuam nec epistolam archi- praesulis mei... Gerbert similarly uses the term sacra to refer to letters from the Empress Theophano (ep. 45, 117, ed. Havet, 43-44, 107).

11 Count Fulk of Anjou instigated the murder of Hugh of Beauvais. The crime was committed in King Robert's presence, and Fulk afterwards protected the murderers. In ep. 95, Fulbert informed Fulk that "...mundani judices asserant capitale te quoque reum majestatis..." and that he would be excommunicated if he did not come to terms with Robert. However, Robert had agreed that if Fulk would come to trial "...non super vitas suet super membra, sed super facultates ultio reflectatur."

12 Ep. 26: Quae cumque... contra leges fuerint a principibus obtenta, non valeant. This passage, taken from Cod. Theod. 1.2.2 (=Brev. 1.2.1), also appears in a letter written sometime after by the canons of Chartres Cathedral (PL 141, 275). Although Fulbert nowhere applies the term tyrannus to an unjust ruler, he does condemn the actions of prelates who usurp their offices as tyrannical (ep. 28).
The state, as Fulbert conceives it, is basically feudal, for the fundamental bond which ties men to each other and subjects to their king is that of fidelity.\textsuperscript{13} This term describes the relationships existing between men of all ranks, whether they be laymen or clerics; and although Fulbert occasionally designates particular individuals as milites or casati, the persons so qualified are essentially fideles.\textsuperscript{14} He refers to those who are bound directly to the king only as fideles or subditi; and in his usage, these terms are synonymous.\textsuperscript{15}

In replying to a question posed by Duke William of Aquitaine, Fulbert explained the fundamental obligations which resulted from the oath of fidelity.\textsuperscript{16} A vassal must abstain from all acts which might harm his lord’s person, possessions, or rights, or which might hinder his actions. In addition to these negative obligations, he owed his lord positive services, which Fulbert did not discuss but rather summarized

\textsuperscript{13} In several instances, Fulbert apparently used fidelis and related words in a loose sense (e.g., ep. 20, 47), but such usage is indicative of the extent to which the concept of fidelity influenced all of the Bishop’s thought. For obvious examples of stricter usage of these terms, see especially ep. 23, 24, 27, 30, 58, 74, and the examples cited in the following notes. Fulbert also characterized the bond between cleric and bishop, bishop and metropolitan as one of fidelity (ep. 97, 11). The actual promise of obedience which he took to Archbishop Leotheric is apparently included in a group of such promises from the Province of Sens dating from the early eleventh century (G. Waiz “Obedienzerklärungen Burgundischer und Französischer Bischöfe,” Neues Archiv III (1878), 200).

\textsuperscript{14} Milites (ep. 6); casatus (ep. 11, 88). The casatus named in ep. 11 is entitled fidelis in ep. 12. Persons of lower status are variously called domestici (ep. 18, 38, 107), ministri (ep. 29), homines (ep. 23). Land-holdings are termed beneficium (ep. 6), casamentum (ep. 6, 10, 59), hospitium (ep. 23). In none of his extant writings does Fulbert use the term feudum.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. notes 7, 8 supra. For other examples of royal fideles, see ep. 30, 34. In ep. 95, Robert is indicated as Fulk’s senior. Concerning the controversy over royal fideles and vassals, see Jean-François Lemarié, “Les fideles du roi de France (936-987),” Recueil de travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955), II, 158-162, and the older literature cited there.

\textsuperscript{16} The written authorities which Fulbert claimed to have used (ex librorum auctoritate) have long been a subject of discussion. Mitteis (Lehrrecht, 312-313) characterized Fulbert’s letter as a frühscholastische explicatio to Isidore, Etymologiae II, 4, 4 (Sasoria autem in tribus locis dividitur: honesto, utile, et possibile); and he called attention to the use of this same source in Quadripartitus, Dedicatio 29 and Leges Henrici 4 (ed. Lieberman I, 531, 547-548). Fulbert’s reason for using this text seems obvious. Sasoria was a species of oratory designed to persuade someone else, and an educated man living in the feudal age would naturally connect this with feudal consilium. Isidore’s work was widely known in the Middle Ages and would have had special appeal for Fulbert, who regarded the opinions of ancient Christian writers as possessing particular authority (cf. ep. 80). Moreover, in ep. 12, Fulbert expressly connected consilium with suasio (... per consilium et suasum ejus...)
under the customary headings of *auxilium* and *consilium*. Indeed, the vassal's claim to his fief was based on his faithful performance of these duties.\(^\text{17}\) Finally, the lord was expected to act in good faith towards his vassal and to reciprocate on all these matters with him.\(^\text{18}\)

Fulbert's letter has frequently been cited as an early attempt to analyze the basic principles characterizing the bond of fidelity. In actuality, the Bishop was merely trying to provide an easily-remembered device for recalling essential feudal obligations. Thus his exposition of the vassal's negative obligations took the form of a brief commentary on six terms which Fulbert would require the vassal to remember. He similarly grouped the vassal's positive duties under the two categories of *auxilium* and *consilium* and did not enumerate more specific obligations which would, of course, vary greatly. The use of mnemonic devices has been a favorite teaching method at all times. The one which Fulbert invented was soon well-known at Chartres and elsewhere;\(^\text{19}\) and it retained its popularity during succeeding centuries, even among scholars whose legal ability and training far surpassed that of the eleventh-century Bishop of Chartres.\(^\text{20}\)

---

\(^\text{17}\) Cf. ep. 23: *Nos quoque pro illis animae vestrae corporique vestro et fideles sumus et semper esse valeamus; ep. 72: ... debitorem esse fidelitatis animae tuae et corpori, *propter benignitatem* quam... exhibuisti.* (Italics mine). Implicit in these passages is the notion that fidelity is the vassal's return for the fief which he has received. On the importance of this idea in the development of feudalism, see Ganshof, *Feudalism*, 125-136.

\(^\text{18}\) Ep. 58: *De forma fidelitatis aliquid scribere monitus, haec vobis quae sequuntur breviter ex librorum auctoritate notavi. Qui domino suo fidelitatem jurat, ista sex in memoria semper habere debet: Incolume, tutum, honestum, utile, facile, possibile. Incolume, videlicet, ne sit domino in damnum de corpore suo. Tutum, ne sit ei in damnum de secreto suo, vel de munitionibus per quas tutas esse potest. Honestum, ne sit ei in damnum de sua justitia, vel de aliis causis quae ad honestatem ejus pertinentem videntur. Utile, ne sit ei in damnum de suis possessionibus. Facile vel possibile, ne id bonum, quod dominus suus leviter facere poterat, faciat ei difficile; neve id, quod possibile erat, reddat ei impossibile. Ut fidelis haec nocumenta caveat, justum est, sed non ideo casamentum meretur, non enim sufficit abstinere a malo, nisi fiat quod bonum est. Restat ergo, ut in eisdem sex supradictis consilium et auxilium domino suo fideliter praestet, si beneficio dignus videri vult, et salvus esse de fidelitate quam juravit. Dominus quoque fidelis suo in his omnibus vicem reddere debet. Quod si non fercerit, merito censetur malefidus; sicut ille, si in eorum praeventiatione vel faciendo vel consentiendo deprehensus fuerit, perfidius et perjurus.*

\(^\text{19}\) Cf. the allusions to this letter in ep. 71 (*... utile et honestum*) and in Hildegar's letter to Eberard (*... quam incolumis tute consistis [PL 141, 271])*.

\(^\text{20}\) In addition to the principal Fulbertian manuscripts, the letter to Duke William is also found in numerous others (*c.e.g.*, Paris BN *Lat* 8625, 12315, 16216; Douai 318, 519, 520; Vat. *Lat.* 4982; Vat. *Reg.* 291) as well as in Gratian's *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 5, c. 18 (ed.
More concrete details concerning the duties which Fulbert exacted from his own vassals are found in other letters taken from the Bishop's correspondence. The first of these was addressed to Count Reginald of Vendôme, Bishop of Paris. Reginald must not harm Fulbert's person nor the land which Fulbert then held or should acquire in the future by Reginald's advice. He owed Fulbert *auxilium* against all men except King Robert. 21 Whenever Fulbert demanded it, Reginald must make available to Fulbert or to the latter's vassals the use of Castle Vendôme, which Reginald held in fief from the Bishop of Chartres. Moreover, Reginald's own vassals whom he had enfeoffed from the lands which he held from Fulbert were to promise to the latter fidelity against all men except Reginald. 22 Finally, Reginald should support the decisions rendered in Fulbert's court. 23 At the same time, Fulbert also wrote to those who held "casamentum sanctae Mariae Carnotensis Ecclesiae per donum Reginaldi episcopi" and demanded under threat of excommunication and confiscation that they either promise him fidelity or else prove that they held their benefice on some other basis. 24

In none of his extant correspondence does Fulbert speak of specific

---

21 Robert had prior claim on Reginald's fidelity not as king but rather as Reginald's feudal lord; for Reginald held lands directly from the crown and was also a royal bishop. see Kienast, *op. cit.*, 28-29.

22 The meaning of this passage is disputed. Ganshof ("Relations," 106) believes that Reginald had subinfeudated these persons without Fulbert's authorization and that Fulbert here demanded that they become his vassals and hold their fiefs directly from him. On the other hand, Kienast (*op. cit.*, 29n-31n) claims that these men were to do homage and swear fidelity to Fulbert without holding their fiefs directly from him. Thus they became his vassals but were exempt from aiding him against Reginald, from whom they had received their holdings.

23 *Ep. 6*: Hoc a vobis exigo: securitatem de mea vita et membris, et terra quam habeo vel per aestium consilium acquiram. De auxilio vestró contra omnes homines, salva fidelitate Roberti, de receptu Vinocìni castri ad meum usum et meorum fidelium qui vobis assecurat illud; commendationem vestrorum militum, qui de nostro casamento beneficium tenent, salva fidelitate vestra; justitiam [concerning particular complaints] et de legibus attriorum nostrorum.

24 *Ep. 10*: Voco vos... aut nostrum servitium facere, aut de vestris casamentis legitimam rationem rededere. Quod si non feceritis, excommunicabo vos... Postea vero ipsa casamenta quae tenetis aut uni aut pluribus dabo... As may be seen by comparison with the preceding letter, Fulbert used *servitium facere* as equivalent to *commendare*.
financial or military aids owed him by his vassals. Undoubtedly these were included under the general category of auxilium, and the Bishop did not consider it necessary to give additional details.\textsuperscript{25} The lack of references to military service is further explained by Fulbert's strict upholding of ecclesiastical prohibitions against clerical participation in warfare. When he does speak of armed service, it is to reproach one of his clerics who has gone over to armatae militiae or to contrast the milites of a fellow bishop with his own fideles as a pointed reminder that a true churchman does not maintain an armed following.\textsuperscript{26}

A striking feature in Fulbert's letter to Duke William is his insistence on the reciprocal nature of the feudal contract. Both parties are bound by similar obligations; and if either one breaks his word, he will be considered unfaithful and perjured. Fulbert's treatment of this subject is brief; yet his emphasis on the moral aspects of the contractual relationship denotes a definite strengthening of the ties which provided the basic foundation for feudal society and the fundamental framework of the feudal state.

\textit{University of North Carolina.}

\textsuperscript{25} In theory, a vassal was required to obey his lord's wishes and to aid him insofar as he was able. However, if the lord commanded anything contrary to divine law or harmful to himself, the faithful vassal would oppose such actions. This idea, implied in ep. 56 (in nullo enim quod bonum sit coram Deo vestrae voluntati nitimur contraire), appears more clearly in a letter written by the canons of Chartres Cathedral shortly after Fulbert's death (vere etenim illi fideliores eritis, si quae sunt corrigenda in regno ejus correxeritis. et animum ejus ad eandem correctionem compuleritis [PL 141, 276]). Cf. Fulk of Rheims's letter in PL 131, 13-14.

\textsuperscript{26} Ep. 108, 18, 6.
THE French Renaissance inherited its great fondness for anagrams from the Middle Ages. This literary pastime had become a standard ingredient in the personalized lyrics of Guillaume de Machaut. More satisfactory, in matters of “amour courtis” than the “senshal” of the troubadours, it combined a modicum of discretion required by the code of Love, while preserving for perspicacious readers and posterity the name of the poet and his lady. It seems strange that while Machaut used anagrams in all his major compositions, Froissart, who imitated him in so many other respects, should have entwined his name and that of his “Droite Dame” only once in his substantial output of amorous verse. Jean’s playful spirit was well adapted to this sort of game. It is my opinion that he indulged in it more than once in his poetic career of thirty-four years, that he had personal reasons for not giving us further clues about them, and that they have a bearing on the nature of his sentimental and poetic experience.

Over two centuries ago, Froissart’s biographers began to sift his poetry to uncover the identity of the woman who inspired his “dittéés”. They made false starts, to the extent of converting Jean into a trivalent Don Juan who assuaged his own broken heart by dabbling with two others, when his true love had jilted him. As if a poet

---

1 They were deemed worthy of filling the lighter moments of such grave scholars as Etienne Pasquier, who, it is true, was also inspired by La Puce de Madame DesRoches. We know that “Thomas du Clocher” and “Pierre Tryocan” concealed the names of Thomas l’Incredul and Pierre Croyant, in the Cymbalum Mundi. “Alcofridas Nasier” became famous under similar circumstances. Sévole de Sainte Marthe often signed his poems “La Sainte Muse te Décore.” In 1579, La Croix du Maine threatened to publish “les anagrammes ou noms retournés des personnages dignes de recommandation, divisés en IV livres.”


steeped in the tradition of courtly love did not know that since the days of Andreas Capellanus, and before, "nemo duplici potest amore ligari"... Scheler unlocked the secret of his faithful and persevering love, by using the key provided at the end of l’Espinette Amoureuse.

This key was yielded after some soul-searching on the part of Jean, whose blood churned at the thought of revealing his lady’s name. After all “qui non celat amare non potest.” It said so in the Book, —Andreas’ book. The result was a compromise in the form of a riddle.

Mès telement vous pense mettre,
Sans nommer nom, sournom ne lettre,
Que qui assener y saura
Assés bon sentement aura.
Nompourquant les lettres sont dittes
En quatre lignes moult petites
Entre nous fumes et le temps.
Se venir y volés à temps,
La trouverés, n’en doubté mie
Pour cognoistre amant et amie.4

Earlier in the poem, Froissart had described the happy days of his sentimental quest. His “Droite Dame” would call, “en l’ostel ou je reparois,” in the company of a relative of hers, who was also an ally of his. Quite conveniently, a “locus amensis” had been provided for them in the hostel, and padded with rug, cushions and pillows. There sat the poet’s lady, “pour soi esbatter.”

N’i ot roses ni violiers,
Mès j’appelloie ce, par m’ame,
Le Vregier de la Droite Dame.
JE HANtoie à tempre et tart,
Dont FROIS, dont chaux, navrés d’un dART
D’amours; et lors de flours petites,
Violetes et MARGHERITES,
Semoie dessus le tapis
Qui dedens la chambre estoit mis. (lines 3377-85)

Scheler followed the poet’s instructions and lifted the transparent veil. He read: JEHAN FROISSART ET MARGHERITES. So far so good, but we haven’t learned much since Jean’s poems are strewn with praises of the “margherite.” While these coincided with a rash of


4 Auguste Scheler, Poesies de Froissart, I, 210, lines 4179-82.
pieces by Machaut, Deschamps, Chaucer, et al., celebrating the daisy, the persistence of Froissart’s eulogy, and the unmistakable phraseology of “l’amour courtois” make it clear that his “margherite’s” appeal was more than floral. Furthermore, this revelation entailed little risk, since the proliferation of Margherites in his day provided ample protection for his lady’s identity.

The significant quatrains from l’Espinette Amoureuse concealed further information, however, as the poet implied when he said “sans nommer nom, sournom ne lettre.” The word “lettre,” as it stands, rhymes beautifully with “mettre,” but it does not make much sense, since the poet did provide the necessary letters to spell out the names. According to Scheler, the word represents an alteration of the text, “lettre” for “l’estre,” i.e. the place of residence. This was indeed one meaning of “estre” at that time. Froissart used it to express the same idea in various other contexts; and undoubtedly, that is what it means in the quatrains. But the alteration or substitution certainly did not take place for the sake of the rhyme, since “estre” is permitted to rhyme with “lettre” elsewhere (lines 965-66). It represents rather a deliberate attempt on the part of the author to complicate the riddle and make good his boast that it will take a sharp wit to unravel it. Scheler guessed, quite correctly, that l’estre” in this case was Valenciennes. So far, then, we can admit that the quatrains contain the words: JEHAN FROISSAR’1 ET MARGHERITES... DE VALENCHIENES. The editor makes a further conjecture with respect to the lady’s last name; but that will be discussed later.

When Froissart wrote l’Espinette Amoureuse, his love affair had ended in a fiasco, and he had relatively little to lose if anyone guessed the meaning of his anagram. Such was not the case in his earlier poems, when, as a young man aspiring to the affections of a lady higher up on the social ladder, he had to protect her good name and his good fortune against the malicious flappings of Male Bouche. Later on, too, he might have felt less broad-minded than Petrarch or Jean le Bel about

---


6 Tarbé, op. cit. 185, said that Marguerite de Provence, wife of Saint Louis had set the style. The name was extremely popular with the noble families of 14th century France, Burgundy, Hainaut, and it appears frequently among the bourgeois mentioned in registers for the period.

amorous entanglements, and felt that a clergyman should not proclaim his undying love for a married woman, especially if a persuasive husband failed to appreciate his public lyricism. It is conceivable, therefore, that Froissart wove similar anagrams into his other poems, for his own "Plaisance," and that of Marguerite, but without providing any obvious clues as to their existence.

In 1373, Jean became pastor of Lestines, and in the Joli Buisson de Jonèce, he rhymed an elaborate flashback to his youthful romance. His sentimental swan-song had to be prodded out of him as he complained bitterly to Venus that he had served his "Droite Dame" faithfully, over the years, but that she hadn't done right by him. In fact, she had jilted him for another. He didn't think highly of Love's promised reward. Venus was quite upset by this apparent loosening of the bond between the two lovers, and she hastened to bring them back together, if only in dream, and in anagram.

JE me voil retraire à l'aHAN.
FROIS as est li ARS mainT an
De mon chier fil, dont moult le carge,
Mès bien voi que, se plus atarge,
Tu en es en peril de te perdre.⁸

Compare the first four lines of this passage with the quatrain from l'Espinette Amoureuse: JEHAN FROISSART stands out just as clearly. But MARGHERITE has disappeared. It is strange to hear Venus accuse her ubiquitous and traditionally eager-beaver son of neglecting his archery for years on end. This is heresy, and the goddess should realize it better than anyone, since long ago the Pervigilium Veneris proclaimed that "cras amet qui nunquam amavit, quique amavit cras amet." The statement is less surprising, however, if we realize that scrambled together with JEHAN FROISSART are the letters ET MARGHERITE... DE VALENCIENCES.⁹

In both l'Espinette Amoureuse and the Joli Buisson de Jonèce, therefore, the poet has woven his "nom, sournom and estre," as well as those of Marguerite, within the space of four lines. This seems to set a pattern which may serve as a basis for examining his other major compositions. At the end of the Paradys d'Amours, Froissart and his "Droite Dame are seated in a meadow strewn with daisies, discreetly chaperoned by

⁸ Scheller, II, 28, lines 930-34.
⁹ The text of Froissart's chronicles shows the name of his native city spelled Valenchienes, Valenchiennes, Vallenchiennes, Valenciennes, and Valenciennes, the last two of which, v.g. in Luce, I, 129.
Plaisance, Beauté-sans-Envie, Franchise, Honneur, Gaie Vie, Manière, Sens, Attemprance, Cremeur, Avis and Pourvoyance. The lady asks Jean if he has written anything new; and while she picks the daisies around her to weave a "chapelet," he recites the famous "ballade:"

"Sus toutes flours j'aime la margherite"

She is quite pleased with the flattering tribute and declares that it is only right that she give the chaplet to the one who composed it:

Le chapelet qui fu estoys
Fremo elle, de ses beaus dois,
De la flour où je me delitte
Que je vous nomme margherite.\(^{10}\)

We already know who composed it; and we know why he's so fond of the marguerite. Quite appropriately, if one allows the multiple use of "N," —a license usually granted in such cases—, these "quatre lignes moult petites" also include the letters required to form the words: JEHAN FROISSART ET MARGHERITE... DE VALENCIENNES.

Early in his poetic career, Froissart composed an allegorical analysis of the mechanics of "l'amour courtois," entitled Li Orloge Amoureus. To illustrate each portion of the intricate machinery, he laid bare his own feeling for "celle pour qui j'ai ce dittié empris." The movements of Desir, set in motion by Beauté, are regulated by Attemprance; and extreme care must be taken not to set off Male Bouche. The clock contains a "roe chantore" or "sonnerie" that regulates the chiming of its little bells. Interpreted in terms of sentimental cardiography, this is none other than Discretion, which controls the effusions of Doux Parler, and indicates the proper moment for the declaration of love.

Dont, pour vous ouvrire une grant quantité
De mes secrés, et savoir s'en pité
Je serai ja receús de vous, dame,

he tells her that night and day he is tormented by Love, which conjures up the image of her beauty and great qualities:

Que je ne sçai comment je me maintiengne.
Il n'est estas d'amours que ne soutienge;
Dont frois, dont chaus, diversement me mue;
Mon coer tressaut et vole et se remue...\(^{11}\)

Among these "secrés", could the poet have woven his name and that of

\(^{10}\) Scheler, I, 50, lines 1670-73.
\(^{11}\) Scheler, I, 241, lines 527-30.
his lady?... If we allow the double use of the "H," the above quatrain also contains the letters which spell: JEHAN FROISSART ET MARGHERITE... DE VALENCIENNES.

One day, in the Prison Amoureuse, Froissart is invited by "Rose," a pseudonym selected by Wenceslas de Brabant in honor of his lady, to correspond with him, on matters of love, under a psuedonym of his own. The poet acquiesces readily, —since the whole composition is his anyhow,— but he is coy about the selection of his "nom de plume." He wants to use the name of a flower too, for reasons we already know, but without revealing his lady's name. He decides to call himself Flos.

On pensoir auçes ançois
C'on devinast pour le quele
J'ai ores ce nom apele;
Il n'est mie tamps dou savoir. 

(lines 891-94)

The boast sounds like an echo of l'Espinette Amoureuse, where Jean said

... qui assener y saura
Assés bon sentement aura.

But we're not kept in the dark too long. The poet needs a signet ring, since his correspondent had sealed his letters with the emblem of a rose:

J'en voel errant faire un forgier.
Quel cose porai je ens logier?
J'ai visé une fleur petite
Que nous appelons margherite.12

It comes as no surprise that, allowing the double use of "H," the four little lines also lodge the words: JEHAN FROISSART ET MARGHERITE... DE VALENCIENNES.

Finally, in Le Joli Mois de May, Froissart gives us one of the most detailed descriptions of his lady. Among other things, he tells us that she sports the colors of the lily and the rose in her cheeks (lines 217-220); later he informs us that she is the sovereign flower

Qui nulle bruine n'estaint
En tous temps est clere et certaine

(lines 291-2)

We know, from the Dittié de la Fleur de la Margherite,13 that these colors and weather-proofing are standard attributes of the daisy. The

12 Scheler, I, 241, lines 896-99.
13 Scheler, II, 210-11, lines 17 and 60.
glowing description of his lady's assets inspires the poet to sing a ballad in her honor:

    Je le dirai, car c'est bien droit;
    Or m'en soit Amours en aie
    Qui me fait par son envaie
    Chanter en si gracieus mois.14

Need I point out that the “quatre lignes moult petites” contain the letters which spell out JEHAN FROISSART ET MARG(H)ERITE... DE VALENCIENNES?

Of course there are other quatrains, in Froissart’s works, and in those of other poets, which include the same combination of letters, a total of forty in a running text of a hundred, more or less. But the percentage of such occurrences is relatively small. The fact that the combination appears in each of Froissart’s major poems, in contexts which make the presence of an anagram logical, and that each time, the conditions set down by Froissart’s clue in l’Espinette Amoureuse are fulfilled, indicates that more than coincidence is involved. This was Jean’s way of entwining his lady’s name with his own, to the satisfaction of both Plaisance and Discretion.

The clues provided in l’Espinette Amoureuse hinted at the presence of a “sournom” also; and that is where the anagram turns out to be anything but transparent. Scheler suggested that Marguerite’s family name might have been VREDIAU, a bourgeois name that appears frequently in the administrative registers of Valenciennes for the second half of the fourteenth century. He based his opinion on the fact that VREGIER, which he considered to be synonymous with it, was introduced “assez brusquement” just before the significant quatrain.15 In effect, according to this theory, “Le Vregier de la Droite Dame” would be an inverted form of “La Droite Dame dou Vregier,” i.e. VREDIAU. It so happens that the letters which compose this name are available in the “quatre lignes moult petites.”

The theory is attractive, but it must be rejected. There is nothing startling about the appearance of VREGIER in this context. The “locus amenus” has been strewn with violets and daisies, and the fairest Marguerite of them all is propped up in the middle of this flower bed as a centerpiece...

    Là estoit, ses mains sus son pis
    Et son chef sus les oreilliers. (lines 3375-76)

14 Scheler, II, 204, lines 321-25.
15 Scheler, I, 389.
Since the Song of Songs, and particularly since the day when Guillaume de Lorris indulged in allegorical rėverie, it was customary to provide a garden or "vregier" as a setting for amorous discourse. Having sprinkled daisies about the premises, Froissart did not tax his imagination in calling his décor "le Vregier de la Droite Dame," meaning Le Verger de Marguerite(s).

While it is true that VREDIAU was a prominent bourgeois name in the fourteenth century, it did not necessarily mean "Vregier." Caffiaux, who pointed out that it was modified according to gender, like other proper names (Emmeris Vrediaus and Sandrain Vredielle) expressed the belief that it was an adjective derived from the verb "vreder," meaning to run or to hurry. Actually, the two words developed somewhat independently. The forms "vregier, vergel, verger" came from "viridarium," a derivative of "viridis," and designated a garden or orchard. The verb "verger" meant to stripe a piece of cloth or to measure off a plot of ground with a "virga" or rod. On the other hand, "vrediau, vrediel, verdier," etc... came from a Gallo-roman form "viridarium," and referred to a forest warden, the "maître des eaux et forêts." It also came to be a nick-name for the parrot because of its green wings.

Lors s’assist sour une breteske
    Ele et Vrediaus li papegais. (Renart le nouvel, 1914, Méon)

It is under this source that Godefroy lists the proper name VERDIAUS, which he found in fourteenth century Valenciennes. Although Ducange cites the use of "viridarium" in the sense of garden, (viridarium spatiose et delectabile... cum pluribus lignis diversos fructos ferentibus), it is probable that as a proper name, "VREDIAU" meant forest-warden, whereas "VREGIER" was the basis for such proper names as Du Verger, Du Verdier, similar to Du Gardin, so often mentioned in documents of old Valenciennes.

Finally, it should be pointed out that in the fourteenth century Valenciennes, besides the Vrediaus, there were prominent bourgeois families named Creste, Cretin, De la Motte, Du Fay, Dury, Partit, and

---

Polle, among others. 19 Any one of these names may be substituted for Vrediau, as a family name for Marguerite, in the quatrain from l'Espinette Amoureuse (allowing the double use of "C" in the case of Creste or Cretin). In fact, the letters for most of these names are included in most of the quatrains we have quoted from Froissart's poems. This means that Jean's transparent anagram, with respect to his lady's "sournom," is just about impenetrable.

In conclusion, there is reason to believe that throughout his poetic career Froissart linked the name of Marguerite with his own, in anagrams for which he gave no clues. If this opinion is valid, Jean's cult was anything but mere compliance with a literary fad, since this would not explain the need for such secrecy. Certainly, there are in his "dittiés" barren areas strewn with the desert roses of "seconde rhétorique" so dear to his generation, and padded with platitudes for patrons who paid for "quantity." But through the cumbersome trappings of allegory, a spark of genuine poetry escapes now and then. Perhaps, in the jovial Jehan's heart, the embers of love smoldered wistfully down through the years, after his romance had been shattered:

Onques plus nulle n'enamai
N'enamerais, quoi qu'il aviegn;
N'est heure qu'il ne m'en souviegne.
Vous avés esté la premerainne,
Aussi serés la derrainne 20

We do not know Marguerite's family name; but it would not add much to her poetic reality, any more than Portinari or Noves add to the idealized visions of Beatrice or Laura.

*Boston College*

19 Caffiaux, op. cit., passim; Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Récits d'un Bourgeois de Valenciennes* (Louvain, 1877), passim.

20 Scheler, I, 202, *Espinette Amoureuse*, lines 3896-3900. This gratuitous guarantee of undivided affection is, of course, a sine qua non instrument for the modus operandi of the amant courtois, and the Don Juan of all times. Machaut even provided the wording for it. But it has also been used by poets whose hearts were really bleeding.
The Influence of Canon Law on the Property Rights of Married Women in England *

MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, C.S.B.

The canon law of marriage was primarily concerned with the matrimonial bond. But in the elaboration of the conditions required for validity, and in the consideration of secondary questions such as the termination of marriage, certain doctrines were advanced that went beyond the regulation of the sacrament itself. Some of these doctrines involved a partial statement and defence of the property rights of women during and after their marriage.

Thus in the analysis of the solemnity of matrimony canonists tended to relate the financial arrangements between the spouses to the *celebratio in facie ecclesiae.* Roman law had considered the constitution of dowry\(^2\) to be a sign of regular marriage, and Gratian, as did other canonists before him, tended to attach much importance to it.\(^1\) In fact one text, which he ascribed to a Council of Arles, seemed to require the grant in dowry for the validity of the marriage.\(^3\) A literal interpreta-

---

* This is a slightly expanded version of a paper read during the session "Canon Law and Social Change in Medieval Europe" at the seventy-seventh annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Dec. 30, 1962 in Chicago.

1 Throughout the present study the word ‘dowry’ will be used for the gift to the husband on the part of the wife. It will correspond to the marriage portion (*maritagium*) of the English law courts and writers and to *dos* as commonly employed by the canonists and civilians. The word ‘dower’ will be used for the husband’s endowment of his wife. It will correspond to the *dos* of English writers and to the *donatio propter nuptias* of the canonists and civilians.

2 Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 3, q. 4, c. 4; C. 27, q. 2, c. 31; C. 30, q. 5, cc. 1, 3, 4, 6. For the appearance of these texts in earlier collections cf. the notes to Friedberg’s edition of the *Decretum*.

3 "Nullum sine dote fiat conjugium . . ." (C. 30, q. 5, c. 6). The source of the canon is the *False Capitularies* of Benedict the Deacon, Bk. II, c. 153, ed. H. G. Pertz, *MGH*, Leges II (Hanover, 1857), pars altera, p. 80. On the earlier history of this rule and on
tion of this text did not agree with the accepted notion of the essential conditions for marriage and the decretists were quick to disallow it. But their law contained an important series of texts associating *dos* and *donatio propter nuptias* with the proper constitution of the marital bond, and this association was to have consequences of importance.

The canonists were also concerned with the devolution of property owned by a married couple when their marriage came to an end by separation or death. Their views on this problem were based on a series of papal letters, several of which were sent to addressees in Great Britain. In these decretals it was claimed that, since the dissolution of the marriage by declaration of nullity or separation pertained to the ecclesiastical courts, the supervision of an equitable division of property, accessory to the main decision, also pertained to this jurisdiction. As to substantive rulings: where the causes of separation were licit, the spouses were to have what each had contributed to the marriage; the adulterous wife was unable to recover her dowry. These decretals were collected, organized with the title *De dote post divorcium restituenda* of the *Compilatio prima*, found a place in most of the subsequent systematic collections and, with the publication of the *Decretals* of Gregory IX, became part of the common law of the Church. In the glosses and treatises on these collections the recovery of donations between spouses is usually treated. It will suffice for our present purpose to stress three important qualities of this literature: first, it was accepted that the jurisdiction of the courts Christian should extend beyond the declaration of nullity or separation to the division of property between spouses; second, the discussion was usually carried on within the terms

the gradual shift of the meaning of the word *dos*, so that well before Gratian's time it often meant the husband's gift to his wife (dower), see A. Lemaire, "Origine de la règle 'Nullum sine dote fiat conjugium';" *Mélanges Paul Fournier* (Paris, 1929), 415-424.


6 X, IV, 20, 1, 2, 4, 5.

7 *Comp. Ia*, IV, 21; *Comp. IIa*, IV, 14; *Comp. IIIa*, IV, 15; *Comp. Va*, IV, 3; *Collectio Lipsiensis*, tit. LXIII, etc.; see A. Friedberg, *Quinque compilationes antiquae* (Leipzig, 1882).

of a dotal system (the main preoccupation was the recovery of the property of the wife); third, both papal decretals and the canonists were careful to recognize local custom.\(^9\)

Closely allied to this concern of the canon law with the property of the wife when marriage was terminated, was the special position it gave to the widow. This portion of ecclesiastical law was not accessory to the law of marriage, but was based on an entirely different principle. It will be recalled that even in Apostolic times the widow was the object of special solicitude. As the centuries passed various customs and institutions were developed to protect her and regulate her activity; in time canon law included certain rules in her regard.\(^10\) These are of interest to us from two points of view; first, they afforded general protection to the widow as a \textit{miserabilis persona}; second they provided precise rules for the defence of her free choice of state either in widowhood or re-marriage. Considered as a \textit{miserabilis persona}, she could claim the special protection of both the bishop and the king (of God and the king as the Anglo-Saxons expressed it). The principle was clear enough, but the extent of its practical application was not. In fact it posed a dilemma to the canonist. Did the widow have the right of recourse to ecclesiastical protection only when justice was refused her? The canonist claimed this right for every Christian. Or did she have the right of recourse to the courts of the Church, direct and immediate, in any plea? This understanding of her privilege was unacceptable to the lay jurisdiction and contradicted the royal duty to protect the widow, a duty that was stated within the \textit{Decretum} itself.\(^11\) Professor Brian Tierney has recently described how these conflicting claims were resolved in an equitable fashion by the canonists of the first half of the thirteenth century.\(^12\)

Of a more immediately practical application were the canonists'

---


\(^10\) See A. Rosambert, \textit{La veuve en droit canonique jusqu'au XIV\textdegree\ si\c{c}cle} (Paris, 1923), 39-92, 154-201.

\(^11\) C. 23, q. 5, c. 23.

\(^12\) \textit{Medieval Poor Law; a Sketch of Canonical Theory and its Application to England} (Berkeley, 1959), 15-19: the widow who was really poor and helpless was allowed to bring her plea before the courts of the Church even though she had not exhausted the possibilities of the secular tribunals.
ideas on the widow’s freedom to choose her state. Their position was a nice resolution of two principles, namely that the state of continence was in itself the better state, and that marriage was a good which the widow was free to choose. They defended and favoured her right to live in widowhood, while at the same time they insisted that she was free to marry, that her spouse should be of her own choice, and that she was not bound by the rule of mourning, the tempus luctus of Roman law, so that her re-marriage could take place as soon as she wished. This statement of her freedom was completed by Gratian’s time. Its bearing on the position of the widow in a feudal society was not without important practical results.

Finally, canon law exerted influence on the property rights of married women through its treatment of the testament. It would take the present study too far afield to attempt a description of the rather complex process whereby the canonists and ecclesiastical courts became involved in the supervision of bequests. Let it be sufficient to state the following facts: first, from the beginning Christian teaching emphasized the importance of the donation in alms; second, in time the pious gift became associated with the testament—so much so, in fact, that in some areas of the West the testament became known as the eleemosyna; third, bishops acquired a right of supervision over the delivery of legacies in alms. By the last years of the twelfth century, as is clear in treatises like Bernard of Pavia’s Summa decretalium, a sophisticated theory of the testament was being developed by the canonists. In this they were deeply indebted to Roman civil law,

13 Decretum, C. 27, q. 1, cc. 38, 42; C. 51, q. 1, cc. 10-13 and q. 2; C. 32, q. 2, c. 16. With regard to the widow's freedom to remarry immediately, Gratian remarks (dict. ad C. 2, q. 3, c. 7) that some secular laws still attached infamy to failure to observe the tempus luctus. This was the case in late Anglo-Saxon law: the widow was not allowed to marry for one year after her husband's death; see 5 Æthelred 21, 6 Æthelred 26.1, and II Cnut 75, ed. A. J. Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge, 1925), 85, 99, 211. 329n. See Rosambert, op. cit., 121-127.

14 See H. Auffroy, Evolution du testament en France des origines au xiiié siècle (Paris, 1899), 384:398 for a brief description of the canon law of the testament. The growth of this jurisdiction is described more fully by the present writer in The Will in Medieval England from the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to the End of the Thirteenth Century, Studies and Texts, 6 (Toronto, 1963), 120-135.

15 Quia eleemosyna morte liberat (Tob. 4, 11) cited by St. Polycarp of Smyrna in his Letter to the Philippians, ch. 10, was a favourite dictum.

16 A. Perraud, Étude sur le testament en Bretagne (Rennes, 1921), 53 n.


18 Ibid., 132-133.
though they were subject to other influences as well. Their doctrine incorporated a theory of the testament, notions on the personal and material extent of testamentary freedom and a procedure of implementation and supervision. It included a consideration of the testamentary capacity of the married woman.

The common law of England was taking shape in the last years of the twelfth century. By that time, as has been seen, the canon law of the western Church included a complete if not systematic treatment of the property rights of the married woman. This canonical teaching was to have considerable consequences in English law and practice. The understanding of the development that is now to be sketched will be facilitated by recalling several general tendencies that appeared in the rules governing property in England as they became explicit in common law. There was, first of all, the insistence that any plea of land must be held before the secular courts. Perhaps more important from the point of view of the present study was the tendency to limit the proprietary capacity of the married woman: lands of her dowry or inheritance were controlled by her husband so far as administration and fruits were concerned. The wife retained ownership and, on termination of the marriage, ordinarily could recover. With regard to chattels her position was even weaker: movable property received in dowry or that came to her after marriage fell to the husband. This was not merely a case of the control of movable property by the husband as in some of the community systems on the Continent; it was a case of outright ownership. Another tendency that weakened the claims of the married woman was the gradual breakdown of the customs protecting family rights in the property of the husband and father. During the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries his right to alienate land by donatio inter vivos or sale was asserted against the claims of the heir and the lord.\(^{19}\) Only the wife’s dower resisted this movement. The same tendency is evident in the husband’s disposition of movable property (which it will be remembered included the chattels brought to the marriage by the wife). At first he exercised his testamentary freedom to dispose of chattels within a quota system, which reserved a portion of his movable property to wife and children. But this restriction was gradually removed so that by the end of the Middle

Ages, throughout much of England, he could alienate all chattels in his last will. Thus if the needs of the wife were respected it was by the choice of her husband rather than by requirement of law.

We shall first investigate the influence of canon law on the English practice of dower. It is not intended to explore the early history of this institution; we shall begin, rather, with its appearance in Glanvill. As was mentioned above, the preoccupation of the canonists was with dowry, the wife's gift to the husband. In England, it was dower, the husband's gift to the wife, that was of chief concern. Glanvill began his treatment of this subject with the statement that dower was demanded by both ecclesiastical and secular law. For reasons that we have seen, the canonists could not make a donation of any sort a requirement for the validity of marriage. However, they favoured it, for the publicity of the gift helped to establish the publicity of the marriage itself. In England the endowment of the bride at the door of the church was incorporated into the sacramental liturgy. Glanvill's remark is some indication of the effectiveness of this support of the system of dower. However, it is significant that, although questions touching the validity of a marriage were normally referred to the courts Christian, questions as to the constitution of dower at the door of the church were not. This information was sought from a jury of neighbours. The jury might include the priest who had questioned the groom about the provision for his wife, but his presence was not necessary. The law of the Church and its concretization in the ritual encouraged the gift of dower and, what is very important, gave it a place within a public religious act. But it did not demand it for the validity of marriage.

20 For orientation in this problem see F. Joüon des Longrais, La conception anglaise de la saisine du xii\textsuperscript{e} au xiv\textsuperscript{e} siècle (Paris, 1925), 315-317.
21 Tenetur autem unusquisque tam iure ecclesiastico quam iure seculari... (VI. 1); see above, n. 3, where it is pointed out that dos in Decretum, C. 30, q. 5, c. 6 was interpreted as dower.
It was admitted in England that judgment of nullity of marriage or separation pertained to the spiritual forum. But the extent to which accessory proprietary pleas belonged to this jurisdiction is one of the problems that still require clarification. A decretal of Alexander III that was probably addressed to the bishop of Bath ordered that a husband, who had been separated from his wife by the bishop's judgment, be compelled to return her dowry. But other letters of the same pope imply that he did not press the right of the courts Christian to judge of lay fee even though the plea began as a matrimonial case before this jurisdiction. On investigation, the lay courts are found to be enforcing a division of land following the separation of a couple similar to that sought by canon law. Like it they were especially concerned with the wife's dowry. On declaration of the nullity of her marriage, she could recover landed property from her former husband by a writ of novel disseisin. Similarly, her husband's heirs could bar her claim of dower. As in the canon law it was held that the adulterous wife should be punished by loss of property. The generally held opinion that she forfeited her claim to dower was reinforced by the Second Statute of Westminster, c. 34 (1285) in which it was denied her unless the husband had freely received her back before his death. Cases concerning the movable portion of the wife's dowry pertained to the courts of the Church, being one of two pleas de catallis et debitis that were permitted them. But the extent of this jurisdiction as exercised by the courts Christian remains largely unexplored. From the first years of the thirteenth century it is evident that the husband can come before this court to demand payment of dowry in movable property by the donor or his heir. But did this jurisdiction seek to

23 Cited above, n. 9. In 1224, Henry III obtained the support of the pope in his efforts to recover the dowry given with his sister Joan to Hugh de Lusignan, who had married Queen Isabella instead: Regesta pontificum romanorum, ed. A. Potthast (Berlin, 1874-5), 7293; Comp. Va, IV, 3, 1 (ed. Friedberg, pp. 180-181).
24 X. IV. 17, 4-5; cf. A. Morey, Bartholomew of Exeter, Bishop and Canonist; a Study in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, 1937), 68:70.
25 E.g., Curia Regis Rolls [hereafter cited as CRR], vol. II, 267, 298 (1209), V, 251; XIV, no. 1387; cf. Flower, op. cit., 102-103.
26 E.g., CRR, XI, no. 1852 (1224).
27 See Pollock and Maitland, History, II, 394-396.
29 ... cognitio de maritaggio pertinet ad forum ecclesiasticum de denariis (CRR, XIV, no. 575, dated 1230). Similarly, London, PRO, KB 26/124, m. 18d (Michaelmas, 1242).
supervise the return of the movable part of a wife's dowry that remained after the dissolution of her marriage? After separation could it force her husband to support his children by her? Would it even seek to enforce the return of the wife's dowry lands by ecclesiastical sanctions? There are many indications in episcopal registers of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries that the answer will be yes to all of these questions.\(^{30}\) As yet, however, an answer is not possible. It is hoped that current studies of the ecclesiastical courts of England will provide the information that is needed. For the moment it can safely be maintained that at least an important moral pressure was exerted by the bishops and their courts in defence of all the property rights of women, following declaration of nullity of marriage or separation from their husbands.

When we turn to the position of the widow in common law, we find that her legal defence came to rest normally with the secular courts. Her rights had tended to suffer during the power struggles within feudal society, so that by King John's time the lot of the widow of the upper classes was a rather hard one. She had become an asset of king or lord; her right to marry or not to marry was largely dictated by financial and political needs.\(^{31}\) Late in John's reign a powerful current in the opposite direction set it. The Barnwell chronicle tells us that the king was already moved to improve the widow's position in the concessions made late in 1212 after his withdrawal from the Welsh campaign.\(^{32}\) As is well known, the widow's rights to dower, dowry and inheritance, a share in her husband's chattels, and reasonable necessities and shelter during the period pending award of dower were expressed with increasing care in a series of clauses extending from the 'Unknown

\(^{30}\) E.g., in Registrum Roberti Winchelsey, ed. Rose Graham, Cant. and York Soc. (Oxford, 1952-6), I, 163-164, 256, judges are ordered to see that "omnianque bona mobilia et immobilia ipsius mulieris" are returned to the plaintiff following the declaration of the nullity of her marriage (1297); a similar case is in Registrum Henrici Woodlock, dioecesis Wintoniensis, A. D. 1305-16, ed. A. W. Goodman, Cant. and York Soc. (1940-1), II, 556. In 1348 Reginald Webbe appeared before the court of the bishop of Rochester and agreed to support his children by Joan Akerman: Registrum Hamonis Hetho dioecesis Roffensis, A. D. 1318-32, ed. C. Johnson, Cant. and York Soc. (1948), II, 1004.


Charter' through the Articles of the Barons to their final statement in the Charter of 1217.\textsuperscript{33} When court records resume once more after the advent of Henry III, they not only convey the impression that the royal courts were well equipped to defend the widow's right to dower and marriage portion,\textsuperscript{34} but that her pleas enjoyed certain procedural advantages as well.\textsuperscript{35} It is evident that the final statement of the widow's right to choose her state, to marry when and whom she would, and of her property rights was almost exactly that which the canonists had sought for her seventy-five years before.\textsuperscript{36} I have no evidence that canonical teaching was explicitly invoked in the preparation of this portion of Magna Carta. It was undoubtedly well known to Archbishop Langton and the other bishops, and it seems reasonable to conclude that it contributed to the climate of opinion in which such notions about the widow could be stated and enforced.\textsuperscript{37} King John himself had undoubtedly acquired more than passing acquaintance with the papal notions of the widow's rights in the long struggle with Innocent III over the dower of Queen Berengaria.\textsuperscript{38}

It becomes apparent even in this brief examination of dower and the rights of women on the termination of their marriage that, in the period during which the main principles governing married women’s property in English common law were stated, the canonists provided

\textsuperscript{33} ‘Unknown Charter,’ cc. 4, 6, edited by C. E. Petit-Dutaillis, Studies and Notes Supplementary to Stubbs’ Constitutional History, trans. W. E. Rhodes (Manchester, 1908-29), I, 117-118; Articles of the Barons, cc. 4, 17, 35; Magna Carta (1215), cc. 7, 8, 11, 26; Reissue of 1216, cc. 7, 8, 20; Reissue of 1217, cc. 7, 8, 22; Reissue of 1225, cc. 7, 8, 18 (Stubbs, Select Charters, 9th ed. by H. W. C. Davis, 286-289, 294-296, 327-328, 341-342, 350).


\textsuperscript{35} Essoins of bed-sickness and royal business were disallowed in pleas of dower in CRR, VIII, 137 (1219); XII, nos. 176, 1026; XIV, no. 4. See Flower, op. cit., 238.

\textsuperscript{36} For a consideration of the state of widowhood by a twelfth-century English author see A. Morey, Bartholomew of Exeter Bishop and Canonist, 67 and c. LXII Augustinus de bono viduati quis in Bartholomew’s Penitential, printed ibid., 228-229.

\textsuperscript{37} Roger of Wendover mentions that during the meeting of the barons in London, August, 1213, Archbishop Langton showed them the Coronation Charter of Henry I and suggested that they use it to recover their lost liberties. This charter guaranteed the rights of widows in chapters 3 and 4 (ed. Stubbs, Select Charters, 118); see F. M. Powicke, Stephen Langton, Ford Lectures, 1927 (Oxford, 1928), 113-116.

some of the legal notions, and their law served as a support and occasionally as a development of the common law. One has a strong impression that the two jurisdictions had a remarkable identity of purpose. This impression disappears when attention is turned to the testamentary rights of the married woman. In some ways the most profound influence of the canonists on common law was through their contribution to the law of wills. The general law of the Church with regard to the testament was not only applied in England, it was developed to an extent unknown elsewhere. By Glanvill’s time the courts Christian had acquired an intrinsic jurisdiction over the will; they dealt with questions touching the validity and contents of the act. During the last years of King John’s reign an extrinsic jurisdiction was admitted in the same courts so that their powers were extended to include supervision of the execution and enforcement of most wills.\(^{39}\) Finally, during the middle years of the thirteenth century, the bishops consolidated their position as supervisors of the distribution of the movable property of the intestate.\(^{40}\)

This unique jurisdiction influenced the property rights of the wife in three ways. The first and most enduring consequence was not derived from the theory of the canon law nor from the intention of those officers of the courts Christian who accepted jurisdiction in testamentary cases, but it was to prove of major importance. Given the complete control of pleas of land by the civil courts, the assumption of testamentary jurisdiction by the ecclesiastical courts meant that succession to movable and immovable property came under different authorities. A general and consistent view of the property rights of husband and wife became difficult, if not impossible. This division is probably one of the main reasons for the wife’s unfavourable position before common law with regard to chattels.\(^{41}\) The second and third influences of the canon law of wills tended to compensate for the first effect. They are to be seen in the attempt to establish and defend rights of the wife in the chattels of the family. An effort was made on the one hand to give her a power of bequest, while on the other hand the testamentary freedom of her husband was subjected to limitations so that a portion of his movable property would be reserved to her.

\(^{39}\) Sheehan, op. cit., 164-169.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 169-176.

\(^{41}\) See Pollock and Maitland, History, II, 482-483 and Holdsworth, History, III, 525-528.
The power of bequest exercised by the married woman is described by Glanvill in a chapter that immediately reveals the tension between that which was enforceable by law and that which was fitting (pium esset et merito valde honestum). Since the wife can own no chattels, she does not have the right to make a will. However, Glanvill considers it to be fitting that her husband permit her to bequeath that part of his property that would fall to her if she survived him.  

We now know that the 'fitting' responded to the desires of a large part of the population. The same tension between the legal and the suitable appears again in Bracton and Fleta with an even stronger note of suitability attached to the bequest of clothing and jewels that were especially associated with the wife's personal use. But during the next two hundred years the common law would unfold the implications of its initial decision that the wife could own no chattels. This process carried through to completion in the teeth of strong resistance has been described in the great histories of English law and can be read there.

However, there was resistance to this process, and it is to one part of it that we must now turn.

In synodal decrees of the thirteenth century English bishops claimed a right of bequest for all adults. By this time, of course, canonists were fully aware of the Roman law touching the persons to whom testamentary freedom was extended (a group that included the married woman), and they were able to draw on it. However, it should be remembered that the roots of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in testamentary matters did not lie in a canonical theory of family property but in a theory of alms; within the framework of that theory, the freedom to bequeath was as much the need of the wife as of the husband or the widow. Glanvill witnesses to this point of view when he makes a distinction between the testamentum and the ultima voluntas, pointing out that even the latter, which was especially associated with the final gift in alms, was not permitted the wife without her husband's permission. Beginning with the statutes of Bishop Walter de Cantilupe of Worcester in 1240 the bishops stated the wife's right of bequest again and again. However, the synodal statement of the wife's testamentary

42 De Legibus, VII, 5.
43 Bracton, fol. 60b; Fleta, II, 57.
45 C. 67, De Testamento pauperis; in D. Wilkins, Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae, 446-1718 (London, 1737), I, 674. The wife's right of bequest was stated in statutes at
capacity as customary (Lambeth, 1261) or as a right to bequeath her own property (Exeter, 1287) was easily met by the common lawyers. They pointed out that the wife had no such customary right and that she could not be expected to bequeath the property that, by her state, she was excluded from owning. A last great effort to state and defend the wife's position was made in the provincial statutes of Archbishop Stratford in 1342. This occasioned a protest in Parliament two years later that strengthens the impression of a deterioration of the situation. There would be further efforts but the common law stood firm. It is perhaps an indication of the decline of the Church's hopes for the testamentary capacity of the wife that in 1287 Bishop Quivil could speak of the wife's clothing and other personal effects as being so much her own that they were not included in the division of property in thirds on her death or that of her husband, while in the middle of the fifteenth century, Lyndwood pleaded that at least the wife's paraphernalia should be freely bequeathed.

So far as can be seen the pressure exerted by the courts Christian throughout this debate remained on the level of persuasion. I have discovered no example where it is certain that the husband was excommunicated for hindering execution of his wife's will. Nor is there any example of a bishop declaring a wife deceased without a will

Lambeth (1261), Salisbury (probably 1257-62), Winchester (1262-5), Exeter (1287); see Wilkins, Concilia, I, 754, 714; II, 298, 155-156.


49 Episcopai registers include excommunications of those who interfere with wills of married women, but in the examples that have been examined the husband has not been identified as an offender; e.g. in 1291 Bishop Sutton of Lincoln excommunicated those who hindered execution of the will of Lecia, wife of Robert de Marays: The Rolls and Register of Bishop Oliver Sutton, Vol. III, ed. Rosalind Hill, Lincoln Record Soc., XLVIII (Lincoln, 1954), 125.
to be intestate.\textsuperscript{50} He could then proceed as her bishop to appoint an administrator to distribute her goods.\textsuperscript{51}

Such was the law. But the law was not the whole story. In fact, documents of practice during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries indicate that many wives made wills and that they were successfully implemented. Pollock and Maitland illustrated this fact for the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{52} The same can be done for the thirteenth century. From the distinctions of property bequeathed in the wills of these women, it becomes clear how strong was the resistance to the system of chattel ownership described by Glanvill, Bracton and others. A good example is provided by the will of Agnes de Condet, which can be dated 1223 or a little earlier. The testatrix indicates the sources from which her legacies were to be drawn, and reveals an attitude towards married women’s property far removed from that described by Glanvill. The husband granted her one half of the chattels on his lands. The income of a manor was to be devoted for one year after her death to the completion of her will as was the income from a wardship that she had purchased from her husband. Finally, those chattels that were her own (\textit{omnium que mea sunt}) were to be sold for the same purpose. The residue of her property was to be distributed for the good of her soul at the discretion of her executors.\textsuperscript{53} Many other examples of this sort of document could be given from the early years of the reign of Henry III well into the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} This fact was noted in the Year Book of 5 Éward II: E d’autrepart si femme devie intestat l’ordinarie s’entremettera point (ed. G. J. Turner, Selden Society, LXIII [1947], 241). An interesting case of the year 1347 appears in the register of Bishop Hamo de Hethe of Rochester: William Miller is charged with unlawful disposal of the goods of his wife who died intestate. He appears and swears that “dicta Alicia bona aliqua non dimisit de quibus testari potuit.” The entry concludes with the remark “unde nos officialis predictus prefatum Willelmmum ab officio nostro dimittimus propter paupertatem Alicie prenotate,” implying the possibility that there could have been intestate succession in Alice’s case; see \textit{Registrum Hamonis Hethe}, II, 972.

\textsuperscript{51} On episcopal supervision of distribution of the property of the intestate see Plucknett, \textit{History}, 729-731.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{History}, II, 428-429.


\textsuperscript{54} E.g., the will of Cecily, wife of Geoffrey Huse, 1287 (London, PRO, E/210, 291); the will of Lucy Lundeys, 1299 (Wells, Library of the Dean and Chapter, Liber Albus, R. I, fol. 128), summarized in \textit{Hist. Mss. Comm. Report}, 28, Vol. I (1907), 165-166. For the fourteenth century see the examples from York discussed in Pollock and Maitland,
In the Middle Ages it is very difficult to know how frequently married women made bequests. Most early wills have come down to us because they included a legacy of land. But, since wives did not normally control the devolution of real estate, only a small proportion of their wills has survived. Occasionally, however, one can establish proportions between the number of wills made by men and women. Thus in the diocese of Rochester, during the Black Death, circumstances were such that some comparative figures can be established. In 1347 in a small group of villages the wills of 51 men and 20 women were proved. Of the women's wills 12 were presented for probate by the husbands of the deceased, two were the wills of unmarried women and five the wills of women of undetermined status, of which at least one was probably married at the time of death. The following year the wills of 78 men and 37 women are mentioned. Of the latter, 14 were presented for probate by the husband of the deceased, two were the wills of unmarried women and 21 the wills of women of undetermined status, of which at least four were almost certainly married at the time of death. Thus it seems possible to conclude that, although the common law of England steadfastly refused to enforce the will of the married woman, in fact she very often managed to distribute property at death. I do not wish to give the impression that canon law was the unique or even the most important cause of this practice of bequest among married women. The desire to give alms at death and manifest affection in this way was prior to any law. Yet it seems beyond question that the efforts of the bishops and their courts were partially responsible for the continued attempts by married women to exercise a testamentary capacity. Due to this influence many wives made wills and these wills were executed. As a result two thirds rather than one half of a family's chattels were distributed. These facts are of importance to the social and economic historian as well as to the historian of law.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the husband exercised his right of bequest within a quota system. There were various arrangements, according to local custom, though by far the most common


55 See Registrum Hamonis Hethe, Index s. v. 'Wills-Probate,' Vol. II, 1270.
provided a third of the movable property for husband, wife and children. The courts of the Church supervised this distribution. They do not seem to have advanced a position of their own as to the portion to be bequeathed, but were content to honour the custom of the locality. The exercise of a testamentary power within a quota system poses many problems. Even in the wills of the thirteenth century it is sometimes evident that husbands were deciding which pieces of equipment, animals, etc. would constitute the portion reserved to their wives and children. Soon they can be seen extending their freedom of alienation over larger and larger portions of their movable property. During the fourteenth century this tendency apparently reached its term. The provincial statutes of 1342 condemned those who alienated all their property on their death-beds by gift inter vivos, to the neglect of wife, children and others. Twenty-five years later, a statute of Archbishop Thoresby of York mentioned that men were using their wills for the same purpose and condemned the practice. Pleas before the royal courts show that wives and children were occasionally seeking their portions before this jurisdiction. Though the bishops were opposed to this neglect of obligations, their courts could not, or would not prevent it. Husbands were drawing out the implications of the system of chattel ownership that had been announced by Glanvill; if they had outright ownership of all the movable property of the family, it seemed reasonable that they should be able to dispose of it all in their own way. The details of this important and uneven development remain to be investigated. But the results are clear: by Elizabeth's time, in much of the province of Canterbury, the wife's claim was denied. It was only in the distribution of the property of the intestate, a distribution supervised by the bishop, that a portion of the husband's movable goods was reserved to his wife.

57 Pollock and Maitland, History, II, 350-356.
58 Ibid.
59 Wilkins, Concilia, II, 706, cc. 8, 9. An example of this procedure is mentioned in Registrum Hamonis Hethe, II, 988: Thomas son of John Amfrey appears before the court and says that his father did not make a will but "diu ante mortem suam bona sua omnia alienavit" (1348).
60 Wilkins, Concilia, III, 70.
61 For an account of these pleas before royal courts see Pollock and Maitland, History, II, 351-352 and the supplementary information in Plucknett, History, 743-745.
63 Plucknett, History, 729-731. The widow was often made administrator of the estate of the intestate husband.
It is in the law of wills that the canonists made one of their chief substantive contributions to English common law. But in two important areas of this law of wills, namely, the persons to whom testamentary freedom was extended, and the portion of a husband's movable property over which his power might be exercised, the canonists supported a position that was opposed to those principles of chattel ownership that were adopted by the common law. The position of the ecclesiastical courts was not accepted. This rejection involved a serious set-back to the property rights of the married women of England.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies*
Canon Law in England
on the Eve of the Reformation *

R. J. SCHOECK

The canon law is indeed a vast sea; and increasingly in modern times both the law of the Church (once understood as so fundamental to "the entire life of the Church and Christian society") and its complex and technical literature (once accessible to and a part of the training of a larger part of the learned professions) have become arcane. ¹

* An earlier version of this paper was given at Yale University in December 1962 under the auspices of the St. Thomas More Project as 'Sir Thomas More and Canon Law in England.'

¹ Still the standard scholarly text is the edition of the Corpus iuris canonici by A. Friedberg, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1879-81; rpt.d 1959). Also consulted: J. F. Schulte, Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf die Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1875-1880); A. Tardif, Histoire des sources du droit canonique (Paris, 1887); Stephan Kuttner, Repertorium der Kanonistik: 1140-1234 (Vatican City, 1937); E. F. Jacob, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch, 2d ed. (Manchester, 1955); Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory—The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism (Cambridge, 1955); F. W. Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of England (London, 1898), together with the summary of the literature of this important controversy, and an evaluation of the case, by H. W. C. Davis, "The Canon Law in England," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte... Kanon. Abt. III (1913), 344 ff. The more recent study of the late Z. N. Brooke has reinforced Maitland's point of view by its use of early collections of canons and decretales: The English Church and the Papacy from the Conquest to the Reign of John (Cambridge, 1931), which concludes that "The English Church recognized the same law as the rest of the Church: it possessed and used the same collections of Church law that were employed in the rest of the Church. There is no shred of evidence to show that the English Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was governed by laws selected by itself" (p. 113). See also S. Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, "Anglo-Norman Canonists in the Twelfth Century," Tradition, IV (1949-51), 279-339.

For the earlier period see Paul Fournier and Gabriel Le Bras, Histoire des Collections Canoniques en Occident depuis les fausses Décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratien, 2 vols. (Paris, 1931-1932); and a useful recent survey of the later period is Willibald M. Plöchl, Geschichte...
But what I propose to discuss is not so much technical aspects of the canonista's work (for which I can claim no competence) as the importance of canon law for St. Thomas More and his times, together with some aspects of common-law links with canon law. It is so much a terra incognita, as Ullmann recently characterized it in surveying modern canonistics, that I may be excused, I trust, from the charges, first, of trespass and, second, of sciolism. And it is with an awareness of the risk I run of reproducing elementary historical and legal learning that I offer this survey of the state of canon law in England on the eve of the Reformation, together with some prospects for future studies.

In the fifteenth century there is no way around the canon law; it touched every Englishman in most of his important activities. To follow Haskins' convenient summary:

For the canon law was the law of the universal church, which claimed authority everywhere, not only in religious matters but in many spheres now reserved to civil authority alone...

Canon law was operative, first, upon the religious and their diverse monasteries, churches and foundations (ratione personae), and ultimately this jurisdiction affected the social and political structure of Lancastrian and Tudor England. And by virtue of the subject matter (ratione materiae), canon law claimed jurisdiction over all questions of ecclesiastical organization and administration, questions touching the property and property rights of the church, questions growing out of the sacraments, such as marriage and family relations, also wills, vows, pledges, and contracts resting on good faith. On the criminal side it was


G. Le Bras has recently made an eloquent statement of "the fundamental importance of canon law for the entire life of the Church and Christian society" in his Prolegomenes (Histoire du droit et des institutions de l'Eglise en occident I—Paris, 1955); equally eloquent is the Wimmer lecture of Stephan G. Kuttner, Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law (Lutrobe, Pa., 1960).

See my cautionary note "Was More a 'Roman Lawye' " in Notes and Queries, 94 (14 May 1949), 284; and the further discussion by J. D. M. Derrett, "Withernam: A Legal Practice joke of Sir Thomas More" (Manuscripta VII, 1961). 211 ff. In "The Libraries of Common Lawyers in Renaissance England" (Manuscripta VI, 1962), 155-67 I have initiated investigation of a question which will be broadened to include, among other things, consideration of ownership of canon and Roman law-books by common lawyers.

concerned with sin as such... particularly all false doctrine, heresy, and schism, perjury and usury, and various sexual offenses...  

E. F. Jacob's *Essays in the Conciliar Epoch* have suggested how deeply conciliar thought and consistory practice (which both drew so extensively from canon law and its glossators) penetrated thought and letters in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and Jacob's studies have been enlarged and extended for the period up to about 1400 by such scholars as Tierney and Morrall. With brilliance and erudition Kantorowicz has applied canonical lore and traditions to the illumination of the growing concept of the king's two bodies, which the English jurists of the Tudor period, Plowden especially, developed as legal fiction.  

It would be well to remind ourselves here that the training of canonists was long and exacting, for (in addition to its own arduous discipline of *memoria* and other skills) it involved competence in several related disciplines, such as the *ars dictandi* and dogmatic theology. Further, it was the twin of medieval Roman law. No one (Hughes has written)  

could be expert in the one unless almost equally at home in the other, and not even the novice was allowed to study either separately. And of the two it was the Canon Law which had the more important function in the formation of the great jurist, according to the current adage, *Canonista sine legibus parum valet, legista sine canontibus nihil*. Courts of Canon Law there were, in abundance—and there had to be—in every country of the Middle Ages...  

The point has been well taken that law in the medieval period comprised a far larger field than it does now:  

...law was a collective name for those branches of scholarship now rather loosely termed social sciences. And political science was wholly undistinguishable from legal science: politics and law were interchangeable terms in medieval days.  

---


7 Ulmann; he continues: “Empire versus papacy was a constitutional quarrel; the canonists forged the weapons for the papacy, the legists or civilians for the empire. ...” *Medieval Papalism*, 8.
And the dignity of the law (this is a point that merits separate development) and their professional dignity gave jurists high place in medieval protocol; Baldus, for one, said simply but suggestively: "Professors of Law are called priests." 8

While all this is commonplace enough for the medieval period, there has not yet been anything like sufficient recognition of the importance of the canon law in English thought and political life on the eve of the Reformation. No student can long ignore the relevance of canon law studies or question the importance of their contribution.

But of canonistics even in the late fifteenth century much less has been written than of earlier periods: for the fifteenth century as a whole we have nothing like Tierney's Foundations of Conciliar Theory, which studies the contributions of medieval canonists during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Similar studies of the canonists for their contribution to economic and even theological thought have yet to be made in any depth for the later period, 9 and we have nothing in English canon law studies for the period of More to compare with Guido Kisch's recent studies on the rival schools of Roman law interpretation represented by the mos italicus and the mos gallicus; and Plucknett has been virtually alone in studying the common-law application of canonistic principles and concepts. 10 Historians of the common

8 Baldus on Dig. A.1.1.1, n.5: "Item nota quod legum professores dicuntur sacerdotes." (Q. Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies, 123 and note 109). The other side of the coin is an anti-canonical attitude which will become familiar enough in the sixteenth century (and will be discussed below) but which began to appear as early as the twelfth century; see Kuttner, Harmony, 56. Contempt of Italian jurisprudence goes back to certain humanistic jurists, such as Cujas, who coined 'the cheap phrase that the Post-Glossators were 'verbosi in re facili, in difficili muti, in angusta diffusi.' Ullmann, Med. Idea of Law, 20.

9 It should be pointed out, however, that substantial studies have been made of individual concepts or problems of medieval wills: see Sheehan, The Will in Mediaeval England (Toronto, 1963) or of marriage (as in A. Esmein, Le Mariage en droit canonique, 2d ed. by R. Général and J. Danvillier, 2 vols., Paris, 1929-35); and, for treatment of a general topic which touches medieval canon law in England at a number of points, see Brian Tierney, Medieval Poor Law; A Sketch of Canonical Theory and Its Application in England (Berkeley, 1959). For the canon law itself, and for the effects upon the life of the Church in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the importance of one text, the "Constitution 'Cum ex eo' of Boniface VIII" has been indicated by Leonard E. Boyle, O.P., in his magisterial study in Mediaeval Studies, XXIV (1962), 263 ff.

10 There is the convenient, if sketchy summary by Ullmann (cited above in note 9); speaking of canonistics as a terra incognita in modern England, since the modern beginnings by Maitland, Ullmann points to Kathleen Edwards' work on the medieval English cathedrals, and the work of Jacob already cited. T. F. T. Plucknett's work may be
law have not been much interested in Roman and canon law influences except during the early periods, or for an isolated individual like Fortescue. For the early sixteenth century especially, the question of the influence of Roman law is a subject urgently needing attention; and this present paper is the only introductory survey known to me touching canon law influences upon the common law.\(^1\)

If historians since Maitland have been neglectful of canonicists, the bibliographers have been still more so. There is nothing in Bennett's *English Books and Readers, 1457 to 1557*, e.g., on canon law books or readers in England. Yet—to take the oldest of the traditional lawbooks (and by 1500, one already losing ground in the law schools)—although Gratian was not printed at all in England, it can be estimated that on the continent something like 35,000 copies of the *Decretum* of Gratian approached through his brilliant lectures on *Early English Legal Literature* (Cambridge, 1958), which I have discussed in a review article in *Natural Law Forum*, IV (1959), 182-90. See Lyndwood studies cited in note 13 below and equity studies discussed in note 35 below.

\(^1\) There is much material for the earlier period in Maitland's edition of *Selected Passages from the Works of Bracton and Azo* (Selden Society, vol. VIII for 1894), in which he was able to show that, inexpert though he was, Bracton's treatment of Azo's work was a first-hand study of a number of Roman and canon law sources. See also Maitland, *Canon Law in England* and the brilliant case for the defense, *English Law and the Renaissance* (London, 1901), rptd. (with some omissions but up-dating of some notes) by Helen M. Cam, in *Selected Historical Essays of F. W. Maitland* (Cambridge and Selden Society, 1957). Fortescue shows some familiarity with canon law in his *De Laudibus Legum Anglie* and *De Natura Legis Nature*; but he seems to have been caught out on a confusion of two canons and whether they emanated from a general council: see S. B. Chirmes, ed. *Sir John Fortescue: De Laudibus Legum Anglie* (Cambridge, 1942), 179. Canon law does not come within the compass of Margaret Hastings' otherwise admirable study of *The Court of Common Pleas in Fifteenth Century England* (Cornell U.P., 1947). Some attention is given to aspects of canon law in Sir Charles Ogilvie's excellent survey of *The King's Government and the Common Law, 1471-1641* (Oxford, 1958), but unfortunately the subject is nowhere treated more than passingly. There is a great deal on the penetration of canonical thought, and of the glossators in particular, in 'mediaeval political theology' by E. H. Kantorowicz *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, 1957), but little on the study and application of canonicistic teaching during the early Tudor period (except for Plowden, though nothing of his possible knowledge of canon law). See further my review, "Political Theology and Legal Fiction," in *Review of Politics*, XXII (April 1960), 281-4. In a number of valuable articles Gaines Post has contributed valuable background studies: "A Romano-Canonical Maxim, *Quod omnes tangit*, in Bracton," *Traditio*, IV (1946), 197-251; "The Two Laws and the Statute of York," *Speculum*, XXIX (1954), 417-492; "Two Notes on Nationalism in the Middle Ages: I, *Pugna pro patria*, II, *Rex Imperator*," *Traditio*, IX (1953), 281-320. Much of all this rests upon the foundation of Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* as translated by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge, 1900).
were printed by 1500.\textsuperscript{12} Copies made their way into England, of course, for there was what Hughes calls "a small army of clergy trained in the Canon Law, professional canonists who made a living by their practice in these various episcopal courts"; the most cursory check of the individual canonists in Emden's \textit{Register} of Oxford University, or of canonical literature in university manuscript catalogues, or of Oates' catalogue of the printed books in the Cambridge University Library, will reveal how much of Gratian there was.

In the year 1430 William Lyndwood, who was the archbishop's principal official, "finished his gloss on the provincial constitutions of the archbishops of Canterbury:" his work, the \textit{Provinciale}, was widely known: about fifty manuscripts are extant, and there were more than a dozen early printings. The important point is that while it was a gloss on the provincial constitutions, it is geared to the Roman canon law: Lyndwood without the \textit{Decretals} is meaningless.\textsuperscript{13} (A neat little study is to be made of Jean Chappuis, the French canonist "who gave the \textit{Corpus Iuris} its final form by adding two books of extravagants to the old statutory books." This is the Chappuis who took part, as Maitland has noted, in the Parisian edition of Lyndwood's \textit{Provinciale}.\textsuperscript{14})

But to carry forward the picture of Gratian's great availability: there are 164 post-1500 editions, of which perhaps 50 were printed by 1533. Again, some of this was for English law students at Bologna, Orleans, and other centers of canon-law studies, and perhaps a significant number was for direct sale in England. These figures take no account of the hundreds of editions of commentaries and brevia, of summae, dictionaries, and the like, both in manuscript and printed form. To all this we would then have to add the as yet uncounted editions of the

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. E. Will, "Decreti Gratiani Incunabula ..." \textit{Studia Gratiana}, VI (1949), 1-280.


Decretals of Gregory, the Sext, the Clementines and Extravagantes (both Johannes XXII and Communones), and of the Glossa Ordinaria for each of these. The canon law literature before the Reformation was indeed immense, but so far as I know there has been no special study of the English scene, although the recent announcement of Duggan’s forthcoming study of the 12th-century Decretal collections and their importance in English history promises to fill some part of the gap.  

Canon law in England at the beginning of the reign of Henry VIII was a part of the long life-line of its history; by the end of Henry’s reign the line has been cut and the study of canon law prohibited. Of this great breach of continuity Maitland has written that

No step that Henry took was more momentous. He cut the very life thread of the old learning. The ecclesiastical judges in time to come might administer such of the ancient rules as were not contrariant nor repugnant to the laws (newly interpreted) of God and the statutes of our lord the king; but they would not have been, like their predecessors in time past, steeped and soaked for many a year in the papal law-books and their ultra-papal glosses.

After about 1528 the movement against canon law and Rome is general, and a detailed history must be most complex, as Hughes, Pickthorn and Baumer have shown; but four statutes will serve as landmarks and mileposts for the long movement.

Statute 25 Henry VIII, c. 21 [1534], compelled all judges “to say that it was only ‘by their own consent’ that the people of this realm ever paid any regard to decretals or other laws proceeding from any

---


16 Canon Law in England, 92-3.

17 Hughes, Reformation, I; Kenneth Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1951); Franklin Le Van Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship (Yale, 1940).
'foreign prince, potentate, or prelate'.

The King's power to keep what canon law he chose, "and to abolish whatever he disliked was (1536) asserted by 27. Henry VIII, c. 15." And with Statute 32 Henry VIII, c. 58 (1541), "now the king, who 'is otherwise by learning taught than his predecessors in times past of long time have been,' has discovered the fraud, and is going to annul and extirp much that has passed for law." Finally (in 1546), by Statute 37 Henry VIII, c. 17, the power of the bishop of Rome is swept away, and the last canonical ties have been cut, and henceforth the work of canonists would be done in England by civilians.

Let us try to focus this general picture. We are ready to ask several questions about how much canon law Thomas More could have known, and what kind of evidence there is in More's writings concerning knowledge of the canon law.

To ask how much canon law he could have known is to invite the larger question of how much was known by common lawyers generally. It has already been indicated that More's learned fifteenth-century predecessor Fortescue was familiar with some canon law, though there is no certitude as to how much.

An important question is whether anything of canon law was taught in the Inns of Court; but at the present time we must say that we do not know. Perhaps the second (and long awaited) volume of Thorne's edition of Moots and Readings will provide new light; perhaps in the introduction to Plucknett's forthcoming edition of Doctor and Student (also for the Selden Society) there will be some treatment of St. German's knowledge of Roman and canon law, and of St. German's legal training in the Middle Temple. In the forthcoming Yale edition of More's Debellation I shall be dealing generally with St. German's legal career and knowledge, though specifically only with those elements of

---

22 See note 11 above. For Fortescue, Chrimes summarizes (p. lxxix), "the principles and ideas of Roman and Canon law loom pretty large in his mind, but he makes very few specific quotations from either. He cites, specifically or otherwise, the Institutes five times, the Digest twice, and the Codex once, showing knowledge of the Accursian gloss. His only specific and correct citations of Canon law come from the Glossa Ordinaria of Bernard of Parma, and he alludes twice inaccurately to Gratian."
legal expertise which are part of his controversy with More, in St. German's *Salem and Bizance* and More's countering *Debellation of Salem and Bizance*.

Christopher St. German, a common lawyer with knowledge of and some experience in civil and ecclesiastical law (in equity courts under Henry VII and VIII)—who very nearly deserves the epithet of "that most erudite of early Tudor lawyers" given him by Baumer—has given ample evidence of a working familiarity with canon law; the question is how much of his knowledge comes from Gerson, the *Summa Angelica* and other intermediate sources. A closer examination of *A Treatise concernyng diverse of the constucyons prouynciall and legantes* might divulge St. German's working tools and procedures. Further study is needed and an interdisciplinary seminar in St. German would be challenging and most fruitful. First, study is needed of St. German's sources and habits of thought and expression (in the light of his professional legal experience), for their own importance as well as for the further light that such studies would throw on the role of St. German in Cromwellian England and the remarkable similarity of St. German's writings to later Acts of Parliament, as, notably, the Act for the Submission of Clergy.

Others of those whose work More studied and with whom he crossed controversial swords had more than passing knowledge of the canon law. There is Robert Barnes, whose collection of *sententiae* from patristic and canonistic writings was published in Wittenberg c. 1531: *Sententia ex doctoribus collectae*. Another was Stephen Gardiner, appoint-

23 F. Le Van Baumer, "Christopher St. German, The Political Philosophy of a Tudor Lawyer," *Amer. Hist. Rev.* XLII (1940), 631-51; see also *Early Tudor Theory of Kingship*, 37 ff. St. German seems to have retired from active legal practice and to have devoted himself to study of canon law, theology and other matters about 1522, the year that Marsigilo of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* was published. St. German was known to the sixteenth century for his learning, and his library was reputed to be among the best; see my "The Libraries of Common Lawyers in Renaissance England," *Manuscripta*, VI (1962), 159.

24 STC 10084, printed by T. Godfrey, probably in 1535; see Baumer, *Early Tudor Theory of Kingship*, 70-1.

25 See Baumer, *op. cit.*, 71: "St. German, in other words, despoiled the clergy of their traditional right to legislate without the king's consent, and thus gave effect in literary form to the principles of the 'Petition of the Commons' and the famous Act for the Submission of the Clergy." See the studies of this by J. J. Scarisbrick, "The Pardon of the Clergy, 1531," *Cambridge Hist. Journal*, XII (1956), 22 ff., as well as Elton, Hughes, Pickthorn, as cited. In cap. 4 of *Doctor and Student* (1531) there is an important reference to Pierre d'Ailly; see Elton, *Tudor Government*, 237. See also note 35 below.

26 Interestingly there are marginal references in this work (*Sententia doctoribus collectae*...
ed Bishop of Winchester in 1581, who is a notable example of the bias in favour of canon and civil law among the Henrician bishops; for Gardiner, Tunstal, Lee, Bulkeley, Bonner, and Thirlby are all examples of conservative bishops who were either canonists or both canonists and civilians, whereas there were no canonist-bishops among the reformers. Gardiner's collections of canon law, to be found as an Appendix to volume III of Strype's Memorials, give evidence of how closely the canon law was studied in the 1520's and 1530's under the light of Henrician or Cromwellian policies. A number of the passages in Gardiner's collections, some of them taken from variant versions of the Decretals, are on topics which figure importantly in More's controversies with Tyndale and St. German.

Finally, it is worth observing that the reformers sometimes drew their Patristic texts from the Decretum of Gratian, as Zwingli did upon occasion for Hilary, and Luther for Jerome, Cyprian and Gregory.

Many of More's friends at this period before his entering the King's service were ecclesiastics, and a number of them trained in canon law: Edward Lee, Richard Pace, Reginald Pole. Croke, who later visited the Italian centres of learning to collect canonists' opinions on the divorce (under the name of Ioannes Flandrensis), was an early correspondent of More.

Many of those with whom More served on embassies of the King were ecclesiastics in the Royal service, for in the small army of clergy trained in the canon law was, in Hughes' words, "the reservoir whence..."
the king could draw those civilians whom the conduct of national affairs demanded." 31 Richard Sampson and Tunstal worked together with More on the commission sent to the Low Countries in 1515; Tunstal had begun his career in 1509 as chancellor to Archbishop Warham; Sampson as chancellor in Wolsey's see of Tournay about 1514; and both were in the king's service (as Smith puts it) 32 before "the issue of Henry's divorce with Catherine placed the trained canonist at a premium." This is doubtless the context of More's advice or reminder to Oxford University that "the State needs men learned in the law."

It is difficult to put a limit on the interest and lore More might have developed in his long relationships with these and others who taught or were involved in the canon law. What is equally important is that More's ideas of reform are likely frequently to have differed from the ideas of those whose spirit asked "what is, rather than what ought to be." 33

For students and practitioners, canon law in the early sixteenth century—Chappuis helped greatly to organize and standardize, but he did not change the nature of the study—was still a rewarding if exacting study; for, as Smith has reminded,

The knowledge of canon law had become the criterion for clerical promotion. Bishop's chancellors, diocesan vicars-general, and archdeacons were all trained in the intricacies of church law. 34

In the circle of More's continental friends, Budé was a notable Romanist, who had more than a nodding acquaintance with canon law, and Busleiden another. Erasmus has been studied by Guido Kisch most thoroughly, and there is now no doubting his expertise in questions of jurisprudence.

31 Hughes, Reformation, I, 73.
32 Smith, Tudor Prelates, 40. Smith also notes (p. 53) that Tunstal, More and Stokesley were co-executors of Linacre's will.
33 J. A. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction (London, 1926), 8-9; cf. Smith, Tudor Prelates, 45.
Although he was himself not trained in the law [as Gilmore summarizes Kisch’s thesis], Erasmus’ ethical ideas circulated widely among the humanist lawyers, and it is particularly significant that Erasmus included a discussion of *sumnum ius summa iniuria* [that is, that the rigour of the law untempered by equity is not justice but the denial of it] in his influential collection of adages. Kisch traces the expansion of Erasmus’ ideas through the various editions of the *Adagia* from the first in 1500, when Erasmus is already contrasting the literal meaning of the law with the realization of justice, to the last editions in Erasmus’ lifetime, when he has incorporated legal materials supplied to him by his friend Boniface Amerbach...  

Vives was another humanist with a very wide range of interests, and his was an important role in disseminating the Aristotelian conception of *epieikeia*. He was of course one of the most influential educational reformers of his generation, but, as Gilmore has noted, “his legal writings, notes on Cicero’s *De legibus* and the *Aedes legum*, have been little noticed.”  

---


36 Gilmore, *loc. cit.*, p. 495; he goes on to describe the latter: “a dialogue published in Louvain in 1519, [which] was an attack on the scholastic commentators of the law,
I have been gathering material for an article on treatments of law in early Tudor literature, and two prime exhibits for canon law are Skelton and the author of 'The Image of Ipocrisy', which was long attributed to Skelton but demonstrably was written after Skelton's death, in the mid-1530's.

Particularly in his 'Why Come Ye Not to Courte?' Skelton voices a strong attitude concerning Roman law, together with something more than an average knowledge of it:

\begin{verbatim}
Strawe for lawe canon,
Or for the lawe common,
Or for lawe cyuyll! (413-15)

. . . . . . . . . . . .
The deuyls vycare generall,
And to his college conuentual,
As well calodemonyall
As to cacodemonyall,
To purvey for our cardynall
A palace pontificall,
To kepe his court prouynycall,
Vpon artycles iudicyall... (804 ff.)

. . . . . . . . . . . .
Decre and decretall,
Constytyucion prouynycall,
Nor no lawe canoncall,
Shall let the preest pontyficall
To sit in causa sanguinis... (1154 ff.)
\end{verbatim}

But it is the Skeltonic and still anonymous 'The Image of Ipocrisy' which blasts at the canon law most violently. One passage must suffice from this very long poem:

\begin{verbatim}
As thoughe lay men were dawes,
And dome as any stone,
With sivile and canon
To serve God and Mammon;
Righte and wronge is one.
Serche his decretalles
\end{verbatim}

especially the representatives of the Bartolist tradition in Italy. This dialogue contains a clear statement of the Aristotelian theory, explaining the conception of equity as the emendation and interpretation of the law rather than as the realization of the principle of justice in the law itself. Kisch considers that Vives may have found his sources for this conception in part in the work of Budé, whose Annotationes in Pandectas had been published in 1508, perhaps also in the work of St. Thomas, and certainly in the philosophia Christi of his friend Erasmus.
And bulles papalles,
Et, inter alia,
Loke in his palia
And Bacchanalia,
With his extravagantes
And wayes vagantes:
His lawes arrogantes
Be made by truantes
That frame his function
Into distinctions,
With cloutes of clawses,
Questyons and cawses,
With Sext and Clementyne,
And lawes legantyne...\(^{37}\)

Let us turn now to consider Thomas More himself as jurispritus, not only because of his historical importance and because More was the most distinguished common lawyer of his generation, but because more than ten years ago I asked "Was Sir Thomas More a 'Roman Lawyer':" wanting to point out the stiff requirements for admission to Doctor's Commons, which More did not at that time meet, and to strike a cautionary note by indicating that there were other Thomas Mores in the legal profession at that time. Recently a biographer of Sir Thomas Elyot has confused our Thomas More with another of that name in making our Sir Thomas a student of the Middle Temple.\(^{38}\) I still feel that we cannot be absolutely certain that More was admitted to Doctor's Commons in December 1514: indeed, his plea of ignorance of Roman law in 1534 is much harder to accept if he had been admitted to Doctor's Commons. But I am now convinced that More had more than a smattering of Roman law, and that his admittance was probable. As Derrett has summarized, with More's earlier career in mind: "More was highly interested in Roman law, but from the more or less academic angle of the sources of the fundamental law of all countries. The international questions in which he took part, and the learning of the scholars in the Low Countries with whom he debated, will have helped to sharpen his interest."\(^{39}\)


\(^{38}\) See my article in N. & Q., 194 (1949), 203, and discussion by Derrett (both cited above in note 2); Stanford E. Lehmburg, Sir Thomas Elyot, Tudor Humanist (University of Texas, 1960), 60, which I have corrected on this point in Manuscripta, VI (1962), 110-2. See further my "Sir Thomas More: Humanist and Lawyer," forthcoming in University of Toronto Quarterly (1963).

\(^{39}\) Derrett, loc. cit., 220.
CANON LAW IN ENGLAND ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION 139

It is a fact that in 1534 in a letter written to Dr. Nicholas Wilson from the Tower, More spoke of his lack of competence in canon and civil law:

Now concerning those poyntes I never medled. For I neyther understand the doctors of the law nor well can turn their book. And many thynges have there since in this great matter grown in question wherein I neyther am suffycyently learned in the law nor full enfurmed of the fact...⁴⁰

But is this not what one would expect from a former councillor who lies in prison suffering the displeasures of his prince? The 1530's were times when canon law expertise might be rewarded or might equally prove to be dangerous, and this is the vein of More's earlier reference in a letter to Cromwell earlier in 1534 to "an ordinary process of the spiri⁴¹ nal law, whereof I could little skill." In any case, we can now adduce considerable evidence that More did understand some of the doctors of the law and did at times know how to turn their books.

It is not yet possible to fix a *terminus a quo* for a knowledge of canon law greater than the layman's, but let us begin with More's service as a page in the household of Cardinal Morton, then Archbishop of Canterbury; a bright lad might well have picked up considerable legal lore in such a situation.⁴²

There were of course canon law lectures at Oxford which More conceivably might have heard, though he was there only two years before being brought home by his father, then a rising barrister and about to become a serjeant. The delicate balance of canon and common-law jurisdiction, to be disturbed so often in More's lifetime, is likely to have been a topic of conversation in his father's house during the 1490's, when *prerogativa regis* was being lectured on in the Lincoln's


⁴¹ *Selected Letters*, 209; *Correspondence*, 495.

⁴² E. M. G. Routh writes: "To Morton's table came men of letters, nobles, statesmen, lawyers, priests and friars, and travellers... The boys serving in the great dining-hall, as they waited silently behind their masters' seats, handling dishes or pouring wine, and eating, as they stood, whatever might be given them from the table, had the opportunity of hearing discussions on all the topics of the hour...and the pages themselves were sometimes drawn into talk by their elders, who took this means to test their readiness and wit." *Sir Thomas More and His Friends, 1477-1535* (Oxford, 1934), 5. Morton was a doctor in both laws and began his career as an advocate in the Court of Arches (E. Foss, *Judges of England* [London, 1870] 464).
Inn readings;\textsuperscript{43} and young Thomas More is likely to have encountered ecclesiastical law directly during his years in the Charterhouse; indeed, the very fact of his staying on without vows for several years raises a number of interesting canonical problems.\textsuperscript{44} Unfortunately, we cannot speak in any detail of his studies in Lincoln’s Inn.

Perhaps in his lectures on Augustine’s \textit{De Civitate Dei} about 1501 More would have considered some aspects of canon law, but lacking these lectures we do not know; nor do we know how much, while More was writing his biography of Pico della Mirandola, he might have been interested in Pico’s canon law studies, or whether he may have interested himself in the teaching of law at Paris and Louvain, when he visited those universities about 1508.\textsuperscript{45}

We do know that after 1510 he held the office of Under-Sheriff of the City of London: there would have been some contacts with ecclesiastical jurisdiction, not only in the inescapable and routine dealings with birth, marriage, death and wills or with a notorious \textit{cause célébre} in these affairs (in the Hunne affair, to which I shall return), but also in matters arising from the fixing of fair prices and the like, which problems the church kept under scrutiny. It is purely conjectural, at present at any rate, to speculate on the subject-matter of More’s own readings in Lincoln’s Inn in 1511 and 1514-15.\textsuperscript{46}

In his \textit{Richard III} (c. 1513), he glances at the canonical requirements for the priesthood, showing a precise comprehension of what was then called bigamy; and some of the glosses to \textit{Richard III} show a certain degree of canonical knowledge.\textsuperscript{47}

I do not know whether anyone has ever asked of More’s \textit{Utopia} the question of how much is built upon or in reply to canonist theorizing about the state, but it is a question worth asking.\textsuperscript{48} And only Surtz,


\textsuperscript{44} However, Chambers quotes a modern Carthusian (Dom Lawrence Hendriks, \textit{The London Charterhouse} [London, 1889], 65) as a reminder that “in those days the rule which limits visits and retreats to ten days was not in force;” see R. W. Chambers, \textit{Thomas More} (London, 1935), 77, and notes to \textit{Harkesfield’s Life of More} (E.E.T.S., O.S., 186, 1922), 311.

\textsuperscript{45} See Chambers, \textit{Thomas More}, 98; Routh, \textit{More’s Friends}, 35.

\textsuperscript{46} See my “Sir Thomas More: Humanist and Lawyer” (note 38 above), and my summary of More’s Lincoln’s Inn connections in “More and Lincoln’s Inn Revels,” \textit{Philological Quarterly}, XXIX (1950), 426-30.


\textsuperscript{48} There are political questions like the founding of a state, traceable back to the
I think, has so much as glanced at *Utopia* in the context of the 5th Lateran Council which lasted from 1512 to 1517 and was so much concerned with reform; the final report of the Council (it is worth remembering) began: *Canonisti dicunt*.49

In 1519/20, in his *Letter to a Monk*, More speaks of having read the Decretals ‘long ago’ (coepi tandem velut per nebulam recordari eiusmodi olim quippiam me legisse in codice Decretorum Pontificum). That earlier reading of the Decretals was certainly well before his letter to Dorp in 1515, in which the reading of Decretals figured significantly, and amusingly. “If ever you see the Decretals, Erasmus,” Dorp had remarked; More repeats this remark and then comments, heaping sarcastic coals upon Dorp’s head for his implication that Erasmus could not see, or had not read the Decretals:

as if, of course, he could in no way see the Decretal letters [Decretales epistolas] which you imply you have seen.50

It is likely, then, that More could have been working with and studying in canon, and with it Roman, law before December 1514, the date that a Thomas More was apparently admitted to Doctors’ Commons. I say ‘apparently’ because there is still the possibility that some names were added later. His advocacy in the case of the Pope’s ship seems to have involved greater skill in common law than Roman, though the arguments would have ranged outside the ordinary sphere of the common law.51 But we must still recognize the extraordinary nature of More’s admission to Doctor’s Commons: that he, a common

---

49 Surtz, *Praise of Pleasure*, 177, 225, note 228, note; Mansi, *Concilia*, XXXII.


lawyer, should be admitted to a professional association of canonists and civilians without a formal period of study at a university of recognized faculties in the two laws, and without even any academic degree much less the advanced degree in law and the specialized ecclesiastical practice that were required. 52

There are further arenas of More's activity and sources of knowledge. At the embassy to Bruges in 1520-21, references were made to More's skillful handling of "multasque rationes, jura, leges et canones." 53 Indeed, the importance of canon and civil law in the King's Council, for doctrine as well as procedure, is another matter to be investigated.

In 1525 More became High Steward of Oxford and Cambridge, and he would have been responsible for the trial of privileged persons of the universities (scribes and servants, not clerks), and this would at times have involved some elbowing with the canon law. 54

As Chancellor after 1529 he is likely to have been called upon for more than familiarity in a number of areas of canon law jurisdiction, though I cannot at present say how much: I hope some day to deal with More's work as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and as Lord Chancellor of England in a separate study. 55 Certainly the question of

52 See my article in N. & Q., 194 (1949), p. 203, and Derrett, loc. cit., 211 ff. It must be stressed that we do not know the requirements for admission to Doctors' Commons which were in effect in the earliest years; W. S. Holdsworth has discussed this particular point (at p. 236) and Doctors' Commons more generally and fully (pp. 235-9) in his History of English Law, 3d ed. (London, 1945), IV.

53 Chambers notes (Thomas More, 175) only that references to "More's polite speech and calm bearing are noted." Hanserecesse (1256-1535) bearbeitet Dietrich Schöfer, 25 vols., III Teil, VII (1905), Sächsische Städtetage zu Braunschweig—verhandlungen 3a Brügge, 1521 Sept. 12-Nov. 30, notes further: 'ipse valide cor instare multasque rationes, jura, leges et canones ad hoc diu..." I am indebted for this and other lore to Prof. R. S. Sylvester.


55 See generally Philip Hughes, "The Constitution of the Church," in Under God and the Law, ed. Richard O'Sullivan (Westminster, Md., 1949), 59-88, on the full, and complicated, legal system of the Church of Rome. More was a Privy Councillor, and procedure in Council was generally a 'simplified variant' of that in Courts of Civil or Canon Law. On the duties and jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, see the works of E. F. Jacob, especially his essay on "Chichele and Canterbury," Studies in Mediaeval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke (Oxford, 1948), 386-404, and the Essays in the Conciliar Epoch, cited above in note 1. More's career as Chancellor, 29 October 1529 to 16 May 1532, is discussed briefly by Chambers, Thomas More, 236-252, 267-282, but there is ample material to be studied in the List of Early Chancery Proceedings preserved in the Public Record Office,
equity was of paramount importance in Chancery in the early sixteenth century, and several streams of jurisprudential thought here come together, and the question merits attention.

There had been first the initial influence of Aristotle on the Roman lawyers quite early in the Middle Ages, followed by the introduction of Roman thinking by such common lawyers as Bracton. Then there was "the assimilation of Aristotelian thought by the romanists and canonists of the later middle ages," with an application of this assimilated thought to Chancery proceedings in the fifteenth century through the simple fact that the medieval chancellors were invariably bishops who called to their aid (as Hughes has put it) "the principles and the practice of another system with which they were familiar, and which they were daily employing in their lives as bishops, the Canon Law of the Holy Roman Church." A third development was the "reception of Aristotelian theories in the jurisprudence of the sixteenth century:" the mos gallicus of the humanistic jurisprudents which ran counter to the mos italicus, the approach of the Bartolists; and we have already touched upon the immensely important role of Erasmus in the circulation of ideas of justice among the humanist lawyers. By virtue of his position as Chancellor of England and of his own line of thought and that of his friends, More stands very much in the middle of the humanism of jurisprudence.

An immensely significant, but still incompletely studied, factor in the sixteenth-century expansion and circulation of ideas of equity and a basic attitude of hostility towards the canon law itself was the publication of Marsiglio of Padua in 1522. The way had been prepared by Ockham, who "cites episkeia in approaching the problem of appeals from, and judgments on, a legitimate Pope who has fallen into heresy"

Vol. VI (1922). That the Chancellor was traditionally versed in the Canon Law is a point that has often been made: See C. Ogilvie, The King's Government and the Common Law 1471-1641 (Oxford, 1958), 35; and Select Cases in the Court of Chancery, (1364-1471) ed. W. P. Baildon (London, Selden Society, vol. 10, 1896). For an introduction to the legal education of Lord Chancellors before More, see Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, I, 213-422. Coing has noted independently that "in the period from 1390-1515 at least fifteen chancellors had studied canon or Roman law" (p. 238, note 76).

56 Gilmore, "Jurisprudence of Humanism," 494-5; Maitland, Selected Passages from Bracton and Azo, passim.

57 Hughes, Reformation, I, 73, and Gilmore, "Jurisprudence," 494.

58 See discussion above and note 35. On equity in canon law, see Charles Lefebvre, "Le rôle de l'équité en droit canonique," Ephemerides iuris canonici, VIII (1952), 305-321, and cf. equity in chancery discussed in note 35 above.
[Octo Questiones, I, XVII], and as Morrall has argued, "this context is strikingly close to the problem of Papal intransigence which faced Gerson and his fellow supporters of a Council at the time of the Schism." 50 The combined impact of Marsiglio, Ockham and Gerson upon English political thought of the 1520's and 1530's was, as I hope to develop more fully elsewhere, immense, and the guiding spirit, I believe, was Christopher St. German.

Certain it is that by the time More became Chancellor he had become familiar, in different ways, with canon law. Finally, there was the Hunne affair, which occupied men of London, and of all England, for three decades. Clearly no one could speak out as More did on the Hunne affair without being quite certain of the canon law on the questions of a mortuary, i.e., the customary burial payment, of the liberties of the Church, and of lay-clergy relations. More's interests were several: Hunne's resistance to the claims of the clergy to offerings was supported by popular feeling in London at a time when More as Under-Sheriff of London had such close ties with the city. To the priest's suit in ecclesiastical court, which was won, Richard Hunne brought an action for praemunire in the king's bench, which was lost; charged with heresy for possessing a Lollard Bible and lodged in the Lollard's Tower, Hunne was found hanged. Though the coroner's jury, a common-law proceeding, found for murder, an ecclesiastical court traversed the finding and adjudged Hunne a heretic post mortem. It was a most interesting case in the intersection of common-law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in which More was very much concerned at the time, and at which he tells us in the Dialogue he was present.60

50 Gerson and the Great Schism, 121.

60 On the Hunne affair see: A. F. Pollard, Wolsley (London, 1929), 31-40. His statement that he was present is contained in the Dialogue (III, ch. 15): "I was also myself present at the judgment given in Poules, whereupon his books and his body were burned. And by all these things I very well know that he of whom ye have heard this matter hath told you tales far from the truth" (ed. Campbell, London, 1927), 233-4. The point has been well made that in the Hunne affair, so extreme a case of anti-clericalism, the popular fear of ecclesiastical courts (a familiar story in the England of Langland and Chaucer) fanned the flames of the feelings of London crowds. As Elton from his distinctive point of view discusses the point: "The [ecclesiastical] courts excited much dislike and even hatred among the laity, with heresy and tithe the two issues which caused most trouble. In general, fear and dislike of the courts played its part in the notorious anti-clericalism of early Tudor England. Their jurisdiction interfered widely in the private lives of the laity; their procedure differed from that of the common law, and though it was not so different from that of the conciliar courts it was conducted in incomprehensible Latin;
Further, More's brother-in-law John Rastell was granted "the lands, tenements, goods and debts of the heretic Richard Hunne," together with the wardship of Hunne's two daughters; and apparently he envisaged the marriage of the girls to his own sons, John and William.61 It is an affair which More continues to discuss in the controversial writings, as late as the Debellation, and the questions of tithes, mortuaries and offerings continued to be disputed matters between the London clergy and citizenry during the 1520's and 1530's. Little wonder, then, that More should speak with such knowledge, and such feeling, about the Hunne affair.62

In the immense controversies that More wrote while he was Chancellor and afterwards, there is much evidence of familiarity with canon law. In the Dialogue Concerning Tyndale there is good indication that he was familiar with the compiling of Gratian's Decretum and this at a time when historical study of canon law was unknown:

And, therewith, I took down off a shelf among my books the register of Saint Gregory's Epistles, and therein turned to the very words which are by Gracianae [Gratian] taken out of his second epistle ad Serenum episcopum Masse-silie[us], and incorporate in the decrees.63

So too in Second Part of Confutation (C. IV), he discusses Gratian's 'compiling' and 'gathering'. In the same Dialogue we find More referring to the Oxford Council of 1407, for which he probably was using Lyndwood, though he does not cite the Provinciale, because a little further on he does refer to Lyndwood:

And therewith I set him forth the constitutions provincial, with Linwood thereupon, and turned him to the place in the title, De Magistris...64

they were thought to be particularly oppressive and expensive; and it was freely alleged that vexatious suits at the instance of clergy or even of counsel eager for business were common. How far they deserved their evil reputation has not yet been established. ..."


62 In ch. xv of the Dialogue, and in the Apology and Debellation, passim.

63 Dialogue, p. 264. It is noteworthy that when Pole returned to England under Queen Mary, he (no mean legist and canonist himself) brought with him as legal adviser Antonio Agustin (1517-1586), who has been described by Maitland as one of the most learned lawyers of that age (in English Law and the Renaissance), and that it was Agustin who began the historical study of the canon law: see H. D. Hazleton in General Preface to Chrimes ed. Fortescue De Laudibus (Cambridge, 1942), p. xxv, and F. de Zulueta, Don Antonio Agustin (David Murray Lecture, Glasgow, 1989).

There are numerous references to or uses of canon law and decrees of particular Church councils in the *Apology* and *Debellation*, so much of this controversy with St. German turning around the contrasting or opposing treatment of heretics in common and in canon law.\(^{65}\)

Here and elsewhere such important parts of More's thought as his concept of *ecclesia*, of the power of councils, of papal *plenitudo potestas*, and of justice, must be assayed against the work of the glossators and post-glossators: it is a vital area for study.\(^{66}\)

We must conclude that Sir Thomas More was more than ordinarily interested and competent in the canon law, in part because of his own extraordinarily wide-ranging interests in legal matters and in ideas of justice, but in part also because of the importance of the canon law in England down to 1535. Hughes has reminded us\(^{67}\) of Maitland's saying that "the Chancery in the Middle Ages was 'peopled with canonists.' No less (he goes on) is this true of the 'Foreign Office' of those days. And it is the reverse side of this picture that the hierarchy was peopled

My Yale co-editor Dr. Richard Marius has kindly called to my attention the following passage in *More's Confutation* (1557 *Works*, p. 623 [misnumbered 561]:

[The pope] leteth none of his to obeye theyr higher powers, but by the canon lawes of the churche, commaundeth euerie of them to obeye theyr higher powers, and to keepe & obserue the lawes of the prynces and countries that they lyue in.

\(^{65}\) E.g., the frequently cited *extra. de hereticis* (X.5,7, esp. c. 9-15); *c.f.* Lyndwood (1679 ed.), 288 ff. These canons and decrees are further identified and discussed in the forthcoming Yale edition of the *Apology* and the *Debellation* by J. B. Trapp and the present author; this controversy between More and St. German is, for England, the most significant battle over canon law.

\(^{66}\) There would be firm foundation in the work of Maitland, *Canon Law in England*, 49, 72; of Ullmann, *The Medieval Idea of Law*, and Medieval Papalism; of Tierney, in *Foundations of Conciliar Theory*, and "Canonists and the mediaeval state," *Review of Politics*, XV (1953), 378-88, and "Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the canonists," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), 40-70: and of Jacob, *Essays in the Conciliar Epoch*. There is a convenient survey by Tierney, "Some Recent Works of the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists," *Traditio*, X, (1954), 594-625. Mention must be made of P. A. Sawada, "Two Anonymous Tudor Treatises on the General Council," *Journal of Eccles. History*, XII (1960), 197-214, for its significant demonstration that material for the composition of these two treatises of the 1530's (Hatfield MS 46, and *A Treatise...* [STC 24237]) was drawn not only from the *Digest* and the *Decretals* but from Bartolus' gloss on *Dig.* 1, 14, 3, and from one of the aids for studying the *Decretals* of Gregory IX (Book III, tit. 94, *De voto et voti redemptione*).

\(^{67}\) Hughes, *Reformation*, I, 77. On St. Ambrose's reminder to the young Emperor Valentinian II that "things divine are not subjected to the imperial power" (*Ep.* XX. 8 (*PL.* XVI, 1089A): *quea divina sunt, imperatoriae potestati non esse subjecta*), see Kantorowicz, *King's Two Bodies*, 188.
with civilians. Strange antecedents, indeed, for diocesan bishops, pastors of men's souls, spiritual guides; but how much stranger for men whose duty it might be to play St. Ambrose and give to Caesar the great reminder, *imperator intra Ecclesiam non supra Ecclesiam est,* a text which (to gild Hughes) we may find in the *Decretum* (C XXII qu.8 c.21 S.1) and the implications of which More's actions and words of 1534 and 1535 made manifest.

Is it to be wondered at, then, that canon law had so immensely large a role in the affairs of Lancastrian and early Tudor England, that the canonist-civilian bishops should have bulked so large in the Henrician hierarchy, and that an episcopacy so highly specialized in so technical a law could have grown so out of touch with the realities of their own times?—for More's sense of that reality see Book I of *Utopia*—but that is a story that Hughes has told consummately well in the first ninety pages of his *Reformation in England*, and Baldwin Smith has told us much of what we want to know about the Tudor prelates and their weakness for or in Tudor politics. And of More we might say that he was *jurisperitus*, in canon law that is, but not committed to it— in the law (as he was in the world), but not of it.

Any attempt to understand early Tudor history or political thought without considering the theories and discussions of the canonists is incomplete, if not fruitless; for the influence of the canon law in pre-Reformation England was immensely far-reaching and immensely significant. I trust that I have been able to indicate something of that influence, and to suggest, if only as a prospect for future studies, the importance of canon law in the career and writings of Thomas More, as well as St. German and other contemporaries.

*St. Michael's College, University of Toronto*

---

68 One must find room for recommendation of Sir Maurice Powicke's *Reformation in England* (Oxford 1941, 1961). Closer study of their ideas in the light of their places of study, of their masters and models, is now in order.

69 See Ullmann's parallel statement of the importance of canon law for medieval history in *Medieval Papalism*, 8.
Chaucer and the Dido-and-Aeneas Story

LOUIS BREWER HALL

No investigation to date has revealed any satisfactory immediate source for the adaptations of the Aeneid in Chaucer’s House of Fame or his “Legend of Dido.” The editors of the anonymous Excidium Troiae found a unique parallel between that work and the “Legend of Dido” in the fact that Aeneas, before “he stal away to his navye,” left his sword standing at the head of Dido’s bed.¹ A comparison between the Ilias Latina of Simon Aurea Capra and The House of Fame led Prof. Albert Friend to conclude that Simon’s adaptation was in the “background of Chaucer’s reading” when he was working on the first book of The House of Fame.² These articles, however, are inconclusive in identifying either the Excidium Troiae or the Ilias Latina as Chaucer’s immediate source.

Ultimately Chaucer’s story had to come from the Aeneid, of course, and a detailed comparison between the story of the Aeneid and Chaucer’s adaptations has been made by E. F. Shannon in Chaucer and the Roman Poets.³ Shannon demonstrated that Chaucer in general manipulated the Vergilian material to extol Dido and condemn Aeneas, fusing the story of the Aeneid with the attitude of Ovid’s seventh letter of the Heroides. Whether Chaucer consulted Vergil directly cannot be decided with complete assurance until we know a great deal more of a specific nature about the level of Chaucer’s linguistic accomplishments, a subject we cannot pursue here. In any case, the fourteenth-century translation of Andrea Lancia would have provided Chaucer with a reasonably accurate rendering of Vergil’s narrative content in Tuscan prose, a language with which he was familiar, as we know.⁴

The approach taken by Shannon as well as by those who searched

³ (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 196-208.
⁴ G. Folena in his introduction to La Istoria di Eneas (Palermo, 1956), xxvii-xl, discusses the importance of this work.
for a unique source ignores the fact that during the entire Middle Ages a tradition of Vergilian adaptation had developed, and Chaucer's adaptations should be evaluated in their relation to this tradition as a whole and not in their relation to only one representative of it. This will be our procedure here, and in addition we shall compare each of Chaucer's adaptations with the other. In this way we shall be able, first to discover elements common to them all; second to learn just what qualities there are that differentiate Chaucer's two treatments of the story from these common elements and from each other.

We have selected five examples as representative of the medieval tradition in redacting the Aeneid: the Excidium Troiae, which had its composition before the sixth century but which was still being copied in the thirteenth;\(^5\) from the twelfth century, the Roman d'Enéas;\(^6\) the redaction of the Aeneid in the Primera Crónica General;\(^7\) Simon Aurea Capra's Ilias Latina;\(^8\) and from the thirteenth century, I Fatti d'Enea, the selection from Guido da Pisa's Fiore d'Italia.\(^9\) In all of these adaptations the story of Dido and Aeneas and sometimes of the whole Aeneid is told at length and with enough significant differences to provide profitable instances of comparison.

The authors of these adaptations, we discover, employed five primary techniques in medievalizing the Aeneid:\(^10\) first, the suppression of book two and most of book six of the Aeneid; second, the use of the ordo naturalis; third, the addition of Trojan history or other material not related in the Aeneid; fourth, the use of roughly contemporary though idealized settings and characters; and finally, the use of a variety of techniques to motivate the changes that occur in the story. As we examine the redactions for the first technique, we discover that I Fatti d'Enea preserves more of the wanderings of Aeneas, books two and three of the Aeneid, than any other adaptation, but that in the rest Aeneas' sea voyage is interrupted, soon after he leaves Troy, by a storm which drives the refugees to Carthage. The trip to the other-

---

\(^5\) Edit., Atwood and Whitaker, xiv-xv.
\(^7\) Edit., Ramón Menéndez Pidal in Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Españoles (Madrid, 1955), I, 33-44.
\(^8\) Edit., André Boutrém, Scriptorium 1 (1946-47), 267-288.
\(^9\) Edit. Basilio Puoti (Florence, 1845). In addition we can discover a myriad of references to the story of the Aeneid from Ausonius' Cupido Cruciatum though the works of Dante, Petrarch, Boccacio, Chaucer, and Gower. In these instances the story is not told at enough length or with enough detail to contribute appreciably to our study.
\(^10\) Perforce I have had to repeat some of the categories as I used them in "Caxton's Enéidos and the Redactions of Vergil," Medieval Studies XXII (1960), 136-137.
world, book six of the *Aeneid*, is treated summarily in the *Ilias Latina*, the *Roman d'Eneas*, and *I Fatti*, ignored in the other works, though Guido da Pisa is worried about the problems of truth this episode raises.\(^{11}\) As a result of these condensations the story of Aeneas now revolves around two principal episodes, the story of Dido and Aeneas, and the story of the fight in Italy. It was the first of these two episodes that became one of the most popular love stories of the Middle Ages, as we know.

The second of the techniques of medievalization, the use of the *ordo naturalis,\(^ {12}\)* was preferred in three of the redactions: the *Excidium Troiae*, the *Primera Crónica General*, and the *Ilias Latina*. In the *Roman d'Eneas* the order of events is generally from Troy to Carthage, but twice the author interrupts the strict chronology: first, for events of the Trojan War before the fall, inserted after he has described the destruction of the city (vv. 101-183); then for the story of Aeneas' own vicissitudes during the fall related as a story-within-a-story after the banquet. In the *Fatti* Guido also employs the *ordo artificialis* to relate Aeneas' wanderings.

We recall that at the end of book one of the *Aeneid* (vv. 321-340) Venus appears to Aeneas and tells him the early life of Dido. Venus' story is an interruption of the strict chronological movement, but medieval commentators understood this kind of interpolation as a necessary accommodation within the *ordo naturalis.\(^ {13}\)* All adaptations include this information about Dido though none except Simon's *Ilias Latina* introduces Venus.

The beginning and end points of the *ordo naturalis* were not clearly defined, and adaptors extended their limits to include events before the fall of Troy\(^ {14}\) and after the death of Turnus. The *Excidium Troiae*

---

\(^{11}\) Ma in che modo fosse quest' andata fu favoleggiata di Virgilio, e quest' intendimento è poetico, altri dicono che quest' andata non fu altro che il savio e sottile considerare che fece Enea delle cose terrene e delle cose che dovevano avvenire, e questo intendimento è morale; altri dicono... fu per arte di Negromanzia... e questo intendimento è magico... e se egli vi andò visibile, anche qui nasce un altro dubbio, cioè, se egli vi andò col corpo o senza corpo. Chapter xxviii, p. 76.


\(^{13}\) Faral (p. 55) cites Cornificius, "ad casum temporis accommodatum."

\(^{14}\) Interest where to begin the Troy story was reflected in scholia of the *Ars Poetica*, line 146, *ab ovo*: Similiter qui vult bellum Troiae narrare, non ex illo tempore facta Graecorum et Trojanorum incipit narrare, quo Iuppiter sub specie cygni cum Leda matre Helenae concubit, sed potius ex eo tempore quo Paris Helenam rapuit. Ed. Botschuyer, I. 485.
commences with the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, the *Roman d'Enneas* with the dispute over the golden apples, the *Ilias Latina* with the birth of Paris. The *Primera Crónica General* and *I Fatti d'Enea* connect the Vergilian story to events in African and Italian history respectively. The prophecies of Anchises about the future glory of Rome (*Aeneid* VI: 756-853) are transferred to the end of the relations as a terminus for the *ordo naturalis*.

All the adaptations employ various degrees of exaggeration by which the Roman ideal is transformed into a medieval ideal, a process which Dorothy Everett in her *Essays on Middle English Literature* called the idealization of ordinary life.\(^{15}\) The process can be observed most vividly in the *Roman d'Enneas*. In this work Carthage is a medieval walled city built on a high rock perfect for defense; one side is protected by a river, the other by a marsh. The defense is enhanced by a revolving bridge and a magnetic wall which holds fast both mailed knight and his weapons (vv. 407-416; 433-440). The city has a true rarity in the Middle Ages, wide streets (v. 459), and Dido's feast for Aeneas another rarity, sufficient light (v. 838). The great detail which exists all through the *Roman* is found in no other adaptation, and in all of them physical descriptions of the setting are minimal.

Detailed descriptions of the protagonists are also meagre, though Dido is idealized as a queen, hostess, and paragon of beauty. Simon in the *Ilias Latina* is the most exuberant. Here Dido not only possesses those qualities that make her an ideal queen, but also she lacks only immortality of being a goddess.\(^{16}\) To describe Aeneas the adaptors emphasize his handsomeness and nobility, but all details of physical appearance are lacking. Simon, for example, makes use of a nice *traductio* between *Venus* and *vemustus* for his description: *Hec natum Veneris plus ipsa matre vemustum* (v. 589).

For our final consideration of the technique by which the *Aeneid* was medievalized let us examine how both Dido's passion and Aeneas' desertion were motivated by our various authors. In the *Primera Crónica General* Dido's love, culminating in marriage, is the result of a natural process aroused by Aeneas' good looks: there is no substitution of Cupid for Ascanius nor any storm and rendezvous in the cave (*Aeneid* I: 695-722; IV: 90-172). Guido relates both the substitution

\(^{15}\) (Oxford, 1955), 8.

\(^{16}\) *Vis breuiter doceam dotes Dydonis?* *Eidem*

*Posse mori demas, nil uetat esse deam...*

*Iusticia, sensu, studiis, animoque uiriliu,*

*Preter amare nimir, nil muliebris habet.* (vv. 583-584; 587-588).
and meeting in the cave but calls the first a fable as he did with Aeneas' descent to the other-world.17 The other redactions rely on magical elements, though in varying degrees, to arouse the passion and bring it to a climax. The Roman d’Eneas, for example, does not relate the substitution, but Ascanius is endowed with the magical kiss directly.18 To express the change that took place in Dido's attachment—her loyalty to the memory of Sycaeus forgotten in her love for Aeneas—Simon employs a verse that is basically a proverb: *Et uterem mutat cor multibre novum* (v. 580). Almost any collection of *sententiae* and proverbs contains warnings against changing new friends for old.19

When we examine the cause for Aeneas' desertion, we find that only in the *Primera Crónica General* is it entirely independent of the Roman gods, and in this work the author changes the sequence of events in the *Aeneid* to accomplish his purpose.20 Guido attributes a single visit of Mercury to a fable, but the desertion in the *Fatti* still depends on it. In the *Excidium Troiae* the flight of Fama, the prayer of Iarbas and a single trip of Mercury are all utilized. The author of the *Roman d’Eneas* had a different problem, for he had to preserve sympathy for Aeneas after the desertion. Fama brings the news of Dido's affair to the nobles of Carthage, who calumniate Dido for her licentiousness (v. 1573), and later in the narrative the author reminds his listeners that Aeneas still received a message to leave on behalf of the gods (v. 1616). Dido's licentiousness provides an excuse for the desertion, and the message relieves Aeneas of responsibility for it; in this way

17 Questra trasformazione di Cupidine in Ascanio non importa altro se non che la reina Didone s’inflammò d’amore di Enea; onde Virgilio per abbellire questo amore favellìa che Venere, la qual secondo l’error de Pagani era tenuta la Dea dell’ amore mandasse Cupidine in forma d’Ascanio ... edit. Puoti, 43.
18 ... puis apela [Dido]
   l’fant, qui a son pere vint;
   acola lo, soef lo tint,
   molt lo baisa estroitement ... (vv. 802-805).
19 Ignotum notis noli praeponere amicis

20 ... y estas cosas [Aeneas’ marriage to Dido and the wealth of Carthage] le frazenie ser uicioso e rico e poderoso ... dixo quando so padre muriera en Cezilia quel prometiera de frazer grandes onras en su sepultura e de dar mucho por sa alma quando conseio ouisses que la pudiesse fazer, ca estonce no lo uuira complir nin tenie de que; mas pues que era rico e abandado, que en todas las guisas tenie que lo deuie complir, e por end querie yr alla. Edit. Menéndez Pidal, 89.
the stature of Aeneas is preserved. Simon Aurea Capra concentrates more on the effects of the desertion on Dido than on the motivation for it.

The five works we have been examining are widely separated geographically and chronologically, yet the techniques by which the story of Æneas was adapted for the various audiences and to accomplish the various purposes of each author are similar, and a continuity of adaptation existed from before the Middle Ages until the fourteenth century which included the five conventional techniques we have been exploring. We are now in a better position to understand Chaucer's adaptations, for these conventions will explain much about the form and treatment of this material in *The House of Fame* and the "Legend of Dido." The fact that the story of Dido and Aeneas is magnified in *The House of Fame* does not now seem extraordinary, for in all the adaptations we have seen a re-emphasis occurred as a result of the condensation of Aeneas' trips to Carthage and to the other-world. The trip to Carthage Chaucer shortens in both his adaptations as other adaptors did. Aeneas' trip "to helle" is reported only in *The House of Fame* where it is moderate in length, about what it was in the *Ilias Latina* but considerably shorter than it was in the *Roman d'Eneas*. Chaucer reminds his audience that Aeneas saw Anchises, Palinurus, Dido, and Deiphebus as well as "every turment eke in helle..." The questions of truth and of theology that might arise in the minds of his listeners Chaucer refers to *aucoritee*, Vergil, Claudian, and Dante, and these questions do not intrude on his story as they did in Guido's *Fatti*.

Chaucer is conventional in both *The House of Fame* and the "Legend of Dido" in employing the *ordo naturalis*. In *The House of Fame* he mentions the fact that Aeneas told the story of his wanderings to Dido after he landed at Carthage:

Ther sawgh I grave how Eneas  
Tolde Dido every caas  
That hym was tyd upon the see.  

(vv. 253-255)

The actual events of this story, however: the fall of Troy and the storm which blew the Trojans to Africa, these Chaucer related at the beginning of the Vergilian episode (vv. 151-196). The "Legend of Dido" contains the same type of reminder of the story-within-a-story (vv. 1152-1155). Chaucer includes the traditional appearance of Venus in both his adaptations. In *The House of Fame* she comforts Aeneas for the loss of his ships, but she tells him nothing of Dido's early history. In the "Legend" Chaucer reports the fact that Venus told Aeneas
Dido’s early history, but of that history only Dido’s marriage to Sychaeus remains:

This noble queen, that cleped was Dido,
That whilom was the wif of Sytheo,
That fayrer was than is the bryghte sonne... (vv. 1004-1006)

Chaucer has added narrative material to the basic story of the *Aeneid* in both his redactions, but the material has been adapted from the literature of love and is not historical as it was in all the traditional redactions. To the end of the Dido episode in *The House of Fame* (vv. 387-427), Chaucer appends a list of forlorn lovers typical of many others lists during the Middle Ages, and he then returns to the story of Aeneas. We recognize this list as a typical *amplificatio*, of course, and it serves to emphasize the theme of desertion. Chaucer was not interested in extending the limits of the *ordo naturalis* like the other redactors, who had the problem of coupling their narratives to the whole Trojan story and thus to the history of the world. Chaucer, on the contrary, enriched his central story by a common rhetorical device. To the “Legend of Dido” Chaucer adds the beginning of the seventh letter of the *Heroides*. We have forgotten, perhaps, that this letter was an integral part of the story of Dido during the Middle Ages. It was included as part of Dido’s history in the *Primera Crônica General*, and it was employed as far back as the fifth century as a model in the *ars dictaminis*. These opening lines of Ovid’s letter would have been familiar to most of Chaucer’s audience and gave an appropriate and recognizable close to Dido’s story in the “Legend.”

In his use of physical description, the “idealization of ordinary life,” Chaucer is very sparing. *The House of Fame* is devoid of this traditional technique of medievalization. In the “Legend of Dido” Chaucer uses the superlative for the feast:

What nedeth yow the feste to descrive?
He neveretter at ese was in his lyve. (vv. 1098-1099)

In describing the furnishings of the castle he mentions:

To daunsyne chaumberes ful of paramentes,
Of riche beddes, and of ornementes,
This Eneas is led, after the mete. (vv. 1106-1108)

Unlike the redactors who are more extensive in their physical descrip-

---


tion for example the author of the *Roman d’Eneas*, Chaucer skilfully sharpens the effect of the meagre details that he employs. He preceded his description of the furnishings of the castle by three important verses:

This Eneas is come to paradys  
Out of the swnolow of helle, and thus in joye  
Remembreth hym of his estat in Troye.  

(vv. 1103-1105)

Coming between the feast and the description of the furnishings, this contrast of the “swoLOW of helle” with “paradys” intensifies the effect of both the feast and the chamber more than a conventional description alone might accomplish. In the *Roman d’Eneas* the lengthy descriptions serve the purpose of verisimilitude, as the Middle Ages understood it. Chaucer’s descriptions serve this purpose also, to be sure, but in addition his descriptions contribute to the understanding of character and to the understanding of the relationship between characters, which they do not in other adaptations. Thus in Chaucer the descriptions become a more carefully integrated element of the overall effect.

This integration of description and overall effect can be observed especially in Chaucer’s descriptions of Dido and Aeneas. In the “Legend” Chaucer, like Simon, makes Dido a goddess. He accomplishes this by suggesting that the Christian God might find her worthy if He “wolde han a love.” In addition she is here an ideal queen as she is traditionally:

...she was holden of alle queenes flour,  
Of gentilisse, of fredom, of beaute.  

(vv. 1009-1010)

These attributes are those that were conventionally associated with Dido in our five adaptations, but each of these ideal qualities now furthers the audience’s judgment of Aeneas. Because of Dido’s gentility, “refreshed most he been of his distresse.” Chaucer emphasizes Dido’s liberality in a long list of gifts so that she “In fredom passen alle.” Her beauty “al the world... hadde yfred.” This combination of conventional traits now serves to intensify Aeneas’ treachery. In spite of the gentility, the liberality, and the beauty, Aeneas is not honorable. He lacks even the basic gratitude owing Dido as a hostess. Thus again we see that Chaucer employed the elements common in the traditional adaptations, but he used them economically getting a very powerful effect from a minimum of detail.

When we come to examine the characterization of Aeneas, we find that in *The House of Fame* he is a “traytour” to love, one who:

Wol shewen outward the fayreste,  
Tyl he have caught that what him leste.  

(vv. 281-282)
The role of Aeneas as traitor is not emphasized in the traditional adaptations, but this "exemplary figure," to employ E. R. Curtius' term, appears in many other works of the Middle Ages, two of which come most readily to mind. We find Aeneas as traitor in the Roman de la Rose, where the Duenna warns Bialacoi against his like.23 Then Christine de Pisan refers to him as traitor in "L'Epistre au Dieu d'Amours." 24

When he describes Aeneas in the "Legend of Dido" Chaucer employs the conventional details of the traditional adaptations, but now this description helps to interpret the relationship between Dido and Aeneas. Aeneas is reported only as he appears to Dido. He is "lyk a knight;" he is "lyk to been a verray gentil man," and "wel a lord he semede for to be." Like her Spanish counterpart, Chaucer's Dido notices Aeneas is "formel wel of braunes and of bones" (vv. 1066-1071).25 Like Simon Chaucer compares Aeneas to his mother, Venus, but English does not allow the play on words that the Latin achieved:

For after Venus hadde he swich faynnesse
That no man myghte be half so sayre, I gesse. (vv. 1073-1074)

These conventional details in the "Legend" are important for the motivation of Dido's falling in love, but first let us examine how this passion was motivated in The House of Fame, for we shall accept the hypothesis, generally held, that The House of Fame was written before the "Legend." In The House of Fame we discover a double motivation for the love affair, one the result of divine manipulation, the second the result of a weakness in Dido's character. Chaucer has no substitution of Cupid or cave scene, yet he still attributes the cause of the passion to Venus:

She made Eneas so in grace
Of Dido, quene of that contree,
That, shortly for to tellen, she
Becam hyrs love, and let him doo
All that weddynge longeth too.  (vv. 240-244)

In addition, Chaucer wants Dido's passion to exemplify a general law of human conduct:

Loo, how a woman doth amys
To love him that unknowne ys! (vv. 269-270)

25 In the Primera Crónica General Aeneas was... muy bien faycionado de cuerpo e de miembros. Edit. Menéndez Pidal, 38.
Here we have a variant of the proverb we noticed in the *Ilias Latina*, and it is important for the purpose of instruction. Chaucer develops at some length how Dido, not knowing Aeneas, is led astray by his appearance. What results in the structure of the narrative, however, is a second motivation. The lesson Chaucer wishes to emphasize would not have been possible had Dido been solely a victim of the gods, and thus the *sentence* and the *solaas* are actually working at cross purposes.

Chaucer avoids this double motivation in the "Legend of Dido", for like Guido he attributes the substitution of Cupid to Vergil, and this incident can, then, no longer figure in the sequence of events that motivates the passion. The motivation in the "Legend" is the same as the second motivation in *The House of Fame*, Dido is led astray by false appearances, but Dido's reaction is now organic to the story. We recall that Chaucer described Aeneas only as he appears to Dido. The audience could anticipate that Dido, a victim of her senses, is forming a false idea of Aeneas, and thus a tragedy is in the offing. Chaucer leads their anticipation by the use of a traditional proverb, a variant of the one in Simon:

And, for he was a straunger, somewhat she  
Likede hym the bet, as God do bote,  
To som folk ofte newe thyng is sote.  

(vv. 1075-1077)

The integration of the description of Aeneas with the action of the story contributes simultaneously to the movement of events and to the lesson. Thus in the "Legend of Dido" the *sentence* and *solaas* are complementary.

When we examine the motivation for the desertion, we again notice a real difference between *The House of Fame* and the "Legend of Dido." In *The House of Fame* Chaucer concentrates more on the effects of the desertion on Dido than on the motivation for it as we observed Simon did. Chaucer actually circumvents the problem of motivation when he uses the exemplary figure of traitor for Aeneas, and when he reminds his listeners that Dido "loved al to sone a gest." After he relates the events of the desertion, Chaucer reminds his audience of the part Mercury played according to "the book:"

But to excusen Eneas  
Fullyche of al his grete trespas,  
The book seyth Mercurie, sauns fayle,  
Bad hym goo into Itayle...  

(vv. 427-430)

Coming as it does after the events it is supposed to motivate, this reminder relieves Aeneas of responsibility for the desertion and solves
for Chaucer the problem we observed in the *Roman d'Eneas*, how Aeneas, weakened in sympathy, can ultimately triumph against Turnus and win Lavinia. While Chaucer accomplishes this feat without ruining the character of Dido, by calling attention to Mercury he introduces another contradiction into *The House of Fame*. Aeneas cannot at the same time be a traitor to love and be excused. But in motivating the passion, here Chaucer again needs two elements: one human, on which the lesson in conduct can be based, another divine, on which the good character of Aeneas depends.

The motivation for the desertion in the “Legend of Dido” rests solely on Aeneas who

\[
\text{Is wery of his craft withinne a throwe;} \\
\text{The hote ernest is al overblowe.} \\
\text{(vv. 1286-1287)}
\]

Fama and Iarbas are mentioned, but they do not figure in the causal sequence because the prayer to Jupiter is omitted. Chaucer, however, is still able to introduce Mercury in the speech of Aeneas to Dido. Earlier in the “Legend” Chaucer gave the responsibility for divine manipulation to Vergil, and now, when Aeneas mentions the visit of Mercury to Dido, it sounds like an improbable excuse. Thus the double motivation of *The House of Fame* has been eliminated. The presence of the gods in the “Legend,” rather than weakening the independence of action, weakens Aeneas’ character.

The purposes of the various redactions, as far as anyone can determine purpose, can be used to explain the major differences found between them. Two of the redactions are patently histories: the *Primera Crónica General* and *I Fatti d'Enea*, and the authors try to avoid the use of the Roman gods. The gods were eliminated entirely from the *Crónica* and only present under protest in *I Fatti*. Simon Aurea Capra is proud of his Latin style, and no verse is without its alliteration, *anaphora, conversio* or *traductio*, and we can say that style determined Simon's treatment of the story. The author of the *Roman d'Eneas* seems to be interested in verisimilitude, and there is a rationality even about his magic. The *Excidium Troiae* presents a special case because of its mixed and obscure provenance. If it is a school text as its editors affirm, that fact would account for the simplicity of its narrative technique.

Among these redactors Chaucer alone used the story of Dido and Aeneas as an *exemplum*. He emphasized those details which would illustrate that in love—and by implication in life as well—one should not make final judgments on the basis of outward appearance. The
commentary he added to the story emphasized the lesson, a very appropriate one for The House of Fame. Probably no one would dispute that the poem treats of worldly reputation, and when later in the poem Chaucer shows how arbitrary and foolish the judgments of the world are, we realize that Dido's misfortune was a particular example of Lady Fame's general truth.

When Chaucer wrote the "Legend of Dido," telling the story for a second time as is generally believed, he now achieved a thoroughly integrated narrative. The description of Dido aggravates the treachery of Aeneas, and the description of Aeneas aggravates the error of Dido's judgment. All the essentials of the story: the elements common to medievalization, the techniques of motivation, and the lesson taught were all unified into an example of what is excellent in medieval narration.

*University of Idaho*
Chaucer’s Pardoner as Entertainer

PAUL E. BEICHNER, C.S.C.

JUST as the Wife of Bath entertains the Canterbury Pilgrims chiefly with an account of what she knows best—sovereignty in marriage—attained especially through her experiences with five husbands, so too, for the entertainment of the Pilgrims, the Pardoner tells them about his profession, in which he too is an expert—fund raising. The profession of being a wife goes on forever, but the profession of Pardoner was abolished at the Council of Trent. A modern reader of Chaucer, therefore, cannot assume that he knows about Pardners from his knowledge of the Church as it functions today. For a richer appreciation of the Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale, some attempt must be made to understand things as they were in Chaucer’s time.

In the fourteenth century, besides its spiritual ministry to the souls of the faithful, the Church had another monopoly, if you wish to call it that, directed towards the good of the body as well as the soul—charities. Whether organized or unorganized, charities, with the collection and distribution of funds or goods, were in the hands of the Church, ecclesiastics and religious orders. The motive for giving was a frankly religious one: give alms for the love of God, give to gain merit for the next life, give as a penance, give to gain an indulgence. And the funds or resources collected were used not only for churches, hospitals, schools, and the needy, but also to a certain extent for what today would be classified as public works. Indulgences were granted to those who contributed funds, supplies, or labor even for the construction or repair of such public works as bridges, roads, harbors, and the like.¹ Such contributions were considered “works of mercy” by

¹ See Dr. Nikolaus Paulus, Indulgences as a Social Factor in the Middle Ages, tr. J. Elliot Ross (New York, 1922), which gives numerous examples. Not only did bishops and archbishops of England frequently grant indulgences for bridgebuilding, but (p. 102): “The popes, also, granted numerous bridge indulgences for England. Urban V, 1364, for North Stoneham (diocese of Winchester); Clement VII, 1384, for Cowal (diocese of Argyle); Boniface IX, 1391, for Islepe (diocese of Lincoln) and Schelfrod (diocese of Ely); in 1400 for Toryton (diocese of Exeter), Kerdington (diocese of Lincoln), and Bradeforde
churchmen. One needs to be constantly aware, therefore, of how inclusive the term Church can be, and where money ultimately went, or who profited, regardless of how it was collected. W. A. Pantin gives a good example of such awareness, when, speaking about papal appointment to English benefices, he says:

The advantages, however, were not all onesided; the pope was generous in giving the king a large share in the papal tenths levied, amounting to about £230,000 between 1301 and 1324 — a convenient arrangement by which the pope incurred the odium and the king got the money.²

Although medieval men hated taxes, they were deeply religious people. Hence, by giving through the Church and for religious motives, they would support social projects or certain projects for the common good which the State could not have supported through taxation if it had tried. Charity covered a multitude of needs.

Charities today are in the hands of not one type of organization but several: 1) the Churches or religious groups; 2) secular welfare or social service organizations like the Red Cross, the Community Chest, United Fund, Care, and so on; 3) foundations, whose chief function is to distribute the large amounts of money turned over to them by millionaires, companies, etc.—Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford; and 4) the government, whether it takes care of those perennially on relief, or responds with quick relief to its citizens in major disasters such as floods and hurricanes, or whether it gives aid to schools, or whether it sends foreign aid abroad for one reason or another. Of course, government charities are paid for by taxes. The primary motive for giving to the Churches or through the Churches may still be the love of God, bolstered by secondary motives. But the primary motive appealed to for giving in other fashions is a secular one: give for the love of man or mankind, give to alleviate suffering, give to spread your ideas of democracy or the American way of life, give in enlightened self-interest. For this giving you can even gain a “secular indulgence,” now, in this life, this year—you can write most of it off against your income taxes,

(diocese of Salisbury); in 1401 for Stracerton (diocese of Salisbury) and Corbrig (diocese of Durham); in 1402 for Fordynbygghhe (diocese of Winchester) ...” (P. 104-105) “In 1401 Boniface IX granted an indulgence of seven years and seven quarantines for the improvement of the King's highway which ran from Gloucester to London, and a further indulgence of seven years for a road near York. Martin V, in 1419, issued indulgences for an embankment in the diocese of St. David's, and in 1425 for a road near York.”

especially if you are in the higher brackets. As everyone knows who has read *Everyman*, the finest of the old morality plays, the medieval theory was: "Use your goods to perform good deeds, for only they will accompany you to the next world." The Church believed this too. The theory of the modern American, however, seems to be: "Give to the cause in which you are personally interested, or the government will take it away from you anyhow."

Now Chaucer's Pardoner of Rouncival was a high-pressure fund raiser. The chapel and hospital of St. Mary of Rouncival were outside London near Charing Cross and Westminster, but the motherhouse from which this establishment was made more than 150 years earlier was in Navarre, and anyone opposed to "foreign aid" could make arguments out of the association. John of Gaunt, however, was one of the hospital's patrons. But pardoners of Rouncival were satirized, because in the 1380's unauthorized collections or "unauthorized sales of pardons" were being made by persons professing to collect for the hospital.3 Somebody was operating a racket or confidence game, and neither the hospital, the duped contributors, nor the public liked it.

The expression "sale of pardons" or "sale of indulgences" is a shorthand way of saying that a person had to fulfill all the conditions for gaining the indulgence which included the making of a donation or the giving of an alms as the prescribed good work. Because this particular requirement for gaining certain indulgences was subject to abuse in spite of all kinds of ecclesiastical legislation, and because it offered a good field of endeavor for contemporary confidence men and racketeers which the Church could not possibly police, the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century dissociated the giving of a contribution or an alms from the gaining of an indulgence and abolished the position of pardoner forever. Today the saying of certain prayers or the visiting of a church constitutes the usual good work prescribed for the gaining of an indulgence, and not the making of a contribution or offering to anything. *Quaestor*, which means "collector," is the Latin term for "pardoner;" it emphasizes the fund raising. The English term "pardoner" emphasizes the inducement offered for making a contribution, namely, indulgences—"write it off against your heavenly income taxes which will otherwise be collected in Purgatory."

There is no reason to believe that Chaucer intended to present his

---

Pardoner as a priest. "He was in chirche a noble ecclesiaste" means at most that he was but a minor ecclesiastic—a cleric or clerk. He is, therefore, not a pastor, curate, or chaplain; he does not have the cure of souls, nor does he act as a substitute for a clergyman who does. His occupation is that of quaestor, a professional collector. But the Pardoner himself is really not interested in offering indulgences except as a gimmick for getting contributions. And he has other gimmicks too—kiss the phoney relics he carries and make an offering. To make his pitch really effective, he has a trick, his "gaude," to blackmail his audiences into giving; he tells them that shameful sinners, adulterers, and such, are not permitted to make an offering. For him this device has proved to be as good as a mint. The Pardoner is of course a very clever rogue, described as such in the General Prologue, superb at raking in the profits. Like so many medieval literary characters, he is not completely rounded; in his way personifying money getting, he could almost step into a morality play. At his craft, "fro Berwyk into Ware," from the top to the bottom of England, there was never another such pardoner.

The Introduction to the Pardoner's Tale has not always received an interpretation even slightly favorable to the Pardoner, and yet it is not quite fair to shift any of the Host's blame from his own masculine shoulders to the Pardoner's back. Moved by the Physician's story of Apius and Virginia, the Host says:

By corpus bones! but I have triacle,
Or elles a draughte of moyste and corny ale,
Or but I heere anon a myrie tale,
Myn herte is lost for pitee of this mayde.

The Host suggests three possible cures for his "heart trouble:" 1) "triacle," which is an allusion to the Physician's remedies; 2) a draught of ale, which is a suggestion that the company have some refreshments; or 3) an amusing tale to dissipate the mood of the preceding story.

---

4 *Canterbury Tales*, I (A), 708. The text used throughout this paper is that of F. N. Robinson, *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, second edition (Boston, 1957). Line 416 of the Pardoner's Prologue (CT, VI [C]) with its reference to "my bretheren," and the passage line 439 ff. indicate that he belongs in some fashion to the organization for which he is "collecting," but not necessarily that he himself is a mendicant friar. Whether he has the vow of poverty or not, he is not going to be trapped into living in poverty as long as he can preach and beg, but neither will he labor with his hands like a monk. He will appropriate from his "collections" whatever he needs for living high.
Addressing the Pardoner as “beel amy,” the Host continues: “Telle us som myrthe or japes right anon” (319)—something amusing or some fabliau anecdotes. The Pardoner replies: “It shall be done; but first at this alestake, or roadside tavern, I will both have a drink and eat some cake.” He is willing to give the Host his third cure, but only after the second; and, *ne potus noceat*, he himself will have some food with his drink. The way is open: if others do not wish to drink, let them eat cake. The company does not reject the idea of refreshments, but it is concerned about the type of entertainment. “But right anon thise gentils gonne to crye, / ’Nay, let hym telle us of no ribaudye!’” (323-324)—“Don’t have him tell us a ribald story!” And them as a request to the Pardoner: “Telle us som moral thyng, that we may leere/ Som wit, and thanne wol we gladly heere” (325-326). Saying that he agrees, the Pardoner adds: “but I moost thynke/ Upon som honest thyng while that I drynke” (327-328). This three-way interchange is much more of an indictment of the Host and his wishes and tastes than it is of the Pardoner, who of course is skillful enough and ready enough to satisfy whoever is calling the tune. By his Tale with its fine *exemplum* he is able to give the “gentils” what they wanted, “som moral thyng;” and by his Prologue with its exposé of his tricks, particularly his “gaude,” he comes close to providing the Host with “japes,” a neat compromise indeed.

The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale, however, go together as a unit. They are essentially an exposition of his fund raising technique—a how-to-do-it tale, ending in a demonstration. In the Prologue, like a carnival man explaining his pitch or a stage magician demonstrating his tricks, the Pardoner is letting a select group in on his trade secrets for their sophisticated amusement. And his trade, one should always remember, is fund raising, not saving souls. To make himself appear the better fund raiser, he even plays down any spiritual good that may come from his preaching.

For myn entente is nat but for to wynne,
And nothyng for correccioun of synne.

Thus kan I preche agayn that same vice
Which that I use, and that is avarice.
But though myselfe be gilty in that synne,
Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne
From avarice, and soore to repente.
But that is nat my principal entente;
I preche nothyng but for coveitise.
His posture of wickedness and perversion is, perhaps, a little analogous to the posture of a young bully who likes to pretend that he is meaner and tougher than he really is: it makes a deeper impression on the public opinion of the small fry of the neighborhood.

And so in his Prologue the Pardoner explains his precedures and his props, turning them inside out for all to see. In raising funds he has "sold iceboxes to Eskimos," and for him it had been great sport. He knows that he has his routine polished to the perfection of a fine art, and he enjoys bragging about it. To run through that routine he tells his Tale, which is a version—for the Pilgrims—of his most successful money raising "sermon." Strictly speaking, it is not a sermon at all, but it does use his sermon stuff. He inveighs against gluttony, drunkenness, gambling, swearing—the so-called sins of the tavern—and then as an exemplum to make his words memorable, he tells the story of the three revellers who went out to destroy Death, found gold under a tree, and in their avarice destroyed each other. At the end he gives a little peroration, prays God to forgive men their tresspasses and warns them against avarice—"Now, gode men, God foryeve yow youre trespas,\textit{/} And ware yow fro the synne of avarice!" (904-905)—and makes his model pitch. "My holy pardon may cure you all, provided you make an offering of nobles or sterling, anything of silver. Come up you wives, and offer of your wool. Into the bliss of heaven shall you go, without stopping in purgatory. I will grant you an indulgence—you who will make an offering—so that you will be as clean and bright as the day you were born." And there the sample sermon ends. It must be emphasized that the Pardoner did not intend to preach to the Pilgrims to turn them away from avarice or from any other vice. He intended to give an audition of his act, for he continues: "—And lo, sires, thus I preche" (915).

Having concluded his moral tale requested by the "gentils," the Pardoner marks the fulfillment of his task by a benediction of the Pilgrims.

\begin{quote}
And Jhesu Crist, that isoure soules leche,
So graunte yow his pardoun to receyve,
For that is best; I wol yow nat deceyve.
\end{quote}

These lines are of considerable importance, for at this point, failing to recognize them for what they are, a minstrel prayer for the audience, G. L. Kittredge was misled into his "paroxysm" theory and a misunderstanding of the tone of the rest of the poem. He says:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
The Pardoner has not always been an assassin of souls. He is a renegade, perhaps, from some holy order. Once he preached for Christ’s sake; and now, under the spell of the wonderful story he has told and of recollections that stir within him, he suffers a very paroxysm of agonized sincerity. It lasts but a moment. The crisis passes, and the reaction follows. He takes refuge from himself in a wild orgy of reckless jesting:—“But see here, my friends! I forgot to tell you about my relics.”

The authority and great eloquence of Mr. Kittredge have made it all but impossible to question his interpretation. Nevertheless, I disagree with him for reasons given by G. G. Sedgewick. Although some of the Pilgrims conclude their turns with a prayer for the audience and are thus following a tradition even though the prayer be highly personal (such as that of the Wife of Bath), it is to be noted that the Summoner uses a benediction to end his Prologue:

God save yow alle, save this cursed Frere!
My prologue wol I ende in this manere.

III (D), 1707-1708

The Friar, however, had given a benediction to conclude his story of the summoner seized by the devil, and then to fan the anger of the Pilgrim Summoner even more, he added a kind of postscript or epilogue, saying that if he had had the leisure, he could have told for his benefit all about the pains of the cursed house of hell.

And God, that maked after his ymage
Mankynde, save and gyde us, alle and some,
And leve thise somonours goode men bcome!
Lordynges, I koude han toold yow, quod this Frere,
Hadde I had leyser for thiSomnour heere...

III (D), 1642-1646

The structural use of the benediction and the epilogue baiting the Summoner are paralleled in the Pardoner’s Tale.

The Pardoner’s benediction is to be taken at face value. The first two lines (916-917) could have appropriately been spoken by any Pilgrim; they have the impersonality of a traditional formula and they are sincere. The next line (918) is personal, for by it the Pardoner calls

---

6 See “The Progress of Chaucer’s Pardoner, 1880-1940,” Modern Language Quarterly, 1 (1940), 431-458. In general I agree also with Professor Sedgewick’s own interpretation of The Pardoner’s Tale, and I believe that several points of this paper give it support. I am unable to accept much of Professor R. M. Lumiansky’s article, “A Conjecture Concerning Chaucer’s Pardoner,” Tulane Studies in English, 1 (1949), 1-29, because of its pivotal contention that the Pardoner is seriously trying to extract money from the Pilgrims.
attention not only to the difference between Christ’s pardon and the pardons which he dispenses, but also to his own intention not to deceive the Pilgrims. This line of farewell is honest too. Chaucer, his Pardoner and Pilgrims knew the difference between shrift or the reception of the Sacrament of Penance forgiving the guilt of sin (the culpa), and a pardon or the reception of an indulgence remitting the penalty (the poena) or temporal punishment due to sin already forgiven. All, including the Pardoner, knew which was important. The conclusion of the Canterbury Tales, Chaucer the poet’s farewell, even though it contains formulas, is a magnificent expression of faith in the forgiveness of sin (the guilt, the culpa) and hope of salvation:

...bisekynge hem [oure Lord Jhesu Crist and his blisful Mooler, and alle the seintes of hevene] that they from hennes forth unto my lyves ende sende me grace to biwayle my giltes, and to studie to the salvacioun of my soule, and graunte me grace of verray penitence, confessioun and satisfacioun to doon in this present lyf, thurgh the benigne grace of hym that is kynge of kynges and preest over alle preestes, that boghte us with the precious blood of his herte; so that I may be oon of hem at the day of doom that shulle be saved.

Qui cum patre et Spiritu Sancto vivit et regnat Deus per omnia secula. Amen.

X (1), 1089-1091

And the Pardonner, when he uses such expressions as “my pardon,” “my absolution,” “I will absolve you,” means only that he will grant an indulgence.

In his Prologue the Pardoner has spoken about his skill as a popular preacher, and for the entertainment of the Pilgrims he has given a sample as his Tale. In the Prologue he had also spoken about his relics, bulls of indulgences, and his “gaude” or trick to compel the people to come up and make an offering. And now in the epilogue after the benediction, for the amusement of the Pilgrims he does a take-off or burlesque of his pitch using props, and he tries to secure some audience participation. He will do more than tell the Host a “jape;” he will involve him in one. “Sirs, one thing I forgot in my tale. I have relics and pardons in my pack as fine as those of any man in England. Step up folks, make an offering; kneel down and receive an indulgence. Or receive an indulgence as you ride—at every mile’s end, if you will make offerings. With my pardons I am good insurance, for perhaps someone may fall off his horse and break his neck.” The “gaude” or trick of the Prologue (that only those not guilty of serious sin would be permitted to make an offering) he now reverses. “I think I’ll begin with our Host here, for he is most enveloped in sin. Come up, sir Host, make the first offering; you shall kiss the relics every one, yes, for only a penny; get out your purse.”
Now this reverse “gaude” seems to have caught the Host by surprise, and he can’t take the kidding. The dig, “For he is moost enveloped in synne” (942), is a little too appropriate, a little too personal, and a little too much like a natural inference which could be drawn from the Pardoner’s sermonizing on the vices of the tavern. He is not going to play games with the Pardoner for the amusement of the Pilgrims if he is going to be the object of the laughter. The Pardoner has scored on him and therefore he defends himself by taking the offensive and offensively directing the attention of the audience to the Pardoner’s person. His reply is that of an angry man who resorts to vulgarity and personal abuse to counter a deft rapier thrust of wit or cleverness. He is trying to bludgeon the Pardoner into silence and he is successful.

Throughout his Prologue and Tale the Pardoner had been performing like a professional entertainer for the Pilgrims and not like a professional quaestor trying to raise funds from them. His touch in the Prologue had been amusing and impudent; and the tone of his epilogue was to have been that of jest and horseplay. But his entertainment goes sour. He had not expected the Host to make an offering; but neither did he want the Host to become violently angry. I cannot accept Kittredge’s interpretation that the Host “answers with rough jocularity, but means no offense.” The Host is trying to be as offensive as possible, for if there ever was an “argumentum ad hominem,” it is the Host’s reply (946-955) with its open reference to castration: “Thou woldest make me kisse thyn olde breech... I wolde I hadde thy coillons in my hond/ In stide of reliques... Lat kutte hem of... They shul be shrnyed...” What could the Pardoner, of whom Chaucer wrote in the General Prologue “I trowe he were a geldyng or a mare,” say in these or even less vulgar circumstances? He knows that his physical deficiency has been exposed. And regardless of whether the Host had yet said of himself—

I woot wel she wol do me slee som day
Som neighebor, and thanne go my way;
For I am perilous with knyf in honde—

the Pardoner also knows that the Host is not a man to provoke to action. Since he cannot win in a verbal duel or physical brawl, he becomes angry and says nothing. In having the last word, however, the Host conceded perhaps more than he wished, because his statement, “I wol no lenger pleye/ With thee, ne with noon oother angry man” (958-959), shows that he understood that the Pardoner was playing a
game and that he could play it too. In any event, the Knight stops further conflict and brings about a reconciliation apparently without delay or too much difficulty—"Anon they kiste, and ryden forth hir weye" (968)—but not before the Pardoner had received the embarrassing poetic justice he deserved.

What attitude should one take towards the relics of the Pardoner and the part they play in the *Canterbury Tales*? One can assert quite boldly that Chaucer believed that true relics were worthy of veneration and that he accorded them respect and veneration as a form of piety. After all, the Pilgrims are going to Canterbury because the relics of St. Thomas of Canterbury are there—"The hooly blissful martir for to seke." But Chaucer and other medieval creative writers—and for that matter, the fictional Pardoner—could play with ludicrous relics precisely because they knew what was ridiculous and what was serious, and they expected other people to know also. If a person or a society does not believe in or reverence any relics at all, there can be no false and funny relics as absurd deviations from the normal—just as it becomes a bit superfluous and unsatisfying for one person to tell another person to go to hell if neither believes in hell. "Fictitious relics," so named or described, are usually supposed to be funny as individual items or as a collection. If a reader sees nothing amusing about them, he is likely to have missed the point and should begin all over again. With his fertile imagination Boccaccio assembled a nice collection of impossible relics in the tenth story of the sixth day of the *Decameron*. Some of these choice relics are the following: the finger of the Holy Ghost, as whole and entire as it ever was; a phial of the sweat of St. Michael battling with the Devil; a bottle of sound of the bells of Solomon's temple; a feather from Gabriel's wing; and some coals from the fire over which St. Lawrence the Martyr was roasted. By letting the imagination run a while, almost anyone could invent a good list too. I offer these to start the process: the apple core thrown away by Adam and Eve; a rung from Jacob's ladder standing on earth and reaching to heaven, which the patriarch saw in his dream; a dove cage from Noe's ark; and a recording of the roar of the lions when they were not permitted to eat Daniel in their den.

Chaucer gave his Pardoner ludicrous fictitious relics too: a pillowcase which he said was Our Lady's veil, a piece of sail from St. Peter's boat, reliquaries crammed with rags and bones, a shoulder bone of a holy Jew's sheep, and a magic mitten. It seems to me that oftentimes the Pardoner's relics are taken too seriously. Certainly they are satirical, but they are also funny; and if a righteous reader becomes so incensed
at the fraud, that he cannot laugh at the absurdity of the objects, he is missing the vintage quality of Chaucer's writing.

Today ridiculous relics are too medieval or too uncommon to be a writer's matter for humor or comedy, but something has taken their place—ridiculous religious articles. However, only those people who understand the use of approved religious articles for pious purposes can see the humor of absurd deviations. I would like to pursue this point by presenting a modern instance. A few years ago a summer dramatics class at the University of Notre Dame, which consisted chiefly of Sisters, staged a musical, *The Complaining Angel*, especially written for them. It was fun for everyone who had anything to do with it, authors, cast, and audience. It received notices in the papers, *Life* and *Time*, and some foreign counterparts. In one scene—but let me quote from *Time*, July 30, 1956, p. 36:

A salesman for a religious supply house plagues the sisters with his sales talk for Rosary clickers (to show you where you were when you fell asleep), electric vigil lights ("flip it on for ten minutes on bus or car—gives you a lift for that tired feeling"), rosaries in which "each bead contains Waters of Jordan and a blessed guppy."

And there were more articles not mentioned by the reporter; for example, a St. Michael-with-a-flaming-sword cigarette lighter, for lighting candles, of course; a 12-apostles charm bracelet; and a missal with a built-in compass—it finds its own place. By a very useful coincidence for the purpose of comparison, there is an account captioned "Religious Hucksters" in the same number of *Time*, a few pages farther, in the section "Radio & Television" (p. 43):

Religious evangelists pose a peculiar problem for radio and television stations. Many are enormously popular, and some bring religion to the bedridden, the busy or the lazy. The problem arises because of a built-in difficulty: the TV evangelist cannot pass the plate. If he needs money he must ask for it. But solicitation over the air is a privilege which can easily be abused. Most stations disapprove of it and some ban it...

The more frenetic, who seem to be largely concentrated in California, offer radio listeners and TV viewers a number of many-splendored things in return. Faith Healer Leroy Kopp offers "instantaneous and gradual healing" over Los Angeles' KGER... Inducements offered by others: a plastic cross that glows in the dark ("the glow of God's presence") and, for a certain sum, of course, "a genuine autographed picture of Jesus Christ."

The fun of *The Complaining Angel* is in sharp contrast to the seriousness of the warning contained in "Religious Hucksters." And the analogy between religious articles and relics should make it easier for
a modern reader to see that Chaucer and his Pardoner are entertaining their audience, not warning them.\footnote{7} Because the Pardoner tells the Pilgrims about his false relics, his preaching of pardons only for gain, his tricks to raise funds, his disinterest in souls, his disbelief in his own exhortations against vice, his “coveityse,” and so forth—all with unparalleled candor, to say nothing of impudence—his performance has sometimes been labeled a confession. The candor of it reminds one of the truthfulness expected of sacramental Confession, but after that the similarity ends. However, it is possible for one to be led on by such candor to expect the Pardoner to show signs of contrition also, and because he does not, to call his self-revelation a false confession, thereby implying that he is even a bigger scoundrel for having spoken at all. Robert P. Miller toys with the idea in footnotes:\footnote{8}

It should be noted that Faux-Semblant, disguised as a friar, makes a similar false confession in the \textit{Roman de la Rose}. Confession is said to be false if unaccompanied by contrition.

...It is impossible, within the limits of this article, to elaborate the full irony of the situation. The Pardoner’s false confession—perversion of the second requisite in penitence;... [and several other points] all deserve investigation and can only be suggested here.

But the Pardoner is not making a “false confession” or perverting “the second requisite in penitence” because he is not “going to confession” at all. He is entertaining the Pilgrims by talking about himself, just as the Wife of Bath entertains them by talking about herself in her Prologue; and it would be ridiculous to call her performance a “false confession” because she is not really sorry that she did not treat her

\footnote{7} Analogies are not lacking in ancient history, for the ancients had their equivalent of devotion to relics. Père H. Delehaye, \textit{The Legends of the Saints}, tr. V. M. Crawford, introd. Richard J. Schoeck (University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 164: “... in the temples visitors would be shown divers curiosities whose connection with a god or hero would command their respect. In Rome were to be seen the bones of a whale found at Joppa which were said to be those of the monster to which Andromeda was exposed. In other places might be seen the cithara of Paris, the lyre of Orpheus, the ships of Agamemnon and Aeneas. And as the eager credulity of travellers rendered the \textit{neocorai} and the \textit{periegetai} as ingenious as our modern vergers and \textit{cicroni}, in the end no relic was too improbable for them to profess to exhibit: Leda’s egg, the white sow with her thirty little ones sacrificed by Aeneas on the site of Alba, the anvil which Jupiter suspended to Juno’s feet, and the remains of the clay out of which Prometheus had created man.”

\footnote{8} “Chaucer’s Pardoner, The Scriptural Eunuch, and \textit{The Pardoner’s Tale},” \textit{Speculum}, XXX (1955), 180-199; cf. notes 38 and 43.
five husbands better. Except perhaps for the boasting tone, the Pardoner seems to be speaking honestly to the Pilgrims about his dishonest practices and his unedifying self. That much Chaucer allows him, and we should give the rogue his due.

This paper has endeavored to present the view that the Pardoner was a professional fund raiser, and that in order to entertain the Pilgrims, when his turn came, he gave (1) in his Prologue an exposition of his methods, his tricks, and his props; and (2) in his Tale a sample of his money-raising-sermon stuff; and (3) in the epilogue a burlesque demonstration. Realizing that he is being made the object of laughter by being drawn into a clowning demonstration, the angry Host retaliated by focusing attention away from himself and on the physical deficiency of the Pardoner, who, of course, became angry at the exposure but had to remain silent lest he make his own embarrassment worse. The Knight restored order by reconciling the two, and they rode on. Such an interpretation avoids the assumption that the Pardoner was trying to raise funds from the Pilgrims—an assumption which creates greater problems than it solves. Moreover, it is no more reasonable to assume that the Pardoner must practice his profession of fund raising on the Pilgrims, than it would be to assume that the Physician must practice medicine on them, that the Friar must beg from them, or that the Miller must grind corn.

University of Notre Dame, Indiana
A Mediaeval "Tractatus de coloribus"

Together with a Contribution

to the Study of the Color-vocabulary of Latin

MILLS F. EDGERTON, JR.

INTRODUCTION

I. A detailed knowledge of the semantic interrelationships which existed among the lexemes of Latin, first in ancient and then in mediaeval times, is clearly a prerequisite to an understanding of the evolution of the semantic structure of the vocabulary of each of the several Romance languages. It is clear that the Weltanschauungen implicit in those structures can be understood both synchronically and diachronically only if adequate, broadly synchronic knowledge of the semantic interrelationships first of ancient and then of mediaeval Latin can be counted among the resources at hand upon which to base an investigation. Since it is not possible to question participants in either the ancient or mediaeval cultural complexes—and they are several in each case—of which a form of Latin was the primary or secondary linguistic vehicle, and since, in the case of the ancient cultures, only a relatively small amount of linguistic and other evidence exists from which to draw conclusions, while, for the mediaeval period, only comparatively abundant evidence exists (although a large proportion of it remains inaccessible because it has not yet been edited), the hope cannot be entertained that a thorough understanding of the semantic structure of Latin can be reached which would be comparable to the results which careful studies would certainly yield if carried out among participants in the French-, Italian- and Spanish-speaking cultures of today. It is, in fact, manifestly impossible ever to attain comparable thoroughness. Nevertheless, much can be done with the available evidence.

It is clear that the probabilities of success in the quest for an insight into such semantic structurings are greater if the larger problem is first reduced to smaller, more manageable areas of inquiry. To be useful, however, such areas must meet certain criteria; above all each
of them must seem to be internally coherent; each of them, that is, must appear to present a semantic unity among its constituent lexemes which seems sufficiently close-knit to justify as a working hypothesis the assumption of its existence. Two clear tests of such unity would seem to be, first, the existence of a general lexeme under which more specific vocabulary-items can be subsumed and, secondly, a body of specific vocabulary-items, large enough and attested with sufficient frequency in a variety of contexts to admit of detailed analysis, which can be shown to have been so subsumed by native users of the language in question. Lexemes the reference of which is to color-notions meet these criteria in both ancient and mediaeval Latin texts.

It seems not unwise to believe that methods and principles which, taken together, may eventually constitute a coherent structural semantics can most successfully be evolved from close investigation of such internally unified and interrelated bodies of lexemes. It is therefore perhaps not altogether foolish to hope that it will be possible to draw some conclusions of methodological value for the larger problem as work progresses in the more restricted area of color-vocabulary.

This paper presents an edition of a relevant text and an accumulation of data in the hope that subsequent additions to those here presented will ultimately permit a meaningful synthesis. It is proposed to deal in the near future with the general lexeme and its derivatives and shortly thereafter to present a trial glossary of the color-vocabulary of mediaeval Latin, accompanied by an analysis, and based primarily on the text published here and on two others which have already been edited. It is hoped eventually to be able to trace in detail the history and development of the lexical resources for the expression of color-notions of Latin on the one hand and French, Italian and Spanish on the other. An excellent preliminary study has been made, by J. André,¹ in which the broad outlines of the color-vocabulary of ancient Latin are clearly delineated and in which a vast amount of material is presented upon which, together with the ample documentation readily available for many terms in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, it will be possible to construct an investigation of the semantic interrelationships linking the individual lexemes; M. André’s book contains numerous and often detailed observations which contribute significantly to the resolution of the structural problem. The part of the total history which in all probability is crucial if we are to arrive at an understanding of the semantic structure of each of the vocabularies and if we

are to be able to compare them as units and which, at the same time, is still most in need of systematic investigation from the linguistic standpoint rather than exclusively from that of the history of art and of technology, is precisely the color-vocabulary of mediaeval Latin. The writer, therefore, first undertook in his doctoral dissertation to analyze existing editions of the manuals of Heraclius and of Theophilus and then, some time later, spent several months in the Federal Republic of Germany, supported by a generous grant from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, in search of similar works which might be of interest specifically from the philological point of view.

It is sensible to suppose that, at least in the great majority of cases, the extended and metaphorical uses of color-terms which are to be found with great frequency in mediaeval alchemical, medical and magical writings ultimately rest, at least in large part, on their less exotic and more prosaic uses in contexts, both ancient and mediaeval, such as those furnished us by such manuals of recipes and practical advice for the preparation and application of artist's colors. There is the strong probability that the use of color-terms in such specialized works will be greatly elucidated, particularly in texts on alchemy and the magic arts, when their straightforward, literal use has been clearly delineated. Since a correct understanding of the use of color-terms in alchemical, magical and even medical contexts is impossible either because of the stage of development which research into these aspects of mediaeval science has reached or because, at the very least, such an understanding requires much detailed and highly specialized knowledge of the subject-matter concerned, such that the historian of the Romance-languages is, except perhaps occasionally, incompetent to deal effectively with the problems which must be resolved in dealing with unedited texts before anything can be said about the color-terms as such, consideration of much potentially valuable material must be postponed.

II. Codex Monacensis Latinus 444 (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich), a *liber miscellaneus*, the contents of which are principally medical, contains a short treatise on color which is best titled in its own words *Tractatus de coloribus* (214v-217v), which is of substantial philological interest. It is embedded in a single signature, which in the Codex runs from 213r to 220v. The pages of this signature are somewhat smaller than the majority of those bound into this volume. The *Tractatus* is preceded in the signature by a short treatise, which is illustrated by six detailed line drawings, on the construction and use of various pieces of laboratory apparatus. There is, however, no con-
tinuity between this short treatise and the *Tractatus de coloribus*; the
treatise was not written to help the practitioner who might want
actually to produce *colores* for his palette from the recipes in the *Tractatus*.

The *Tractatus de coloribus* ends at the bottom of column I of 217v
with the statement: “Explicit tractatus de coloribus,” through which,
however, a single horizontal line has been neatly drawn. There follows
a medical treatise (217v, column II through the first one-quarter of
column II of 219v) by the same hand that wrote the second part of
the *Tractatus*. This medical text contains many words and phrases in
more or less adulterated Greek transcribed into the Roman alphabet.
The text is clear and undamaged with the exception of a hole in the
page at l. 14 of 219v/(col.)I, and another immediately following the
end of the text. In both cases the defects existed before the leaves were
used; the text is written around the first and down to the second.
Beginning immediately below the hole one-quarter of the way down
219v/II, there follows a short medical text in a different and smaller
hand in which cures for gout are specified and instructions are given
for preparing the prescribed medicaments; this text occupies the
remaining three-quarters of 219v/II and all of 220r/I, and is a later
addition to the material contained in the earlier pages, to judge both
from the hand itself and from the intense blackness of the ink. 220r/II
contains three short paragraphs, again of a medical nature, by a hand
different from all the preceding; these paragraphs occupy slightly less
than two-thirds of the column. The last third of 220r/II is blank. The
top third of 220v contains a single paragraph entitled *Ad preparandum
vinum ne colorem amittat*, written by yet another hand and added later
than the preceding parts of this manuscript. It is not written in two
columns; the lines run across the whole of the page, exclusive of a
regular and ample left-hand and an irregular and minimal right-hand
margin. The rest of the page is blank.

III. The *Tractatus de coloribus* itself (214v/I-217v/I) is dated to the
fifteenth century; on palaeographical grounds it can perhaps be
assigned to the second quarter of that century.

While the earlier pages (1-184) of the volume are paper, those with
which we are concerned are vellum, as are all of the remaining folia.
The text, written in a slightly faded black ink with red initial capitals,

---

2 *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis*, Tomi I Pars I, Codices
Num 1-2329 Complectens, Monachii A. M. D. CCC. LXVIII.
is clearly legible with certain exceptions which are dealt with below and in the Notes on the Text.

The vellum itself was damaged and repaired (sewn) before use, specifically as follows: 215r/I, the last half of l. 29 and the end of l. 30, and 215r/II, the first one-third in each case of ll. 29 and 30; 215v/I, the last third of ll. 29 and 30, and 215v/II, approximately 150 mm in the middle of l. 28, slightly more than the first half of l. 29 and the very beginning of l. 30; 217r/II, the last one-quarter of l. 24, and 217v/I, the first one-quarter of ll. 24 and 25. The repairs carried out at these points naturally affect the length of the subsequently written lines within which they occur.

The text itself has been defaced only by an obviously unintentional stroke which cuts through the beginning of 216r/1/(lines) 25, 26, 27; a clear reading of ll. 25 and 26 is not thereby impeded, but the initial word of l. 27 is rendered illegible. (Cf. Text and Note.)

At least two scribes wrote the text. 214v and 215r through l. 32 of column II are the work of one hand, while the rest of the Tractatus seems to be by a single, second hand. The last lines (33-41) of 215r/II are somewhat more tightly written than are the following pages; nevertheless, there seem to be only two clearly identifiable scribes.

It is clear from 214v/1/26-29 that the Tractatus was begun by a German: "...lapides fluuiales albos et lucentes ad modum cristalli quos Kiselsteine uocamus." It is certainly most probable that the treatise was also finished in Germany, presumably at the same place at which it had been begun and by a fellow-countryman of the first writer. It is also reasonable to suppose—and in this we have palaeographical support in the manuscript itself—that only a very brief time-span separates the first from the second part.

There are two instances in which the author speaks in the first person singular, both of which occur in the second part of the Treatise (217r/1/3 and 18). It seems reasonable to view the second part as an addition by the scribe to the remarks and recipes that had been written into the signature by a first writer who may or may not have been the author of what he wrote. The verbs in the first person singular seem to imply contrast with the material in the second part which the author is merely transmitting; what is stated in the first person is his own contribution or, at least, his emphatic confirmation of what he is copying.

There is also a difference in content between the first and second parts of the Tractatus. The first part is rather general, but includes specific recipes for ‘gold.’ The second part is concerned very largely
with azurium and viride. There is an obvious break in continuity at
the point where the handwriting changes (215r/II/33).

There are but two marginal notations. There is a small lower-case
n, contemporary to the writing, to the left of 215r/II/33 to guide both
the second scribe (perhaps) and the illuminator who, however, neglected
to insert the capital N of the first word of l. 33, 'N]otandum.' There
is also near the lower edge of the margin, below the same column, a
hastily written symbol which might be read as a capital R; it is either
foreign to the text or perhaps an indication, left by the first scribe for
whoever should succeed him, that the text was to continue uninterruptedly.

IV. Since the purpose of this study is to consider in context those
color-terms which occur in one specific manual in order to begin the
construction of what will, it is hoped, eventually be a complete struc-
tural tabulation of the semantics of such terms, little reference is made
at this time to the scholarly literature which has accumulated around
the general theme of color.

One of the most important results of the study of the color-vocabulary
of the Tractatus is that it is now possible to define 'color-term' in such
a way that the term is a useful instrument of expression. In this study,
'color-term' designates all Latin lexemes classifiable under color, I, II or
III (see below) as well as all lexemes of which the etymological relation-
ship to one or more lexemes classifiable under color (I, II or III) is clear
to the speaker (hearer; writer, reader). Those directly classifiable under
color are color-terms of the first order, those etymologically related to
these latter are color-terms of the second order.

In this study the color-vocabulary of one manual of color-recipes is
analyzed on its own terms (Part II); that is to say that only absolutely
minimal assumptions have been made concerning which are and which
are not 'color-terms.' Actual use in specific contexts has been the
principal criterion according to which terms have been recognized and
included in the category 'color-term.'
## PART I

### TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE «TRACTATUS»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>214r/I/1-9</td>
<td>De cerusa componenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-24</td>
<td>De suffusione cristalli et eius triplici tinctura.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-38</td>
<td>De perlis atque margaritis componendis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-214r/II/7</td>
<td>De margaritis componendis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214r/II/7-23</td>
<td>Quod si ebur uel ossa uel ligna uel fila aliquo colore colorare volueris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-35</td>
<td>Quod si predicta viridi colore colorare uolueris ualde pulcro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>Quod si nigro colore uolueris colorare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-215r/I/27</td>
<td>Ad faciendum aurum cum quo scribere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215r/I/28 - 215r/II/20</td>
<td>De modo componendi vermillonem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215r/II/21-32</td>
<td>Ad faciendum aurum musicum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-215r/I/16</td>
<td>Notandum quod azurium est duplex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215r/I/16-35</td>
<td>Modus autem componendi predictum pastellum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-215r/II/17</td>
<td>Nunc scierendum quod azurium citzmarinum affinandum et per capitellum et non per pastellum...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215r/II/17-25</td>
<td>Notandum autem quod azurium transmarinum cognoscitur hoc modo...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-33</td>
<td>Alio modo cognosci poterit azurium transmarinum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-39</td>
<td>Solent et aliqui deceptores...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-216r/I/3</td>
<td>Si uis dare colorem azurio...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216r/I/3-12</td>
<td>Ad faciendum autem azurum artificiale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-25</td>
<td>Ad idem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-38</td>
<td>Lexuium ad purificandum azurium sic fit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-216r/II/31</td>
<td>Si inueneris lapidem lazuli...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216r/II/32-37</td>
<td>Item sic etiam potest fieri azurium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-216r/II/1</td>
<td>Sequitur de viride.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216r/I/1-14</td>
<td>Videamus ergo primo de viride greco nobiliori.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-19</td>
<td>Viride salsum sic fit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-216r/II/5</td>
<td>Aliud de uiridi salso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216r/II/5-12</td>
<td>Si uero viride hispanicum facere uolueris...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-20</td>
<td>Si uis facere alio modo... (viride romanicum).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>Item alio modo fit color viridis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-39</td>
<td>Item alius modus ad viride grecum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-217r/I/2</td>
<td>Alij dicitur...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217r/I/3-15</td>
<td>Ad idem modus alius quem causaliter inveni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>Item coniunge indicum cum auripigmento...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-217r/II/7</td>
<td>Sequitur de uernicione albo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217r/II/7-29</td>
<td>Est quidam alius color qui uocatur verniza...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-217v/I/2</td>
<td>Est etiam alia verniza...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217v/I/3-10</td>
<td>Color aureus lumbaricus sic fit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-21</td>
<td>Sequitur de membrana...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-26</td>
<td>Si vis deaurare pelles aut laminas...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-39</td>
<td>Nunc dicendum est qualiter fiat tenta...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. De cerusa componenda. accipe.¹ laminas plumbe-
2. as uel stagneas tenues atque aliquan-
3. tum perforatas et ipsas suspense² [sic] super accetum
4. acerrimum uel super vrinam puerorum uel salsam in
5. poto uel uase terreo bene obturato et pone sub
6. fimo equino calido et humido per dies. 17. uel amplius [:]
7. post remoue et florem abrade et iterum re-
8. pone. et nota quod de laminis ferreis potest croceus fieri modo
9. predicto faciendo. ¶ De sulfusione
10. cristalli et eius triplici tinctura [:] prius bene inter
11. prunas igniatur et post in aceto extinguatur
12. et terratur³ subtiliter et apponatur de cerusa et
13. de sanguine utri ad terciam partem ipsius [:] post fundatur
14. in crucibulo inter brunas⁴ ardentes igne acer-
15. rimo in cibano vitreariorum uel in fabrica cum
16. follibus ventilando⁵ [sic] [:] quo insumo vas forma ad pl-
17. citam ut de uiro. Quod si ipsum aliquo colore
18. colorare uolueris hoc modo facere poteris [:] quod si
19. in colore persico impone azarum transmarinum
20. afinityum⁶ [sic] partquam fuerit fusus. Quod si ipsum in
21. colore rubeo uolueris hoc fac de minio et cetera.
22. Si in colore viridem hoc fac de flore eris
23. uel viridi greco. Et scias quod omni colore quo coloratur
24. vitrum potest colorari cristallus. In omni colore
25. dico ignem sustinente [:] ¶ De perlis atque
26. margaritis componendis. Recipe. lapides sporicos

¹ The manuscript has been transcribed as accurately as possible; the contractions and abbreviations of the original have been expanded, with one exception (See note 16), and all such additions have been italicized. The punctuation of the original is reproduced here without change; additional punctuation has been added in conventional square-brackets to facilitate reading.

² 'Suspense' is apparently a singular imperative corresponding to *suspense*re. Since such a verb is unlikely, it is perhaps best to conclude that the scribe wrote an s instead of a d, a substitution possibly caused by unconscious interference of the participle suspensum. The form is in any case clearly parallel to pone, l.5., remoue, abrede and repone, ll. 7-8. 'Suspense' also occurs in 216r/1/5; compare, however, the expected suspender in 216v/1/4.

³ Systematic transcription required 'terratur'; obviously, however, terratur is intended.

⁴ 'brunas' is clearly a variant spelling of prunas. It is worth noting, however, that no such variant is listed in DuCange and, no less remarkable, that 'brunas' appears here in a text primarily concerned with colores; cf. brunus, a, um. Whether 'brunas' is merely a lapsus motivated by the color-notions pervading the whole Tractatus or has some bearing on the not yet satisfactorily elucidated etymology of brunus must be investigated separately.

⁵ Obviously ventilando is intended; perhaps merely a lapsus calami, although the possibility cannot be excluded that the scribe, whose lapsus are rare, be it noted, actually although mistakenly intended 'ventilando'.

⁶ A lapsus calami for afinityum (affinitum).
27. in capitis piscium repertos lucentes aut la-
28. pidus fluuiales albos et lucentes ad modum
29. cristalli quos Kiseldine uocamus quos in sub-
30. tilissimum puluerem redactos distempera
31. cum suco limatum terendo in lapide. marmoro. ut
32. fiat ad modum paste durum de quo protrahe
33. formulas ad placitum magnas uel paruas
34. seca partis perforatas [;] pone in pilo de cauda
35. equi et decoque in pane ordeaceo in furnace des-
36. coquendo aut in pastillo inter carnes bouinas [;]
37. post ultimo decoque per horam modicam in
38. ventre columbarum iuuenum. [ ] De mar-
39. garitis componendis. Recipie vitrum euitumque co-
40. lore [sic] volueris et ipsum redige in subtilissimum
41. puluerem quem distempera cum suco limacis cum teren-
42. do in lapide. marmore. [sic] ut fiat ad modum paste

214v/II
1. dure de qua fac formulas paruas protracted
2. inter digitos oleo invnctos quas sera parti
3. perforatas pone in filo cupreo et tene
4. super prumas ardentes in fornaes [sic] per foramen
5. aliquid quas bene ignitas extingue calidas
6. in calato thuris [;] post laua in aqua pura
7. et terge mundo panno [;] Quod si ebur uelossa
8. uel ligna uel fila aliquid colore colorare uo-
9. ueris. primo per horam bulliant et iaceant
10. in aqua aluminata et desiccentur bene [;] post
11. habeas bonum bresileturn subtilissime rasum
12. puluerizatum et fac bullire in aqua pura
13. uel lexivio et in tali decoctione bresileti bene
14. calida pone ista ut bene mergatur [;] post remoue
15. et ad umbram desica et hoc fac rei-
16. terando donec sufficient. quidam deco-

7 The reading is clearly ‘limatum’; the spelling should be limacum; cf. l. 41, limacis.
8 ‘Seca’: cf. 214v/II/2, ‘sera,’ both of which are ablative singular attributive to parti.
For seca, although the reading is clear, read sera. The positive of this adjective is not
attested for Classical Latin; the comparative is post-classical. The meaning of sera parti
is obviously ‘in the bottom part’.
9 The reading is clearly ‘marmore’ (= marmoro); the lapsus is certainly by analogy to
the final e of lapide. The manuscript reads ‘mar**’.
10 Read formace.
11 The manuscript seems to require this reading; the intended reading is probably
calatho.
12 The expansion is ‘bresiletum’ rather than ‘brisiletum’ since the former is the more
frequent in this text.
13 Singular because the subject is apparently the resultant mixture.
17. quant brisiletum in aqua et fit color
18. rubeus quidam in lexiiio et fit purpureus [;] quidam
19. uero colorant rem colore croceo postea in
20. decoctione breislei et sic res melius
21. coloratur. fitque pulcherior44 si uolueris cum
22. rebus iam dictis et sic optime fiunt
23. ossa colorata rubra [.] † Quod si predicta
24. viridi colore colorare uolueris ualde
25. pulcro.44 Iaceae[n]t primo in aqua aluminata uel
26. bene imbivantur [;] post accipe viride grecum
27. et ipsum distempera aceto acerrimo ita ut
28. sit liquidum et impone parum de sale ar-
29. moniaco et de laminis cuprij et ipsam rem
30. colorandam et pone in uase cupreo uel
31. quercino bene opturato in quo pone pre-
32. dicta ossa uel ligna [;] post pone sub fimo
33. equi calido et humido per. 17. dies uel amplius
34. et erunt optime colore viridi colora-
35. ta. † Quod si nigro colore uolueris
36. colorare. accipe. gallas minutum con-
37. fractas et ipas in bono acceto bulli
38. cum predictis rebus [;] post cola decoctionem
39. et pone ibi utriuolum et succum nu-
40. cis maioris et iterum in illis bulliant res predicte [;] † Ad
faciendum aurum
41. cum quo scribere. Recipe. argenti viui unciam. 1.

215r
2. plus. fundatur primo stagnum et cum
3. ipso misceatur argentum viuum et
4. teribile [;] terantur. ergo. ista simul super lapidem
5. ita quad totum vnum corpus fiat. postea ha-
6. beas vnum virinale in quo illud ponas
7. et habeas vnam ollam in qua cineres cribella-
8. tas pone et in eis colloca virinale ita
9. quad totum cooperiatur cineribus usque ad collum
10. et non cooperiatur virinale antequam humiditas
11. exaluerit et fac primo lentum ignem
12. et postea aliquantulum augmenta quousque
13. tota humiditas exiuerit [;] tunc obturatur
14. virinale cum aliquo pavmo lineo continu-
15. ando a mane in estate usque ad horam
16. .14. et erit completum [;] postea frange vri-
17. nale et illud quad inueneris in fundo
18. ad colorem tuum reseruas quoniam habebit au-
19. reum colorem. Illud distempera cum virina

44 Elsewhere in this text the h is generally not omitted.
20. cocta in qua dissoluantur gummi arabici una.  
21. et tunc refrigerata virna erit  
22. rubra et clara cum qua distempeta  
23. colorem tuum in cornu et scribe inde [;]  
24. procul dubio resultat color egregius et  
25. quanto antiquius [sic] tanto melior erit [;]  
26. cum autem scribere solueris moue in cor-  
27. nu cum baculo sicut mouetur minimum.  
28. De modo componenti vermillonem [;]  
29. Recipe. libram .1. argenti.  
30. viui et mediam libram.wel terciam  
31. partem sulphuris viui. primo fundas sulphur  
32. in pulvere redactum in patella terrea  
33. bene vitreata quo fuso et ab igne des-  
34. posito impone argentum viuum bene insimul  
35. comparando ne apararet [;] post abstractum  
36. pulveriza et pone in uase terreo in-  
37. terius plumbato vel in uase sublimatorio  
38. ad hoc facto ut in ampulla uirea dec-  
39. quando lento igne carbonum donec  
40. humiditas consummetur et post igne a-  
41. criori foramine clauso donec spiritus

215r/II

1. sublimetur quod scitur colore rubeo. fumi. Sed  
2. nota quod drebis accipere ,ij.15 partes argenti, viui  
3. et vnam sulphuris viii [;] postea habecas aliquam  
4. ampullam de vitro et pone totum intus  
5. ita quod sit plena [;] post habecas forncem de lapi-  
6. dibus inferior strictam et desuper amplam et  
7. sint due virge terree desuper [;] tunc colloca ollam  
8. tuam super virgas et fac subtas ignem clarum de  
9. lignis siccis et sit ignis semper lentus [;]  
10. tunc videbis flammam desuper et audies frango-  
11. rem inferior [;] et quando fundus clarescet quia  
12. nichil in fundo remanebit quin ascendant  
13. ad os ampulle [;] quando flamma penitus cessauerit  
14. et fundus erit uauius et flamma non  
15. exhibit tunc habecas vnam paruam tegulum et  
16. tegie de illa os ampulle et facias magnum  
17. ignem ita quod videatur quod ampulla tota fundatur [;]  
18. tunc dimittre ignem per se infringescere et ex-  
19. tingue calorem donec ad crastinum [;] post accipe.

15 Both Arabic and Roman numerals appear in the text. Presumably ‘ij’ means ‘2’ but the possibility cannot be excluded that the correct interpretation is ‘1-1/2’; the question can be settled satisfactorily only by reproducing the colores experimentally in the laboratory. Other examples occur passim in which the same doubt arises concerning the i.
20. ampullam et inuenies tune os ampulle quod queris.
21. $\text{V}$ Ad faciendum aurum musicum. Recipe iij. $\text{I.}$
22. de stagno et funde et proice desuget. $\text{I.}$ l. de
23. mercurio [:] postea pulverizetur fortiter et adde
24. $\text{I.}$ 5. de sulphure viuo pulverizato et. $\text{I.}$ l.
25. de sale armoniaco trito et iunge omnia simul
26. et pone in vinale et ad ignem pone
27. in olla plana cinereus cribellatis et fac ignem
28. per to tum diem et cum infrigidatum fuerit inuenies
29. aurum musicum cum quo po-
30. teris scribere sicut cum iacasto sed non
31. debet teri sed ponatur in cornu et distemperetur
32. cum albumine ouorum colato per spongiam.
33. [N]otandum quod azurium est duplex. videlicet natura-
34. le et artificiale. Naturale duplex. scilicet, transma-
35. rum et citraramarinum. et ipsorum duplex est
36. affinacio. scilicet. per pastellum et capitellum [:] per
37. pastellum transmarinum affinatur hoc
38. modo [:] accipitur lapis ipsius mineralis et ignitur
39. inter prunas candentes [:] post exinguitor
40. in bono aceto et territur $^{18}$ [sic] subtilissime cum
41. aqua et sale in lapide proficuo [:] postea desiccatur

215v I

1. et pulverizatur et per panum cribellatum [:] post ponitur
2. in pastillo ipri bene incorporando [:] post ponitur in aqua
3. calida et fricatur inter manus uel cum baculo agitatur
4. div in uase ligneo ut exeat azurium affinatum
5. valde pulchrum et predicta aqua efficitur indici
6. coloris [:] post colatur aqua per panum lineum
7. in patella terrea bene plumbata [:] post aqua
8. depurata effundatur et pulvis azuri in pa-
9. tella residens in umbra desiccetur et in corio
10. reseruetur. Quod si non sit boni coloris uel forsitan
11. tendens ad pallorem decoque bressiletum in
12. puluerem redactum in bono lexiuio uel aqua
13. pura [:] postea cola per panum et impone aliquantulum
14. de alumine glasse cum tuo azurio iam affinitato [:]
15. hoc dat bonum colorem et in pondus ipsius azurij

$^{18}$ The symbol 'I' is troublesome. I can find no satisfactory explanation for it. It is
apparent from the context that it is a unit of measurement and that it is neither
'pound' nor 'ounce', for each of which one expression is systematically used, an abbrevia-
tion in the former and a symbol in the latter case.

$^{17}$ Space was left for a large initial capital and a small a was written in the margin
to the left of the column to guide the illuminator; the letter, which is the only such red
capital missing from the entire Tractatus, was never added.

$^{18}$ Cf. note 3.
16. augmentat. * Modus autem componendi predictum
17. pastellum [:] accipe. de mastic libram .1. colofone
18. libras .5. de resina colata libram .1. quater tantum
19. de sepo caprino uel arietino et ã.ij. de
20. cera virginea .ij. ã. de vernice et olei lini
21. coclear vnum plenum. primo funde ceram uirgi-
22. neam et sepum in vernicem in patella [:] post pone
23. resinam et ultimo puluere masticis et
24. colophonam. bene cum spatula incorporando [:] post
25. tempta si spissum satis fuerit ponendo guttam
26. vnam in aqua frigida [:] quo uiso tunc cola per pan-
27. num lineum et reserua [:] quando vero ipro uti
28. volueris incorpora predicto pastillo mineram
29. tuam in subtilissimum puluere
30. redactam [:] post extrahce aqua calida mediante.
31. Sunt quidam qui de solo mastic. colofona. et
32. verniza componunt predictum pastellum omis-
33. sis alii iam dictis. Notandum etiam quod si fu-
34. erit predicti pastilli .A. libre debet imponi
35. libra una.
36. Nunc sciendum quod azurium citramari-
37. num affinandum *ep* [: sic] et per capitellum et
38. non per pastillum quia grossum est et ponderosum
39. et nullo modo extrahi posset a pastillo nisi bono
40. capitello uel sapone romano infecto et

215v/II
1. dicitur azurium citramarinum scilicet. de alem-
2. nia apportatum uel de anglia uel de hispania
3. seu de lombardia et affinatur hoc modo [:]
4. Accipe. lexiuum bonum de cineribus clauellatis
5. factum bene clarum in quo dissolue saponem
6. romanum in bona quantitate ut sit bene uiscosum
7. in quo pone mineram tuam in subtilissimum
8. puluere redactam [:] post ad ignem pone et
9. aliquantulum bullire permitte mouendo cum spa-
10. tula atque cum pemna spumam deponen-
11. do [:] post paulatim effuso capitello re-
12. peries in fundo patelle azurium affinatum
13. valde pulchrurn et pastea pulies leues [sic] aqua
14. pura calida atque frigida ut auferatur ab ipso
15. viscositas saponis et etiam per pa[n]num lineum
16. tociens colabis donec totum habeas pulchrum

19 Cf. note 16.
20 The reading is clearly ‘ep’ through which a single horizontal line has been neatly
drawn to indicate that the letters are a scribal error which was immediately caught and
clearly marked as such.
17. et affinatum. ¶ Notandum autem quod azurium trans-
18. marinum cognoscitur hoc modo [:] accipere.
19. de ipso azurio. affinato vel de minera pul-
20. uerizata et pone aliquantulum de ipso super
21. terrum ignitum quod si non mutauerit suum co-
22. lorem est optimum et transmarinum. Si uero ten-
23. dit ad nigredinem vel pallorem alleman-
24. nicum et parum ualens si uero ad albe-
25. dinem tunc artificialiter est factum et abiciendum.
26. ¶ Alio modo cognosce poterit azurium trans-
27. marinum [:] ponas ipsum in manu tua
28. aut in scutella et infunde aquam
29. claram et frica
30. cum digitis [:] post aqua subito inde
31. effusa si currant22 [sic] per rimulas manus aut
32. scutella22 [sic] bene jpsius azzurij valde
33. pulchre bonum est. ¶ Solent et aliqui
34. deceptores ponere in fundo saculi
35. mineram paruam et superius bonam
36. quorum fraus et decepcio hoc modo
37. perpendi [sic] potest [:] videlizet in fundo cum cul-
38. tello parum apperiendo sacculum et
39. illud exrahendo sicut prius. ¶ Si uis
40. dare colorem azurio pone rasuram

216r/I

1. de bressilio in aqua frigida tere per diem [:] postea cola
2. et in illa aqua pone azurum et recuper-
3. abit colorem. ¶ Ad faciendum autem azurum
4. artificiale. Recipe laminas argenti tenues quan-
5. tas ulueries et suspense22 super acetum acer-
6. ritum in uase terreo vel caldario nece
7. bene opturato et subpone fimo equino
8. calido et humido per dies .18. vel amplius et
9. colligatur ibi flos azzurij valde pul-
10. cher et si vis reitera et sicut ponitur
11. sub fimo sic potent poni sub uis24 [sic] compressis que
12. proiecte sunt de torculari. ¶ Ad idem
13. Recipe. [:] ceruam ablutam et candidam
14. vnam partem et duas partes indici insimul
15. tere [:] uero pari mensura quiscueris erit
16. flauum azurium vel tendens ad colo-
17. rem talem. Auge vel etiam minue sicut vis
18. ut melius appareat [:] ¶ Item nota quod azu-

21 The macron over the a is presumably a lapsus calami; the form should be currat.
22 The form as it stands is impossible; read scutelle.
23 Cf. note 2.
24 Read vitibus.
19. rium de monte ario uel de massa
20. tollatur cum indico de balgadea [] hoc
21. est cum flore indici [] et uiiioratur cum
22. pinguedine ceruse [ ]; et cum aqua viridis
23. eris misce et azurio da bibere
24. et si satis h[ab]uerit nullam pen[i]tus proba-
25. cionem timet. ¶ Lexuiium ad purifi-
26. candum azurium sic fit. accipe cineres
27. v ?rue25 et ponas in cacabum cum aqua et
28. calce viua et bene moueas [ ]; dimite re-
29. sidere per duos dies et tunc extrahas lexuiium
30. clarum quod supernatat et factum lexuiium
31. bene per predictos cineres facias transire et
32. tunc erit bonum et forte et cum isto lexuiio
33. lauabis purum permettendo ipsum resi-
34. dere in predicto uase uel patella et subtra-
35. hendo lexuiium successiue sicut dictum
36. est de aqua tandem siccata cooperto panno
37. et siccatum pulerem reserva ad opus
38. tuum. ¶ Si inueneres lapidem lazuli
39. elige melius coloratum et eice album

216v/II

1. et frange cum martello super incud[ien]em26 [ ]; postea pista
2. in mortario eneo cum aqua calida [ ]; postea moue super
3. marmorem cum aqua salsa quaousque sit quasi uinum [ ];
4. postea desicca ad solem uel ad ignem quaousque pasta
5. sit dura [ ]; postea fac pastillum ad vnam librann
6. minere unam librann de pastillo [ ]; accipe. collofone. uncias.
7. vj. resine. uncias. jj. et 5. mastici. unciam. 1. classe 1127 libras.
8. cere alibi ante. unciam. 1. olei de lino. uncias. iij. Et pone primo
9. oleum in vnam ollam mundam ad ignem lentum [ ]; postea
10. ceram [ ]; postea puleriza masticem classam et thus
11. et pone in ollam. [ ]; postea resinam et colofonam [ ]; et
12. deduc donec sit totum insimul corporatum [ ]; post
13. habeas aliquod uas de ligno et vnum baculum grossum
14. et deduc in illo uase cum baculo et iacta
15. desuper parum de aqua tepida et deduc quaousque
16. videris aquam liuidam [ ]; cola illam in aliquod uas mundum
17. per pannum [ ]; postea iacta de aqua magis calida et ita

25 Because of slight accidental damage to the page after the text had been written, this first word is illegible; the letters which seem clear have been transcribed, while a question mark has been used to indicate that (presumably only) one letter has been completely obliterated.
26 Presumably the full form is intended; the maccron, however, is short and appears neatly placed above the e. It has seemed most rigorous to enclose the ‘im’ in square-brackets.
27 The symbol in the manuscript is a large circle, the only numerical value of which known to this writer is 11.
18. facias quamdiu uideris exire aquam liuidam 
19. posteae habeas lexiiium simplex et extrahe similliter cum 
20. illo lexiiium calido. [;] posteae cum lexiiium facto de cineribus 
21. et calce ita facias donec sit totum abstractum [;]
22. post dimittite quiescere usque ad alien diem [;] post eice 
23. illam aquam et azurium remanebit in fundo 
24. vasi [;] posteae lexiiium habeas et pone in patellam 
25. vnae cum illo azurio et dimittit bullire 
26. fortiter super ignem et expuma cum vna 
27. penna et seria. spuma etiam bona est ad ponendum 
28. in pastillum [;] post depone ab igne et sine quiescere 
29. et eice illud lexiiium [;] post ablue cum aqua clara et 
30. cola per panum album et eice illa[m] aquam et 
31. exsicca ad solem vel ad ignem et est factum. 
32. Item sic etiam potest fieri azurium [;] accipe. ampullam 
33. puri cupri et pone in ea calcem usque ad medium 
34. et imple eam fortissimo aceto et cooperi et 
35. sigilla et pone sub fimo calido et dimittite 
36. usque vnum mensem [;] posteae aperi et inuenies [;]
37. sed hoc non valet nisi pictoribus in pariete et cetera. 
38. Sequitur de uiridi. Notandum est ergo quod multiplex 
39. est viride. sicilicet. viride grecum et salsum 

216v/I 

1. et cetera. Videamus ergo primo de uiridi greco nobi-
2. liori. Quod sic fit. Recipe laminas purissimas cupri 
3. et rade ut sint mundae et clare [;] posteae asperge 
4. aceto fortissimo et suspende in aliquo uase 
5. tereae vel ligneo vbi sit acetum forte et po-
6. ne ita quod acetum non tangant et tege ualde 
7. bene ut nihil uaporis eexat et pone in aliquo pro-
8. lecto calido ut pote in illo quod prohibitor a tor-
9. culari vel in sterquilino equorum et dimittite stare 
10. sic per. 24. dies [;] posteae uenias ad uas uuum 
11. et detegae et quod inuenies super tabulas rade 
12. et exsicca et est optimum viride. Et iterum posteae 
13. predictas tabulas asperge ut prius et hoc reitera 
14. tociens quousque satis habeas [;] Viride salsum sic 
15. fit [;] accipe. mel et decoque bene. quo decocto asperga 
16. de eodem tabulas purissimas cupri rasas [;] posteae 
17. puluizaca eae bene sic. De isto autem viridi magis 
18. fit insimul quam de alio veruntamen illud melius est et 
19. subtilius. Aliud de uiridi salvo. Sume 
20. lignum quercinum quante latitudinis et longitudinis 
21. volueris et caua illud in modum scrini. De 
22. inde tolle cuprum et fac illud crocomari in la-

28 There seems to be nothing in the standard Latin and Greek lexica to which the manuscript reading might correspond in this context; the reading has been expanded to ‘crocomari’ because this seems a likely solution, although the word remains mysterious.
23. minas quante latitudinis vel longitudinis volueris vt tamen
24. longitudo eius cooperiat longitudinem ligni
25. concaui [...] postea accipe scutellam plenam salis
26. et comprimes cum [...] fortiter in igne et cooperi car-
27. bonibus per noctem et in crastino tere fortiter
28. super lapidem siccum [...] tunc. accipe furculas graciles etiam
29. colloca eas in predicto ligno concauo ut due
30. partes concaui inferius sint et tertia superius sic-
31. que illinas laminas ex utraque parte melle [...]
32. postea asperge sal tritum et collocabis super fur-
33. culos [...] illos [...] coniunctim cooperiensi diligentissi-
34. me altero ligno ad hoc apto ita ut nichil
35. spiraminis exire possit [...] postea fac foramen
36. cum terebello in angulo ipsius ligni per quod possis
37. infundere calidum acetum aut vinam pueri calidam
38. ita ut tercia pars eius impleatur et mox
39. obstrue foramen illud et lignum pone ut

216V/II
1. possis sterquilinio cooperire ex omni parte [...]
2. post 4. septimanas solue cooperculum et
3. quicquid super cuprum inueniis abrade et serua
4. et iterum repones [...] cooperi eo ordine quo
5. prius [...] Si uero viride hyspanicum facere
6. volueris tolle cupri tabulas attenuatas
7. et radens eas diligenter ex utraque par-
8. te profunde acceto calido [...] absque melle
9. et sale componesque eas ut prius in ligno
10. minore concauo ordine quo prius [...] post
11. [...] ebdomadas expose et rade [...] sic facias
12. donec tibi sufficiat. [...] Si uis facere alio
13. modo sume laminas de cupro et vnge eas
14. bene cum sapone [...] postea pone eas in potto
15. nouo et implo pottum aceto et cooperi
16. et pone in loco calido et dimitte hbi per 24.
17. dies [...] postea aperi et rade tabulas siue
18. laminas illas super tabulam planam
19. et dimitte siccarj et illud uocatur viride
20. romanicum. [...] Item alio modo fit color
21. viridis [...] cupram mundissimum sublimabis
22. et in subtilem puluerem redigas quem in
23. usae cupreo vel metallico miffas cui
24. vinum super infundas [...] ignique superponas

29 Read eam.
30 The reading is clearly ‘furculos illos’. Cf., however, the expected ‘furculas’ in l. 28.
The masculine may have been in current use alongside the more usual and more ‘regular’
feminine or it may be attributable rather to the individual German-speaking scribe.
31 ‘super infundas’ is clearly written as two words; ‘superponas’ is clearly one word.
The two expressions are, however, obviously parallel and each is to be understood as a
25. ut bulliat et cum satis viride fuerit
26. tolle et refrigerari permitte extra-
27. hens illud et reponens puluerem
28. siccum ut prius et sic poteris facere
29. quantum vis. \[ Item alius modus\] ad viride
30. grecum. Recipe. laminas cupreas quanto plures habere
31. possis et ipas sale armoniaco in melle
32. dispumato resuluto in uinculus\[ sic\] suspen-
33. de locatos\[ sic\] in uetege super acetum aut
34. super vrimam pueroam bene distillatam
35. ac etiam salsatam in potto alicuo cupreo
36. bene opturato filto sub fimo equino
37. potto posito per xiiiij. dies vel amplius
38. et colligetur circa illas tabulas flos
39. cris uiridis valde pulcher. \[ Alibj\]

217r/1

1. dicitur \[ :\] pervnge laminas cupri uitellis ouorum
2. et asperge sal commune et suspende ut prius.
3. \[ :\] Ad idem modus alius quem causalter inveni \[ :\]
4. accipe. de tartaro puluerizato vini albi
5. libram \[ .1.\] salis communis libras \[ .5.\] salis armoniaci
6. \[ uncias.\] iij. vitri combusti aut casti calcis ouorum
7. aut gipsi aut calcis marmoris libras.
8. \[ 3.\] quam in subtilissimum puluerem redacta[m] dis-
9. tempera cum aceto acerrimo vini albi et
10. aliquantulo mellis et interpone laminas cupri
11. quam plures in scutella sel ligno quercus sel ua-
12. se cupreo bene opturato et expone calori
13. solis aut sub fimo calido equino per dies ali-
14. quos et habebis colorem mirabiliter
15. pulchrum. \[ :\] Item coniunge indicum distempera-
16. tum cum auripigmento distemperato et hiis
17. duobus liuido et croceo \[ ;\] resultabit
18. inde pulcherrimus color et hoc ego seprius vidij.
19. Sequitur de uernicione albo. accipe. de
20. glassa partem vnaui et \[ 2.\] partes
21. olei canabini aut lini aut nucum
22. et habeas \[ .3.\] pottos terreos nouos in
23. quorum vno ponas oleum et sic mitte
24. ad ignem lentum ut bulliat pau-
25. latim \[ ;\] postea Recipe glassam et pone in alio

single word; perhaps the Germanic speech habits of the scribe inclined him to favor
such formations.

\[ 32\] For the form ‘uinclusas’ read vinculis and for ‘locatos’ read locatis. In German an
accusative would be correct, a fact which perhaps accounts for the case, but certainly not
for the lack of concord; the gender, however, may ultimately depend on German Ketten,
which is feminine.
26. et Recipe tercium pottum et pone illum
27. super pottum qui continet glassam et po-
28. ne in alicio\textsuperscript{33} os illius potti sit inferius et
29. luta vnum pottum ad alium et sic
30. pone super ignem lentum quousque glas-
31. sa fundatur. De inde habeas virgam fer-
32. ream et mitte in vas illud et moue
33. et extraehe et si in extractione videris
34. crustulas super virgulamiacentes
35. signum est quod adhuc non est bene fusae et
36. si non videris aliiud nisi mundum et clarum
37. signum est effusionis sufficientis \textsuperscript{\textit{[i]}} hoc facto
38. Recipe, pottum in quo est oleum et funde
39. in pottum glasse per suum foramen paruum
40. et inducite fortiter cum baculo et

217r/II
1. augmenta ignem tuum per spaciun vnius hore
2. uel tantum quod \textit{.7.} spalmi possent dici. Et si
3. flamma exeat a poto obstrue foramen eius
4. cum passo lineo medefacto\textsuperscript{34} [sic] postea depo-
5. ne ab igne et pone liquorem in alicio us-
6. se et sic servare poteris quamdiu volueris etiam
7. et vendere pro optimo vernicio. \textsuperscript{\textit{[i]}} Est quidam
8. alius color qui uocatur verniza qui superponitur\textsuperscript{35} [sic] omnibus
9. aliis. coloribus et est nobilior omnibus quia
10. splendorem facit et durat semper et preser-
11. uat a pluuia et a uento et fit in hunc
12. modum. Recipe, libram .1. glasse albe in puluarem
13. redacte quam ponas in uase terreo vernizato
14. uel plumbatis et ignem sustinent et super-
15. pone aliaud uas in fundo foramen habens ita ut
16. terrum longum cum manubrio possit intrare
17. et bene conglutinatum vndique pasta et
18. pone super tripodem ad ignem carbonum non dan-
19. tem flammam et moue semper cum spatula donec
20. fundatur glassa qua fusae impone coclear ple-
21. num de oleo calidissimo lini uel canabi
22. semper mouendo \textsuperscript{\textit{[i]}} sic oleum paulatim imponendo ultimo
23. pone to tum probatio[nis] autem decoctionis. Recipe parum
24. cum ferro et pone super cultellum
25. et si filum faciat tumc ab igne depone
26. et aliquantulum infrigadari\textsuperscript{36} [sic] permitte \textsuperscript{\textit{[i]}} post

\textsuperscript{33} Under the phrase ‘pone in alicio’ there appears a neatly written broken line indicating that the phrase is an error and is to be ignored.
\textsuperscript{34} Read medefacto.
\textsuperscript{35} A simple lapsus calami; the r is clear, but i is obviously the proper reading.
\textsuperscript{36} Read infrigidari. The a is clear, but presumably a lapsus calami.
27. cola per pannum et serua et nota quod due par-
28. tes de oleo et tercia de glassa debent
29. poni. ¶ Est etiam alia verniza que non est
30. alba ut predicta et est aliquantulum cro-
31. cii coloris et non adeo bona nec ita
32. cara que fit de ambra in hunc modum [:]
33. Recipe. puluerem ambre subtilissimum et
34. ipsum incorpora cum oleo lini et canabi ut
35. fiat ad modum paste durum uel aliquan-
36. tulum liquidius [:] post pone in potto vno
37. superposito alio potto in fundo perforato
38. ut iam dictum est et decoque lento igne
39. carbonum et fiant omnia per ordinem
40. ut iam dictum est et ista verniza utendum est

217v/1

1. in grossis operibus puta in muris et parietibus
2. sed prima valet in sellis clipes et ymaginibus et cetera [:]
3. Color aureus lumberdicos sic fit [:] accipe.
4. fel magni piscis et ipsum rumpe
5. super petram marmoream et appone aliquan-
6. tulum terre pellicarie uel vitri calcionati et
7. modicum aceti et terendo in marmore ut
8. fiat ad modum minij. De quo scribe quod
9. uoluereis et hoc modo faciunt greci etiam litteras
10. deauratas. ¶ Sequitur de membrana que est color
11. quo pingitur facies nuda et nuda corpora [:]
12. sic componitur [:] tollc cerusam illud album quod fit de
13. plumbo et pone cama non tritam sed ita ut est
14. siccum in aliquod uas cupreum uel ferreum et pone
15. super prunas ardentess et combust evone con-
16. urtatn in flauum colorum [:] deinde tere et admis-
17. ce album cerusam et zenobrium donec
18. carni simile fiat quorum colorum mixtura in
19. tuo sit arbitrio. Vt si faciam rubeam
20. uelis facere addde cenobrium si uero candi-
22. ¶ Si vis deaurare pelles aut laminas
23. Recipfe fel bouinum in quo dissolue crocum yta-
24. licum post superpone ipsis prius
25. cum aliquo planatino38 bene pla-
26. natis et cetera. ¶ Nunc dicendum est qualiter fiat
27. tenta que est color miser uisu [:] cum tamen

37 Read adde. The reading, however, is clear; the final i is either the result of uncertainty on the part of the scribe, which seems somewhat unlikely in view of the general correctness of the morphology of the text, or a simple lapsus.
38 The macron permits this reading, although no such word appears in the standard lexica. The sense is clear in any case; the word is an instrumental derivative formed on the passive participle of plano, the nominative being, probably, planatinum.
PART II

Color, -is

The following is a discussion of the semantics of the Latin substantive color in the Tractatus de coloribus. It is intended to serve as a general introduction to the discussion of specific color-terms which follows.

I. (a) Color is used as an all-inclusive designation for physical substances, whether simple or compound, liquid or solid, which are useful as coloring-agents or to protect paintings, i.e. varnishes, etc. The term is used by extension, but in obviously intimate relation to this general notion, (b) to refer to those same substances when they are considered not as end-products but as ingredients in recipes for the preparation of more complex coloring-agents, and (c) to refer to coloring-agents considered as the end-results of such recipes. Examples are as follows: (a) 214v/I/24 and 217r/II/9; (b) 215r/I/23 and 217v/I/18; (c) 217v/I/27.

II. Color is used to designate the visual-percept of color generically and of individual colors specifically. Examples of this use are 214v/I/39-40, 215v/II/21-22 and 40, 216r/I/3.

It is of interest to note that color occurs sixteen times in combination with a color-adjective; in addition, there is one instance in which color is ‘understood’ (214v/II/16-18), making a total of seventeen such occurrences. In ten of the sixteen instances the order is color + adjective, and in the remaining six it is adjective + color. In twelve of the seventeen cases the phrase refers solely either to visual-percept(s) (ten instances) or to coloring-agent(s) (two instances); in one of these latter cases the phrase color viridis is a sub-class rather than a single coloring-agent (see below). In the remaining five cases various combinations of these two uses are found. The combinations which occur are the following:

(1) Color + adjective: aureus, (aureus) lumbardicus, croceus, persicus, purpureus, rubeus, viridis (rubeus and viridis, three occurrences each);
(2) Adjective + color: aureus, croceus, flavus, indius, niger, viridis.

39 The reading is clearly ‘sl’ under each of which letters a dot been carefully placed to indicate that they are a scribal error and hence to be ignored.
40 A single horizontal line has been neatly drawn through the sentence, "Explicit tractatus de coloribus." See the Introduction to this article.
Aureus, croceus and viridis occur in both adjective positions. Aureus color (215r/I/16-19) and color aureus (217v/I/29) are clearly interchangeable; in both cases a visual-percept is meant. The same is true of croceus color (217r/II/30-31) and color croceus (214v/II/19), while in the case of viridis it is clear that the combination color viridis in 214v/I/22 refers to visual-perception while the same combination in 216v/II/20-21 clearly refers to the sub-class of colores (I) which are subsumed under viridis. It is interesting, however, to note that the expression viridis color in 214v/II/24 refers primarily to a coloring-agent and secondarily to the visual-percept, while color viridis in 214v/II/34-35 refers primarily to the visual-percept and secondarily to a coloring-agent; in other words, the relative emphasis is reversed. Both occur in the same recipe, one at the beginning and the other at the end. From the context it would seem to be a valid deduction that color, in texts such as this Tractatus, was felt by professional painters and practitioners of similar crafts to mean primarily substance, coloring-agent. That is to say that the more emphatic of the two words in these two instances is the second, linguistic behavior which is quite consistent with the practice of the Romance languages and, hence, presumably rooted in popular Latin. However, relative emphasis within a given context is also an important determinant of the relative positions of the noun and adjective. There seems to have been no single, consistent difference between the two possible word-orders which was independent of context; there is, in other words, no reason to conclude that, for instance, the order adjective + color was regularly preferred to indicate that a coloring-agent was meant which incidentally produced the visual-percept specified, or, conversely, that the visual-percept of the color specified by the adjective was consistently meant by the order color + adjective. It is clear, in fact, that in all seventeen cases the notion of the visual-percept predominates; the two word-orders are used as they are to express differing emphasis, not different concepts.

III. Color is used as a generic, all-inclusive term for color (I), color (II) and combinations of the two with varying emphasis. The best example of III is the very last word of the Tractatus (217v/I/39); another is to be found in 217r/II/9.

It is interesting to note that while the visual-perception is often clearly implied by the coloring-agent, frequently quite simply because the term used to designate the latter contains an adjective or a noun which clearly refers to a specific visual-percept, the reverse does not obtain. The more general is readily suggested by the specific, but the specific is not easily brought to mind by generic terms. That is to say that specific coloring-agents readily suggest the visual-percept which they produce and the corresponding generic linguistic label, while that same label (viridis, albus, niger, etc.) seldom if ever provokes uniform associations in the reader's or hearer's mind between itself on the one hand and a specific coloring-agent and its recipe on the other, simply because there are a number of recipes all of which produce the same visual-percept. The generic term would regularly suggest a specific recipe only in two cases: (1) when there is only one recipe in use which produces the visual-percept implied by the generic term, and (2) when one recipe is generally used by the practitioners in preference to the others, which, although perhaps numerous, are in fact rarely used.

Finally, it should be noted that there are instances in which color in its immediate context quite clearly refers primarily to a coloring-agent but is then broadened by the implications of an attributive pulcher to include the visual-percept; cf. 217r/I/14 and 18.

To sum up; color is used to mean (I) coloring-agent, singly and collectively, (II) visual-percept(s) of color(s), and (III) various combinations of I and II.
Colorae, -are

This verb occurs in the generic sense, to produce colors II by means of colorum I, cf. 214v/11/18-21 and 28-30; it is used in this sense with the ablative aliquo colore in 214v/11/17-18 and 214v/11/7-9, where it is clear that the meaning is ‘to alter by means of a coloring-agent in such a way as to produce the visual-percept implied in the color I chosen.’ With but slight restriction the term is similarly used in 214v/11/23-24.

The verb occurs in the active voice in combination with the ablative colore modified by a color-adjective in contexts in which it is clear that color is primarily any member of the sub-class indicated by the accompanying adjective, i.e. any color I which produces the visual-percept indicated by the adjective; the notion of the visual-percept is emphasized by the adjective; cf. 214v/11/18-21 (colorare colore creceo), 214v/11/23-25 (viridi colore colorare), 214v/11/35-36 (nigro colore colorare).

Periphrastic passive of resultant adjectives are found in 214v/11/21-23 (note the predicate nominative rubea) and 34-35 (‘colore viridi colorata’); the finite verb in the first example is fieri and esse in the second. In these cases the visual-percept is obviously paramount.

Note, finally, the use of coloratus in 216v/11/39 in contradistinction to albus (also l. 39). This use is of particular interest in that albus is otherwise a color and as such subsumed under colorare, even when albus, as here, means ‘colorless’ etc. (See albus).

Albedo, -inis

This substantival derivative of albus occurs once in this text, in 215v/11/24-25. It is clear that it refers exclusively to a visual-percept and that it is, therefore, a color. Note that albedo is used as the polar opposite of nigredo (q.v.).

Albus, -a, -um

This adjective has two clearly separate uses. It is used to mean ‘white,’ for which use the best example occurs in 217v/11/17 in which the adjective is attributive to cerusa, which is itself white, to emphasize the whiteness of the cerusa which is not yet yellow (ll. 15-16) as a consequence of having been heated. The example is particularly felicitous, since cerusa is a sub-class of album, -i (q.v.). Another example of this use occurs in 214v/11/28; note the combination ‘albos et lucentes.’

The second meaning of albus is ‘colorless, translucent, transparent.’ In this sense it is also used to mean ‘uncolored’ as opposed to ‘colored, dyed.’ Cf. 217v/11/30, a particularly good example (note the opposition of albus and ‘aliquantulum creci coloris,’ lll. 30-31), 217v/11/19 (again, as in the preceding example, albus is applied to ‘clear’ varnish), 217v/11/4 and 9 (where albus is clearly ‘white’ as opposed to ‘red wine, i.e. ‘clear, colorless’); for the meaning ‘uncolored, undyed’ see especially 216v/II/30 (where albus clearly implies ‘cleanness,’ ‘purity’ since the panarius must be such that it can be used to filter liquids to remove impurities; the cloth is albus simply because no artificial color has been added to it); in 216v/11/39 albus refers to lapis lazuli and means ‘pale, not blue’ in contradistinction to coloratus which, in this case, refers to the natural color of the raw material itself as it appears to the naked eye of the purchaser. In all of these uses, albus is clearly a color, albeit in some cases ‘negatively.’

Album, -i, n.

This substantivized neuter singular occurs in 217v/11/21; it is a color and is specifically described as candidum, i.e. ‘white,’ not ‘clear, colorless, undyed, etc.’ This album is a sub-class of color.
Albumen (ovorum)

For the sole instance of the use of this noun see 215r/II/32. While not itself a color, this term must be included in any schematic arrangement of color-terms since it was closely linked to albus, unless the etymological relationship was no longer apparent, which is unlikely in view of the obvious resemblance of the two lexemes and the fact that albus was frequently used to mean ‘colorless, transparent;’ cf. the ‘color’ of the ‘white’ of a fresh egg. In passing it should also be noted that the ‘white’ of a hardboiled egg is a milky white (albus) and that such mediaeval glass (also albus) was at best opaque and often milky because of the presence of impurities.

Alumen glassae

This term, which is a phrasal compound, occurs only once in this text, in 215v/I 14, in a context in which it seems probable that it is a color; cf. ll. 14-15, especially l. 15 ‘hoc dat bonum colorem.’ This term is included here only tentatively; further accumulation of evidence will be necessary before its status becomes clear.

Ambra, -ae

This term occurs twice, in 217r/II/32 and 33; it obviously designates a substance in both cases which is an ingredient in a recipe for verniza. It is presumably the coloring-agent in the verniza which is ‘croci coloris.’ It is clear that the yellow color of this verniza is incidental; hence ambra is a color in this context but only, as it were, by default.

Argentum, -i

It is not clear from the evidence of this text (216r/I/4) whether argentum was considered a color. It is evident that the metal itself is meant and that it is an ingredient in a recipe. A decision concerning the status of argentum as a color must await the accumulation of more evidence.

Argentum vivum

This phrasal compound occurs relatively frequently in this text; cf. 214r/II/41, 215r/III/3, 29-30 and 34. The term has only its literal meaning in all cases; it is not clear whether or not it was considered a color; the question cannot, therefore, be resolved until more evidence is available.

Aureus, -a, -um

This adjective occurs only in combination with the substantive color; cf. 215v/ I/18-19 and 217v/I/29, in both of which cases it is clear that a visual-percept (color) similar to that produced by gold (aureus) is meant. This criterion is met by a great number of separate recipes which produce colores yielding such a visual-percept. 215v/I/18-19 contains a particularly clear example of color in combination with an adjective (aureus) to refer to a visual-percept to the exclusion of the notion of a physical substance. There is no actual gold involved in these recipes. In 217v/I/3 there occurs the expression color aureus lumbardicus, used to label a substance resulting from a recipe. It is clear that this latter is a specific member of the sub-class color aureus of color; by the same token it is clear that color aureus was also used to refer to the means (coloring-agents) of producing the visual-percept.

Auripigmentum, -i

This term, which elsewhere (i.e. in other, similar mediaeval texts) is extremely frequent (cf. the remarks concerning ‘gold’ under deauro), occurs only once in this
text, in 217r/I/16, where it designates an ingredient in a recipe, for the preparation of a color (a ‘green’). It is clear from the context (cf. ll. 15-17) that the visual-percept implied in ‘auripigmento’ (l. 16) is to be equated with that of ‘croceo’ (l. 17) and that it is a color.

Aurum, -i

The substantive aurum occurs alone in a sub-title in 214v/II/40-41 in which it is clear that gold-colored ink is meant. It can be shown that inks were clearly classified in other texts as colores; suffice it to say in this instance that the very inclusion of the following recipe in a Tractatus de coloribus indicates that aurum ‘cum quo scribere’ was so classified. Note that there is no actual gold involved in the preparation of this aurum; much mediaeval literature of this type is preoccupied with substitutes for metallic gold which would, however, look like gold (cf. aurum musicum). Clearly aurum in this sense is a color.

The existence of a separate recipe for aurum musicum, also the coloring-agent in an ink prepared without actual gold as a substitute for that metal and therefore clearly a color, makes it clear that aurum is also a sub-class of color, one of the members of which is aurum musicum; cf. 215r/II/21 and 29. The factor common to all colores subsumed under aurum is that the visual-perception derived from them resembles that of metallic gold. In some cases the resemblance was less than convincing if judged by modern standards; it is precisely for that reason, however, that the mediaeval classification is of unusual interest. It is generally not a question of preparing gold for use in painting or manuscripts; it is a matter of preparing less expensive and more readily available substitutes for gold.

Azurium, -i (Variant forms in this text: auzurium, azarum, azurum).

Azurium is clearly and invariably a substantive. Cf., however, Spanish azul and Italian azzurro, both of which are primarily adjectives today; when they are used nominally, they are clearly substantivized adjectives.

Azurium is used to mean a substance (color I); examples: 215r/II/19 (cf. azurium transmarinum, ll. 17-18); 216v/II/9 (cf. azurium artificiale, ll. 3-4); 216r/I/23 (cf. azurium de monte ario vel de massa, ll. 18-19). There are clear instances of use of this substantive in the sense of color III; examples: 215r/II/12 (cf. affinatum, l. 12, and pulchrum, l. 13); 216r/I/2 and 216r/II/32 (in both of which the notion of the visual-percept is secondary, but clearly present).

Azurium labels a concept which is internally unified by the notion of the visual-perception of the color blue. Azurium is a collective term under which are subsumed all ‘blues’ and, as such, it labels a sub-class of color. Its use as a generic term has been dealt with above. The various specific ‘blues’ subsumed under azurium are designated by means of phrasal compounds — semantically unitary terms consisting of more than one word — of which azurium is the head; there are two kinds of such terms: (1) those which designate concepts more specific than azurium, of which these concepts are sub-classes, each of which includes two or more colores, and (2) those which designate specific colores. The examples of the first found in the Tractatus are the following: (azurium) artificiale, naturale, citraramarinum, transmarinum and naturale transmarinum; azurium is used propresentatively for various of these expressions in contexts in which its precise reference is nonetheless clear. The two phrasal compounds found in this text which designate specific colores are azurium de monte ario and azurium de massa.

Note particularly 215r/II/33-36 in which eight different kinds of azurium are
distinguished according to origin and mode of preparation. It is clear that they all have in common only the visual-percept 'blue' and it is equally clear from this passage and its context that azurium is primarily a color (I); the visual-percept, which is necessarily implied by the term, however, makes it preferable to classify azurium as a color III (primarily I and secondarily II).

For azurium artificialiae see 216r/1/3-4 and 9. A sub-class of azurium, all of the members of which have in common only the fact that they do not belong to the sub-class azurium naturale. For azurium naturale see 215v/1/13-14 (cf. 215v/11/33-36 ff.); for azurium citramarinum, 215v/1/36-37 and 215v/11/1-3; for azurium transmarinarum, 214v/1/19-20, 215v/11/17-22 (transmarinarum in l. 22 refers to ipsum azurium, l. 19), 215v/11/26-27 and 32.

For azurium de massa and azurium de monte ario see 216r/1/18-19. In this context it is impossible to decide whether these two phrasal compounds designate two distinct but similar colores or are two synonymous terms. Since both of these terms occur in what is essentially a parenthetical remark, it is not clear to which general sub-class of azurium (artificialia, etc.) they belong.

Breiletum, -i, n. (Variants found in this text: brisiletum, bressiletum, bressilletum).

Breiletum is clearly a substance used as the principal ingredient in the preparation of a coloring-agent, decocito breiletii; cf. 214v/11/10-14, 16-21 and 215v/11/11-12.

That breiletum is considered the principal ingredient in the color is clear from the use of the expression decocito breiletii (214v/11/10-14) to refer to the resultant liquid coloring-agent; note that there are at least two decociones breiletii, one prepared with water, yielding a (color) rubens, and another with lexicium, yielding a (color) purpureus. It is clear, therefore, that the expression decocito breiletii is generic and that it labels a sub-class of color I, in which breiletum is the principal ingredient and, hence, itself a color I.

Bressilium, i.

This term occurs but once, in 215v/11/39-216r/1/1, where it clearly designates a substance used as an ingredient in a recipe. From the context it is not clear whether it was a color; it seems to have been rather a catalyst.

Calx, -cis

Calx occurs in this Tractatus; cf. 216r/11/33, 217v/1/6 and 7. It is not clear from the evidence of this text whether it was considered a color; in any case, its color is unimportant in these instances.

Candidus, -a, -um

This adjective occurs twice in 217v/1/20-21 in its primary use as a color-adjective. The form 'candidas' apparently refers to an understood 'facias' (cf. 'faciam' l. 19) and stands in contrast to 'rubeam', l. 19. In l. 21 it is attributive to 'albi' an ingredient in the recipe) and serves to emphasize the 'whiteness' of the album (plumbum), simultaneously removing any possible ambiguity inherent in album; cf. the use of albus to mean 'colorless, etc.'

Cenobrium, -i (The variant zenobrium occurs in 217v/1/17).

This term occurs twice in the Tractatus, in 217v/1/17 and 20. It is clear in both cases that it refers to a substance which is an ingredient in a recipe. It is clear from ll. 17-18 that cenobrium was a color; its resultant visual-percept is obviously implied in the same lines and in 19-20.
Cerusa, -ae

This substantive occurs six times in the Tractatus; in all cases it is clearly a substance used as a coloring-agent. In 214*/I/1 it is clearly the color for which the following lines contain a recipe, while in I. 12 and in the remaining four instances of its use it is mentioned as an ingredient in recipes for the preparation of other colores: 216*/I/13 and 22; 217*/I/12 and 17. Only in these last two cases is the visual-percept emphasized. In 217*/I/12 cerusa is clearly equated to ‘album quod fit de plumbo’ (i.e. album plumbum); note that ‘illus album’ is equated to ‘cerusam’ in such a way that it is clear that cerusa is a color classified in the sub-class alibum, specifically as equal to ‘illid album quod fit de plumbo.’ In 217*/I/17 ‘cerusam’ is specifically qualified by the adjective ‘alibam’ in contrast to the cerusa of I. 12 which has turned yellow as a consequence of having been heated. Note that cerusa does not automatically suggest ‘whiteness’ strongly enough to contrast with I. 12. In 216*/I/13, ‘cerusam ablutam et candidam’ candidus (q.v.) is used not so much to indicate color as to emphasize ‘purity’ (cf. albus).

Claresco, -ere

This verbal derivative of clarus occurs only once, in 215*/II/11, in a context in which it is clear that it means ‘grow lighter, brighter,’ ‘glow red or white hot;’ in any case it refers to a visual-percept of intense brightness produced by heating (the ‘fundus’). Cf. clarus (first use); claresco is also clearly a color-term, since it indicates a change in color.

Clarus, -a, -um

This adjective has three separate but intimately interdependent uses in this text. In 215*/II/8-9 it is used to ascribe ‘brightness’ to a fire, clearly a visual-percept; the phrase ‘ignem clarum de lignis siccis’ presumably refers to a fire with light-colored, yellow flames and a minimum of smoke. Note the ‘positive,’ ‘optimistic’ tone implied. In 216*/I/30 ‘clarum’ is attributive to ‘lexiuum’ (I. 29) and means ‘colorless, transparent, translucent,’ while in 215*/I/21-22 (‘virna erit rubra et clara’) it obviously means only ‘transparent, translucent.’ In 216*/I/3 and 217*/I/36 clarus is combined with mundus in what is apparently a set phrase ‘mundus et clarus’ meaning ‘clean, free of impurities, unblemished.’

In the first of these three uses clarus is clearly a color-term, as it is in the second, if only as a ‘negative’ color-term; the extension of meaning found in the third use is not such that it can be subsumed under the notion of ‘color-term.’ The collateral semantic connection is, however, quite parallel to that found for albus (q.v.). Cf. also lucens.

Crocus, -a, -um

Crocus does not occur as a simple adjective in this text; it does occur, however, twice in combination with color, in 217*/II/30-31 and 214*/II/18-21. In the former instance the combination ‘crocei coloris’ clearly describes one verniza which is ‘yellow’ in contradistinction to another verniza which is ‘alba’ (i.e. ‘clear, colorless’) hence, the expression clearly refers to a visual-percept. In the latter case color crocus is primarily a coloring-agent (the ablative must be so understood); the notion of the resultant visual-percept is clearly present, however, in the clause ‘et sic res melius coloratur’ and, therefore, also in the means by which the coloration is imparted (color crocus and decusio breviti), which notion is, moreover, reinforced by the adjective crocus itself as well as by the substantive color.
In 214v/1/8 'croceus' presumably agrees with an understood color in the sense of coloring-agent; in 217r/1/17 'croceo' is apparently the ablative of the substantivized neuter singular croceum and stands with 'liuido' in opposition to 'hiis duobus' (ll. 16-17) and is a substance, an ingredient in a recipe. In both of these cases croceus obviously designates a sub-class of color (coloring-agents), not a specific color.

Crocus italicus

This phrasal compound occurs only once in this text, in 217rv/1/23-24, where it is an ingredient in a recipe; it is obviously the coloring-agent used to achieve the effect implied in deaurare (l. 22), hence a substance and, therefore, a color.

Deaurare, -are

This verb, a derivative of aurum, is used twice in this text, in 217rv/1/10 and 22. In both cases it means 'to color golden.' Note that there is no actual gold involved; the verb, in keeping with the mediaeval artist's preoccupation with gold and substitutes for it, is perhaps best defined as 'to apply colors in such a way as to produce a visual-percept like that of gold.' Note that the objects of the verb are 'litteras, pelles, laminas,' all cases in which the effect of richness was much desired.

Flavus, -a, -um

In 216r/1/16 'flauum' is clearly a color-adjective modifying 'azurium'; it means 'yellow, yellowish' and seems to imply rather strong yellow coloration; cf. the following phrase 'uel tendens ad colorem talem' in which a weaker yellow coloration is given as an alternative possibility. In 217rv/1/16 flavus occurs in combination with color to refer only to a visual-percept, which, in this case, is a sign that the cerusa has been heated to the desired temperature. Note the use of flavus color in preference to the simple flavus.

Flos eris [aeris]

This phrasal compound occurs in 214v/1/22-23 in circumstances in which its status is particularly clear. The context is such that flos eris and viride grecum are obviously alternative colores, substances which can be used as coloring-agents to produce a 'green' visual effect.

Incaustum, -i

This term occurs once, in 215r/1/30; it is obvious that it refers to a coloring-agent which, it is clearly implied, is a substance which must be ground and mixed with a liquid carrier. Incaustum seems to mean primarily the ink 'cake' and only secondarily the prepared liquid.

Indicus, -a, -um

This term occurs only once as a straightforward adjective, in 215r/1/5-6, where the combination indicus color is clearly intended to indicate a visual-percept; note the synonymity of azurium and indicus color as labels for visual-percepts.

The substantivized neuter singular of this adjective occurs alone, in 216r/1/14 and 217r/1/15, as a label for a substance in recipes in which it is clearly a coloring-agent. In 216r/1/21 flos indici occurs; it is clear that 'indic' is the genitive singular of indicum, and, from the context (cf. ll. 20-21) that flos indici is a synonym of indicum de balgadea, another instance of the substantival use of the neuter singular, this time in a unitary expression, a phrasal compound, denoting a substance which is used as a coloring-agent. The term was current, or, at least, thought to be current by the author.
**Lapis lazuli**

In 216r/1/38, its only occurrence in this text, this term clearly refers to a substance which is a coloring-agent. Note especially the distinction established between *lapis lazuli* which is *melius coloratus* and that which is *albus*; the mineral does indeed vary considerably in quality. For this latter reason perhaps *lapis lazuli* ought rather to be understood as designating a sub-class of *color* (coloring-agent).

**Lividus, -a, -um**

In 217r/1/17 ‘liuido’ seems to be a neuter substantive, one of the two appositives (with ‘crocco’) of ‘hiis duobus’ (II. 16-17), which depends for its case on ‘cum’ (l. 16); if this interpretation is correct, *lividum* is clearly a substance used as an ingredient in a recipe; from the context it is clear that it is a *color*.

*Lividus* is clearly an adjective in 216r/II/16 and 18, where it refers exclusively to the visual-percept of a color. In both cases it is the *color* that indicates that a certain stage of the preparation has been reached; hence, only the visual-percept is meant.

**Lucens, -entis**

This form, the present-participle of *lucere*, occurs twice, in 214v/1/26-29; in both cases it is applied to small stones (‘lapides’) and in both cases it means ‘bright, shiny.’ Note that it is combined with ‘albos,’ in a phrase ‘albos et lucentes’ which is then further specified by the expression ‘ad modum cristalli.’ It seems wisest to consider *lucens* to be a color-term; it is worth noting, in this context, that lexemes expressive of brightness and darkness are in general difficult to separate from those more specifically indicative of color.

**Membrana, -ae**

This term occurs once, in 217v/1/10, where it is specifically stated to be a *color* (coloring-agent). It is a ‘color quo pingitur facies nuda et nuda corpora’ (II. 10-11); the visual-percept is, however, clearly implied. Note that it is not claimed that the visual-percept produced by using *membrana* for this purpose is true to life; it is quite simply stated that *membrana* is the *color* used for this purpose, presumably because it produced a visual effect which seemed to the contemporary eye to be reasonably accurate. However, tradition also played an important rôle in the selection of certain *colores* for certain purposes; often the tradition has its roots in an earlier and less sophisticated stage of technological development in which the *color* so used was indeed the closest approximation possible, given the resources of the time. In some cases, even though a later age might have better resources for the same purpose, the heavy hand of tradition prescribed the older practice.

**Minera, -ae**

It is clear that *minera* is not a *color*, properly speaking (cf. 215v/1/28 and 215v/II/7). It is equally clear that the term could be used pro-presentatively for any *color*, i.e. coloring-agent occurring in nature. Since it could also be so used for any useful substance so occurring and was not restricted to those which were *colores*, it is only a partial synonym of *color*. Its intimate link to *color* must, however, be noted in order to achieve a reasonably detailed and complete presentation of the semantic scheme centered on *color* of which *minera* is a part, although, so to speak, only laterally.

**Minium, -i**

In 214r/1/20-21 *minium* is obviously a coloring-agent, the means by which the *color rubeus* is to be produced. The primary notion is that of physical substance;
the visual-percept is, however, strongly implied. In 215v/II/26-27 and 217v/II/8 it is clearly the physical properties of the substance minium that matter; the notion of the visual-percept produced by minium is most incidental, if present at all.

**Niger, -gra, -grum**

This adjective occurs once, in 214v/II/35, in combination with color. The expression niger color is a label for a group of coloring-agents, specifically those which produce a ‘black’ visual-percept, and is, therefore, a sub-class of color. In this particular instance it indicates a specific coloring-agent, the recipe for which appears in the following lines. At the same time niger clearly and strongly implies the resultant visual-percept, since the property of producing a ‘black’ visual-percept is precisely what all nigri colores have in common. It is clear, however, from the use of the ablative in this specific instance that the notion of the coloring-agent is predominant.

**Nigredo, -inis**

This term occurs only once in this text; see 215v/II/23, but cf. ll. 17-25. It clearly refers to a visual-percept. Note that nigredo is used in such a way that it is clear that the visual-percept to which it refers and that to which pallor allemannicus refers are similar. Note also that nigredo is apparently considered to be the polar opposite of albedo; hence, both nigredo and albedo are probably very general in their implications in this passage and mean ‘dark color’ and ‘light color’ respectively rather than ‘black’ and ‘white.’ There is, however, no clear instance in this text of a similar opposition between niger and albus.

**Pallor, -is**

This substantive occurs alone in 215v/II/11 where it is used as the polar opposite of bonus color; it is a property or quality of colores (visual-percepts) and is clearly undesirable. Clear antonyms of color in any of its meanings must obviously be admitted as color-terms. In 215v/II/23-24 there occurs the expression pallor allemannicus; it is evident that the expression, at least in this context, refers to a visual-percept. Note the implication that nigredo and pallor allemannicus are visually similar (cf. ll. 17-25); in any case, pallor allemannicus must be ranked, at least temporarily, as a color.

**Persicus, -a, -um**

Persicus occurs only once in this text, in 214v/II/19, where, in combination with color (‘coloere persico’) it clearly refers exclusively to a visual-percept.

**Pictor, -is**

This term occurs only once in this text, in 216v/II/37. It is included in this present study because of its obvious lateral connection with color. It is, of course, the nomen agentis of pingo, a verb intimately, but laterally connected with color (cf. tintura); pingo and coloro will be found to be partial synonyms.

**Purpureus, -a, -um**

This term occurs only once in the Tractatus, in 214v/II/16-18; it is clear from the context that it is used attributively to an ‘understood’ color. It is not absolutely clear whether only the resultant visual effect or the resultant liquid as a coloring-agent is meant; in either case it is plain that the visual effect is paramount.
Rubeus, -a, -um

Rubeus occurs six times in this text. In three instances it is simply an adjective attributing 'redness' to a specified substantive: 214v/II/21-23 (predicate nominative 'rubea' specifying more closely what is meant by 'colorata' and attributive to 'ossa'); 215r/1/21-22 (attributive to urina; note the combination of rubeus and clarus, a clear indication that rubeus could be applied to translucent as well as opaque objects); 217r/I/19 (attributive to facia; hence 'flesh-colored,' at least in a very general sense).

In the three remaining instances rubeus is coupled with color; in two of these three cases the combination color rubeus clearly refers to a visual-percept: 214v/I/20-21 (note that the coloring-agent, minimum, is clearly specified in l. 21), and 215r/II/1, where there is no doubt, given the context, that only the visual-percept is meant—a particularly clear-cut example. In the remaining case, 214v/II/16-18 color rubeus is a solution, the principal ingredient in which is bresileatum, which is prepared for use as a coloring-agent; the visual-percept is, however, prominent by virtue of rubeus itself. In this last case rubeus color is a sub-class of color I.

Sanguis vitri

This term occurs only once in this text, in 214v/I/13, in a context in which it is clearly an ingredient in a recipe for the preparation of a color and in which, because sanguis vitri and cerausa seem to be logically parallel, it may well be a color (coloring-agent); it is not clear, however, in this context, whether sanguis vitri is, in fact, a color.

Tenta, -ae

This term occurs only in this Tractatus, in 217r/I/27, in a context in which it is clearly stated that tenta is a color. From ll. 27-30 it is clear that it refers primarily to a physical substance (coloring-agent) which is produced according to the recipe which follows. The expression 'miser usus' apparently describes the substance tenta; its visual-percept is clearly stated to be a color aureus valde pulcher (ll. 29-30).

Tinctura, -ae

This term occurs only once in this text, in 214v/II/10. It is, obviously, a derivative of tingo and must be included in this study because it is laterally connected with color through the partial synonymity of tingo with coloro.

Vermilio, -nis

This term occurs only once, in 215r/II/28. It is obvious that it is a color, since a detailed recipe for its preparation is given in this Tractatus de coloribus. It is equally clear that it is a coloring-agent compounded according to that recipe from the ingredients specified.

Vernicio, -nis, m.

For the classification of vernicio as a color, see Verniza. It occurs in 217r/I/19; note that albus here means 'colorless, translucent.' Cf. Vernicum.

Vernicum, -i

For the classification of vernicum as a color, see Verniza. It occurs in 217r/II/7. Note that in that context (ll. 5-7) 'liquorem' = 'vernicionem' (cf. 217r/I/19); hence either vernicum is a synonym of vernicio or the two are so similar (i.e. both are clear varnishes) that vernicio produced according to this recipe can be sold as if it
were *vernicipium*, in which case it would clearly be implied that *verniciu*um is the better of the two.

**Vernix, -iis**

It is to be noted that this substantive occurs twice, in 215\textsuperscript{v}/I/20 and 22; there is no indication in this text that it was considered a *color*.

**Verniza, -ae**

It is specifically stated in 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/7-8 that verniza is a *color*. *Verniza* is a varnish and is ‘alba’ (cf. 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/29-30) or ‘colorless, clear, transparent.’ It is clear from the fact that there are two recipes for [verniza](217\textsuperscript{r}/II/7-29 and 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/29-217\textsuperscript{r}/I/2) and from the ‘alnia verniza’ of 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/29 (cf. also l. 40) that the term corresponds to a sub-class of *color* (coloring-agent). Note that both *verniciu*um and *vernicipium* are subsumed under *color*; cf. the implication inherent in the ‘alias’ of 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/7-8. Note, too, that the colorlessness of verniza is emphasized by the contradistinction implied in 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/30-31 (‘aliquantulum crocei coloris’) which applies to the ‘alia verniza’ of 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/29. The term occurs pro-presentatively in 215\textsuperscript{v}/I/32 and 217\textsuperscript{r}/I/36.

**Vernizo, -are**

This verb occurs once, in 217\textsuperscript{r}/II/13, where it clearly means ‘to varnish.’ It means ‘to apply *verniza*’ and is derived from this latter; hence it is also a *color*-term, although not a *color*.

**Viridis, -e**

*Viridis, -e* is an adjective the neuter singular of which is found substantivized. In the following analysis, the adjectival uses are treated first; the substantival follow.

As an adjective *viridis, -e* uniformly refers to visual-perception of the color green (*color II*); cf. 216\textsuperscript{r}/II/25 and 38-39 (for this latter use cf. 216\textsuperscript{r}/I/22-23). The gender in 216\textsuperscript{v}/II/25 is determined by *vinum* (l. 24), the liquid vehicle of the *pulvis* (l. 22).

*Viridis* occurs in combination with *color*, in both possible word-orders. In all instances the combination refers, first, generically to all *colores* which produce a green visual-percept; the combination simply labels a sub-class of *colores*, those which are ‘green,’ and refers primarily to substances (coloring-agents). Secondarily, the combination emphasizes visual-perception in 214\textsuperscript{v}/II/34-35. In 214\textsuperscript{v}/II/23-25 *viridis color* is used pro-presentatively for *viride grecum* (l. 26) and is, therefore, used in the sense of *color II*; *viridis color* is, however, consciously preferred to *viride grecum*, since it is desired to emphasize the visual-percept rather than the coloring-agent which produces it (cf. ‘ulde pulcro,’ ll. 24-25). *Viridis* color is the more general term; *viride grecum* is subsumed under it. Hence the former can be used pro-presentatively for the latter. A clear instance of the use of *viridis color* to label a sub-class of *color* is found in 216\textsuperscript{r}/II/20-21.

**Viride, -is, n.**

It is abundantly clear from 216\textsuperscript{r}/II/38 and 39 that *viride* was a sub-class of *color* (coloring-agent), the general term under which are subsumed all of the sub-classes of *viride* and the specific ‘greens’ which, in turn, are included in these latter. Note that a very large part of the *Tractatus* (216\textsuperscript{r}/II/38-217\textsuperscript{r}/I/18) is devoted to *viride*, etc. Note especially the statement, ‘multiplex est viride’ (216\textsuperscript{r}/II/38-39).

Note that the neuter gender of *viride* reflects systematic practice whenever a *color* is labeled substantivally by means of an adjective; cf. *album*. 
Under *viride* are subsumed a certain number of sub-classes bearing names which are phrasal compounds: *viride grecum*, for which several different recipes are given (see 216*/I/1-12* for a clear indication of the subsuming of *viride grecum*, l. 1, under *viride*), cf. 214*/II/22-23, 214*/II/23-35, 216*/I/1-2, 216*/II/29-30; *viride hispanicum*, 216*/II/5; *viride romanicum*, 216*/II/19-20 (color Ic); *viride salsum*, 216*/I/14 and 19 (in each case primarily a color Ic) and note *viride* in I. 17 used pro-presentatively for *viride salsum*.

In all cases it is clear that *viride grecum* refers to coloring-agents, *colores* I, but with strong overtones of visual-perception due to *viride* itself; hence *viride grecum* refers to a sub-class of *colores* III.

The relationships among these terms can be diagrammed as follows:

\[
(1) \text{viridis, -e} \\
(2a) \text{viridis color} = (2b) \text{viride, -is, n.} \\
(3a) \text{viride grecum} \\
(3b) \text{viride hispanicum} \\
(3c) \text{viride romanicum} \\
(3d) \text{viride salsum}
\]

Any term can be substituted pro-presentatively for any other term which is the same part of speech and bears the same or a higher number.

In the following Charts the color-terms discussed in the preceding remarks are arranged according to their principal use; as it becomes possible to complete the Charts it will be necessary to indicate graphically relationships which are still self-evident at this stage.

Charts II and III are expansions of *color I* and *color II* of Chart I respectively.

The capital letters in Charts I and II have been used tentatively to label various levels of generality/specificity; (A) indicates the highest level of generality and (E), at the other extreme, the level of maximum specificity. B, C and D are sub-classes of A, C and D of B, and D of C; *colores* included under E are not sub-classes.

In Chart III, (B) has the value already indicated for Charts I and II; (C*) labels the *colores* (adjectives) properly and principally classed under (B); (C*) labels nouns which are also properly *colores* II but which are not listed under (C*); (D) labels derivative abstract nouns; (E) labels verbs derived from terms included under (C*), or (D). A great many other terms will be added as evidence accumulates (e.g. *albesco, candesco, flavesco, rubeo, rubedo*). Synonyms and antonyms are bracketed below the terms to which they correspond and are indicated respectively by a preceding = or ≠.

Although it is evident that the following *colores* are all to be classed in Chart II under (E) it is not clear from the text of this *Tractatus* under which term in (C) or (D), if any of those listed here, each of them can most adequately be entered.

- auripigmentum
- lapis lazuli
- ambra
- membrana
- cenobrium
- tenta
- crocus italicus
- vermilio
- flos eris

Other texts will yield abundant evidence which will permit us to put these terms into their proper places in these patterns. It will also be possible to justify ...
clusion of many terms with which the reader is no doubt familiar (albus color, croceus color, indicus color; nigrum, rubeum) but which do not occur in this Tractatus and which, therefore, cannot be included here without a sacrifice of methodological rigor.

In subsequent studies it will be possible to present a large amount of information with comparative brevity by referring to this analysis as a model. It is expected that the charts will continue to be modified and amplified as evidence accumulates.

**CHART I**

(A) *color III (I plus II)*

(B) *color I* + *color II*

**CHART II**

(B) *Color I*

(C)

| album    | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | cerusa  |
| aureus color | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | color aureus |
| aurum (>deauro) | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | aurum musicum |

(D)

| azurium | azurium artificiale |
| azurium natuale |
| azurium citramarinum |
| azurium transmarinum |
| azurium natuale |
| transmarinum | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | azurium de massa |
| azurium de monte ario |

| croceum (?) |
| incaustum |
| indicum | indicum de balgadea |
| lividum (?) |
| niger color |
| rubeus color | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | bresiletum |
| minium |
| verniza | .   | .   | .   | .   | .   | vernicio |
| = (?) vernicium |

| viridis color |
| = viride | .   | .   | viride grecum |
| viride hispanicum |
| viride romanicum |
| viride salsum |

**CHART III**

(B) *Color II* → *coloro, -are* → *coloratus*  
≠ *pallor*  
(pingo) pictor  
(tingo) tinctura  
≠ *albus*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(C₁)</th>
<th>(C₂)</th>
<th>(D)</th>
<th>(E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>albus</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>albedo</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≠ lucens (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>≠ nigredo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= coloratus</td>
<td>aureus (+ color)</td>
<td></td>
<td>deauro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>aurum</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>azurium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>candidus</td>
<td></td>
<td>claresco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= albus (2)</td>
<td>clarus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= albus (2)</td>
<td>croceus (+ color)</td>
<td>flavus (+ color)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indicus (+ color)</td>
<td>= azurium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lividus</td>
<td>niger (+ color)</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>nigredo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>≠ albedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pallor</td>
<td>= pallor allemannicus (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming that the language of this Tractatus is typical, it will have become clear in the foregoing presentation that in mediaeval Latin the noun color and those lexemes which are semantically either parallel or subordinate to it can be arranged according to a complex but internally coherent scheme with appropriate subschemata and that such an arrangement is in fact necessitated by the interrelationships obtaining among those lexemes. The arrangement presented here is a first attempt to order the material and is, of course, in no sense final. It is obvious that it is still excessively simple and superficial; in addition, some rearrangement will certainly be necessitated by subsequent investigations of individual lexemes or groups of closely interrelated lexemes. It is understood that many color-terms which come quickly to mind from mediaeval Latin texts are missing from these schemata; they will be included as clear, concrete examples are found for them.

Note the internally hierarchical character of the schemes of color I and color II as well as that of color III; under color (following the section on color III) it is pointed out that specific terms (under color I) readily suggest more general terms (subclasses C and D), the reverse situation, however, rarely obtains. The more general term may easily be used pro-presentatively for the more specific (A for B, C, D or E; B for C, D or E; C for D or E; D for E), but the reverse is seldom possible (cf. viridis).

Note that terms (colores I) containing no component with specific color-reference will suggest a visual-percept only to the reader who knows what color II results from applying the color I produced by the recipe in question; there are, generally speaking, no such associations for the uninitiated. The scheme presented in Charts I, II and III is valid, therefore, only for those painters and craftsmen for whom this and similar texts were intended; it is a semantic pattern found in their special language, their professional Sondersprache, and does not reflect accurately the situation in the
Saussurian *langue* of the Latin of time — and it is possible to speak of a *langue* in such circumstances.

Those *colores* I which readily suggest *colores* II even to the uninitiated are not entered separately under *color* III. Any term which appears in both I and II is automatically III. Terms considered tentative have not been incorporated into the schemata.

The word *color*, in this *Tractatus* and similar texts, is generally to be understood to mean *color* III unless a narrower meaning (I or II) is specified or clearly implied; cf. the discussion of relative positions of *color* and accompanying color-adjectives under *color* (II).

Just as *color* is the most general of all color-nouns, its verbal derivative, *coloro*, -*are*, and the passive participle of this latter, *coloratus*, are respectively the most general verbal and adjectival terms. While this text contains examples of color-terms (in contradistinction to *colores*) which are derived from verbs that are not in turn derivatives of terms specifically referring to *colores* (cf. *pictor* from *pingo* and *tinctura* from *tingo*), it contains no example of a *color* so derived; *colores* II are principally adjectives derived from nouns and *colores* I are nouns or noun-phrases. The nominal character of color-notions is clearly primary; verbal notions are secondary. Verbs are, as a rule, subordinately derived from nominal stems (cf. *albesco*, *rubesco*, *rubeo*, et sim., although they do not occur in this text).

Note that *pulcher* in this text — and in similar contexts — is a visual adjective of *color*, not shape, size or proportion. The semantics of *pulcher* need further investigation.

It is clear that, whether or not they are color-terms, all lexemes which are etymologically related to those which are color-terms, must be included in such schemata unless it is reasonable to suppose that the etymological relationship was no longer apparent; this latter case is apt to arise only when the two terms have become so dissimilar that their etymological kinship is obscured. It is, it seems evident, always wiser to sin by reason of excessively zealous inclusion of *recte excludenda* than of excessively severe exclusions; see *albumen*, for instance. It seems convenient to class such terms as ‘color-lexemes of the second order;’ the first order includes those which properly refer to *colores*.

In the preceding pages use has been made on several occasions of the notion of a ‘negative’ *color* or color-term; see, for example, what is said under *albus*. The Latin substantive *color* and many of the terms with which it is semantically most intimately connected and which are, therefore, subsumed under it, could be used to convey the notion that a liquid, for example, was clear and colorless or that a piece of cloth had not been dyed — that it had, in other words, retained whatever *color* (II) it ‘accidentally’ had.

The expression ‘phrasal compound,’ occurs in this discussion, a term which it has been necessary to establish and which is defined as follows: a semantically unitary term consisting of more than one lexeme. A number of examples will be found under *azurium*.

*Bucknell University*
Hugh of Honau and the "Liber de Ignorantia"

NICHOLAS M. HARING S.A.C.

At least two of the works written by Hugh of Honau are preserved in MS Cambridge, University Library II.4.27, fols 2-177. The first of them bears the title: Liber de homöysion et homœysion (fols. 2-129) and is divided into four distinctiones. The Catalogue¹ suggests Anselm of Havelberg (d. 1158) as its author.

The second work is entitled: Liber de diversitate naturae et personae proprietatumque personalium non tam Latinorum quam ex Graecorum auctoritatibus extractus (fols. 130-177). It is not complete.

The next folio begins with a work called Liber de ignorantia (fols. 178-188). And since its introduction contains a list of its seventeen chapter headings, we know that it is complete.

The author of the first work concludes his introduction with the titles of the four distinctiones into which the work is divided (fol. 2). It is quite understandable that no attempt is made to provide a list of the chapter headings because the first distinctio consists of 35 chapters (fols. 2'-28), the second of as many as 80 (fols. 28-70), the third of 36 (fols. 70-108), and the fourth of 40 (fols. 108-129).

The author of the second work had also planned to divide it into several distinctiones and a number of chapters, for he states at the end of fol. 139: Haec sunt primae distinctionis capitula. Unfortunately the following folio is blank, but it still shows clear evidence of a text which was later erased. Even in its present incomplete form the first and only distinctio contains 51 chapters.

In view of this exceptional endeavour to present the reader with an outline of the works, one may rightly be inclined to conclude that the three treatises date back to the same author. In fact, when Charles Homer Haskins² compared the Liber de diversitate and the Liber de homöysion he concluded that they are written "in the same style and may well be by the same author." There is indeed copious evidence to show that the suggestion made by Haskins is well founded.

¹ Catal. of the Latin Manuscripts 3 (Cambridge, 1858) 464, no. 1824.
It has since been shown by Antoine Dondaine\(^3\) that the author of the *Liber de diversitate* is Hugh of Honau,\(^4\) a Deacon of the Sacred Palace under the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190), who entrusted him with several missions to the court of Manuel I (1141-80) in Constantinople.\(^5\) The author of the *Liber de homosion* is the same schoolman (*scholasticus*), Hugh of Honau in Alsace.

After speaking of Hugh of Honau's two works preserved in MS Cambridge, University Library II.4.27, A. Dondaine turns to the *Liber de ignorantia* and writes: "Ce nouveau traité peut ne pas appartenir au dossier dont nous tentons de dresser un inventaire; il n'est cependant pas exclu qu'il lui appartienne. Nous en ferons mention, parce que nous le croyons du même auteur que les ouvrages précédents: Hugues de Honau."\(^6\) Ch. H. Haskins did not commit himself. Concerning this third work he simply declares: "Then comes a treatise of a different sort."\(^7\) Although Dondaine does not proffer reasons for his view and although convincing proof is lacking, the assumption that Hugh of Honau is the author is not without probability.

Dondaine sees in the *Liber de ignorantia* a veiled attack on the followers of Peter Lombard.\(^8\) It seems, however, that the author has no such intention and aims at a simple clarification of terms in order to discuss some moral problems arising from ignorance and various degrees of guilt. The author's opening statement reveals why he wrote the treatise: *Quid ignorantia sit multi ignorant. Idemque nescire et ignorare esse putantes et in proprietate loquendi peccant et in sententia veritatis errant.* The *proprietas loquendi* was also Hugh's main concern in his previous works. The conclusion of the tract will convince the reader that Hugh was not interested in polemics but in the clarification of moral questions.

We have seen that the author's endeavour to give an outline of his works is apparent in all three treatises. As a consequence the manuscript would constitute a sort of dossier of Hugh's systematic writings. Although, as has been said, there is very little circumstantial evidence to strengthen this view, one should draw attention to the author's

---


5 See also N. M. Haring, "The *Liber de differentia naturae et personae* by Hugh Etherian," *Med. St.* 24 (1962) 1-34.


7 *Studies*, p. 212.

8 *Écrits*, p. 45.
reference (X, 30) to Frederico gloriosissimo Romanorum Imperatori, for in his Liber de diversitate (I, 5) Hugh of Honau speaks likewise of "Frederick, the most glorious Emperor of the Romans" (legatione Frederici gloriosissimi Romanorum Imperatoris). The similarity might be considered accidental, however, for the author makes this remark while speaking of the two translations of the Liber de natura hominis. He attributes the work to Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa and brother of Basil the Great, and writes (X, 30): De Graeco in Latinum translationem duplicem inveni. Quorum alterius auctorem9 non reperi, alteram Burgundio10 Venecianus edidit atque eam Frederico gloriosissimo Romanorum Imperatori, victo Mediolano et subacta Italia obtulit...

Knowing Burgundio's translation, the author may only be echoing Burgundio's preface which begins: Invictissimo et gloriosissimo Domino Frederico, Dei gratia Romanorum Imperatori...11 Yet at the same time the writer adds something he could not have learned from Burgundio, namely the remark: victo Mediolano et subacta Italia. Being in the Emperor's service, Hugh of Honau might well be expected to express pride in his master and to know that Burgundio's translation was made after the victory over Milan and the defeat of Italy.12

Hugh admits that there were two translations of the De Natura hominis. He does not say that he used both of them. First he used Burgundio's translation and improved it with the help of Alfano's text. Later he followed Alfano's translation rather than Burgundio's. Burgundio's translation is the basis of the passage transcribed in chapter X, 31. The first sentence (Si in nobis... ignorantiam) is almost identical in both translations. But the second sentence in the Liber de ignorantia reads: Qui enim ebrius est vel iratus et facit aliquid perversum, hic quidem ebrietatem ille vero iram causam habet eorum quae ab ipso fiunt quae erant voluntaria. This agrees with Burgundio's text with the exception of perversum, which Hugh took from Alfano's translation to replace malum found in Burgundio.13 Alfano's version of the same passage reads: Nam ebrius et iratus faciens aliquid perversum, hic quidem ebrietatem hic vero furem causam habet actorum ab ipso,

9 Nemessii episcopi Premon Physicon a N. Alfano, Archiepiscopo Salerni, in Latinum translatus; ed. C. Burkhard (Leipzig, 1917) 1-146.

10 Gregorii Nysseni (Nemessii Emenesi) Peri Phyeos Anthropou liber a Burgundione in Lat. translatius; ed. C. Im. Burkhard in Programmata Gymnasiae Meidingensis (Vienna, 1891-1902) 11-132. The work will be quoted under the title De Natura hominis.


12 According to one manuscript used by Burkhard (p. 11), Burgundio's version was made in 1159. Haskins, Studies, p. 207, assigns it to the year 1155.

13 Liber de natura hominis (Burg. interpr.) 30; ed. Burkhard, p. 98.
quae erant voluntaria.\textsuperscript{14}

To quote another example, the final sentence in the same excerpt reads: ut in loco solito quis sagittans patrem transeunte per eventum percutiens interemit (X, 31). Burgundio translates this passage as follows: puta si in loco quis consueto sagittans patrem transeunte casu traiciens interfecit.\textsuperscript{15} For some reason Hugh of Honau preferred Alfano's translation (p. 114): ut in loco solito quis sagittans patrem transeunte per eventum percutiens interemit. We need not suppose that this mixture was already found in a translation used by Hugh, for without indicating a source he states later (XIII, 51): ut si quis in loco consueto sagittans patrem transeunte casu traiciens interfecit. In other words, Hugh used both translations and felt free to adopt whichever reading suited him. However, the long excerpts found in chapter XII, 37-42 are copied from the Alfano translation.

It may finally be noted that the terminology found in the \textit{Liber de ignorantia} points to the school of Gilbert of Poitiers. Since Hugh of Honau was a pupil and ardent admirer of Gilbert we may note points of contact in his distinction between \textit{genuinum} and \textit{nativum} (II, 8) and in his marked preference for the otherwise rare use of \textit{adminiculum} (III, 9 and IV, 10).\textsuperscript{16}

Assuming with some probability that Hugh of Honau is the author of the \textit{Liber de ignorantia}, the dating of our treatise should be considered. In the reference, cited above, to "Frederick, the most glorious Emperor of the Romans" no mention is made of Barbarossa's death; this omission suggests that the work was written before 1190. There is no doubt that the first of the three works was written before 1181 and the second not long after 1181. And since the order in the manuscript seems to be chronological the third tract was probably written in the eighties.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Liber de natura hominis} (Alf. interpr.) 31, 7; ed. Burkhard, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Liber de natura hominis} (Burg. interpr.) 50; p. 98.

There is some other evidence to suggest this date, for Hugh tells a story about Simon of Tournai’s having completely lost his memory: In qua miseria lacrimabilis dicitur nuper evanuisset omnis scientia cuiusdam viri doctissimi Simonis Tornacensis (IX, 27). On the testimony of Matthew of Paris it is generally held that Simon’s professorial career ended in 1201. But the story, if true, might well refer to an earlier appearance of an affliction which gradually brought about the end of his teaching activity. The story in itself is of small importance. In fact, one reader had so little confidence in it that he changed Tornacensis into Carnocensis, a change which promptly transferred Simon from Tournai to Chartres. Moreover, Stephen of Bourbon tells a similar tale about a “most excellent preacher in Paris.” Nevertheless the mention of a contemporary—nothing is said of Simon’s death—and the allusion to the event as being recent (dicitur nuper evanuisset) lends some, if only slight, probability to the date suggested above.

An analysis of Hugh’s Liber de ignorantia need not delay us here. The subject is treated in a lucid and scholarly fashion. Hugh first defines such terms as scientia, intellectus, and intelligensia to prepare for the proper understanding of such opposite terms as nescientia and ignorantia. After these clarifications, Hugh deals with the causes and moral aspects of ignorance in order to define the various degrees of guilt connected with it.

In the course of his arguments he quotes the Posterior Analytics to determine the meaning of scire (I, 6). To this he adds the definition of scientia given by Alexander (I, 7). Boethius is cited to show that both God and prime matter (hyle) are beyond our perfect understanding (V, 13). Quoted at considerable length, but attributed to Gregory of Nyssa is the De Natura hominis of Nemesius. We have already seen that Hugh used two translations: the translation made by N. Alfano, Archbishop of Salerno (1058-85), and the version made by Burgundio of Pisa, whom Hugh erroneously describes as Venetian. Hugh admits that he failed to discover the name of the author of the first translation. Several quotations from St. Ambrose and St. Augustine serve to clear up discrepancies in terminology. They are all copied from Gratian’s Decretum.

INCIPIT
LIBER DE IGNORANTIA

1 Quid\textsuperscript{1} ignorantia sit multi ignorant. Idemque nescire et ignorare esse putantes et in proprietate loquendi peccant et in sententia veritatis errant. De qua propo-
situm habentes, quia scientiae opposita est ignorantia contrariaque contrariis cognos-
cuntur, prius dicas quid scientia sit ut, illo cognito, ad ignorantiae cognitionem
facilium pertingamus.

2 Talis igitur erit ordo: \textit{primo} quid scientia. \textit{Secundo} cuius sit scire et cuius sciri. \textit{Tertio}
qui sint modi sciendi et quae illorum ad minimula. \textit{Quarto} quae per sciendi modos
et coen ad minimula sint perceptabilia et quae non et quod alia illorum dicantur
sensibilium, alia intellectabilia. \textit{Quinto} quae differentia sit inter intellectum et in-
telligentiam et quae inter intellectabilia et intelligibilia. \textit{Sexto} quomodo nescientia et
ignorantiae scientiae sint opposita ac quae inter illa differentia; praeterea quorum
sint nescire et quorum nescir, quorum ignorare quorumque ignorari et unde dicatur
ignorantia. \textit{Septimo} quid proprie sit ignorantia et quae homini inflecta. \textit{Octavo}
qui sint effectus ignorantiae. \textit{Novo} quod modis insit humano generi vitium ignoran-
tiae. \textit{Decimo} quod sint species ignorantiae. \textit{Undecimo} quia ignorantia circa involun-
tarius versatur, quid voluntarius sit et quid involuntarius. \textit{Duodecimo} quod species
sint involuntarii. \textit{Tertiodecimo} quid\textsuperscript{2} involuntarius sit per nescientiam. \textit{Quarto-
decimo} quae ignorantia sit involuntaria, quae non-voluntaria et quae voluntaria.
\textit{Quintodecimo} quae sint singularia quae circa facta propter ignorantiam considerantur.
\textit{Sextodecimo} quae ignorantia sit dampnabilis et quae ad poenam non imputabilis.
\textit{Ultimo} in quibus factis reprehensibilior et in quibus sit venialior.

I

QUID SIT SCIENTIA

3 Scientia est animi motus plenam rei notitiam per certa comprehendens indicia.
\textit{Animi} dico, non corporis; et non irrationabilis sed animae rationalis. [f. 178v]\ Ideo
dicitur \textit{animi} quia animus non est nisi cuius est et mens i.e. animae rationalis. Sunt
autem diversi animi motus: imaginatio, opinio, fides. Quorum nullus apertam et
plenam rei consequi potest cognitionem. Imaginatio rei conformat imaginem.
Opino vel fingit vel per dubias fluctuat conjecturas. Fides non ut est rem vere et
manifeste cognoscit: assentit tamen esse ut credit.

4 Scientia autem certas quasdam signorum notas in re non transeuntur\textsuperscript{3} inspiciet
sed diligenter et constanter considerat quibus ad ipsius sine errore ducatur cogni-
tionem. Et bestia quidem certas quasdam notas in re ponit quibus ipsius obtineat
notitiam sed sensu solo et vi quadam suae naturae. Rationale autem animal non

\textsuperscript{1} MS Cambridge, University Library II.4.27, fol. 178. Date: end of 12th century.
\textsuperscript{2} quid . . . quartodecimo marg.
\textsuperscript{3} transeunter corr. ex transeuntes. All corrections in this edition are the scribe's or the
corrector's, unless noted otherwise.
solo sensu sed et animi discretione et diutina cognitione notas rebus infigit quibus eorum notitiam consequatur; verbi gratia, liquorem quem video mordicationem in carne facere, acetosum saporem et stipticum habere virtutem per haec signa acetum esse cognosco.

5 Elementum quod considero esse in gravitate et frigiditate, humiditate quoque et mobilitate, aquam esse contemptor, praesertim cum haec signa diutina sint et numquam fallentia nec aliter in rebus omnium\(^4\) generum omnia evenienitia. Notitia igitur rei \textit{per certa} sui \textit{indicia} et \textit{per\(^5\) plarium notarum suarum signa cognitio habita recte dicitur scientia. Tunc enim perfecte et aperte rem scio cum eius per apertas et certas notas atque indicia notitiam habeo.

6 Huic descriptioni concordat \textit{ARISTOTILES}\(^6\) in \textit{Posterioribus Analectis} dicens: Scire est rem sic se habere et causam quare sic se habeat et quod aliter non contingat cognosccere. Videoliquorem hunc se habere vere ut acetum et causam quare sic se habeat inspicio quia mordicatius, acetosus est et stipticus. Et video quia aliter non contingit. Nec enim liquor in tribus his proprietatis omnibus esse valet nisi acetum sit.

7 Concordat et \textit{ALEXANDER}\(^7\) his dictis qui degniis scientiam ait: Scientia est demonstrativus \([l. 179]\) habitus rerum semper vel frequentius similiter contingentium. \textit{Habitus} dicitur quia est animi motus difficile mobilis. \textit{Demonstrativus} quia per certorurum signorum atque notarum et indiciorum demonstrationem comparatur. \textit{Rerum semper vel frequentius similiter} se habentium neque aliter \textit{contingentium} dicitur quia \textit{per certa indicia} et immobilia signa sic se habere comprehenduntur. Ibi enim certitudo et immobilitas indiciorum et notarum est ubi signa \textit{semper vel frequentius similiter} se habent. \textit{Semper autem dicitur ut} in mathematicis et theologicis; \textit{frequentius} ut in physicis et rebus naturalibus. In illis immutabilia sunt cognitionis signa; in ipsis consuetud. In theologicis \textit{semper} et immutabiliter se habent \textit{similiter}. In naturalibus consuete et frequenter se habent \textit{similiter}.

II

\textbf{CUIUS SIT SCIRI ET CUIUS SCIRE}

8 Definita scientia, sequitur ut aperiatur quorum sit per scientiam scire et quorum sciri. Genuini i.e.\(^8\) divini, et nativi i.e. Creatoris et creaturae sciri est et scire.\(^9\) Quicquid enim est, aut nativum aut genuinum est i.e. aut Creator aut creatura. Nec excluditur ab hac universitate aliquid quia natura Creatoris in Creatore, natura creaturae in creaturae includitur. Sola igitur haec duo sunt quorum est et scire et sciri. Sed differenter. Genuinum i.e.\(^{10}\) divinum omne et totum scit sed non totum scitur. Nativum omne scitur i.e. scibile est sed non omne scit. Solum enim rational\(\text{e}^{11}\) nativum scit.

\(^4\) omnium corr. \textit{ex hominum}.
\(^5\) per \textit{add. corrector}.
\(^6\) \textit{Anal. Post.} 1, 2; PL 64, 713D (different version).
\(^7\) Cf. Boethius, \textit{In Lib. de interpr. ed. secunda} I; PL 64, 410C.
\(^8\) genuini id est marg. See \textit{supra}, note 16.
\(^9\) sciri est et scire \textit{marg}.
\(^10\) genuinum id est marg.
\(^11\) genuinum et \textit{add. scriptor sed del. corr}.
III

QUI SINT MODI SCIENDI ET QuAE ADMINICULA


III

Quae per sciendi modos et eorum adminicula sint [f. 179v] perceptibilia et quae non.... 13

10 Omnia igitur scabilia vel sensibilia sunt vel intellectabilia: illa sensu atque sensuum adminiculis, ista intellectu et intellectus adminiculis sunt perceptibilia. Itaque quae his modis et adminiculis non perciipientur, non sunt scabilia. Arcana igitur divina nec sensibilia sunt nec intellectabilia quia nec sensu nec intellectu et eorum adminiculis sunt comprehensibilia; intelligentia tamen sunt scrutabilia.

V

Quae differentia sit inter intellectum et intelligentiam

11 Nimium alius est intellectus, alius intelligentia. Intellectus dicitur ab "intellecto", praeterit temporis participio. Ideoque perfectionem notat et consumptionem intelligendi et cognitionis. Intelligibile igitur recte dicitur et vere est quod intellectu integre et perfecte cognoscit potest. Intelligentia vero dicitur a participio praesentis et imperfecti praeterit temporis quod est "intelligentes". A cuius genitivo per grammaticae derivatio proprietatem habet intelligentiam.

12 Qui ergo incipit rem scrutari et investigare sed remanet circa perfectionem investigatae rei nec potest pertingere ad consumptionem investigationis, quae est rei cognitione perfecta, non est in intellectu rei sed in intelligentia, quia non habet rem ut intellectam sed investigat et sequitur eam ut intelligens i.e. intelligendo inquirens quod est ut intelligere incipiens et cipiens sed non ad intelligendum consumptionem perveniens. Itaque caelestia divinitatis occulta, quae nequeunt aliquo intellectu comprehendi sed utcumque intelligentia investigari, non habent omnino aliquem nec etiam in archangelis intellectorem sed in intelligendo admitterunt scrutatorem et investigandam amatorem.

13 Non sunt intellectabilia sed utcumque dici possunt intelligibilia i.e. intelligentibilia. Atque ideo nullatenus sunt scabilia i.e. secundum proprietatem sciendi cognoscibilia. Similiter nec ideo philosophis ita est [f. 180] intelligibilis. Unde Boëtius Contra Euticen et Nestorium ait: Deus et ideo perfecto et integro intellectu seiri non possunt. 14

12 See supra, note 16.

13 The five dots are actually found in the manuscript. The missing words are: et quod alia illorum dicatur sensibilia, alia intellectabilia.

VI
QUOMODO NESCIENTIA ET IGNORANTIA SCIENTIAE
SINT OPPOSITA ET QUAE INTER ILLA DIFFERENTIA
ET QUORUM SIT NESCIRE, QUORUM NESCIRI, ET
QUORUM IGNORARE, QUORUM IGNORARI,
ET UNDE DICATUR IGNORANTIA


15 Praeterea a nota derivatur quoque verbum “nosco” quod est nota scio; a quo componitur “cognosco” quod est per plurimum notarum concursum scio. A “nosco” quoque dicitur “ignorans” quod est ratione noscens. “Gnari” enim prudentiae et sapientiae dedit, utpote omnia ratione discere studentes, prope nuncupantur; a quo per compositionem privatoria significacione dicitur “ignarum” quod est non studens vel cupiens ratione aliquid noscere. Ab “ignaro” autem deducitur verbum “ignorantia.” a quo derivatur ignorantia. Unde sicut per scientiam scire, per notitiam noscere ita per nescientiam nescire, per ignorantiam recte dicitur quis ignorare.

16 Sicut autem scientiae inscientia vel nescientia ita notitiae opposita est, ut ita dicam, in-notitia et ignorantia ita tamen ut illam notitiam accipias quae non solo sensu sed et ratione et intellectu comparatur quae vere et proprie dicitur scientia. Quamobrem scientiae rite dicitur opponi ut privatio habitui in-scientia et ignorantia; nescientia autem ut affirmatio negationi.


18 Illud igitur ignorare diceris recte quod quidem non scis sed scire debes. Properea quia Deus in suis arcans non est scibilis nec eorum ulli creaturae debetur scientia, nescientiam illorum habere poteris sed non ignorantiam. Illorum ergo est tantum ignorantia et proprie quae cum sint scibili15 et possibilis est eorum et nobis debetur scientia. Eorum vero ignorare quae, cum16 non sciant, scire tamen debuerunt.

19 Ideo nulli creaturae nisi rationali convenit ignorare cui et soli competit scire; nescire vero omni creaturae i.e. non scire. Non scit enim brutum animal. Nescit et lapis Deum.17 Non scit18 et chimera. Tam enim de his quae non sunt19 quam de

15 scibilia corr. ex sibilia.
16 cum corr. ex est.
17 (et lapis Deum) apud Deum corrector.
18 scit corr. ex sit.
19 sunt corr. ex sit.
his quae sunt vere dicitur nescire i.e. non scire; ignorare autem tantum de his quae sunt de quibus et scire. Ignorantur vero tantum ea quae sunt: et inter ea sola illa quae sciri debent et possunt. Quare nescientia vel nescire nec est peccatum nec poena peccati. Ignorare vel ignorantia est aliquando peccatum; semper autem in homine poena peccati. Quod hoc modo constabit.

VII

QUID PROPRIE SIT IGNORANTIA ET QUARE HOMINI INFRACTA

20 Primus homo creatus fuit in plenitudine scientiae statui suo conveniente et in ea fortitudine scire posset omnia quae scire ipsum debebat et expeditiebat. In qua naturae suae dignitate si perseverasset, in ampliorem secundum gratiam Conditoris erat sublimandus et perpetua confirmatione corroborandus. Et haec est causa quare omnis homo miseriae subjectus scire debuit et potuit quod modo non scit. [f. 181] Quare autem non sciata quod scire debuit talis est ratio: in tanta scientia, claritate et potestate constitutus scienter et voluntarie et ex ambitione illius scientiae quam habere non debuit quam concepit cum ei dicetur: Eritis sicut dii scientes bonum et malum.21 peccavit.

21 Ideoque a collatae sibi lumine scientiae et concessae scientiae potestate merito cecidit in tantam cecitatem et infirmitatem ut nec expedientia sibi intellexeret nec scire posset quae scire deberet et scire ipsum possibile esset. Et haec passio et infirmitas non sciendi quae scire debuerat rite ab auctoribus dicta est "ignorantia" quae quia pro peccato dictae ambitionis, scilicet illuciteae sibi scientiae, ei est inflecta vera et digna sui peccati exstitit poena.

VIII

QUI SINT EFFECTUS IGNORANTIAE

22 Ex qua22 genus humanum habet originaliter ut aliubi sint fatui, aliqui obli- viosi, aliqui obtusi ingenii et tardi, in puertiâ insci, imprudentes, stulti et huissi- mediones, in reliquis aceribus ignorantiae incommoda per iram, per furorrem, per ebrietatem et per alios multiformes casus. Variis enim modis persequitur primi hominis posteritatem. In aliquibus hominibus ita est infixa per occultum Dei iudici- cium ut nullatenus in hac vita sit emendabilis nec a creatione data scientia sit aliqua ratione reformabilis ut in fatuis per naturam; in aliquibus emendabilis temporis est processu et reformabilis scientia ut in his qui per actatis incrementa scientiae accipiant augmenta ut pueri, iuvenes et studiosi.

23 In aliquibus quae temporis processu est emendata23 reedit iterum in omnimo modam animi caecitatem et obscuramation incognito Dei iudicio ut in furiosis et infirmitis quibusdam atque infatuat. Remanet in aliquibus insolito sui cursu plus in aliquibus et minus in alius. Et peccatis sui exigentibus vel omnino viget et turbat hominem ut in ebriosi, iracundis, vel moderatóris se habit. In aliquibus gratia

20 constitutus corr. ex consecutus.
21 Gen. 3:5.
22 Supple poena.
23 emendata corr. ex emenda.
illuminante tolerabi [f. 181*] lior ut in studiosis, in aliquibus peccato efficiente violentior ut in negligentibus et discere detractantibus.

VIII

QUOT MODIS INSIT HUMANO GENERI VITIUM IGNORANTIAE

24 Ex tam variis ignorantiae effectibus contingit ut multis et diversis modis insit humano generi vitium ignorantiae. Omnis enim ignorantia poenaliter homini inficta aut est ex ratione naturae aut ex infortunio humanae miserie aut ex incuria negligentiae. Ex ratione naturae proveniens, alia est ex defectu naturae universali- ter, alia ex impedimento naturae particulariter. Ex defectu naturae est illa in qua nascentur fatui. Sicut enim in variis corruptionibus et defectibus corporalium membrorum plerumque nascentur caeci, monucli, manci et huieusmodi sic in defectu spiritualium virtutum ex uteris maternis multotiens egrediuntur fatui universaliter i.e. toto tempore vitae suae. Est autem invincibilis haec ignorantia 24 sed non inevitabilis atque ideo non omnium nascentium est generalis.

25 Ex impedimento naturae est quae non pauitur defectum sed ex ratione actatis impedimentum ut in parvulis et senibus. In illis enim impedit actatis ratio25 naturam ne in suo statu scientiam habeant, in ipsis ne quam habuerunt obtineant sed in desipiuntiam cadant; factique illos non sapere, istos desipere. Quare in parvulis est inevitabilis et ideo omnium generalis sed vincibilis et ideo terminabilis; in senibus et evitabilis et vincibilis atque ideo non omnium senum generalis. Quare in utrisque ignorantia est particularis i.e. quorundam tantum temporum, non, sicut prior omnium temporum universalis.

26 Quae ex infortunio est humanae miserie, alia est ex corruptione corporeae infirmitatis ut in febricitantibus, maniacis, freneticis, melancolicis et huieusmodi, alia ex vito inaniun cogitationum ut in his qui curarum immoderatis solli [f. 182] citudinibus alienantur a sensu, alia ex casu inopinati eventus ut in arrepticiis, furiosis et in infautilis. Contingit enim plerumque aliquos inopinato casu, sive infirmos sive sanos existentes, adeo infetuari ut cum in omni scietia peritiis eloquentia facundissimi fuerint in tantam ignorantiam cadant ut nec characteres litterarum cognoscant nec litteratos intelligent nec aliquam scientiam retineant et interdum aliqui omnino obmuteant.

27 In qua miseria lacrimabili dicitur nuper evanuisse omnis scietia cuiusdam viri doctissimi, Simonis Tornacensis.26 Haec autem ignorantia evitabilis est sed vel ex toto vel ex parte invincibilis. Quae ex incuria negligentiae est, alia est ex vito perversae voluntatis, alia ex errore humanae fragilitatis. Item ex vito perversae voluntatis existens alia est ex adipe iniquitatis 27 ut in ebriosis, iracundis, alia ex discendi odio, alia ex studendi taedio, alia ex alterius cuiusque rei studio.

28 Prima per ebrietatem vel iram quis peccat. Inter sequentes prima ignorans efficit quia discere repugnat, secunda quia discere non curat, tertia quia non approbat. Prima discere contemnit, secunda negligent, tertia postponit. Prima per contumatiam est obstinata, secunda per desidiam dissoluta, tertia per vanitatem extracta. Et haec quadruplex ignorantia supina est, vincibilis et evitabilis.

24 ignorantia corr. ex ignorantia ea.
25 ratio corr. ex rationem.
26 Carnocensis corrector.
27 Cf. Ps. 72:7.
29 Quae ex errore est humanae fragilitatis alia est ex errore personae, alia ex errore facti. Error in persona est quando erratur in attributis personae quae a rhetoribus undecim praeter suas partes numerantur. Error in facto quando in ipso et eius circumstantiis erratur quae sunt: locus, tempus, instrumentum, modus, causa. Quae in hoc versu comprehenduntur: *Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxilliis, cur, quomodo, quando.*

*Quis* persona est; *quid* factum; *ubi* locus est; *quando* tempus in quibus factum perpe [f. 182r] tratum est; *quibus auxilliis* instrumentum; *cur* causa propter quam opus peractum est.

X

**QUOT SINT SPECIES IGNORANTIAE**

30 Omnes hos ignorantiae modos duae continent in se species ignorantiae. Aliud enim est propter ignorantiam quid agere, aliud vero ignorantem agere sicut ait *GREGORIUS episcopus Nyssae*, frater magni BASILII Capadoceni episcopi in libro *De Natura hominis*. De Graeco in Latinum translationem duplicem inveni. Quarum alterius autorem non reperi, alteram *Burgundio* *VEncianus* edidit atque eam *FRIDERICUS gloriosissimo Romanorum Imperator*, victo Mediolano et subacta Italia, obtulit nominique suo dicavit.

31 Si in nobis, inquit *GREGORIUS*, fuerit ignorantiae causa, ignorantem quidem facimus sed non propter ignorantiam. Qui enim ebrius est vel iratus et facit aliquid perversum, hic quidem ebrietatem ille vero iram causam habet eorum quae ab ipso fiunt quae erant voluntaria. Licebat enim eum non inebriari. Ipsae igitur sibi ipsi factus est ignorantiae causa. Haec igitur non per ignorantiam dictur facere sed ignoranter, agere quae non sunt involuntaria sed voluntaria. Ideo et exprobrantur a bonis viris qui talia gerunt. Si enim inebriatus non fuisse, numquam fecisset. Volens autem inebriatus est. Volens igitur et haec fecit. Per ignorantiam autem haec gerimus cum non ipsi tribuimus causam

---

29 Gregorii Nysseni (Nemesii Eneseni) Peri Physeos Anthropou Liber a Burgundione in Latinum translatus, 30; ed. C. Im. Burkhard, p. 98: Si enim in nobis... interemitt.
30 (sed non) non vero Burgundio.
31 et Burgundio.
32 malum Burgundio (perversum Alfano).
33 propter Burgundio (per Alfano).
35 gerere Burgundio (agere Alfano).
36 viris Alfano.
37 haec Burg. et Alf.
38 Si enim non inebriatus esset Burgundio.
39 nequaquam Burg. et Alf.
40 autem Burg. et Alf.
41 propter Burgundio (per Alfano).
42 hoc Burgundio (haec Alfano).
43 tribuimus corr. ex tribuamus.
ignorantiae sed ut\textsuperscript{44} contingeret\textsuperscript{46} per incuriam accidit ut\textsuperscript{48} in loco solito\textsuperscript{47} quis sagittans patrem transeuntem per eventum percutiens interemint.\textsuperscript{48}

32 In hac specie ignorantiae continentur omnes modi ignorantiae ex errore humanae fraililitatis evenientes et qui subsunt naturae et infortunio praeter eum qui est ex vitio inaniam cogitationum. Ille etenim et qui subsunt negligentiae secundum vitia perversae voluntatis referuntur ad eam speciem ignorantiae qua dicimus aliquem ignorantem agere, non propter ignorantiam; hic obtinet [f. 183] in se et tribuit ipse causam ignorantiae sibi qui immoderatis cogitationum sollicitudinis in alienatione sensus sui praecipitatur sicut qui inebriatur et irascitur nec continget fuorem et sicut qui perversis voluntatibus alienis aut odio aut taedio habent disciplinas aut alienis vanis studiis postponunt. Quae omnia constat esse in voluntariis et in his quae vituperantur a bonis.

33 Ex vitio namque perversae voluntatis ignorantia nulla est involuntaria cum omnia per ipsam perpetrata sint in exprobratione et vituperatione. Voluntariorum autem, ut ait idem \textsc{Gregorius},\textsuperscript{49} est vituperatio. Sed mirari potest quis quod aliqua ignorantia dicitur voluntaria, cum omnis ignorantiae opus videatur esse involuntarium. Ut igitur hic scrupulus amputetur, necesse est ut quid voluntarium sit et quid involuntarium exponatur. Hoc autem praedictus \textsc{Gregorius} determinat verbis talibus:

XI

QUID VOLUNTARIUM SIT ET QUID INVOLUNTARIUM

34 "Quia\textsuperscript{50} multotiens meminimus voluntarii et involuntarii, necesse est de his incipere ut\textsuperscript{51} eorum notitia perfecta non erremus. Sed oportet volentem de voluntario motu\textsuperscript{52} et involuntario disserere prius regulas quasdam et indicia apponere per quae discernatur quid sit\textsuperscript{53} sive\textsuperscript{54} voluntarium sive involuntarium. Quia igitur omne voluntarium in actu quodam est, et\textsuperscript{55} involuntarium in actu quodam esse mox habeatur\textsuperscript{56} non post multum. Quidam autem hoc quod vere\textsuperscript{57} involuntarium non solum in pati sed et\textsuperscript{58} in agere ponunt.

\textsuperscript{44} ita \textsc{Burgundio}.
\textsuperscript{45} contingit \textsc{Burgundio} (contigerit \textsc{Alfano}).
\textsuperscript{46} (per incuriam accidit ut) puta si \textsc{Burgundio}.
\textsuperscript{47} consuet\textsc{Burgundio} (solito \textsc{Alfano}).
\textsuperscript{48} per eventum percutiens interemint \textsc{Alfano} (casu traiciens interfecit \textsc{Burgundio}).
\textsuperscript{49} \textsc{De Natura hominis} 31 (\textsc{Alf.} interpr.); ed. \textsc{Burkhard}, p. 114: Sed voluntariorum est vituperatio (\textsc{Burgundio}: Voluntariorum vero est exprobatio).
\textsuperscript{50} \textsc{De Natura hominis} 29, 1-2 (\textsc{Alf.} interpr.); ed. \textsc{Burkhard}, p. 109: Quia vero multotiens... ponunt.
\textsuperscript{51} ut in \textsc{Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{52} motu \textsc{add. Hugo Hon}.
\textsuperscript{53} (quid sit) quod fit \textsc{Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{54} sit \textsc{add. Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{55} (et) etiam et \textsc{Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{56} (mox habeatur) monstrabitur \textsc{Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{57} est \textsc{add. Alfano}.
\textsuperscript{58} etiam \textsc{Alfano}.

36 Sunt igitur indicia voluntarii quod omnino consequitur laus aut vituperatio et quod cum delectatione agitur et operationes placentes esse operantibus. Involuntarii vero sunt indicia quod dignum sit venia vel misericordia et quod agitur cum afflictione et quod non placet. Ecce apparet voluntarium esse illud cuius operatio in delectatione et beneplacito est operantis et quam laus vel vituperatio consequitur; involuntarium vero quod agitur cum afflictione et est in displicentia et penitudine et dignum est venia.

XII

QUOT SPECIES SINT INVOLUNTARII

37 Porro duae sunt species involuntarii quas Gregorius ita distinguit: "Involuntarium hoc quidem est per violentiam, hoc vero per nescientiam. Involuntarius itigur per violentiam effectivum est principium extrinsecum. Aliud enim quid violentiae causale est, non nos. Definitio igitur involuntariorum per violentiam est cuius principium est exterius nihil conferente eo cui violentia est illata secundum proprium placitum. Principium vero dicitur hic effectiva causa.

38 Quaeritur autem si haec involuntaria sint ut iacturae ponderum quas faciunt nautae in hieme sive cum aliquis turpiter quid et malum agit ut salvet amicos vel patriam. Sed existunt magis haec voluntaria. Propert hoc enim additur definitioni: nihil conferente secundum proprium placitum eo cui violentia infertur. In talibus

60 operanti Alfano.
61 secundum Alfano.
62 aliae Alfano.
63 veniae Alfano.
64 haec Alfano.
65 tormentantes Alfano.
67 sint Alfano.
68 fit Alfano.
70 involuntarii Alf. et Burg.
71 exterius Alf. et Burg.
72 quidem del. corrector.
73 turpe Alfano.
74 vel Alfano.
75 egerit Alfano.
enim\textsuperscript{76} volentes ipsi per semetipsos\textsuperscript{77} movent organica membra et sic proiciunt in marn\textsuperscript{78} onera. Similiter et qui turpiter\textsuperscript{79} vel periculosum quid sustinet\textsuperscript{80} pro maiori bono ut Zenon qui dentibus abscedit suam linguam et espuit eam Dionysio tyranno ne omnino ei confiteretur inenarranda.

39 Similiter Anaxarets\textsuperscript{81} philosophus sustinuit demergi a Nicocreon tyranno ne manifestaret amicos. Universaliter igitur quando quis pro timore maiorum\textsuperscript{82} elegerit minus malum quod non est aliquid nisi corrigere [i. 184] non involuntarium sustinet actum vel passionem. Agit enim secundum praelectionem et tunc sunt placentes quando fiunt per se\textsuperscript{83} existentes placentes. Sunt hae occasiones\textsuperscript{84} mixtae non-voluntario\textsuperscript{85} et voluntario. Involuntaria\textsuperscript{86} quidem per se ipsa,\textsuperscript{87} voluntaria\textsuperscript{88} vero per circumstantiam. Nam sine circumstantia nullus eligeret hoc\textsuperscript{89} agere. Ostendit autem laus vel vituperatio in talibus facta actibus quod voluntaria sint.

40 Involuntariorum namque operum nulla laus erit vel vituperatio. Non\textsuperscript{90} enim facile discernere\textsuperscript{82} quale prae quali sit eligendum. Oportet autem frequenter prae turpibus eligere afflictiantia\textsuperscript{82} ut Susanna et Joseph fecerunt, non semper vituperandi. Origenes autem ne incidet in turpitudinem Aethiopum, immolans decidit ab omni. Sic non est facilis talium cognitio quia quandoque nihil\textsuperscript{91} periculosius est quam manere in sententiis. Non enim similiter obumbrant pericula expectata et consequentia.

41 Sed quandoque diiudicantes erramus in iudicio peiora eligentes ut\textsuperscript{94} quibusdam contigift in martyris qui in principio fuerunt robusti et circa finem in vereincia et in temptatione cruciantium\textsuperscript{83} sunt molliti.\textsuperscript{96} Nullus autem putet veneris desiderium et fuorem involuntatiur esse delictorum eo quod haec initium exterius habent effectuum. Nam species meretricis attraxit\textsuperscript{97} inspectorem ad venerem et irritans movit fuorem. Quamvis enim initium exterius habeant, tamen ipsi per se

\textsuperscript{76} namque Alfano.
\textsuperscript{77} se ipsos Alfano.
\textsuperscript{78} mare Alf. et Burg.
\textsuperscript{79} turpe Alfano.
\textsuperscript{80} sustinent Alfano.
\textsuperscript{81} Anaxarchus Alfano.
\textsuperscript{82} maiorum malorum Alfano.
\textsuperscript{83} non add. Burkhard.
\textsuperscript{84} actions Alfano.
\textsuperscript{85} (non-voluntario) ex involuntario Alfano.
\textsuperscript{86} involuntario Alfano.
\textsuperscript{87} ipsas Alfano (ipsa corr. ex. ipsam MS).
\textsuperscript{88} voluntario Alfano.
\textsuperscript{89} haec Alfano.
\textsuperscript{90} est add. Alfano.
\textsuperscript{91} decernere Alfano (discerneres corr. ex discernere MS).
\textsuperscript{92} afflignantia Alfano.
\textsuperscript{93} nihil add. Hugo Hon.
\textsuperscript{94} ut in Alfano.
\textsuperscript{95} cruciatuum Alfano.
\textsuperscript{96} emolitii Alfano.
\textsuperscript{97} exerpsit Alfano.
et per organica membra agunt et non subsunt definitioni involuntarii, cum principii etiam causam ipsi obtineant per ineptam educationem: a passionibus igitur devicti sunt.

42 Vituperantur igitur haec agentes ut voluntarium malum proficientes. Quod vero sit voluntarium, ex hoc manifestum: delectantur enim in actu. Sed involuntarium afflictivum ostensum est. De involuntario quod fit per violentiam sufficiant haec. Restat autem dicere de involuntario per nescientiam.”

XIII

QUID INVOLUNTARIUM SIT PER NESCIENTIAM [§ 184]

43 Involuntarium per ignorantiam quod GREGORIUS vocat per nescientiam duobus dicitur modis: uno contradictive et obviative quasi involuntarium i.e. contra voluntatem; altero negative ut involuntarium i.e. non ex voluntate. Illud non removet voluntatem ab operante involuntarie sed per quandam contradictionem obviat cogitique ut faciat quod non vult. Istud autem voluntatem ab operante et removet ab eo faciendi propositum ut quod facit non ex voluntate faciat sed ignoranter. Prius igitur involuntarium convenit invito et coacto operatori quod est involuntarium per violentiam. De quo in praemisso egit capitulo GREGORIUS Nyssae. Secundum involuntarium congruit ignoranter operanti. Quod enim ignorans agit, non contra voluntatem sed non ex voluntate agit.

44 Contrarium his dictis videtur quod AUGUSTINUS in Libro Quaestionum dicit: Merito quaeritur quae sint peccata nolentium utrum quae a nescientibus committuntur an etiam possit recte dici peccatum esse nolentis quod facere compellitur. Nam et hoc contra voluntatem dici solet.”

45 Dicens non simpliciter “hoc” sed cum adiectione copulativae coniunctionis “et hoc” insinuat non tantum peccatum nescientis sed et coacti esse contra voluntatem atque ita utrumque esse contra voluntatem significat. Ego autem dixi coacti esse contra voluntatem sed non ex voluntate esse. Intelligendum est autem AUGUSTINUM non insinuasse ad proprietatem verbi “nolentis” quod non tantum significat non velle sed omnino non velle ita ut si cogatur quis velle contra voluntatem suam oporteat velle. Secundum quod dixi etiam solet “nolens fecit” i.e. praeter suam voluntatem fecit. Quod convenit non tam nescienti quam coacto. Unde uterque praeter voluntatem i.e. non cum voluntate facit.

46 Quia vero nesciens ita praeter voluntatem facit quod nihil cum voluntate, coactus vero ita praeter voluntatem quod aliquid in illa coactione contra voluntatem agit, ideo proprie loquens dicam [§ 185] quod nesciens agit non contra voluntatem sed praeter voluntatem et non ex voluntate agit. Quod vero coactus agit, non tantum praeter voluntatem sed et contra voluntatem agit atque ita nesciens non vult quod agit. Coactus vero non agit quod vult sed quod contra suam voluntatem est agit. Et id tamen quodam modo vult intentione vel evitandi mali vel consequendi boni.

98 subintringt Alfano.
99 idem ipsi Alfano.

1 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 1: Idem in Libro Quaestionum: Merito quaeritur... Augustine, Quaest. in Heptat. IV, 24; PL 34, 727.
2 coniunctionis corr. ex coniunctionem.
47 Unde de eo continuo subiecit Augustinus:9 "Sed utique vult id propter quod facit tamquam si periurare nolit quod tunc facit cum vult vivere si quisquam, nisi fecerit, mortem minetur. Vult ergo facere quia vult vivere. Et ideo non per se ipsum appetit ut falsum iuret sed ut falsum iurando vivat. Quod si ita est, nescio utrum possint ista dici peccata nolentium."

48 Quod ita accipias i.e. peccata non volentium quia quodam modo voluntaria sunt. Secundum quem intellectum ait4 in Libro Retractionum primo: "illa quae non immerito non-voluntaria peccata dicuntur quia vel a nescientibus vel coactis perpetrantur non omnino possunt ista dici voluntaria dicam."

49 Quod de coactis planum est. De nescientibus autem non omnino verum est. Sunt enim nescientium quorumdam delicta prorsus involuntaria et omnino non-voluntaria, quorumdam non-voluntaria et aliqua ratione voluntaria. Qui enim non ex voluntate ignoranter agit aut quod facit facere non proposuit, factum tamen non odit aut non propsectit et factum omnino odit. Illud aliquantulum appropinquat voluntati quia placet cum factum fuerit; istud prorsus abest a voluntate. Ideoque penitus est involuntarium quia displicet. Sicut igitur ait Gregorius6 consequenter capitulo proximo post praedictum: "Eorum quae propter6 ignorantiam aguntur7 duae8 species sunt: una quidem non voluntarium, altera9 involuntarium."

50 Multa gerimus per ignorantiam in quibus post gestionem laetamur ut cum quidem non solens inimicum occidit, gaudeat autem in morte eius.10 Haec igitur et talia vocantur non-voluntaria; nimirum et voluntaria.14 Non-voluntarium18 enim voluntariis magis [f. 185v] subicitur mixtum existens. Nam initium quidem habet involuntarium i.e. non-voluntarium, finem vero voluntarium. Ex19 processione namque et eventum factum est voluntarium quod fuit involuntarium.

51 Et rursus gerimus quaedam per ignorantiam et in his quae facta sunt tristamur ut14 si quis in loco consueto sagittans patrem transeuntem casu traiciens

3 Ibidem.
4 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1. dict. ante c. 1: Augustine, Retract. I, 13, 5; PL 32, 604A.
5 De Natura hominis 31, 5 (Alf. interp.); ed. Burkhard, p. 113: Eorum vero...
6 per Alfano.
7 sunt Alfano.
8 duae corr. ex duo.
9 vero add. Alfano.
10 De Natura hominis 31, 1 (Alf. interp.); ed. Burkhard, p. 113: Multa agimus per ignorantiam de quibus post actionem gaudeamus, ut cum solens inimicum occideretur gaudeat in morte. (Burgundione interp., p. 97): Multa gerimus propter ignorantiam in quibus post gestionem laetamur ut cum quis involuntarius inimicum occiderit, laetatur autem in occasione.
13 Ibid. 31, 4 (Alf. interp.): p. 113: Ex processione namque voluntarium factum est involuntarium. (Burg. interp., p. 98): Ex eventum enim voluntarium factum est quod involuntarium.
14 Ibid. 31, 8 (Burg. interp.); p. 98: Puta si in loco quis consueto sagittans patrem transeuntem casu traiciens interfecit.
interfecit. Haec vocantur involuntaria et quaecumque sic gesta sequitur tristitia et afflicto ac penitudo. Recte GREGORIUS vocat huiusmodi involuntaria quia nec ex deliberatione facta sunt nec placent cum fuerint perpetrata et ad conscientiam rei perducta. Quantum tamen ad hoc quod voluntarie incuriosus exstitiit in facto suo quodam modo et hoc factum voluntarium dici potest. Exprobratur enim et hic talis. Voluntariorum autem est exprobratio.


XIII

QUAE IGNORANTIA SIT INVOLUNTARIA QUAE NON-VOLUNTARIA ET QUAE VOLUNTARIA

53 Ex his patet quod ignorantia omnis naturae et infortunii ea quae est ex corporea infirmitate et quae est ex casu inopinati eventus omnino est involuntaria. Quae vero est ex vitio vanarum cogitationum voluntaria est quia ex voluntate processit sed involuntaria est ex processu. Quae ex adipe iniquitatis est in ebriis et iratis similiter huic se habet. Sed aliae tres omnino voluntariae sunt. Quae autem ex errore fragilitatis humanae est, alia est non-voluntaria et voluntaria ut in occasione inimici, alia involuntaria ut in occasione patris.

54 Omnino tamen quaelibet dici potest voluntaria in quibuscumque ignorantiae singularibus consistat quia circa facta sua quae voluntarie aggreditur incurio [f. 186] sus voluntarie fuit errans et in personae attribuit et in facti circumstantiis.

XV

QUAE SINT SINGULARIA QUAE CIRCA FACTA PROPTER IGNORANTIAM CONSIDERANTUR

55 Non est hic praetermundum quod circumstantia facti cum persona "singularia" vocat, quae circa facta propter ignorantiam considerantur, GREGORIUS Nyssae ideo quia cum plura sint secundum singula eorum continget aliquando errari in persona vel in facto per humanae fragilitatis ignorantiam.

56 Tacitis autem attribuit personae, circumstantias facti GREGORIUS enumerans et exemplans in libro supra nominato ait ita: "His itaque sic determinatis, deinceps dicendum est qualia sint quae per singula. Haec autem sunt quae vocantur a rhetoricis circumstantia membra, hoc est: quis, quid, cum quo, ubi, quando, quomodo, propter quid, ut persona, factum, instrumentum, locum, tempus, modus, causa. Verbi graatia: persona quidem est agens vel circa quem actum est. Actio ut si patrem

16 Ibid. 31, 9 (Alf. interpr.); p. 114: Ex praedictis...
17 non ignorans Alfano.
18 esse Alfano.
19 eiusmod Alfano.
19 ergo Alfano.
20 De Natura hominis 31, 11-12 (Alf. interpr.); p. 114: His itaque ... mortiferum.
21 quis quem Alfano.
filius percussit ignorans. Factum est autem illud idem\textsuperscript{22} operatum ut verberare volens caecavit. Instrumentum vero si lapidem iactavit\textsuperscript{23} putans esse punicem. Locus autem si in angiportu\textsuperscript{24} ignorans percussit obviantem. Tempus vero si in nocte putans inimicum interfecti\textsuperscript{25} amicum. Modus autem si in modico\textsuperscript{26} plagans et non nimis interfecit. Ignoravit enim si ex modica plaga interiret. Causa vero si quidem\textsuperscript{27} dedit medicamentum ut sanaret et qui accepit sit mortuus ut medicamentum reperiatur mortiferum.\textsuperscript{28}

57 Errorem ignorantiae in his exemplis insinuat GREGORIUS dicens "putans pumicem" et "putans inimicum." Nota modum exemplans: non quod qualitatis sed quod quantitatis est ponit. Unde dat intelligi non modo qualitatem accipiendam esse in modo facti sed et quantitatem. In quantitate autem intelligi non tantum mensuram sed et numerum et pondus. In quorum singulis errare contingit per ignorantiam. Causa\textsuperscript{29} finalis accipienda est. Quam et ipsae significat dicens "ut sanaret." In qua errat dans medicinam vel cibum quia ignorant [f. 186v] si sanitas aegri vel confortatio sumentis consequatur, putat autem. Errat igitur in causa quia\textsuperscript{30} ut putat non est in medicina sanationis nec in cibo confortationis causa sed vel per immoderationem vel per toxici corruptionem causa mortis. Per instrumentum quod intelligitur cum quo et in quibus auxiliis non tantum instrumentum gladii sive alterius eius modi rei sed et auctor et socius sive particeps facti est intelligendus quorum administricus res agitur.

58 Sicut enim errat in instrumento facti qui, putans cum virgis, puerum verberat cum spinis sic et qui non eo auctore eoque facti coadiutore quo debet furem suspendit. Errat etiam in loco et tempore et causa qui putans quidem non tamen eo loco vel tempore vel causa qua debuit perpetrare aliquid intendit: haec vel omnia vel plura ignorari contingit. Unde subdit GREGORIUS:\textsuperscript{31} "Haec simul quis ignoravit\textsuperscript{32} cum esset\textsuperscript{33} maniosus. Qui vero plura\textsuperscript{34} horum vel magis praecipua ignoravit\textsuperscript{35} hic per ignorantiam fecit. Magis vero praecipua sunt in his cuius causa et quid sit quod operatum est, hoc est causa et factum.\textsuperscript{36}

XVI

QUAE IGNORANTIA SIT DAMPNABILIS ET QUAE NON AD POENAM IMPUTABILIS

59 Sequitur ut ostendatur quae ignorantia sit peccatum et quae non. Quod \textsuperscript{22} id est MS.
\textsuperscript{23} iactans MS.
\textsuperscript{24} angiporto Alfano.
\textsuperscript{25} interemit Alfano.
\textsuperscript{26} (in modico) modice Alfano.
\textsuperscript{27} hic quidem Alfano.
\textsuperscript{28} causae MS.
\textsuperscript{29} quia ut ... confortationis causa marg.
\textsuperscript{30} De Natura hominis 31, 13 (Alf. interpri): p. 115.
\textsuperscript{31} ignorabit Alfano.
\textsuperscript{32} (cum esset) vel etiam Alfano.
\textsuperscript{33} plurima Alfano.
\textsuperscript{34} ignoraverit Alfano.
est manifestum. Cum enim Augustinus\textsuperscript{35} De Vera religione dicat: “Usque adeo peccatum est voluntarium malum ut, nisi sit voluntarium, nullo modo sit peccatum,” involuntaria et non-voluntaria videntur non esse peccata. Et ideo ignorantia involuntaria, quae est naturae et infortunii secundum vitium corporeae infirmitatis et quae est secundum casum inopinati eventus, nullatenus est peccatum nec poenam meretur.

60 Oblivio enim et imprudentia in fatuis et in infatuatis et parvulis atque senibus furor quoque sive ex febre sive ex eventu in arrepticiis nec peccata sunt nec poenam merentur. Unde sicut fatuis ita et parvulis et furiosis in maleficiis subvenitur ut non ei imputetur [f. 187] ad poenam quae ex mentis deliberatione non processerunt. Quod non tam humanis quam divinis legibus noscitur approbatum.

61 Ait enim Augustinus\textsuperscript{36} Ad Petrum Diaconum de parvulis: “Firmisse tene parvulis qui neceedum propria voluntate credere nec poenitentiam pro peccato quod originaliter traxerunt\textsuperscript{37} agere possunt sacramentum fidei quod est sanctum baptismum quamdiu rationis aetas eorum capax esse non potest, sufficere ad salutem.” Ex eo quod dixit: quamdiu rationis aetas eorum capax esse non potest, evidenter dat intelligi nulli post baptismum peccata imputari sive sit adultus sive impubes nisi rationis fuerit capax.

62 De furiosis quoque Augustinus\textsuperscript{38} in Libro quaestionum Veteris et Novi Testamenti manifeste idem testatur ita dicens: “Aliquos scimus subito dementes factos ferro, fuste, lapidibus, morsibus multis nocuisse quosdam et occidisse. Captos autem industria et iudiciis oblatos minime reos factos eo quod non voluntate sed impellente vi nescio qua gesserint haec necientes. Quomodo enim reus constituitur qui nescit quae fecerit?”

63 De eodem Ambrosius\textsuperscript{39} in Exameron in tractatu primae diei: “Illia cavenda sunt quae ex nostra voluntate prodeunt delicta iuventutis et irratione corporis passiones. Quorum ergo nos sumus dominum eorum principia extrinsecus non requiramus nec derivamus in alios sed agnoscamus ea quae proprie\textsuperscript{40} nostra sunt quod possimus non facere si volumus\textsuperscript{41} huius electionem mali nebis potius debemus ascribere quam alii.\textsuperscript{42} Ideo in iudiciis istius modi\textsuperscript{43} voluntarios reos non necessitate compulsos culpa constringit, poena condempnat. Neque enim si per fuorem aliquis innocentem perimam, obnoxius morti est. Quin etiam ipsius\textsuperscript{44} divinae legis oraculo si quis per imprudentiam intulerit necem, accipit impunitatis spem, refugii facultatem, ut possit evadere.”

\textsuperscript{35} Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1. dict. ante c. 1: Augustine, De Vera religione 14, 27; PL 34, 133.

\textsuperscript{36} Abbreviated from Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 3: Ait enim Augustinus de parvulis in libro De Fide ad Petrum diaconum... Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum 30, 71; PL 65, 702C.

\textsuperscript{37} trahunt Gratian.

\textsuperscript{38} Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 5: De furiosis autem Augustinus in Libro Quaestionum Vet. et Novi Testamenti ita... Augustine, Quaest. ex Vet. Test. 2; PL 35, 2219.

\textsuperscript{39} Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 6: Item Ambrosius in Exameron in tractatu primae diei: Illa... numeraverit. Ambrose, Hexam. I, 8, 31; PL 16, 152A.

\textsuperscript{40} proprie Gratian.

\textsuperscript{41} volimus MS.

\textsuperscript{42} aliiis Gratian.

\textsuperscript{43} mundi Ambrose.

\textsuperscript{44} ipsius marg.
64 De his quae per ebrietatem fiunt scribit idem45 in Libro De Patriarchis: "Sane cavendam dicitus ebrietatem per quam crimina cavere non possumus. Nam quae sobrii cavemus [f. 187v] per ebrietatem ignorantes committimus.46 Nesciunt quid loquantur qui nimio vino indulgent, iacent sepulti ideoque47 quia per vinum delinquerint apud sapientes iudices venia quidem facta donantur sed ut levitatis dampnatur auctores.

65 De codem Augustinus48 Contra Faustum libro secundo: "Inebriaverunt Loth filiae eius et se nescienti miscuerunt. Quapropter culpandus est quidem, non tamen quantum ille incestus sed quantum illa ebrietas meretur." Item AMBROSII49 De Vita beata testatur non esse peccata nisi fuerint voluntaria ait: "Non est quod cuiquam nostrum50 ascribamus erumpam nisi nostrae voluntati. Nemo nostrum tenetur ad culpam nisi voluntate propriae deflexerit. Non habent crimine quae inferuntur reluctantibus. Voluntaria tantum commissa sequitur delictorum invidìa."

66 Ex his patet non esse damnabilem ignorantiam quae fuit involuntaria et quae non ex voluntate propria processerit. In Poenitaliis tamen THEODORI51 inventitur quod obici possit per fuorem commissis: "Siquis, inquit, insaniens aliquem occiderit, si ad sanam mentem pervenerit, levior ci poenitentia inunigatur."52

67 Sed de illo forsitan hoc intelligendum est "quem53 propria culpa perduxit ad fuorem" ut qui vitio inanum curarum a sensu alienatur. Quae et voluntaria dicitur ignorantia. Illa vero ignorantia quae per incuriam negligentiae est ut in desidiosis, discutia repugnantibus et scire nolentibus quod scire oporteret et debent, omnino damnabilis est. Et de ea dictum est: Ignorans ignorabitur.54 Quae et ideo peccatum est quia omnino voluntaria est.

XVII

IN QUIBUS FACTIS SIT REPREHENSIBILIOR
ET IN QUIBUS VENIALIOR

68 Inter reprehensibiles autem ignorantias illa minus est damnabilis cuius factum, cum ad conscientiam fuerit percutum, penitundine et tristitia est plenum. In qua peccatur non quidem quia per ignorantiam erratur sed quia incursio et negligenter agitur. Illa vero reprehensibilior est quae laetatur in facto. Et hacc

45 Gratian, Decr. C. 1 q. 15 c. 7: Idem in Libro de Patriarchis: Sane discimus vitandam ... auctores. Ambrose, De Abraham I, 6, 57; PL 14, 465A.

46 Here both Gratian and Hugh omit part of the original.

47 idem MS.

48 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 9: Idem Contra Faustum: Inebriaverunt ... Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, 44; PL 40, 427.

49 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 10: Item Ambrosii De Beata vita: Non est ... Ambrose, De Iacob et vita beata I, 3, 10; PL 14, 632B.

50 nostram Gratian.

51 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 12.

52 imponenda est Gratian.

53 Gratian, Decr. C. 15 q. 1 c. 12 dictum.

54 Cf. 1 Cor. 14: 38.
distinctio in his ignorantiis est attendenda quorum sola incuria est causa et non voluntas perversa.  

70 Si quis etiam per ebrietatem occidit inimicum, de cuius morte factus sobrius laetatur, culpam habet et in causa et in ignorantiae consequentia. Attendendum est quoque quod si in opere, quod quis debet facere, peccat ignorantem venialior est. Si vero in eo, quod non debuit vel qui non debuit vel cum quo non debuit vel loco vel tempore vel modo vel instrumento quo non debuit vel causa qua non debuit, ignoranter peccat dampnabilior est ignorantia.

71 Non debet clericus vel monachus vel caecus iaculum ludo vel venatione vel virium exercitacione mittere, cum aliena nullus dormire; gladium in nullo loco debet aliquis vibrare nec sagittare nisi praevideat neminem posse occurrere; nullus in loco consecrado vel tempore festivo vel in tenebris pugnare; non duriter sed molliter nec cum spinis sed cum virgis castigando filium vel disciplum verberare; nec propter odium sed propter disciplinam nec ut occidat vel in corpore debilitet vel quocumque modo laedat sed ut sanct et confortet, medicinam vel cibum dare. Si scienter quis in his omnibus vel pluribus vel singulis peccaverit, criminaliter, si ignorantem, delinquere venialiter dictetur.  

_Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies_

---

55 consequentiam _MS_.
56 sed propter _marg._
57 fol. 188v-189v are blank; fol. 190 is a leaf from a Missal.

This publication represents a section of work done as a Fellow (1958 and 1962) of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation.
Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus
and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination

CHARLES B. SCHMITT

I. INTRODUCTION

The outlook of the philosophical thinkers of the sixteenth century reveals a somewhat uncomfortable mixture of old and new. On the one hand we see certain previews of the scientific attitudes of Galileo or Newton or of the philosophical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz; on the other hand is betrayed a continuing concern with the problems of mediaeval philosophy, of ancient mystical speculations, and of the pseudo-scientific traditions, both Eastern and Western. While the traditional aspects of the philosophical outlook of the thinkers of this period are most marked in those who were officially connected with the universities, the more “individualistic” philosophers were by no means as hostile to the questions of traditional philosophy as we are sometimes led to believe.

Perhaps nowhere does this become so apparent as with Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533),1 nephew of the famous Giovanni Pico, who symbolizes for many the attempt of the age to assimilate both the old and the new into an all-encompassing system of thought. The breadth and depth of the nephew’s learning rival that of the uncle. The philosophical outlook of the two, however, differs in a number

---

1 Neither the life nor the philosophical thought of Gianfrancesco Pico has been carefully studied. The only general monograph relating to him is the out-of-date, but still useful, Ricardi Bartoli Minoritae in Joannem Franciscum Picum ... Allocutio (Bonacci, 1793). On his life see Girolamo Tiraboschi, Biblioteca modenese ... (Modena, 1781-8), IV, 108-22 and the various studies of Felice Cerrutti, which appeared in local Italian publications between 1870 and 1915, especially his “Gianfrancesco II Pico” in Biografie pichensi (Mirandola, 1909), II, 43-51, with bibliography. The most important contributions to a study of his religious and philosophical thought are to be found in Fortunat Strowski, Montaigne (Paris, 1906), 124-34; Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (Berlin, 1911), zweite Aufgabe, I, 145-9; Antonio Corsano, Il pensiero religioso italiano (Bari, 1937), 54-64; Eugenio Garin, La filosofia (Milan, 1947), II, 72-7; Richard H. Popkin, A History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, The Netherlands, 1960), 19-21.
of respects. Giovanni Pico attempted to promote a pax philosophica by arguing that in all the various philosophical systems a certain amount of truth is to be found and that, beyond their surface differences, all philosophies are in essential agreement.

Gianfrancesco, turning directly against the program of his uncle, contents that none of the philosophies have reached a sincera veritas. According to him this is to be found only in the Scriptures. This becomes clear-cut in Gianfrancesco's Examen Vanitatis Doctrinae Gentium, the most complete expression of his mature philosophical attitude. This work is cast into the form of a long diatribe against philosophy in general and against the system of Aristotle in particular. In brief, the author argues in this work that the various schools of philosophy have not been successful in their quest for truth, for truth is to be found only within the revelations of Christianity and to look elsewhere is not only foolhardy but self-deceiving. Although all of the ancient schools of philosophy are rebuked in ample detail, the Aristotelian tradition is singled out for particular abuse. In Pico's estimation the teachings of the Stagirite are responsible for the increasing reliance on sense knowledge and the increasing interest in secular pursuits at the expense of religion.

The way in which Gianfrancesco Pico chooses to attack Aristotle places him immediately within the mainstream of early modern thought. His objections to Aristotelian physics, focusing on a critique of Aristotle's concepts of motion, time, place and vacuum, put him in the company of philosophers such as Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno, Bernardino Telesio, Tommaso Campanella, Pierre Gassendi, and Galileo Galilei, all of whom will direct criticisms against Aristotelian natural philosophy which show a marked similarity to those of Pico. Furthermore, Gianfrancesco was the first post-ancient writer to read and utilize the works of Sextus Empiricus. He assiduously applies the Pyrrhonic scepticism he finds therein to a critique of

---

2 He says this specifically in his work Examen Vanitatis I, 2, 486 and IV, 2, 666. The page references are to the following edition: Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae Domini ... Opera quae extant Omnia ... (Basileae 1601). All further references to Pico's writings will be to this edition unless otherwise noted.

3 This attitude is already apparent in the early work De Studio Divinæ et Humanæ Philosophiæ of 1496 (in edition cited p. 1-28), but it is given greater precision in the Examen Vanitatis (1520).

4 For Pico's criticism see Ex. Van. VI, 1-6, p. 761-71. Certain of Pico's arguments are drawn from the then untranslated Hebrew philosopher Hasdai Crescas. On this see Harry A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 1929).
Aristotle's theory of knowledge, a fact which once again connects him closely to one of the major trends of early modern philosophy.  

Central to this prolonged attack on Aristotle is the recurring insistence that all valid knowledge must come directly from God and nothing whatever is to be gained from purely natural modes of inquiry. Although in Pico this theme is developed in a different way and he applies it to a different end, nevertheless it has a certain resemblance to the mediaeval discussions of "illumination". It is, therefore, not too surprising to see him enter into the thick of this traditional discussion, paying particular attention to Henry of Ghent's solution to the problem and Duns Scotus' ensuing criticism of that solution. While pursuing his "modern" critique of Aristotle, Pico pauses for a while to concern himself with one of the traditional problems of scholastic philosophy. In doing so he utilizes certain techniques of his own, techniques which will gain a central role in the philosophical thought of the next century and a half. This application of a sixteenth century method to a thirteenth century problem is not without interest either in illustrating the continuing concern with the problems of mediaeval philosophy at the later date or in illustrating just what the effect of Pyrrhonic scepticism is when related to such a problem. We shall, therefore, look into the matter in some detail.

In developing his quite original, but somewhat peculiar, theory of knowledge, Henry of Ghent showed himself to be more than a little dubious of the reliability of sense knowledge. It is in this context that Gianfrancesco Pico, a reviver of scepticism, gives careful consideration to what Henry says about the question of Divine Illumination. Henry's theory, however, had already been extensively criticized by several of the later Scholastics, especially Duns Scotus. This makes it necessary for Pico to meet the objections of the Subtle Doctor. Consequently, he turns aside from his critique of Aristotle for a few pages to do this.

---

5 Besides Popkin's recent work (see note 1) which traces the force of scepticism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in ample detail, still valuable, but more limited are Pierre Villey, Les sources et l'évolution des essais de Montaigne (Paris, 1908), Louis I. Bredvold, The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden (Ann Arbor, 1951), and Henry Busson, Le rationalisme dans la littérature française de la Renaissance (Paris, 1957). For Pico's influence specifically on Gassendi in this regard see Tullio Gregory, Scetticismo ed empirismo: studio su Gassendi (Bari, 1961), 121-5.
II. The Origins of the Illumination Theory

But let us start from the beginning. Henry of Ghent's theory of knowledge owes much to that of the Augustinian School. One of the central notions which distinguishes this school of philosophy from other mediaeval schools is the so-called "theory of illumination." This theory which originated in Christian philosophy with Augustine has many roots in Greek thought, particularly in the writings of Plato and the Neoplatonists. Although the theory knows many different interpretations in the course of its history, there are several general remarks about it which hold true. According to this theory, man is held to have firm and certain knowledge about some matters. Further, the certainty of this knowledge is not generated by man's reason per se, but an "illumination" ab alto is necessary. In Christian terms this means that God, the source of all knowledge, illuminates human minds in some way, giving to them irrefrangible knowledge.

Our task here is not to write the history of this theory, but we must sketch in its basic features to make Pico's critique of Scotus intelligible. In our necessarily brief summary we can only speak in general terms and some of the refinements of the theory—of which there are many—will be passed over.

Let us first turn to the origin of the doctrine in St. Augustine. During the long career of this great doctor, the concept of illumination seems to have evolved slowly. In the earlier works, such as the Soliloquies, an epistemology is formulated primarily in the Platonic conception of ἀνάμνησις. Later, Augustine modified his doctrine to bring it more into accord with the spirit of Christianity. Consequently, in the Retractationes, in place of the "remembering process" of Plato is put an "eternal light of reason" which brings forth truth. This, of course, releases Augustine from an uncomfortable consequence of Plato's position, metempsychosis, which is unacceptable to Christian theology.

---

6 A useful summary of the development of the theory with additional bibliographical information is to be found in Sofia Vanni-Rovighi's article "Illuminazione" in the Enciclopedia filosofica II, col. 1237-41.

7 For example in Soliloquies II, 20, 35 or De Quantitate Animae I, 20, 34. In the latter passage Augustine says: nec alii quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari.

8 Perhaps most explicit in the Retractationes dealing with the Soliloquies (I, 4) where he says: credibilibus est enim propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur, quia praeens est eis, quando id capere possunt, lumen rationis aeterneae, ubi haec immutabilia vera conspiciunt, non quia ea noverant aliquando et oblii sunt, quod Platoni vel talibus visum est. CSEL, XXXVI, 24-5.
Illumination is obviously a central notion of Augustine's philosophical outlook. It is given explicit application in the Second Book of the *De Libero Arbitrio*. Aside from the obviously maieutic process by which the conclusions are reached in this and other dialogues such as the *De Beata Vita* and the *Soliloquies*, Augustine formulates clearly the basic structure of the illumination theory. Here he speaks of certain, infallible “interior rules of faith” which are proper to man as man⁹ and which “illumine” man, as it were, giving him a basis of certitude. The fact that these come from God is made explicit in several places, particularly in the *De Trinitate*, where the Platonic and the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis is refuted.¹⁰

The Augustinian doctrine of illumination became very important in later philosophical thought, attaining its highest influence in the course of the thirteenth century. Practically all of the great masters of that century adopted the theory in one form or another. Especially was this taken over by the Franciscan thinkers with the notable exception of Duns Scotus. Although they did not accept the theory to the letter, many others, including Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, and Henry of Ghent, accepted certain aspects of it and modified it to meet the needs of their own philosophical systems. It is with the last of these that we are particularly concerned.

### III. Henry of Ghent

Henry does not take over the Augustinian-Bonaventurian¹¹ view on illumination whole-heartedly. He gives the traditional view a somewhat novel interpretation, one which we shall treat in adequate detail to allow Scotus' rejection and Pico's support of it to be better understood.

---

⁹ For example we can read the following: Et iudicamus haec [i.e. external objects] secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis quas communiter cernimus, de ipsis vero nullo modo quis iudicat. *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 194 in *CSEL* LXXIV, 70. Also interesting is a mathematical example given at II, 823, p. 57.

¹⁰ Here Augustine is explicit: Non enim omnes in priore vita geometrae fuerunt, cum tam rari sint in genere humano, ut vix possit alquis inveniri: sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporae, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadjacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus, *De Trinitate* XII, 15. 24 in PL 42, 1011.

Henry admits that it is possible to have some knowledge without the aid of illumination, but, in order to differentiate knowledge attainable without illumination from that which can be grasped only through the aid of illumination, he insists that we must distinguish between knowing a true thing and knowing the truth of a thing. According to Henry the former occurs in the natural process of sensation available to all sentient beings, whereas the latter requires a reflexive act of the mind. The problem of truth or falsity does not occur in the first case but only in the second.

Thus the act of knowing can be divided into two moments, the first being the apprehension of the external object, the second being the reflexive act which is concerned with the truth or falsity of the object. It is only in the second moment that the problem of illumination arises, for truth or falsity, according to Henry, is concerned with the relation of the impressed species, which is received in the first moment, and the exemplar. But Henry continues following Plato in saying that the exemplar is twofold, there is one exemplar in the individual intellect and a second in the mind of God. The question naturally arises, "to which of these must we refer in order to reach the

12 Henry's theory is treated in Bettoni, Il problema ... p. 255-73. It is given somewhat more extended treatment in the same author's Il processo astrattivo nella concezione di Enrico di Gand (Milan, 1954). The basic source for Henry's theory is in his Summa a. 1, q. 23. I use the following edition: Magistri Henrici Goethals à Gandavo ... Summa (Ferrariae, 1646).
13 Absolute ergo concedere oportet, quod homo per suam animam absque omni speciali divina illustracione potest aliqua scire aut cognoscere, et hoc ex puris naturalibus; contrarium enim dicere multum derogat dignitati animae, et humanae naturae. Summa a. 1, q. 2, n. 11; vol. I, p. 9b.
14 Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 13-4; vol. I, p. 10a-b.
15 Ex parte intellectus ratio est, quia intellectus veritatem non concipit simplici intelligentia, sed solum compositione, et divisione ... Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 14; vol. I, p. 10b.
16 Intantum enim vera est quaecumque res, inquantum in se continet, quod exemplar eius repraesentat ... Quia igitur verum dicit intentionem rei in respectu ad suum exemplar, quae non est prima sed secundaria, ens enim dicit intentionem rei primam, et absolutam: id quod est ens, et verum in re bene potest apprehendi ab intellectu absque hoc quod intentio veritatis eius ab ipso apprehendatur; Intentio enim veritatis in re apprehendi non potest nisi apprehendendo conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar, intentio vero entis apprehenditur in re absoluta sine omni reali respectu. Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 14; vol. I, p. 10b-11a.
17 Est enim, secundum quod vult Plato in principio Timaei duplex exemplar, quoddam factum atque elaboratum, quoddam perpetuum atque immutabile. Primum exemplar rei est species eius universalis apud animam existens, per quam acquirit notitiam omnium suppositorum eius, et est causata a re: Secundum exemplar est ars divina continens omnium rerum ideals rationes, ad quod Plato dicit Deum mundum instituisse, sicut artifex ad exemplar artis in mente sua facit domum non autem ad primum. Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 15; vol. I, p. 11a.
truth of something?" Henry considers both sides of the issue. If the object be referred to the exemplar in the individual mind, a certain degree of truth may be obtained, but this is not infallible, since in dreams or in states of passion, for example, there is the possibility of error.\textsuperscript{18}

He then recognizes with Plato and Augustine the necessity for reference to the exemplar in the Divine Mind if we are to assure ourselves of an "infallible knowledge of genuine truth." \textsuperscript{19} For our concepts to have this infallible character, it is necessary that the "Uncreated Truth" be imprinted on them, thus raising them above the purely natural level of knowledge. When given this special illumination \textit{ab alto}, the concepts rise above the "imperfect, dark, and obscure" character inherent in all purely natural forms of knowing.\textsuperscript{20}

For Henry, therefore, there are two levels of human knowledge. The first is that which is gained \textit{ex puris naturalibus}, which we might roughly equate with knowledge attained by the normal Aristotelian process of abstraction from the materials of sense experience. Henry insists, on the other hand, that because of the uncertainties of sense experience, this knowledge must remain \textit{imperfecta, obscura et nebulosa}. In order for certitude to become possible, a second type of knowledge must be posited. This is the knowledge that comes from above, so that when one is in possession of it he can refer the mental concept to the exemplar in the Divine Mind. Consequently this solves the problem of the criterion of certain knowledge. The \textit{species accepta a re} has a certain materiality and incompleteness about it. In order for it to become perfect it must receive the perfective illumination of the eternal exemplar.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.} a. 1, q. 2, n. 16-7; vol. I, p. 11a-12a gives Henry's reasons for not accepting this position. His conclusion is: \textit{Veritas autem sincera non perceptur nisi discernendo eam a falso ...et ideo se debeat certa scientia haberi veritatis oportet mentem avertere a sensibus, et sensibilibus, et ab omni intentione quantumcumque universali, et abstracta a sensibilibus ad incommutabilem veritatem supra mentem existentem, quae non habet imaginem falsi a qua discerni non potest ...}.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.} a. 1, q. 2, n. 21-2; vol. I, p. 14a-b.

\textsuperscript{20} Necesse est igitur, quod illa veritas increata in conceptu se imprimat, et ad characterem suum conceptum nostrum transfigeret, et sic mentem nostram expressa veritate de re informet similitudine illa, quam res ipsa habet apud primam veritatem ... Perfecta igitur, ut dictum est, informatio veritatis non habetur nisi ex similitudine veritatis menti impressa de re cognoscibili ab ipsa prima, et exemplari veritate: Omnis enim alia impressa quocumque exemplari abstracto a re ipsa, imperfecta, obscura, et nebulosa est, ut per ipsam certum iudicium de veritate rei haberi non possit. \textit{Ibid.} a. 1, q. 2, n. 23; vol. I, p. 15a.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.} a. 1, q. 3, n. 17; vol. I, p. 22b.
As a consequence, it is only through Divine Illumination that man can attain to the infallible truth of things. But, even though such illumination is given to some men, this does not mean that it is possible for men to know God directly, which would be the logical consequence if Henry did not qualify the nature of this illumination somewhat. To avoid this undesirable consequence, Henry says that the nature of the illumination is not direct, but obliquo aspectu. The illumination takes place in a way analogous to the illumination of an object by reflected, rather than direct, light.

Furthermore, this illumination is a free gift of God, bestowed upon whom He wishes without regard to the moral quality of the one receiving it. Its effect on the intellect is fundamentally one of sharpening the mental powers and abolishing the imperfecta, obscura et nebulosa character of natural knowledge derived via sense experience pure and simple.

Henry, faced by the problem of the fallibility of sense experience and the prevailing scholastic opinion of the necessity of Divine Illumination for strictly reliable knowledge on the one hand and the Aristotelian reliance on sense experience on the other, attempted to construct a halfway-house. He wished to synthesize the basically Platonic notion of illumination with the basically Aristotelian procedures of natural philosophy and dialectic. The result is somewhat strange but, at the same time, is not completely unsuccessful. Simultaneously, it allows

---

22 Henry insists on this several times. For example: Ex puris naturalibus exclusa omni divina illustracione nullo modo contingit hominem scire liquidam veritatem. Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 25; vol. I, p. 16a.

23 This is treated in question 3, article 1 of the Summa (vol. I, p. 18-23) which is entitled: Utrum homo cognoscat lucem divinam, qua cognoscit alia. Note particularly the following: Quando vero lux ista illuminat quasi obliquo aspectu a suo fonte, tunc illuminat ad videndum alia a se. Sicut lux obliquata a Sole in medio illuminat ad videndum alia a Sole non ipsum solem. Et ideo sicut lux ista Solis materialis non illuminat oculum ad videndum se nisi recto aspectu, sed alia tantum: Sic divina lux cum quasi obliquo aspectu illuminat, solum illuminat ad videndum alia a se, seipsam autem nequaquam. N. 13, p. 21a.

24 Ibid. a. 1, q. 2, n. 26-7; vol. I, p. 16a-b. For Henry, the illumination is not natural to man, but a free gift of God. For Bonaventure, who formulated the more “orthodox” theory of illumination, this is natural to man and the degree to which the illumination occurs is somehow related to the moral perfection of the individual receiving it. For a comparison of the two see Bettoni, II problema ... p. 270-2.

25 Summa a. 1, q. 3, n. 11; vol. I, p. 20a-b.

26 Ibid. a. 1, q. 1; vol. I, p. 2-8. Here Henry discusses the question: Utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire. He tries to meet the basic arguments known to him against the possibility of humans attaining knowledge.
some latitude for a purely natural approach to knowledge and yet retains the necessity for a *sincera veritas* to reside in the immutable Truth of the Christian God of the Scriptures and of Augustine.

IV. DUNS SCOTUS

What does Duns Scotus object to in the theory of Henry? First of all he focuses upon Henry's criticism of natural knowledge. Henry had given three reasons why knowledge *ex puris naturalibus* is not completely reliable. In brief these hinge on the mutability of the object known and of the knowing subject (the soul) and on the fallibility of the exemplar in the mind if it is derived merely by the Aristotelian process of abstraction from sense data.

Scotus argues against each of these in turn. First, if the object continually changes, we cannot have certitude concerning it in whatever light it appears, for it would not be certitude at all if the object were known in a way different than it actually is. That is, if the object actually changes and we see it in a light in which it appears not to change, this is not certitude. Therefore, certitude cannot possibly consist in knowing the changeable as unchangeable. Secondly, if the exemplar in the soul is changeable, it follows that whatever is put into the soul would also become changeable, including the act of understanding itself. Thus it follows that even when the *species illabens* comes to the soul, it too will become changeable. Thirdly, if the *species accepta a re* is joined to the exemplar from above, how is the conjunction to escape the deficiency of the first member?

---


28 See *Summa* a. 1, q. 2, n. 17; vol. I, p. 11b-12a. Here Henry gives the reasons for his views, which in summary form are as follows: prima ratio est, quod exemplar tale eo quod abstractum est a re transmutabilis, necesse habet aliquam rationem transmutabilis ... Secunda ratio est, quod anima humana quia mutabilis est, et erroris passiva, per nihil quod mutabilitatis aequalis vel maioris est cum ipsa potest rectificari ne obliquetur per errorem, et in rectitudine veritatis persistat ... Tertia ratio est, quod huissmodi exemplar cum sit intentio, et species sensibilis rei abstracta a phantasmate similitudinem habet cum falso sicut vero.

29 Although Scotus' answers to these are somewhat lengthy, we shall give them here in *toto*. His presentation of Henry's arguments is found in the edition cited n. 211-4.
For the Subtle Doctor, Henry’s theory of knowledge confuses the issue. It retains the problems of both the illumination theory of Augustine and the “naive realism” of Aristotle. Or, as Bettoni puts it, “The compromise attempted by Henry of Ghent is unsupportable... Who accepts the negative part of Platonism, should accept the positive part as well, or should resign himself to follow the sceptical thesis of the Academics.”

The basic criticism made, Duns Scotus sets about to refine and substantiate his objections. He rejects Henry’s contention that St. Augustine supported his own view on the fallibility of sense knowledge. Rather than to Augustine, Duns would attribute the mistrust of sense knowledge to the Academics. And it is to them and their theory that he next directs his attention. The Subtle Doctor argues against their sceptical conclusions by attempting to show that there are some bits of knowledge about which there can be no doubt of their certainty. He begins by saying that there is no doubt concerning the truth of what we moderns would call analytic statements. These are known by every intellect and their certainty rests on nothing other than their own terms.

p. 128-30. The answers are to be found at n. 219-22, p. 133-5. They read as follows:

... Istae rationes videntur conclundere impossibilitatem certae cognitionis naturalis.

Prima, quia si objectum continue mutatur, nec potest haberi aliqua certitudo de ipso sub ratione immutabilis; immo nec in quocumque lumine posset certitudo haberi, quia non est certitudo quando objectum alio modo cognoscitur quam se habet. Igitur nec est certitudo cognoscendo mutabile ut immutabile—Patet etiam quod antecedens huius rationis, videlicet quod ‘sensibilium mutatur,’ falsum est ...

Similiter si propter mutabilitatem exemplaris quod est in anima nostra non posset esse certitudo, cum quidum posset in anima subjectiva sit mutabile, etiam ipse actus intelligendi, sequitur quod per nihil in anima rectificatur anima ne errat.

Similiter, secundum istam opinionem species creata inhaerens concurrat cum specie illabente. Sed quando a’quid concurrat quod repugnat certitudini, non potest certitudo haberi: sicut enim ex altera de necessario et altera de contingenti non sequitur conclusio nisi de contingenti, ita ex certo et incerto, concurrentibus ad aliquam cognitionem, non sequitur cognitio certa.

Idem patet etiam de tertia ratione, quia si species ipsa abstracta a re concurrat ad ommem cognitionem, et non potest iudicari quando illa repraesentat se tamquam se et quando se tamquam objectum, ergo quodcumque aliud concurrat, non potest haberi certitudo per quam decernatur ‘verum’ a verisimili. — Istae igitur rationes videntur conclundere ommem incertitudinem et opinionem acdemicorum.

30 II problema... p. 274-5.
32 Ibid. n. 229-33, p. 138-40. Here Scotus concludes: ... ergo non potest stare compositio talium terminorum [i.e. termini principiorum] quin sit vera, et ita non potest stare perceptio illius compositionis et perceptio terminorum quin stet perceptio conformitatis.
But this still leaves open the question of the source of these terms. "How will the intellect not err regarding the knowledge of the principles (principiorum) and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived concerning the terms?" Scotus asks. His answer is somewhat strange and not completely satisfying. He says that in this case the intellect does not have the senses for cause but only for occasion. Thus the logical force of the proposition is not diminished even though the senses themselves may be deceived in a particular instance.  

Although the fallibility of the senses may not affect the validity of purely logical constructions, a question can still be raised about the validity of the sense knowledge derived from the individual sense experiences. This is the problem to which he next addresses himself. He says that experience does not have to do with all singulars, but only with many of them (i.e. less than all) and from these one comes to know that such and such a thing is true in all cases and forever. The reason Duns gives for this conclusion is that the proposition "whatever happens in many cases from a cause not free is the natural effect of that cause." This may seem to be a rather weak argument, but it rests upon Scotus' elaborate analysis of causation, which is probably most clearly and concisely presented in the De Primo Principio. Here we cannot go into the background of his doctrine, but suffice it to say, it represents a satisfactory solution to the problem for the Subtle Doctor. For one less metaphysically oriented and more sceptical-minded, the argument would appear somewhat less than convincing.

Duns Scotus then gives a third example of what he considers to be certain knowledge. This is knowledge about our own acts. The certainty of this even some sceptics will accept, but by no means all.

compositionis ad terminos, et ita percepio veritatis, quia prima percepts evidenter includunt perceptionem istius veritatis. N. 230 p. 139. Helpful for the understanding of this and the following difficult passages of Scotus is Gilson's paraphrase (op. cit., p. 560-7).

33 Op. Ox. n. 234, p. 140-1. The crux of the passage is: Respondeo—quantum ad istam notitiam—quod intellectus non habet sensus pro causa, sed tantum pro occasione, quia intellectus non potest habere notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus; illa tamen accepta, virtute sua potest simul componere simplicia,—et si ex ratione talium simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute propria et terminorum assentiet illi complexioni, non virtute sensus a quo accipit terminos exteriorius.

34 Ibid. n. 235-7, p. 141-4. The heart of the argument is: ... dico quod licet experientia non habeatur de omnibus singularibus sed de pluribus, neque quod semper sed quod pluries, tamen expertus infallibiliter novit quia ita est et semper et in omnibus—et hoc per istam propositionem quiescentem in anima: 'quidquid evenit ut in pluribus ab aliqua causa non libera, est effectus naturalis illius causae.'

35 On this see Efrem Bettoni, L'ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto (Milan, 1943) and Gilson. op. cit. p. 128-43.
An example of this type of knowledge would be that there can be no
doubt that I am now sensing white, although the object that I am
sensing may appear black to others.36

After giving these arguments against the Academic doubts concerning
knowledge derived from mutable external objects, Duns phrases the
question in somewhat different terms: "How do we have certainty of
those things which are based on acts of sensation?" 37 As we will see,
here is the crux of Gianfrancesco Pico's problem. Scotus answers that
there are two possibilities. Either the different senses support one
another in their perception or they do not. If the first is true then
there is no problem. The principle enunciated above (Whatever
happens in many cases from a cause not free is the natural effect of
that cause) is valid. It is the second case which creates an additional
problem. A simple example of this is the case of the stick which is
partially submerged in the water. To which of our senses should we
give credence? To the touch which tells us that the stick is not broken
or to the sight which tells us that it is? Scotus replies that the intellect
is in possession of a proposition which states that no unyielding
(duritus) object is broken by coming in contact with something yielding
(mollis). Consequently, the stick is not broken by immersing it into
water, for this proposition is asserted to by both senses.

Although it is possible for the senses to err, the intellect is constantly
standing over them as corrective, which can obviate any disagreement
among them by calling forth a criterion based on experience of the
type that was spoken of above. By the use of reason and by previous
experience the intellect has formed certain evident propositions (e.g.
"a non-yielding object is not broken by coming into contact with a
yielding one") which can be called upon if a particular set of sense
experiences is dubious.38

37 Ibid. n. 240-5, p. 146-8.
38 The crux of Scotus' argument is: Et ut aubicumque ratio iudicat sensum errare, hoc
iudicat non per aliquam notitiam praecise aquisitam a sensibus ut causa, sed per
aliquam notitiam occasionatam a sensu, in qua non fallitur etiam si omnes sensus fallantur, et per aliquam aliam notitiam, aquisitam a sensu vel a sensibus 'ut in pluribus'
que scintor esse vera per propositionem saepe allegatam, scilicet 'quod in pluribus
evenit' etc., p. 148. Very interesting is the interpolated text that appears at this point in
some manuscripts, which says: "Sed nota, quod si omnes sensus errarent circa omne
commune sensibile omnibus... tunc intellectus non posset habere aliquam certitudinem
carried this far (i.e. Pyrrhonic scepticism), of course, cannot be solved by Scotus' argument.
This then is Duns Scotus' solution to the sceptics' problem of the mutability of the external object and the possibility of error arising from the disagreement of the different senses. This problem disposed of, he treats the other two arguments of Henry of Ghent in summary fashion.

The first of these is the problem of the mutability of the soul and the difficulties that this would cause for the construction of a legitimate science. This Scotus treats in a rather interesting way. He says that two types of mutability of the soul are possible (1.) the mutability from ignorance to knowledge and vice versa and (2.) the mutability from truth to deception and vice versa.39

Of these two, the first is natural to man as man prima mutabilitate and nothing can be done to change it. It is a natural quality of humanity to be subject to this type of change. The mutability of the second type, however, is only partially applicable, for there is always the certitude of the purely formal type of statements which were spoken of above. And as long as we are still in possession of these certitudes, other uncertainties can be overcome by the intellectual processes of the type we have already described.40

The third objection has to do with the confusion of the verum with the verisimile in sleeping, states of passion, etc. This is disposed of rather quickly. The Subtle Doctor argues that the confusion occurs only in those abnormal states and not in the normal working state when phantasm can readily be distinguished from authentic knowledge.41

But he pursues the same argument further. It can be said that "it seems to me that I see or hear, when actually I do not." At this point Duns becomes somewhat dubious of the sincerity of his opponent. saying, "If you concede that nothing is known per se, I do not wish to dispute with you, for it is evident that you are a hair-splitter and not convinced even by your own experience." 42 Thus Scotus sees no further point in discussing such matters with one who will not even accept the fact that certain principles are known per se.

As a final blow to Henry's theory, Duns attempts to show that it is full of internal inconsistencies. He argues, for example, that it is not

39 Ibid. n. 250, p. 152-3.
40 Ibid. n. 250, p. 152.
41 Ibid. n. 251-2, p. 153-4.
42 Si concedis nullam esse per se notam, nolo disputare tecum, quia constat quod protervus, et non es persuasus, sicut patet in actibus tuus. Ibid. n. 256, p. 155.
possible, as Henry had said, to know the exemplar of the Divine Mind without knowing the nature of the Divine Mind directly. At the same time, *sincera veritas* is possible for man by the method already described, whereby the certainty of analytic statements is coupled with sense experience—and the use of the deductive process—to produce certain conclusions.\textsuperscript{43}

In thus showing Henry’s analysis of sense experience and of error to be incorrect, Scotus feels that he has succeeded in demonstrating that infallible truth is possible for man without aid *ab alto*. He therefore concludes that the need for *illuminatio specialis* is superfluous.

The elaborate theory of knowledge constructed by Henry of Ghent to overcome the Academic objections to the validity of human knowledge has been destroyed. Scotus has struck at the very base of the involved and carefully thought out doctrine. He has used his famous subtle arguments to cut away the Academic critique. Once Duns has levelled his weapons at Henry, the fallability of the senses and of the mind seem less than before and they seem perhaps even capable of producing certain bits of truth.

V. GIANFRANCESCO PICO

This is the state of the problem when Gianfrancesco Pico enters into the discussion. Duns Scotus, who has often criticized Aristotle and the Aristotelians elsewhere, in this particular case seems to defend them. In doing so, he has criticized a theory very similar to the one which Gianfrancesco Pico has formulated in his *Examen Vanitatis*. Although Gianfrancesco draws his material mostly from the more thoroughgoing form of scepticism of the Pyrrhonians, he is, nevertheless, also closely tied to the milder forms of Academic scepticism.

After briefly summarizing Henry’s views and the criticisms of Scotus,\textsuperscript{44} Pico begins immediately his attempted refutation of the Subtle Doctor. As we will see from the objections to Scotus’ analysis of the problem, some of his arguments are cogent, but others seem to beg the question and retreat into a more or less fideistic position which


\textsuperscript{44} *Ex. Van.* V, 4; p. 707-8.
says: "Although your argument seems true on the face of things, with God all things are possible."

Gianfrancesco first challenges Scotus' opinion that if something is by nature mutable, it will be mutable, illumination or no, for that is its nature. To this Pico answers that something considered mutable in a weak light is not mutable when viewed in that light which comes from God. On the face of it this appears either to avoid the issue or to miss the point. Scotus had approached the problem of mutability squarely and had offered a rather ingenious solution to it, striking at the heart of the sceptic predicament. "What precisely is the nature of this much talked-about mutability?" he seems to ask. If it is a "real" mutability, then no light, not even Divine Illumination, will show it to be otherwise. But, on the other hand, what if it is not a mutability at all, but seeming mutability? This latter is the position that Pico seems to adopt (i.e. that the human perceiving natures are too weak to break through the aura of seeming mutability which surrounds physical reality), following the lead of the ancient sceptics. When Gianfrancesco speaks of honey seeming sweet to some, bitter to others, he recognizes that honey has a fixed nature, but a nature hidden to us because of the weakness of our own mechanism of perception.

Actually, part of the problem seems to consist in a marked difference in the understanding of just what "mutability" means. Scotus and Pico certainly give opposing answers to the same question. For Scotus, mutability appears to mean a real changeability inherent in the nature of the subject, e.g. the changeability of the color of the chameleon. Seeming-mutability is no mutability at all.

Quite differently for the sceptic (at least for one like Gianfrancesco Pico who accepts Christianity to the letter), it seems to mean that the object is not actually changing, but merely appears to, e.g. the visual effect of passing an object from a medium of one color to one of another color. If mutability is viewed in this latter way, the argument of Pico has a certain validity.

This leaves us in the somewhat paradoxical position that the realist (Scotus) is upholding the real mutability of objects and the sceptic (Pico) is defending their basic permanence.

This, however, is not completely correct, for in view of this and similar arguments, the sceptic is forced to retreat to the position of

45 See above note 29.
46 Potest enim, quod uno in lumine obtuso magis et debili mutabile cognoscitur, id tanquam immutabile percipi, eo in lumine, quod imago quaedam est exemplaris omnino immutabilis; quod in Deo esse apud omnes plane confessum est. Ex. Van. V, 4, p. 709.
“complete scepticism” in which nothing is certain, not even the uncertainty of his own convictions. On the other hand, a position such as the one we have attributed to Scotus is tenable only within the framework of a realist theory of knowledge, where there are some basic irrefutable certainties to which such mutabilities can be referred to determine whether they are in fact mutabilities. That this is the case with Scotus we have already seen.

In conclusion to our analysis of this rather minute, but instructive point we can say several things. For the sceptic such as Pico, “mutability” means that a genuine uncertainty (at least from the viewpoint of man’s ability to know) underlies all knowledge, whereas for the realist it means a changeability which can be referred to something else which is stable. This is important, for on the one side Scotus’ criticism of the sceptic position concerning this point would not be at all convincing to the sceptic himself; and, on the other hand, Pico’s refutation is equally meaningless for the realist. In fact, the only person to whom Pico’s argument would be convincing is one we might call a “Christian sceptic,” of whom there have been a few examples in history, notably in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.47

Gianfrancesco continues his critique by asserting that it is false that sensibles do not continually change, for this is known by both reason and experience. What is composed of opposing qualities necessarily constantly changes by its very nature. And it is evident that sensibles are sublunar and hence composed of contrasting qualities. Here we have a fine example of Pico’s reliance on Aristotle when it fits his purpose, for as support of this already Aristotelian doctrine, he refers the reader to the Aristotelian opusculum De Coloribus.48

Pico is here arguing against Scotus’ contention that “quod ‘sensibilia continue mutantur’ falsum est.” 49 As we have seen, however, Scotus

47 On this see Popkin, op. cit.
48 Falsum etiam quod sensibilia continue non mutentur. Notum hoc experientia, notum, quia quod compositum est ex pugnantibus inter se continue qualitatibus, continue secundum naturam mutari necesse est tametsi ipsa singulis momentis mutatio non perciptatur: omne autem sensile, maxime sublunare ex contrariis, et semper inter se bellantibus qualitatibus confiri manifestum est: Notum et Aristotelis authoritate, cum a libri de Coloribus, qua de re operis progressu nonnulla dicere consentaneum fuerit. Ex. Vm. V, 4, p. 709. For a more detailed discussion of this see Pico’s short treatise De Elementis, p. 115-23. The text of Aristotle referred to here by Pico is difficult to determine. The De Coloribus (generally regarded as written by an early follower of the master, rather than by Aristotle himself) deals with the changes in coloration due to various causes. Among the things discussed are the changes in color which occur on mixing.
49 As cited above in note 29.
did not really develop that line of reasoning; but, rather, he attempted to show that there are a few truths which demonstrably do not change and from these can be constructed an entire framework of knowledge which is trustworthy.

A further objection is raised against Scotus' contention that if knowledge is gotten through a conjunction of our natural powers and illumination *ab alto*, the conclusion of the two necessarily follows the weaker member. In other words, Scotus is saying that given a proposition of the type A & B, where A is true and B is doubtful, the truth value of the whole statement follows B. So, in the case in question, if certain knowledge is conjoined to uncertain, the end cannot help being uncertain.50

Pico argues that it is true that in a syllogism the conclusion follows the weaker member, but in the case of knowledge, the stronger light is followed. The two members are not opposed to one another, but the higher power perfects the lower.51 Here it seems as though his criticism of Scotus' reasoning is sound, for to reduce the process of knowing to purely logical or formal terms, as the Subtle Doctor tries to do, is to pass over its distinctive qualities. It could further be added—and perhaps would have been if Henry or one of the Augustinians had answered the critique—that although the two aspects of the knowing process (the natural and the supernatural) are logically separable, they but form different moments of the same process.

Man is capable of certitude, Gianfrancesco continues, "but it is not located below, but above; above the intellect of man is that certitude. This is the basic belief of our Faith, disclosed by the Divine Light. Further, who has any doubt that the Faith is more certain than any appearance (*visio*)? Faith, I say, in what is heard, as it were, which comes from God, Who does not err, and Who cannot err." 52

50 For Scotus' arguments see note 29, beginning Similiter, secundum istam opinionem ...
52 Illud autem ... quoniam non in imo, sed in sublimi, hoc est, supra hominis intellectum, nostrae fidei fundamentum divino patefactum lumine, collocatur. Atque ita etiam omni visione certiorum esse fidem, quis ambigat? Fidem, inquam, ex auditu, scilicet, qui derivatur a Deo, qui et non fallit, et falli omnino non potest. Ibid. V. 4, p. 709.
So is reiterated Gianfrancesco's basic fideistic position. God is the source of truth and our single road to it is through faith. It is through faith alone that we can attain certitude. All other forms of knowledge are susceptible to the sceptical doubts and in the final analysis are not knowledge at all, but seeming-knowledge.

Continuing his argument against Scotus, Pico charges his adversary and others with misunderstanding the meaning of Augustine. On this point, he goes on at great length, supplying many arguments from a wide range of sources to support his own position. Although he tends to be quite rambling, the major point at issue is clear. According to Pico, Scotus had tried to show that the arguments about the fallibility of the senses and of natural knowledge in general were not the opinion of St. Augustine, but of Academics only. He further tried to show that Augustine had held that sure knowledge could be derived through sense experience.53

Now, Augustine occasionally made statements that might lead one to draw such a conclusion, but it does not seem to have been his overall intention and Scotus is rather begging the question here. Pico is quick to notice this. If Augustine spoke of the possibility of man attaining certainty, Pico argues, he did not refer to knowledge derived from sense experience but to knowledge that is innate.54 Not only Henry, but others such as Jean Gerson have recognized this to be his true opinion. Furthermore, it is clearly seen to be Augustine's opinion by reference to his works, continues Pico, pointing to the clear passage of the Retractationes.55

Gianfrancesco then strikes out against the Subtle Doctor's contention that the senses are not the cause of knowledge, but merely the occasion.56 How can this be true if "the intellect cannot have knowledge

53 Op. Ox. n. 223-8, p. 135-7. See also Gilson, op. cit. p. 559-60.
55 Ibid. p. 710. The key passage of the Retractationes is cited above in note 8.
56 It should be noted that the Scotist position is not quite as simple as Pico tries to make it. It is not simply the case of the senses being the "cause" or the "occasion" of knowledge. The process by which the intellect arrives at this type of knowledge "occasioned" by sense experience, but ultimately "caused" by the "intellect's own power," is rooted in a somewhat more sophisticated epistemology than Pico is willing to admit. The question is not merely one of choosing between a strictly empirical theory of knowledge (e.g. Radical Aristotelianism) and the illumination theory (e.g. Henry of Ghent), as
of individuals (simplicium), unless taken from the senses,” as Scotus contends.

“What, I ask, does this mean other than to have the senses for a cause? Does the sense furnish to the intellect that which it uses? Hence in the genus of material cause can it be considered to elicit cognition, if we consider the sensible species. And, in a certain way in the genus of the formal cause, if the intellectual species is considered the impression or phantasm received from the senses by which the intellect itself is given the form as it were? These things being so, if the sense errs, it follows that the intellect, which clearly uses the evidence of the sense as a judge would do, errs also. But, what else does intellect judge, if mention is made only of natural cognition, if not what the sense indicates to it?"

As we said above, Scotus’ contention that the sense is only the occasion of natural knowledge is not entirely satisfying. It is not surprising that Pico in his eager attempt to undermine the reliability of all sense knowledge also finds Duns’ position less than convincing. When he says that the intellectual species cannot be derived without the aid of a formal or material cause, he seems to rend asunder the fabric of the Scotist argument. It is certainly difficult to see how the Subtle Doctor might escape this loophole without entering into the occasionalist predicament with all of its attendant difficulties.

But Scotus has argued further that only the simple terms are taken from the senses and that they are connected “by the intellect’s own force” into a proposition “evidently true.” Thus, according to Duns,

Pico seems to contend. Rather, other possibilities (such as the one offered by Scotus) are open to consideration. See the text cited in note 55 and Gibson, op. cit., p. 561.

On the other hand, from Pico’s point of view the Scotist position still seems to be open to the criticism of the skeptic. In his determination to overthrow an empirical-based epistemology, he is not willing to let sense experience have any role whatever in the formation of true knowledge. From his somewhat restricted viewpoint he tends often to overemphasize the empiricism of the philosophers he criticizes. One might say that the position he criticizes approaches the one later defended by Locke, although it is doubtful whether any of the philosophers he criticized actually themselves held such an extreme position. Our analysis here will be in terms of Pico’s critique, though it must be realized that the position he attributes to Scotus is sometimes misrepresented in the way we have just discussed.

the mind can accept the notions of “whole” and “greater” from the senses and then compound the two into the proposition “every whole is greater than its parts.” In doing this, Scotus contends, the intellect assents to the combination of these terms by its own power and in no way depends on the senses as cause.\(^{58}\)

To such a proposal Gianfrancesco Pico asks: “But how are such things evidently true, if the sense from which the terms or notions are drawn forth errs? I ask, how does this come about if either one or both of the simple terms are falsely received?” \(^{59}\) There are a number of things to prevent such a certainty, continues Pico; the intellect can be troubled by the disposition of the will (affectione voluntatis) or by a false appearance so that it discerns something contrary to what it actually is. According to Scotus’ example of the whole and the part, there is the presupposition that there are actually a whole and part which have been conjoined in the proposition. But this is possible only if they have been derived from the senses. If the senses were reliable judges of such matters there would be no problem, but this is not so. The definition (ratio) of things comes from a higher faculty.

Consequently, for Pico there is no difficulty in the formation of the proposition by the intellect or in the forming of the ratio of “whole” and “part”. The problem lies, as he says often, in the reliability of the raw materials used in the formulation of these. It lies in the question: “How are the terms true, if what points them out is false? If their basis or origin is false? And how does the judgment of the intellect give a true opinion, if it rests on the false testimonies of the senses?” \(^{60}\)

According to Gianfrancesco the difficulties in Scotus’ position are not in his attributing to the intellect the power of compounding individual terms into reliable propositions. They are in deriving reliable terms from the unreliable world of sensation. The mechanism of the intellect is not called into question, but merely the mechanism for reducing sense data into reliable concepts (rationes, as the term is here used).

---

\(^{58}\) Op. Ox. n. 234, p. 141.


\(^{60}\) Quomodo igitur eorum veri termini, si eorum indicatio falsa est? Si falsum eorum, sive fundamentum, sive principium. Et quomodo index intellectus veram promet sententiam, falsis nitens sensuum, testimoniiis? Ibid. V, 4, p. 712. This problem which is central in Pico’s critique of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge is discussed at length in Ex. Van. IV, 12, p. 687-9 and V, 2-3, p. 695-707.
Thus to continue the same example, there is no problem involved in formulating the proposition “every whole is greater than its parts.” This is purely an intellectual construction. If we try to apply such a proposition to this particular whole or this particular part, however, which lie in the sense world, the difficulty begins. The wholes and the parts of sense objects are deceitful and do not give us the surety necessary to gain our confidence. Here we see clearly the unbridgeable gap which separates the world of intellect from the world of sense for Gianfrancesco. This is at the base of his problem. He can see no valid way in which to relate the materials of sensation to the materials of intellect.

The Subtle Doctor is further rebuked for his attempt at a justification of the induction process. As we have seen, he tried to do this on the basis of the principle: “whatever happens in many cases from a cause not free, is the natural effect of that cause.” 61 This, of course, is a point rather vulnerable to any type of sceptic criticism. The so-called problem of induction is one that has plagued philosophers for as long as they have existed and, although a number of rather sophisticated arguments have been brought to justify the inductive process, none have been entirely satisfactory, particularly in the face of a Pyrrhonic criticism. 62

Pico first says that whoever does what Scotus has done commits the fallacy of the consequent: (fallacia connexionis consecutionisve). 63 Presumably, he says this because the inductive argument of Scotus could be expressed in syllogistic form as follows:

A causes B in some cases (i.e. observations reveal this)
We observe B
Therefore, A caused it.

Such a process of induction Pico couples with the common logical fallacy of the consequent. For example:

A \rightarrow B
B
Therefore, A

61 See note 54.
63 Ad haec in progressu conatur Scotus deducere, quod ex quibusdam experimentis, non omnibus, nec semper, ita tamen esse et semper, et (ut eius utar verbo) infallibiliter cognoscitur, qua in re ipse maxime fallitur. Primo quia a minori numero argumentatus ad maiorem concludendum, incurrit fallaciam connexionis consecutionisve ab Aristotele damnatum. Si quidem minor numerus a maiori includitur, non contra. Ex. Van. V, 4, p. 713.
Indicating the logical fallacy of Scotus' argument points precisely to the central problem of induction and must be counted as a valid criticism, although Pico offers no alternative to it.

A second criticism of Scotus' contention is Gianfrancesco's rejoinder that in the natural course of events "things are not always what they seem to be," examples of which can be found in the works of men like Aristotle and Theophrastus. This, of course, is no more than a reiteration of the basic sceptic argument with some embellishment. Some of the same arguments about the unreliability of sense knowledge are brought forth. He says, for example, "For many reasons something can appear to be true which is not and, therefore, a rule for distinguishing must be given. This Henry judged to be Divine, Scotus to be human." Pico concludes that Scotus has not in fact overthrown Henry's arguments.

Our author next reproves Duns for not understanding the meaning of the "mutability of the sensibles." Ordered change, as in the case of growth, is one thing, Pico argues, and it can be known in its variety and change; it is, however, something quite different when an object changes in an unordered way. Scotus, the master of the subtle distinction, is charged with not distinguishing the two in his discussion of the matter.

In summary, we might say that in Pico's eyes the Scotist solutions to the problems involved in obtaining trustworthy knowledge from the world of sense experience were no solutions at all. They raise more problems than they solve. This, of course, was not entirely Scotus' fault. He was not fully aware of the various detailed arguments of the ancient sceptics, which Pico would later bring to bear, and consequently did not devote much attention to refuting them. This fact Pico realizes when, after his point by point counter argument, he asks the Subtle Doctor:

---

64 Secundo quia quae a causis etiam naturalibus proveniunt, non semper ita se habent, ut aliquando se habere visa sunt. Exempla huius rei multa in Aristotelis libris de Animalibus, et Theophrasti de Stirpibus referuntur. *Ibid.* V, 4, p. 713. An example of this can be found in Aristotle's discussion of the generation of bees, a point mentioned several times by Pico. See *De Gen. An.* III, 10.

65 ...et quod multis ex causis potest apparere verum cum non sit, quare regulam discernementem dare oportet, Henricu salvinam, Scotus humanam arbitratur esse. *Ex. Van.* V, 4, p. 713.


"But, O Scotus, if you proceed in such a way, how will you refute the Academics, whom you claimed above to have refuted in some way? How the sceptics, whose books I think you have never seen? How is it that you have been certain of your own acts, relying on Aristotle, who often doubted concerning his own? And when we sense who doubted whether we sense ourselves to sense? Likewise, how do you avoid ending up in circular arguments? How do you not beg the question in your disputation? These types of fallacy were ridiculed by Aristotle."

In addition to Pico's suggestion that Scotus was not fully aware of the sceptical arguments, this series of questions raises other interesting points. For example, his contention that Scotus seemed more certain of his own acts than Aristotle did of his, is a point well made here. The attitude of Scotus in his strict reliance on sense data is somewhat puzzling in these passages, especially when we consider it in conjunction with other aspects of Scotist doctrine. It does not fit in very well, for example, with his arguments directed against St. Thomas' proofs for the existence of God. Scotus held that these proofs did not transcend the changeability of the world of sensation and that they did not show God to be transcendent as is necessary in Christianity.

The charge that circular reasoning is used by Scotus is not altogether clear. It seems that Pico has in mind the fact that the Subtle Doctor was somewhat ambiguous in his attitude toward sense experience as a legitimate source of knowledge. For example, the Scotist argument that the senses are not the "cause" of natural knowledge, but only offer the "occasion" for it, would not answer certain questions to Pico's satisfaction. This position does not explain, among other things, why those whose senses are impaired in some way cannot have as complete a knowledge as those whose senses are perfect.

In support of Henry's position, Pico cites Jean Gerson, who had argued that for the mind not to be confused and covered in the


69 It is worth noting that in his exegesis of this section of Scotus' work, Gilson (*op. cit.*, p. 560) has also noted an extremity in his tone. After discussing the Subtle Doctor's opinion that Augustine defended the reliability of sense knowledge, M. Gilson says: Ceci ne veut pas dire que Duns Scot soit passé avec armes et bagages dans le camp d'Aristote, ni que rien, dans sa noétique, ne rappelle le souvenir d'Augustin. He then proceeds to show this must be qualified.
darkness of phantasm it must be fortified. For this to come about, the concurrence of a higher light is necessary, Gerson had concluded, following St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{70}

Without this illumination from above, Pico continues, we can be deceived as to what is actually true or false.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, such illumination is necessary for Christianity, for the Scriptures are divinely inspired writings which require illumination from God, and faith itself is a divinely infused gift that rises above the knowledge afforded by natural light. Scotus himself admits that different modes of participation in the Divine Light must be possible if the light of faith and of prophecy be admitted. Therefore, why does he not admit as well that by such an illumination knowledge which is uncertain can be transformed into that which is certain?\textsuperscript{72}

Pico has here resorted to a somewhat specious form of argument, it would seem. Given that according to Christian theology a certain amount of latitude is allowed for special illumination, this gives him no particular justification to conclude that this is true in other matters. The Grace of Faith fulfills the requirements of special illumination giving a \textit{sincera veritas}. The same is true of prophecy and of the Sacred Scriptures, which have certainty for a similar reason. This has been admitted essentially by all of the theologians of the Christian tradition. But, where is the line to be drawn between legitimate and pretended prophecy and scripture? Here is again the old problem of the criterion about which Gianfrancesco had so much to say elsewhere. Here he is strangely silent. How are we to distinguish the value of the prophecies of the Scriptures from those of Joachim da Fiore or Savonarola? On this problem Gianfrancesco Pico is not quite so sceptical as he is regarding some others.\textsuperscript{73}


\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Nam sine ipsius fulgorre possimus nose falsa, et ca credere vera esse, contraque nosse vera, et credere ea falsa, vel dubitare, qualis fere fumana cognitio, si radio illo supernae lucis divinitus immissa deestuatur. Ex. Van. V}, 4, p. 714.

\textsuperscript{72} Caeterum si quicunque bene instituti in Sacris literis affirmant, lumine divinitus menti infuso, ea quae supra naturae nostrae facultatem sint, credenda cognosciatur, haberi debet a Scoto tanquam absurum lumine etiam divino vim nostrae mentis, illustrari ab sincere percipienda quae insyncrea aliqui percipereuntur? Diversos enim divinum lumen diverse participare, et ipse Scotos concedat oporet si fidei lumen et prophetiae lumen admittit. \textit{Ibid. V}, 4, p. 714.

\textsuperscript{73} For Gianfrancesco’s views of prophecy see the treatise \textit{De Rerum Praenotione} (p. 248-466). For an attempt at prophecy on the part of Pico himself see his \textit{De Veris Calamitatum Causis Nostrorum Temporum} (not in the \textit{Opera} but existing in a modern edition of Modena, 1860) and Charles Trinkaus, \textit{Adversity’s Noblemen} (New York, 1940), 130-2.
But this takes us somewhat beyond the point at issue. Of course Scotus, as a Christian, must admit that there is a certain illumination from God. This does not entail, however, as Pico seem to imply, that he must admit the necessity of illumination in purely natural matters. Scotus formulated a theory of knowledge in which it was not necessary. The theory is subject to criticism on other counts, some of which Pico has pointed out. This final one, however, seems to beg the question and to be in essence no counter argument at all.

In conclusion to his polemic against Scotus, Pico cites a passage from Nicholas of Cusa's *De Docta Ignorantia* which admirably supports his own position. There is a certain similarity between Gianfrancesco Pico's way of thought and that of Cusanus, although the latter's orientation is more metaphysical than is Pico's. But, nonetheless, the conclusions they come to are quite similar. Cusanus, like Pico, had denied to man the possibility of coming to a certain knowledge of things by purely natural means.74 Nicholas' concept of "learned ignorance" comes very close to being the ideal which is implicit in the whole of Pico's endeavor. With this quotation, which more or less sums up Pico's outlook, he chooses to conclude his critique of Scotus' criticism of Henry.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

All in all this analysis of Gianfrancesco's attempt to come to grips with a major philosophical thinker like Duns Scotus has put into

evidence several rather significant things. We see first of all a prime example of just how his philosophical orientation differed from that of his uncle.75 We see further that he does not defend Henry's theory of illumination from the Scotist criticism in order to build upon it. Quite the opposite, he endeavours to refute Scotus' arguments and then lets Henry's theory fall and concerns himself no further with it. The whole exercise was merely an exhibition of the power of the sceptical criticism. Pico had admired Scotus earlier in the *Examen Vanitatis* as one of the few mediaeval philosophers who had been keen-sighted enough to see that Aristotle had not said the last word on the subject of philosophy.76 Here, however, he attacks Scotus essentially for being an Aristotelian and in no way attempts to connect the diverse opinions.

As we read through the works of Gianfrancesco, it becomes more and more apparent that he has little use for philosophy in general. He sometimes attempts to distinguish between Christian and Pagan philosophy, but is not particularly successful in his separation of the two. Nearly everything that we would call philosophy in the normal sense of the term falls under his heading of *philosophia Gentium* (or “human” as opposed to “Divine” philosophy).77 What is left for a Christian to philosophize about is very little. In fact, in his whole approach to the problem there is an implicit attitude that the chief function of philosophy is to destroy philosophy. As some of our own contemporaries contend that the sole function of philosophy is one of linguistic clarification with the ultimate end of obviating the need for philosophy in a world of the sciences, Gianfrancesco, much in the same way, feels the critical function to consist in the abolition of the need for philosophy and the realization that its purpose would be superseded by the Divine Science—Religion. In doing this, his approach shows a marked similarity to certain of the mystical and anti-intellectual tendencies of his time. The similarities to Savonarola’s *Sermons*, to Erasmus’ *Praise of Folly*, to Sebastian Brant’s *Ship of Fools*, or to certain tendencies of the Reformers are brought immediately to mind. Whereas Savonarola and the Reformers relied principally on religious argument, Erasmus

---

75 See the reference above in note 2.
76 See for example *Ex. Van.* IV, 2, p. 666 where is mentioned the famous text where Scotus turns aside from Averroes in favor of Avicenna (*Op. Ox.* prol. I, q. 3, a. 1, n. 3).
77 It is framed in these terms in the *De Studio Divinæ et Humanae Philosophiæ* where a clear cut separation is made between philosophy which takes its starting point from sense experience and that which takes its starting point from the Scriptures. Cf. *De Studio*, *proem.*, p. 3.
and Brant on rhetorical and literary ornamentation to make their arguments believable, Pico relied on philosophical criticism. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the matter, but the overriding pietism of Gianfrancesco and, at the same time, his wide philosophical learning and willingness to descend to particulars of philosophic polemic prepared him admirably for his task of destroying philosophy in the name of Christianity.

After our extensive discussion, the question naturally arises whether Pico himself held Henry’s theory of illumination. Although he tends to lean in the Platonic-Augustinian direction on such matters, the details of his own opinion concerning this are not very evident. Divine Illumination is certainly considered by him to be the single source of valid knowledge, but he does not elaborate on his own position to any extent. Although his defense of Henry of Ghent on the subject is vigorous, he does not seem to follow Henry in the larger context of the theory. Henry admitted that a certain type of truth could be attained ex puris naturalibus. This, however, Gianfrancesco would admit in no way. There is, in his opinion, no reliability whatever to be attached to knowledge gained through the senses. He agrees essentially with Augustine’s extreme position that “Non est igitur expectanda sinceritas veritatis a sensibus corporis,” although it is doubtful whether Augustine himself sustained this in a form as extreme as did Pico. Rather than following the modified theory of illumination of Henry, it certainly seems evident that he followed the more extreme one of Augustine and Bonaventure, if we must attribute a position to him.

Why he chose Henry as a touchstone for developing his own form of scepticism is by no means clear. In the later stages of mediaeval thought, particularly in the fourteenth century, it is well known that a sceptical tendency developed, often expressed in a somewhat more extreme form than could be found in the writings of Henry. Why this did not make as much an impression on Gianfrancesco as did Henry’s writing is a subject of wonder.

78 See the passage cited above in note 18.
79 De Div. Quaest. 83a9; PL 40, col. 13.
80 The classical studies on this movement are by Konstanty Michalski in Bulletin de l’Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres (1921-8 passim). This scepticism runs through the whole so-called “nominalist school,” beginning with Ockham and being very evident in thinkers like John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autrecourt.
81 It is worth noting that Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and several others of nominalist leanings are mentioned repeatedly throughout Pico’s writings, so he was certainly aware of their arguments.
In any case it is Henry that he chose and we can certainly see, if not a definite reason for this, a partial explanation. Assuredly, Henry did not carry his doubts as far as did Pico, but, nevertheless they were cast in a context which had a certain urgency for the sixteenth century author. The relation between knowledge divinely imparted and knowledge ex puris naturalibus everywhere held a fascination for the younger Pico. Henry had weighed the problem carefully and had come to a solution that attempted to mediate between scepticism and realism—and to satisfy the empiricist as well. That such a solution would not be entirely satisfactory to a more extreme sceptic such as Gianfrancesco Pico we have already hinted at, but at least he saw in Henry’s theory an attempt to solve the problem. Scotus’ subsequent criticisms of this gave Gianfrancesco ample opportunity to exhibit the critical power of a Pyrrhonic-inspired rebuttal. He found Henry to be on the right track in this matter and, consequently, felt that the latter’s arguments must be defended against the unfavorable criticism of Scotus. In doing so he was able to utilize the Pyrrhonic arguments of which he was so fond, thereby introducing the strong medicine of the ancient sceptics into a problem of mediaeval philosophy.

*Fordham University.*
The "Introitus ad sententias"

of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M.

EDWARD A. SYNAN

TWO works of the Franciscan, Roger Nottingham, are extant in a 14th century codex preserved in the British Museum.¹ The first of these, an exposition of dialectical techniques effective in solving "insolubles," concludes with a gratifyingly circumstantial colophon: the Insolubilia were presented by brother Roger, an Oxford bachelor, who completed them near the 29th of June, 1343.² Immediately following is the undated theological text edited here: Introitus ejusdem ad sententias, scilicet, Rogeri Notinkam, fratris.

In this context,³ the term introitus seems to refer to the public lecture on a problem derived from the Sentences of Peter Lombard with which a candidate in the faculty of theology entered on his work as a bachelor of the Sentences, an academic act exactly parallel to that with which a bachelor of the bible was qualified by delivering a lecture on one of the canonical books.⁴ To contend with the logical puzzles posed by

¹ British Museum, Harleian MS 3243; the first of these, the Insolubilia, occupies fols. 57a-58a and the second, the Introitus, fols. 58a-59b; the columns average 56 lines.
² Fol. 58a, II. 36-39: Expliciunt Insolubilia data a fratre Rogero Nottingham oxoniensi bachelario, completa anno domini M° .ccc.” xliii circa festum sanctorum apostolorum petri et pauli. On Roger Nottingham, v. A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500 (Oxford, 1957-1959) II. 577 s. v. Nottingham, Roger de, where, in addition to the Insolubilia and the Introitus, certain astronomical treatises are associated with his name and evidence that he was both a Franciscan and a doctor of theology is noted.
³ The term introitus had the totally unrelated meaning, current in mediaeval Oxford, of a student residence under the responsible direction of a Principal, v. S. Gibson, ed., Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis (Oxford, 1951) p. 227, II. 8-11: Item omnes et singuli principales, tempore admissionis eorum ad principalitates, iurent sacrosanctis Dei Evangeliiis, quod nullum admittent ad eorum aulas vel introitus, nisi de quo bonum testimonium habeant ... (1420 March 29); p. 243, I. 37-p. 244, I. 3: ... igitur universitas et decrevit quod quilibet principalis alieius aule vel introitus saltem non collegii, necnon substitutus ipsius eius in absencia, de cetero sit graduatus, moribus et scienza suos coaulares idoneus ad regendum ... (24 May 1432).
⁴ In connection with the training of theologians at Paris, Rashdall remarks that the candidate "entered upon his baccalaureate with a public exercise known as a principium" to which Powicke and Emden have added the note that "before c. 1250, this exercise
insolubles was an exercise of the artists; we may assume, therefore, that in the early summer of 1343, Roger was a bachelor in the faculty of arts and, further, since at this moment he was capable of contriving noteworthy rules for the solution of insolubles, no doubt well advanced in that faculty. Thus the Introitus records the scholastic exercise with which Roger Nottingham achieved standing as sententiarius and, given the statutory program required for promotion from bachelor of arts to bachelor of the Sentences, this can hardly have taken place before about 1350.6

Material for Roger’s Introitus was supplied by book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 1, chapter 1: Quod unum est principium, non plura, and chapter 2 of the same distinction: Quid sit creare, quid facere. As presented by Peter Lombard, these questions occasion no more than a summary statement of the biblical doctrine of creation as against the mythical cosmogony of the Timaeus and its three principles that are themselves without a principle.6 But between Peter Lombard and Roger Nottingham, the 13th century Albigensians had intervened to provoke a passionate Christian reaction against their latter-day Manichaism and, if the newly mastered Physics of Aristotle gave that reaction new weapons, its doctrine too constituted a target for the theologians.7 Thus the author of the Introitus, heir to Henry of Ghent

was called the introitus,” Powicke and Emden, Rashdall’s Medieval Universities (Oxford, 1956) I, 474, n. 3, and 477. The Oxford terminology, reflected in applications for graces by candidates who listed the academic requirements they had fulfilled, speaks of the introitus biblic and its parallel, the lectura libri sententiarum: v. Gibson, Statuta p. cx, text of January 1450: after lecturing on the Sentences ..., and also lectured on some book of the Bible; text of regulations for such a grace, ibid., note 6; v. also p. cxii, text of record of application dated 18 January 1453-1454; last, a late text in English, 1566-1567, mentions a beadle’s fee for “enteryng of senttans.” C. Wordsworth, The Ancient Kalendar of the University of Oxford (Oxford, 1904), 65, n. 2; the present text is evidence that the term introitus was not restricted to the principium delivered by the bachelor of the bible.


6 Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum (Quaracchi, 1916) II, 306, 307: ... elidens errorem quorundam, plura sine principio fuisset principia opiniantium. “Plato namque tria initia aestimavit, Deum silecit et exemplar et materiam, et ipsa increata sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem.” Creator enim est, qui de nihil aliqva facit ... Et creare proprie est de nihil aliqve facere; facere vero non modo de nihil aliqve operari, sed etiam de materia ...

7 St. Bonaventure, for instance, noted that ancient philosophers, including Platonists and Peripatetics, had long wanderd among by-paths where any believer would have
and to Duns Scotus, was to be preoccupied with the problem of infinity, created and Uncreated, with determining what weight of being the conception “nothing” might be made to bear, with the sense in which the cosmos, created by the Best of beings, must be the best of all possible worlds. Last, Roger's most personal teaching is his contribution to the endless series of attempts by believers to compel the unbelieving, by dint of reasoning, to accept the existence of God. It is not hard to see that this attempt is the work of one who had made an impression with a treatise on insolubles, for his starting point is neither our notion of God nor concrete experience, but propositions stated in austerely logical form. Nor is Roger's reasoning, here at least, to be described as metaphysical or moral or physical: it is the inferential logic expressed in consequentiae. From any instance of propositions necessarily true, or from any instance of the contradictory proposition, he undertakes to demonstrate that God exists.

Roger cited his authorities carefully but a few details should be noted. The inner divisions of the works he adduced do not always correspond to those of our printed editions; one reference to a Quodlibet of Henry of Ghent seems to stem from a remark made by the Solemn Doctor in his Summa quaestionum ordinaria rum; with all his contemporaries, Roger ascribed the pseudo-Augustinian De fide ad Petrum to the bishop of Hippo; his Aristotle is the Aristotle of Averroes. In so brief a work the sources chosen can ground only limited conclusions, but the least that can be remarked is that this Franciscan has not been parochial in selecting his authorities: he has invoked Saint Augustine twelve times, Aristotle and the Commentator eight times, Henry of Ghent four times, Saint Thomas Aquinas and the pseudo-Areopagite twice each, Bonaventure (not yet canonized in Roger's day), Robert Grosseteste, Richard of Saint-Victor, Richard Rufus, Boethius, and Duns Scotus, once each.

If the same scribe copied both the Insolubilia and the Introitus, as may well be the case, for both are written in an excellent bookhand without any notable personal characteristics, the text of the Introitus, nevertheless, suffers by comparison with that of the Insolubilia. The state of the writing has deteriorated, perhaps owing to inferior ink,
but this has put the sense of a phrase in jeopardy in only two passages and in each of these the context precludes serious misunderstanding.

Except for Notinkam, neither the spelling nor the punctuation of the original has been kept and in only two cases has it been necessary to supplement the careful corrections of a contemporary hand. The marginalia are given in the notes because they indicate the articulations of the argument which some intelligent mediaeval reader has observed. Paragraph divisions and numbers are my addition; references to the text in the following introduction are indicated by these paragraph numbers enclosed within parentheses.

I

The Introitus proceeds in two moments and the first stage is organized around a question which Roger calls "first" and "principal" (16, 19): Whether the natural order of the universe flows completely from the unity of its principle? For, as Peter Lombard had asserted, all things proceed from God and nothing beside, in opposition to Plato's appeal to god, exemplar, and uncreated matter, the first of the three, therefore, an artisan rather than a Creator. A negative response to this first principal question is postulated and tested through a discussion of two conclusions which that denial appears to entail (1 ff.).

A second moment is developed in the presence of the results achieved in the debate on the first question with its conclusions; Roger here submits to analysis the notion that Being Itself is the object of participation by the multitude of created beings according to a more and a less, measured by the diverse grades of creation (21).

II

Roger's first conclusion (2, 8), is that creation cannot be described as the flow of a creature into the being of existence by a change or production from simple and absolute non-being, so fully nothing as to be unmixed with potentiality. On the contrary, creation is a production from non-being conjoined to an infinite potentiality (1). Because it is possible to imagine created beings in grades of actuality infinitely intense or infinitely diminished, the potentiality thus open to infinite actualization can be no less infinite than the actuality of which it is the correlate (3, 4; cf. 14). This conclusion is reinforced by the reflection that, if the potentiality vanquished by the act of creation were not infinite, then the creative act would not be an act of infinite power; creative power would be comparable to the power of a natural agent that produces its effects from what pre-exists (5). Both authoritative
texts on creation as a power possessed by God alone (5) and the conception of God as supreme essence, as He who supremely is, require us to ascribe infinite actuality to Him and to Him alone. If God be posited as the peak of Being, it is not self-contradictory to locate at the opposite extreme, that is, at the non-being without qualification prior to creation, a conjoined, infinite potentiality (6). As for the legitimacy of the conception which postulates the possibility of ever diminishing degrees of reality, diminishing even to infinity, Roger adduces prime matter, that entity which is minimal in the order of substance, and invites us to imagine the successive creation by God of other lesser entities, first one that would be less in being than is prime matter by two, yet another, less by four, and so to infinity. Still, he argues, given this imaginary cosmos of near nothings, it would remain true that, beneath any grade of actual being in our present world, there is now no less a range of potentiality than would then obtain. For, no matter how low a grade of being, it is infinitely distant from its own negation: Saint Thomas, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Robert Grosseteste are at one in acknowledging that between anything and nothing there yawns an infinite distance, an abyss such that only an infinite power can bridge (7).

III

A second conclusion bears on the total, hierarchic excellence of the cosmos: given the present, ordered unity of the world, no higher species of being can be created (2, 8). As the potentiality conjoined to absolute non-being is an infinite one, that conjoined to any given level of actuality, no matter how low that level may be, is necessarily finite. Thus there can be no ascent to infinity in created grades of excellence: at some point, the finite potentiality, which is all that survives the production of even the least of beings, will be exhausted and there the ascent must reach a standstill, a stand which coincides with the supreme perfection of the universe (9). No doubt, between the highest and the least of creatures, an infinity of degrees might be calibrated (4), but this is not an unqualifiedly infinite range of potentiality, for, that unqualified infinitude should be linked to definite degrees of intensity, is beyond the grasp of imagination (10). Hence it cannot be argued cogently that the infinite capacity for subdivision between two extremes of created being, with the correspondingly infinite degrees of actualization, means that an ascent to infinity beyond the highest actual level of created perfection remains possible (11). With the creation of what is marked by even a minimal entity and which, precisely because it is minimal, is compossible with the widest imagin-
able potentiality, the infinitude of that potentiality is destroyed. What entitative potentiality remains is as necessarily finite as is the corresponding actuality and this finite range is gradually to be reduced as level after level of entitative potentiality is realized (12).

This same thesis is further grounded in the essential perfection native to the cosmos. Should no creature be, in fact, as supremely noble as it is possible for a creature to be, the universe would be truncated; in terms of an image provided by Richard of Saint-Victor, the world would resemble a headless human body (13). Perhaps Roger realized that here a reader might incautiously envision a necessity in creation such as can characterize only the Creator who alone is that than which a greater cannot be conceived; in any case, he has hastened to limit the scope of Richard's remark with the reservation that he means a being which is "created, or capable of being created, supremely perfect according to the essential order and unity of the universe." There is necessarily a summit of creaturely perfection which cannot be surpassed (14).

It might be argued that a creature of such perfection is not possible, owing to the infinite distance which must be acknowledged between the First Cause and the highest of His effects. Roger's reasoning against this is *a pari*, for, as there is a highest, so there is a lowest of entities and this lowest is prime matter. Anything less in entity than is prime matter would necessarily be either act or potency, principles which are themselves reducible to matter and form. This hypothetical entity could be neither: not act, for then act would be less perfect than the pure potency which is prime matter (15); not matter, since, as Aristotle has proved and his Commentator has explained, matter is not a predicamental entity (16). Saint Thomas was right to have said that, in its fashion, the universe cannot be improved by the insertion of a new, more perfect creature any more than a well-tuned musical instrument can be improved by tightening one string: the harmony of adjustment would be lost (17). In the same sense, Henry of Ghent had noted that it is not licit to assign to the series of increasingly excellent forms, source as they are of perfection, the infinite divisibility which is legitimately ascribed, not to form, but to matter. For matter grounds division exactly to the point that it is potential (18). To return to the more perfect end of the scale, Plato, impressed by the matchless beauty of the world, has inferred that it has been made according to the best of exemplars by the best of makers. The remarks of the *Timaeus* on the exemplar, indispensable source of beauty and of excellence in the creation of the world, are only the more convincing for the Christian, Dionysius for one, who identifies the Exemplar with God (19).
Roger’s second principal theme is the participation in Being Itself by creatures according to their diverse degrees of perfection (21). Our author tests the truth of this second question with a “first conclusion” which bears on the distance between the terms of the “mutation” from one contradictory to another and argues that not all pairs of contradictories are equidistant in comparison with others (22). Not all instances of created being are at the same distance from absolute non-being and thus the mutation from absolute non-being to the varied levels of creaturely reality does not always traverse equal distances. In the end, the variety of limited levels that characterizes creaturely participation in being grounds, as Augustine knew, this consequent: only God is supremely Being (23). Nor can Augustine’s remarks be restricted to “natural being”—it is clear that the being he had in mind is the absolute act of essence, as wide in application as any metaphysician could demand (24). There are many sorts of opposition—privation and possession, a positive contrary and its opposite—but, despite their differences in intensity, in the end, as the tradition that stems from Aristotle has it, every opposition is reducible to that of contradiction (25). If the distances were in all cases equal, the creative transition would be no more radical than any transition from one contradictory to its correlate. Duns Scotus has shown that creation is an instance of mutation according to contradiction: if all such transitions were conquests of equal distances, to take a chair would be evidence of a power equal to that of creation (26).

This whole analysis, responses with objections, would collapse if it could be shown that there is no distance at all between the terms of a mutation from one contradictory to another and there is one reason for thinking that such might be the case. If there be any distance at all between contradictories, then there must be a middle between them and this is opposed both to Aristotle and to his Commentator (27). Not only would the very distance be a middle, worse yet, because extended, that distance would be patient of infinite calibration (illa erit infinite modificata) and thus incommensurable with any other such distance (27).

But this, Roger claims, is an illusion. As one given instance of being exceeds another, so the imaginary non-being that corresponds to one exceeds the imaginary non-being that corresponds to the other, lesser, grade of being, for the purely negative can be quantified only in terms of its positive correlate. A good illustration of this is the way the privation of an item is known through an instance of its possession
and Saint Augustine, as a convert from Manichaeism ever conscious of the unreality of evil, has apposite texts to establish this (28). More, the non-being opposed to God is non-being in an infinitely more profound sense than are the nothings opposed to beings less than God.

From yet another point of view, it must be conceded that the potentiality conjoined to any other degree of non-being is less than that conjoined to the absolute non-being which creation alone can bridge: hence the mutation at stake in creation implies not only a maximum potentiality, but also, and necessarily, the maximum distance between the terms of the mutation. Henry of Ghent can testify on the various correlations of potentiality and actuality, can say to what point infinity can and cannot be verified in the case of creatures, can explain how infinity is verified of God (29). Roger is sure that in debating his own first principal question, he has established a useful first conclusion, namely, that creation is a mutation from a non-being, the simple nothingness of which does not preclude conjunction with infinite potentiality. For this conclusion has been shown to imply a complex antecedent that constitutes in itself a rich doctrinal position: creatures participate more or less in Being Itself; they are located at a greater or lesser distance from Being Itself; their corresponding, limited, non-being too lies at diverse distances from the absolute non-being which is the extreme opposed to Being Itself; not all contradictories face each other across equal distances, not all potentialities are of the same degree (30).

V

Our author's second principal theme is debated under the direction set by a second conclusion: this is that, like the distance between opposed terms, so the degree of contradiction between various pairs of contradictories is not always equal. Three lines of argument are invoked to demonstrate this crucial conclusion.

The first argument holds that the greater the distance to be traversed in a mutation from one contradictory to another, the greater, and this in proportion to the distance, is the incompatibility of the contradictory terms. Stated in the language of being and non-being, this means that unequal potentialities—the infinite potentiality conjoined to the non-being that precedes creation and the finite potentiality conjoined to the less profound non-being that precedes natural generation—bespeak unequal degrees of contradiction with respect to their actualizations (30).

Taken from a slightly different angle, the impossible excludes being in a more thorough way than does any instance of what, although in
fact non-being, remains possible with respect to being. Thus, the contradiction between impossible being and necessary being is incommensurable with that which obtains between any contingent being and its equally contingent, contradictory, non-being (31).

But Roger knows that here an opponent might interpose the objection that God, who is Necessary Being, does not have for the extreme opposed to Him by contradiction the non-being of impossibility; indeed, His contradictory encloses no inner contradiction. The non-being of the world before creation was an instance of non-being, to be sure, but, as the event has shown, one conjoined to unlimited possibility. Therefore, so the objection runs, the rule which states that the more necessary one extreme of a contradiction, the more impossible its opposite, is not valid (32). The actual non-being which prevailed before creation is not the contradictory of God’s Necessary Being; the totally impossible contradictory of the First Necessary Being is that expressed in the proposition God is not and this proposition includes the maximum contradiction (33). For philosophy, theology, and even infidel opinion, Roger remarks, are at one in asserting that, because God is Prime Being, the Prime Incomplex Truth, and the Prime Necessary Being, the truth of the statement God is flows with formal necessity from every instance of being or of truth posterior to the primal Being and Truth that He is.

An instance of necessary truth, posterior to the First, is the proposition: Man is or is not, a formulation we may be permitted to expand to: Either that man is, or that man is not, is necessarily true. The opposite of this proposition, contradictory and enclosing items which bespeak entitative contradiction, is contrived where the two members, man is, man is not, are associated by the copula and rather than by the disjunctive or: Man is and man is not. Expanded, Roger’s formula would read: That man is and that man is not are true at once. In the modest logical symbolization current in his time, Roger lets .a. represent the necessary truth: Man is or is not. This allows him to join philosophy, theology, and the metaphysically periphrastic infidel in recognizing this logical consequence: .a., therefore, God is—Man is or man is not is necessarily true, therefore, a fortiori, that God is must be true (34).

The formal consequence is clear when the pre-supposed ground of the argument is examined. This supposition is that an order obtains among necessary truths and that God is the absolutely Prime Incomplex Truth, necessarily prior to, and thus pre-supposed by, all posterior, complex, necessary truths. For, given the truth of .a., this formal consequence is valid: .a. is true, therefore, that God is must be true and
further, from the opposite of the consequent, there follows formally the opposite of the antecedent. From this Roger infers that, given the coherence of \( a \), therefore, \( God \ is \), the opposite of \( a \) is a contradiction (35) for it is ineluctably linked to that worst of contradictions, the proposition which states that the First Necessary Being in fact does not exist at all, namely, \( God \ is \ not \), a contradiction in its own right and one that includes formally every imaginable contradiction (36).

Roger’s second argument is equally formal: impossible being and inner contradiction are inseparable; since the proposition \( God \ is \ not \) asserts what is impossible, it encloses contradiction. Here he changes the reference of the symbol \( a \) and employs it to represent a hypothetical impossible of which it is postulated for the sake of argument that it does not include contradiction. But, he reasons, a thus-understood \( a \) is inadmissible: it neither does exist nor can it exist since, assuming that \( a \) is in fact an absolute impossible, it is clear that to posit \( a \) as existing would be to make simultaneously the following incompatible assertions: \( a \) is, \( a \ is \ not \), \( a \ cannot \ be \); all three would follow with equal necessity (37).

A third argument purports to prove that from every instance of necessity in being and from every contradiction, the proposition \( God \ is \) follows with necessity and, its correlate, the proposition \( God \ is \ not \) encloses inner contradiction. As for the validity of inferring the existence of God from posterior necessary truths, our author excuses himself presently (39) from pursuing this consideration any farther: the point is clear from the suppositions already made and defended (34, 35). As for the second, he has but to align with the truisms of the logic of consequences the correlations he has already established: a necessary consequence is no less necessary than is its formal antecedent, an impossible consequent is no less impossible than is its formal antecedent. The assertion \( God \ is \) counts as a formal consequent from every instance of necessity in being and the same assertion is supported by an analysis of the impossibility with respect to being that burdens every contradiction. In short, there can be no instance of necessary being which does not enclose virtually the ultimate instance of Necessary Being which is its ground nor can there be any contradictory proposition not virtually enclosed in that worst of contradictions, the proposition \( God \ is \ not \) (38).

This whole deduction depends for its evidence on the demonstration of the double antecedent, namely, that the proposition \( God \ is \) follows from every instance of necessity in being and that the truth of the same proposition can be derived from every instance of contradiction.
Roger's last responsibility is to show that the second of these gambits is valid since the first of them needs no further discussion.

Here the symbols \( a \) and \( b \) are utilized to represent two mutually exclusive items, such that their simultaneous presence in a proposition would render it a contradiction. To provide himself with such a contradiction, Roger has gone to the enemy: an atheist logician must be willing to accept responsibility for the proposition: \( \text{That 'God is not' is free from contradiction} \). Since his adversary is a logician as well as an atheist, Roger feels free to restate the proposition in the proposed symbols and in the form of an antecedent with its consequent: \( \text{God is not, therefore, } a \text{ is not } b \). But if the atheist had been so unwary as to concede this apparently harmless restatement of his own position, he would have put a lethal weapon into Roger's hand for our author, exercising a logician's right to explore the implications of what an opponent says, posits the opposite of the consequent he has contrived for his adversary. The consequent now reads: \( .a \text{ is } .b \) and this, given the value of the two symbols, constitutes a contradiction. Now, as every logician knows, from the opposite of a consequent, there follows necessarily the opposite of the antecedent. Since the atheist's antecedent was \( \text{God is not} \), Roger can infer triumphantly and, as he had promised, "from a contradiction," the opposite of that antecedent; therefore, he concludes, \( \text{God is (39)} \). It cannot be denied that this reasoning reveals an extreme confidence in the ultimate validity of the most formal logical principles, a conviction that ran in the 14th century, to be sure, but one that Saint Augustine had more than suggested in the 4th.\(^8\)

No doubt the putative atheist would protest at this cavalier treatment of his thesis; Roger might well retort that, having swallowed the camel of contradiction by asserting that the First, the Necessary, Being is not, his adversary has small cause to strain out the gnat, \( a \text{ is } b \). In any case, our tyro theologian had undertaken to infer the existence of God from an instance of contradiction and, to his own satisfaction, this is what he has done. Faith could hardly ask more of dialectics.

\(^8\) De doctrina christiana 2, 32, 50, PL 34, 58, 59: Ipsi tamen veritas connexionum non instituta, sed animadversa est ab hominibus et notata, ut eam possint vel discere vel docere; nam est in rerum ratione perpetua et divinitus instituta. Sicut enim qui narrat ordinem temporum, non cum ipse componit; et locorum situs, aut naturas animalium vel stirpium vel lapidum qui ostendit, non res ostendit ab hominibus institutas; et ille qui demonstrat sidera coruneque motus, non a se vel ab homine aliquo rem institutam demonstrat: sic etiam qui dicit, Cum falsum est quod consequitur, necesse est ut falsum sit quod praecedit; verissime dicit, neque ipse facit ut ita sit, sed tantum ita esse demonstrat.
INTROITUS EJSDEM AD "SENTENTIAS,"
SCILICET, ROGERI NOTINKAM, FRATRIS

<U>trum ordo naturalis universi perfecte fluat ab unitate sui principii?

I

1 Et arguo quod non: quia, cum fluxus creaturae in esse existentiae a suo principio sit per mutationem vel productionem de non esse ad esse, cum ipsum productum per talem mutationem non fluxit de non esse simpliciter et absolute, sine admixta potentialitate, sed potius fluxit de non esse ut conjuncto potentialitati respectu producendi, sequitur quod esse, taliter productum a primo principio, producitur de non esse infinitiae conjuncto potentialitati; consequens falsum et consequentia videtur nota.

2 Probo ergo assumptum primum: quod, videlicet, in omní mutatione de simpliciter non esse ad esse, conjuncta sit potentialitas infinita cum termino a quo, scilicet, cum ipso non esse. Et ex illius conclusione volo ulterius inferre quod universus, jam creatus, tantam de facie3 habet unitatem quod supra speciem supremam jam creatam non est alia species creabils quae aliqou modo cum universo jam creato possit habere coordinationem et unitatem.

3 Ad primam conclusionem arguo et suppono4 primo quod omnia entia non3 aequalem habent ac(a/b)tualitatem. Haec suppositio patet per hoc quod, quia deus solus est summe ens et summe actualis, ut patet per Augustinum 2 De libero arbitrio, c. 334 et 12 De civitate dei, c. 55 et creatura solum per participationem recipit actualitatem sicut creatura recipit diversos gradus et diversas dignitates essendi, ut patet per Augustinum, uti supra, et per Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 56 ita etiam diversas recipit actualitates.

4 Ideo, hoc supposito, capio per imaginationem totam multitudinem actualitatum possibilem, citra actualitatem praeae causae, et arguo sic: illa latitudo actualitatis quam tantam de facie MS; for identical formula, cf. infra, par. 8.

2 marg. conclusio prima. suppositio.
3 om. MS; added by second hand.
4 De libero arbitrio 2, 15, 39, PL 32, 1262: ...si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil eset superius ... Est enim Deus, et vere summeque est.

5 De civitate dei 12, 5, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Turnhout, 1955) 48, 359: Deus, qui summe est atque ob hoc ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est (quia neque illi aequalis esse debet, quae de nihil facta esset, neque ullo modo esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset), nec ullorum vitiorum offensione vituperandus et omnium naturarum consideratione laudandum est.

6 Ibid. Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam sunt et ideo habent modum suum, speciem suam et quandam secum pacem suam, profection bonae sunt; et cum ibi sunt, ubi esse per naturae ordinem debet, quantum acciperunt, suum esse custodiunt ...; De divinis nominibus 5, (tr. John Erigena), PL 122, 1147 D-1148 A: ...Si autem et sunt divini animi super reliqua existentia, et vivunt super alia viventia, et intelligunt, et cognoscunt super sensum et rationem, et ultra omnia existentia bonum et optimum appetunt et participant, ipsi magis sunt circa optimum, abundantius ipsius participantes, et plures et majores ex eo donationes accipientes.
tatis est infinita et continet gradus actualitatis infinitos, intensiores et remissiores, secundum coordinationem imaginariam; ergo, infinita est potentialitas ad aliquem gradum actualitatis in latitudine data; cum, igitur, potentialitas, conjuncta cum non esse, in mutatione ad esse quodcumque, sit in nulla proportione major quam sit potentialitas ad aliquem gradum imaginarii latitudinis datae, sequitur quod potentialitas, conjuncta cum simpliciter non esse, sic infinita in mutatione ad esse, sit simpliciter infinita: quod fuit probanda.

5 Secundo ad idem arguo sic: si potentialitas, conjuncta cum simpliciter non esse rei, in mutatione ad esse certum de non esse, non sit infinita, igitur non infinites majoris virtutis foret reductio vel activa mutatio de potentialitate conjuncta cum non esse simpliciter ad esse quam de potentialitate conjuncta cum aliquo esse ad aliquem terminum positivum alterius mutationis et, per consequens, in causa, tanta virtus requiritur in agente naturali, ex parte ipsius agentis, ad suum naturaliter agere vel de aliquo praecurrente producere, sicut aliquid de nihilc creare; consequens falsum, quia tunc, non solus dei foret potentia creativa vel virtus, quod manifeste videtur contra Augustinum, libro 2 Contra Julianum et Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum libri 210 et 3 De trinitate, c. 911 et 1012 et De fide ad Petrum, c. 5: "In hoc," inquit, "cognosceur deus omnipotens: quod creaturam de nihilc facit."22

6 Confirma argumentum per hoc quod, quia Deus est summum essentia et summe esse, ideo inest sibi actualitas infinita; igitur, eadem ratione, in alio extremo, scilicet, simpliciter non esse, cum quo tamen non repugnaret stare potentialitatem conjunctam, erit potentialitas infinita: quod est probandum.

7 Praeterea, capto aliquo absoluto remotissimo vel infimo jam creato, puta, esse prima materiae, quae videtur habere minimam entitatem possibilem secundum doctores, saltem in genere substantiae sicut alias probabatur, si, per imaginationem, deus sub infimo jam creato faceret aliud quod duplo minus haberet de esse quam illa materia prima, et aliud quadruplo minus, et sic in infinitum, tunc, sub quocumque gradu actualitatis essendi, foret potentialitas realis infinita. Sed, de facto, sub nullo gradu actualitatis essendi est modo minor potentialitas quam tunc foret; igitur, de facto inter omnem22 gradum23 actualam essendi et suum purum non esse

---

7 marg. 2.
8 om. MS; marg. sicut.
9 Contra Julianum Pelagianum 2, 4, 8, PL 44, 678: Ergo et ex Deo, quia creat; et ex homine quia generat; cf. ibid., 692, 694.
10 Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum libri duo, PL 42, 603: Non enim soli Manichaei ... sed et Marcionistae, et alii nonnulli ... Iste ... detestatur Deum mundi fabricatorem.
11 De trinitate 3, 9, PL 42, 877: Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo causarum cardine condere atque administrare creaturam, quod qui facit, solus creator est Deus ...
12 De trinitate 9, 18, PL 42, 878: Sed non est creator, nisi qui principaliter ista format. Nec quisquam hoc potest nisi ille penes quem primitus sunt omnia quae sunt mensurae, numeri, et pondera; et ipse est unus creator Deus ...
13 Liber de fide ad Petrum (ps. Augustinus, Fulgentius de Ruspe) 3, 25, PL 40, 761: Principaliter itaque tene, omnem naturam quae non est Trinitas Deus, ab ipsa sancta Trinitate quae solus verus et aeternus Deus est, creatam ex nihilc ... Hic Deus qui sine initio semper est, quia summe est, dedit rebus a se creatis ut sint ... in eo vero ejus omnipotentia intelligitur, quia omnem creaturam ... de nihilc fecit.
14 marg. conf.
15 om. MS; marg. omnem
16 om. MS; what appears to be abbreviation for “dum” em. to: gradum.
est potentialitas infinita, quam potentialitatem dico conjunctam cum suo non esse; unde et illam potentialitatem dicit sanctus Thomas esse distantiam infinitam quaestionibus suis De potentia, q. 4,17 et Bonaventura, 2 Sententiæum, d. 3, q. 2.18

Item, Gandaviensis, 4 Quodlibeto, q. 3, ubi dicit quod productio ex nihilno omnino est opus potentiae infinitae quia inter omnino nihil et ens in actu est distantia infinita quam non potest absolvere nisi potentia infinita.19 Item, Lincolniensis in Commento super Dionysium, De divinis nominibus, c. 8, particulo 2,20 ex quo sequitur conclusio principaliter probanda.

8 Et ex illa conclusione arguo secundam conclusionem,21 scilicet, quod universus, jam creatus, tantam de facto habet unitatem quod non supra quamlibet speciem creabilem speciem superiorem creari et cum ordine universi in unitatem ordinis perfectionisque concurrere est possibile.

9 Istam conclusionem arguo sic: et suppono praecedentem, videlicet, quod in omni mutatione de non esse etc., quo supposito, arguo sic: nulla potentialitas conjuncta cum aliquo termino mutationis est infinita praeter illam quae conjungitur cum simpliciter non esse in mutatione ad esse; igitur, tota potentialitas dependenda in acquisitione actualitatis nobilioris et nobilioris, cum illa non sit infinita, deperdetur per acquisitionem actualitas finita solum; non igitur ertipossibilis accessus ad actualitatem nobiliorum et nobiliorum, et sic sine statu, immo, necessario stabitur ad aliquam perfectionem et actualitatem ubi tota potentialitas (58b⁹/59a) terminabitur et ertiposse completa ultima suprema perfectionis universi: quod volui probare.

10 Quod autem, deperdit potentialitatem infinita per mutationem de simpliciter non esse ad esse, solum restat potentialitas finita dependenda ut universus perficitur suprema specie possibili, arguo ex hoc: quia alter latitudo potentialitatis versus utrumque extremum foret simpliciter infinita, quod non capiti imaginatio de aliqua latitudine ubi sunt gradus intensiones et remissiones imaginales.

11 Nec potest dici quod, licet potentialitas conjuncta cum esse rei sit finita solum, ipsa tamen imaginario coextenditur actualibus infinitis specie determinatis secundum ordinem possiibile vel imaginaria et sic minori potentialitati et minori continuo correspondet major et major actualitas e, per consequens, in infinitum

17 De potentia q. 3, 2, 4, Opera omnia (Paris, 1875) XIII, 45: Sed contra, ens et non ens in infinitum distant. Sed operari aliquid ex distantia infinita est infinitae virtutis. Ergo creare est infinitae virtutis; et ertip non potest alci creaturae communicari.

18 Comm. in II lib. Sent., d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, Opera omnia (Quaracchi, 1885) II, 28, 29: Item, impossibile est creaturam agere per potentiam infinitam; sed inter omnino nihil et aliquid est distantia infinita: ergo non potest reduci nisi ad agente virtutis infinitae; tale autem est scius Deus: ergo etc.

19 Summae quaestionum ordinario, a. 35, q. 6 (Paris, 1520) I, fol. 226°H: Cum igitur in infinitum plus distet potestia qua aliquid est productibile ex nihilno, a quacumque potestia qua aliquid productibile est ex alioquo, oportet quod potestia qua elicitur actus producendi aliquid ex nihilno, in infinitum sit maior in vigore quacumque potestia finita elicienre actum producendi aliquid ex alioquo.

20 In Dionysii de divinis nominibus, cap. 8, part. 2, MS B. N. lat. 1620, fol. 49° a; words of the Dionysian text embedded in that of the commentary are given in italics: Attribuimus ei definitam potentiam non solum in adducente a non esse, videlicet, in esse omnem virtutem a pure enim nihilno adducere in aliquid, cum omne aliquid in infinitum excedit pure nihil, est infinitae potentiae.

21 marg. 2. conclusio.
erit possibilis processus in imaginaria actualitate et perfectione universi, uti prius supra.\textsuperscript{22}

12 Contra istam responsionem arguo sic\textsuperscript{23} et capio infimum vel minimum esse universi, puta, illud quod habet minimam entitatem et majorem potentialitatem de toto universo, et ponitur materia prima, ut prius dictum est,\textsuperscript{24} et sit \textit{a}. Tunc arguo sic: ex prima conclusione et uno argumento facto per mutationem de simpliciter non esse ad esse ipsius \textit{a}, deperdita est latitudo potentialitatis infinita et solum finita potentialitas relinquitur dependerenda; igitur, cum tanta vel major actualitas conjuncta sit vel insit primo simpliciter esse, quod est esse praeae causae, quanta potentialitas conjuncta est cum simpliciter non esse. Sequitur quod, sicut cum esse \textit{a} et supra solum remanet, in ordine dato, potentialitas finita dependerenda, etiam ratione formari, inter esse praeae causae in ordine ad \textit{a}, solum erit actualitas finita dependerenda et, converso ordine, acquirienda; et sequitur conclusio principaliter probanda.

13 Praeterea,\textsuperscript{25} si in universitate creaturarum nulla foret creatura summae nobilitatis possibilitis de ordine universi, sequeretur quod universus careret aliquam perfectione essentiali sibi naturaliter debita ad complementum suae perfectionis; consequens falsum et consequentia patet per Richardum, \textit{4 De trinitate}, capiteultimo, "quod," inquit, "est in operatione humana corporis effigies sine capite, hoc," inquit, "esse videtur in operatione divina universitas fabricata sine optimae genere creaturae."\textsuperscript{26}

14 Praeterea,\textsuperscript{27} si non est dari summe perfectum: creatum vel creabile, secundum essentialem ordinem et unitatem universi, hoc maxime videretur propter infinitam distantiam praeae causae ad quodcumque tale creabile. Sed istud non cogit quia ex codem argueretur quod sub quilibet esse posset aliquid minus esse in ordine essentiali in infinitum propter infinitatem distantiae inter quodcumque esse et simpliciter non esse.

15 Sed istud consequens videtur falsum, quod probo sic: quia, si infra materiam primam posset creari in essentia ordine alia minor entitas quam sit prima materia, talis entitas vel esset actus vel potentia; sed neutrum potest poni quia, cum actus et potentia reducantur ad formam et materiam, ut patet ex 11 \textit{Metaphysicae}, c. 6,\textsuperscript{28} sequeretur quod, si talis inferior et entitas foret actus, foret minus nobilis quam potentia, quod est contra Philosophum, 9 \textit{Metaphysicae}, 15;\textsuperscript{29} sequeretur etiam quod actus perfectibilis <eset>\textsuperscript{30} per potentiam et forma per materiam, contra Philosophum quasi per totam philosophiam.

16 Et ex codem arguo quod talis entitas non potest dici potentia quia tunc materia, respectu illius, esset actus, quod est contra Philosophum, 7 \textit{Metaphysicae},

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{v. supra}, par. 4.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{marg. 1}.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{v. supra}, par. 7.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{marg. 2}.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{De trinitate} 4, 25, PL 196, 948 A.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{marg. 3}.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Meta.}, 11, 2; 1060a 19-21.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Meta.}, 9, 8; 1049b 17-1050a 10; the 15 cited by Roger refers to the \textit{textus communis} at stake; cf. the remarks of Averroes on this passage (Venice, apud Juntas, 1562-1575), VIII, fol. 241°C ff.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{om. MS}.
textu commenti 8: "Dico," inquit, "quod materia quae, secundum se nec quid, nec quantum, nec ad aliquid dicitur, quomodo est, est determinata, quare, "inquit, "quod est ultimum secundum se, nec quid, nec quantum, nec aliquid aliud est;" ubi etiam dicit Commentator quod materia non est aliquod entium praedicamentorum.\textsuperscript{31}

17 Item, pro illa conclusione videtur esse sanctus Thomas, prima pars \textit{Summae}, q. 25, articulo 6, ubi tenet quod universus, propter determinatum ordinem ad Deo sibi tributum, non potest esse melius quam sit; unde dicit quod, si aliqua pars universi sic melioraretur, corrumpetur proportio ordinis, sicut dicit, si una plus debito extendetetur, corrumpetur consonantia;\textsuperscript{32} haec ille.

18 Item, pro cadem conclusione videtur esse Gandaviensis, \textit{Quodlibeto} 5, q. 3, ubi quaerit utrum infinitas idearum sit in Deo. Dicit quod non videtur sibi, licet inter (a/b) deum et supremam creaturam sit distantia infinita, quia tamen augmentum in perfectione se habet per modum appositionis ad formam, eo quod perfectio est a forma et processus in infinitum non potest esse per appositionem ex parte formae licet possit esse in infinitum divisio ex parte materiae in quantum potentia, ut patet 3 \textit{Physicorum}, capitulo de infinito; ideo videtur sibi quod in augmento perfectionis necessario erit status.\textsuperscript{33} Sed hoc maxime videtur rationale in suprema causa universi; ergo propositum.

19 Item, pro conclusione videtur esse Plato in \textit{Timaeo}, libro 7, capitulo ubi per hoc arguit creatorem optimum quia mundus tam mirabili pulchritudine est constitutus, quod non potuerit habere extra deum exemplar "elaboratum"; unde, sicut dicit, quia "mundus incomparabili pulchritudine" constitutus, et est "opifex... ejus optimus, perspicuum est quod, juxta sincerae atque immutabiles proprietatis exemplum mundi sit instituta molitio," adeo "quod nec cogitari nec mente concipi" potest ipsum constitut "ad elaboratum" seu factum exemplum.\textsuperscript{34} Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius: optimum fuerit optimum effluere.\textsuperscript{35}

20 Item, pro conclusione videtur esse Rufus, 1 \textit{Sententiarum}, d. 44, q. 2;\textsuperscript{36} ex quibus omnibus videtur sequi conclusio intenta.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Meta.}, 7, 3; 1029a 10-32; Averroes, \textit{loc. cit.}, fol. 158*G-I, for text of Aristotle, fol. 159*D-159*G for his commentary cited here by Roger.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{ST} I, 25, 6, ad 3: Dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse melius, propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo... sicut, si una chorda plus debito intenderetur, corrumpetur citharae melodiam.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Quodlibetum} 5, q. 3, (Paris, 1518) I, fol. 155*R: ... processus ille secundum gradus perfectionis, secundum magis et minus imitando divinam perfectionem in infinitum est per additionem ad formam: quia omnis perfectio est a forma. Et ita gradus superior in imitando est a forma perfectiori. Si ergo processus ille possibilia esset progresi in infinitum in forma: ergo per appositionem procedere potest augmentum simpliciter et absolute in infinitum. sicut et divisio in quantitate secundum materiam per divisionem procedere potest in infinitum. quod plane est contra determinationem Philosophi .iii. \textit{Physicorum}. cap. de infinito, ubi plane dicit quod infinitum potentia est sicut materia; the text of Aristotle cited by Henry is \textit{Physics}, 3, 4; 202b 30, to the end of book 3.


\textsuperscript{35} \textit{De divinis nominibus}, c. 4 (Erigena version), PL 122, 1183 A; Hoc unum optimum et bonum singulariter est omnium multorum honorum et optimorum causale.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{In 1 sent.}, d. 44, q. b, MS Balliol 62, column 371, 11. 32-43: Sed aix: Pulchrior esset
II

21 Secundo quaeitur: 37 Si ordo naturalis universi perfecte etc., igitur, cum primum principium tantum sit ens quod habet esse per essentiam, a quo cetera habent esse per participationem, ut dici Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 5, omnia, inquit, quae sunt, participatione essendi sunt, 38 et Boethius, De hebdomadibus, "Omne quod est participat eo quod est esse," 39 sequitur quod ipsum esse, secundum diversos gradus essendi creaturae, foret magis et minus participatum, secundum quod tenet Doctor Solemnis, 31, q. 3, in fine. 40

22 Sed, quod illud consequens sit falsum arguo quia, posito consequente, sequuntur duae conclusiones: prima, quod <non> 41 in omni mutatione de contradictorio in contradictorium foret aequalis distantia terminorum et ex illa sequitur quod non inter omnia contradictoria aequalis sit contradictio.

23 Prima conclusio probatur sic: 42 non quaecumque esse creat aequaliter distant a non esse simpliciter; igitur, cum ad omne esse creati sit possibilis mutatio de non esse simpliciter, et omnis talis mutatio est de contradictorio in contradictorium, sequitur quod non in omni mutatione de contradictorio in contradictorium sit etc. Ista consequentia videtur nota et major patet per Augustinum, 12 De civitate dei, c. 2, cum inquit: "Deus summam essentia sit, hoc est summe sit... rebus, quas de nihilone creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse..." licet "aliiis dedit esse amplius, aliiis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit" 43 et ibidem infra, c. 5; 44 et, per consequens, non quaecumque esse aequaliter distant a non esse simpliciter.

24 Nec potest hic dici quod Augustinus velit hic locui de esse naturali, non secundum quod esse est actus absolutus essentiae; dicit enim convenienter ubi status totius universi sine peccato quam cum peccato. Non, quia quicquid tu deturpas per culpam, Deus reformat per justam poenam... et est pulchritudo universae creaturae per hacc tria inculpabilis: damnationem peccatorum, excitationem justorum, perfectionem beatorum.

37 marg. 2. principalis.
38 v. supra, note 6.
39 De hebdomadibus, no. 6, PL 64, 1311 C.
40 Quodibetum 5, q. 3, ed. cit., I, folis. 157*F-158*G: ... Ipsa autem divina essentia, quia non est nisi purum esse, ratio est omnium cognoscibilibum quae esse participant: non tantum quod rationem communis essentiae, sed quod rationem eorum quae sunt minima in ipsis, quibus differunt ab invicem. Nec restat igitur apud intellectum divinum sive sint entia actu sive non: sive simul possibilia existere sive non: dum tamen esse sui sint aliquo modo participabilia.
41 om. MS; non has been a stone of stumbling for the scribe in three places where a mediaeval hand, his own or another's, has made the necessary emendation, par. 3, note 3, par. 28, note 56, par. 30, note 61; the corrector has missed the present passage where the necessity of non for coherence is supported by the same formula, correctly stated in the following par. 23: ... sequitur quod non in omni mutatione de contradictorio in contradictorium sit etc.
42 marg. conclusio prima.
43 De civitate dei 12, 2, ed. cit., 48, 357: Cum enim Deus summam essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex aihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliiis dedit esse amplius, aliiis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit.
44 v. supra, par. 3, note 5.
asseritur explanando quod, sicut "sapere" ad "sapientiam," ita "esse" absolute, scilicet, ad "essentiam." Et quod ad omne esse creatum sit possibilis mutatio de non esse simpliciter patet ex se, et ex hoc quod illud est esse creatum et, per consequens, per mutationem de non esse simpliciter.

25 Praeterea, ad eandem conclusionem arguo sic: in omni genere oppositionis contingit fieri mutationem de contradictorio in contradictorium; sed non omnium talium mutationum est aequalis distantiæ; igitur, etc. Consequentia est per se nota et antecedens arguo quia, data quamque oppositione, sive privationis ad habitum, sive contrariorum positivorum quorumcunque, subducta omni mutatione de non esse ad esse, nulla foret secundum illam speciem mutatio. Unde Philosophus, 10 Metaphysicae, Commento 15, dicit quod oppositionis privationis ad habitum est quodam modo contradictio propter affirmationem et negationem quam includit, ubi etiam ostendit quod opposita contradictorie opponuntur secundum habitum et privationem et, per consequens, in cujuscumque oppositionis mutatione, includitur mutatio secundum contradictionem.

26 Sed quod non omnium talium mutationum sit aequalis distantiæ terminorum, arguo sic: quia, cum creatio sit quaedam mutatione secundum contradictionem, ut probat Doctor Subtilis, libro 2, d. 1, q. 4, sequitur quod non majoris distantiæ foret inter terminos creationis quam cujuscumque alterius mutationis. Consequentia falsum, quia sic sequeretur quod non majoris virtutis vel potentiae simpliciter foret virtus creativa ut sic quam virtus quaecumque creata naturaliter generativa ut sic, quod videtur (59v°b/59v°a) inconveniens. Sic enim videtur esse concedendum quod non majoris virtutis foret facere de simpliciter non ente esse quam de non sedente sedentem, et, per consequens, non in omni mutatione de contradictorio etc.

27 Sed forte diceretur quod inter terminos mutationis contradictio nullæ est distantiæ omnino; probò, quia tunc inter contradictoria possit dari medium sicut inter opposita contrarie vel privative, quod est contra Philosophum et Commentatorem superius allegatos. Secundo, quia quilibet recessus ab uno extremorum contradictio ponit reliquum necessario et, per consequens, si sit ibi distantiæ, illa erit infinite modificata et, per consequens, nullius proportionalis comparationis ad aliquam aliam.

28 Contra: quantum est aliquod esse, tantum est ejus contradictorium non esse, saltem, quantum aliquod esse excedit aliquod aliud esse quodcumque determinatum, tantum aliquod non esse imaginarii exceedit aliquod aliud non esse. Non enim videtur quomodo pure negativa possit quantificari nisi per suum positivam affirmationem contradictoriam, ut privatio per habitum, sicut dicit Augustinus,
De civitate dei, 8\textsuperscript{55} et 3 Super Genesim, c. 8.\textsuperscript{53} Sed aliquod est infinitum esse quod etiam infinite excedit quodcumque aliud esse, puta, divinum esse, per rationem Augustini, 5 De trinitate, c. 13, probanterm quod deus essentialiter est quidquid est,\textsuperscript{54} et 12 De civitate, c. 2;\textsuperscript{56} igitur, erit aliquod non esse imaginarium, scilicet, non esse dei, quod est infinite magis non esse quam quocumque aliud non esse. Sed, quantum aliquod esse et non esse excedit aliud esse vel non esse, tanto magis distat ab opposito termino; igitur, non\textsuperscript{56} omnis contradictonis est aequalis distantia terminorum.

29 Praeterea,\textsuperscript{57} cum nullo termino alicujus mutationis per contradictonem conjunctur, tanta potentialitas sicut cum simpliciter non esse cum in mutatione ad esse, quae mutatio solum est in creatione; igitur, quaelibet alia mutationi minorem includit potentialitatem; igitur, et majorem distantiam terminorum. Consequentia patet quia, quanto est major potentialitas, tanto est major approximatio ad actualitatem, ut tenet Doctor Solemnis, uti supra,\textsuperscript{58} et, per consequens, major distantia terminorum. Totum antecedens patet ex prima conclusione primi principalis; igitur, etc.

30 Unde, ex illa conclusione videtur sequi secunda conclusio\textsuperscript{59} secundii principalis, videlicet, quod non inter omnia contradictoria aequalis sit contradictio. Haec primo probatur quia, quanto termini mutationis de contradictorio in contradictorio magis distant, tanto magis videntur repugnare secundum proportionem suae distantiae; igitur, erit major contradictio ipsi duobus\textsuperscript{60} esse proportionatis respectu quorum inaequaliter sunt potentialitates in carum mutationibus de esse ipsorum ad sua non esse.\textsuperscript{61} Inaequaliter sunt contradictiones, sed talia duo esse sunt possibiliter et de facto sunt in mutationibus creationes et generationes naturalis; igitur, non inter omnia contradictoria est aequalis contradictio. Illa consequentia est bona et antecedens probatur esse verum ex praemissis; igitur et conclusio.

31 Praeterea,\textsuperscript{62} ad conclusionem arguitur sic: quanto aliquod non esse quod est purum non esse plus privat esse, tanto majorem habet contradictionem ad esse;

\textsuperscript{52} De civitate 12, 8, ed. cit. 48, 362, 365 and, a more exact statement, ibid., 7, 362: Ea quippe quae non in specie, sed in eius privatione sciuntur, si dici aut intelligi potest, quodam modo nesciuntur, ut sint nesciantur.

\textsuperscript{53} De Genesi contra Manichaeos, cap. 4, 7, vers. 3, PL 34, 176, 177: Quia ubi lux non est, tenebrae sunt, non quia alicui sunt tenebrae, sed ipsa lucis abscondia tenebrae dicuntur. Sicut silentium non aliqua res est, sed ubi sonus non est, silentium dicitur. Et nudatas aliqua res non est, sed in corpore ubi tegumentum non est, nuditas dicitur. Et inanitas non est aliquid, sed locus ubi corpus non est, inanis dicitur.

\textsuperscript{54} De trinitate 5, 2, 3, PL 42, 912: ...aliae quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae, cipient accidentia, quibus in eius fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio: Deo autem aliquam ejusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime et verissime competit.

\textsuperscript{55} v. supra, par. 23, note 43.

\textsuperscript{56} scribal correction; v. supra, note 41.

\textsuperscript{57} marg. 2.

\textsuperscript{58} v. supra, note 19.

\textsuperscript{59} marg. 2. conclusio.

\textsuperscript{60} marg. 2.

\textsuperscript{61} scribal correction of original reading: de non esse ipsorum ad sua esse.

\textsuperscript{62} marg. 3.
sed quolibet imposibile esse est\textsuperscript{63} hujusmodi non esse quod plus privat esse quam aliquid non esse quod non est imposibile esse; igitur, est major contradictio inter non esse quod est imposibile esse et esse quod est contradictorium illius, quam inter alium non esse quodcumque quod non est imposibile esse et esse quod est contradictorium illius. Captis, igitur, duobus contradictoriiis contingentibus et alii duobus contradictoriiis quorum unum sit necesse esse et reliquum imposibile esse, sequitur quod illae duae oppositiones non aequalis includunt contradictionem. Consequentia patet per hoc, quod unum istorum oppositorum essentia includunt impossibile esse et reliquum istorum oppositorum non solum compositur possibilitatem essendi sui oppositi et reliquum istorum oppositori solum compositur possibilitatem essendi sui oppositi, sed utrumque ad alternum\textsuperscript{64} permittit potentialitatem; igitur, illae oppositiones non aequales includunt contradictiones.

32 Sed forte posset hic dici quod\textsuperscript{65} non semper istorum oppositorum quorum alterum extremum est magis necessario esse, reliquum extremum est magis imposibile esse;\textsuperscript{66} videtur enim quod suprema species impotens sit includere contradictionem, et constat quod deum esse est summe necesse esse, cujus tamen contradictorium, ut dicit opinio, non claudit contradictionem et, per consequens, non semper majori esse correspondet contradictio majoris non esse.

33 Sed contra istam responsionem\textsuperscript{67} (a/b) arguo et probo quod deum non esse non solum includit contradictionem, sed quod majorem includit contradictionem quam sit alia contradictio quae non includit ipsam.\textsuperscript{68}

34 Ad probationem hujus conclusionis suppono primo quod, quia deus est primum ens et primum verum incomplexum et primum necesse esse, sicut tam philosophia quam theologa quam etiam omnis infidelium secta testat, ideo ex quolibet posteriori sequitur formaliter primum est primum et primum necesse esse. Quo posito, capio aliquid necesse esse quod non est primum, puta, istud: homo est vel non est, quacumque ita apud intellectum determinata, illud est necesse esse quia immediatur a primo principio, ut patet ex 4\textsuperscript{a} Metaphysicae, textu 5: "De quolibet affirmativo etc."\textsuperscript{69} Hujus igitur oppositum est copulativa facta\textsuperscript{70} ex contradictoriiis: homo est et non est, quod claudit contradictionem; sit igitur illud necesse esse \textit{a}.\textsuperscript{71} et arguo sic: \textit{a}. est; igitur, \textit{deus} est.

35 Consequentia patet ex supposizione; sequitur enim formaliter hoc: \textit{a}. est; igitur, \textit{a}. non est primum quia, ex suppositione, deus est primum verum incomplexum et, per consequens, ejus esse praesupponitur ad \textit{a}. esse. Ex quo arguo: haec est formalis consequentia: \textit{a}. est; igitur, \textit{deus} est; ergo, ex opposito consequentis formaliter sequitur oppositum antecedentis; igitur, formaliter sequitur antecedens \textit{deus} est; igitur, oppositum \textit{a}. est et, per consequens, contradictio est et ultra, cum in omni consequentia bona formalis, conclusio est de intellectu antecedentis, eo quod antecedens includit suum consequens, sicut patet 2 Topicorum 12\textsuperscript{72} et primo Posteriorum

\textsuperscript{63} om. MS; marg. est.
\textsuperscript{64} om. MS; marg. ad alternum.
\textsuperscript{65} marg. Responsio.
\textsuperscript{66} marg. Nota.
\textsuperscript{67} marg. contra responsionem.
\textsuperscript{68} marg. conclusio n(osando).
\textsuperscript{69} Meta., 4, 4; 1007b 30 ff.
\textsuperscript{70} scribal correction of original reading: facta copulativa.
\textsuperscript{71} marg. fo ... illegible.
\textsuperscript{72} Topica 2, 4; 111a 23 ff.
THE "INTROITUS AD SENTENTIAS"

13. Sequitur quod deum non esse formaliter includit oppositum .a., quod est contradictio.

36 Et per idem arguo quod includit omnem aliam contradicitionem et, per consequens, deum non esse non solum unicum tantum contradicitionem sed includit omnem imaginariam contradicitionem. Et ita sequitur quod deum non esse majorem includit contradicitionem quam aliquod aliud quod deum non esse non includit, quod est probandum.

37 Item, secundo sic: et probo quod deum non esse claudit contradicitionem: deum non esse est impossibile; igitur, claudit contradicitionem. Consequentiam arguo quia quodlibet impossibile formaliter includit contradicitionem quia, si non, detur .a. impossibile quod non includit contradicitionem, et arguo sic: quia sequitur formaliter: .a. est impossibile; igitur, .a. includit repugnantiam tam ad esse quam ad posse esse, quia formaliter sequitur: .a. est impossibile; igitur nec .a. est nec posse esse. Pono enim quod .a. sit unum absolute impossibile et, si sic, igitur .a. includit repugnantiam tam ad esse quam ad posse esse; igitur, ex positione .a. in esse, formaliter sequitur: .a. esse et .a. non esse nec posse esse; igitur, posito .a. in esse, formaliter sequitur contradictio.

38 Tertio sic: ex omni necesse esse sequitur deum esse et ex omni contradicitione sequitur deum esse; igitur, deum non esse claudit contradicitionem. Consequentia arguitur sic: quia nullum consequens est minus necessarium quam suum antecedens formale necessarium, si antecedens sit necessarium, nec aliquod consequens est minus necessarium quam sit suum formale antecedens impossibile, si sit impossibile; igitur, cum deum esse formaliter sequitur ad quodlibet necesse esse et ad quodlibet impossibile contradictorium, sequitur quod deum esse est tam necesse esse quam necesse esse est omne necesse esse et quam impossibile esse est omnis contradictio et, si sic, igitur, deum esse includitur virtualiter in omni necesse esse et in omni impossibili contradicitionis tamquam formale consequens in suo formal antecedente et, si sic, igitur deum non esse virtualiter includit quodlibet impossibile simpliciter et quodlibet impossibile contradicitionis; igitur, deum non esse includit contradicitionem.

39 Tota ista deductio videtur per se nota, probato antecedente, scilicet, quod ex omni necesse esse sequatur deum esse et ex omni contradicitione sequitur deum esse. Quod probo sic: pars prima antecedentis constat ex se et suppositione praemissa, et secundam partem arguo sic: capio aliqua duo formaliter repugnantia, sicut .a., .b. et assumo positionem adversarii ponentis: deum non esse sine contradicitione. Et arguo sic: deus non est; igitur, .a. non est .b.; igitur, ex opposito consequentis, .a. est .b.; igitur, deus est. Et ita ex hac contradicitione, .a. est .b., sequitur quod deus est et, per consequens, conclusio principalis.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

73 Post. An. 1, 2; 72a 6 ff.
74 marg. 2.
75 marg. 3.
The "Megas Kanon" of Andrew of Crete and the "Félire" of Oengus the Culdee

JOHN HENNIG

IN his paper "Eine Parallele zur Commendatio Animae in der griechischen Kirchenpoesie," A. Baumstark\(^1\) said that the Eastern Church has an abundance of phenomena in Christian prayer literature which, similar to the Selihod prayer in the Mishna, present a series, varying in length of (Old Testament = OT) types of salvation or of fulfillments of prayers.\(^2\) Baumstark referred in particular to two texts in Euchologion to mega (about A.D. 800).

a) from an exorcism (iii, 1, v, 1 and 2, vi, 1 and 2, vii, 1 and viii, 1):
   ... as Thou rescredst Jacob from the hands of Esau
   ... as Thou fulfilledst the petition of Ezechias
   ... as Thou rescredst Thy prophet from the belly of the whale
   ... as Thou rescredst David from the lions
   ... as Thou rescredst the three children from the furnace of burning fire.

b) from the Akolouthion of the wedding rite:
   as Thou guardedst Noah in the ark
   as Thou guardedst Jonas in the belly of the whale
   as Thou guardedst the three children in the furnace of burning fire
   as Thou rememberedst Enoch, Sem and Elias.

Baumstark (1) considered these texts as illustrative of the origin of this type of list in Alexandria; (2) suggested a Greek source common to these texts and the tradition represented by them and to the Latin tradition represented by the Libera-prayer\(^3\) as we have it to this day in the Commendatio Animae (= CA) and (3) pointed to the importance of this tradition for Christian iconography.

Indeed these lists illustrate the point made by L. Réau.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\) Oriens Christianus N. S. 4 (1914) 298-305.
\(^{2}\) See the synopsis of Jewish texts in DACL IV (1920) 437.
\(^{3}\) To this day the Yiddish Zion hymn Eli, eli lana asawtuni says: "Rett' uns, rett' uns, if not for our sake, for our fathers' sake."
Dans l'immense répertoire de la Bible certains sujets seulement—ce ne sont pas toujours les plus poétiques ni les plus pittoresques—ont été retenus par les théologiens qui les ont proposés aux artistes.

In the Eastern Church this limitation of subjects has been even more marked—and remained so—than in the West, a point of interest to the present paper.

A late echo of such lists was traced by Baumstark in Coptic hagiographical literature. L. Gougaud\(^6\) listed twelve texts containing lists of OT types similar to the Libera-prayer of CA. H. Leclercq\(^6\) drew attention to the earliest of such lists in the Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians.\(^7\) In fact we may go back to Acts 7 f. and Hebr. 11. The texts listed by Gougaud after the Orationes pseudocyprianae\(^8\) are, with the exception of two late mediaeval ones, either Irish or associated with Ireland. They are all of what will be described as of the Libera-type, that is, a petition is made for a present person (referred to in either the first or the third person\(^9\)), with reference to a series of instances, reported in Scripture or (as in the reference of St. Thecla, familiar to us from CA) in the acts of martyrs, where God rescued a person in a miraculous manner.

Parallel to the Libera-form we have the Deus qui-form which in contrast to the former occurs more frequently with a reference to one instance only. It does occur occasionally with serial references; to quote an example no longer found in post-Reformation liturgical textbooks:\(^{10}\)

Deus... qui noe et filiis suis de mundis et imundis animalibus praecepta dedisti qui olera herbarum humano generi quadrupedia munda edere praeceptisti qui agnum in Aegypto Moysi et populo tuo in vigilia paschae comedere praeceptisti et in nocte illa omne primogenitum in Aegypto percuti praeceptisti

The Benedictio Agni has preserved only the last reference in a different form. We shall see that the non-chronological arrangement is rather typical of these serial references. The Libera-form refers to

---

\(^5\) Ephemerid. Liturg. 49 (1935) 3 ff.
\(^6\) DACL IV, 427. Réau op. cit. 248, says that CA was composed at the end of the second century by St. Cyprian of Alexandria! The Orationes pseudocyprianae originated in Gaul about 700.
\(^7\) O. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur (Freiburg 1902) I, 103.
\(^8\) DACL IV, 430.
\(^9\) See below note 11.
salvation in general, whereas the Deus-qui form primarily refers to specific occasions; therefore the latter occurs far more frequently than does the former with one reference only, and this type of Deus qui-prayer is of course familiar from many Blessings; it also occurs in many liturgical collects, where a special event or feature of a Saint's life is related to a petition for a particular gift. This latter development of Deus qui-prayers has in fact become almost the standard of modern Collects proper to the feasts of Saints.

In the prototype of serial references to sacred history, Ecclesiasticus 44 f., the arrangement is in chronological order.\textsuperscript{11} In the Libera-prayer in CA as we have it at present, the first reference to Henoch adds Elias, then follow references to Noah, Abraham, Job, Isaac, Lot, Moses, Daniel and the three children and Susanna, David, Peter and Paul and Thecla. Henoch and Elias were grouped together because they were both rescued de communi morte mundi. It is not clear why the reference to Job was inserted between those to Abraham and Isaac. The reference to Lot appears hinged to the last words of the reference to the immolation of Isaac (de manu... Abrahae). The references to Daniel among the lions and to the three children follow upon each other also in the two texts in Euchologion to Mega and in Oratio S. Gregorii.\textsuperscript{12} In

\textsuperscript{11} Compare Mishna of Tanit II 11 (DACL IV, 437):
Thou lovingly rememberest Noah
He heard our fathers in the Red Sea (the distinction between deprecative and invocative references is insufficient; see my paper in Traditio 7 (1949-51) 241 f.)
Josua in Gilgal
Samuel in Mitzpa
Elias on Mt. Carmel
Jonas in the belly of the whale (see below)
David and Salomon in Jerusalem,
i.e. place-names are mentioned as in the Martyrology. Compare the sequences in the Blessing of the Emperor (now of the King) in Andrieu, op. cit. II 395 ff.:
sicut visitasti Moyse in rubo
Josue in proelio
Gedeon in agro
Samuelem in templo
or:
Aaron in tabemaculo
Heliseus in fluvio
Ezechias in lectu
Zacharias in templo
or:
Josa in castris
Gedeon in proeliis,
and the symmetrical references to place-names in the prologue of Fèlix Oengusso (below p. 287). In all these cases place-names are an indication to stricter historical conception.

\textsuperscript{12} A. Kuypers, Book of Cerne (Cambridge, 1902), 104.
the prayer of the wedding rite in *Euchologion to Mega* it is most obvious that a systematic arrangement was attempted: These two references are here prefaced by that to Noah but instead of *in diluvio* (as in CA, in the *Oratio S. Gregorii* and, as we shall see, in *Félire Oengusso = FO*) it has *in aera*, i.e. in these three instances the place where the salvation took place is stated.¹³ In FO the reference to Daniel is followed by that to Moses and then that to the three children. The two latter references end in a Latin phrase (see below) which suggests direct derivation from a Latin source. The arrangement of references in the various texts here to be considered may well supply some indication of their stemma and of the various sources from which they were derived.

In the serial type of both the *Libera*-form and the *Deus qui*-form references to instances under the Old Covenant appear side by side or even intermingled with references to instances in the New Covenant. Serial references play a considerable part in the tradition of Christian devotion to OT Saints. March 25 used to be a general commemoration of the history of our salvation from the Creation to the Crucifixion.¹⁴ In the late Middle Ages, August 23rd was a collective feast of the OT Saints not individually commemorated. To this day the third Sunday in December is, in the Greek Orthodox Church, the Sunday of the Propaotores (according to the *Agioiologion*¹⁵ commemorating Adam and Eve, Abel, Sara, Isaac, Jacob and his sons, Aaron, Ruth, Judith and Esther).

In the history of Christian interpretation of the OT, references to “types of salvation and of fulfilment of prayers” hold an important position. Réau gave his chapter *Le symbolisme typologique* the subtitle *ou la concordance des deux Testaments* and referred to the artistic principle of symmetry. Symmetry, however, is but one form of typological interpretation of the OT, and the concordance of the two Testaments only one subdivision of it. In this concordance, which undoubtedly has proved most influential in the pictorial arts, two events in the past are paralleled.¹⁶ In the *Deus qui*-prayers as we have them in many

---

¹³ See note 11.
¹⁵ S. Eustratiolos (Athens, 1935).
¹⁶ The principal distinctions are:
   a) literal fulfilment: Mich. 5:1 — Lk. 2:4
   b) material correspondence: 3. Reg. 4:32 ff — Lk. 7:11 ff
   c) exaltation: *immolatio Isaac filii Abrahae — immolatio Christi filii Dei*
   d) interpretation: passage through the Red Sea — Baptism.

As regards persons of the Old and New Covenants symmetry is impressively represented
Blessings, a parallel is established between a point under the Old Covenant and the respective point in Christian liturgy. In the Deus-qui-prayers as we have them in the Sanctorale, a parallel is established between an event in the past and a present (or future) situation. Finally in the Libera-prayers the total situation of the Old Covenant (the covenant as such) is related to the total situation of a Christian, hence these prayers are primarily a private devotion.

In the concordantial interpretation, the teaching that the NT is the fulfilment of the OT is illustrated by specific points. The two Testaments are placed in parallel. In the Deus qui-prayers of the Benedictionale the Old Covenant is primarily taken on its own merits, e.g., when in the Blessing of vestments the weaving of Mary, the sister of Moses, is referred to, no similar instance being recorded in the NT. In the Deus qui-prayers of the Sanctorale and even more so in the Libera-prayers the present is seen directly derived from the OT, independent of its transfiguration through the NT. In the concordantial interpretation the OT is seen projected upon the NT. In the other forms of typological interpretation the OT appears as directly projected upon us in the same way as the NT. The vestments and the organ are blessed with reference to Mosaic law exactly as the fishing-boat and the vehicle are blessed with reference to their use by the Apostles.

It would appear that the extra-concordantial or direct typological interpretation of the OT originated in private devotion. That also the non-concordantial forms of typological interpretation are basically non-historical (in our sense of the word) can be seen from the fact that the chronological order appears as immaterial. OT references do not always appear in the chronological order; furthermore OT and NT references are intermingled.

The prevalence of the serial type among references to the OT in prayer literature, whether private or liturgical, is the counterpart to the prevalence in devotion to OT Saints, particularly in the arts, of

in the opposite choir stalls in the Cathedral of Ulm (G. Dehio, Handbuch der deutschen Kunstdenkmäler III (1925), 538 f) by Jörg Syrlin (1469-74) where the lowest tier comprises the wise men and women of antiquity, the central tier the prophets and holy women of the OT, the top tier the apostles and martyrs. Symmetrical representation is also invited by the two wings of church doors, an exquisite example (mostly one figure only for each panel) being the bronze door at Augsburg (Dehio, op. cit., 33).

17 "We shall expound in a useful manner the historikós περαγμένα and by a fitting explanation transform and thus clarify the narrated events εἰκ ἄνων ἄνως σκίας," Cyril of Alexandria, Gephyra (PG 69, 161).
choirs (patriarchs, prophets) rather than individuals. In the litanies
the choirs of patriarchs and prophets are generally followed by fewer
names than the choirs of NT Saints, in fact, in many litanies, the choirs
of OT Saints are followed by no names at all. The arrangement of the
Saints by choirs is obviously systematical. We have seen that certain
aspects in the arrangement of the serial references in prayers may also
be ascribed to systematisation. In this systematical arrangement the
historical individuality is subordinated to a devotional unit beyond
history.

If veneration of OT persons as Saints would derive from the sym-
metrical interpretation, OT Saints would occupy a lower rank than
NT Saints. In reality, the few relics of mediaeval veneration of OT
Saints, e.g. in the Martyrology, in the Te Deum or in the Litany of the
Saints in CA, clearly show that there is no trace of such lower ranking.
In the Pontificale, and derived therefrom the Rituale, scarcely less OT
Saints are referred to than NT Saints, and in many instances these
references are direct rather than symmetrical, and frequently in line
with references to NT Saints. While the non-historical typological
interpretation is natural to prayers, in the Martyrology we have direct
historical interpretation, though in anniversaristic rather than in
annalistic order of time.18 Neither in their placing among the entries
for one day nor in their wording (basically place name plus name of
Saint) are the entries for OT Saints treated differently from those for
NT Saints; indeed nothing indicates explicitly that these entries
relate to OT rather than NT Saints.

A counterpart to the references to Saints rarely considered are the
references to persons who were the very opposite of Saints. A typical
instance is the malediction of violators of nuns in the Benedictio Virgi-
num: Fiat pars et hereditas ejus cum Cain fratricida, cum Dathan, et Abiron,
cum Ananias et Saphira, cum Simone mago et Juda priditore, three refer-
ences each to the OT and the NT, the latter not arranged in a chrono-
logical order, appearing in line rather than in symmetry.

Still another type of serial references to the OT are the Improperia
of Good Friday, which are strictly symmetrical. A ramification of the
pattern characteristic of the Improperia (a benefit being returned by an
evil deed) will be considered presently in the Megas Kanon of Andrew
of Crete.

Among the parallels to the Libera-prayer in CA, Fêlire Oengusso (FO)
was briefly referred to by Gougaud. Various approaches have been

18 See above note 11 and my paper on kalendarium and martyrologium (below p. 287).
made in some previous papers of mine to assess the position of FO in the history of religious literature. (1) In my paper on the literary tradition of Moses in Ireland (Traditio 7 (1949-1951) 233 ff., especially 239) I have studied the references made in particular in the Epilogue of FO to OT Saints in relation to other such references (a typology of which was outlined), especially the serial ones, in mediaeval Irish literature. (2) In my papers “The Irish counterparts of the Anglo-Saxon Menology,” Mediaeval Studies 14 (1952) 98-106 and “Studies in the literary tradition of the martyrologium poeticum,” Proc. R. Irish Acad. 56 C (1954) 197-226, I have studied the place of the calendaric body of FO in the tradition of what Stokes described as “metrical martyrlogies.” (3) In my paper “The Fēilire Oengusso and the Martyrologium Wandalharti,” Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955) 219-226; I studied the relationship between these two works in what Quentin termed the vogue in versifications of this kind in the ninth century. (4) In my paper “Kalendarium und Martyrologium als Literaturformen,” Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft 7 (1961) 1-44, English summary in Studia Patristica 5 (1962) 69-82, I have considered FO in the tradition of martyrologies and calendars in general (a special aspect was treated in my paper “Britain’s place in the early Irish martyrologies” in Medium Aevum (1957) 17-24, with particular reference to the statements made in FO on the nature and scope of this féilire).

The relationship mentioned under (3) arises from the structure of those two works, in both of which the calendaric body is prefaced and followed by parts directly speaking of the nature and scope of such works and summarising the general significance of the material presented as a devotion to all the saints.

The Prologue of FO contains a symmetrical series of negative and positive instances in history, the only reference to the OT being:

Though he was king of the world
Nabodon (Nabuchodonosor), red, very valiant,
since he died with his household,
his sovereignty has been extinguished.
Not so Old-Paul the monk... and John the Baptist (93 ff.).

Similar comparisons are drawn between Herod and St. Peter, Nero and St. Paul, Pilate's queen and the Blessed Virgin, Decius and St. Quiricus. 161 starts a symmetrical series of negative and positive

---

19 See above note 11.
20 The Martyrology of Oengus the Culdee (H. B. S. xxix, London, 1905), xxxix.
instances in old Irish history (pairs of places and pairs of persons alternating):

Tara (perished) Armagh (abides)
Lóiguir - Patrick
Rathcroghan - Clonmacnois
Aillenn - Brigid
Emain (now Navan) - Glendalough.

The Epilogue of FO consists of the following parts:

1. 1-148: Contents, composition and sources of the féilire,
2. 149-224: its spiritual function,
3. 225-308: choirs of saints enumerated,
4. 309-440: a prayer for mercy,
5. 441-546 (end): the litanic prayer "Mayest Thou save me, o Jesus".

In a comparison of the wording of the serial references to the OT found in this latter part with other Libera-prayers we must bear in mind that the wording in FO is largely due to the versification and the intricate rules of Irish vinnard, of the use of which FO is the most outstanding example in the early religious literature of Ireland. Among the Libera-prayers the last part of the Epilogue of FO holds a distinctive place. (1) This is the only versification in this field. (2) This is the only work in this field written in a non-classical language, (3) but it clearly points to a Latin source by the retention of the phrases de manu Faronis (501, Faraonis would not have fitted into the metre, see Dt. 7:8 and 4. Reg. 17:7) and de camino ignis (508, Dan. 3:17), both still found in CA (in the latter instance Orationes pseudocypr. II: de ege cami) as well as cetti magni (464, the entry for Jonas is not found in CA; the LXX and Vetus Latin version rather than that of the Vulgate which Jon. 2:1 has piscem grandem. For the use of cetus in this connection see Thesaurus Ling. Lat III (Leipzig 1907) 977,21 kētos also in the two Libera-prayers in Euchologio to mega. These three Latin phrases always occur at the end of the respective quatrain, as do the words:

don domun (448) in the entry for Elias and Henoch (names reversed for metrical reasons) which are connected with the last words of the corresponding entry in CA de communi morte mundi (Eccl. 14:12?)—domun being the Irish word for "world"—,

21 "Was es für ein Fisch gewesen sei, sagt der Verfasser nicht; er wird an eine Haifischart denken, sagt aber absichtlich unbestimmt ein grosser Fisch, da es ein Wundertier sein soll," E. Sellin, Das Zwölftprophetenbuch (Leipzig, 1922) 247.
din dile (452) even etymologically related to the words de diluvio (Gen. 7:17) at the end of the Noah entry in CA, and de lmaib a athar (468), a literal translation of the words de manu patris (Gen. 22:10,12), forming the end of the corresponding entry (immolation of Isaac) in CA.

References to the unknown Latin source of Oengus may also be assumed in the words claidib Gòli (= gladii Goliæ) in 484 (1. Reg. 17:51, comp. Ex. 18:4) and in n aímsir na pláge (= in tempore plague) in 492. By comparison with CA, FO treated the entry for Job slightly differently. Instead of de passionibus suis Oengus has “from the tribulations of a demon” (522). FO also refers more specifically than does CA to the story of St. Thecla when instead of de tribus atrocissimis tormentis, it says “from the maw biastæ” (472, clearly again a reference to the Latin word). 22

(4) FO has several references which CA has not got:

476: Jacob “from the hands of his brother” (not “brethren” as Stokes translated; The Euchologion Exorcism has a reference to Jacob’s being rescued “from the hands of Esau”)
489: Ninivites (Orat. pseudepigr. II)
493: Israel on Mount Gilboa (1. Reg. 31: 1 I. Par. 10: 1)
509: Tobias (different from the Tobias entries in Orationes pseudepigr. I and II)
525: Joseph from the hand of his brethren
529: Israel from bondage in Egypt (529 Mich. 6: 4), the prototype of the Improperia of Good Friday
541: Samson (Hebr. 11: 32).

(5) The reference to a source close to the Greek text is most obvious in the entry for Daniel among the lions: FO 500 says assin cuithi leoman. CA 23 has with the Latin tradition de lacu leonum where lacus is an etymological misinterpretation of lakhon, whereas Irish cuithe is etymologically related to putoem.

(6) Both the last part of the prologue and the first part of the epilogue of FO treat so extensively of the nature and scope of this work that it would appear that at that time a work of this nature required some introduction. On the other hand, FO is a work of such high literary qualities that there must have been a previous development leading up to it. It is in these respects that I intend to compare FO, especially the fourth and fifth parts of its epilogue with

22 The various versions of the reference to Theda in this tradition (Cyprian: de medio amphitheatro, Oration. pseudepigr.: in igne) would require special study.
23 With Orat. pseudepigr. (DACL IV 431); lakhon also in Megas Kanon (PG 97, 1376).
the representative of a type of litanic prayer known in the Eastern Church as kanon, with the “invention” of which St. Andrew of Crete († 470) was credited in very much the same way as Oengus was credited by later “prefaces” to his work with the “invention” (aírec) of the félie.

I am referring to Megas Kanon (MK) which to this day is recited in the Greek, Slavic and Melchite liturgies in the night from Wednesday to Thursday of Passion Week. The Synaxarion triodii called MK “the largest and of all the existing kanons the one harmonized and composed most beautifully and with greatest skill... each trope yielding unspeakable pleasure.”\(^{25}\) Comprising 250 tropes—unfortunately not numbered in any edition known to me—MK has been described as laboriosum et valde prolixum\(^{26}\) and “immense”.\(^{27}\) The Epilogue of FO has 140 quatrains, the complete FO, the recitation of which is called 177 ff as “a commutation of seven Masses, of the three times fifty psalms or of three triduans” comprises 590 quatrains. In their respective countries, MK and FO are the largest works of religious poetry in the Middle Ages. In Ireland, the work in this field nearest in size to FO is Saltair na Rann,\(^{28}\) which was also attributed to Oengus but was probably written a century later. So far as I am aware, MK has never been translated into a modern vernacular in its entirety (Migne of course has a Latin translation). Of FO we have Stokes's translation (to which I do not always adhere). The literary qualities of MK have been the subject of some discussion. This work has been criticised for its subtleties and its forced comparisons.\(^{29}\) Similar criticism has been advanced with regard to FO.\(^{30}\) Such criticism cannot diminish the importance of these works in the history of devotional literature and, in fact, of Christian devotion in general.

As regards the skill of its composition, MK by comparison with FO lacks in structure. Indeed MK is subdivided into nine odes\(^{31}\) interspersed with versicles but there is no real sequence of thought except

---

\(^{24}\) Stokes ed. cit., 3-15.
\(^{25}\) PG 97, 1361 and Synekdemos orthodoxou (Athens, 1961) 890.
\(^{26}\) N. Nilles, Kalendarium Manuale (Innsbruck, 1881) II, 145.
\(^{27}\) H. T. Henry CE I (1907) 473 (here this Canon is erroneously described as “Greek” rather than as “Great”).
\(^{28}\) J. Kenney, Sources for the early history of Ireland I (New York, 1929), no. 60.
\(^{29}\) Henry, l. c.
\(^{30}\) Stokes, ed. cit., xlvii and my paper in Archiv f. Liturgiewissensch. 7, 38.
\(^{31}\) Regarding the terms oda, hirmus, etc., used with reference to kanons, see Nilles, op. cit. I, li ff.
perhaps a fairly chronological arrangement of the references to the OT and the NT (the latter being outside the scope of this paper).

In FO the transition from the third to the fourth section of the Epilogue is made by quatrains 297 ff:

My soul (anim), my wounded body (corp)... may they be consoling me, the kingfolk I have entreated.

At this point Oengus turns from meditation upon the choirs of Saints to contemplation of his own condition, the key note being struck by the repetition of the Latin phrase miserere michi (308 f.). We could compare FO Ep. 297 f. with the third strophe of MK:

Come, wretched soul, with thy flesh and confess to the Creator of all things.

FO Ep. 386 Oengus speaks of his body as corpán and 392 of himself as bochtán (bocht = poor), the suffix -án denoting despicable wretchedness. However, FO offers a confident prayer for mercy while MK is concerned with confession and contrition.

**MK second strophe**

Whence shall I start my mourning at the actions of my wretched life? What beginning shall I make, o Christ, of this song of mourning? But Thou, Who art merciful, grant me forgiveness of my sins.

**FO Ep. 307 ff**

O Christ, whose slave²² I am, misere michi. Miserere michi, o royal prince, abundantly. O Jesus, I love Thee, o great God, I beseech Thee.

**MK third strophe**

Bring to God the tears of repentance.

**FO Ep. 337**

Over their (the saints') white faces I appeal by their tears (dér)³³

The Synaxarion triodii says that “having collected and gathered the whole historia of the Old and New Testaments, Andrew harmonised the present poem from Adam certainly to the Ascension of Christ and the preaching of the Apostles.” FO however presented the history of the Saints rather than that of Scripture from féliri and martyrologies (Ep. 75 f., 109,137 ff.) in a calendaric order (Prol. 285 ff., Ep. 1-8).

---

²² Cèle, the word from which “Culdee” is formed.
²³ Stokes, ed. cit. 318, referred to the relationship with Gr. dābru.
³³ Hérmosato; an Irish expression cuíed, meaning “harmonisation” occurs FO Ep. 124. For the term synegrapsen used by the Synaxarion in this connection (see above p. 289) compare FO Ep. 88 f, two different words for “composed;” for the second word see Stokes ed. cit. 268, note 7.
Ep. 101 Oengus issued a solemn warning against anyone “disturbing the order of chapters” (ord inna caiptel) of his work.

In MK references to the OT take up the greater part of the work (up to ode 7); at the end of these references Andrew says that these references were “brought up (parēgagon) for example (hypogrammon), that we are to imitate the God loving actions of the just and to feel the sins of the wicked.” FO Ep. 29 says that on the kings of the hosts of thousands of saints are “brought forward” (tucsan). Ep. 18 Oengus mentioned that among the choirs of saints there are the patriarchs (urasalathair) but that “their feasts are unknown,” a remark the importance of which to the history of liturgical veneration of OT Saints will be expounded elsewhere. In part 3 of his Ep., Oengus listed after the archangels

“the troop of ancestors (rerach) around Nōe...
the troop of prophets (fāith = vates) around Esaia profēta...
the troop of patriarchs around Abraham”

(follow apostles, martyrs, etc.), an uncommon subdivision of the choirs of OT Saints. MK starts with Adam and Eve, the fourth and fifth strophes reading: “I have imitated Adam, Thy protoplaston, by sinning... Wretched soul, why hast thou become like Eve?” FO prefaced the last section of his Epilogue by the verse: “The seed of Adam that is noble, By Jesus it has been saved.” It is FO rather than MK that represents the devotional tradition which gradually resulted in the names of the first parents being mentioned in the lists of Saints. The last word of Oengus’ just mentioned is sōerad; this word sets the key-note for the subsequent 31 quatrains all of which start with the word Rom-sōerae (libera me). Here again FO speaks of hope while MK of contrition. Once again we compare the third strophe of MK: “Come, wretched soul, with thy flesh and confess to the Creator of all things and abstain henceforth from thy former aloria:” FO Ep. 441: “Mayst Thou save me, o Jesus, my body and soul, from every evil that exists, that offends on earth.” MK speaks of (subjective) sin, FO of (objective) evil.

Let us compare the following eight OT references in MK and FO (Epil.):

(1) FO 445: “Mayst Thou save me, o Jesus... as Thou savedst Hēli with Enōc35 from the world” (=CA). Fresgabail Hēli, the ascension of

35 Stokes ed. cit. 474: The accent on -ōc indicates that this was treated as an Irish formation (“Roseform”).
Elias, is commemorated in the body of FO on August 29.\textsuperscript{36} FO 449: “... as Thou savedst \textit{Nbe macc Lamech} from the flood” (\textit{dile}, see above). MK ode ii, alius hirmus says: “Hast thou not been like Cain or Lamech? Thou hast not been like Seth, thou hast not imitated Enos, nor Enoch, who was taken away, nor Noah.”

(2) FO 453: “... as Thou savedst Abraham from the hands of the Chaldaeans” (= CA). MK ode III, hirmus: “Go out, my soul, from Charan, the land of sin, and enter the land flowing with everlasting incorruption, which was allotted to Abraham.”

(3) FO 457: “... as Thou savedst Loth from the sins of the cities” (similar to CA). ML already at the end of ode II, alius hirmus referred to God’s raining fire on the Sodomites (CA: \textit{et de flamma ignis}). After references to Cham, Sem and Japheth, Abraham (see above), Isaac (see below), Agar and Jacob, ode III, hirmus reverts to the story of Sodom: “May the example of the Sodomites terrify thee. Beware, o soul, like Loth of the fire of sin, beware of Sodom and Gomorrah.”

(4) FO 465: “... as Thou savedst Isaac from the hand of his father” (= CA). MK Ode III hirmus asks the soul to emulate Isaac, the new victim mystically slain for the Lord. At this point it appears that MK prefers subjective, FO objective projection of sacred history.

(5) FO 473: “... as Thou savedst Jacob from his brother’s hand” (not in CA). MK, ode III, hirmus: “Thou art not ignorant of Jacob’s ladder; my soul, why hast thou not piety as a safe basis of thy steps?”. Similar instances are David (FO: Goliath, MK: kingship) and the Ninivites (FO 489 and MK ode VII, hirmus alius—end of OT references in MK).

(6) FO 501: “... as Thou savedst Moses \textit{de manu Faronis}.” In MK ode V, hirmus the strophe: “Thou hast heard, my soul, the \textit{thebe} of Moses when through the waters, the flood of the river he escaped the evil intention of the Pharaonites” (PG 97,1353); this verse has been omitted in the reprint of MK in \textit{Synekdomos orthodoxou Christianou}, 887.\textsuperscript{37}

At two points, near in time, but remote from each other in space, MK and FO represent paraliturgical literature in so far as a litanic type of serial references is used for a new form of devotion which in the

\textsuperscript{36} Stokes’s note \textit{ed. cit.} 426: “Elisei profetae \textit{Mart. Rom.}” seems to be a mistake.

\textsuperscript{37} Similarly the references to Daniel (“Hast thou heard, my soul, how Daniel silenced the lions in the \textit{lakkon}?”) and to the three children (“Doest thou know how Azarias and his companions extinguished the flames of the burning furnace \textit{[kaminou floga haionenē]?”} show the subjective turn and yet close affinity to the tradition discussed above p. 287 f.
case of MK has later obtained some measure of liturgical recognition, while in the case of FO it has been the substitute for liturgical features (such as the Sanctorale) otherwise scarcely found in old Irish liturgy. Both works mark in their fields a unique climax in a type of devotional literature which has remained limited in historical and geographical application. The Biblical references in these works illustrate important degrees in spiritual appropriation of the OT in Christian thought and life. In contrast to what Baumstark observed, these later works have exercised no influence in pictorial arts.

This paper aimed at establishing types of devotional literature. It is not its purpose to suggest a historical connection between MK and FO. Whether in this case as in other spheres Spain acted as an intermediary between the Eastern and the Irish Churches may be a matter of further conjecture.\textsuperscript{38} By comparison with the prologues and epilogues of FO and Martyrologium Wandalbarri, MK is more subjective, a work of strictly private devotion. It is obvious however that these three works represent a type of devotional literature for which a need was felt within one century in various parts of the Church. In the history of Christian devotion to OT Saints MK and FO occupy an important place as representatives of the serial references type of prayer.

\textit{Basel, Switzerland}

The Lives of the Saints in Old Norse Prose
A Handlist

OLE WIDDING, HANS BEKKER-NIELSEN, L. K. SHOOK, C.S.B.

PREFACE

THIS Handlist is intended to be a complete record of the hagiographic materials deriving from mediaeval documents and written in Old Norse prose (Norw. until 1370, Icel. until 1540). It supplies accurate references to mediaeval manuscripts, and in special cases to later ones if they have some textual significance. References to manuscripts which have already appeared in print are to the best editions.

The Handlist has been arranged according to the following very simple rules:

(1) Saints are dealt with alphabetically according to name, with proper calendar date indicated in each case.
(2) Arabic numerals followed by distinctive title denote variant versions of the same life; where possible, versions are listed in chronological order.
(3) Minuscule letters (a, b, c, etc.) denote different MSS containing the same version; where a MS is known to be a copy, it is included under the same minuscule as the original; in all cases, in so far as possible, chronology is observed.
(4) MSS are vellum unless otherwise stated.
(5) Cross references to the BHL are supplied whenever possible; supplementary comments bearing on textual problems are sometimes added.
(6) The bibliographical literature appended to each entry is selective.

In general the Handlist can be said to reflect the present state of scholarship in ON hagiography. Where the editors can supply additional information they do so; where they detect minor errors they correct them silently.

The material on which the Handlist is based is to be found in the archives and libraries of Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Through the courtesy of the staffs of the Royal Library, Stockholm,
the National Archives, Oslo, and the Royal Library, Copenhagen, the
original documents have been made available to us in the dictionary
department of the Arnamaganean Institute. For other courtesies
received during the preparation of the Handlist we are much indebted
to Mr. Thorsten Eken and Mr. Finn Hødnebø of Oslo, Professor
Magnus Már Lárusson of Reykjavík, Dr. Tue Gad and Mr. Thorkil
Damsgaard Olsen of Copenhagen, and Mr. Mattias Tveitane of Bergen.
We wish also to thank Mr. Peter Foote of London for many fruitful
discussions of ON hagiography over a number of years.

For a fuller description of the principles behind the Handlist, see
Hans Bekker-Nielsen, “On a Handlist of Saints’ Lives in Old Norse,”

**ABBREVIATIONS:**

AM  
The Arnamaganean Collection of Manuscripts, Copenhagen.
Cf. Kristian Kaland, *Katalog over den Arnamaganeanske hand-
skriftsamling I-II* (Copenhagen 1889-1894).

ArnFragm  
Gustav Morgenstern (ed.), *Arnamaganeanske Fragmente* (Leip-
zig and Copenhagen 1893).

BHL  
*Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina* (Brussels 1898-1901).

*Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina. Supplement* (Brussels 1911).

Bisk  
Jón Sigurðsson and Guðbrandr Vigfússon (ed.), *Biskupa Sögur*
I-II (Copenhagen 1858-1878).

Cod623  
Finnur Jónsson (ed.), *AM 623, 4°. Helgensaega* (Copenhagen
1927).

Cod645  
Ludvig Larsson (ed.), *Islaedskra handskriften No 645 4° i den
Arnamaganeanske samlingen* (Lund 1885).

Codex Scardensis  
A privately owned manuscript. Cf. the facsimile edition in
*Early Icelandic Manuscripts in Facsimile* II (Copenhagen 1960),
with an introduction by D. Slay.

Delag  
De la Gardie's Collection of Manuscripts in the University
Universitets Biblioteks fornisländska och fornorska handskriftert*
(Uppsala 1892).

Foote  
P. G. Foote, *Introduction to Early Icelandic Manuscripts in*
*Facsimile IV* (Copenhagen 1962).
O. WIDDING, H. BEKKER-NIELSEN, L. K. SHOOK

GkS
Gammel kongelig samling. The Old Royal Collection of Manuscripts in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. Cf. Kristian Kålund, Katalog over de oldnorsk-íslandská hánkskrífer í det store kongelige bibliotek (Copenhagen 1900).

HMS
C. R. Unger (ed.), Heilagra Manna Sögur I-II (Christiania 1877).

Holm

Jónsson

JS

Kall
Kall’s Collection of Manuscripts in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. Cf. Kr. Kålund, Katalog etc. (see GkS).

KLN M
Kulturhistorisk Leksikon for nordisk middelalder I-VII (Copenhagen 1956-1962). To be continued.

Lbs.

Lehmann

Mar
C. R. Unger (ed.), Mariu Saga (Christiania 1871).

MignePL
J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus ; ; Series latina (Paris 1844 ff.).

MM
See Widding, Bekker-Nielsen MM.

Mogk

NkS
Norsk Riksråd. The Collection of fragments in the National Archives of Norway, Oslo. No printed catalogue.


Fredrik Paasche, Norges og Islands litteratur inntil utgangen av middelalderen, 2nd ed. (Oslo 1957) ed. by Anne Holtsmark.


C. R. Unger (ed.), Postula sögur (Christiania 1874).


Rask's Collection of Manuscripts in the Arnamagnæan Collection, Copenhagen. Cf. Kr. Kålund, Katalog etc. (see AM).

Stephensens Collection of Manuscripts in the Arnamagnæan Collection, Copenhagen. Cf. Kr. Kålund, Katalog etc. (see AM).

Thott's Collection of Manuscripts in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. Cf. Kr. Kålund, Katalog etc. (see Gkå).

G. Turville-Petre, Origins of Icelandic Literature (Oxford 1953).

Unger's introduction to HMS.

Unger's introduction to Post.


Hugo Gering (ed.), Íslandsk Æventyri I (Halle 1882).

Hugo Gering, Íslandsk Æventyri II (Halle 1884), introduction and commentary to Æventyri.
AGATHA

1. Agathu saga meyiar. I.
   a. Holm 2 fol. (14c) 82r-84r: HMS I, 1-6.
   b. AM 429, 12o (c. 1500) 69r-76r.
      Cf. BHL 133.

2. Agathu saga meyiar. II.
   AM 233 a, fol. (14c) 26r-27r: HMS I, 7-13.
   Cf. BHL 133.

3. Agathu saga.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. II (14c) 6r-v.
   Cf. BHL 133.

4. Agathu saga meyiar. III.
   NoRA, fragm. 70 (14c) 1r-v: HMS I, 13-14.
   Cf. BHL 133.

5. De sancta Agattā.
   AM 672, 4o (15c) 61r-v. An epitome.
   Lit. Foote 27; Mogk 891; UngerH viii.

AGNES

1. Ag terse saga meyiar.
   b. AM 429, 12o (c. 1500) 61r-69r: HMS I, 19-20, 21-22, 15-19 var.
   c. AM 238 fol. fragm. I (c.1300) 2r-v: HMS I, 20-21, 18-19 var.
   d. AM 235 fol. (c.1400) 4v (defective): HMS I, 15-16 var.
   e. AM 238 fol. fragm. II (14c) 6r.
      BHL 156.

2. Agnesar saga meyiar.
   AM 233 a, fol. (14c) 26r (defective): HMS I, 22.
   Cf. BHL 156.

3. Agnesar saga.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. XV (14c) 1r.
   Cf. BHL 156. An epitome?
   Lit. Foote 28 f.; Mogk 891; UngerH viii f.

ALEXIUS

1. Fabella Alexis confessoris. Alexis saga.
   AM 623, 4o (13c ?) 26r-29r: Cod623 47-53; Prøver 438-446; HMS I, 23-27.
   BHL 288.
   Lit. Lehmann 43; UngerH ix.

AMBROSE

1. Ambrosius saga byskups. Appendix.
   AM 655, 4o fragm. XXVIII a (13c) 2r-v: HMS I, 52-54.
   Cf. BHL 377.

2. Ambrosius saga byskups.
   b. AM 238 fol. fragm. X (14c) 1r-v: HMS I, 34-39 var.
      Cf. BHL 377 (and additional material).
3. AMBROSII SAGA.

_Holm 3 fol._ (16c) 38v-45v.
Based on 1-2 with additional material from Pass.

Lit. Foote 21 f.; Jónsson II, 873; Mogk 893; Turville-Petre 135; UngerH ix; Widding, Bekker-Nielsen MM 119.

AMELIUS see Amicus and Amelius.

AMICUS AND AMELIUS October 12

1. AMICUS OR AMELIUS SAGA.

_Holm 6, φo (c.1400) 1r-3r: E. Kölbings (ed.) “Bruchstück einer Amicus ok Amelius Saga”, Germania XIX (1874) 184-189.

Cf. BHL 387.


ANDREW THE APOSTLE November 30

1. ANDREAS SAGA POSTOLA. I.

a AM 645, φo (13c) 41r-43r (defective): Cod645 124-130
   (older part only, 41r-42r); Post 349-353 (in toto).

b AM 652, φo (13c) 8r-v (defective): Post 343-345.
   AM 630, φo (paper, 17c) 47v-57r: Post 318-343.

c AM 656 I, φo (14c) 51r-52r (defective): Post 345-348.

d AM 238 fol. fragm. II (14c) 1r-v: (variant reading interpolated Post 321r-s).

e AM 239 fol. (14c) 96r-101v: Post 324-343 var.

f AM 667, φ fragm. VII (c.1500) 1-2v.

g AM 629, φo (paper, 1697) 123v-150v.

h AM 639 a, φo (17c) 20v-29v (defective).

i Rask 69 (paper, c.1800) 101r-125r.

j JS fragm. 8, A (14c) 1v.

Cf. BHL 430, 428 (a and c only).

2. ANDREAS SAGA POSTOLA. II.

a AM 646, φo (14c) 1(bis) 34r-37v: Post 354-370, 371v-383.

b AM 647, φo (15c) 1r-14r: Post 370v-371, 354-383 var.

c AM 696, φ fragm. XII (15c) 1r-2v.

Cf. BHL 430, 428.

3. ANDREAS SAGA POSTOLA. III.

Codex Scardensis (14c) 36v-39v.

AM 628, φo (paper, 18c) 1r-19r: Post 389-404.

BHL, Andreas, 11, Epitomae (Leg. aur.)

4. ANDREAS SAGA POSTOLA. IV.

AM 625, φo (c.1400) 32r-41v: Post 404-412.

AM 669 a, φo (paper, 18c) 1r-14r.

Abbreviated recension of 1 or 2, or conflation of both.

5. ANDREAS SAGA POSTOLA.

AM 667, φ fragm. V (c.1500) 1v-r (wrongly bound).

Presumably translated from Low German.
6. AF BISKUPI OK PůKA (miracle).
   a  AM 646, 4° (14c) 34°-36°: Post 383-385; Æventyri 95-98 var.
   b  AM 657 a-b, 4° (14c) 65°-66°: Æventyri 95-100.
   c  AM 124, 8° (paper, 17c) 1°-3°.
   d  AM 81, 8° (paper, 17c) 31°-34°.
      See Gering’s commentary, Æventyri II, 80 f.

Lit. Jónsson II, 870; Mogk 888; Turville-Petre 128, 130; UngerP xix ff.

ANNE

1. EMIRENTIU SAGA, QNNU OK Mariu.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 135°-168° (defective).
   Translated from Low German. The source followed is St. Annen Büchlein (Hans Dorn, Braunischweig 1507) supplemented from Pass and occasionally other sources.

2. SAGA HEILAGRAR ANNE.
   a  AM 230 fol. fragm. III (15c) 1°-2°.
   b  AM 82, 8° (paper, 17c) 1°-112° (defective).
      Fragment of a different translation of a text related to St. Annen Büchlein, presumably from an older edition of this work.


ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

On Anselm in Mar, see Mary, the Blessed Virgin III, note.

ANTHONY

1. ANTONIUS SAGA.
   AM 234 fol. (14c) 1°-19° (defective): HMS I, 55-121.
      BHL 609.

2. ANTONIUS SAGA.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 124°-131°.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 327b-332d. See also BARLAAM AND JOSAPHAT, 1, note.

Lit. Lehmann 43 f.; Mogk 891; UngerH ix; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 247 and MM 123.

AUGUSTINE

1. (Rúnófr Sigmundarson) AUGUSTINUS SAGA.
   a  AM 221 fol. (c. 1300) 4°-5° (defective): HMS I, 149-152 app.
   b  AM 234 fol. (14c) 67°-73°; HMS I, 122-149. (Fol. 72 was formerly included in AM 627, 4°.)
      AM 648, 4° (paper, 18c) 1°-22°.
   d  AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 42°-49°: HMS I, 122-149 var.
   e  AM 627, 4° (paper, 18c) 1°-7° (excerpts from AM 234 fol. and AM 235 fol.)
      Cf. BHL 787 (Unger) with additional material. “The precise source... is still to seek” (Foote).
2. AUGUSTINUS SAGA.

Holm 3 fol. (16c) 45r-46r + 95r-100v.
Compiled from various sources, among them a now lost recension of 1 and Pass (Widding, Bekker-Nielsen).

Lit. Foote 23; Jónsson II, 873 f.; Lehmann 44; Mogk 893; UngerH ix f.; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 251 f. and MM 119 f.

BALTHASAR see Three Holy Kings.

BARBARA

1. BARBAKE SAGA.

a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 78r-79r: HMS I, 153-157.

b AM 429, 12o (c. 1500) 76r-80r: HMS I, 153-157 var. BHL Suppl. 913a (Foote).

2. UM BARBARU MÉY.

AM 672, 4o (15c) 56r.
Epitome of 1.

Lit. Foote 26; Lehmann 44; Mogk 891; UngerH x.

BARLAAMS AND JOSAPHAT

1. BARLAAMS OK JOSAPHATS SAGA.


Holm 49 fol. (paper, 1672), 22r-219v.

b AM 232 fol. (14c) 1r-54r (defective): op. cit. 81-82, 143-145, 170-172, 179-181, 200-204, 212v-21v, 45-212 var.

c AM 230 fol. (14c) 1r-80r (defective): op. cit. 1-92, 21-22, 10-212 var.


e AM 231 fol. fragm. II (14c) 1r-v: op. cit. 31-34 var.

f AM 231 fol. fragm. IX (14c) 1r-2v: op. cit. 167-170 var., 181-184 var.

(e and f originally belonged to the same MS)

f AM 231 fol. fragm. III (14c) 1r-4v: op. cit. 45-49 var., 67-70 var., 94-97 var., 142-145 var.

f Holm 12 fol. fragm. VI (14c) 1r-v: op. cit. 151-154 var.

(P and P originally belonged to the same MS)

g AM 231 fol. fragm. V (14c) 1r-3v: op. cit. 108-111 var., 126-129 var., 162-166 var.

h AM 12 fol. fragm. V (14c) 1r-2v: op. cit. 177-180 var., 194-198 var.

(g and h originally belonged to the same MS)

h AM 231 fol. fragm. VI (14c) 1r-2v: op. cit. 111-113 var., 137-139 var.

h AM 233, 8o (from AM 104, 8o) 3 small fragments (14c): Kr. Kålund (ed.) in Arkiv för nordisk filologi XII (Lund 1896) 368-369, corresponding to Keyser and Unger op. cit. 132-134.

(h and h originally belonged to the same MS)

i AM 231 fol. fragm. VII (14c) 1r-2v: Keyser and Unger op. cit. 117-120 var., 126-129 var.
302 O. WIDDING, H. BEKKER-NIELSEN, L. K. SHOOK

j AM 231 fol. fragm. IV (15c) 1r-v: op. cit. 71-73 var.
k AM 231 fol. fragm. VIII (15c) 1r-2v: op. cit. 149-152 var., 165-169 var.
l AM 231 fol. fragm. X (15c) 1r-v: op. cit. 186-188 var.
m AM 668, 4o (15c) 2r-v + 4r-v (wrongly bound, defective), corresponding to op. cit. 49-52, 155-159.

n AM 696, 4o fragm. XVIII (15c) 1r-2v.
o NoRA, fragm. 64 (14c): op. cit. 169-171 var.

Note.

In the saga material about a few other saints is found. The saints listed below (with references to the edition) have been given special prominence.

St. Antony: 52-55.
St. Pelagia the Penitent: 87-90.
St. Thais: 90-93.
The sources of these anecdotes have not been studied in detail.

2. Barlaams saga ok Josaphats.

Holm 3 fol. (16c) 19r-25v.

Lit. Kr. Kaland, loc. cit. 367 and XIII (1897) 100; R. Keyser and C. R. Unger op. cit. iii-xxiv; KLNMI I, 342; Lehmann 81; Mogk 871 f.; Paasche 473; Widding, Bekker-NielsenMM 114.

BARTHOLOMEW

August 24

1. Bartholomeus saga postola. I.

a AM 645, 4o (13c) 33r-35v (defective): Cod645 99-108; Post 757-762.
b AM 652, 4o (13c) 6r-7v (defective): Post 754-757.

AM 630, 4o (paper, 17c) 16v-20v: Post 743-754.
c Codex Scardensis (14c) 86r-88v.

AM 628, 4o (paper, 18c) 41r-51r: Post 744-752 var.
d AM 656 I, 4o (c. 1600) 56r-61r (defective).
e AM 629, 4o (paper, 1697) 83r-96v.
f Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 50r-57r.

No prologue (ch. 1) or epilogue (translatio, ch. 9) in a, c, and d. Ch. 2-8 BHL 1002. Ch. 9 cf. BHL 1004 (?) in the same version as represented by 2.

2. Bartholomeus saga postola. II.

AM 655, 4o fragm. XII-XIII (13c) 3r-v: Post 762-766.

BHL 1002 and translatio BHL 1004 (?). See note above.


AM 237 b, fol. (14c) 1r-2r (defective).

4. Um Bartholomeus postola.

AM 672, 4o (15c) 55r-v.

Epitome.

Lit. Jónsson II, 872; Mogk 889; Turville-Petre 130; UngerP xxvi.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE            303

BASIL THE GREAT

1. Basilius saga.
   AM 655, 4o fragm. VI (13c) 1v-2r: ArnFragm 24-25.
   BHL 1022 (Morgenstern).

2. Basilius saga.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. II (14c) 2r-4v: ArnFragm 25-35.
   Cf. BHL 1022 with interpolations (Morgenstern).


On Basil in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III, note.

BEDE THE VENERABLE

May 27

   BHL 1075. Also Durandus, Rationale divinorum officiorum VII, 40, 1-2.

Lit. Th. Möbius op. cit. x; G. Turville-Petre op. cit. 104 ff. 120.

On Bede in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III, note.

BENEDICT

March 21

1. Benedictus saga.
   Holm 2 fol. (14c) 53r-57r: HMS I, 158-179.
   Cf. BHL 1102. Derived from the early translation of Gregory’s Dialogues, ii, AM 677, 4o et al.

Lit. Foote 24f.; Jónsson II, 874; Lehmann 44; Mogk 893; Paasche 297; UngerH x f.
   See Gregory’s Dialogues, below.

BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX

August 20

On Bernard in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

BLASE

February 3

   AM 655, 4o fragm. IX (12c) 2r-v: HMS I, 269-271.
   Steph 23 (paper, 18c) 84v-86r.
   Cf. BHL 1377.

   a AM 623, 4o (13c?) 19r-26r: Cod623 33-47; HMS I, 256-264, 265-269.
   b Holm 2 fol. (14c) 40v-43r: HMS I, 264-265, 256-269 var.
   Cf. BHL 1377.

3. Af Blasius.
   AM 672, 4o (15c) 61v-62r.
   Epitome of 2 (closer to 2b than to 2a; Foote).

Lit. Foote 23; Jónsson II, 874, 969; Mogk 891 f.; Turville-Petre 132 f.; UngerH xi.
BONIFACE IV  
On Boniface in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

BONIFACE OF TARSUS  
1. ÅF FRÚ AGLAIS.
   AM 657 a-b, 4° (14c) 56v-57v: Æventyri 19-21
   Cf. BHL 1413 (Gering).
   Lit. Hugo Gering in Æventyri II, 10 f.

BONITUS  
On Bonitus in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

BRENDAN THE VOYAGER  
1. BRANDANUS SAGA.
   NoRA, fragm. 68 (14c): HMS I, 272v-273g, 273h-27, 273h-274b, 274b-275%, 275b-275b.
   BHL 1436. Corresponding to ch. 64-115 in Selmer’s edition:
   Carl Selmer (ed.) Navigatio Santi Brendani Abbatis (Publications in
   Medieaval Studies XVI, Notre Dame 1959).
   Lit. Mogk 893; Paasche 457 f; UngerH xi.

CANUTE OF DENMARK  
The chapters on Canute in the Old Norse Knytingasaga (ed. Carl af Petersens and
Emil Olson in Sogur Danakomunga (Copenhagen 1919-1925) 27-294) cannot be
regarded as a proper Saint’s Life.
On this saga and its sources, see Gustav Albeck, Knytinga (Copenhagen 1946)
with references.

CANUTE LAVARD  
The chapters on Canute in the Old Norse Knytingasaga (ed. Carl af Petersens
and Emil Olson in Sogur Danakomunga (Copenhagen 1919-1925) 27-294) cannot be
regarded as a proper Saint’s Life.
On this saga and its sources, see Gustav Albeck, Knytinga (Copenhagen 1946)
with references.

CARITAS see Fides, Spes, and Caritas.

CASPAR see Three Holy Kings.

CATHERINE  
1. KATERINE SAGA.
   a  AM 233 a, fol. (14c) 16v-19r: HMS I, 400-421.
   b  Holm 2 fol. (14c) 74v-78r: HMS I, 400-401, 401-421 var.
   c  AM 429, 12o (c. 1500) 15v-27r: HMS I, 400-421 var.
   d  AM 238 fol. fragm. II (14c) 5r-v.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE

305

c  AM 667, 4º fragm. II (15c) 1r-2v: (variant reading interpolated HMS I, 404º).
   Cf. BHL 1659, 1660. Additional material from BHL 1657, 1663, 1667 (Foote).

2. KATERINE SAGA (miracles).
   AM 180 b, fol. (15c) 5r-8v.
   A version of the Translatio Rotomagum et miracula,
   BHL Suppl. 1679 b (Foote).

Lit. Foote 26; Mqk 891; UngerH xiii.

CECILIA

November 22

1. CECILIUS SAGA
   a  Holm 2 fol. (14c) 80r-82v (defective): HMS I, 276-279º, 289º-297.
   b  AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 66v-68v (defective): HMS I, 274º-276, 276-279º var.
   c  AM 429, 12º (c. 1500) 29r-45v: HMS I, 287-289º, 276-297 var.
      BHL 1495 (ch. 1-2 omitted; Foote) with additional material (2
      Icelandic miracles).

Lit. Foote 26 f.; Jónsson II, 874; Lehmann 44; Mqk 891; UngerH xi.

CELESTINE V see Peter Celestine.

CHARLEMAGNE

January 28

The Old Norse Karlamagnús saga ok kappa hans (ed. C. R. Unger, Christiania 1860)
cannot be regarded as a proper Saint’s Life. Frá Karlamagnúsí, Æventyri 34-43 is
a parallel to the saga, Unger’s edition 541-547.
On the saga and its sources, see E. F. Halvorsen, The Norse Version of the Chanson
de Roland (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XIX, Copenhagen 1959) with references.
See also Hugo Gering, Æventyri II, 27 f.

CHRISTOPHER

July 25

1. CHRISTODORUS SAGA.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 66v-70v.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 82b-83d.

Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 and MM 117.

CHRYSTOSOTOM see John Chrysostom.

CLEMENT I

November 23

1. CLEMENS SAGA.
   AM 645, 4º (13c) 11r-24v: Cod645 33-74; Post 126-151.
   Cf. BHL 6644 (Unger) Ch. 50-58 and 60-73 of Petrs saga postola, I,
   depend on Clemens saga.

2. CLEMENS SAGA.
   AM 655, 4º fragm. XXVIII a (13c) 1r-v.

Lit. Mqk 890; Turville-Petre 129 f.; UngerP xvi f.
   See also Peter the Apostle.
CROSS, THE HOLY

I. The Origin of the True Cross.

1. Huadan kominn er kross drottnis. Origo Crucis.

AM 544, 4º - Hauksbök (14c) 17r-18v: E. Jónsson and F. Jónsson (ed.), Hauksbök (Copenhagen 1892-1896) 182-185; HMS I, 298-301; Th. Möbius (ed.), Analecta Norrøna² (Leipzig 1877) 204-207.


2. Úm kross dróttins.

AM 667, 4º fragm. V (c. 1500) 6r-v.

"It is certain that AM 667, 4º, V, which follows the Latin original more closely than Hb [i.e. Hauksbök, l. above] does, cannot be derived from the latter" (Helgason). The text follows Meyer, op. cit. §§ 12-15; note, however, that it has been supplemented from a (presumably) Low German source, similar to "Van deme hylligen Kruce als dat ghevunden waert", Pass 24a ff.


AM 65 a, 8º (paper, 17c) 59r-64v.

The text agrees in the main with 1 until 1854 (Helgason). From 61r-63r it cannot be compared with any of the mediaeval texts in Old Norse.

4. Huadan kominn er kross dróttins.

Holm 4, 8º (paper, 17c) 113r-115v.

Extract of a text similar to 3. The text 113r-115r is comparable to 3. 61r-63r.

5. Nockud Minnelegt um Forfoduren Adam.

Kall 614, 4º (paper, 18c) 171r-175v.

Cf. Meyer, op. cit. §§ 3-26. The text covers the whole of Meyer’s Latin text, except §§ 1-2; it is impossible to establish any direct genetic connections between this version and versions 1-4 above. Nothing indicates that it can be derived from a mediaeval tradition in Old Norse.

The story of Seth’s journey and the Cross is used by Jón Guðmundsson lærdi in his Tíðforðir (1644), AM 727, 4º II (author’s autograph, on paper), and is also found elsewhere in late paper manuscripts, e.g. Nks 1140 fol. (18c), and summarized in e.g. AM 281, 4º and AM 597 b, 4º (17c)].

II. The Invention of the Cross.

1. Inventio Crucis.

NoRA fragm. 75 (13c) 1r-v.


2. Inventio Crucis.

a AM 238 fol. fragm. XI (14c) 1r-2v: HMS I, 301-308.

b AM 233 fol. (14c) 28v-29r: HMS I, 301-308 var.

Cf. BHL 4169 with additional material. The Old Norse text is incomplete, breaking off on p. 10 of Holders’ edition of the Latin text.

3. See I, 2, above which deals in part with the Invention of the Cross.

III. The Flagellation of the Cross.

1. Flagellatio Crucis.

a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 85v-86v: HMS I, 308-311.

b AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 55r-56v: HMS I, 308-311 var.
“This is an abridged version of the miracle-story, derived from the recension BHL 4230” (Foote).

Lit. Foote 28; Jón Helgason, Haukštöór (Manuscripta Islandica V, Copenhagen 1961) introduction xiv (with references); Jónsson II, 931; Lehmann 44; Mogk 890; Th. Möbius, op. cit. ix f.; Turville-Petre 114, 131; UngerH xi f.

CUNEGRUND see Henry and Cunegund.

CUTHBERT March 20
1. [Af Cuthberto].
   \textit{AM} 764, \textit{4o} (14c) 36r 1-s (defective).
   Cf. BHL 2021 (extracts from ch. 38-39).

CYPRIAN AND JUSTINA September 26
1. \textit{Exemplum Af Sancte Sipriano Peim Gooda Manne}.
   \textit{AM} 629, \textit{4o} (paper, 1697) 190v-192r.
   A version of the well-known fable from an unknown source.

DIONYSIUS October 9
1. Dionysius saga.
   a \textit{Holm} 2 fol. (14c) 19r-20v: HMS I, 312-322.
   b \textit{AM} 235 fol. (c. 1400) 52r-55v: HMS I, 312-322 var.
   Cf. BHL 2175 with additional material (Foote).

Lit. Foote 22; Lehmann 44; UngerH xii.

DOMINIC August 4
1. Dominicus saga.
   \textit{Holm} 3 fol. (16c) 131v-134v (defective).
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 98c-101c.

Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 248 and MM 123 f.
   On Dominic in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

DOROTHY February 6
1. Dorotheu saga.
   \textit{AM} 429, \textit{12o} (c. 1500) 49r-57r: HMS I, 322-328.
   Cf. BHL 2324 (Unger, Lehmann).

Lit. Lehmann 44; Mogk 891; UngerH xii.

DUNSTAN May 19
1. Dunstanus saga.
   \textit{AM} 180 b, fol. (15c) 1r-5v: Gudbr. Vigfusson (ed.), \textit{Icelandic Sagas} II (London 1887) 385-408.
   \textit{NKS} 267 fol. (paper,16c) 1r-24v.
   Cf. BHL 2343 and 2346 with additional material (Harty).
2. AF HINUM HELGA DUNSTANO.
   a  AM 637 a-b, 4o (14c) 39r-v: Æventyri 46-47.
   b  AM 238 fol. fragm. XXI (15c) 2r: Æventyri 47 var. On sources and parallels, see Gering’s commentary Æventyri II, 31 f.


On Dunstan in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

EDMUND

November 20

In his Íslendingabók Ari Porgilsson († 1148) mentions a “saga” of St. Edmund; and only recently Hermann Pálsson, in his “Játmundar saga hins helga”, Skírnir CXXXI (1957) 139-151, has defended the older notion that Ari was referring to an Icelandic document. However, most agree that “the saga Ari cites can only be Abbo of Fleury’s Latin Life of the Saint or the Old English homily based upon Abbo by Aelfric.” (A. H. Smith, “The Early Literary Relations of England and Scandinavia”, Saga-Book XI, 3 (1936) 215-232, and spec. 230 f.).

EDMUND RICH

November 16

On Edmund in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

EDWARD THE CONFESSION

October 13

1. SAGA JÁTVARDAR KONÚNGS HINS HELGA.
   a  Holm 5 fol. (14c) 69r-72v: C. C. Rahn and Jón Sigurðsson (edd.), Annaler for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie (Copenhagen 1852) 10-42; Gudbr. Vígfnsson (ed.), Icelandic Sagas I (London 1887) 388-400.
   Holm 55 fol. (paper, 1688) 1r-19v.
   AM 663 a, 4o (paper, 17c) 1r-14v.
   Nks 514, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-24v.
   AM 663 e, 4o (paper, c. 1700) 1r-19v.
   Rask 29 (paper, 18c) 305r-313v.
   Nks 1148 fol. (paper, 18c) 398r-404r.
   Nks 1733, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-19v.
   Kall 249 fol. (paper, 18c) 1r-12v.
   AM 950, 4o (paper, 18c) 6v-22v.
   AM 237, 8o (paper, c. 1800) 115r-120v.
   c  AM 238 fol. fragm. XVI (15c) 1r-v.
   d  AM 663 b, 4o (paper, 17c) 1r-7v.

Compiled from various sources (cf. Rogers).

2. FRÁ SÝN EDVARDÆS KONÚNGS.
   AM 764, 4o (14c) 57r.

LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE


EGIDIUS see Giles.

ELIZABETH OF SCHÖNAU

June 18

1. Elisabeth of Schönau’s visions...


Cf. BHL 2485 (esp. BHL 5355). A separate recension of the vision in which E learned about the Assumption of Mary; also included in the saga of Guðmundr 3 (Bisk II 151-154); and in Mar see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.


ERASMUS

June 2

1. Erasmus Saga.

AM 655, 4° fragm. V (13c) 1r-2v: ArnFragm 14-22; HMS I, 363-368.

Probably based on one of the recensions of the Latin Passio (BHL 2578-82); not fully investigated.

Cf. BHL 2580 (Unger).

2. Erasmus Saga.

Holm 3 fol. (16c) 100r-104v.

Translated from Low German. Cf. Pass 33c-36b.

Lit. UngerH xiii, Widding, Bekker-Nielsen MM 120 f.

EUSEBIUS OF VERCELLI

On Eusebius in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

EUSTACE

September 20

1. Placidus Saga. Appendix II.

AM 655, 4° fragm. IX (12c) 1r-v: HMS II, 207-209.

Cf. BHL 2760.

2. Placidus Saga.

a AM 655, 4° fragm. X (13c) 1v-2v: HMS II, 204-207 (Appendix I).

b Holm 8, 8° (paper, 17c) 136r-140v: HMS II, 193-203.

c Holm 31, 4° (paper, 17c) 31v (defective).

Cf. BHL 2760.

3. Placidus Saga. Appendix III.

AM 696, 4° fragm. III (c. 1400) 2r-v: HMS II, 209-210. Epitome of 1 or 2 (?)..

Lit. Jónsson II, 874 and “Plácitúsdrápa,” Opuscula philologica (Copenhagen 1887) 254-258; Lehmann 45; Mogk 890 f.; Turville-Petre 131 f.; Unger H xx.
FIDES, SPES, AND CARITAS
August 1

1. Fides Spes Caritas.
   a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 85r-v (defective): HMS I, 372a-376.
   c AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 36v-38v: HMS I, 372b-38a, 369-376 var.
   d AM 429, 12s (c. 1500) 81r-84v (defective); HMS I, 369-372 var.

   The Latin source was a form of the Passio, BHL 2971 (Foote).

Lit. Foote 28; Jónsson II, 931; Lehmann 44; Mogk 891; UngerH xiii.

FORTY ARMENIAN MARTYRS
March 10

   Cf. BHL 7539.

2. Quadranginta Militum Passio. Appendix.
   AM 655, 4o fragm. XXXIII (13c) 1r-v: HMS II, 219-221.
   Cf. BHL 7539.

Lit. Jónsson II, 874; Lehmann 45; Mogk 892; UngerH xx.

FRANCIS OF ASSISI
October 4

On Francis in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

FULBERT OF CHARTRES
April 10

On Fulbert in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

GANGULPHUS
May 11

1. Af Sindulfo ok hans frú.
   AM 637 a-b, 4o (14c) 57r-58v: Æventyri 28-30.

   Ultimately related to BHL 3328 (Gering).

Lit. Hugo Gering in Æventyri II, 18 f.

GEORGE THE GREAT
April 23

1. Georgius saga.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 70v-78v + 47v-54r.

   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 7b-13d.

Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 and MM 117 f.

GILES
September 1

1. Egidius saga hins helga.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. XVI (15c) 2r-v.

   Cf. BHL 93.

GREGORIUS PECCATOR see Gregory on the Stone.
GREGORY THE GREAT.

March 12

1. Gregorius saga.
   a NoRA fragm. 71 (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\): HMS I, 395-396.
   b AM 921, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) fragm. IV,2 (c. 1300) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-2\(\frac{v}{v}\): ArnFragm 47-49.
   c Holm 2 fol. (14c) 29\(\frac{r}{r}\)-34\(\frac{v}{v}\) (defective): HMS I, 377-395.
   d AM 238 fol. fragm. X (14c) 2\(\frac{r}{v}\).

   Based on BHL 3640 and 3641 (cf. Foote).

2. [A\(\bar{F}\) Gregorio].
   AM 764, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) (14c) 18 bis\(\frac{r}{v}\).

   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 33\(\frac{v}{v}\)-38\(\frac{v}{v}\).
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 374d-378a.


On Gregory in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

GREGORY’S DIALOGUES.

1. Fragmenter af Gregors Dialoger. (Benedictus saga. Appendix).
   a AM 677, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) (13c) 25\(\frac{r}{r}\)-41\(\frac{v}{v}\) (defective): HMS I, 198-241\(\frac{r}{r}\), 242\(\frac{r}{r}\)-250; Porvaldur Bjarnarson (ed.), Leifar forfra kristina fræða þilenzkra (Copenhagen 1878) 87-150.

   (Note that the MS is wrongly bound, and that Leifar follows the MS; the correct sequence (used in HMS) is: 29\(\frac{r}{r}\)-31\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 40\(\frac{r}{r}\)-41\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 32\(\frac{r}{r}\)-33\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 29\(\frac{r}{r}\)-28\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 34\(\frac{r}{r}\)-39\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 35\(\frac{r}{r}\)-39\(\frac{v}{v}\).
   b AM 239 fol. (14c) 101\(\frac{v}{v}\)-109\(\frac{v}{v}\) (defective): HMS I, 179-198, 198-211 var.
   c NoRA fragm. 77 C\(\frac{o}{o}\) r (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v: HMS I, 188-193 lower text.
   d NoRA fragm. 77 C\(\frac{o}{o}\) r (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-2\(\frac{v}{v}\): HMS I, 250-255.
   e NoRA fragm. 77 C\(\frac{o}{o}\) r (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v: HMS I, 207-211 var.
   f\(\text{a}\) NoRA fragm. 72 (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v: HMS I, 241\(\frac{r}{r}\)-242\(\frac{r}{r}\).
   f\(\text{b}\) NoRA fragm. 76 (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v.

   (P and P\(\text{b}\) originally belonged to the same MS).
   g NoRA fragm. 71 (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\): HMS I, 234\(\frac{v}{v}\)-244 var.
   h NoRA fragm. 72 b (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v.
   i AM 655, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) fragm. XV (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-v: HMS I, 228-229 var.
   j AM 921, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) fragm. IV, J (13c) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-2\(\frac{v}{v}\): ArnFragm 44-47.
   k AM 667, 4\(\frac{o}{o}\) fragm. XIV (c. 1400) 1\(\frac{r}{r}\)-2\(\frac{v}{v}\).

   Cf. BHL 6542.


GREGORY ON THE STONE

1. Gregorius saga biskups.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 84\(\frac{r}{r}\)-86\(\frac{v}{v}\) + 31\(\frac{r}{r}\)-33\(\frac{v}{v}\).
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 281b-284d.

Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 f. and MM 118.
GREGORY THAUMATURGUS

See Barlaam and Josaphat 1, note.

GUÐMUNDUR THE GOOD.

March 16

1. Saga Guðmundar Arasonar Hóla-biskups, hin elzta.
   c AM 220 fol. fragm. I (14c) 1r-2v.
   d AM 220 fol. fragm. II (c. 1500) 1r-2v.

   a AM 657 c, 4° (14c) 13r-51v (defective): Bisk I, 559-604, 608-613; select variant readings cited in the edition of 1.
   b AM 204 fol. (paper, 17c) 48r-71v: Bisk I, 604-608, 613-618.
   c Lbs. fragm. 5 (14c) 1r-2v: Jakob Benediktsson (ed.), “Nokkur handritabrot,” Skjálfr CXXV (1951) 183-188.

Versions 1 and 2 (the so-called Míðsaga) are interrelated, and may be compared with parts of the Sturlungasaga. MSS of the Sturlungasaga are not listed here, since this saga does not belong to hagiographic literature. There are other MSS containing the Guðmundarsaga (e.g. AM 401, 4°, Holm 4, 4°, Kall 256 fol.) all late paper MSS whose interrelation has not yet been definitely established.

3. (Arngrím [Brandson ?];) Saga Guðmundar Arasonar Hóla-biskups.
   a Holm 5 fol. (14c) 1v-46v: Bisk II, 3-134.
   b Holm 2 fol. (paper, 1689) 1r-238v.
   c AM 219 fol. (14c) 11r-17v (defective): select variant readings in Bisk II 42-180.
   d JS fragm. 6 (14c) 1r-v.
   e JS fragm. 5 (14c) 1r-v.

(b1, b2 and b3 originally belonged to the MS).

   a AM 396, 4° (c. 1400) 1r-42v (defective): Bisk II, 1-20 var., 57-104 var., 108-144 var.

   AM Fragment in þjónminjasæfn Islands, n° 176 (c. 1400) 1r-v: Jón Pörkelsson (ed.), Nokkur blöð Úr Hauksbók og Broð Úr Guðmundarsögu (Reykjavík 1865) 43-47.

   a AM 220 fol. fragm. III (15c) 1r-2v.
   b AM 220 fol. fragm IV (15c) 1r-2v.
   c AM 220 fol. fragm V (15c) 1r-v.
   d AM 398, 4° (paper, 17c) 1r-105v: Bisk II, 184-187, 3-165 var.
   e AM 397, 4° (paper, c. 1700) 1r-170v.

(i and j arc mutually independent copies of a now lost MS (Bibliotheca Reseniana) that was related to b 1-3).

A translation of Arngrím’s Latin vita (now lost).

Lit. Jakob Benediktsson, op. cit. 183, 189 f.; Jón Helgason, Byskupa sogur (photogr. ed. of 3 a, in Corpus Codicum Islandicorum Medii Aevi XIX, Copenhagen
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE


GUY see Vitus

HALLVARD

May 14

1. HALLVÄRS SAGA.

a AM 238 fol. fragm. VIII (15c) 1v: HMS I, 396–418.
   AM 670 l, 4º (paper, 18c) 67–71.

b AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 1r (defective): HMS I, 396–47.
   It is possible that a now lost, fuller version of BHL 3750 was the source
   (Storm).

Lit. Jónsson II, 875; Mogk 895; Gustav Storm, introduction to Monumenta historica
   Norvegiae (Christiania 1880) xlv; UngerH xiii.

HENRY AND CUNEGUND

July 15, March 3

1. HINRIKS SAGA KÉISERA OK FRÚ KUNEGUNDIS.

   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 7–14r.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 58a-60d + 60d-62a.

Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 and MM 113.

HERMAN THE CRIPPLE

September 25

On Herman in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

HIPPOLYTUS AND CONCORDIA see Laurence of Rome.

HUGH OF BONNEVEAUX

April 1

On Hugh in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

HUGH THE GREAT OF CLUNY

April 29

On Hugh in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

ILDEPHONSUS

January 23

On Ildephonsus in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

JAMES THE GREATER

July 25

1. JACOB SAGA POSTOLA. I.

   a AM 645, 4º (13c) 30r-33r: Cod645 90-99; Post 524-529.
b AM 652, 4° (13c) 5r-6r (defective): Post 521-523.
AM 630, 4° (paper, 17c) 12v-16r: Post 513-521.
c AM 656 I, 4° (c. 1600) 56r-v (defective).
d AM 659 b, 4° (17c) 1v-2v (defective).
e AM 629, 4° (paper, 1697) 73r-82v.
f Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 43r-48v.
BHL 4057 (Passio in b etc. supplemented from Speculum Ecclesiae,
Migne PL 172, 981 ff. (ch. 1 and 4 in b).

2. JACOBS SAGA POSTOLA. II.
AM 655, 4° fragm. XII-XIII (13c) 2r-v: Post 529-533.
Separate recension of 1b, cf. BHL 4057 and Speculum Ecclesiae.

3. JACOBS SAGA POSTOLA. III.
AM 656 I, 4° (14c) 50r-v (defective): Post 534-535.
Cf. BHL 4057.

4. JACOBS SAGA POSTOLA.
AM 667, 4° fragm. V (c. 1500) 2r-3v.
Translated from a Low German source. Can partly be compared with Pass
79d ff.

5. JACOBS SAGA POSTOLA.
AM 667, 4° fragm. XI (c. 1400 [better late 15th cent.]) 1r-v.
Presumably translated from Low German.

Lit. Peter G. Foote, The Pseudo-Turpin Chronicle in Iceland (London Mediaeval Stu-
dies: Monograph No. 4, London 1959) 9, 49; Jónsson II, 871; Mogk 888;
Turville-Petre 130; UngerP xxiii.
See also John the Evangelist II.

JAMES THE LESS

May 1

1. SAGA JACOBS POSTOLA.
a AM 630, 4° (paper, 17c) 63r-64v: Post 737-740.
b AM 659 a, 4° (17c) 31r-33v.
(a and b are copies of AM 652, 4° (see James the Greater, 1, b), made when
this MS was still complete).
c AM 629, 4° (paper, 1697) 165r-168r.
d Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 48r-50v.
e Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 138r-140r.

2. DE SANCTO JACOBO APOSTOLO.
a Codex Scardensis (14c) 86r.
AM 628, 4° (paper, 18c) 39r-41r: Post 742-743.
b AM 238 fol. fragm. XI (14c) 1r: Post 742-743 var. 1 and 2 are probably based
on the same source, which has not yet been found, however.

Lit. Jónsson II, 871 f.; Mogk 889; UngerP xxvi.

JÅTVARÐR see Edward the Confessor.

JEROME

September 30

1. HIERONYMUS SAGA.
Holm 3 fol. (16c) 116r-124r.
Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 208d-216c.
JOHN THE ALMONER
On John in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

JOHN THE BAPTIST
1. Jóns saga baptista. I.
   a AM 625, 4° (13c) 41v-49v (defective): Post 842-849.
      AM 669 b, 4° (paper, 18c) 1r-15r.
      (Note that the copy (669 b) was made when AM 625, 4° (above 1, a) was still complete).
   b AM 238 fol. fragm. VIII (15c) 2r-v.
   c AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 1r-2v (defective).
      The text is largely dependent on the biblical accounts (Lilli Gjerløw in KLN M VII); no foreign source following the same lines has been found.
2. (Grímr Hólmsteinsson:) Jóns saga baptista. II.
   a AM 232 fol. (14c) 86*-107v: Post 850-931.
      AM 637, 4° (paper, 18c) 4r-150v.
   b AM 233 a, fol. (14c) 1r-5r (defective): Post 849-850, 850-852 var., 873-885 var., 925-931 var.
      AM 233 b, fol. (paper, c. 1700) 1r-3r (prologue only).
      AM 637, 4° (paper, 18c) 1r-3v (prologue).
   d AM 236 fol. (c. 1600) 66r-71r (defective): Post 903-919 var., 926-931 var.
   e AM 651, 4° (14c) 99r-100v (defective): Post 924-925 var., 928-929 var.
   e² AM 385, 4° I (14c) 1r-2v (defective): Agnes Agerschou (ed.), ‘Et fragment af Jóns saga baptista’, Opuscula I (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XX, Copenhagen 1960) 101-104.
      (e² and e² originally belonged to the same MS).
   f AM 236 fol. fragm. IX (c. 1400) 1r-2v.
   g AM 667, 4° fragm. IX (14c) 1r-2v.
   h AM 667, 4° fragm. XII (15c) 1r-2v.
      Compiled by G. H. († 1298) from various sources cited by the compiler (cf. Lilli Gjerløw in KLN M VII).
   AM 237 b, fol. (14c) 2v (defective).

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM
1. Johannes saga gullmunns.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 108r-112v.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 347a-349b + 349b-351a.
   Lit. Widding, Bekker-Nielsen GR 250 and MM 121.

JOHN DAMASCENE
On John in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.
JOHN THE EVANGELIST

I.

1. Jons saga postola. I.
   a AM 652, 4o (13c) 1r-4v (defective): Post 436-443.
   b AM 639, 4o (paper, 17c) 1v-12v: Post 412-496.
   c AM 659 b, 4o (17c) 1r (defective).
   d AM 629, 4o (paper, 1697) 44r-72v.
   e Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 24r-43r.
      Compiled from various sources, e.g. BHL 4320, 4324.

2. Jons saga postola. II.
   AM 656 I, 4o (14c) 39v-44r: Post 445-454.
      Cf. BHL 4320 (and 4324).

   AM 623, 4o (13c ?) 6r-15r: Cod623 9-25; Post 455-465.
      Cf. BHL 4320.

4. Jons saga postola. IV.
   AM 649 a, 4o (14c) 1 bisr-4v + 6r-48r, (16c) 5r-v: Post 466-513.
   AM 649 b, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-5v (extracts).
   Revised recension of 1-3 with additional material, e.g. the story of St. Marcellinus (see Marcellinus 1).

5. Jons saga postola.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. IV (15c) 1r-v.
      Abridged version of 1-3.

   AM 655, 4o fragm. XIV (13c) 1r-v.
      Abridged version of 1 (-3).

II.

1. Tveggja postola saga Jons ok Jacobs.
   a Codex Scardensis (14c) 40r-81v.
      AM 636, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-200r: Post 536-639m, 643w-711.
   b AM 239 fol. (14c) 1r-35v (defective): Post 536-540 var., 547-554 var., 557-604 var., 649-677 var., 680-691 var., 694-699 var.
   c AM 651, 4o (c. 1400) 1 ter-r-98v (defective): Post 642v-643m, 536-694 var.
      AM 632, 4o (18c) 1r-111v.
   d AM 650 a, 4o (c. 1400) 1r-4v (defective): Post 639w-642l, 639-648 var.
   e AM 653 b, 4o fragm. I (14c) 1r-2v: Post 536-538 var., 543-546 var.
   f AM 653 b, 4o fragm. II (14c) 1r-2v: Post 536-538 var.
   g AM 653 a, 4o (14c) 1r-9v (defective): Post 562-565 var., 574-576 var., 584-589 var., 598-601 var., 663-670 var., 694-697 var., 700-703 var.
   h AM 236 fol. (c. 1600) 1r-42v (defective): Post 672-673 lower text, 536-567 var., 582-600 var., 602-672 var.
   i Lbs. 2454, 8o (14c) 1r-2v.
   j JS fragm. 7 (14c) 1r-2v.
      A composite text. For the life of St. John: cf. BHL 4320, for the life of St. James: cf. James the Greater 1-3. Material has been added from other sources, e.g. the Pseudo-Turpin Chronicle and Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum historiale (cf. Foote).
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE


JOHN OF HÓLAR see Jón.

JÓN OF HÓLAR

April 23

1. (Gunnlaugr Leifsson:) Jóns saga helga hin elzt.
   a AM 221 fol. (13c) 1r-4r (defective): Bisk I, 182-192 var., 199-202 var.
   AM 393, 4o (paper, c. 1700) 1r-52r.
   Kall 619, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-67r.
   Thott 1770, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-51v.
   c AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 10v-12r (defective): Bisk I, 151-161 var.
   d AM 391, 4o (paper, c. 1700) 1r-35v.
   e Rask 30 (paper, c. 1800) 107r-133v.
   f Kall 616, 4o (paper, 18c) 97r-107v.
   g Kall 618, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-31v.

   a AM 392, 4o (paper, 17c) 1r-39v: Bisk I, 203-212; selected variant readings cited in the edition of 1.
   b Holm 4, 4o (paper, 17c) 224r-251v.
   c AM 391, 4o (paper, c. 1700) 37v-65r (excerpts mainly from a, but also from other MSS).

3. (Gunnlaugr Leifsson:) Jóns saga hins helga.
   Holm 2 fol. (paper, 1689) 248r-306v.
   (b contains a section omitted in a).
   c AM 205 fol. (paper, 1644) 46r-71r.
   d AM 210 fol. (paper, 17c) 15r-18v (defective).
   e AM 396 fol. (paper, 1676) 50r-65v.
   f NKS 1202 fol. (paper, 1768) 1r-18v.
   g Thott 1748, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-67v.
   1-3 are recensions of a translation of G. L.'s Latin *vita* (now lost). The questions of their relationship and age have not been finally answered; however it is generally admitted that 1 is older than 3 (Widding, Sveinsson).

   *NoRA* fragm. 57 (14c) 1r-7v. Seems to be a conflation of 1 and 3.
   [The Latin version found in two late paper MSS: AM 222 fol. (c. 1700, Árni Magnússon's autograph) and its copy NKS 1201 fol. (18c), is a translation of 1 d above, made by Árni Magnússon for the Bollandists.]


JOSAPHAT see Barlaam and Josaphat.

JUDE THADDAEUS see Simon and Jude.

JUSTINA see Cyprian and Justina.

LANFRANC OF CANTERBURY May 28

1. AP LANFRANCO.
   AM 657 a-b, 4° (14c) 23v-25v (defective): Æventyri 298-305.
   "Ein mosaik verschieden den stellen des Speculum historiale" (Gering), BHL Lanfrancus n° 5.
   Lit. Hugo Gering in Æventyri II, 240 f.

LAURENCE OF ROME August 10

1. LAURENTIUS SAGA.
   a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 49r-51v: HMS I, 422-432.
   b AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 38r-41r: HMS I, 422-432 var.
      Ch. 1-3: BHL 7802, ch. 4-7: BHL 4754, ch. 8: BHL 3961 (cf. Foote).

2. DECIUS SAGA KEISARA, SIXTUS PÁFA, LAURENTIUS, CONCORDIA OK HIPPOLYTUS.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 62r-66v.
   Based on a recension of 1, and supplemented from Pass.
   Lit. Foote 24; Lehmann 44; Mogk 891; UngerH xiii; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 252 and MM 116 f.

LAZARUS December 17

1. LAZARUS SAGA.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 87v-92v.
   A composite work, mainly translated from Low German, cf. Pass 5d-7b, 85d.
   Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 and MM 115.

LEO THE GREAT April 11

On Leo in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

LEONARD OF NOBLAC November 6

There is no Old Norse life of St. Leonard, but a section of his vita (BHL 4862) is the source of a prayer found in Icelandic MSS from c. 1500.
On the prayer, see Hans Bekker-Nielsen, "En god bøn," Opuscula II, 1 (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XXV, 1, Copenhagen 1961) 52-58 with references.
LUCY OF SYRACUSE

1. **Lucie saga.**
   *Holm 2 fol.* (14c) 79r-80r: HMS I, 433-436.
2. **Om... St. Lucia.**
   *AM 921, 4º fragm.* V (14c) 1r-v.
   Cf. BHL 4992. 1 and 2 appear to be independently derived from the same original (Foote).

`Lit. Foote 26; UngerH xiii.`

**MAGI** see Three Holy Kings.

MAGNUS

1. **Magnúss saga. II.**
2. **Magnúss saga. I.**
   b. *AM 351, 4º* (paper, c. 1700) 1r-22r.
   Kall 263 fol. (paper, 18c) 1r-37r.
   c. *AM 352, 4º* (paper, 17c) 1r-23r.
   d. *NKS 1218 fol.* (paper, 18c) 1r-43r.
   e. *NKS 1786, 4º* (paper, 18c) 1r-61r.
   (a-e are copies of the same MS on vellum (Bœjarbók á Rauðasandi), now lost).

The problems of the relation between 1 and 2 have not been solved: 1 includes matter from a now lost Latin *vita* by a certain Master Rödbert; 1 and 2 are moreover related to the section on St. Magnus in the composite *Orkneyinga saga* (ed. S. Nordal, Copenhagen 1913-16; G. Vigfusson, *op. cit.*).

`Lit. Jónsson II, 651 f.; Mogk 817; Paasche 455; Einar Ólafur Sveinsson, *Sagnaritin Oddaverja* (Studia Islandica I, Reykjavík 1937)19-34 with references; G. Vigfusson, *op. cit.*, Introduction xii f., xxxiv f.`

MALCHUS

1. **Malcus saga.**
   *AM 764, 4º* (14c) 27r-30r: HMS I, 437-446.
   Cf. BHL 5190.

`Lit. Lehmann 44; Mogk 892; UngerH xiii.`

MARCELLINUS

1. **Af Marcellino páfa.**
   *AM 657 a-b, 4º* (14c) 55r-56r: Æventyri 16-19; HMS I, 714-716.
   A separate recension of the story also found in John the Ev. I. 4. On the sources see H. Gering in Æventyri II, 9.

`Lit. Jónsson II, 874; UngerH xv.`
MARGARET

1. Margretar saga.
   a. *AM 235 fol.* (c. 1400) 17r-19r: HMS I, 474-481.
   b. *AM 233 a, fol.* (14c) 27r-v (defective): HMS I, 477 lower text, 474-476 var.
   c. *AM 433 c, 12o* (c. 1500) 1r-24r.
   d. *AM 428 b, 12o* (c. 1400) 1r-2v (defective).
   e. *NKS 1265 fol.* II fragm. I. (16c) 1r-2v.
   Cf. BHL 5303, most closely followed in c, which has moreover been occasionally supplemented from 3 below.

2. Margrétar saga.
   a. *AM 428 a, 12o* (14c) 1v-15r.
   b. *AM 429, 12o* (c. 1500) 2r-13r.
   Cf. BHL 5303. A separate translation that omits the introductory section. The selection of material from the Latin source differs widely from that of 1.

3. Margrétar saga.
   a. *AM 667, 4o fragm.* I (14c) 1r-2v.
   b. *AM 430, 12o* (15c) 1r-33v (defective).
   c. *AM 431, 12o* (c. 1500) 1r-21r.
   d. *AM 432, 12o* (15c) 1v-84v (defective).
   e. *AM 433 a, 12o* (c. 1500) 1r-43r (defective).
   f. *AM 433 b, 12o* (c. 1500) 2r-57r.
   g. *AM 433 d, 12o* (16c) 1r-22r.
   h. *AM 667, 4o fragm.* VIII (15c) 1r-v.

   A composite text, ultimately related to BHL 5303 and 5308. The textual relationship of the three versions has not so far been thoroughly investigated.


MARINA (MARINUS)

1. Af Marinu munk.
   *AM 657 a-b, 4o* (14c) 43v-v: Æventyri 149-151.
   A close parallel to *Speculum Ecclesie*, Migne PL 172, 1053 f. (Vrátyn).


MARK

1. Markús saga postola.
   *AM 667, 4o fragm.* V (c. 1500) 5r-v + 7 (3 small fragments).
   Presumably translated from Low German.

MARTHA AND MARY MAGDALEN

1. Marthe saga ok Marie Magdalene.
   c. *AM 235 fol.* (c. 1400) 19r-30r: HMS I, 513-553 var.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE

321

d *NoRA* fragm. 79 (14c) the 2 smaller fragments.

Chiefly based on the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais with additional material (cf. Foote).

2. [AF MARTHA].

*AM* 764, 4º (14c) 15v-16r.

Extracts of 1, ch. 15 and 26.

Lit. Foote 25 f.; Jónsson II, 874; Lehmann 45; Mogk 890; UngerH xiv.

MARTIN OF TOURS

November 11

1. Martinus saga byskups. I.

*AM* 645, 4º (13c) 55v-66v (defective): HMS I, 554-574.

Cf. BHL 5610, with additional material from BHL 5611, 5615, 5616.

2. Martinus saga byskups. II.

*AM* 235 fol. (c. 1400) 57v-66v: HMS I, 575-607.

Cf. 1 above, supplemented from BHL 5612, 5613, 5619, 5621, 5622 5623 (Foote).

3. Martinus saga byskups. III.

*Holm* 2 fol. (14c) 2r-9v: HMS I, 607-642.

Cf. 2 above, with additional material (cf. Foote).


*AM* 655, 4º fragm. XXXI (14c) 1r-3v.

Cf. BHL 5615: fol. 1-2, BHL 5623: fol. 3 (Foote).

Lit. Foote 20; Jónsson II, 874; Lehmann 45; UngerH xiv f.

MARY THE BLESSED VIRGIN

August 15

I. The Life of Mary.

1. Mariu saga.

a *AM* 240 fol. fragm. XI (13c) 1r-v: Mar 377-380 var.

b *AM* 240 fol. fragm. XIV (c. 1300) 1r-v: Mar 393-396 var.

c *AM* 240 fol. fragm. II (c. 1300) 1r-v: Mar 393-398 var.

d *Holm* 11, 4º (14c) 1r-26v: Mar 1-62.


f *AM* 232 fol. (14c) 55v-66v: Mar xii-xiii, 1-62 var.

g *AM* 240 fol. fragm. I (14c) 1r-2v: Mar 360-366 var.

h *AM* 240 fol. fragm. IX (14c) 1r-v: Mar 332-339 (prologue).

i *NoRA* fragm. 78 (14c) 1r.

j *AM* 656 I, 4º (14c) 1v-17v (defective).

k *AM* 233 a, fol. (14c) 5r-v (defective).

l *NoRA* fragm. 79 (14c) the 2 larger fragments.

m *AM* 240 fol. fragm. X (c. 1400) 1r-3v: Mar 343-351 var., 362-367 var.

n *AM* 235 fol. (c. 1400) 41r-42v (extract).

o *Holm* 1, 4º (15c) 1r-16v: Mar 332-401 var.; select variant readings 1-62.

p *AM* 240 fol. fragm. XIII (15c) 1v.

q *Holm* 5, 8º (16c) 25v-27v (extracts).

r *AM* 633, 4º (paper, 18c) 1r-59v: Mar 1-62 var.

s *AM* 634-635, 4º (paper, 18c) 1r-19r + 49r-57v (defective): Mar 1-22 var., 51-62 var.
Cf. BHL 5343, supplemented from the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew (BHL 5334 ff.), the canonical gospels, the Antiquities of the Jews, and various other sources. Some major problems in textual history have yet to be solved.

II. The Assumption of Mary.

1. Transitus Mariae.


BHL 5350.

III. The Miracles of Mary.

1. AM 656 II, 4<sup>°</sup> (13c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v: Mar xxxix-xl.
2. AM 655, 4<sup>°</sup> fragm. II (13c) 1<sup>r</sup>-4<sup>v</sup>: Mar xxxii-xxxviii.
3. AM 655, 4<sup>°</sup> fragm. XIX (13c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Mar xxxi-xxxiii.
4. AM 240 fol. fragm. XI (13c) 2<sup>r</sup>-4<sup>v</sup>: Mar xxiv.
5. AM 240 fol. fragm. II (c. 1300) 2<sup>r</sup>-3<sup>v</sup>: Mar 633-634.
6. AM 240 fol. fragm. V (c. 1300) 1<sup>r</sup>-6<sup>v</sup>: Mar 409-411, 450-453, 472-482, 502-508.
7. AM 240 fol. fragm. XII (c. 1300) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Mar xxxii-xxxviii, 1076-1077.
8. AM 655, 4<sup>°</sup> fragm. XXXII (c. 1300) 1<sup>r</sup>-14<sup>v</sup>: Mar 430-436, 445-450, 457-468, 487-499, 572-577<sup>p</sup>, 577<sup>p</sup>-583, 599-604, 608-613 lower text, 614-619, 623-629.
9. AM 656 I, 4<sup>°</sup> (14c) 18<sup>r</sup>-20<sup>r</sup>.
10. AM 234 fol. (14c) 39<sup>r</sup>-55<sup>v</sup>: Mar 153-157, 1022-1023.
11. AM 232 fol. (14c) 66<sup>r</sup>-83<sup>r</sup>: Mar 65-152.
12. NoRA fragm. 78 (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v: Mar xxi-xxii.
13. Lbs. fragm. 3 (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>.
15(b). Lbs. fragm. 4 (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Jakob Benediktsson (ed.), "Nokkur handritabrot," Skírnir CXXV (1951) 191-196.
16. AM 240 fol. fragm. IV (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-3<sup>v</sup>: Mar 509<sup>p</sup>-83, 916-920, 946-947<sup>p</sup>, 947<sup>p</sup>-948, 949<sup>p</sup>-954, 1107-1112.
17. AM 240 fol. fragm. VIII (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Mar 1174-1175.
18. AM 667, 4<sup>°</sup> fragm. III (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Mar xv-xviii.
19. AM 240 fol. fragm. III (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v.
20. AM 240 fol. fragm. VII (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>: Mar 1177-1178.
21. AM 240 fol. fragm. VI (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v.
22. Holm I, 8<sup>°</sup> (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-24<sup>v</sup>: Mar 1112-1116, 1121-1126, 1133-1141, 1145-1147, 1161-1162.
23. Holm II, 8<sup>°</sup> (14c) 27<sup>r</sup>-84<sup>r</sup>: Mar 62-65, 157-331 (with insertions in the edition from 14, above).
24. AM 655, 4<sup>°</sup> fragm. XXIV (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v.
25. AM 662 b, 4<sup>°</sup> (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v.
26. AM 666 a, 4<sup>°</sup> (14c) 1<sup>r</sup>-v.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE

27. AM 657 a-b, 40 (14c) 19r-22v + 41v-42r + 91v: Æventyri 147-149 [41v-42r];
Alfr. Jakobsen (ed.), "Et bruddstykke av en Maria-legende" [91v], Opuscula
1 (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XX, Copenhagen 1960) 268.
28. AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 42r-v.
29. AM 238 fol. fragm. VI (c. 1400) 1r-2v.
30. AM 720 a, 40 fragm. VIII (c. 1400) 1r.
31. Holm 11, 40 (15c) 85r-99r: Mar 707-708, 711a-31, 724r-31, 748-749, 763-764,
770a-39, 788-789, 801-802, 869-870, 872b-34, 942-945, 950-951, 989a-31, 995-
996, 1031-1032, 1058-1064, 1070-1072a, 1072b-1073, 1077-1090, 1192-1193.
32. AM 240 fol. fragm. XIII (15c) 1v 1-31 + 2r-4v: Mar xxix.
33. Holm 1, 40 (15c) 16v-178r: Mar 401-690 (with insertions in the edition from
5, 6, 8, 14, 15(a), 16, and 38), 698-699, 725-727, 728-736, 887-888, 894-
34. AM 667, 40 fragm. XIII (15c) 1r-v.
35. AM 238 fol. fragm. XXXIII (15c) 1r.
36. AM 238 fol. fragm. XIII (c. 1500) 1r-2v.
37. AM 681 a, 40 (c. 1500) 10r-v.
38. AM 634-635, 40 (paper, 18c) 57v-510r: Mar 588-594, 654-681, 690-1060
(with insertions in the edition from 10, 15(a), 16, 31, and 33), 1060-1204
(with insertions from 7, 14, 15(a), 16, 20, 22, and 31).
39. AM 633, 40 (paper, 18c) 60r-115v.
A detailed list of references to foreign (mostly Latin) sources or parallels of the
miracles is out of place here. Moreover, a large number of problems in the
textual history have yet to be solved. This much can be said, that the miracles
are based largely on Latin versions and very few are of native origin.

Note.
The miracles of Mary include hagiographic material dealing with many other
saints. The following is a selected list (with references to Mar) of those saints
who have received special prominence in marian legends:

Bede: 650-652.
Boniface IV: 695-698.
Bonitus: 541-549, 1168-1171.
Dominic: 811-812, 813-816.
Dunstan: 716-722.
Elisabeth of Schönau: 915-917.
Eusebius of Verceil: 690-699.
Francis of Assisi: 811-812.
Fulbert of Chartres: 549-554, 724-725.
Gregory the Great: 224-225, 1172-1173.
Herman the cripple: 143-144, 1076-1077, 1077-1079.
Hugh of Bonnevaux: 483-488, 1151-1152.
John the Almoner: 702-704.
John Damascene: 438-444, 1116-1121, 1121-1126.
MARY OF EGYPT

   AM 238 fol. fragm. I (c. 1300) 1r-ν: HMS I, 510-512.
   Cf. BHL Suppl. 5417 d.

2. Mariu saga egipzku. II.
   a AM 657 c, 4ο (14c) 3ν-9ν: HMS I, 495-509.
   b AM 655, 4ο fragm. XXXIII (13c) 1r-2ν: HMS I, 495-507 var.
   Cf. BHL Suppl. 5417 d.

3. Mariu saga egipzku. I.
   a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 64r-66v: HMS I, 482-495.
   b AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 5r-6v: HMS I, 487-495 var.
   Cf. BHL Suppl. 5417 d.

Lit. Foote 25; Jónsson II, 874; Mogk 892; UngerH xiv.
On Mary of Egypt in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

MARY MAGDALEN see Martha and Mary Magdalen.

MARY OF OIGNIES

On Mary of Oignies in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

MATTHEW

1. Matheus saga postola.
   AM 655, 4ο fragm. IX (12c) 3r-ν: Post 823-825.
   Cf. BHL 5690.

   a AM 645, 4ο (13c) 35v-41ν: Cod645 108-124; Post 813-823.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE 325

b AM 652, 4 (13c) 11r-14v (defective): Post 807-813.
AM 630, 4 (paper, 17c) 57v-61v: Post 797-807.

c AM 656 I, 4 (14c) 44v-49v (defective): Post 825-834.

d Codex Scardensis (14c) 92r-94v.
AM 628, 4 (paper, 18c) 69r-81v.

e AM 629, 4 (paper, 1697) 150v-161v.

f Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 125v-135v.
Cf. BHL 5690. b (with c and f) does not include the description of Paradise.

AM 655, 4 fragm. XII-XIII (13c) 3v-5v: Post 834-841.
Revised recension of 2 a, c, or d, with additional material (translation, miracles:
cf. BHL 5694?).

Lit. Jónsson II, 872 f.; Mogk 889; Turville-Petre 130 f.; UngerP xxvii f.

MATTHIAS
February 24

1. Mathias saga postola. I.

a AM 630, 4 (paper, 17c) 64r-68r: Post 767-775.

b AM 659 a, 4 (17c) 33v-36v (defective).
(a and b are copies of AM 652, 4 while this was still complete).

c AM 629, 4 (paper, 1697) 168r-178r.

d Rask 69 (c. 1800) 140r-146r (defective).
Based on the vita written by Lambertus Parvus a Legio (Lehmann): cf.
BHL 5699 ff. — Not fully investigated.

2. Mathias saga postola. II.

a Codex Scardensis (14c) 88v-89r.
AM 628, 4 (paper, 18c) 51r-55v: Post 775-778.

b AM 238 fol. fragm. X (14c) 27v: Post 775-778 var.
A separate translation of the source(s) of I.

Lit. Jónsson II, 872; Lehmann 19; Mogk 889; UngerP xxvi f.

MAURICE
September 22

AM 655, 4 fragm. X (13c) 1r-5v: HMS I, 656-658.
Cf. BHL 5741-5747, closest to 5746 (Foote).

2. Mauritus saga.

a AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 49r-52v: HMS I, 643-656.

b Holm 2 fol. (14c) 86v: HMS I, 644-645 var.
A conflation of 1 and BHL 3446 (Foote).

Lit. Foote 28; Jónsson II, 874; Mogk 891; UngerH xv.

MAURUS
January 15

1. Maurus saga.
Holm 2 fol. (14c) 60r-63v: HMS I, 659-675.
Cf. BHL 5773.

Lit. Foote 25; UngerH xv.
MELCHIOR see Three Holy Kings.

MICHAEL THE ARCHANGEL

September 29

1. (Bergr Sokkason, † 1350;) MICHAELS SAGA.
   a AM 657 a-b, 4o (14c) 1r-17v: HMS I, 676-713.
   b AM 657 c, 4o (14c) 1r-3r (defective): HMS I, 707-713 var.
   c Holm 10, 8o fragm. V (c. 1400) 1r-2v.

   Compiled from various sources. Literary relations have not yet been fully investigated. 7001-7031 is included in Mar 5445-5489s (BHL 1420); and the same story in another translation: Mar 1168-1171 (BHL 1419, Vincent of Beauvais).

Lit. Lehmann 45; Mogk 890; UngerH xv.

NICHOLAS

December 6

1. NIKOLAUS SAGA EKIBYSKUPS.
   a AM 655, 4o fragm. III (c. 1200) 1r-2v: ArnFragm 1-7; HMS II, 41-46.
   b AM 921, 4o fragm. V (14c) 1r.
   c AM 642 a, 4o fragm. II (c. 1400) 1r-v.

2. NIKOLAUS SAGA EKIBYSKUPS. I.
   Holm 2 fol. (14c) 9r-13v: HMS II, 21-41.

3. NIKOLAUS SAGA EKIBYSKUPS. Appendix 2.
   NoRA fragm. 69 (14c) 1r-v: HMS II, 46-49.
   1-3 are independent versions of the material most completely represented in 2. The chief source is John of Naples’s Latin vita, BHL 6104 ff. (esp. 6105 and 6106). Cf. Widding’s list of contents and Foote’s references to BHL.

4. (Bergr Sokkason, † 1350;) NIKOLAUS SAGA EKIBYSKUPS. II.
   There is no critical edition of this saga. Unger’s edition is best described as an eclectic text established from those of the MSS below that are referred to HMS.
   a Holm 16, 4o (c. 1400) 3r-62v ≠ HMS II, 50-158.
   b AM 643, 4o (c. 1400) 1r-35v (defective) ≠ HMS II, 49-61, 77-98, 101-146.
   c AM 641, 4o (c. 1400) 1r-33v (defective) ≠ HMS II, 49-50, 53-55, 57-59, 88-111, 113-115, 125-129, 134-141.
   Nks 1789, 4o I (paper, 18c) 1r-11v.
   d AM 642 b, 4o (c. 1400) 1r-2v (defective) ≠ HMS II, 53-58, 75-79.
   e AM 642 a, 4o fragm. Ia (14c) 1r-11v ≠ HMS II, 76-78, 81-82, 83-85, 88-89, 115-117, 139-141, 143-145, 150-152, 153-155.
   f AM 642 a, 4o fragm. I β (14c) 1r-2v ≠ HMS II, 150-153.
   g AM 642 a, 4o fragm. I γ (14c) 1r-2v ≠ HMS II, 99-100, 107-108.
   h AM 642 a, 4o fragm. I δ (14c) 1r-2v ≠ HMS II, 80-82, 85-86.
   i AM 640, 4o (15c) 1r-54v ≠ HMS II, 49-157.
   AM 644, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-109v.
   Nks 1222 fol. (paper, 18c) 1r-24v.
   j AM 638, 4o (paper, 18c) 1r-121v ≠ HMS II, 49-138, 145-157.
   k AM 764, 4o (14c) 31v-33v (extract).

A compilation that includes material from a shorter saga like 2 re-worked and re-edited by B.S., and supplemented from other sources. The last chapter (found only in a) is copied from 1.
5. De Nicolao.

*AM* 672, 4° (15c) 62r-v.

Epitome of the saga based on a text like 2 (Foote).


NICHOLAS OF TOLENTINO

1. Nicolaus saga.

*Holm 3 fol.* (16c) 104v-107v.

Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 148c-151a.

*Lit.* Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 248 and MM 121.

NICODEMUS, GOSPEL OF

1. Niðrstigningar saga. I.


2. Niðrstigningar saga. II.

*AM* 623, 4° (13c?) 1r-5v (defective): Cod623 1-9; HMS II, 9-14.

3. Niðrstigningar saga. III.

*AM* 233 a, fol. (14c) 28r-v (defective): HMS II, 14-17.

4. Niðrstigningar saga. IV.

*AM* 238 fol. fragm. V (15c) 1r-v: HMS II, 17-20.

1-4 are slightly different recensions of the Gospel of Nicodemus (second part only; Tischendorf’s A-text).

*Lit.* Jónsson II, 929; Magnús Már Lárusson, "Um Niðurstigningsarsögut," *Skírnir* CXXIX (1955) 159-168; Møgk 890; Paasche 298 f.; Turville-Petre 126 ff.; UngerH xv.

ODILO OF CLUNY

On Odilo in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

OLAV OF NORWAY

1. In die sancti Olaui regis et martiris (sermon and miracles).

*AM* 619, 4° (c. 1200) 54r-63r: Gustav Indrebø (ed.), *Gamal Norsk Homilebok* (Oslo 1931) 108-129; George T. Flom (ed.), *Codex AM 619 Quarto* (Illinois 1929) 159-177.

Textual parallels are found in BHL 6322-6324, which, however, cannot be the direct source (cf. Anne Holtsmark, *Studier* 15-24).

2. Den ældste saga om Olav den Hellige (life and miracles).

a *NoRA* fragm. 52 (13c) 1r-6v: Gustav Storm (ed.), *Otte Brudstykker af den ældste Saga...* (Christiania 1893) 2-12.

b *AM* 325 IV α, 4° (14c) 1r-2v (defective): *op. cit.* 12-16.

3. Olafs saga hins Helga (life and miracles).

*Delag 8 fol.* (13c) 70r-109v: Oscar Albert Johnsen (ed.), *Olafs saga...* (Christiania 1922) 1-108.
2 and 3 are closely related; both include material from a text similar to 1; 2 is badly damaged, but the loss is to some extent compensated by 3.

4. **Olaf's Saga Hins Helga** (life and miracles).
   *AM* 225 fol. (c. 1400) 30*-36*; HMS II, 159-182.
   A short separate saga including material from 1-3.
   [Episodes and miracles related in 1-4 can also be found in the profane sagas of St. Olav (not listed here), e.g. *Den store saga om Olav den hellige*, ed. with introduction by Johnsen and Helgason from a multitude of manuscripts (Oslo 1941), and the Olafssaga in *Heimskringla*].


**OSWALD**

1. **Saga Oswalds Konungs Hins Helga.**

   *Holm 3 fol.* (16c) 14*-19*; Jón Sigurðsson (ed.), *Annaler for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie* (Copenhagen 1834) 24-91 (with a Danish translation).
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 102c-105b.

**Lit.** Jónsson III, 141; Mogk 895; Jón Sigurðsson, *op. cit.* introduction 3-24; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 248 and MM 113 f.

**PATRUM VITAE** *see* Vitae Patrum.

**PAUL THE APOSTLE**

1. **Pals Saga Postula.** I.
   a *AM* 645, 4° (13c) 43*-51*; Post 216-236.
   b *AM* 655, 4° *frang.* XVI (13c) 3*-4*; Post 223-230 var.
   Chiefly based on *Actus Apostolorum*.

2. **Pals Saga Postula.** II.
   b *AM* 84, 8° (15c) 2*-53*; Post 267-271, 236-279 var.
   c *AM* 655, 4° *frang.* XVII (13c) 1*-3*; Post 260-263 var., 271-274 var., 276-278 var.
   d *Codex Scardinis* (14c) 27*-36*.
   *AM* 631, 4° (paper, 18c) 141*-184*; Post 236-279 var.
   e *NoRA* fragm. 80 (14c) 1*-2*; Post 279-283.
   f *AM* 236 fol. (c. 1600) 60*-65* (defective): Post 236-254 var., 259-263 var.
   Based on *Actus Apostolorum* and other sources (e.g. Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica*).
3. Páls saga postola.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. XV (14c) 1v.
   Epitome of 1.
   Lit. Jónsson II, 870; Mogk 887 f.; UngerP xviii f.
   See also PETER THE APOSTLE.

PAUL THE HERMIT
   January 15

1. Páls saga eremita.
   Holm 2 fol. (14c) 57r-59v: HMS II, 183-192.
   Cf. BHL 6596. The prologue is omitted.
   Lit. Foote 25; Lehmann 45; Paasche 293 f.; UngerH xx.

PELAGIA THE PENITENT
   October 8
   See Barlaam and Josaphat 1, note.

PETER THE APOSTLE
   June 29

1. Petrs saga postola. II.
   a AM 630, 4° (paper, 17c) 31r-47v: Post 159-201.
   b AM 659 a, 4° (17c) 1r-20v.
      (a and b are copies of AM 652, 4°, made when this MS was still complete).
   c AM 629, 4° (paper, 1697) 1r-43v.
   d Rask 69 (c. 1800) 73v-101v.
      Cf. BHL 6659, supplemented from BHL 6570, the canonical gospels,
      Actus Apostolorum, and probably other sources.

2. Petrs saga postola. II B.
   AM 655, 4° fragm. XII-XIII (13c) 1r-v: Post 211-216.
   Separate recension of 1.

3. Petrs saga postola. II.
   a AM 645, 4° (13c) 25r-30r (defective): Cod645 74-90; Post 201-211.
   b AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 13r-17v: Post 181-200 lower text or var.
      Abridged recension of 1; b has insertions ultimately related to 5.

4. Petrs saga postola. II.
   AM 655, 4° fragm. XVI (13c) 1r-2v: Post 172r-39, 167-173 var.
   Revised recension of 1.

5. Petrs saga postola. I.
   a Codex Scardensis (14c) 1v-27v.
      AM 631, 4° (paper, 18c) 1r-138v: Post 1-126.
   b AM 639, 4° (15c) 1r-45r: Post 1-126 var.
      AM 239 fol. (paper, 17c) 86r-92r.
   c AM 239 fol. (14c) 52r-85v: Post 1-106 var.
   d Holm 19, 4° (14c) 1r-77v: Post 1-125 var.
   e AM 621, 4° (15c) 1v-57v: Post 1-15 var., 18-30 var., 33-50 var., 52-85 var.,
      89-96 var., 98-106 var., 108-126 var.
   f AM 660, 4° (15c) 1r-23v + 17 bis + 19 bis (defective): Post xv-xvi, Post 1-2
      var., 6-10 var., 14-16 var., 20-21 var., 25-27 var., 42-45 var., 49-65 var.,
      73-76 var. (omitting ch. 80-81), 78-90 var., 93-98 var., 107-110 var.
   g AM 658, 4° fragm. I (14c) 1r-4v.
h AM 658, 4o fragm. II (14c) 1r-5v.
i AM 658, 4o fragm. III (c. 1400) 1r-7v.
j AM 658, 4o fragm. IV (14c) 1r-2v.
k AM 658, 4o fragm. V (14c) 1r-2v: Post 53-55 var.
l AM 236 fol. (c. 1600) 43v-60v (defective).

Cf. BHL 6659 and 6570 with additional material from Actus Apostolorum and various other sources. Ch. 50-58 and 60-73 are derived from a text of Clemens saga, see Clement I. 1.

6. TVEGGJA POSTOLA SAGA PETRS OK PALS.
AM 656 I, 4o (14c) 20v-39v (defective): Post 283-318.
A composite text. Essentially a Petrs saga similar to 1, with chapters on St. Paul added from a text of Paul. 1.


PETER CELESTINE

1. AF CELESTINO OK BONIFACIO PÁFUM.
a AM 624, 4o (15c) 154r-157v: Æventyri 77-83.
b AM 657 a-b, 4o (14c) 100v (defective): Æventyri 77-78 var.
On the sources, see Hugo Gering’s commentary, Æventyri II, 68 ff.

PETER MONOCULUS, O.S.B. Cist.

On Peter in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

PHILIP THE APOSTLE

1. SAGAN FRA PHILIPPO POSTOLA.
a AM 630, 4o (paper, 17c) 62r-63r: Post 735-737.
b AM 659 a, 4o (17c) 30r-31r (defective).
(a and b are copies of AM 652, 4o made when this MS was still complete).
c AM 629, 4o (paper, 1697) 161v-164v.
d Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 136v-138r.
Cf. BHL 6814.

2. SAGA PHILIPPI POSTOLA.
a Codex Sardensis (14c) 85v-86r.
AM 628, 4o (paper, 18c) 37v-39r: Post 740-742.
b AM 238 fol. fragm. XI (14c) 1r: Post 74130-7422.
Cf. Legenda aurea (BHL, Philippus 3).

3. PHILIPPI SAGA POSTOLA.
AM 667, 4o fragm. V (c. 1500) 4r-2 (wrongly bound).
Probably translated from a Low German source.
Lit. Jónsson II, 871 f.; UngerP xxvi.

PLACID see Eustace.

QUADRAGINTA MILITES see Forty Armenian Martyrs.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE 331

REMIGIUS

1. Remigius saga.
   AM 764, 4º (14c) 23r-25v: HMS II, 222-227.
   A direct source has not been found. The text consists of material ultimately
   derived from Hincmar’s vita (BHL 7152 ff.) supplemented from BHL 7150

2. Af Remigio erkibiskupi
   AM 657 a-b, 4º (14c) 39v (defective): Æventyri 297.
   On sources and parallels, see Hugo Gering in Æventyri II, 230.
   Lit. Lehmann 45; Mogk 893; UngerH xx; Pórhallur Porgilsson, Drög að skrá um
   ritverk á íslensku að fornu og nýju af latinskum eða rómönskum uppruna 1 (Reykjavík

ROCH

1. Rochus saga hins helga.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 25v-29r.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 200d-203b.
   Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 248 and MM 114 f.

SEBASTIAN

1. Sebastianus saga.
   a AM 235 fol. (c. 1400) 3r-4v (defective): HMS II, 228-231a, 232a-235.
   b AM 238 fol. fragm. VIII (15c) 1r-v: HMS II, 231b-232b, 232-235 var.
   c AM 238 fol. fragm. XII (c. 1400) 1r-v.
      BHL 7543.

2. Sebastianus saga.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 29r-30v + 87r-v.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 333c-334d.
   Lit. UngerH xx; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 250 and MM 115.

SEIJUMANNAÐÁTTIR see Sunniva and companions.

SERVATIUS

1. Servavius saga.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 113r-116v.
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 27b-30a.
   Lit. Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 247 f. and MM 122.

SEVEN SLEEPERS

1. Septem dormientes.
   AM 623, 4º (13c?) 29r-31v (defective): Cod623 54-59; HMS II, 236-240.
   Cf. BHL 2319 f. (Lehmann)?

2. Septem dormientes.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 92r-94v + 55r-v.
   Compiled from various sources. The main source was probably a now lost
   version of an old saga, supplemented and revised from Pass.
   Lit. Lehmann 45; Mogk 891; UngerH xx; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 252 f.
   and MM 115 f.
SILVESTER December 31

1. SILVESTERS SAGA.
   a AM 655, 4º fragm. V (13c) 2v: ArnFragm 22-23; HMS II, 280-281.
   b AM 655, 4º fragm. IV (13c) 1r-v: ArnFragm 8-14; HMS II, 281-286.
   c Holm 2 fol. (14c) 20r-29r: HMS II, 245-260.
   d AM 236 fol. fragm. VII (14c) 1r-v: HMS II, 261-266 var.
      Cf. BHL 7725 ff. (esp. 7726, 7729, 7734, 7731, 7732).

2. AF CONSTANTINO KÖNIG.
   AM 657 a-b, 4º (14c) 18r-v: Æventyri 21-23.
   A separate anecdote based on I (ch. 36).
      Cf. BHL 7734.

3. SYLVESTERS SAGA OK CONSTANTINUS.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 54r-v † 79r-84r.
   Translated from Low German. Cf. Pass 314d-318c.

Lit. Foote 22; Jónsson II, 874 f.; UngerH xxi; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 249 and MM 118; Æventyri II, 12 f.

SIMON AND JUDE October 28

1. TVEGGAJA POSTOLA SAGA SIMONIS OK JUDE. I.
   a AM 652, 4º (13c) 10r-11r (defective): Post 789-791.
      AM 630, 4º (paper, 17c) 26v-31r: Post 779-789.
   b Codex Scardensis (14c) 89r-92r.
      AM 628, 4º (paper, 18c) 55v-69r: Post 779-789 var.
   c AM 656 I, 4º (c. 1600) 61r-62r (defective).
   d AM 629, 4º (paper, 1697) 113r-125r.
   c Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 66v-73r.
      Cf. BHL 7749-7751.

2. TVEGGAJA POSTOLA SAGA SIMONIS OK JUDE. II.
   AM 655, 4º fragm. XII-XIII (13c) 5v-6v: Post 791-797.
   Revised recension of 1, occasionally supplemented from a text like Legenda aurea (BHL, Simon et Judas 3).

Lit. Jónsson II, 872; Mogk 889; UngerP xxvii.

SINDULPHUS see Gangulphus.

SIXTUS II see Laurence of Rome.

SOPHIA see Fides, Spes, and Caritas.

SPES see Fides, Spes, and Caritas.

STEPHEN THE DEACON December 26

1. [De S. Stephano].
   Holm 15, 4º (c. 1200) 80v + 94r-97r: Th. Wisén (ed.), Homiliu-Bók (Lund 1872) 175-176, 201-207.
2. **Stephanus saga.**
   b. *AM 661*, 4o (15c) 1v-24v: HMS II, 287-309 var.

3. **Stephanus saga.**

4. **Stephanus saga.**
   *AM 655*, 4o *fragm. XXII* (13c) 1v-2v.
   Versions 1-4 are ultimately derived from one translation. 3 has been somewhat abridged. 2 and 4 have been re-edited. On the sources, see Foote.

5. **[Stephanus saga].**
   *NoRA fragm. 67 e* (14c) 3 very small fragments.
   Close to 4 but independent of it (Foote).

6. **Stephanus saga protomartyris.**
   *Holm 3 fol.* (16c) 56v-62r.
   Based on a text similar to 2 supplemented from Pass 96b-98c.

   **Lit.** Foote 23 f.; Jónsson II, 875; UngerH xxi; Ole Widding, *op. cit.* 148 ff.; Widding, Bekker-NielsenGR 251 and MM 116.

**STEPHEN OF GRANDMONT**

On Stephen in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.

**Sunniva and Companions**

Old Norse versions of BHL 7936 (Seljumannaþátttr) are found in some of the sagas of Olav Tryggvason. Cf. Gustav Storm in *Monumenta Historica Norvegiae* (Christiania 1880) xli-xliv; Just Bing, "Sunnivalegend," (*Norsk* Historisk *Tidsskrift* 5. rK. V (1924) 533-545; Jean Young, "Legenden om den hellige Sunniva," *ibid.* 5. rK. VIII (1930-33) 402-413.

**Thais**

See Barlaam and Josaphat I, note.

**Theban Legion** see Maurice.

**Theodore Tyro**

**November 9**

1. **Theodorus saga.**
   *AM 235 fol.* (c. 1400) 56v-57r: HMS II, 310-314.
   *BHL 8077* (*Acta SS Nov. IV*; Brussels 1925).
   **Lit.** Lehmann 45; Mogk 891; UngerH xxi.

**Thomas the Apostle**

**December 21**

1. **Thomas saga postula. I.**
   a. *AM 652*, 4o (13c) 9r-7 (defective): Post 727-728.
   *AM 630*, 4o (paper, 17c) 20v-26v: Post 712-727.
   b. *Codex Scardensis* (14c) 82v-85r.
   *AM 628*, 4o (paper, 18c) 21v-37v: Post 712-727 var.
c AM 629, 4° (paper, 1697) 96r-113r.
d Rask 69 (paper, c. 1800) 57v-66r.
Cf. BHL 8136.

2. Thomas saga postola. II.
a AM 656 I, 4° (14c) 53r-55v (defective): Post 729-734.
b JS fragm. 8. A (14c) 1r.
Cf. BHL 8136.

3. Úm Thómas postola.
AM 672, 4° (15c) 62v.

Lit. Jónsson II, 871; Lehmann 43; Mogk 888 f.; Unger P xxv f.; Fr. Wilhelm, Deutsche
Legenden und Legendare (Leipzig 1907) 42.

THOMAS BECKET

December 29

1. Thomas saga erikibyskups. I.
a Holm 17, 4° (13c) 1r-92v (defective): C. R. Unger (ed.), Thomas Saga Erki-
byskups (Christiania 1869) 1-120, 134-140, 143-273 (279).
b AM 662 b, 4° (14c) 2r-4v (defective): op. cit. 510-519, 273-277.
c NoRA fragm. 66 a-c + d (14c) 4 fragments: op. cit. 508-510; d not edited.
Cf. BHL 8194, 8195.

2. Thomas saga erikibyskups.
a NoRA fragm. 67 a-d (14c) 1r-4v: op. cit. 528-534.
b AM 234 fol. (14c) 79r-81v (defective): op. cit. 534-544.
On the sources, see Foote in Saga-Book (esp. 407 ff.).

3. Thomas saga erikibyskups.
Holm 2 fol. (14c) 1r-2r (defective): HMS II, 315-320.
On the sources, see Foote in Saga-Book (esp. 416 ff.).

4. Thomas saga erikibyskups. II.
a GKS 1008 fol. Þómasskinna (c. 1400) 3r-91v (90v) (defective): C.R. Unger
(ed.), Thomas Saga Erkibyskups (Christiania 1869) 295-504.
AM 223 fol. (paper, c. 1700) 1r-204v.
AM 224 fol. (paper, c. 1700) 1r-139v.
(223 and 224 were copied from a when this was already defective).
b AM 662 a, 4° fragm. II (14c) 1r-3v: op. cit. 521-526.
c AM 662a, 4° fragm. I (c. 1400) 1r-v: op. cit. 520-521.
d AM 662 a, 4° fragm. III (c. 1400) 1r-v: op. cit. 526-527.
A composite work (by Arngrimr, author of the saga of Guðmundr 3?).
See further Foote in Saga-Book.

5. Af hinum helga Thoma.
AM 657 a-b, 4° (14c) 18v-19r: Æventyr 67-69.
On this anecdote, see Gering in Æventyr II, 58 f.

Lit. Foote 19 f., and “On the Fragmentary Text concerning St Thomas Becket in
ences); Jónsson II, 876 f.; H. G. Leach, Ancevin Britain and Scandinavia (Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1921) 128; Lehmann 46 f., 54; Eirikr Magnússon, Thómas saga
erikibyskups I-II (Rolls Series, London 1875-1883) introduction; Paasche 488;
Unger H xxi.
On Thomas in Mar, see Mary the Blessed Virgin III note.
LIVES OF THE SAINTS IN OLD NORSE PROSE 335

THORLAC THORHALLI see Þorlákr.

THREE HOLY KINGS

January 6

1. SAGA UM HÍNA HEILÍGÚ ÍRJÁ KONUNGÁ.
   Holm 3 fol. (16c) 1v-7v (defective).
   Translated from Low German, cf. Pass 318c-323b, with minor additions.
   Lit. Widding, Bekkker-NielsenGR 250 and MM 111 ff.

URSULA AND COMPANIONS

October 21

1. [AF Ursulu].
   AM 764, 4v (14c) 31v 14-24.
   A very brief epitome, perhaps ultimately related to the Speculum historiale of
   Vincent of Beauvais (BHL, Ursula et sociae 8).

VINCENT THE DEACON

January 22

1. VINCENCIV SAGA.
   a Holm 2 fol. (14c) 51v-52v: HMS II, 321-326.
   b AM 655, 4v fragm. IV (13c) 2v.
      Cf. BHL 8639. “The translation throughout is somewhat abridged”
      (Foote).

2. UM HÍNN HEILAGA VINCENTIV.
   AM 238 fol. fragm. XV (14c) 1r-v.
   Epitome of 1.
   Lit. Foote 24; UngerH xxi.

VITAE PATRUM

1. VITAE PATRUM.
   a AM 234 fol. (14c) 74v-78v (defective): HMS II, 335-347 var. (with lacunae),
      356-365 var., 374-382 var. (with lacunae), 392-402 var.
      (Fol. 75v-r was formerly in AM 627, 4v).
   b AM 232 fol. (14c) 108r-121v (defective): HMS II, 335-374 var., 381-430 var.
   c AM 225 fol. (15c) 110r-138v: HMS II, 335-671.
   d AM 668, 4v (15c) 3r-v (defective): HMS II, 534-542 var.
      (2r-v is not from Vitae Patrum as stated in the catalogue, see Barlaam and
      Josaphat 1 m).
      For HMS II, 334-488 cf. BHL 6524; for 489-622 cf. BHL 6525 (until
      MignePL 73, 793); 623-671 is mostly based on BHL 6527.
      [Anecdotes derived from Vitae Patrum are found in a number of MSS, e.g.
      AM 657 a-b, 4v (14c) 17v-18v (ed. in HMS II, 632-633 lower text), and
      AM 764, 4v (14c) passim].
   Lit. Hans Bekker-Nielsen, Opuscula I (Bibliotheca Arnamagnæana XX, Copen-
   hagen 1960) 109 f.; Jónsson II, 875; Mogk 892; Paasche 446; M. Tveitane, List
   of sources of HMS 623-671 (not printed); UngerH xxi ff.
VITUS

1. Vitus saga.
   a  AM 180 b, fol. (15c) 34r-36r: HMS II, 327-334.
   b  Holm 8, 8° (paper, 17c) 140v-143v.
   Cf. BHL 8711.

Lit. UngerH xxii.

WALBURGA

1. [Af Valbjorgu].
   AM 764, 4° (14c) 34r-v (defective).
   Cf. BHL 8766, 8767, and 8768.

ÞORLÁKR OF SKÁLHOLT

December 23

1. Biskop Þorláks Järtecken.
   a  AM 645, 4° (13c) 1r-11v (defective); Cod645 1-33; Bisk I 333-356.
   b  AM 383, 4° fragm. IV (14c) 3r-4v.
   The oldest collection of miracles of St. Þorlákr.

2. Brot af Þorláks sögu hinni elztu.
   AM 383, 4° fragm. I (13c) 1r-2v: Bisk I, 391-394.

   a  Holm 5 fol. (14c) 60r-68r: Bisk I, 89-124.
      Holm 2 fol. (paper, 1689) 320r-383v.
   b  AM 205 fol. (paper, 17c) 14r-32v: select variant readings in Bisk I, 89-114.
   c  AM 206 fol. (paper, 17c) 7v-15v: select variant readings in Bisk I, 89-114
   d  AM 210 fol. (paper, 17c) 7v-9r (defective).
   e  AM 396 fol. (paper, 17c) 10r-20r.
   f  Kall 261 fol. (paper, 18c) 10r-20r.
      (b-f omit the miracles, ed. 114-124).

4. Þorláks saga helga hin yngri (B).
   a  AM 382, 4° (14c) 1r-38v (54v) (defective); Bisk I, 263-265h, 269h-283h
      286h-290h, 296v-297v, 299h-302h, 305h-311h, 315h-325h, 325h-332.
   b  AM 383, 4° fragm. II (14c) 1r-2v: Bisk I, 312h-313h, 325h-332, and variant
      readings 311-315, 322-326.

5. Þorláks saga helga hin yngsta (C).
   a  AM 383, 4° fragm. IV (14c) 1r-2v: Bisk I, 266-267 var., 270-271 var.
   b  AM 219 fol. (14c) 5r-10r (defective); Bisk I, 269-272 var., 294-304 var.
      385-391 var.
   c  AM 385, 4° fragm. II (14c) 1r-v.
   d  AM 383, 4° fragm. III (c. 1400) 1r-2v: Bisk I, 285-288 var., 292-294 var.
   e  AM 379, 4° (1654) 14r-77v: Bisk I, 265h-269h, 283h-286h, 290h-296h,
      297v-299h, 302h-305h, 311h-312h, 313h-315h; 357-391 (miracles).
   AM 387, 4° (paper, c. 1700) 1r-218v.
   f  AM 204 fol. (paper, 17c) 6r-27r.
   g  AM 380, 4° (paper, 17c) 15r-69r.
   h  AM 384 a, 4° (paper, c. 1700) 21r-36v.

Versions 2-5 are interrelated. The problem of their relationship has not yet
been solved.

AM 209 fol. (paper, 17c) 26v-73r.

A conflation of 3(b) and 5 (Vigfússon).

[5 f and g seem to belong to a late inferior MS tradition like so many other paper MSS, e.g. AM 381, 4°, AM 385, 4° fragm. III, AM 388, 4° all from the 17th century or later].

For Latin material on Ærlák, see BHL 8273-8274.


Arnamagnæanske Kommissions Ordhæ, Copenhagen
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Al-Kindi's Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness

MICHAEL E. MARMURA and JOHN M. RIST

Introduction

In the third and fourth sections of his treatise, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), dedicated to the caliph al-Mu'tasim, al-Kindī gives a discussion of the True One, al-wāhid al-haqq.¹ In the third section, he undertakes to prove the existence and oneness of God;² in the fourth section he investigates the nature of this oneness and its relation to creation. The fourth section is a continuation of the third and like the latter consists of a series of proofs. Both these sections form a remarkable piece of sustained argument, intricate and detailed, yet never losing sight of its objectives.

This is not to say that the argument is secure against serious criticism. But it remains impressive, not only for its philosophical vigour and confidence, but also for the measure of independence shown by its author at this early stage in the transmission of Greek philosophy into the Islamic world. Our purpose in this paper is not to offer a critique of al-Kindī's ideas, but to understand them and relate them to their Greek antecedents. Indeed, since the treatise appeared in print, first in 1948, edited by Professor F. Ahwānī and then in 1950, included in Professor M. A. Abū Rīda's edition of al-Kindī's works, little has been added to further our understanding of this part of the treatise, the discussion of God's existence and oneness.

In parts I and II of what follows we shall give a brief survey of al-Kindī's argument and in part III discuss the Greek background to al-Kindī's ideas. We will then conclude with some brief remarks of a general nature.

¹ Al-Kindī, Rasa'il al-Kindī al-Falsafiyya, ed. M.A. Abū Rida (vol.I: Cairo, 1950), 123-162. All references will be made to this volume which will be abbreviated "A.R."
² Al-Kindī does not mention God by name; he speaks only of the True One.
I. The Proof of God's Existence and Oneness.

Al-Kindī first gives the proof in an abbreviated form\(^3\) and then proceeds with the more detailed and "rigorous" argument.\(^4\) The proof in its shorter form can be summed up as follows:

If we examine the predicables,\(^5\) we find that each of them partakes of both unity and plurality. If unity were to exist in each of these essentially, it would have to exclude the existence of plurality. Al-Kindī examines each of these predicables and shows that plurality cannot be excluded from them. Hence, the unity in them cannot exist essentially. It exists in them accidentally. A central premise is then posited: whatever exists accidentally in one thing, must exist essentially in another which is the cause of its accidental existence.\(^6\) Hence, unity which exists in each of the predicables accidentally must exist essentially in an existent which does not derive it from anything else. This is the True One.

Having given the proof in its abbreviated form, al-Kindī proceeds to show at great length that the predicables and things related to them must partake of both unity and plurality. Unity and plurality, he argues, relate to the predicables in only one of the following three ways:\(^7\) (A) the predicables must partake either of plurality or of unity, to the exclusion of the other; (B) they must partake of both; (C) some predicables must partake of unity only, some of plurality alone. He proceeds to disprove (A) and (C) and hence prove (B). In a series of arguments reminiscent of Plato's antinomies in the Parmenides he tries

\(^3\) A.R., 124-132.
\(^4\) Ibid., 132-143.
\(^5\) *Al-maṣūlāt*, the term used in Arabic for both the categories and the predicables. It is clear, however, that in this treatise, al-Kindī is not using it in reference to the ten categories of Aristotle. Al-Kindī's grouping them under essential and accidental attributes makes them closer to the predicables of Aristotle or Porphyry, though not identical with them. Here we are confronted with what appears to be al-Kindī's own classification. His inclusion of the individual as one of the predicables, in particular, seems odd. What he probably has in mind is a class, the class of individuals, and not single entities as such. The predicables he lists are as follows: (1) individual; (2) species; (3) genus; (4) differentia; (5) proper accident (*al-khāṣṣa*); (6) general accident; (7) whole; (8) part; (9) all (*al-jamīl*); (10) some; (*al-baʿd*). See A.R., p. 128.
\(^6\) Ibid., 132. This is also a central premise in Avicenna's proof for the existence of the prophetic intellect in his *Fi Ḥībat al-Nubiyyāt*. Ibn Sinā, Tīs' Rāḍīl (Cairo, 1908). For the importance of this premise to Avicenna's argument see M. E. Marmura, "Avicenna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 22, No. 1 (January, 1963), 53, 55.
\(^7\) A.R., 132-133.
to show that the predicables cannot exist devoid of either unity or plurality. If we suppose them to partake of plurality without unity, then the following contradictions ensue.⁸

1. There cannot be one thing common to all of them. But as a matter of fact they do share the one common thing.⁹

2. There can be no contrariety because the contrary of plurality is unity. The existents will have to be similar in every respect. But in fact they are also dissimilar.

3. There can be no similarity since similarity exists by virtue of one thing common to all.

4. They will be both in motion and at rest at one and the same time. For, if there is no unity, then there can be no one state and things must be in motion. But motion means alteration in place, quantity or substance, i.e. change from one state into another. This implies that which is “other.” But that which is other than plurality is unity.

5. They will be either: (a) composed of individuals (ashkhāṣ) or (b) not so composed. If (a), then the individuals must be either: (c) units (āḥād) or (d) not units. If (d), then it would have to be an infinite plurality. But the actual infinite is impossible because its consequence is that one infinite is greater than another. Hence (c) must be true. (b) is impossible because plurality is an aggregate of individuals. If (b) is false, (a) is true and if (a) is true, (c) is true and (c) implies unity.

6. The individuals that constitute plurality cannot be defined.¹⁰ To define something is to give it one meaning. But, in fact, these are definable.

7. Plurality cannot partake of number since number is plurality composed of ones. As such, plurality cannot be enumerated. In fact, however, it is enumerated.

⁸ Ibid., 133-136.

⁹ This and the proofs that follow are given here in an abbreviated form. Al-Kindī tends to elaborate. The style of his arguments may be conveyed by the following translation of the above proof: “If each of the predicables is by nature a plurality alone, then there can occur no participation in one state or one idea. But such an occurrence, I mean participation in one state or one idea, exists. Unity, hence, exists with plurality. But we have supposed unity not to exist. Unity, then, exists and does not exist and this is an impossible contradiction.” A.R., p. 133.

¹⁰ Probably, it is the class of individuals that are intended here. See above note 5. On the other hand, by mahḍād, al-Kindī may have meant “limited” in a numerical sense, rather than formally “defined.”
8. Knowledge by definition is the knowledge of something which is in one state. Hence, if there is no unity, there can be no knowledge. But, in fact, there is knowledge.
9. Every class of existents is either a thing or not a thing. If it is a thing, then it is one thing and hence there is unity. If it is not a thing, it cannot be compounded of things and hence it would not be a plurality.

(9) also shows that there cannot be some classes of existents that are a plurality according to the third possibility (C) above.

Having given this set of proofs to show that in the predicables there cannot be plurality without unity, al-Kindī proceeds to show by a similar set of proofs that there cannot be unity without plurality. If we suppose the existence of unity without plurality, then the following set of contradictions arises:11

1. There can be no contrariety and otherness since these require a minimum of two things. Two things constitute a plurality. Yet contrariety and otherness exist.
2. There can be no exception (istithnā') since this implies the existence of the thing excepted: but exception exists.
3. There can be no difference: but this exists.
4. There can be neither agreement nor disagreement, integration nor separation: but these exist.
5. There can be neither beginning, a middle position, nor an end since these exist in things that have parts. (The one has no parts). But these things exist.
6. There can be no shape. Shapes consist of arcs and straight lines and these involve plurality. But shape exists.
7. There can be neither movement nor rest. Movement is alteration in place, quality, quantity or substance. These form pluralities. If at rest, things would have to be at rest in a place: some of its parts would be in some other thing. But "place" and "parts" involve plurality.
8. There will be neither a whole nor a part. If there is no plurality, then there can be no whole and if there is no whole, there can be no part since by definition, "part" is "part of a whole." But in fact things consist of wholes and parts.
9. The part is "one" part. If it exists, then unity exists. But if the part exists, the whole exists and this involves plurality. If plurality does exist, then neither the whole nor the part exist. In other words, nothing

11 A.R., 136-140.
exists. But we have supposed the existence of unity alone. Hence unity exists and does not exist and this is contradiction.

From these two sets of proofs, al-Kindī concludes that in the predicables both unity and plurality must exist. Unity and plurality, furthermore, must be interdependent. They cannot exist separately from each other. Otherwise, we would have in effect the existence of unity by itself and plurality by itself and this has been shown to be impossible.

Now, this interdependence of unity and plurality, al-Kindī continues, must have an explanation. It cannot be due to chance because this would in effect render them unrelated and separate from each other when they must be interdependent. Hence, it must be due to a cause. What then is this cause?

This cause would have to be either from among the predicables or outside them. If it is one of them, then it would have to partake of both unity and plurality. This unity and plurality in the cause, in turn, must be interdependent. But this calls for an explanation, for another cause. This would lead to an infinite regress of causes, which is impossible. Hence the cause of the interdependent existence of unity and plurality in the predicables must be outside them; it must be a transcendent cause.

The transcendent cause, in turn, will have to be either a unity or a plurality or both. It cannot be a plurality alone because plurality consists of unities. If it is both unity and plurality, then the cause of unity and plurality in the predicables would be unity and plurality. A thing would then be the cause of itself and this is impossible. The transcendent cause, hence, must be unity.

II. The Nature of Divine Oneness.

Having given the proof of the existence and oneness of God al-Kindī proceeds to investigate the nature of this oneness. He tries to show: (a) that the term “one,” as applied to the True One, unlike such terms as “great” and “small,” is not relative; (b) that it is neither quantity nor number, though the basis of all number; (c) that the True One is neither genus nor species, that it is not compounded of form and matter and that it is not a predicable; (d) that it is motionless and

---

12 Al-Kindī does not show explicitly that some of the predicables cannot partake of unity without plurality. This seems to be implicit in the set of proofs he had given.
13 A.R., 140.
14 Ibid., 141 ff.
timeless; (e) that it is neither soul nor intellect; (f) that the term “the True One” is used neither synonymously nor equivocally; (g) that it is the cause of the existence out of nothing of all individual existing things.

Al-Kindī gives a lengthy discussion in an attempt to show that oneness alone is not relative. The terms “great” and “small” as applied to quantity in general, “long” and “short” as applied to continuous quantity (al-kammīya al-muttaṣila) and “many” and “few” as applied to discrete quantity (al-kammīya al-munfasila), i.e. number, are relative. The term “great,” he argues, cannot be used in an absolute sense, but only in relation to other things. “Great” can only be understood as “greater than something.” Otherwise we would have to allow the possibility of a magnitude which is great as such and which can have no greater. This, he argues, is impossible. The gist of his argument is that this will disallow the infinity of a magnitude either actually or potentially. It will also disallow the possibility of a magnitude doubling itself, either in actuality or in potency. Although al-Kindī holds that a magnitude cannot be actually infinite, he holds that it must be infinite in potency, i.e. the possibility of its being increased indefinitely must be allowed. The supposition of the existence of a magnitude which is great as such will not allow this and hence would be contradictory.

The difficulty that faces al-Kindī lies in his attempt to prove that there can be no magnitude which is small as such. Is there not a smallest number? Some hold that the number one is such a number, while others hold that it is the number two. Al-Kindī attempts the dual task of showing that one is not a number, and that although two is the smallest of numbers, it is still small in a relative, not in an absolute sense.

Al-Kindī then presents arguments against and for the idea that one is a number. One can argue, he maintains, that the sense in which one is spoken of as a number is equivocal. In its nature (ḥi-l-ṭab) it is not a number. Otherwise it would be a quantity. A quantity is divisible into ones. The one by definition is indivisible. If a quantity, then it would have to be divisible into ones, some equal to it and some unequal. At this point al-Kindī reminds us that by one is not meant

---

15 Ibid., 143-151.
16 Ibid., 144-146.
17 Ibid., 146-151.
18 Ibid., 146-150.
one matter (hyle). Matter becomes one through oneness. Similarly an aggregate of material things are enumerated by number, but themselves are not number. “For example,” he writes, “when we say, ‘five horses,’ these horses are enumerated by the five which is number without hyle.” We must not confuse the one with that which is rendered a single thing by the one. What is under discussion is oneness as such and this is utterly indivisible.

But the argument that one is not a number “by nature” is open to question. The statement that if one is a number it must be divided into ones equal to it and unequal to it should be applicable to other numbers. Thus the two and the three would have to have other twos and other threes equal and unequal to them. This is not the case. If this is inapplicable to things we are certain of as being numbers, it certainly is inapplicable to one. Since we cannot apply the argument to one, we cannot use it to prove that one is not a number. Moreover, if one is not a number, two would have to be the smallest number. Two would then be the number which can have equals and larger numbers but not smaller. But why should this not be applicable to one if we regard it as a number?

The argument that one is not a number is then reproduced in a different form and another of its weaknesses revealed. If one is a number, it is argued, it must be either odd or even. If even, it must be divisible into equal parts. But one is indivisible. Moreover, it would have to be composed of ones and this is contradictory. If, on the other hand, it is odd, the odd is that which divides into parts, into ones, that are unequal. But one is not divisible. Hence one can be neither odd nor even and as such cannot be number.

But in this argument, the definition of the odd number as that which divides into parts whose ones are unequal assumes the point at issue, that one is not a number. For it is only when it has already been shown that one is not a number that the old number can be defined as that number which must divide into unequal parts. Otherwise, there is nothing to prevent us from holding that not all odd numbers need be divisible. As such, one can be included among odd numbers.

Hence this type of argument cannot prove that one is not a number and al-Kindī resorts to a different procedure:19 the elements or constituents of a compounded thing, taken by themselves, are not identical with the thing. The vocal sounds from which speech is composed, individually and by themselves, do not constitute speech. Again, if we

19 Ibid., 149-150.
take a particular composed of form and matter, neither the matter by itself, nor the form by itself, is identical with the thing. Similarly, number is composed of ones. The one which is the basis of number, is not itself a number.

The one, al-Kindī concludes, inasmuch as it is not a number, cannot be the smallest number.\(^{20}\) The smallest number is two. But is it not then the small as such? Al-Kindī denies this and argues that if we analyze the number two in itself, without relating it to anything else, we find nothing in the analysis to tell us that it is the smallest number. We gather that it is the smallest number only when we compare it with another number unequal to it. Hence, the term “small,” as the term “great,” is a relative term. The only term which is not relative, which is absolute, is “one.”

Having established that oneness as such, which exists essentially in the True One, is alone absolute, he proceeds to demonstrate that the True One is neither species nor genus.\(^{21}\) When we say that something is greater or smaller than another, shorter or taller, more numerous or less numerous, we must make these comparisons among things of the same genus. Thus, for example, magnitude when applied to a body cannot be applied to a surface. A surface is greater or smaller than another surface, not another line, time, number or speech. But since one is not one by virtue of something else to which it is related, it is not a genus. What has no genus is eternal.\(^{22}\) The True One is therefore eternal. Since, again, it is not one by virtue of its relation to another thing, it has no matter, and matter is the principle of individuation. Nor can it be composed of genera and species, form and matter and the like, because apart from the fact that it is not a genus, these are compounds, and the One is simple. The same applies to the various predicables. Again, motion and time partake of multiplicity and quantity and hence the True One is neither in motion nor in time.\(^{23}\)

The True One, al-Kindī then proceeds to maintain, is neither soul nor intellect.\(^{24}\) The soul is the place of the passions and these are multiple and in movement. The eternal and immovable True One cannot be soul. Neither can it be intellect. For al-Kindī, the actual intellect (al-‘aql bi-l-f‘īl) that moves the potential intellect in man from

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 151-152.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 152

\(^{22}\) Al-Kindī had argued for this point in the second section of his treatise: A.R., 113 ff

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 153-154.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 154-155.
potentiality to actuality, thereby making it an acquired intellect (‘aql mustafād), is the genera and species. These he regards as intellect.\textsuperscript{25} But these are multiple whereas the One is absolute unity. Hence the True One cannot be intellect.

Al-Kindī then devotes a long section to a discussion of the use of the term “one” as applied to the True One.\textsuperscript{26} This term, he argues, is not used synonymously. Al-Kindī’s meaning is illustrated by the example he gives. The terms “blade” and “knife” are used synonymously to refer to the instrument of slaughter. They are “one” in this sense. But the thing to which these terms refer is divisible and partakes of plurality. Thus “one” with reference to the True One, cannot be used in the same way as it is used when we say that the “blade” and the “knife” are one. He then proceeds to show that it is not used equivocally, nor to refer to a common element or genus of many things.

The discussion is concluded with a recapitulation of some of its main points and an argument stating that the True One is the creator of all existents \textit{ex nihilo}.\textsuperscript{27} Unity and plurality exist together in all things other than the True One. Unity exists in these things accidentally, not essentially. Plurality is nothing more than the aggregate of unities. Plurality cannot exist without unity. Unity in things, on the other hand, being accidental, is necessarily caused by that which is essentially one, the True One. Thus the True One is the cause of the existence of all plurality and unity.

Now, argues al-Kindī, a thing exists as an identifiable individual through unity. Its coming into existence as an individual thing (\textit{al-tahauwi}) is due to its acquiring unity. All unities in the world are emanations from the True One. The giver of unity is the giver of existence. The True One that causes unity and plurality in the world must cause all existing things out of nothing, since without unity these are nothing. Hence the True One creates \textit{ex nihilo}. Again, inasmuch as a thing cannot continue to exist without unity and since this unity is accidental in the thing and derived from the True One, a thing cannot continue to exist without the continual bestowal of this unity by the True One and without it it becomes obliterated. Hence, the True One is not merely the creator of things \textit{ex nihilo}, but the sustainer of all which He creates.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, 155.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, 155-160.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, 161-162
III. The Greek Background of al-Kindī's Argument.

Al-Kindī appears to have a degree of familiarity with the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and other Greek thinkers, but to be confident enough of his own powers to be able to use these writings to support his own positions — which are often very different from theirs. His attitude may be observed in the case of the following topics:

(a) Al-Kindī seems to be much indebted to the second part of Plato's Parmenides for his detailed argument to prove that both unity and plurality must exist in the predicables (A.R., 133-40). Yet al-Kindī does not seem to regard the dialogue as a source for metaphysics, but rather as a store-house of arguments which can be arranged to suit his own purpose. Although the antinomies look similar in the two philosophers, their purpose and presentation are quite different. In hypotheses seven and eight (164B, 165E), for example, Plato says: “If there is no One, what are the consequences for the others?” Al-Kindī, on the other hand, assumes the existence of his predicables and asks how, given their plurality, they can avoid partaking of unity as well. Plato of course never poses any such question as “If there are many, what are the consequences for unity?” Furthermore the method of producing the antinomies is different. Plato draws his antinomies out of the different logical and ontological relations possible between Being and Unity. Al-Kindī, on the other hand, tends to make one half of the antinomy logical, the other an appeal to fact. He says, for example: if all the predicables partake of plurality only, then the following contradiction arises:

(a) There cannot be any one thing common to them all (logical).
(b) But as a matter of fact they do share in a common thing (appeal to fact).

Al-Kindī later goes on to show that the predicables cannot partake of unity without plurality (A.R., 136-40). Again the logical method contrasts with the appeal to fact in an unplatonic way. Plato asks: If there is One, what are the consequences for the others (hypothesis three, 151B; hypothesis four, 159B)? — and shows that there are contradictory conclusions to be deduced from a proposition of this kind. Al-Kindī, on the other hand, shows that if there is only plurality there

28 Similarly al-Fārābī, in his work, On Plato's Philosophy, seems to follow a Middle Platonist rather than a Neoplatonist interpretation. In his edition (London 1943), p. xv. R. Walzer has argued that the source may be Theon of Smyrna.
can (for example) be no contrariety: *but contrariety in fact exists*, he adds.

(b) In his demonstration that the existence of plurality and unity in the predicables implies a transcendent cause (A.R. 140-43), al-Kindī makes use of the Aristotelian dictum that infinite regress is impossible.

(c) Al-Kindī's doctrine that the True One is neither genus nor species (A.R., 153, 160, 161) is an echo of the normal Middle and Neoplatonic tradition about the First Principle at least from the time of Albinus (2nd century A.D.). In chapter ten, section four of Albinus' *Didaskalikos* (p. 59 Louis), we read that the First Principle is unspeakable and only to be grasped by the intellect, that he is neither genus nor species nor difference, that he has no accidents, that he is neither good nor bad (i.e. that he is above categories of virtue, cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178B10 ff., *Enneads* 1.2.3.31), that he is neither quality nor absence of quality.

Al-Kindī emphasizes not only that the True One is neither genus nor species, but also that he is non-material and simple—in these latter respects differing from all other things. As a Muslim with Mu’tazilite leanings (see below part IV) he is obviously eager to mark off God from his creatures, and the doctrine of hylomorphism is a most effective way of achieving this end. He therefore perhaps attaches rather more weight to this distinction than most of the ancients had done, but *Ennead* 5.4.1 provides an interesting Plotinian parallel. It should always be remembered that Plotinus supposed the existence of intelligible matter as well as sensible—and considered that this was pure Platonic doctrine.\(^{29}\) Hence, although Plotinus did not greatly emphasize the distinction between the immaterial One and the combination of matter with Form that constitute even the highest level of the world of plurality, yet the distinction is there. MacKenna-Page renders *Ennead* 5.4.1.17 as follows: “Nothing simplex can be a body, and, as a thing of process cannot be a First, the Source cannot be a thing of generation: only a principle outside of body and utterly untouched by body, could be the First.” It is worthy of notice that this part of the *Enneads* survives in the so-called *Epistola de Scientia Divina*.\(^{30}\) Geoffrey Lewis\(^{31}\)


\(^{30}\) For problems about the authorship of this work see P. Kraus, “Plotin chez les Arabes”, *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte*, 23 (1941), 263-295.

gives an English translation of the Arabic as follows: "The pure true One is not one in respect of anything but by itself alone." (Here we have a doctrine similar to al-Kindī's view that unity is present to the One essentially and to others accidentally). "Apart from the First, there is nothing purely simple. No body is simple, but is composite and liable to corruption. The First is not corporeal but one and simple, so it is indubitably the first of all things."

(d) The idea, discussed by al-Kindī (A.R. 146-51), that one is not a number but the source of number dates back to the pre-Platonic stage of Pythagoreanism. Speaking of the Pythagoreans in *Metaphysics A* (986A17), Aristotle tells us that they held that the elements of number are the even and the odd and that the unity proceeds from (or "consists of") both of these, for it is both even and odd. According to Theon of Smyrna we could have found a similar idea in Aristotle's work on the Pythagoreans, who, he said, called the unit the even-odd. And the Pythagoreans were not alone in regarding the unit as distinct from the numbers. The doctrine is also in Euclid (7,Defs. 1, 2) and Aristotle himself (*Met. 1092B10*). Heath and Ross suggest that Chrysippus, who called the unity *pléthos hen* (multitude one) was the first to break through this mathematical tradition.

It is also possible that al-Kindī could draw not only on the mathematical, but also on the metaphysical tradition in this matter. He could have learned about the one being both even and odd from *Metaphysics A* (986A17). The same book would give him one of Aristotle's accounts of the Platonic generation of the Form-Numbers from the One to the Dyad. According to Plato, says Aristotle (987B22), the numbers are derived from the Great and Small by participation in the One. In this passage there is a sharp division between One and the Numbers (*arithmoi*).

(e) In his discussion of the terms "great" and "small" (A.R., 143 ff.), al-Kindī follows the view held by Aristotle in the *Categories* (5b) and presupposed by the puzzle called Sorites, that such words as great, small, long, short, many and few are terms of relation. As such, says Aristotle,
things are not great or small. They are only called so by comparison. In this way we may call a mountain small and a grain large if we compare them with things of a similar kind. Yet if al-Kindī is adopting Aristotelian positions here, we should also notice that his views of the infinite do not always correspond with those of the third book of the Physics.

(f) Al-Kindī’s argument that the One is neither soul nor intellect (A.R., 154-55) is obviously influenced by Neoplatonism. Yet the details of his argumentation do not always follow the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. He holds, for example, that the soul is the place of the passions, and that these are multiple and in movement—in contrast with the One which is simple and immovable. All the Greek Neoplatonists would have agreed about the multiplicity and movement of the soul, but the question of the passions is more difficult. There was a dispute within the Neoplatonic school about whether the soul “wholly descends” or whether a part still remains above in the intelligible world. The part above is, in the opinion of Plotinus, free from the passions. Proclus, however, denied that there is any such part—and it is his view that al-Kindī seems to be following. Among the Greek Neoplatonists Damascius was almost alone in agreeing with Plotinus. Simplicius and Iamblichus were, with Proclus, the chief upholders of the opposite position. Some of the relevant texts are Enneads 4.8.8.2-3, 5.1.10.17-18, Proclus in Tim. 341, Damascius, de Principiis 400 (Ruelle 2, 254). It is worthy of notice that the so-called Theology of Aristotle repeats the Plotinian position (Henry-Schwyzer 2, 249 and 285).

Al-Kindī holds that the actual intellect is the genera and species (A.R., 155). This looks like a curious combination of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrine. It is well known that Aristotle and the Neoplatonists agreed in making the thinking mind and its object identical in the act of thought. So far the doctrine of al-Kindī looks orthodox enough. What is odd is that he himself speaks of the actual intellect, which is something in which Plotinus took no interest. In fact al-Kindī appears to have a new variant solution for the baffling chapter five of the third book of Aristotle’s De Anima. Certainly for al-Kindī the actual intellect is not the First Principle (as it is for Alexander of Aphrodisias); nor, since it is genera and species, is it wholly within man. It is comparable, though not identical with, the active intellect as understood by Avicenna. It is a superior power to man, outside man but below the One. As such it corresponds in certain respects, as we have seen, with the Plotinian nous, but as an interpretation of Aristotle it is very strange. The nearest ancient parallel may be a doctrine
ascribed to Marinus, the biographer of Proclus, by Philoponus in his *Commentary on the De Anima* (p. 535 Hayduck). Marinus apparently held that the actual intellect is not the First Principle but something angelic or spiritual (*daimonion*). Perhaps he is thinking of Socrates’ divine sign?

As for the doctrine that since the actual intellect (which equals the genera and species) is a plurality and the One is absolute unity, therefore the One cannot be intellect, there is no difficulty in recognizing this as a basic Neoplatonic position. We should compare, for example, *Ennead* 5.3.11 (*Epistola de Scientia Divina* p. 321 Henry-Schwyzer). We should remember, of course, that the doctrine of the superiority of the One to the intellect is a Neoplatonic position formulated by Plotinus in conscious opposition to Aristotelianism. The fact that al-Kindī takes it over is the clearest indication of a Neoplatonic influence in his writings. We have already observed other varieties of Platonism as influences: at any rate his interpretation of the *Parmenides* is not Neoplatonic. It could be taken directly from the dialogue itself or from a Middle Platonist writer like Theon of Smyrna. In fact al-Kindī seems familiar with several variations on the Platonic theme and is able to adopt whichever of them suits his immediate purposes.

(g) Al-Kindī holds that the True One causes individual existence by the gift of unity (A.R., 161-62). In describing the coming-into-existence of particulars, he uses the word *fayd*, emanation. Yet he does not hold a system akin to that of Avicenna and al-Fārābī who believe the world and the emanative process to be eternal. Al-Kindī denies the eternity of the world; creation is for him *ex nihilo*. These beliefs are alien to almost all Greek thinking. Only Philoponus is a predecessor of al-Kindī here. Yet there is an element in al-Kindī’s thinking that dates back to Plato. This is the doctrine that the gift of unity is the gift of existence. Plato, of course, believed that unity brought limit and hence existence to a disordered substrate and held that some sort of material principle was from eternity, but we have only to look at his names for the most real things, the Forms, in the *Philebus* to see a trace of the Platonist tradition in al-Kindī’s work. In this dialogue the Forms are referred to as “henads” or “monads” (15AB). Plato came

---


26 For the relations between al-Kindī and Philoponus see R. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic* (Oxford, 1962), 190-196.
to believe at the end of his life that the Forms are "generated" by the imposition of the One on the Indefinite Dyad. Until unity is imposed, the Forms cannot be distinguished one from another ("until" must of course be understood in the sense of logical priority, not of temporal precedence); indeed they cannot really be said to exist.³⁷ There is an echo of this idea in al-Kindī, though the great difference between the Islamic thinker and Plato is that whereas for Plato the removal of unity would mean that existents would revert to chaos, for al-Kindī they would cease to exist. Plotinus too would hold that they would cease to exist, since everything, even formless matter, derives by emanation from the One. He differs from al-Kindī, however, in holding that unity has never and will never be absent from the plurality of things.³⁸

(h) There is another respect in which al-Kindī's position seems nearer to that of Plotinus than to those of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. For these latter thinkers the system of emanation involves a series of intermediary causes which, in effect, deny the direct action of God in the world. Al-Kindī, presumably for theological reasons, seems to take a different approach, and in this respect is nearer to Plotinus, in whose system, it should always be remembered, the process of emanation never precludes the direct presence of the One in the Universe. Plotinus is not a pantheist; rather he holds that all things are in a sense in the One, while the One still remains transcendent. Yet the direct presence of the One and its effects indicate a more "theological" attitude than that held by al-Fārābī and Avicenna, whose grafting of the Aristotelian intelligences on to the Plotinian stem leads to an anti-Plotinian restriction of the role of the One in the universe. After all, it was Plotinus who said³⁹ on his death-bed that he was trying "to bring back the divine in us to the Divine in the All." ⁴⁰

(i) Finally, what about al-Kindī's True One itself? We have already seen that al-Kindī is Plotinian and anti-Aristotelian in making it transcend the intellect. Yet does he follow the full-scale Plotinian doctrine and make the First Principle transcend Being? There appears to be no evidence that he holds such a view of it, and there is an alternative Neoplatonic position which might have been more to his

³⁷ For a development of this doctrine of Plotinus see J. M. Rist, op. cit.
³⁸ Cf., Ennead, 4.8.6.
³⁹ Porphyry, Vita Plotini, Chapter 2.
⁴⁰ For the presence of the One see R. Arnou, Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1921), 160-187.
taste. This is the view that whereas the intellect represents defined being, the First Principle is simply Being as such—regarded as prior to any particular Being. We find this position in fragments of an anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, believed by Professor Hadot to be from Porphyry’s hand. If Hadot is right—and there are grave doubts about this—and the doctrine is Porphyrian in origin, its reappearance with al-Kindi might seem a little more credible. Be that as it may, an alternative to the Plotinian treatment of the First Principle was certainly current in late antiquity.

IV. Concluding Remarks.

We must now comment very briefly on the relevance of al-Kindi’s discussion of divine existence and oneness to Islamic theology and Islamic metaphysics.

In part III of this paper we have seen that although al-Kindi draws on the experience of his Greek predecessors and is influenced by some more than others, his purpose and method of argument remain his own. What then is his purpose? Professor M. A. Abū Rāda and R. Walzer have offered strong evidence to show al-Kindi’s very close affinity to Mu’tazilism. In his discussion of al-Kindi’s doctrine of the negative and positive divine attributes, Professor Abū Rāda has shown conclusively that in this and other treatises al-Kindi shares with the Mu’tazilites both their doctrine of the identity of divine attributes and divine essence and also their endeavour to remove from the Godhead any trace of the anthropomorphic. One need only compare the summary of al-Kindi’s views on divine oneness with the general position of the Mu’tazilite as reported in the Maqālāt of al-Ash’arī to note the striking similarity. It is not then implausible to suggest that in his discussion of divine existence and oneness al-Kindi is offering a rigorous philosophical defence of the Mu’tazilite doctrine of divine unity, al-tawḥīd.

43 A.R., 27 ff.; R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, 176-187.
44 A.R., 80-80(7).
But the discussion is also of interest to the history of metaphysics in general and to the history of Islamic metaphysics in particular. One of the problems we encounter in the metaphysics of al-Fārābī and Avicenna is the relation of the one Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) to His manifold creation. How can plurality proceed from God without this implying plurality in the divine essence? Avicenna’s critics found him vulnerable here. It must be remembered that some of his severest critics were theologians in the Ash'arite tradition. Their criticism was aimed at Avicenna’s doctrine of the identity of divine attributes and essence, his doctrine of necessary creation, his dictum that from the one only one proceeds and his system of intermediary necessary causes. The difficulty of multiplicity in the divine essence, they seem to have thought, could be removed once the attributes were made additional to essence. But this solution did not satisfy everyone, certainly not those who still adhered to Mu'tazilite principles.

It is here that al-Kindī’s discussion is significant because it presents a different approach to the problem. What al-Kindī, in effect, has attempted to point out is that the plurality which we encounter in the world cannot be explained unless there is a cause which is essentially one. In other words, al-Kindī has attempted to show the other side of the problem. For him the question is not: how can there be unity in the divine essence when there is plurality in creation, but rather; without the existence of the True One, the creator who is one in His essence, how can there be plurality in the world at all? 47

University of Toronto

47 The substance of this article was submitted for discussion at the Baghdad and al-Kindī Conference held in Baghdad in December, 1962.
THE SOURCES OF "THE BOOK OF THE DUCHESS"

It would seem that the passages from the Old French love poems which are echoed in Chaucer's Book of the Duchess have already been sufficiently displayed in Kittredge's early articles and other related studies. These have demonstrated that in Chaucer's poem passages are reflected from almost a dozen of Machaut's pieces (Le Dit de la Fontaine Amoureuse, Le Dit dou Lyon, Le Dit dou Vergier, Le Lay de Confort, Le Remede de Fortune, the third, eighth, and ninth Motets, the first Complainte, Le Jugement dou Roy de Navarre, and above all Le Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne), and from Le Roman de la Rose, and from Froissart's Paradys d'Amours. Similarities in the general conduct of Chaucer’s poem have also been pointed out in some of these pieces, notably Machaut's Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne, and also in the anonymous Songe Vert, Jehan de la Mote's Regret de Guillaume, and Graunson's Complainte de l'An Nouvel and Complainte de Saint Valentin.

Despite this full display of parallel passages, a fresh reading of the French love poems reveals a number of noteworthy additional passages remarkably like other parts of the Book of the Duchess and therefore very likely in Chaucer's mind as he wrote. For instance, Kittredge observed that in the opening of the Book of the Duchess, ll. 1-5, 14-15 are rather closely translated from the opening lines of Froissart's Paradys d'Amours; but no parallel has been adduced for the intervening lines 6-13. Here they are, in their context:

I have gret wonder, be this lyght,
How that I lyve, for day ne nyght
I may nat slepe wel nygh noght;
I have so many an ydel thought,
Purely for deuhte of slep,
That, by my trouthe, I take no kep
Of nothing, how hyt cometh or gooth,
Ne me nys nothyng teef nor looth.
Ai is ylyche good to me—


3 PMLA, XXX, 1. See also Furnivall, Trial Forewords, 51.
Joye or sorowe, wherso hyt be —
For I have feynge in nothyng,
But, as yt were, a mased thyng,
Alway in poyn to faile a-doun,
For sorwful ymagynacioun
Ys alway hooily in my mynde.

Now at the opening of Machaut’s *Dit dou Vergier*, the poet, Guillaume, “Pleins d’amoureuse maladic” (l. 19), in summer enters a beautiful garden and is delighted by the singing of the birds and the beauty of the trees and the flowers. He thinks of his beloved, most beautiful and best of all women, except that she is harsh to him. The thought of her harshness fills him with grief:

Jeus tel doleur, a dire voir,...
Car tant fu en mon mal pensis
Que je fui en doleur transis
Si que je ne sos ou j’estoie,
Ne bien ne mal je ne sentoi.
Ensi fui transis longuement
Sans avoir joie ne lourment.

The general similarity of this passage to Chaucer’s lines 6-10, the similarity of phraseology in the italicized lines, and even a likeness in sentence structure are readily apparent.

Similarly, a hitherto unnoted passage in *Le Songe Vert*, again near the opening of the poem, tells how the poet’s grief-induced sleeplessness resulted in such physical weakness that he fell to the earth and lay there as if dead, without feeling anything at all:

Ainz estoit mes cors si failliz,
Qui maintes nuiz veillie avoie,
Car certes si foibles estoie,
Si pales, si maz et si vains,
Que jo flati sor mes dous mains
A la terre trastoz pasmez
Et de tristor si acostez,
Avis m’estoit que fusse morz:
Ne me sentoi point le cors.

---

6 The only other parallel to any part of the *Book of the Duchess* which has been cited from Machaut’s *Dit dou Vergier* is quoted by Skeat (I, 483): it is the “screen of ladies” when the knight first sees his beloved. A similar description of the beauteous group in which the beloved stood out as preeminent in beauty is found in Machaut’s *Judgement dou Roy de Behaingne* (Skeat, misled by Sandras, ascribes it to *La Fontaine Amoureuse*: see Kittredge, *MP*, VII, 468, 470). Miss Dorothy Bethurum is under the impression that this feature — the “screen of ladies” — is not found in Machaut’s poems: see her perceptive and interesting study, “Chaucer’s Point of View as Narrator in the Love Poems,” *PMLA*, LXXIV (1959), 513.
Striking again is the general similarity to Chaucer's opening lines, and the specific similarities between the italicized French lines and Chaucer's ll. 11-13. These two passages from Le Dit dou Vergier and Le Songe Vert seem to account for ll. 6-13, a gap in the opening lines of the Book of the Duchess unaccounted for in Kittredge's parallels.

Taking up his parallels again at l. 16, Kittredge, with a bit of assistance from Loomis, finds similarities between the Book of the Duchess and Machaut's poems throughout ll. 16-43, the rest of the passage in which Chaucer describes his sleep-sickness — except for ll. 30-35. Again, it is in precisely this gap that there occurs an interesting parallel between Chaucer's lines and Froissart's poem, L'Espinette Amoureuse. In essence, Chaucer here says that he does not know what is wrong with him, what the cause of his illness is:

But men myght axe me why soo
I may not sleepe, and what me is.
But natheles, who aske this
Leseth his askynge trewely,
Myselfen can not telle why
The sothe.

Froissart in like vein observes how many lovers, stricken with love-sickness, do not know what is the matter with them:

Comment qu'en la douce vie
D'amours les plaisours bien sont
Navré d'une maladie
Et ne sevennent pas qu'il ont
Mes leur coeurs de ce secrè
Cognoiist bien la droite voie.

The anonymous Songe Vert was early, and rightly, cited by W. O. Sypherd for its general similarities to the Book of the Duchess; but he did not call attention to all the important similarities, and he did not offer any specific parallels to support the general likenesses which he found. The poem consists of 1822 octosyllabic verses in couplets; it is written in the same metre as the Book of the Duchess and is not much longer than the English poem. A synopsis of the plot will reveal some of the large likenesses.

In the time of the plague (1348), the poet, distressed, grief-stricken, sleepless, wishing for death to end his sorrow, walks out at day-break one morning in the Easter season, clad in black. He takes a path into a garden containing a stream where the birds are singing and the air is pure. He hears a bell, the sound of which fills him with distress, for it belongs to an "ordre de mendiaz" in whose ground the

---

7 Léopold Constans (ed.), "Le Songe Vert," Romania, XXXIII (1904), 490-539.
8 R. S. Loomis, "Chaucer's Eight Years' Sickness," MLN, LIX (1944), 178-180.
9 Kittredge, PMLA, XXX, 2-5.
10 W. O. Sypherd ("Chaucer's Eight Years' Sickness," MLN, XX [1905], 241) cites this passage, along with others from Froissart, Deschamps, Machaut, Jean de Conde, and Thibaut IV, to illustrate the love-sickness convention which he finds reflected in the Book of the Duchess; but he does not relate the passage to these particular lines.
11 MLN, XXIV, 46-47.
body of his lady lies. He is so weak that he faints, and while he is unconscious he dreams this dream.

He meets the Queen of Love and upbraids her for slaying his lady. She replies that Fortune is to blame and seeks to dissuade him from killing himself in his grief. She promises him a wonderful lady to love, but he will not be disloyal to his dead lady. Two knights and two maidens attend Love: the maidens Loiautez and Plaisance, the knights Desirs and Bon Espoir. The dreamer faints as though dead, and is revived after eating a "lectuaire" which Desirs had helped Love make, and which is now administered under the direction of Love. Desirs now changes his black robe for a green one. Thereupon the dreamer sees a beautiful flower in which he takes exceeding delight: he is told it is the symbol of his new lady. Since he is now recovered and brought back from despair, Love and her attendants leave him. He climbs a high tree and, looking down, sees a thorny bush ("chardon") threatening his flower. In his eagerness to pull it up he jumps down from the top. The shock of the fall awakes him.

He finds himself in green robes; the hedge ("haie"), which was dry when he fell asleep, is green and flourishing. He goes home, and finds his dwelling decorated with flowers and greenery, though his people assure him they have not decked it. He sends for his black clothes, and when they are brought to him he discovers that they are all now green.

Professor Sypherd, in comparing Le Songe Vert with the Book of the Duchess, calls attention to the dream as a literary device; the conventional rising early and going into a garden where the birds are singing; the author in distress at the opening; the complaint of a lover dressed in black for the death of his mistress; and the ascription of the blame to Fortune. These are indeed striking similarities. We may go farther, however, and stress the structural and thematic likeness. For both poems present the spectacle of a bereaved lover completely beside himself with grief, and in both poems a consoled talks with him and gradually succeeds in easing his distress and bringing him a degree of consolation which enables him to accept the loss and adjust himself to the changed conditions of life. In broad theme and method, therefore, the two poems are the same; and it is not unlikely that the reading of Le Songe Vert helped to suggest the general situation and conduct of his poem to Chaucer.

Specifically, in the Book of the Duchess we have a Black Knight who is so distressed at Fortune's dealing death to his beloved that his whole thought is fixed upon self-destruction. This black mood of overwhelming grief, culminating in the desire for death, occupies the first third of the Black Knight's long speech; and the first task of the consoled is to dissuade the grieving lover from yielding to this blow of Fortune and destroying himself. This he essays by belittling Fortune and citing the folly of other lovers who slew themselves for love and are now eternally damned for their folly. A parallel situation exists in Le Songe Vert. The bereaved lover, clad in black, in his great distress desires only death. When the Queen of Love comes to him and seeks to offer him comfort, he rejects her ministrations. She tells him that Fortune is to blame and urges him to avoid the folly of self-destruction, for if he slays himself God will punish him.

It is in the climactic passages in which the distressed lover utters his woe and cries out for death, and in the dissuading speech of the consoled, that there occur parallels not only of situation and thought but also of expression. Exclaims the Black Knight:
THE BOOK OF THE DUCHESS

The pure deth ys so ful my soo
That I wolde deye, hyt wolde not soo;
For whan I fulwe hyt, hit wol flee;
I wolde have hym, hyt nyl nat me...
And whoso wiste al, by my trouthe,
My soryse, but he hadde rouse,
And piece of my soryse smerte,
That man hath a fendly herte.

(583-594)

And the French knight clad in black:

Et lors j'aperçus le debat
Que la desleias Mort metoit,
Quant vers moi venir ne voloit
Ne sofrir que vers li alaix...
Ensi, de tristesse garniz
Sor toz et pleins de desconfort,
Me guaimentoie si tres fort
Que n'est hom nus, tant cresse fust,
Qu'aucune pitié n'en est
Qui veïst le tres grief dolor
Que jo sofoie nuit et jor.

(174-198)

Here occur two arresting turns of thought, following close upon each other in both poems: the antagonism between Death and the black knight, Death refusing to come to the knight, the knight seeking to come to Death; and the concept of grief so deep that it would move any man to pity, else he were cruel indeed.

Something of similarity is found also in the allusions to Fortune in the two poems. Chaucer's "fals Fortune ... The trayteresse fals and ful of gyle" (618-619) and especially

For Fortune kan so many a wyle,
Ther be but fewe kan hir begile,
And eke she ys the lasse to blame

(673-675)
bear some resemblance to

C'est Fortune la desloiaus,
Que est fontaine de toz maus:
Cele en doit bien estre blasmee.

(327-329)

In the climax of his despair, the Black Knight cries out:

"But yet, what to doone?
Be oure Lord, hyt ys to deye soone.
For nothyng I leve hyt noght,
But lyve and deye ryght in this thouhte."

(689-592)

In the speech of consolation and dissuasion,

"A, goode sir," quod I, "say not soo !...
Remembre yow of Socrates,
For he ne counted nat thre strees
Of noght that Fortune koude doo."
"No," quod he, "I kan not soo."
"Why so? syr, yis parde!" quod y;
"Ne say noght soo, for trewely,
Thogh ye had lost the feres twelve,
And ye for sorne mordred youselfe,
Ye sholde be damned in this cas
By as good ryght as Medea was, ...
... Another rage
Had Dydo, ... which a fool she was!
... and ryght thus
Hath many another folly doon ..."
"Why so?" quod he, "hys y nat soo". (714-742)

Similarly the French knight clad in black reaches his climax of despair, believing that only death can cure his ills:

Por ço la mort tant desiroie
Que jo n’en tenioie nul conte,
Fust a honor o fust a honte.
Et lors, desiranz de morir
Por plus tost de mon mal guarir,
M’en alioie tristes et maz. (162-167)

In her speech of consolation and dissuasion, the Queen of Love says:

"Mes douz filz, jo le te dirai.
C’est Fortune la desloiaus
Que est fontaine de toz maus:
Cele en doit bien estre blasme,
Car ele l’a aprocuree
La Mort, nuit et jor sansz faintise
Et l’a fait par si faite guise
Com tu pues orendroit veoir, ...
Por quoï, mes douz filz, jo te pri
Et requier de cuer doucement
Que tu ne vuesles telement
Ton cors afolez ne destriiez;
Car certes Dieus te devoiz nuire
En toz cas, en mort et en vie,
Se en cele forsenerie
Voloiës ta vie finir."
"Ha! dame, n’en faut ja parler
Car jo ne desir que la mort."
"Certes, mes douz filz, tu as tort."
"Tort, ma dame? Mais vos trop grant.
Puis jo faire nul bon semblant,
Quand j’ai perdu sansz nul retor
Ma dame, ma joie, m’amor,
Que en vie me sostenoit?" (326-353)
The situation, the characters, the relationship between the characters (their attitude toward each other, and the way in which they affect each other and seek to affect each other), the order and substance of the words they address to each other are all alike in the two poems at this climactic point. In a dream set in a spring garden, a black knight, grieving inordinately at the death of his lady and threatening suicide, is answered by a conoler who, after alluding slightly to Fortune, seeks to dissuade the knight from self-destruction by reminding him that God would justly punish him with damnation should he carry out the mad folly of ending his own life. Even the give-and-take of conversation has much the same effect in the two passages. And (except for an out-of-text allusion to Dido) there is nothing of all this in the other French sources.\footnote{Kittredge, PMLA, XXX, 14-15. See also Kittredge, MP, VII, 466, where is cited an allusion to death not much like Chaucer’s ll. 583-584.}

The remaining parallels which I would adduce from *Le Songe Vert* must carry less weight than the preceding ones, for they occur also in Machaut’s *Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne*, usually in a form closer to Chaucer’s lines. Yet, to enforce further the similarity of the anonymous poem to Chaucer’s, they are worthy of citation.

In the *Book of the Duchess*, the second stage of the consolation of the Black Knight turns partly upon his recollection in a long passage of all the beauties, physical and spiritual, of his fair Whyte. There is a similar description, about 100 lines long (486-584), in *Le Songe Vert* of a lady whom the Queen of Love offers as a new love to the knight clad in black. Love’s description of the lady is superlative in its praises: she is a non-pareil, like Whyte. As of Whyte,

\begin{quote}
For all the world so hadde she  
Surmounted hem alle of beaute,
\end{quote}

so of the French lady,

\begin{quote}
... Qu’ele surmonte, a brief parler,  
Tote celes que el mont sont.
\end{quote}

And as the Black Knight said of Whyte,

\begin{quote}
My lady yaf me al hooLy  
The noble yfte of hir mercy,  
Sauynge hir worship, by al weyes
\end{quote}

so the lady destined for the French knight was to love him,

\begin{quote}
Sor toz en pure loiauté  
Et si de franche volonté,  
En tot cas gardant son honor.
\end{quote}

The French black knight, like the English one (759-804), was an early devotee of love:

\begin{quote}
... Al mains si vos ai jo servi  
Loiaument, qu’onques n’i failli,  
Puis que j’oi passé quatorze anz:  
De ço sui jo bien sovenanz.
\end{quote}
And finally, the Black Knight describes the blissful culmination of his love for Whyte as a perfect union of two hearts into one:

"Oure hertes wern so evene a payre,
That never nas that oon contrayre
To that other, for no woo.
For sothe, ylyche they suffred thoo
Oo blysse, and eke oo sorwe bothe."

(1289-1293)

So Love promises the French knight:

"Si te comant a Dieu atant,
Que doint et a li et a toi
Tant de bien com jo vueil par moi,
Si qu'il vos tiegne chescun jor
En un cuer et en une amor."

(1434-1438)

It would seem highly likely, therefore, that Chaucer knew Le Songe Vert and that it influenced him not only in the general conduct of his poem but also in details of its development, particularly in the depiction of the bereaved knight’s grief and the consoler’s dissuasion from suicide. The additional passages to which I have called attention from Machaut’s *Dit dou Vergier* and Froissart’s *L’Estépinette Amoureuse* seem also to have been in Chaucer’s mind. Of course the various other French poems cited by Kittredge and others remain as important as ever — especially Machaut’s *Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne* — both for their influence in the general conduct of the poem and in specific turns of thought and expression. Chaucer’s poem is a fusion of many influences, both general and specific, from his French predecessors.

*Lehigh University*

J. Burke Severs.

GUILLAUME DE PALERNE, A SOURCE FOR TRISTAN DE NANTEUIL

*Tristan de Nanteuil* is a much neglected fourteenth-century French epic. An analysis was given ninety years ago by Paulin Paris in the *Histoire littéraire de la France.*¹ For anyone who desires to follow the story step by step, it is exceedingly misleading. Since the nineteenth century a few literary sources have been firmly established,² while other tales have received only desultory or uninformed comment. One tale so treated concerns the huge and savage hind which lives in an underground lair in the wilds, steals the infant hero from his foster parents and subsequently nurtures him. The hind’s act of providing for a human child it has stolen, enables us to characterise the animal as a suckling beast. The suckling beast motif is often found in association with tales of the Eustachius Cycle, because animals cause children to be separated from their parents and then become the boy’s or girl’s foster parents.

¹ Vol. XXVI (Paris, 1873), 229-269.
Although he successfully established that the Eustachius Cycle is represented in Tristan de Nanteuil where Gui de Nanteuil, his wife Aiglentine and their infant son Tristan are each separated from the other, and that the animal carrying off Tristan becomes a suckling beast, A. H. Krappe was at a loss to find a model for the savage hind.

However, a scholar who did venture to comment on the wild hind was Mme Germaine Colas. On page 13 of her thesis, she reviewed summarily the suckling beasts in mediaeval French literature noting, without discussion, that a wolf adopts its adopted progeny to carry off a lover, protects their flight and provides them with food in Guillaume de Palerne, and that in Dolopatros and Isomberte a hind becomes a foster parent to several children. Eleven pages earlier Mme Colas had made a pronouncement, without discussion, about a source for the hind's role in Tristan de Nanteuil. She wrote: Le lion d'Octavien [in Florent et Octavien] pourrait bien avoir inspiré la cerve de Tristan.

Let us turn to Florent et Octavien. We read that the empress flees with her children and enters a forest. While she is asleep a monkey steals one of her children and a lion the other. She eventually retrieves Octavien from the lion which then attaches itself to them both. It shares their sea voyage to Jerusalem and participates in many adventures which subsequently befall them. None of these developments parallel in any way the activities of the wild hind in Tristan de Nanteuil. Next there are the suckling hinds in Dolopatros and Isomberte. The latter may be discarded since the hind in it behaves in a similar way to its model in Dolopatros. It is related here that the seven children of a knight and a fairy are exposed in a forest. A hermit discovers them, takes them to his dwelling and feeds them for seven years on milk from a hind which also lives with them. There is nothing in this story that is recalled by the hind of our chanson de geste.

Had Mme Colas read Guillaume de Palerne alongside Tristan de Nanteuil, she might have noticed that the werewolf and the hind often act in an identical manner. Not only does each live in an underground lair, steal an infant hero, bring it food, but also each animal helps its adopted child to carry off a lover, protects the two humans in flight and provides them with sustenance. As the dependence of Tristan de Nanteuil on Guillaume de Palerne has not been demonstrated by any scholar to date, including the author of the latest work about Guillaume, it is perhaps an opportune moment to do so.

The points of contact are as follows:

1. Guillaume, son of the king and queen of Puille, is about four years old when he is suddenly seized in the royal garden by a huge werewolf and carried off unharmed

---


4 An analysis was given by R. Bossu in Romania, LXXXIII (1952), 289-331.

5 For the first, see the ed. by C. Brunet and A. de Montaiglon (Paris, 1856), 324-326; the second text was analysed in a review article by G. Paris in Romania, XIX (1890), 320-321.


7 The Guillaume de Palerne incidents (= G.P.) are given first, followed by those of Tristan de Nanteuil (= T.N.). G.P. is quoted by line number from the twelfth-century version ed. by H.
(G.P. 61-92) — Tristan, while still a baby, is suddenly seized in the home of his foster parents by a huge hind and carried off without being hurt (12v).

2. The wolf flees with Guillaume to a forest near Rome where it lives in a deep pit strewn with grass. This is Guillaume’s new home. The wolf provides him with the necessary sustenance. The forest is also inhabited by wild animals (G.P. 166-186) —— The hind takes Tristan to a nearby forest inhabited by wild animals. Its lair is an underground duiere where it keeps the infant. It provides Tristan with food which it obtains by raiding the neighbourhood (12v, and 23v).

3. One day a cowherd and his dog come near the pit. He finds Guillaume lying in the den in royal garb. The wolf is away foraging (G.P. 187-213) —— Clad in a rich mantle, Tristan is lying in the duiere one day with a monkey as a playmate. The hind is out seeking food. A heathen named Lucion d’Ivorie comes unexpectedly upon the lair and enters (24r-24v). —— The epic poet radically alters the outcome of the meeting in his source as it was unsuitable for his purposes. In G.P. 214-267 the cowherd makes off with Guillaume and adopts him. Finding the hero gone on its return, the werewolf follows the tracks of the cowherd to his home and reassures itself that Guillaume is in good hands. In T.N. the monkey screams, whereupon the hind comes hurrying back and promptly kills Lucion. There was little point in giving Tristan another foster parent and a heathen into the bargain, since the author had already often stated that the hero was to spend his youth and adolescence in the company of a savage animal. Our epic poet has no use for events in the next two thousand lines of G.P. where it is told how Guillaume is adopted by the Emperor of Rome, is made a page to princess Melior and falls in love with her. After battles and sieges, coincidences between T.N. and G.P. reappear. Tristan has now reached adolescence.

4. The emperor agrees to a request that Melior marry her cousin (G.P. 2612-2654). Guillaume and Melior don bearskins and elope successfully (G.P. 2991-3121). They traverse a forest by night and hide in a den by day. Guillaume craves food. Melior suggests that they can just as well live on love and wild fruits. The werewolf shadows the couple during their flight (G.P. 3169-3249). —— King Galaffre has a daughter named Blanchandine whose hand is sought by his ally Agrapart (64r). She sets out on the journey to her betrothed. The hind attacks the train, the heroine is abandoned by her guards and the animal and Tristan carry off the maiden (64v). All day they flee until they come to a quarry where they hide (65r-32-65v):

    La n'eurent a menger pain ne char ne poisson;
    Et s'avoyent courri .x. lieues de randon,
    Savoient lain et soif, il y ot bien raison.

—— At the opening of the incident Blanchandine’s position recalls that of Melior. As the story proceeds, we find parallels: there are two lovers who flee, an animal accompanies them, they hide and there is no food.

Michelant (Paris, 1876), while T.N. is recounted by folio and line from the only surviving MS. B.N. franç. 1478. When deviations occur at each point of contact, we comment on them. There is no need to attribute the deviations to supposed lost versions or supposed variant versions of the twelfth-century G.P. Having lived in close contact with the workings of the mind of the author of T.N. during the past ten years and determined all his sources, we can confidently state that it is his wont to omit or change parts of his source material whenever it suits his needs.
5. Knowing of the couple’s hunger, the werewolf forages for food and steals it from a man on the highway. After bringing meat and bread to Guillaume and Melior, the animal provides wine in the same manner (G.P. 3250-3369).—

The hind s’avisa de bonne advison / Pour les enfans donner a manger a foison / Se departi la beste coiement a larron 65r 2-4. The couple proceed to make love (65r-66r). The animal returns: A boire et a manger leur donna l’amysie 67r 2. It had stolen the food and drink from a pagan in the neighbourhood. —— While following his source closely, the author of T.N. has profited from the animal’s absence to interpolate the love scene, a not unnatural sequel to the hero’s first meeting with a maiden. In G.P. the lovers had come together in passionate embraces in the royal gardens before their flight (see vss. 1703-1732).

6. Guillaume and Melior resume their flight southwards, travelling by night and acting like bears during the day, the wold all the while providing food (G.P. 3370-3410). Near Benevento the forested area comes to an end and no cover is in sight. A quarry is found which they enter and where they lie down to sleep (G.P. 3870-3925). —— Tristan and Blanchandine sleep that night together in the quarry: Bras a bras, nu a nu, menant joyeuse vie: / Ains mes dame ne fut sy lost aprivoisie 67r 9-10. —— In T.N. the flight has been shortened in space and time. There is no relation of successive stages. The epic poet makes one quarry do the hide in point 5 and the quarry in point 6. That the place is a quarry is clearly stated (65r 24-28):

Jusques a vespre queurent, n’y font arrestison
C’onques bois ne trouverent ne haye ne buisson.*
Droit a souleil couchant trouverent, se scet on,
Une grande quarriere dessoubz terre ou salbon
Ou on avoit osté de la terre a foison.

This is the first indication that the forest has come to an end. If our author had not been following G.P., it would have been more natural for his lovers to stay in the forest.

7. The lovers are discovered while asleep in the quarry by workmen (G.P. 3930-3954). —— Exactly paralleled in T.N. (67r 33-67r 2):

Mais droit a l’endemain sy qu’a souleil levant
Aloient ly ouvrier a l’œuvre repairant.
A la carriere viennent et pierre vont trajant.
Le maistre qui aloit en la fosse faisant
C’est avalés aval, dont se va regardant
Et a vèô la cerve, Blanchandine et Tristan.

The couple do not know that they have been seen.

8. The quarrymen go off and report the discovery to the provost of Benevento who, with his son and a great host of townsfolk, rides up to capture the couple (G.P. 3955-3990). —— The workmen report their discovery to Galaffre who is riding through the land in search of his daughter. He is accompanied by his cousin named Clariant and a great host of soldiers. All head for the quarry (67r-68r).

9. Guillaume and Melior hear the sound of horsemen and soldiers. To draw the provost’s men away from the quarry, the werewolf seizes his son and carries him off. The animal is hotly pursued, as calculated (G.P. 4025-4118). —— Blan-

* MS: ne trouverent bois.
chandine and Tristan hear Galaffre’s men arrive. Then we learn (68r 5-14):

Or oyés de la beste le certain convenant:
Pour delivrer l’enfant qu’elle avoit nourry tant
Se mist en adventure, sy con orrés avant,
Car de l’embuschement s’en est issue atant.
Envers ung Sarrasin est venue acourant,
Cousin estoit Galaffre, s’ot a non Clariant.
La beste l’aherdi, o lui l’en va portant
Aussy légerement con ne pesast ung gant.
Tout en vie l’emporte. Le Turc va escriant:
“Secourés moy, seigneurs, par Mahon le poissant.”

Galaffre’s horde chases the hind for half a league.

10. Thanks to the diversion, Guillaume and Melior escape successfully (G.P. 4119-4182). — Likewise, the hero and his lover in T.N. (68r 29-32):

Tristan et Blanchandine quant se vont percevant
Qu’i n’orent entour eulk ne femme ne ennfant,
De la carriere yssirent; plus n’y vont demourant.
Parmi les champs s’en fuient vers ung bois verdoian.

11. The werewolf releases the provost’s son, throws off its pursuers and doubles back to the couple (G.P. 4184-4263). — The hind, as was its wont, kills the pagan, eludes its pursuers and doubles back to Tristan and Blanchandine (68v 4-34).

12. The wolf brings a hind and a hart to Guillaume and Melior who flay the animals, don the skins and eventually reach Palerne which is under siege (G.P. 4341-4390; 4540-4656). — The hind brings the couple food as they flee. They are not caught and live together for over a year in the forest (69r-69v). An interlude devoted to Doon, the half-brother of Tristan, follows. Our epic poet arranges for Tristan and Blanchandine — each under different circumstances — to enter a nearby city which is under siege. The author has clearly finished with his model G.P. at this point.

13. Two onomastic coincidences remain to be mentioned. In G.P. Gloriande is the name of one of the two women to whom Guillaume is entrusted by his mother. They are required to watch over the boy, educate him and give him religious instruction. In T.N. Gloriande is the name given to an educating fay whose role is to instruct Tristan about the desirability of baptism and valour.

Secondly, it will be remembered that in G.P. the setting for the flight and for the quarry is Puille. The hero’s lover is called Melior. It appears that the author of T.N. retained these two names for one of his characters. For, the female fatale in Doon’s youth, related after the escape of Tristan and Blanchandine, is named Melior de Puille.

It is now abundantly evident that Guillaume de Palerne is a direct source for our fourteenth-century epic poem. The activities of the werewolf were the model for the suckling beast role of the hind. The author of Tristan de Nanteuil chose to ignore the fact that the werewolf was really a prince under a spell.9


australian national university.

K. V. Sinclair.
CHAUCER AND THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF ANIMALS

The writers of unnatural histories repeated many of the ideas and stories about animals which had come down from primitive times into such collections as the *Panchatantra*, the Sacred Books, and the Aesopian Fables. Even Aristotle, assisted by an army of observers organized by Alexander, included much unscientific fiction in his *Historia Animalium*. Pliny, in the first century A.D. used Aristotle’s work extensively, and the later Roman compilers, Aelian and Solinus in the third, Claudian in the fourth, and Cassiodorus in the sixth century based their information largely on Aristotle and Pliny. The two most popular books of the Middle Ages, the Bestiary — the enlarged form of the *Physiologus* — and *Etymologiarum sive Originum*, written in the seventh century by Isidore of Seville, made ingenious use of the same unnatural history, the one finding it illustrative of moral precepts and theological dogma, the other inventing etymologies to suit the supposed characteristics of each animal. Such material was well suited to an age when the world was a vast cryptogram whereby man might discover God’s truths, and it passed into the medieval encyclopedias such as *De Naturis Rerum* by Alexander Neckam, *Speculum Maius* by Vincent of Beauvais, and *De Proportionibus Rerum* by Bartholomew de Glanville, compilations of stories such as the *Gesta Romanorum*, the homilies of Jacques de Vitry, Odo of Cheriton, Nicholas Bozon, Bromyard and others, as well as into heraldry and sculpture.

Chaucer shares the assumption of the unnatural historians that the behavior of animals is inspired by human motives and, hence, animals are of significance mainly for their resemblance to Man. But the simple conventional ideas which he uses about animals were already part of popular tradition. When he refers to the lion’s generosity (*LGW* Prol., F. 391-5, G. 377-81) and fierceness (**Kant I**, 1598), the wolf’s rapacity (**Par T; X**, 775), and the craftiness of the fox (*LGW*, IV, 1393), he is employing stereotyped traits. The attributes which he gives to animals are usually so general and so well-known that very rarely does he seem to have had recourse to specific unnatural history in written sources. Even for his royal eagle “that with his sharpe lok perseth the sonne” (*PF*, 331), and for his swan, singing “ayens his deth” (*Anel. 346-7, PF. 342, LGW, III, 1355-6*), he did not have to rely on Alanus’ *De Plantis Naturae*, the most immediate source for his catalogue in *The Parliament of Foules*. The one story was well represented in ecclesiastical sculpture, carving and illustration; the other, although discredited by Pliny, was proverbial.

Chaucer’s references to fabulous creatures are also of the most popular kind. Apart from the monsters of classical mythology, his use of fictitious creatures is, indeed, small. He has no yale or unicorn, famous as these beasts were. In *The

---


Book of the Duchess, 982, Blanche is the "soleyn fenix of Arabye," a tribute, perhaps, not so much to her solitariness as to her uniqueness, a quality for which the phoenix became a symbol of Mary as well as of Christ. In The Parson's Tale, X, 853, the basilisk (basilisk) which "sleeth folk by the venym of his sight" is used to illustrate the temptations of luxuria and, as in such widely different works as Mandeville's Travels and the Lamentations of Matheolus, its lethal glance is given a sexual connotation. In The Nun's Priest's Tale, VII, 3270, Chauntecleer "soong murier than the mermayde in the see," a comparison which might have been applied more aptly to Pertelote's song because the mermaid symbolized the fatal power of female blandishments. Chaucer's allusions are brief and he is using creatures that not only belong to the most widely diffused tales of antiquity but appear in almost all versions of the Bestiary, in ecclesiastical carvings and in illustrated manuscripts. The merry quality which he ascribes to the mermaids' song is not, as he claims, in the Physiologus, but in the homilies. Through the sermons of Odo of Cheriton, John of Shippewy and others, such fabulous beasts must have been familiar to many who could never have read about them. Perhaps even the Shipman, when he says that his tale "schal not ben of philosophic, / Ne phislyas, [var. philyas], fisleas, ne terms quinte of law" (Epil. MLT, II, 1188-9), is trying to show that he, a churl, has heard of the Physiologus, although he has difficulty in pronouncing the word.

Also belonging to common tradition are the ideas which Chaucer expresses about the she-wolf (Manc T, IX, 183-6) and the singed cat (WB Prol, III, 348-54). The one, as Emerson points out, may stem from popular lore rather than from a literary source. The other had become one of the "hoary commonplace" of the pulpit by Chaucer's day. But it is questionable whether such stories can properly be termed animal fiction. Since the wolf and the cat were common in medieval Britain, the ideas about them may have been confirmed by observation. The male wolf at time of mating may be an unprepossessing sight, for it wins the female in fight against many rivals. As for the singed cat, although Pepys records one emerging from a chimney during the Great Fire, it may normally be most unwilling to venture out-of-doors because it needs the hairs in its ears and its whiskers to catch minute vibrations and to tell of movements which it has not seen.

---

5 F. N. Robinson (ed.), The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer (Boston, 1957), 777 remarks that Chaucer may have had in mind Met., xv, 392 ff., and Rom. de la Rose, 15977ff., both of which emphasize the solitariness of the bird.
6 See Pearl, ed. E. V. Gordon (Oxford, 1953), p. 16, l. 429; p. 60, note; McCulloch, Bestiaries, p. 158.
10 MS. Harl. 45, fol. 146b.
14 J. G. Wood, Animate Creation, I (New York, 1898), 266.
But neither popular tradition nor fact can account for some of the ideas about the properties or habits of animals which Chaucer expresses. For information concerning the hyena's gall, the satiated wolf, the thirsty horse, the "stibourn" lioness, and the griffin, Chaucer may, one suspects, have relied on his reading. Chaucer's possible sources for the therapeutic properties of the hyena's gall have been noted by Skeat and can be briefly given here. His dependence on the unnatural histories for the references to the other animals has not, so far as I know, been remarked upon.

In the Bestiary the hyena is a two-gendered animal which devours corpses in their tombs. When, in Fortune, 35-6, Chaucer says: "Thee nedeth nat the galle of noon hyene, / That cureth eyen derked for peneuence," he is alluding to the optical benefits which, according to Pliny and Vincent de Beauvais, can be derived from the hyena's gall.

The wolf is commonly used by Chaucer as a rapacious creature threatening the weak and helpless. The image, widely used in the Bible and hermeneutical writings as well as in fable, was proverbial. In The Parson's Tale, X, 768-9, Chaucer uses the conventional image but adds a specific detail:

And, as seith Seint Augustyn, "they been the devoles wolves that stranglen the sheep of Jhesu Crist;" and doon worse than wolves. / For soothe, whan the wolf hath ful his wombe, he stynte to strangle sheep. But soothe, the pilours and destroyours of the godes of hooly chirche no do nat so, for they ne stynye neverce to pile.

Chaucer's contemporary, Bromyard, the great Dominican preacher, expresses a contrary view when he is castigating the oppressors of the poor. He says that the wolf kills more sheep than he needs for his personal sustenance because he has other people in mind. There is the dignity and pomp of his lady to be maintained, sons to be promoted, daughters for whom dowries must be found, a retinue to be kept. Chaucer's observation is to be found in Adian's De Natura Animalium, with a pseudo-scientific explanation: περιτίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ γασθή τόδε, οὐδαίναι δὲ ἡ γλώττια, καὶ τὸ στόμα ἐμφροδύναται.

The horse is mentioned more than one hundred and fifty times in Chaucer's works, primarily as an essential feature of daily life, either on the road or in the hunting field. Used figuratively, it is most commonly associated with stupidity, blindness and lack of control. In The Parson's Tale, X, 815, in a passage for which there is no correspondence in his sources, Chaucer makes the conventional analogy but from a statement which his own observation should prompt him to challenge. He compares the man of "fool-largesse" to "an hors that seketh rather to drynken drovy or trouble water than for to drynken of the clere welle." In the Bestiary it is the camel which prefers muddy water and will stir up clear water with its feet

---

17 McCulloch, Bestiaries, 131.
20 De Natura Animalium, ed. F. Jacobs, I (Jena, 1832), iv, 15.
before drinking.\textsuperscript{23} In Aristotle’s *Historia Animalium* both the horse and the camel are credited with the preference for muddy water.\textsuperscript{23}

The Wife of Bath, declaring that she persisted in her former habits after her marriage to the “joly clerk,” Jankyn, states: “Stibourn I was as is a leonesse/ And of my tonge a verray jangeresse, / And walke I wolde, as I had doon biforn...” (*WB Prol*, III, 637-9). Her previous account of her extra-mural adventures and her admission that she “evere folwede” her “appetit / Al were he short, or long, or blak, or whit” (623-4) leave no doubt as to whether the nature of these habits or the justification for Jankyn’s wrath. But why the Wife should regard the lioness as “stibourn” requires explanation. According to Pliny, the species mates indiscriminately, and when the lion discovers the lioness’s adultery with the leopard, he severely chastises her.\textsuperscript{24} The bestiarists refer to the adulterous association of the lioness with both the pard and the hyena, and Pliny’s account, converted into an exemplum, appears in the *Gesta Romanorum*.\textsuperscript{25} The Wife’s comparison is apt: she and the lioness are “stibourn” in the same way, and their refractoriness evokes the same response from their spouses.

In *The Knight’s Tale*, I, 2130-2152, Chaucer describes Lygurje, King of Thrace:

Blak was his herd, and manly his face;
The cercles of his eyen in his heed,
They gloweden bitwixen yellow and reed,
And like a grifiphon looked he aboute,
With kempe heeris on his browes stoute;
His lymes grete, his brawnes harde and stronge,
His shuldres brode, his armes ronde and longe;
And as the gysse was in his contree,
Ful bye upon a chaar of gold stood he,
With foure white boles in the trays.
In stede of cote-armure over his harnays,
With nayles yelewe and brighte as any gold,
He hadde a beres skyn, col-blak for old.
His longe heer was kembd biyade his bak;
As any ravenes fethere it shoon for blak;
A wrethe of gold, arm-greet, of huge wighte,
Upon his heed, set ful of stones brighte,
Of fyne rubyes and of dyamaunts.
Aboute his chaar ther wenten white alauntz,
Twenty and mo, as grete as any steer,
To hunten at the leoun or the deer,
And folwed hym with mosel faste ybounde,
Colered of gold, and tourettes fyled ronde.

Professor W. C. Curry has shown convincingly that Emetreus and Lygurje are Martian and Saturnalian men respectively, and that Chaucer’s descriptions of the two figures accord with those given by ancient and medieval astrologers for men born under the influence of Mars and Saturn.\textsuperscript{16} But the attributes given to Eme-

\textsuperscript{22} McCulloch, *Bestiaries*, 102.
\textsuperscript{23} *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. F. Didot, III (Paris, 1874), viii, c. viii, 10-15; c. xxiv, 40.
\textsuperscript{24} *NH*, ii, viii, 17.
\textsuperscript{25} Tale CLXXXI.
\textsuperscript{26} Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences (London, 1960), 131-7.
treus, who "as a leon... his lookyng caste," are also leonine with respect to his hair, eyes, the marks on his face, and his voice (2165-2174):

His crispe heer lyk rynges was yronne,
And that was yelow, and glyted as the sonne.
His nose was heigh, his eyen bright citryn,
His lippes rounde, his colour was sangwyn;
A few frakenes in his face yapreynd,
Bitwixen yelow and somdel blak ymeynd;
And as a leon he his lookyng caste.
Of fyve and twenty yeer his age I caste.
His herd was wel bigonne for to spryngye;
His voyes was as a trompe thonderynge.

Chaucer alludes to the griffin in proverbial phrase. The mythical creature was well represented in sculpture and wood carving, particularly to illustrate Alexander's flight to heaven, and Chaucer may have been thinking of heraldic sculpture. On a horn, believed to be a representation of the Cornu Ulphi, sculptured on a wall of York Minster, there is a griffin which appears to be accompanied by white alaunts. While Dante uses the griffin as a symbol of Christ and describes a procession in which it draws a burnished two-wheel chariot, the symbol of the Church, Chaucer's creature does not seem to be symbolic. But the details in the portrait of Lygurge suggest that Chaucer extended the image and drew on the unnatural histories for his description. Lygurge's eyes resemble those of the griffin which, according to Ctesias, were like fire. The Thracian king has shaggy hairs on his brows, like those of the eagle, and a powerful physique, like that of the lion. According to Aelian, Isidore and the bestiariists, the griffin had the wings and head of an eagle and a lion's body. Lygurge's hair behind his back shines as black as any raven's feather; the feathers along the back of the griffin are black. He has a gold coronet set with rubies and diamonds, and the griffin, from Herodotus onward, was associated with gold and precious stones.

Chaucer's use of specific details from the unnatural history of animals is small. Influential as the pseudo-scientific accounts of animals were in fixing the natures of

27 Cited by B. J. Whiting, Chaucer's Use of Proverbs (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), 166.
29 See County Folk-lore, ed. Mrs (Elizabeth) Gutch, II (London, 1901), plate opp. p. 349.
31 Aelian, NA, IV, 27.
32 Kempe, H. B. Hinckley, Notes on Chaucer (Northampton, Mass. 1907), 89, translates as "shaggy, bristy" from Old Norse kampr; similarly, Skeat, Works, V, 84; Robinson, Works, 958, glosses "coarse, stout." Cf. Wood, An. Creation, III, 27. "above the eyes the feathers are so thick and projecting, that they form a kind of roof or shade."
33 Aelian, NA, loc. cit.; Isidore, Etymologicarum sive Origina, ed. W. M. Lindsay, II (Oxford, 1911), xii, 2, 17; McCulloch, Bestiaries, 122.
34 Aelian, NA, loc. cit.
beasts and in causing many curious ideas to be commonly accepted, Chaucer appears to have taken little interest in them. He seems to have been content to accept and to use the popular attributes of animals which were already part of folk belief. The reason for his preference for conventional ideas is not far to seek. Whether the animal serves as a comparison or as part of an actual scene, Chaucer’s purpose is to illuminate not the world of Nature but that of Man, and even his more abstruse allusions, while they are made more meaningful by a specialized knowledge of unnatural history, are designed for the same end. The animal is, in effect, a miniature exemplum, and the more immediate the attribute, the more instantaneous the caricature.

University of Toronto.

Beryl Rowland.

HUGH OF SAINT-CHER’S STOCKHOLM
“GLOSS ON THE SENTENCES”: AN ABRIDGMENT RATHER THAN A FIRST REDACTION

The edition of a number of distinctions from Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Scriptum super Sententias for a study of the theology of the Hypostatic Union in the early thirteenth century has required an examination of the text of these distinctions found in MS Stockholm, Kungliga Biblioteket A 150 (= S). In this manuscript, on the wide margins left around its text of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Friedrich Stegmüller has discovered a version of Hugh’s Scriptum that is not simply the ordinary version found in the numerous extant manuscripts of the work. After examining this manuscript, editing portions of it, and comparing its text with the ordinary text, the distinguished mediaevalist has concluded that this version of Hugh’s Scriptum is a first redaction antedating the ordinary version of the work. This first redaction, he says, is basically a reportatio of the lectures on the Sentences given by Hugh in the year 1229-1230; it was, he states, added on the lower margin of the manuscript along with questions from the lectures on the Sentences by a later master, perhaps Guerric [of Saint-Quentin] or Godfrey of Blenello. According to Stegmüller Hugh then reworked


his gloss into a continuous commentary that had no influence on the gloss in S. Stegmüller's conclusion, therefore, is that S contains the primitive or first Commentary on the Sentences by Hugh of Saint-Cher. 

Although these conclusions have been accepted by some scholars, the editors of Alexander of Hales's Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum point out that the form of Hugh's text as a marginal gloss resembles that of several other marginal glosses they have studied, some of which include excerpts from Hugh of Saint-Cher's Scriptum; hence for them this first redaction of Hugh's commentary is "slightly suspect." A comparison of parts of the text of S with parallel passages found in MSS Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 1424 (11422-23) (= B), Bruges, Ville 178 (== G), and Vatican Lat. 1098 (== V), all thirteenth-century manuscripts containing the ordinary version, has given rise to similar suspicions. A study of the text given by all these manuscripts for distinctions 2, 5-7, 10-12, and 21-22 of Book III of Hugh's Scriptum makes it seem more reasonable to suppose that the version of Hugh's work in S is an abridgment made from the fuller text of his Scriptum and added to S's copy of Peter Lombard's Sentences at appropriate places on the margin.

What are the reasons for this judgment? In the first place, in various passages of the above-mentioned distinctions (in which the text of S is usually literally the same as that of B, G, and V, only frequently shorter) the text of S shows evident signs of its being the work of an abridger. Two examples may serve to illustrate this. Whereas in each example the text of S gives Hugh's reply to an objection in the complete or nearly-complete form of B, G, and V, the objection itself as given in S is a considerably shorter version of that same objection as given in B, G, and V. The particular point to be emphasized here is that in this shorter form the two objections in S lack the statements required to make fully intelligible the replies given in S itself. It is only by reading the full text of the objection in B, G, and V that one finds the key words that are clearly alluded to in the reply of S and yet are lacking in its statement of the objection.

4 "Hugo arbeitete dann seine Glossen zum kontinuierlicheren Kommentar um. Von dieser definitiven Redaktion blieb die Stockholmer Glossen unbeteinflusst. Sie enthält also, freilich nicht ungemischt und nur in Form einer Reportation, den ursprünglichen Sentenzenkommentar Hugos" (Analecta Upsaliensia I, 100).


In MS Arras 855 (526) Hugh's Scriptum is again found on the margins of a copy of Lombard's Sentences; there the Glossa of Alexander of Hales is "étroitement mêlé au commentaire d'Hugues de Saint-Cher," according to P. Bougard, "A propos d'Alexandre de Halès: le ms. 855 (526) d'Arras," Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 50 (1957), 212.
Thus in Book III, distinction 5, of the *Scriptum*, within a discussion whether there was in Christ a human person who was assumed in the union of human nature to the Son of God, an objection as given by B, G, and V includes as an essential part of its dialectical argument the statement that Christ is not a human person by filiation:

...Ergo homo iste in unione non desit esse persona quae erat prius, sed adhuc est persona sua singulari humanitate, sicut prius. Praetera, Christus est humana persona, sed *non filiatione est humana persona* propria. Ergo sua singulari humanitate est humana persona. Ergo Christus in quantum homo est persona, et etiam in quantum Filius est persona. Ergo est duae personae: quod est haeresis Nestorii.\(^7\)

In S the very same argument is presented without the key phrase “Christus... non filiatione est humana persona”:


But in its reply to this objection the text of S, which here perfectly agrees with that of B, G, and V, stresses this very phrase and builds the reply around the interpretation of the idea expressed in the phrase, as follows:

Ad alium dicimus quod haec est duplex: “Christus filiatione est humana persona,” quia ablative potest respicere utrumque nomen divisim, et sic vera sub hoc sensu: Christus filiatione est persona, quae scilicet persona est humana; vel conjunctum,\(^10\) et sic falsa, quia sic notatur quod Christus filiatione sit homo...\(^11\)

From this absence of the key phrase in the objection as stated by S and its use in the reply given by S it seems clear that the objection as given by S is an abridgment of the longer objection as given in the ordinary fuller version; in abridging the objection, the author did not foresee that the reply to this objection is thereby obscured, if not rendered unintelligible.\(^12\)

The second example occurs in Book III, distinction 10, of Hugh’s *Scriptum*. There the full text of B, G, and V gives the following objection:

Item, Jesus in quantum Jesus est singular et *individuum* hujus speciei “homo,” quia “homo” praedicatur de Jesu et aliis hominibus univoce. Sed de aliis praedicatur ut species de individuis; ergo de Jesu. Ergo Jesus in quantum Jesus est *individuum*; ergo persona.\(^13\)

The pivotal word throughout the argument is *individuum*. In its shorter version of this same objection S omits this word in the first part of the reasoning, so that its abrupt appearance towards the end makes the argument inconsequential and

---

\(^7\) Edited from B 51\(^{th}\), G 71\(^{st}\), and V 87\(^{rd}\). There are no significant variants.

\(^8\) Filius *MS*.

\(^9\) Fol. 131\(^r\), *mg.*, *inf*.

\(^10\) *conjunctam* *MS*.

\(^11\) Fol. 131\(^r\), *mg.*, *inf*. The same text is found, with only five insignificant variants, in B 51\(^{th}\), G 71\(^{st}\), and V 87\(^{rd}\).

\(^12\) Although there is a *passing* allusion to the notion of filiation in the earlier part of the objection as given by S (and with no mention of the phrase “Christus... non filiatione est humana persona”), the reply in S is clearly not directed to that part of the objection, but to the part mentioned here.

\(^13\) Edited from B 53\(^{th}\), G 75\(^{th}\), and V 91\(^{st}\). No significant variants.
unintelligible except by means of a shrewd inference on the part of the reader. The text reads as follows in S:

Item, haec species "homo" univoca praedicatur et de Jesu et de aliis hominibus. Ergo in quantum Jesus est individuum; ergo persona.  

Further, the reply in S, which is also somewhat shorter than that of B, G, and V, is again fully intelligible only from the complete text of either the objection or, even more, the reply as given in B, G, and V. In S the reply reads:

Ad aliud dicimus quod non sequitur: "Christus in quantum Jesus est individuum," quia primo tantum duas distinctiones importat; in conclusione, quando per se ponitur, triplexem; unde est ibi fallacia consequentis, vel secundum quid et simpliciter.

The premise of the argument referred to in this reply is not that of the objection as stated in S but rather that of the objection as stated in B, G, and V concerning individuum, which is lacking in S; this is so because the distinctiones mentioned by S are, according to Hugh's teaching, distinctions involved in the individuum. The obscurity of this reply in S is clarified by the fuller reply in B, G, and V:

Ad aliud dicimus quod non sequitur: "Jesus in quantum Jesus est singulare et individuum hujus speciei 'homo'; ergo Jesus in quantum Jesus est individuum," quia primo tantum duas distinctiones importat; in conclusione, quando per se ponitur, triplexem: unde est ibi fallacia consequentis, vel secundum quid et simpliciter.

The inconsistencies of both the objection and reply in S, inconsistencies absent in the fuller text of B, G, and V, make it fairly certain that S contains a sometimes rather clumsy abridgment of the ordinary version rather than a first redaction that was later expanded into a more complete form.

A convincing argument for the same conclusion, based on extrinsic evidence, is also provided from an examination of a series of questions found on the lower margins.

14 Fol. 136v, mg. inf., col. 1.
15 Ibid., col. 3.
16 Shortly before the reply in question, Hugh says: "Solutio: Revera Christus in quantum homo non est persona.... Ad hoc autem planius intelligendum, nota quod triplex est distinctio quae exigitur ad esse personarum, scilicet distinctio singularissimae, distinctio naturalis incommunicabilitatis, distinctio excellenciae sive dignitatis. Primam non habet universale, et ideo nullum universale est persona; secundam non habet animae separatae, et ideo nulla anima persona est; tertiam non habet Christus in quantum homo, et ideo Christus in quantum homo non est persona, sed in quantum Filius Dei. Hanc triplexm distinctio importat hoc nomen 'individuum' posuit in definitione personae: unde patet quod Jesus in quantum Jesus non est individuum substantia...." (Scriptum III, dist. 10: B 59v-54a; G 75v; V 91v). S gives the text in full, fol. 136v, mg. inf., col. 2.
17 Edited from B 54a, G 75a, and V 92v. No variants.
18 A third less certain example occurs in III, dist. 2. Where the text of BGV reads: "... Et est Christus individuum ejus sicut Petrus et aliis, sed in hoc differunt quia illa est totum esse Petri et aliorum sed non Christi" (B 49v; G 68b; V 83v), S reads: "Et est Christus individuum ejus sicut Petrus, sed in hoc differunt quia illa est totum esse Petri et aliorum sed non Christi" (fol. 127r mg.). That is, S leaves out "et aliis" after "Petrus," but retains "et aliorum" after "Petri." Although it is not impossible that "et aliorum" was added (in a supposed first redaction) without "et aliis" having preceded it, the parallelism of the constructions in BGV and their full text lead one to think that here S is abridging the full text.
of $S$ within this same section of the manuscript. These questions are written in the same hand as the texts of Hugh's glosses. They stem from William of Auxerre. These questions deal with the Hypostatic Union and correspond to some of the questions from William's *Summa Aurea* that were edited for the study referred to above. A comparison of the text of these questions in $S$ with those of William that were edited reveals at once that the text in $S$, written by the same hand as the text of Hugh's glosses, is an abridged form of William's questions. The method is exactly the same as for Hugh's glosses: frequently the text in $S$ and in William is the same, but at times $S$ omits whole sections or, more frequently, shortens paragraphs by omitting phrases or sentences. To make sure that this abridged version of William's work was not a copy of Herbert of Auxerre's abridgment of the *Summa Aurea*, these texts in $S$ were compared with the corresponding questions in Herbert's work as found in MS Troyes, Ville 1966. Except for their similarity of topics and their manifest dependence on William's *Summa Aurea*, the two texts are completely different: the material in $S$ is longer than Herbert's and is textually closer to William's full work than is Herbert's summary.

These questions of William of Auxerre in $S$ suggest two possible alternatives. Either $S$ contains a first and shorter redaction not only of Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Scriptum*, but also of William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea* (and one differing from the redactions of William's work that are already known), or the writer of both sets of texts in $S$ has made or copied into the margins of the manuscript an abridged version of both works. Between the two alternatives there should be little hesitation: the first is most unlikely, the second most plausible.

Thus both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence point to the conclusion that the glosses of Hugh of Saint-Cher on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* found in MS Stockholm, Kunigliga Biblioteket A 150, do not represent a first redaction antedating the ordinary fuller version found in other manuscripts, but rather an abridgment of this ordinary version.

Walter H. Principe, C.S.B.

---

19 That is, on foll. 126v-128v and 146v.

20 See supra, p. 900, and n. 1. Some other sections of the manuscript may contain additional material from William of Auxerre; cf. infra, n. 23. Only a thorough comparison of the whole of $S$ with the *Summa Aurea* could settle this question.

21 The sections in Herbert's work corresponding to the questions in $S$ are found in MS Troyes, Ville 1966, fol. 93v-95v, 95v-96v, and 100v.

22 The texts do not correspond with any of the apparently three redactions of William's work in the materials at my disposal, namely, the Pigouchet edition of Paris, 1500, MS Basel, Univ.-Bibl. B. IV. 10, and MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 15746. Nor do the *incipits* of the questions in $S$ agree with the *incipit* given for MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 3056, fol. 83, in *Bibliothèque Nationale: Catalogue général des manuscrits latins* IV (Paris, 1958), 59; this manuscript may contain still another version of William's *Summa Aurea*.

23 There are other texts, written in the same hand as that which wrote Hugh's texts, but they do not seem to belong to Hugh. Only a diligent comparison with works of the period could tell who their author is. Thus the text of Hugh's commentary on Lombard, *Sent.* I, dist. I, edited from $S$ by Stegmüller (*Anecdotum Upsaliense* I, 107-120) is much longer than the text of the same distinction in the ordinary version of Hugh's commentary (edited *ibid.* I, 49-57). The additional material in $S$, written by the same hand as is the material certainly belonging to Hugh, may well have been copied from other authors in the same way as were the questions from William of Auxerre.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE
PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES, a journal of the thought, life, letters and culture of the Middle Ages.

Volumes 1-19 (reprinting) ........................................ $10.00 per volume
Volumes 20-23 (in print) ........................................ 7.00 per volume
Volumes 24-25 (in print) ........................................ 8.00 per volume
Volumes 1-19 will be mailed and invoiced as they appear during 1963.

STUDIES AND TEXTS

Modern scholarship on the Middle Ages in an accumulating series:


2. Saint Peter Damiani and His Canonical Sources: a Preliminary Study in the Antecedents of the Gregorian Reform by J. J. Ryan, with a preface by Stephan Kuttner. Pp. xviii, 213 .......................... $ 5.00


4. The Liturgical Drama in Mediaeval Spain by R. B. Donovan. Pp. 229 .......................... $ 5.50


In progress, for autumn, 1963:


Tenure and Mobility: Studies in the Social History of the Mediaeval English Village, by J. A. Raftis, Pp. ca. 300 .......................... Approx. $ 6.50
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author/translator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAPERBACK SERIES, mediaeval sources in translation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ON BEING AND ESSENCE (Thomas Aquinas), translated with introduction and notes by A. A. Maurer, 63 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ON KINGSHIP, TO THE KING OF CYPRUS (On the Governance of Rulers), Thomas Aquinas, translated by G. B. Phelan. Revised with an introduction and notes by I. Th. Eschmann, XXXIX, 119 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ON THE DIVISION AND METHODS OF THE SCIENCES (Thomas Aquinas), translation of Questions Five and Six of the Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, with an introduction and notes by A. A. Maurer, XL, 104 pp., new revised edition, 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. THE STORY OF ABELARD'S ADVERSITIES, translated with notes by J. T. Muckle, and a preface by Etienne Gilson, 70 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The following standard editions, monographs, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGAZEL-METAPHYSICS, Latin text edited by J. T. Muckle, xix, 247 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS, by Etienne Gilson, new, enlarged edition, xi, 235 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. A lecture delivered in English by Etienne Gilson in March 1960. A long-play 33 1/2 rpm extra fine groove recording, 57 minutes playing time, unbreakable disc. Mailing costs included in price.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DOCTRINE OF BEING IN ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS: a study in the Greek background of mediaeval thought, by Joseph Owens, 535 pp. new revised edition, 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMA PARISIENSIS on the Decretum Gratiani, edited by T. P. McLaughlin, xxxiii, 272 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 7.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>