NIHIL OBSTAT.
Gerald B. Phelan
Cens. Dep.

IMPRIMATUR.
+Jacobus Carolus McGuigan
Archiep Torontin.

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The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury

(XII, XIII and XIV Centuries)

T. P. McLAUGHLIN

IV. PUNISHMENT OF USURERS

In this section of our study we propose to examine a number of problems touching firstly, the nature of the penalties for the crime of usury, and secondly, the manner in which the crime is proven and the penalties applied.

A. Penalties

The number, variety and severity of the penalties incurred by usurers is indicative of how deeply rooted, persistent and widespread was the evil. At the same time is offered evidence of the belief that in order to stamp out this evil the efforts of the Church were doomed to failure unless they received the firm and constant support of the secular authorities. Throughout the period which is here being studied penalties are constantly being promulgated, renewed and multiplied. From decade to decade one witnesses an increasing severity as usurers become more numerous and bold in inventing new methods of obtaining usury in their attempt to circumvent the canons and as the Church finds her efforts to curb them in great part unavailing. These penalties are directed, not only against those who actually take usury, but also against their heirs and families, those who hesitate to denounce them, those who have any part in drawing up or executing their usurious contracts, notaries and judges; against those who make or enforce statutes opposed to the Canon Law on usury; against those who let houses for the purpose of money lending, and even against those in authority who allow usurers to reside within their territory; finally, against those who affirm that the taking of usury is not sinful. Whole groups, collegia, universitates and communitates may be punished. Special penalties exist for clerics guilty of the crime of usury or who fail to enforce the canons against usury.

The texts of the Decretum refuse usurers admission to the clerical ranks. Severe penalties are inflicted upon clerics who receive usury and refuse to cease when admonished by the bishop. With their customary lack of precision as to the exact nature of penalties, these older canons declare that such clerics are to be denied communion, are suspended from office, are rejected from the ranks of the clergy, are deposed, or are degraded.

The more recent texts of the Decretals are more precise. The penalty is suspension from office and benefice and it is understood that the cleric is first to be admonished to cease his usurious practices. Rufinus understands the penalty to

1 See Mediaeval Studies, I (1939) 81-147.
2 D.47.c.4.
3 C.14.q.4.c.2: a communione abstinere.
4 Id.c.1: a clericalibus officis abstinere cogantur.
5 Id.c.3: cohibeat ur a clero; c.4: de gradu suo dejectus, alienus habeatur a clero; c.7: dejiciatur a clero et alienus habeatur ab ecclesiasticò gradu; D.47.c.1: dejiciatur a clero.
6 D.47.c.1: deporatur.
7 D.47.c.5: degradari.
8 X.V.19.c.7: Qui si parere contemperint, si clerici sint, eos ab officio beneficioque suspendas.
be deposition; Bernard of Pavia, first suspension from office, and then deposition if he continues to take usury. Huguccio holds that he is first to be excluded from communion, sacramental Communion as well as the society of the faithful, and then if he remains obdurate he will be deposed, losing both his office and benefice. Hostiensis has also a gradation of penalties. The clerk is first suspended from office and benefice and then degraded. Most of the authors understand the text to mean deposition preceded by a temporary suspension from office and benefice, and that the bishop has power to reinstate one who has made restitution of his unjust gains and performed fitting penance. Degradation may have been reserved as an extreme measure where the cleric's business of money lending was notorious and he remained contumacious. A more exhaustive examination than we have made of the records of the ecclesiastical courts might reveal examples of the degradation of a cleric for the crime of usury. Finally, these penalties are not incurred ipso facto but must be declared by the courts.

Various local councils are concerned with the punishment of clerics who lend at usury. Two English councils of the second quarter of the twelfth century declare that they are to be degraded. At the end of the thirteenth a council held at Exeter pronounces perpetual suspension from office and benefice of such clerics. A council at Montpellier in 1195, recalling the council of Tours, adds that deposition will follow suspension if the cleric does not cease his avaricious practices. The constitutions of the Church of Ferrara drawn up in 1332 decide that not only must the usury exacted by clerics be restored but that the principal itself is forfeited to the diocesan treasury.

A cleric who does not cooperate in bringing usurers to justice incurs the penalty of suspension. This is clear from a canon of the Third Lateran Council which states that those who grant Christian burial to impenitent usurers or who receive their obligations must restore the latter and in addition will be suspended from office ad arbitrium episcopi. Bernard of Pavia remarks that there are avaricious priests who consider that they are free to receive the offerings made by usurers because the money has committed no sin. To whom are such offerings to be restored? Alanus, Goffredus, Innocent IV and Hostiensis teach that they are to be handed over to the bishop. Bernard of Parma and Guilielmus Naso say that they are to be returned to the usurer who made them. Abbas Antiquus holds that it is a safer procedure to restore them to the debtors from whom usury has been exacted. Joannes Andreae and Bohic consider that Bernard's opinion is to be followed when the usurer has begun to make restitution of his ill-gotten gain or is on

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10 Summa Decretarium, V.15.n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238: Si clericus ususarius ab officio suspendatur et, nisi resipuerit, deponetur.
11 Summa, D.47.c.5. abstinere, Paris, Bibl. Nat. Ms. Latin 3892, fol. 55v, col. 1: a communione sacramentorum et fidelium, sed nec sic vult cessare vel abstinere, ab officio et beneficio ecclesiastico tamquam depositum. Cf. also C.14.q.4.c.2. a communione, fol. 218v, col. 2.
12 Summa Aurea, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 376v: Et si ususarius clericus sit, ab officio beneficioque suspendas; Hostiensis, Commentaria on the same word.
13 See various commentaries on X.V.19.c.7.
14 London, 1126, can. 14; Westminster, 1138, can. 9 (Wilkins, Concilia, I, p. 408, 415).
15 Can. 24 (Id. II, p. 146).
16 Mansi, 26, 670.
17 Can. 32 (Id. 25, 917).
18 X.V.19.c.3.
19 Summa, V.15.n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238.
20 See Bohic, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3; Innocent IV, Commentaria on the same canon; Hostiensis, Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 375v.
21 Glos on X.V.19.c.7. reddere.
22 His opinion is reported by Hostiensis, Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 375v. This canonist, a pupil of Alanus, taught at Bologna during the second quarter of the thirteenth century. Cf. Schulte, Geschichte, II, p. 78 ff.
23 Bohic, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3.
the point of doing so. Otherwise the offerings are to be entrusted to the bishop who will distribute them to those who paid usury, to their heirs or to the poor.25

The general council held at Lyons in 1274 deals with the conduct of clerics who grant usurers ecclesiastical burial and declares that they will suffer the penalties promulgated by the Lateran Council against usurers.26 Does this mean that such clerics are to be punished in the same way as usurers? At first sight the canon seems to consider them as abettors in the crime of usury and to punish them in the same way as the principals. However this does not appear to be the sense of the text. The Council of Lyons is referring to the canon of the Lateran Council against usurers, a canon which contains in fact two sets of penalties, one for usurers, the other for clerics who grant them Christian burial or accept their offerings. It is the second clause which Lyons orders to be applied. This is the interpretation of Joannes Andreae 27 who adds that to-day this penalty is excommunication ipso facto.28 This is clear from the canons of some of the local councils. Thus the statutes of the diocese of Paris of the year 1212 declare that such clerics are ipso facto excommunicated, that they are suspended from office and benefice and that only the Pope may absolve them.29 In 1215 a council of Montpellier declares excommunicated and deposed clerics who administer the sacraments or grant ecclesiastical burial to usurers.30 By a decree of the council of Vienne inserted in the Clementinae it becomes the general law that clerics who give Christian burial to usurers are ipso facto excommunicated.31 This crime is listed in the work of Bërenger Frédol among the cases of excommunication where the confessor must demand special faculties from the bishop before proceeding to absolve a penitent.32

The same Council of Lyons threatens with severe penalties clerics of all ranks who do not co-operate in causing to be observed another of its canons concerning usurers. Ordering all foreigners who take usury to be expelled from the territory and forbidding anyone to rent them houses to carry on their business, the council declares that those who act against this decree will be suspended from office if they are patriarchs, archbishops or bishops; other ecclesiastics will be excommunicated; collegia and universitates will be placed under interdict. All of these penalties are incurred ipso facto. Moreover, if they remain under any of these penalties for one month and the usurers are still dwelling in their midst the whole territory falls under an interdict.33

25 Commentaries of both authors on X.V. 19.c.3.
26 VIo.V.5c.2: Omnes autem religiosos et alios qui manifestos usuiarios contra praesentis sanctionis formam ad ecclesiasticam ausi fuerint admittere seputuram, poenae Lateranensis concilii contra usurarios promulgatae, statuimus subiacere.
27 Gloss on preceding canon, poenae: Supple, statutae in Lateranense concilio, supra, contra usurarios. Hoc dico quia hic non habet locum poena contra usurarios statuta sed habet locum poena statuta in recipientes eos ad oblationes et ecclesiasticam seputuram.
28 Gloss on subjicere: Hodie sunt excommunicati ipso facto non obstante exceptionibus vel privilegii.
29 Part V, can. 7 (Mansi, 22, 851).
30 Can. 29 (Id. 22, 941).
31 Clementinae, III.7.c.1. We find some canonists accusing the religious of disregarding this canon: 'Et dicit dominus Antonius quod fratres et religiosi male servare hanc decretalem quia sepeliant usurarios, non solum in ecclesia, sed etiam ante altare.' See John of Anagni, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3.n.1, fol. 167v. Cf. A. Bernard, La sépulture en droit canonique du Droit de Gratifon au Concile de Trente (Paris, 1933), p. 120.
32 Liber de Excommunicatione, ed. E. Vernay (Paris, 1912), section III, complément postérieurs, II, n. 5; III; IV; V, n.2; VI, n.3; VII (p. 60, 68, 77, 79, 84, 90). This work was composed in 1298-1299 and additions were made as new cases of excommunication appeared in the councils or papal decrees.
33 VIo.V.5c.1: Quo vero contra fecerint, si personae fuerint ecclesiasticae, patriarchae, archiepiscopi, episcopi suspensionis, minores vero personae singulares excommunicationis, si autem collegium seu alia universitas, interdicti sententiam ipso facto se noverint incursuros. Quam si per mensem animo suspenderint indurato: errae ipsorum, quamduo in eis idem usurarii commorantur, extunc ecclesiastico subjacent interdicto. The commentary of Joannes Andreae on this text does not suggest any difficulties.
We come now to the penalties incurred by laymen guilty of the crime of usury. The Third Lateran Council in 1179 lays down a threefold penalty for usurarii manifesti: 44 they are forbidden communion, their offerings are refused and if they die in their sin they are deprived of Christian burial. 45 Various texts of the Decretals, 46 and numerous local councils recall the same penalties. 47 As we have already seen, it was considered necessary for the enforcement of this regulation to threaten clerics with an additional penalty if they neglected to apply it to usurers.

The canons ask what is meant by saying that usurers are not to be admitted ad communionem altaris. All the earlier commentators understand it to be a prohibition against the reception of the Eucharist. 48 Abbas Antiquus interprets it to mean that the usurer is not to be admitted to the church during divine services. Since those assisting at Mass should be admitted to Communion if they present themselves it seems that usurers should not be allowed to attend Mass. Panormitanus likes this interpretation and hopes that it will be followed in practice. 49 Alexander de Nevo 50 gives additional reasons why the text, in spite of the word altaris, must mean exclusion from the divine services and not simply from Communion. Theologians teach, he says, that an assistant at Mass who has perfect contrition and who has fulfilled the three necessary conditions, that is, received absolution, made restitution and loves his enemies, such a one, even though he does not approach the holy table to receive the Body of Christ materially, does gain the fruit of the Sacrifice. The mere assisting at Mass then can be called a communio altaris, a communication in the Sacrifice offered upon the altar and it is this which is denied to usurers. Moreover, the Lateran Council intended to inflict new penalties upon usurers. If the penalty were only refusal of Communion this would not be new because whoever is evidently in mortal sin must be denied the Eucharist. 51

The penalties of the Lateran Council constitute an excommunication or, more correctly, a partial excommunication. Such a penalty had already been promulgated by an earlier Lateran Council in 1139, 52 and later synods refer to it as an excommunication to be announced by pastors several times a year, usually on all Sundays and feast days. 53 A text of Alexander III inserted in the Decretals likewise calls it an excommunication. 44 The canons, however, teach that the penalties here constitute a minor excommunication, an excommunication as regards certain acts. The penalties of this canon are first to be applied and if the usurer does not cease his money lending and make restitution he will fall under a major excommunication which will cut him off from all intercourse with the faithful. 54

44 This term will be discussed below, p. 12 ff.
45 X.V.19,c.3: Constituimus quod usurarii manifesti nec ad communionem admittantur altaris, nec christianam, si in hoc peccato descesserint, accipient septruram, sed nec oblationes corum quisquam accepiat.
46 X.V.19,c.5 and 9.
47 Montpellier, 1195; Avignon, 1209, can. 3; Trier, 1238, can. 34; Mainz, 1261, can. 25; Sens, 1269, can. 2; Cologne, 1280, can. 14, etc.
48 Bernard of Pavia, Summa, V.15,n.11, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238; Innocent IV, Commentaria on X.V.19,c.5 ad communionem; Hostisensis, Commentaria on the same canon.
50 This canonist, professor at Padua, wrote before 1441 his Consilia contra Judaos foemineantes. Cf. Schulte, op. cit., II, 330.
52 Canon 13 (Mansi, 21, 529).
53 Avignon, 1209, can. 3; Château-Gontier, 1231, can. 30; Mainz, 1261, can. 25; Arles, 1275, can. 18, etc. (Mansi, 22, 786; 23, 239, 1090; 24, 152).
54 X.V.19,c.7: Si laici fuerint, usque ad dignam satisfactionem ipsos vinculo excommunicationis astringas.
55 Raymund, Summa, II.7.n.7, p. 212: Ipso iure sunt excommunicati quantum ad tria... Postest (judex) usurarii quemlibet cogere ad restitutionem usuras, si necesse esset, etiam per majorem excommunicationem, omni appellatione remota; Bernard of Parma, gloss on X.V.19,c.5. per foemam and on c. 7. excommunication.
Innocent III in a letter of 1208 to the bishop of Arras counsels him to proceed cautiously in enforcing the decrees of the Lateran Council because usurers are so numerous that if all were punished many churches would have to be closed. The bishop is advised not to condemn all at once but to choose a few of the worst offenders of whom he will make an example and so without a personal condemnation frighten others into ceasing their usurious transactions. The councils also declare that the penalty is incurred \emph{ipso facto} though some of them grant a few days grace after the promulgation made in the church. The canonists are divided on the question of whether they are so incurred or whether they must be inflicted by the judge. Innocent IV and Raymond of Pennafort teach that they are incurred \emph{ipso jure}. Bernard of Parma and Hostiensis hold that they are not \emph{latae} but \emph{ferendae sententiae}. Bohic prefers this more lenient opinion. Drogon of Hautvillers says that usurers incur \emph{ipso facto} a minor excommunication, that is exclusion from the sacraments but not from the society of the faithful. Panormitanus holds the more rigorous opinion; a usurer is excommunicated without the necessity of any sentence. He goes on to say that the judge may begin by the penalty which he chooses but he urges him to begin by excommunication which the usurer fears most because it affects him during his lifetime, whereas he has little fear of the penalty which deprives him of ecclesiastical burial.

A number of canons forbid priests to absolve usurers in the confessional even when they promise to make restitution. The crime of usury is a reserved case and only the bishop or one having special faculties may absolve a penitent from this sin except, of course, in danger of death. The usurer is also to be held as infamous and consequently is ineligible for the reception of dignities and honours and his testimony will not be accepted in ecclesiastical courts.

The penalties for the crime of usury are not all by any means of the spiritual order. There are some which affect the usurer in his property, especially when he comes to die. In 1212 a council of Paris declares that the property of one who dies a usurer is to be confiscated by the king and distributed to the poor. At the same time it decrees that no usurer may make a last will bequeathing anything to his family, to religious establishments or to others since the fruits of rapine may not be the object of a gift.

\begin{footnotes}

46 Potthast, 3382 (P.L.215, 1380).
47 Avignon, 1282, can. 1 (Mansi, 24, 439).
48 Commentary on X.V.19.c.3, christianam.
49 Summa, II.7.n.7, p. 212. John of Fribourg holds the same opinion according to Bohic, Commentary on X.V.19.c.3, p. 169.
50 Gloss on X.V.19.c.5, privandos: Et ita canon ille, quia in omnibus (can. 5) non est latae sententiae sed ferendae. Godfreux has the same teaching.
51 Commentary on X.V.19.c.3, sepulturum; c. 5, privandos.
52 Commentary on X.V.19.c.3, p. 169.
54 Commentary on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233r: Sed ego tenerem . . . ut non requiratur sententia hominis quia non est hic positum aliquod verbum per quod sententia hominis exigatur, nam in usurariis videtur ut non admittantur ad sepulturum, etc., et non dicit ut priventur. He supports his argument also from the more recent texts of the Liber Sextus and the Clementinas.
55 Ibid. on c. 7, Vol. VII, fol. 238r.
56 Constitutions of Canterbury, 1222; Exeter, 1287, can. 24 (Wilkins, I, 597; II, 166); Avignon, 1282, can. 1; Lucca, 1308, can. 70 (Mansi, 24, 439; 25, 194).
57 Lateran, 1139, can. 13 (Mansi, 21, 529): In tota vita infames habecantur; Hostiensis, Summa, de usuris, n. 3, fol. 372r: Sed secundum jura canonica in uthraque (that is in exacting either \emph{foenus servitum} or \emph{foenus fœnetarii}) mortale peccatum committitur et infamia irigatur. According to Roman Law only the second kind of usury carried the penalty of infamy. Part V, can. 5 (Mansi, 22, 850).
58 Part V, can. 1 (Id. 22, 849).
\end{footnotes}
A concordat drawn up to settle differences between the ecclesiastical and secular authorities of Normandy in 1190 states that whatever property is left by a cleric who has practiced usury is to be employed by the bishop for works of charity.\(^60\) When it is established that a layman was a usurer at the time of his death, whatever property he has still in his possession is to be confiscated. However what he has alienated during his lifetime is not to be revoked under pretext that he was a usurer.\(^61\) This last clause is a protest of the Church against the practice of the king's agents who refuse to allow bequests to ecclesiastical establishments but claim that the deceased was a usurer and so had forfeited all his property to the state. This same grievance is voiced by Innocent III in a letter to Louis VIII of France in 1212.\(^62\) It is clear from a sentence concerning Normandy, pronounced by the Parlement of Paris in 1258, that the property of a deceased usurer is held by the king only until the first assize when the affair is examined. If the claim of usury is established the property is turned over to the bishop who with the bailiff undertakes to make restitution to those who have been defrauded through usury.\(^63\) An act of the time of Philip Augustus for the same country declares that the distribution made personally by a usurer while on his death-bed is done lawfully but if he neglects to do so his property goes to the king provided it is proven that he loaned at usury during the year preceding his death.\(^64\)

Most of the coutumiers treat of the same question. Thus the Très ancien coutumier of Normandy, belonging to the early thirteenth century, says that all the chattels of one who dies a usurer go to the Duke, none of them benefiting the family or the Church. The family retain the hereditas.\(^65\) The Établissements de Saint Louis, written about 1275, state that the baron receives the chattels of one proven to have died a usurer.\(^66\) The same regulation is to be found in the Coutume de Tourraine-Anjou,\(^67\) and in the Abrégé Champenois.\(^68\) According to Glanvill all the movables and chattels of a deceased usurer are forfeit to the king whether the man dies intestate or not.\(^69\)

\(^60\) Art. 6 (Manz, 22, 590): De bonis vero clericorum eti dicantur fuisset usurarii, vel quocumque genere mortis praeuent, nihil pertinet ad saecularem potestatem, sed episcopali auctoritate in pias causas distribuerit. For the nature of this concordat see R. Généstal, Le Privilegien Fori en France, II (Paris, 1924), p. 107 ff.

\(^61\) Art. 7 (loc. cit.): Item quicquid laici in vita sua donaverint vel quocumque titulo a se alienaverint, eti usurarii fuisse dicantur, post mortem non revocabatur. Quae vero post mortem non alienata invenientur, si recognitum fuerit ipsos tempore mortis fuisse usurarios, confiscabuntur.

\(^62\) Potthast, 4339 (P.L. 216, 487).


\(^64\) Text in Viollet's edition of the Établissements de Saint Louis, Vol. IV (Paris, 1886), p. 38: Nous démasions par nostre serment que des choses as usuriers, tant comme l'usuier sera en lict de sa maladie, se il distribue les choses de sa main propre, se sera chose ferme et stable; et se il ne le fait ainsi, toutes ses choses après sa mort seront à nostre sire le roy, pour tant que il soit prouvé que en chel an, el quel il mourut, il ait presté à usure. See H. Auguhy, Évolution du testament en France (Paris, 1899), P. 458-459.


\(^67\) In Viollet's edition of the Établissements, Vol. III, p. 50. This is one of the sources used by the author of the Établissements. The Compliatio de usibus et consuetudinibus Anegavisi, somewhat later, probably after 1315, says: Il est droiz et usages que se usuriers communs muert en Eno, ou en Poito, ou en Maine, que le meubles est le roy. Ce que l'en en peut trover en Touraine ne tient pas cest usage. Art. 21, edit. Viollet, Vol. III, p. 121.


\(^69\) De legibus et consuetudinibus Anglicis, edit. Woodbine (New Haven, 1932), Bk. VII, chap. 16, p. 112: Omnes res mobiles et omnia cañala quae fuerunt ipsius usurarii mortui, ad usus
Contrary to the rule of the *Très ancien coutumier* the *hereditas* does not remain to the family but returns to the lord who granted it. It is to be noted that no penalty is provided for usurers provided they do not die in their sin. The contemporary *Dialogus de Scaccario* states that if a usurer dies without having made restitution his money and movables are confiscated by the king. The heirs retain the land and immovables.

Gregory X in the Council of Lyons in 1274 makes a general law of the canon of the Council of Paris concerning the testamentary power of a usurer. Unless certain conditions are fulfilled the last will and testament of one who is proven guilty of usury is *ipso jure* null and void. Even though by his last will a usurer orders restitution of what he has received from his business he is nevertheless to be denied Christian burial until full satisfaction has been made by his heirs or until sufficient guarantees have been given that such will be made. The bishop, the pastor or one delegated by either must be present at the drawing up of such a will to receive the guarantees because it often happens that the act orders restitution to be made but when the usurer has been buried the heirs find ways of preventing the execution of his last wishes. To obviate this injustice the council requires that such wills observe certain formalities and forbids all other persons, laymen or clerics, to assist at their writing unless acting as representatives of the ecclesiastical authority. It is hoped that effective restitution will result from the refusal of Christian burial to such testators who transmit to their heirs the obligation of satisfying for their unjust dealings. This canon, inserted in the *Liber Sextus*, is recalled by numerous local councils during the following century and the testaments of usurers are pronounced null and void. Every sunday pastors are to read this canon to the faithful. Notaries are forbidden to assist at the drawing up of last wills unless the parish priest be also present.

Commenting upon the canon of Lyons, Joannes Andreae asks what is the value of a codicil which a usurer adds to his will. Though such codicils are not expressly forbidden and though penalties are to be interpreted strictly, he concludes, however, that a codicil is a will in a broad sense and consequently is without value when made by a usurer. His principal reason for this opinion is that if such codicils were allowed an excellent method would be provided the usurer for evading the law. What is to be said of the last will and testament of a usurer which complies with the conditions required by the Canon Law but the testator has since been lending at usury in such a way that his crime cannot be hidden? Federicus of Siena, a contemporary of Joannes Andreae, declares that such conduct destroys...
the validity of the previous will. Panormitanus holds the more lenient opinion that the will retains its value.\textsuperscript{79}

The same penalties which are inflicted upon usurers also fall upon their heirs who oppose restitution of the ill-gotten gain and upon all others who had shared in this gain.\textsuperscript{80} According to Vincentius Hispanus the heirs are bound in solidum, all their property being obligata, so that if one of them becomes insolvent before restitution is made the others are bound to repay all. Ignorance of the testator’s crime does not excuse them from this obligation.\textsuperscript{81} Hostiensis gives this as the common opinion of his day and hesitates to contradict it. However he proceeds to distinguish between heirs in the strict sense and extranei.\textsuperscript{82} The former are bound in solidum, the latter are not. In introducing this distinction the great canonist is aiming at being practical. The common opinion, in fact, involved a difficulty of the practical order. An outsider might discover only after many years that his property came from the fruits of usury which he had received in good faith and now it is very difficult for him to make restitution. It is not the same with the direct heirs who are generally in a position to know how the property was acquired by the testator.\textsuperscript{83} Joannes Andraeae and others \textsuperscript{84} follow the new doctrine so that Panormitanus can say that all modern authors reject the older opinion and hold for the distinction introduced by Hostiensis.\textsuperscript{85}

A number of penalties directed against the family and servants of the usurer were aimed at bringing about the latter’s conversion. The servants must leave their employ or incur the same punishment as their masters.\textsuperscript{86} Again they are threatened with excommunication if they remain in their service.\textsuperscript{87} The council held in Paris in 1212, so severe in its condemnation of the crime of usury, states that the wife of a usurer has no right to accept anything from her husband because he gives what is not his. However she is permitted to receive what is necessary while she attempts to convert him and persuades him to make restitution. When she discovers that he is incorrigible and that she can do nothing she is bound to seek a separation quoad mensam et convivium but not quoad torum. It is better that she beg than accept any support from her husband. If, however she becomes ill or is otherwise unable to beg, she may receive from him what she needs since she is reduced to the state of a beggar and is really providing him with the opportunity of making restitution to the poor in what he gives her. The same necessity permits children and grandchildren to receive support from their parents.\textsuperscript{88}

A century later a council of Mainz has a similar procedure. If there is hope of correcting him the wife is to live with her usurious husband. If not, she and her children are to leave him and live off their own property if they possess any; if they have none they are to go to relatives and friends. If the husband does not allow this they are to denounce him to the bishop. If he still remains obstinate then

\textsuperscript{79} Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233c.
\textsuperscript{80} X.V.19.c.9: Respondemus quod filii ad restituentas usuras ea sunt distinguten se cogendi qua parentes sui, si viverint, cogerentur. Idipsum etiam contra heredes extranos cedimus exercendum. Cf. also c. 17; Alainus, gloss on c. 5, sendit, and Bernard of Pavia, Summa, V.15. n.10, edit. Laspeyres, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{81} Gloss on X.V.19.c.9.
\textsuperscript{82} As we have just seen, Alexander III affirmed the strict obligation upon the heirs to make restitution but hesitated to lay down the same rule for extranei.
\textsuperscript{83} Commentaria on c. 9; Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 376c.
\textsuperscript{84} Reported by Bohic, Commentaria on c. 9, p. 174-175.
\textsuperscript{85} Commentaria on c. 9, Vol. VII, fol. 239c.
\textsuperscript{86} Paris, 1212, part V, can. 6 (Mansi, 22, 851).
\textsuperscript{87} Mainz, 1310 (Id. 25, 340).

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they may live with him rather than become public beggars or starve. Sometimes a usurer was willing to remain a long time under sentence of excommunication intending to arrange for restitution when he came to die. To prevent this and to forestall the new difficulty which then often arose from the opposition of the wife and family to the execution of his last will, the same council of Mainz decrees that if a usurer remain one month under sentence of excommunication the sacraments are to be refused his wife and children. An exception is made for baptism and also for the other sacraments in danger of death.

Still other penalties are indirectly aimed at bringing about the punishment of usurers. Those who pay usury and do not within a month denounce their creditors are to be excommunicated. The cemetery where a usurer has been buried will be placed under an interdict until the body is exhumed. Sometimes also the church is closed. Lawyers are forbidden, not only, as we have seen, to aid in drawing up last wills of usurers, but also to defend them in court just as they are forbidden to defend heretics. One who disregards this rule will be suspended from office and if he continues to defend such cases will be excommunicated. He may, however, defend one accused of usury provided he swears to retire as soon as he is convinced that it is really a case of usury and not the case of a contract which, though charged with being usurious, is not such in fact or at least so far has not been officially branded as unjust. Hostiensis remarks that even officials of the papal Curia sometimes defend usurers. Notaries are forbidden to perform any service for usurers especially to help them in drawing up their usurious contracts or other contracts in fraudem usurarum. Hostiensis holds that a notary who acts against this canon incurs the penalty of infamy and his testimony is no longer to be accepted in a court of justice.

New and more stringent measures against usurers are promulgated by the general council of Lyons in 1274. These have force of law everywhere and are inserted in the Liber Sextus by Boniface VIII in 1298. No person of any rank, whether an individual or juristic person, may rent or in any way grant a house to a stranger to the district who intends to practice usury, nor allow him to continue to occupy it if it is at present being used for such purposes. All such strangers are to be expelled from the territory within three months. Those who transgress this decree will be excommunicated if they are minor clerics, suspended if they are in major orders and placed under an interdict if they are corporations. The lands of those who remain under any of these penalties for the space of a month will fall under an interdict. If laymen offend against this law the bishop will punish them by ecclesiastical censures. This canon is renewed by numerous local councils in the course of the century following.

89 Mainz, 1310 (Id. 25, 340).
90 Ibid. The same decree is to be found in a council of Trier, 1310, can. 141 (Id. 25, 289).
91 Mainz, 1310 (Id. 25, 340).
92 Würzburg, 1287, can. 23 (Id. 24, 859).
93 Constitutions promulgated by the papal legate in Lombardy in 1287, can. 16 (Id. 24, 885).
94 Paris, 1212, part V, can. 3 (Id. 22, 850); Cf. also canon 8 (Ibid.).
95 Cologne, 1280, can. 14 (Id. 24, 359); Statuimus quod nullus omnino advocatus usurario in usurarum causis patrocinium praestet, nisi juramentum faciat quod quam cito sciverit, vel seire poterit, causam esse usuaram, cam ulterius non fovebit, nec patrocinium aliquod usurario ipsi clam vel aperte impetretur; Saint-Quentin, 1231, in Archives administratives de la ville de Reims, edit. Varin, Vol. I, part 2, p. 552.
96 Commentaria on X.V.19.c.15. timent.
97 Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; Florence, 1346 (Mansi, 25, 498; 26, 61).
98 Summa, de usuris, n. 8, fol. 375r. Archidiaconus follows Hostiensis on this point, Summa, D.46.c.10.n.2, fol. 58r.
99 Yf T.V.5.c.1. Beaunamuor, writing between 1279 and 1283, states that a baron who has forbidden lending at usury on his lands may seize a usurer and hold him until he has made restitution of the usury received since the prohibition, and has also paid the fine for transgressing the law. Coutumes de Beaunais, edit. Salmon, II (Paris, 1900), n. 1933, p. 475; Tours, 1282, can. 6; Würzburg, 1287, can. 23; Auch, 1308, can. 3; Lucca, about 1308,
Discussing this decree, Joannes Andraee points out that this law does not concern usurers who belong to the territory since they are to be punished by the other penalties against usurers. Strangers give greater scandal by the practice of usury and moreover less scandal and inconvenience is caused by their expulsion. This explains the special measures directed against them. If one lends a house to a stranger who is not known as a usurer or lets it to him for some other purpose he is nonetheless bound to evict him as soon as he becomes aware of the true nature of his business. The canon speaks expressly only of renting houses. We are not surprised, therefore, to find usurers obtaining a house as security for a loan or under another title instead of renting it. According to the canonists such contracts come within the scope of this decree. Joannes Andraee says that the canon does not seem to prohibit selling, donating or exchanging a house but only conceding its use to another. However, the terms of the law are general and he is forced to agree with another famous glossator of the Liber Sextus, Guillaume de Montlauzun, that such contracts are presumed to have been made in fraudem legis if it is evident that the house is being used for purposes of moneylending.

Another series of general decrees were formulated by Clement V in the Council of Vienne in 1311–1312 and incorporated in the Clementinae. The first part of the canon touches the question of whether the civil law may permit usury and declares excommunicated all secular officials of whatever rank who make, write or cause to be made or written any statute compelling debtors to pay usury which they have promised or which denies to them the right to recover usury already paid. The same penalty is incurred by those who judge according to such statutes, who enforce them or who, having the power to do so, do not within three months delete them from the statute books or suppress them if they are recognized, unwritten customs. The same prohibition is to be found henceforth in other councils, as in the Liber de Excommuniciones of Bérenger Frédol.

As we have already seen in the first part of this study the canonists hold that such statutes have no binding force since they are opposed to both the divine and the ecclesiastical law. Moreover, civil laws which affirm that a debtor who demands restitution in an ecclesiastical court can be obliged to lend the creditor an equal sum of money for the same length of time as the original loan are without value because a natural obligation may not be made the object of a civil contract. Also stand condemned statutes which forbid demanding usury beyond a certain rate because they seem to implicitly approve the taking of usury provided it is not in excess of that rate.

can. 56; Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; etc. (Mansi, 24, 470, 859; 25, 199, 188, 498).
133 dismissed on V.5.c.1. alicuegenas.
134 Gloss on del finam.
135 Gloss on titolo.
137 Gloss on titolo.
138 Clem. V.5.c.1.
139 Bergamo, 1311, can. 24; Levaur, 1368, can. 120 (Mansi, 25, 500; 26, 538).
140 Ed. Vernier (Paris, 1912), III Complements postérieurs, II, n. 28–32; V, n. 12–14; p. 63, 80, 81.
141 See the various commentators, especially Innocent IV, Histoiais and Joannes Andraee on X.II.7.c.7. Cf Medieval Studies, I (1939), p. 84 ff.
142 Gloss on Clem. V.5.c.1. oner; Panormitanus, Commentaria super clementinas epistolias (Venice, 1588), on the same canon, Vol. VII, fol. 437r.
143 Gloss on facere; Panormitanus on the same canon. The Coutumes d'Alais, of the thirteenth century, allow usury to be charged but no matter how long payment is delayed it may never exceed the principal; edit. Beugnot in appendix to Les Olim, Vol. III (Paris, 1848), p. 1496. The canonists discuss the case of the king of Aragon who forces the Jews and Saracens to pay a tax for their privilege of lending at usury and whose courts refuse to hear the claims of those who seek to recover usury paid. They conclude that by such conduct the king and
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The same council provides a means of more easily ascertaining the nature of the business which a man is conducting. Those accused of lending at usury are to be compelled under threat of ecclesiastical censure to show the books in which they keep an account of their transactions. Joannes Andreae would extend the same regulation to the heirs and others accused of having received something from a known usurer. One accused of the crime of usury who claims that he does not keep books must prove this claim and his own oath to that effect does not suffice to establish it. In the case of an heir his own oath is sufficient when he otherwise enjoys a good reputation. Faith is to be placed in the evidence furnished by accounts when it witnesses against the usurer but not when it is favorable to him. This is because they are documents of a private nature. Joannes Andreae holds that the ecclesiastical authorities may not go beyond the use of penalties of the spiritual order to compel the accused to exhibit his accounts but Panormitanus declares that they may employ force or other means to gain access to them.

A number of councils suspend from office and benefice clerics who, by assisting usurers in drawing up their contracts, by witnessing them or by keeping their accounts, lead men to believe that usury is not sinful. In the fourteenth century it becomes necessary to take measures of a more sweeping and drastic kind to prevent the spread of the error that it is permitted to receive usury. The Council of Vienne declares that if one pertinaciously affirms that it is not sinful to take usury he is to be punished as a heretic. Bishops and inquisitors are strictly enjoined to proceed against persons known or suspected guilty of this error in the same way as they would against those guilty or suspected of heresy. Earlier canonists had sometimes stated that one reason for the prohibition of usury was that it led to idolatry but this is far from saying that it is a form of heresy to act concerning usury as if it were not forbidden. This is the first indication we have found of this point of view but it is recalled by later councils.

This decree is directed not only against usurers but against all who encourage the practice of exacting usury in any way by affirming that it is not a sin. Some are teaching that there is no obligation to make restitution of usury received; others admit that the usurer is bound to make restitution but that when this is done he is not bound to do penance, no more than is one who restores to the owner the house which he has rented. All these assertions are equivalent to saying that usury is not sinful. Such persons, say the canonists, are heretical in a broad sense. One who denies an article of faith or holds incorrect notions concerning the sacraments or who propagates perverse and novel opinions on matters of faith is a heretic in the strict sense. In the case of usury one is a heretic because he affirms something op-

his officials incur an excommunication. John of Imola affirms that for the same reason 'omens domini et omnes communitates sunt excommunicati.' See John of Anagni, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.7.n.2, fol. 181v. One of the reasons for the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities to the communes was that the latter often permitted lending at usury. Cf. P. Viollet, Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France, III (Paris, 1903), p. 36-37; 201-205. See also R. Aubenas, Recueil de lettres des officiels de Marseille et d’Aix, Vol. I (Paris, 1937) p. 49, note 4.

112 Clem. V.5.c.1.
113 Gloss on word ipso; See also Panormitanus, loc. cit., for this and notes following.
114 Gloss on complendios.
115 Gloss on rationum.
116 Gloss on censura.
117 Paris, 1212, part V, can. 3; Sens, 1269, can. 2 (Mani, 22, 850; 24, 4).
118 Clem. V.5.c.1. In 1210 Foulques, bishop of Toulouse, exhorts the faithful to take up arms against heretics and usurers. Cf. Guillaume de Puylaurens, Historia Albigensium, chap. XV in Bouquet, Recueil des historiens de la France, XIX, p. 283.
119 Innocent IV on rubric to X.V.19: Quia in dividendo pecuniam et diligendo viex evitatur idolatria. Repeated by Hostiensis, Commentaria on V.19.c.2. periculum.
120 For example, in the canons adopted by a provincial council held at Prague in 1349 (Mani, 26, 98).
121 Gloss on Clem. V.5.c.2. si quis.
122 Gloss on non est peccatum.
posed, not to the articles of faith or the sacraments, but to the clear teaching of the Church.\textsuperscript{122}

\section*{B. Application of the penalties}

A number of problems remain to be discussed, problems concerning the actual inflicting of the penalties which we have just seen. When is one considered a usurer? How is the fact established? What court is competent in cases of usury? A number of points touching the procedure and also a special case where oaths of various kinds are taken by the debtor in a loan at usury will be given some attention.

The Lateran Council of 1179 and other decrees referred to above declare that the penalties are incurred by \textit{usuarii manifesti}. When is one to be considered a manifest usurer? Some of the councils understand the word \textit{manifestus} to mean notorious; the penalties are incurred by usurers who are notorious.\textsuperscript{124} Others, showing the influence of the teaching of the canonists, provide a more exact and complete explanation of the term. Those are manifest who have been convicted of the crime, who have confessed it before the judge or whose usurious business is carried on so openly that it cannot be concealed.\textsuperscript{125} Without being notorious one may be defamed by common report of the crime of usury. Such a one becomes manifest, say the councils, if he does not submit to the \textit{purgatio canonicam} within the time fixed by the bishop.\textsuperscript{126} Some councils of the fourteenth century in their attempt to stamp out the vice of usury indicate even simpler methods of establishing proof of the crime of usury. A man is to be held as a manifest usurer if he confesses it extra-judicially before the parish priest or a notary public.\textsuperscript{127} Again, two witnesses suffice to establish the fact that one is a usurer and such evidence renders him manifest.\textsuperscript{128} Another canon affirms that the common opinion of people that one is a usurer taken together with certain indications is sufficient to prove the same fact.\textsuperscript{129}

These canons have gradually incorporated brief statements of the teaching of the canonists who developed their theories in the course of the thirteenth century. Whereas Innocent IV is content to state briefly that manifest usurers are those who have been convicted by the courts,\textsuperscript{130} Bernard Bottoni discusses the question more thoroughly. A usurer, he says, may be notorious or not. If he is notorious, then no further proof is required; his crime is manifest and the penalties may be applied. If, however, he is not notorious, then a judicial examination is required to establish the fact of usury and so make his crime manifest. The general report that one is a usurer is not sufficient to bring about his condemnation. To it must be added certain other arguments which tend to show that the report is well founded.\textsuperscript{131}

According to Hostiensis one is a manifest usurer whose crime is notorious. But we must distinguish notoriety of fact and notoriety of law. A man is \textit{notorius facti}

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\item \textsuperscript{122} Gloss on \textit{haereticum}.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Mainz, 1301, 1601, e. 25; Mainz, 1310 (Mansi, 23, 1090; 25, 320).
\item \textsuperscript{126} Cologne, 1210, can. 14 (\textit{Id.} 24, 359): Manifesstos autem usurarios esse dicimus et vocamus qui per sententiam vel confessonem factam in jure vel evidentiam rei quae tergisversatione celeri non poterit, comprobantur.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Cologne, 1301, can. 12; Statutes of Liège, 1287, tit. 33, can. 4 (\textit{Id.} 25, 21; 24, 936).
\item \textsuperscript{128} Statutes of Aquileia, 1339 (\textit{Id.} 25, 1120).
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Salzburg, 1386, can. 13 (\textit{Id.} 26, 731).
\item \textsuperscript{131} Gloss on X.V.19.c.3. \textit{manifesti}.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Gloss on X.V.19.c.15. \textit{manifestos}: Si intelligas manifestos, id est notorios, non est opus alis argumentis. . . Si autem loquitur de manifestis non notorius, secundum hoc evidens probatio requiritur secundum juris ordinem. . . . Ad hoc posset dici quod illud notorium non habet facti perseveratiam, unde aliqua requiruntur argumenta. Vel dic quod solemnis fama docte ipos esse usurarios etideo per fandom et alia argumenta puniuntur, quia sola fama non sufficit ad condemnationem.
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if, for example, he conducts a bank or place of business where he is prepared to lend at usury to all comers. In this case he suffers ipso facto the penalties provided in the law. A man is notorius juris when he has been publicly condemned as such by the Church. If he has merely the reputation of being a usurer he is not a notorious or manifest usurer nor do the penalties affect him until he has been publicly condemned. This sentence will become public when he has been called to answer the charge and either confesses his guilt or denying it is yet proved to be a usurer by the testimony of witnesses. Having equated the terms notorious and manifest, Hostiensis is bound to provide for another eventuality which seems to have frequently arisen. What if one is reputed a usurer but no witnesses appear against him? He answers that he falls into the same category of manifest usurers when he is thought to be a usurer and certain indications point to the correctness of this opinion.\(^\text{122}\)

Joannes Andreae witnesses to the intense efforts being made at the beginning of the fourteenth century to bring usurers to justice. He accepts the teaching of Hostiensis \(^\text{136}\) but adds another method by which one may be proved to be a manifest usurer. He becomes such by an extrajudicial confession made publicly before a priest \(^\text{134}\) and witnesses, promising at the same time to make restitution.\(^\text{135}\) This opinion does not meet with the approval of all the canonists,\(^\text{146}\) some of whom are unwilling to go to such lengths to secure a condemnation for usury. Thus Federicus of Siena, a contemporary, says that an extrajudicial confession alone does not suffice to render a usurer's crime manifest. Even if a man orders restitution to those who claim that they have paid him usury this act does not make him a manifest usurer because he does not confess that he is a usurer but simply orders to be paid to others what they maintain he owes them. The opinion of Joannes will prevail only when all the other conditions laid down in the canons have been fulfilled, that is when the books have been turned over to the competent authority and from the accounts it is clearly evident that the man has been exacting usury. But it is this circumstance and not the confession which makes his crime manifest.\(^\text{147}\) Panormitanus simply accepts the teaching of Hostiensis with the additions of Joannes Andreae.\(^\text{136}\)

No attempt will be made to outline the whole procedure of the courts in dealing with cases of usury,\(^\text{139}\) but we shall confine ourselves to noting a few points specially touching this crime. The earlier method which seems to have been usually relied upon to bring usurers to justice was to hear the claims brought by those who maintained that they had paid usury and now demanded its return. The Church taught that the usurer was bound to make restitution and that those who had paid usury could always claim it because they had suffered an injustice. Recovery of what they

\(^{122}\) Summa, de usiris, n. 10, fol. 375\(^{c}\)–376\(^{c}\); Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3. manifesti; c. 15 non dubitatur.

\(^{131}\) Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3. and Gloss on Vc.V.5.c.1. manifestos.

\(^{136}\) He does not say that he must be the parish priest.

\(^{146}\) Gloss on Vc.V.5.c.2. manifesti: Tamen quoad casum nostrum satis posset dici manifestus si coram sacerdote et testibus publice satis posset dicitur hostiense et usuras restitui mandat forte libros rationum tradens secundum Gul- [jemum de Monte Laudano].

\(^{136}\) Bohic in his Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3. p. 169, repeats Hostiensis and, without noting the addition of Joannes, says that the latter's teaching sufficiently agrees with it.

\(^{135}\) His opinion is reported by Panormitanus, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.3, Vol. VII, fol. 233\(^{v}\).


had parted with in time of difficulty when they were obliged to contract a usurious debt was the incentive held out to encourage debtors to reveal the usurious practices of their creditors. Against those who openly and publicly engaged in the business of money lending at usury even such appeals were unnecessary. They were notorii facti and after being given a triple admonition they were excommunicated by name and the penalties of the Lateran council applied.  

For various reasons, however, debtors were often reluctant to appear as accusers and the Canon Law devised other means of bringing usurers to justice. Thus in 1212 the council of Paris commands all the faithful under threat of ecclesiastical censure to divulge to the authorities all the information they possess concerning the operations of usurers. This measure does not appear to have been widely applied and another method was used. A letter of Innocent III addressed to the bishop of Auxerre in 1207 and later inserted in the Decretals of Gregory IX, relates that many persons are reputed usurers and yet through fear of princes and powerful men no accuser appears to denounce them or to furnish proof of the fact with the result that they escape punishment. The Pope orders the ecclesiastical judges to proceed ex officio against persons who enjoy such a reputation and adds that certain arguments taken in conjunction with it suffice to prove the crime of usury. Such arguments or indications, the canonists add, would be the discovery of accounts revealing the nature of their business; the fact that they sell on credit; their practice of entering into contracts which, though apparently contracts of sale, are in reality loans on security arranged in such a way that they receive the fruits of the pledge placed in their hands.

Some earlier canonists, Tancredus and Joannes, taught that if no one appeared to demand restitution from one accused of usury the same procedure was to be followed as in the case of one who has found an article belonging to another. The accusation is publicly made known and if no claimants appear the accused is cleared of the charge. Bernard Bottoni combats this opinion and holds that a usurer is not to be acquitted because no one seeks restitution. He is obliged to restore the usury which he has received to the poor. Hostiensis follows Bernard on this point and insists that power is given the judge to proceed with the examination of the charge against the usurer even in the absence of a plaintiff demanding restitution.

The councils often repeat the rule that the ecclesiastical judge may act ex officio without the necessity of any accuser. One who without being notorious is suspected of lending at usury is first to be warned to cease such business practices. If he does not appear to heed the warning his case is examined by the court. If he is acquitted but his reputation as a usurer persists he is forced to submit to the compurgation and clear himself by means of oath-helpers in order to repair scandal caused. If he

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140 See, for example, the council of Avignon, 1209, can. 3 (Mansi, 22, 786).
141 Part V, can. 5 (Id. 22, 850). At a later date the Jews are admonished under threat of being cut off from the society of the faithful to reveal the names of Christians who have placed money in their hands to be loaned out at usury. See R. Aubenas, Recueil de lettres des officialités, Vol. II, n. 239, p. 73.
142 X.V.19.c.15.
143 Innocent IV, Commentaria on word argumentum of this canon; Hostiensis on the same word and in the Summa, de usuris, n. 9, fol. 375v.
144 This is probably John of Wales whose gloss we have not been able to consult. In any case no such teaching has been found in the gloss of Joannes Teutonicus.
145 Tancredus, Gloss on Comp. Tertia. V.10, c.5, in Ms. Vat. Lat. 1378, p. 175, col. 1; Cf. also Vincentius on Comp. Tertia. V.10.c.4 in Ms. Vat. Lat. 1378, fol. 87v, col. 1.
147 Commentaria on the same word and Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 377v.
fails to clear himself in this manner he is punished by the penalties prescribed by
the canons.148

Clement V decreed in the Council of Vienne that in cases concerning benefices
and tithes as well as in matrimonial and usury cases the examination by the judges
in the ecclesiastical courts could be made *simplicier et de plano, sine strepitu judicii et
figura*.149 These words are explained in another canon of the same council.150 The
procedure is rendered simpler in that the judge is not obliged to observe all the
solemn forms of the regular procedure but is allowed to suppress many of its parts.
For example, the complaint may be made orally; the delays, exceptions and ap-
peals may be shortened or eliminated; lengthy disputes between opposing counsels
are thrown out; the number of witnesses is reduced. Many other details of a highly
complicated procedure which often hampered the administration of justice in
giving rise to innumerable delays and appeals the judge may at his discretion
modify or suppress.151

The widespread use of oaths in all contracts during the Middle Ages is a well
known fact,152 and is clearly seen in this problem of usury. The creditors compel
their debtors to swear that they will pay the usury promised. Since usury is for-
bidden by the canons it cannot be demanded and a claim for usury will not be
heard in the ecclesiastical courts. Consequently usurers rely upon other means
to obtain their ends and oblige their victims to reinforce a simple promise by an
oath. What is the obligation of such oaths in the eyes of the Canon Law and what
effect have they on the procedure in cases of usury?

Gregory VIII orders the bishops to compel creditors to release debtors from
their oath to pay usury. This is to be done especially in favour of debtors who de-
sire to become crusaders.153 Alexander III lays down the general principle that
no one is obliged to pay usury unless he has sworn to do so. In this case he must
pay but pressure is to be brought to bear upon the creditor that he may release
his debtor from the oath.154 In another case he himself actually frees all debtors
from their promise to pay usury unless to this promise has been added an oath.
In this event the ecclesiastical authority is to compel the creditors under threat of
censure to make restitution.155 This is the method advocated by Innocent III. First
compulsion is to be used upon the usurer to obtain release from the oath. If this
fails the oath is to be kept and further compulsion employed to obtain restitution.156
A number of letters of the same Pope free all debtors from the promise to pay
usury if they wish to go to the aid of the Holy Land and order the bishops to se-
 cure release from any oaths which have been taken.157 Others grant the same
privilege to those who are willing to aid in stamping out heresy in Provence.158
Secular rulers are called upon to use the same procedure against Jewish creditors

148 Château-Gontier, 1231, can. 30; Noyon, about 1280, can. 3; Avignon, 1282, can. 1;
Mainz, 1310 (Mansi, 23, 259; 24, 375, 439; 25, 340); Saint-Quentin, 1231, in *Archives admin-
149 Clém. II.1.c.2.
150 Clém. V.11.c.2. The observance of this
decree is commanded by a council of Paris in
1346, can. 12 (Mansi, 26, 22).
151 See the gloss of Joannes Andreae on these
two canons.
152 See A. Esmén, 'Le serment promissoire
dans le droit canonique,' *Nouvelle revue histo-
rique de droit français*, 1888, p. 248-277.
153 X.II.24.c.1. In 1248 Innocent IV ab-
solves from the payment of usury some nobles
who have given evidence of particular fidelity
to him. See Potthast, 13125.
154 Jaffé, 14151, letter inserted in the collec-
tion designated *Appendix Consilii Lateranensis*,
XVI, c. 6 (Mansi, 22, 344).
155 X.II.24.c.6.
156 X.V.19.c.13, addressed in 1200 to the
bishop of Modena.
157 Potthast, 1045, of the year 1200 to all
French bishops (P. L. 214, col. cxxxvii).
158 Potthast, 3511, written in 1208 to all the
bishops of France, and Potthast, 3828, ad-
dressed in 1209 to the bishops of the province
of Arles (P. L. 215, 1469; 216, 158).
who ignore the ecclesiastical threats and censures. None of these letters go as far as does one of Eugene III in 1145 by which the Pope himself absolves from their oath all who have sworn to pay usury and now wish to go on the Crusades. His successors, Alexander, Gregory and Innocent do not absolve from the oath but strive to obtain release from it. If unsuccessful it is to be fulfilled and then an attempt is made to obtain restitution.

Commenting upon some of these texts which were given a place in the Decretals, the canonists discuss not only the oath of which it is here question but also two others which do not appear to have been purely hypothetical cases but oaths actually employed by usurers in their struggle to evade the Church’s canons. A debtor may, in fact, be asked to take any one or all of a threefold oath: 1) he swears to pay the usury; 2) he swears to pay and also that he will not demand restitution; 3) he swears in addition that he will not denounce the usurer.

In the first case, which is that envisaged by the decretals, all the canonists agree that the oath must be kept. Such an oath is in itself licit and consequently must be fulfilled. It is not opposed to the salvation of one’s soul and does not cause injury to another. From this they argue that paying usury is not in itself sinful and though it is forbidden to lend at usury one may under certain conditions borrow at usury. In the case where such an oath has been taken the debtor must pay the usury agreed upon but he may demand restitution and the creditor is to be compelled to restore what he has received. The debtor should, however, denounce the usurer before paying him and only when he resists the pressure brought to bear upon him to obtain release from the oath is the usury to be paid. Then the compulsion is to be directed toward obtaining restitution. It is not forbidden to seek restitution or release from the oath because these have not been the object of an oath. In swearing to pay usury the debtor does not renounce his right to do these things.

The effect of this oath being nullified by the canons, usurers compel their debtors to take a further oath. They swear not only to pay usury but also that they will not seek its restitution. Such an oath is also valid, say the canonists, and must be faithfully observed. The debtor cannot directly demand restitution, states Raymund of Pennafort. He can do so indirectly, however, in denouncing the crime of the usurer to the ecclesiastical authority. By his oath he has not sworn to refrain from this act. The usurer will be compelled to do penance and he cannot do this unless he first restore his ill-gotten gain. In this way the debtor will recover what he has paid in usury. The canonists are unanimous in permitting this method of denunciation. Must the debtor’s primary motive in so acting be the salvation of the usurer’s soul in forcing him to do penance or may it be simply to obtain restitution?
tution? Some would seem to require that fraternal charity be the primary motive in the denunciation. 169 This belongs, however, to the internal forum and the authors note that even though the debtor act from purely personal interest he is to be heard. 169

The canonists have thus removed another safeguard to the interests of the usurer and he is forced to take a further precaution for his protection. He compels his debtor to swear in addition to the above oaths that he will not denounce him as a usurer. Here again he is opposed by the canonists who declare unanimously that such an oath is illicit and consequently must not be kept. It is opposed to the salvation of another's soul and contrary to the precept of love of one's neighbour. In spite of this oath the creditor is to be denounced since it is for his soul's benefit that he be brought to do penance. 170

Usurers thus find themselves barred at every turn by the teaching of the canonists concerning the oath. Nevertheless they did make great use of them and that because on account of the first oath they obtained possession of the usury paid and then they were willing and able to resist the threats and penalties employed by the Church to force them to make restitution. Hostiensis admits that usurers are often willing to remain excommunicated for a long time and exhorts the secular authority to punish them because the Church has exhausted the means at her disposal. 171 For reasons which do not come within the scope of this article to discuss, the secular power was not always willing to co-operate to the extent desired by the Church.

The canonists encounter another difficulty in treating the question of restitution of usury. The Roman Law contains a number of texts declaring that one who pays what he knows is not owed may not demand its recovery but is considered to have made a donation. 172 Now all know that usury is forbidden by the law of the Church. Therefore the debtor in paying usury, either because of an oath or without an oath, pays what he knows is unowed. How then may he demand restitution of what is to be considered a donation?

Innocent IV discusses only the case where usury is paid on account of the oath. The right to demand restitution is an exception to the rule of Roman Law and is granted because of the oath of which the observance is to be favoured in every way. 173 Bernard of Parma has the same teaching. The usury has been paid out of fear of violating the oath and hence its recovery may be sought. 174

169 Bohic, loc. cit.: Et quod dictum est quod non obstante juramento potest denunciare, intellige verum si denunciat principaliter intentione fraternae salutis comitentiis animae periclitanti. Si vero denunciat principaliter intentione recuperandi illud quod solvit, tunc tutius est abstinerere ut notant Hostiensis et Ioannes Andreae.

169 Gloss on X.V.19.e.13. desistere: Et licet ob privatum commodum denunci et non tamen repellitur ab ea quia procast usurario cum poenitetuir; Hostiensis on the same canon, on word postquam.

170 Raymund, Summa. II.7.n.8, p. 215: Si vero juravit etiam quod non denunciarit, non tenet in hae parte juramentum cum at illicitum ut puta contra saltem proximo et per consequens contra praecepsum de proximo diligendo. Unde non obstante juramento potest procedere in modum denunciationis et ita concurrurit fraudibus usurariorum; Hostiensis, Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 376v. Panormitanus, Commentaria on X.V.19.e.13, Vol. VII, fol. 242v, says that such an oath is invalid but requires that in this case the denunciation be motivated by the desire to obtain the salvation of the creditor and not by personal interest in the money to be recovered.

171 Summa, de jurejurando, fol. 156v. Si vult potius excommunicationem tolerare quam relaxare juramentum, per temporalem potestatem puniri potest contumacia nimia exigente, cum ecclesia non habeat plus quid faciat.

172 Cod. Just. IV.5.9: Indebitum solutum sciens non repetit; Dig. XII.6.1: Sed si sciens se non debere solvit, cessat repetitio; Dig. L.17.53: Cujus per erorem datam repetitio est; ejus consulto data donation est.


174 Gloss on X.II.24.c.6. cogendi; Non obsta
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In his commentary on the Decretals, Hostiensis simply repeats the explanation of Innocent that an exception is permitted on account of the oath. He adds that it is also to prevent the creditor from realizing a profit from his malice and sin, a profit which is opposed to his own good. 178 In his Summa Aura he gives a broader basis for the exception. The earlier canonists in teaching that the exception is allowed on account of the oath would seem to hold, though without discussing the point, that usury which has been paid where there was no oath could not be recovered. Hostiensis opposes this view. 179 In every case the borrower may demand restitution of usury paid because of the sinful agreement upon which the payment is based. Not only is the usury not owed but the usurer may not receive or retain it without committing sin. One may not accept a donation when such an act constitutes a sin. The texts of Roman Law which speak of what is unowed have in mind what is not in itself prohibited by law. Moreover the canons even go so far as to compel a usurer to restore usury which he has received without any agreement, which indicates that usury cannot be considered a donation because it is in itself sinful. 177

Are cases concerning usury to be tried in the secular or in the ecclesiastical court? The canons in the Decretals do not clearly answer this question but there seems to be little doubt that they presuppose that these cases belong to the ecclesiastical judge. 180 However in no case do the canons exclude the competency of the civil courts as well; the latter are condemned only in so far as they refuse to admit claims for the recovery of usury already paid or compel it to be paid. 179

The canonists discuss the question either in dealing with the title on usury or in commenting upon the canon cum sit generale 180 concerning the competency of the various tribunals. Until the fourteenth century they usually hold that the ecclesiastical courts alone are competent to try cases of usury but sometimes it is not clear that they exclude the competency of the secular judge. Huguccio, for example, says that ecclesiastical cases are of three kinds, spiritual, civil and criminal. Examples of criminal cases are usury, heresy and adultery where the examination and condemnation belong to the ecclesiastical judge. 181 From this it seems that cases of usury are to be tried in the Church’s courts but elsewhere the same author states that the secular judge can and must force a usurer to make restitution, 182 and this is held by later writers to have been the opinion of Huguccio as well as of Laurentius Hispanus. 183

Bernard of Pavia clearly teaches that usury is an ecclesiastical crime and conse-

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177 X. II.24.c.6. cogensi.
178 Summa, de usuris, n. 10, fol. 376*: Ideo posset dici quod si solvo cum non juraverim repetere non potero. . . . Sed non credo hoc verum.
179 Loc. cit.: Et dic quod repetere possunt propter pravam actionem præcedentem propter quam adeo est pecunia indebita quod non potest retinere sine peccato. Objectio ergo locum habet indebitis quorum soluto per legem non reprobatur et hoc patet ex eo quia si solvo usuras usurario nulla pactione praemissa ipsas mihi nihilominus restituere debet.
180 See especially X.V.19.c.3, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17; II.24.c.32; Clem. II.1.c.2; V.5.c.1.
181 Clem. V.5.c.1. Cf. also Gratian, C.14.q.4. c.11.
182 Id. on C.14.q.4.c.11. quod judice, fol. 218*, col. 1: Scilicet saccarini. . . . Ergo sicut ecclesiasticus ita et saccarius debet et potest cogere usurarius ad restitutionem usurarum.
183 See Archidnacou, Summa on C.14.q.4. c.11. judice, fol. 240*; Ioannes Andreae, gloss on Clem. II.1.c.2. 'sumn.'
quently is to be dealt with by the ecclesiastical, never by the secular tribunals.\textsuperscript{184} In several places of his gloss, Bernard Bottoni calls usury an offence against the canons whose examination belongs to the church courts as do the crimes of heresy, simony, sacrilege, adultery and perjury.\textsuperscript{185} Hostiensis has the same teaching.\textsuperscript{186}

Against this common opinion of the thirteenth century we find with Archidiaconus at the beginning of the fourteenth, a recognition of the competency of the secular authorities in these cases. After a long discussion of the question, he chooses to follow the opinion of Huguccio and Laurentius which he claims was also held by Goffredus. Though the crime does regard the Church, laymen are to be summoned before the secular judge to answer to the charge of usury.\textsuperscript{187} He adds, however, that the bishop may inquire into the case of anyone suspected of receiving usury in order to impose a canonical penance.\textsuperscript{188} Yet a few years later Jean Lemoine teaches that the examination and punishment of this crime belong to the court Christian because the usurer sins against the natural law and so principally against God Himself. Usury is forbidden by both divine and Canon Law and it should be punished by the Vicar of Christ and the maker of ecclesiastical laws.\textsuperscript{189} Following this canonist, Joannes Andreae holds that usury is an ecclesiastical case in which only the ecclesiastical court is competent.\textsuperscript{190} This is also the opinion of Joannes Lupus Castiloneus\textsuperscript{191} who maintains that it is supported by the doctrine and practice of the Roman Curia.

The two opinions continue to exist side by side but from the fourteenth century those who do not exclude all competency of the secular judge in this matter introduce a useful distinction. When there is doubt as to whether such and such a type of contract is usurious or not, only the ecclesiastical judge is competent to deal with the case. The prohibition of usury is from divine law and the decision which is given in the case, declaring a contract usurious or not, decides whether it is sinful or lawful. Only the Church can pronounce upon this question because it alone has the right to interpret the divine law which it does in declaring that a certain act is sinful. When, however, there is no doubt that a certain contract is usurious but there is a doubt regarding the facts of the case, when, for example it is disputed whether the usury of which the recovery is sought has actually been paid, or when it is necessary to establish other facts by means of witnesses or documents, then the

\textsuperscript{184} Summa, V.15.n.14, edit. Laspeyres, p. 239: Praeterea de recipientia usuris non est sub seculari judice litigandum. . . . Ceterum, cum hoc crimen sit ecclesiasticum, semper est in hujusmodi ad ecclesiasticum judicem recur- rendum.

\textsuperscript{185} Gloss on X.1.31.c.1. canones: Ad episcopos enim pertinent inquirere de hujusmodi crimini- bus ecclesiasticis . . . Item crimen usurarum, sacrilegi, simoniae et similia proprium spectant ad ecclesiasticum judicem; II.24.c.32. veritate: Et quia causa usurarum est quasi spiritualis cum sit ecclesiastica; II.2.6. malefactores: Item crimen usurarum, haeresis, simoniae, perjuri et adulterii. Haec pertinent ad ecclesiam.

\textsuperscript{186} Commentaria on X.V.19.c.17. Michael: Et nihilominus potest impetrare contra laicum in hoc casu, ut sequitur, quia cognitio hujus criminis ad ecclesiam spectat.

\textsuperscript{187} Rosarium on C.14.q.4.c.11. judicia, fol. 240*: Dice secundum Goffredum] sententiam Lau [rentii] esse veram rejectis omnibus aliis et hoc tenendum quod in crimine usurarum licet illud crimen spectet ad ecclesiam . . . laici coram saeculari, clerici vero coram ecclesiastico judice conveniuntur.

\textsuperscript{188} Id. Dic ergo quod episcopus contra aliquem quem suspectum habetur, possit in- quirere de usura, sicut de aliis criminiuis, ad imponendum ex peenitentiam canonica.

\textsuperscript{189} See Panormitanus, Commentaria on rubric to X.V.19, Vol. VII, fol. 231*: Et per hanc rationem dixit Jo[annes] Mo[nachus] in VPL.V.5.c.1, quod ecclesia hoc casu vendicat sibi jurisdictionem in laicos quia usurarii committunt principaliter in Deum abutendo rerum usu; ideo ad ejus vicarium spectat punitio. Item usura est pecatarum inductum ex veteri et novo testamento et ex lege canonica et ideo punitio spectat ad conditionem canonom et ad vicarium Christi.

\textsuperscript{186} Gloss on VIPL.V.5.c.2. alteria facta and on Clem. II.1.c.2. usuris. \textsuperscript{190} Died 1381 (Schulte, op. cit., II, 270). His opinion has been quoted from Panormitanus, Commentaria on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94*.}
secular as well as the ecclesiastical tribunal is competent to examine the case and pass sentence.\footnote{192}

This opinion is held by Paul de Liazaris\footnote{193} against his master, Joannes Andreae, by Antonius de Butrio,\footnote{194} Zabarella,\footnote{195} Bartolus and others of the second half of the fourteenth century so that in the fifteenth Panormitanus calls it the opinio communis.\footnote{196} Butrio declares that there is no other reason for designating usury as a spiritual case than that it involves sin. The thing itself, namely the usury paid, the contract and the whole matter belong to the temporal order. In such cases where a sinful act is present the secular judge is competent provided the principal question examined does not concern the sin and he does not pretend to decide whether an act is sinful or not. If, he says, every case where sin is involved fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts then the secular tribunals would have few or no crimes to try.\footnote{197} Baldus, commenting upon the Authentic ad haec, raises the same objection.\footnote{198} Cases do not pertain to the ecclesiastical tribunal ratione peccati unless they are special ecclesiastical cases or some others expressly named in the law.\footnote{199} Elsewhere he teaches that in cases of usury, whether it is a question of the law or of the facts, only the ecclesiastical judge is competent to decide.\footnote{200} In another place he seems to accept the teaching of Bartolus.\footnote{201}

The latter is quite clear on the point. If both parties in a case of a claim for the recovery of usury admit the facts but there is doubt whether the contract is usurious, the case is to be examined before the bishop since a decision must be given declaring a certain contract licit or illicit. But if the facts are disputed, the two parties offering different versions of them, the creditor, for example, maintaining that there was a contract of sale, the debtor that it was a pretended sale in fraudem usurai, then the affair may be examined in the lay court.\footnote{202}

Though the two opinions persist, Panormitanus adopts the common opinion that the lay judge is competent in cases of usury where it is a question, not of the nature of the contract, but of the facts concerning the transaction.\footnote{203} We may be

\footnote{192} The question is clearly resumed by Panormitanus on X.V.19.c.12, Vol. VII, fol. 241: Est ergo istud crimen mixtum seu mixti fori, ut possit fieri restitutio seu repetitio tam in foro saeculari quam ecclesiastico, et hoc ubi non dubitatur contractum usurariam est. Si autem dubitaretur, cognitio pertinent ad forum ecclesiasticum ut plene notatur in can. cum sit generale. . . . Et tenui menti in hoc istum textum quia multe tenuerunt quod judex saecularis nullo modo potest se intromittere de usuris. The same author gives a lengthy treatment of the whole problem in his commentary on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94c–94r.

\footnote{193} This canonist who wrote several works on the Clementinae died in 1356. Cf. Schulte, op. cit., II, 246.

\footnote{194} Antonius de Butrio (Budrio), canonist and civilian, died 1408. Cf. Schulte, op. cit., II, 289.


\footnote{196} Commentaria on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94r.

\footnote{197} Ibid.

\footnote{198} Cod. IV.32. ad haec, fol. 85r.

\footnote{199} Id.: Quaero numquid quaelibet causa ratione peccati pertineat ad forum ecclesiasticum et videtur quod non, nisi speciales ecclesiasticae sunt, et nisi in quibusdnam aliis casibus expressis in jure.

\footnote{200} Cod. III.1.13, fol. 146r: Tu dic quod sive sit quasertio fact, sive juris, cum sit ecclesiastica, non pertinet ad judicem saecularem ejus disceptatio vel judicium.

\footnote{201} Cod. IV.32. ad haec, fol. 85r.

\footnote{202} Dig. XXIV.3.34, Vol. III, fol. 22r.

\footnote{203} Commentaria on X.II.2.c.8, Vol. III, fol. 94r: Et hoc etiam fuit de mente Bartoli et aliorum hanc opinionem sequentium et assentiant. Nam haec opinio communis mihi placeat. In another place he would seem to accept the contrary opinion, on V.19.c.2, Vol. VII, fol. 232r: Nota primo ex textu, laicos esse compellendos ad restitutionem usurarum per ecclesiam, nam hoc delictum seu ejus coercitio spectat ad ecclesiam. Again on V.19.c.12, fol. 241r, he says that usury is an ecclesiastical crime and it is for this reason, he argues, that the ecclesiastical judge may compel Jews to restore usury received: Nam cum hoc crimen sit ecclesiasticum et judaei peccant contra legem suum et contra naturam exercendo usuras, licite possunt compelliti per judicem ecclesiasticum. However he does not hold for exclusive jurisdiction here but admits that usually the Jews will be compelled by the secular judge.
to restore the usury which they have received. This is also the teaching of John of Anagni, Commentaria on X.V.19.c.12.n.5 ff, fol. 186v–188r. 204 We find the officialis of the bishop claiming jurisdiction over all cases of usury. As evidence of this attitude note a number of model letters dating from the end of the fourteenth to the end of the fifteenth century found in the recently published Recueil de lettres des officialités de Marseille et d’Aix, edit. R. Aubenac, 2 vols. (Paris, 1937–1938). The heirs of a certain debtor accuse the creditor of the crime of usury. The official writes to the pastor of the place ordering him to notify the secular judge that he is to suspend the examination of the charge of debt which the creditor has laid until the ecclesiastical court has settled the charge of usury. The creditor is summoned to answer in the official’s court. Vol. I, n. 44, p. 49 and Vol. II, n. 125, p. 21; The official orders the lay judge to set free a woman imprisoned for a debt which she claims was usurious and who is prepared to prove her claim if she is permitted to appear before the ecclesiastical court. Meanwhile the secular court must suspend the trial of the case of debt. Vol. I, n. 64, p. 75; In spite of a similar admonition in another case the secular judge seized the debtor’s property. The official warns him that such an action has merited an excommunication but he chooses to order him under threat of excommunication to revoke the measure which he has taken. Vol. I, n. 108, p. 114; A question of usury is being tried by the ecclesiastical court but the debtor failing to appear, doubtless because he is unable to prove the charge of usury, is declared contumacious and the official turns the affair over to the king’s court which will examine the action for debt. Vol. II, n. 352, p. 116; Again the official summons to appear before him a man whose debtor maintains that the debt was usurious. Vol. II, n. 241, p. 75. The editor of these texts believes that the ecclesiastical courts of Provence more successfully maintained their competency in cases of usury than in other regions of France, Vol. I, p. 49, note 4.

Relative to this conflict of jurisdiction, the council of Saint-Quentin in 1231 promulgated the following decree: Item commellant judices saeculares per censuras ecclesiasticas, auctoritate concili, ne de crimine usurae, de sacrificio, aut alio crimine ecclesiastico aliquam condemnationem detur eis auctoritas a prelatis. See Archites ad

A libellus in the Ordo judicarius compiled by Aegidius de Fuscariariss between 1262 and 1266, begs the Bishop of Bologna to suspend his secular judge who is seeking thirty pounds usury and requests him to warn the secular judge not to hear the case while it is being examined by the ecclesiastical court.


According to the Établissements de Saint-Louis, about 1273, cases of usury are tried in the lay court and if the charge is proven the chattels are confiscated and the usurer is punished by the ecclesiastical court for his sin. Quant en la terre au baron a aucun userier ou en quel que terre que ce soit, et il en est provez, il muele si en doient estre au baron. Et puis si doit estre puniz par sainte Eglise por lou peché, car il appartient à sainte Eglise de chastoyer chascun pecoror de son peché, selon droit escrit es Decretales. Lib. I, chap. XCI, edit. Viollet, Vol. II, p. 148. In Anjou a mixed tribunal tries cases of usury in the eleventh century but the Coutume de Jouanne-Angou does not determine which court punishes the crime in the fourteenth. The last sentence of the preceding text of the Établissements has been added to the original but it is clearly a borrowing by the compiler. Cf. Viollet, Établissements, I, 255. The same is also true for the Abrégé Champois of the end of the thirteenth century (Id., III, n. LXXXIX, p. 164). The Grand Coutumier de France supposes that cases of usury are tried by the secular court. See edit. Laboulaye and Dareste (Paris, 1868), Lib. III, chap. LXXI, p. 573–575.

The Coutumes de Beauvaisis affirm the general principle that it belongs to the ecclesiastical court to try cases of usury. Since, however, the lay court is competent in questions of debt, it may sometimes incidentally examine the charge of usury. If the debtor, after having paid the debt, seeks its recovery, making a claim of usury, the accused is not obliged to answer it outside the court of Christianity unless he chooses to do so (n. 1932, edit. Salmon, Vol. II, p. 475). If, on the other hand, the debt is still unpaid and the creditor demands it before the lay court, but the debtor enters a plea of usury, then this court is competent to examine the charge of usury. It is the creditor, now become the defendant, who chooses the court before which he will appear to defend himself. But once he has begun to plead in one court he may not choose to go to the other (n. 1925, p. 471). If, while the case of debt is being tried by the secular judge, the debtor appeals to the ecclesiastical court on the grounds of usury, and the latter summons the creditor and forbids the lay judge to continue the case of debt until that of usury has been settled, the secular court is not bound to heed this prohibition unless it chooses to do so. It may proceed to pass sentence on the question of debt. However the debtor may still maintain his plea of usury before the ecclesiastical court and if he proves it the creditor will be excommunicated until he has restored the money which the secular tribunal has obliged the debtor to pay over to him (n. 1926, p. 472).
The Treatise
De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus

Edited by J. T. MUCKLE, C.S.B., with an introduction by Etienne Gilson

Introduction

I. THE INTERPRETATION OF A. LOEWENTHAL

The De Anima was first published by A. LOEWENTHAL, Pseudo-Aristoteles über die Seele—Eine psychologische Schrift des 11. Jahrhunderts und ihre Beziehungen zu Salomo ibn Gebirol (Avicenon), Berlin, Mayer und Muller, 1891. This work had already been partially published as a doctorate thesis (Königsberg) under the title: Dominicus Gundissali und sein psychologisches Compendium—Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Litteratur bei Arabern, Juden und Christen.

This first edition did not contain the text of the De Anima. Loewenthal regards his study as a continuation of his article in the Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums, 1890, pp. 217–224: Fragmente eines pseudaristotelischen Werkes über die Seele in heb. Sprache. For information on his position it is sufficient to refer to the first of these three publications, which contains all that is found in the others, and even more. We shall consider separately the text which he presents and the interpretation which he gives of it.

1. Text—Loewenthal has published some important extracts from the De Anima, pp. 77–131; practically the whole treatise, with the exception of Chap. VIII (cf. p. 119). For his edition he used "die Pariser Handschrift Bibl. Nat. Lanterne 16613" (p. 76). This "Lanterne" (which is not a slip of the pen for it is found in another place: p. 59) seems to imply that the editor had never set foot in the Department of Manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Nationale; he must have misread lateinische in the letter of a correspondent. Ms. 16613 is well known for the deplorable quality of its text. Even without adding to this the faulty readings with which his transcription is littered, neither Loewenthal nor anyone else would have ever been capable of obtaining from it an intelligible edition. In order to correct this worthless manuscript, which he had chosen as a base, A. Loewenthal used that of Gonville-Caius College, no. 504. Many judicious corrections are due to it, for this text is clearly better than that of Paris; but the final result is not thereby rendered any less mediocre. It would not be difficult to prove this if there were not something essentially unpleasant and unjust in those lists of reproaches addressed to predecessors whose efforts have always aided, in some measure, our own work. Let us say simply that the text as presented is incomplete and almost constantly defective.

2. Interpretation—It is difficult to sum up the confused considerations by which Loewenthal arrived at his conclusions with regard to the origin of his text. We must, however, at least know what are his conclusions, and perhaps it will even be sufficient to set them down just as they are in order that their lack of probability be apparent to all.

To explain the existence of the De Anima as he knew it, Loewenthal asks us to take into consideration four different works (op. cit. pp. 72–73).
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1. An original Arabic treatise on the soul in ten books, the author of which would probably be Ibn Gebirol.
2. An original Latin translation of the work by Johannes Toletanus.
3. A Hebrew translation from the Arabic original of which certain fragments would still be conserved in Gerson ben Salomo.
4. The treatise of Dominicus Gundisalvi which contains the greater part of Johannes Toletanu’s translation.

Of these four works we only know the last, although, on Loewenthal’s own admission, to explain its existence we would have to suppose the existence of three other works of which we do not even know whether they have ever existed or not. These are certainly hypotheses which demand a great deal of us. But above all, they are improbable hypotheses. Loewenthal had at least the merit of noticing that several fragments of his text were literally borrowed from Liber VI Naturalium of Avicenna. It was even because of this that he decided not to publish Ch. VIII (op. cit. p. 119). This single fact should have been sufficient to prove to him that his whole argument was worthless. In any case, this fact should have moved him to extend his inquiry; for, the slightest attention would have shown him that almost all his treatise was composed of borrowings from various authors: Avicenna, above all, Gebirol, also, whose Fons Vitae was used by the compiler. So the sources of almost the whole treatise can be found simply by consulting texts already known and published, without having recourse to fantastic and unverifiable hypotheses. Cl. Baeumker had the great merit of pointing this out.

II. THE INTERPRETATION OF CL. BAEUMKER

In the article of Cl. Baeumker, Dominicus Gundissalinus als philosophischer Schriftsteller, in Compte Rendu du IVe Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques, Fribourg (Suisse); IIIe sect., pp. 39–58 (1898), the problem for the first time entered the path which was to lead to its solution. This appreciation of the work of Gundissalinus as a whole contains some very good and penetrating pages on the De Anima. After recalling the adventurous hypotheses of his predecessors on the nature of the work (and one must remember that they were the only ones which had been proposed), Baeumker remarks that there seems no reason for refusing to admit that Gundissalinus himself was the author of the compilation to which he put his name. Baeumker’s arguments are marked with the most elementary good sense but it is fitting to recall them since no one else before him had advanced them.

1. It is granted that fragments of Avicenna are found word for word in the De Anima; now Gundissalinus had taken part in the Latin translation of texts of Avicenna which are found in this treatise; why not admit that he had himself used his own translation? (p. 51).

2. The supposition is all the more probable since these borrowings perfectly agree with the method followed by Gundissalinus in his other works. He consciously made what is actually a mosaic, composing his treatise from small fragments borrowed here and there and juxtaposed in such a way as to form a whole. This manner of composing, however, which fits in so well with the habits of Gundissalinus, would, on the contrary, be little in harmony with those of a mind as original as that of Gebirol (p. 52).

3. Finally Baeumker adds to these observations a list of eighteen passages from the De Anima edited by Loewenthal, which are all borrowed from the Fons Vitae of Gebirol (p. 52, note 2). We know, however, that Gundissalinus was the co-translator of this work, along with John of Spain; hence it became quite unjustifi-
able to grant any intermediary between Gundissalinus and the sources which he evidently knew very well since he had himself taken part in their redaction.

Baeumker's conclusion was, is and will remain henceforth incontestable; the De Anima is a compilation of Gundissalinus himself, like his De Unitate and his De Processione Mundi; he borrowed numerous elements of it from his own translations of Avicenna, Liber VI Naturalium, and from Geberol, Fons Vitae; the hypothesis which regards his work as a translation of a treatise of Gerson ben Salomon must, therefore, be completely abandoned.

III. THE INTERPRETATION OF J. TEICHER

An article of J. Teicher, published in May 1934 in the Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica (pp. 252–258), under the title Gundissalino e l’Agostonismo avicennizante, argues against the thesis which I had maintained in that same review in 1929 with regard to this treatise. I said, in substance, that Gundissalinus had tried to substitute Saint Augustine and Denys for Avicenna in order to explain the origin of our knowledge. J. Teichert attributes to me some very improbable notions on the importance and the rôle of Gundissalinus (in whom I have never seen anything but a first witness, and how slight a one! of a movement which was to develop after him). Whatever may be the truth on this point, the author denies that there can be found in this treatise the least trace of a synthesis of Avicenna’s psychology and Christian illumination (p. 254). The mystical conclusion of the De Anima has, therefore, nothing in common with the theory of natural knowledge which Gundissalinus borrows from Avicenna; it is imposed on it but does not combine with it (p. 255). But, then, whence comes this mystical conclusion whose source, I admit, I have never discovered? J. Teicher has discovered it. It is Plotinus, known to Gundissalinus through the Mohammedan mystics; “la source d’inspiration du mysticisme de Gundissalinus est d’origine musulmane plutôt que chrétienne” and, consequently, my “construction” has no foundation (p. 258). That is quite possible.

IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF P.R. DE VAUX, O.P.

With the work of P.R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l’avicennisme latin aux confins des XII et XIII siècles (Bibliothèque Thomiste, XX, Paris, J. Vrin, 1934), we return to serious things. There is to be found in this work the text of the conclusion of the De Anima, published according to the ms. of the Bib. Nat., lat. 8802, fol. 154r–171r. This text, previously unknown, forms a very valuable addition to our information. Its principal variants will be found in the notes to the text published below. With regard to the nature of the doctrine itself, P. de Vaux agrees with J. Teicher in the sense that he sees in Gundissalinus, not a case of “augustinisme avicennisant,” but a case of “avicennisme latin” pure and simple.

I have no intention of discussing at this time this thesis which deserves serious consideration under the form in which P. de Vaux presents it. I will content myself with a single observation: Is it fully realized what we are trying to prove the existence of, in trying to demonstrate that there was in the Middle Ages an “avicennisme latin” parallel to “averroisme latin”? What Christian thinker, of whom we actually have knowledge has ever thought that we receive our knowledge from a separated substance which would be the active intellect common to the human species and consequently its final end? I do not say that there have never been any; I only ask that, if there have been any, they be cited. The author of the Liber de Caussis Primis et Secundis is not one of them. As he conceived it, God illumines us through the Intelligences, but the text of the Soliloquias which he cites
(1, 8, 15; P.L. 32, c. 877) testified to the fact that his God is beyond a doubt the God of Saint Augustine. Can a doctrine in which Avicenna is combined, not only with Erigena but even with Augustine, be qualified as “aviccennisme” pure and simple?

As for Gundissalinus and his De Anima, they present an analogous problem. To maintain, with J. Teicher, that the source for the conclusion is more Arabian than Christian, without even citing a single precise text in support of it, is clearly a gratuitous assertion. It is also contradicted by the facts; for I have found in that work formulae copied word for word from Saint Augustine, Boethius and Saint Bernard of Clairvaux. Saint James, and above all, Saint Paul, are cited in many places in the work. P. de Vaux has also found in the text of Gundissalinus striking analogies with the Epistola de Anima of the Cistercian, Isaac of Stella. It is very difficult to believe that pages so full of Christian texts come from Arabian sources.

But can one believe at least that this is a case of “aviccennisme latin”? It is a question of terminology and names are arbitrary. When, however, Jean de Jeandun is called an “averroiste latin,” it expresses exactly what is meant. Here we have a Latin on whose mind the philosophy of Averroes imposes itself as the only philosophy that is rationally demonstrable. A true Averroist is a man who, as a philosopher, is content with Averroes. His faith, when he has one, does not descend into his philosophy to reform it; if it does, he is no longer a simple “averroiste latin” but rather a man who is striving to establish some sort of “averroisme chrétien.” His mysticism, if he has one, is neither the completion nor the extension of his philosophy; if it is, he is a man whose doctrine thereby becomes quite different from that of Averroes and it ceases to be a simple Averroism.

If we wish, at present, to read over again the text of Gundissalinus—Where will we find his first citation of St. Augustine? In the very place where he is copying the definition of the separated active Intellect such as it is found in Avicenna. Are we to believe that, for a reader of the Middle Ages, such a precaution could have passed unnoticed or seem lacking in meaning? Let us consider the text without changing a word of it: “Sicut enim sine luce exterioire non fit visio, sic sine luce intelligentiae agentis in nos nulla fit veritatis rei comprehensio” (ed. De Vaux, p. 153, 11–16). There is certainly the active Intelligence of Avicenna; but let us read further: “Hoc enim est mentii ratio, quod est aspectus oculo.” On this point we are referred to SAINT AUGUSTINE, Solil., I, 6, 12 (P.L. 32; c. 875). But what does this text of Saint Augustine say? “Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus.” Is it too much to suppose that the one who cites these latter words in that precise place, remembers that in the text which he cites it is God Who illumines? Is it, in truth, to attribute to him some intention which he never had, to suppose that Saint Augustine is here inserted, not without reason, into Avicenna? At this very point are we not, on the contrary, witnessing the grafting of Augustinianism on the trunk of Avicenna?

However little attention we pay it, we will see numerous indications of this sort. P. 151, 7: “ad contemplandum suum superius quod est Deus.” P. de Vaux’s note is: “quod est Deus, est une gloire de l’auteur au texte d’Avicenne”—Yes, and it is significant: for Avicenna, suum superius, is the created, separated substance; for Gundissalinus, it is God. That is an important difference. P. 155, 1–2: “quia ipsa forma in se nuda est a materia, ut angelica essentia.” Ut angelica essentia is another gloss and a Christian one which puts an angel in the place of the Dator formarum. P. 172, 20–23: “ideo sola intelligentia deus gustari dicitur quia ex omnibus anime ea sola in presenti et futuro nullo mediante tangitur.” Once we say nulla mediante, what becomes of the Active Intellect of Avicenna? Who then illumines us if not,
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nulla natura interposita, the Christian God of Saint Augustine? It is indeed He, ipse (and not ipsa, ed. cit. p. 153, 11) who, according to the words of the Soliloquia, enlightens our thought. The substitution of the God of St. Augustine for the Intelligencia agens of Avicenna is there explicitly in the very text which P. de Vaux publishes; it is difficult to call a doctrine “avicennism” in which there is so much of Saint Augustine.

Etienne Gilson
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Preface

In preparing this edition of the *De Anima* attributed to Gundissalinus,1 I have used the following manuscripts:

V. Vat. Lat. 2186, ff. 104r–119v. These folios are, I should say, in thirteenth century Gothic, carefully written. The *De Anima* begins on f. 104r with the title, *Tractatus de Anima* with no ascription of the treatise to Gundissalinus. The colophon on f. 119v is *finitus est liber* and below in a later hand is *Lege tractatum et fuge errores.* This is the best manuscript of all those I have used and I have made it the base of the text. The scribe has a few capricious traits. Words beginning with the syllable *par* such as *partes*, *paratus*, are often written out in full but the letter *p* has a horizontal stroke through the lower part of the vertical as in the *nota* for *per*; again the imperfect subjunctive of a verb is often written with an abbreviation which is generally used to express the third person plural of the present indicative, e.g. moveret with a horizontal stroke over the *e*. Often the form *estimatio* is read where the other manuscripts give *aestimatio.* The form *estimatio* is also found in the *Liber Sextus Nat.* of Avicenna. I have noted these peculiarities when they occur for the first time. All readings not in the text, even corruptions, I have placed among the variants. In constructing the text of this treatise I have departed from the reading of this manuscript as often as I have considered that of another manuscript better.

M. Venice, B.N. Marciana Cod. 181, a. 203, 1. 144 (Z.L. CCXCIIT), ff. 1–38r. It is listed in the catalogue 2 as fifteenth century; it may be late fourteenth Italian Gothic. It is very well written in a clear, not too angular, hand. It carries neither title nor name of the author. Where chapter headings appear in any of the other manuscripts, it has the letter *q* between dots in the margin for *quaestio.* The colophon is *finitur est liber de anima.* This manuscript belongs to the same tradition as *V*, blended slightly with *G* and *P*, and furnishes a very good text except that there are numerous omissions due to homoeoteleuton. Its chief value lies in confirming the readings of *V*. I have listed all variant readings from this manuscript except omissions just noted, manifest corruptions of which there are a few, and unimportant transpositions of words unsupported by another manuscript.

C. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 504, ff. 146v–169v. Thirteenth century Gothic. This manuscript is very well written but abounds in omissions, and transpositions of words especially in the case of two- or three-word groups such as *simplex una* for *una simplex.* The title is *liber dominici* (dni) *gundisalini de anima ex dictis plurium philosophorum collectus.* No colophon. It belongs to the same family as *P* but gives a much better text. While it is not as good a manuscript as either of the above, I have in some instances adopted its reading especially when supported by another manuscript as the critical apparatus shows. I also list all variants which could be of possible use. Unimportant inversions of words found only in it, evident corruptions and omissions due to homoeoteleuton I have not listed.

P. Paris B.N. Lat. 16613, ff. 2r–42v. Thirteenth Century. This is a wretched manuscript, full of corruptions and false readings. The title is *liber de anima a

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1 All the manuscripts for this treatise give the spelling, Gundisalinus, though *G* gives Gundisalinus in the treatise *de Creatione Mundi et Coeli.* f. 169v, col. 1.

2 This manuscript has been fully described by Jeanne Bignami-Odier, *Le Manuscrit Vat. Lat. 2186 in Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du M.A.* 12–13, 1937–38, pp. 133 sqq. and by Ludwig Bauer, *Dominicus Gundisalinus, de Divisione philosophiae in Beiträge zur Geschichte der philosophie des Mittelalters.* (1903) Band IV, Hft. 2–3, pp. 147–151. The first is the more accurate.

dominico (dno) gundisalino ab arabico in latinum translatus continens X capitula. The colophon is Explicit commentum de anima. It gives more chapter headings than all the others combined. I have, as a rule, used it only when supported by another manuscript, and seldom listed its myriad corruptions, false readings and blunders. In a non-literary text, I can see no advantage in perpetuating the mistakes of an ignorant scribe.

N. Paris, B.N. Lat. 8802. A fragment, part of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. In this manuscript the Latin translation of Avicenna Liber Sextus Nat. begins on f.79r and continues on to almost the end of f.142v. It ends in the middle of a phrase within a sentence. A cursive hand has finished the sentence which closes a paragraph near the beginning of Chapter 7 of Part III, f.15v. I: Propter hoc autem quod una . . . res impletur, etc. The book hand ceases with una and the cursive continues the sentence from res on. Then on f.143r in a different hand Gundissalinus' de Anima begins, starting in the middle of Chapter 9 with the heading de Interioribus Virtutibus Animalium, (p. 56 of this edition). It appears that a scribe who was writing out the Avicenna got as far as quod una at the end of the day's work and for some reason or other never resumed it. Another completed the sentence in a free hand. Later, another scribe began with the latter part of Gundissalinus and continued on to the end of his treatise (f.171v). The de Intellectu of Alexander of Aphrodisius starts on 171v. This manuscript is well written and gives a good text. It is close to V but agrees with C or P or both in some instances. I would say that the script of the de Anima of Gundissalinus is early thirteenth century. I have given all variants found in it. Chapter X, ff.154r—171r, pages 73–98, has been edited by Father De Vaux, O.P. in his work, L'Avicennisme Latin, Paris, Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1934, pp. 147–178.

None of these manuscripts is descended directly from another.

My division of the treatise into chapters is based on the topics of the work given by the author himself (see p. 31). None of the manuscripts gives complete chapter headings or divisions into chapters, and P gives some of them in places which do not accord with the plan furnished by the author. The heading and first sentence of Capitulum Sextum, p. 52, really belong to Capitulum Septimum, p. 53, but I have left them as I find them in the manuscripts and placed them in parentheses.

My references to Avicenna's Liber Sextus Naturalium (de anima) follow the Venice edition of 1508. One might at first suspect that the text of Avicenna used by Gundissalinus was a different translation from that in the Venice edition. Compare v.g. p. 47, lines 15–16 of this text: nam omnis vis, ex hoc quod est vis, non est nisi quia ex ea provenit actio quam principaliter habet, and Avic. f.27r, IB: quod omnis virtus, ex eo quod est virtus, nihil est nisi ad quod ex ea provenit actio quam habet principaliter. But in other long passages Gundissalinus follows the text of the Venice edition word for word except perhaps the change of a vel to an aut. He revised or changed or paraphrased the text in some places, but in my opinion there is not a case of two translations.

Most of the references to the sources of this treatise were provided for me by Professor Etienne Gilson.

The additions of Avothaveth, chapters five and six of Part Four, are much the same in part at least as the de Viribus Cordis published with the Canon Medicinarum of Avicenna, Venice, 1608, Tome II, pp. 334–352. The similarity begins with the second chapter of the de Viribus Cordis; de definitione et natura spiritus et eius virtut: Neque vita neque aliquia perfectio neque bonum aliquod pervenit a prima veritate altissime et a manantione prima cum avaritia. Compare this with Avic. VI Nat. IV, 3, f. 20v, col. 2: nec vita nec ulla perfectionum aut bonitatum est retenta apud primum principium in prima genitura. A study of this question is outside the scope of this article.
In the references to sources the following titles are used: Avic. stands for Avicenna, Liber sextus Nat. (de anima), Venice, 1608.
Fons Vitae refers to Avecebroli (Ibn Gebirol), Fons Vitae. C. Baeumker, Beiträge zur Geschichte de Philosophie des Mittelalters I, 2. 1892.
De Diff. Animae et Spir. refers to Costa-Ben-Lucae, De Differentia Animae et Spiritus Liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi, Carl Sigmund Barach, Innsbruck, 1878, pp. 120–139.
De Motu Cordis refers to the same volume pp. 83–112: Excerpta e Libro Alfredi Anglici, de Motu Cordis.

J. T. Muckle, C.S.B.
LIBER* DOMINICI GUNDISALINI DE ANIMA EX DICTIS PLURIMUM PHILOSOPHORUM COLLECTUS

incipit b prologus in tractatu de anima

Cum s omnes homines aequo constant e ex anima et corpore, non tamen omnes sic d certi sunt de anima sicut de corpore; quippe cum hoc sensui subiacet, ad animam vero non nisi solus intellectus attingat. Unde homines solis sensibus dediti aut animam nihil esse e credunt, aut, si f forte ex motu corporis s eam utcumque h esse i conicitur, quid sit vel quomodo se habeat plerique fide tenent, sed paucissimi ratione convincunt. i Indignum siquidem est k ut illam sui partem qua l homo scienst ipse nesciat, et m id per quod rationalis est n ipse ratione non comprehendat; unde nec Deum o nec se plene potest cognoscere qui id in quo Deo p similis est convictur ignorare. Cum enim multis creaturis homo corpore q sit inferior, sola tamen anima rationali cunctis antecellit, in qua sui r creatoris simulacrum expressius quam cetera gerit.

Quapropter quicquid de s anima apud philosophos rationabilerit dictum invenit, simul in unum colligere curavi. Opus siquidem lajinis t haec tenus in-cognitum utpote in archivis u graecae et arabicae v tantum linguae reconditum, w sed iam per x Dei gratiam quamvis non sine multo labore ad notitiam latinorum est deductum y ut fideles, qui pro anima z tam studiose laborant, quid de ipsa a sentire debeant, non iam b fide tantum, sed etiam ratione comprehendant. Ubi in primis quaeritur de anima an sit, postea quid sit, deinde an sit creatae vel e increata; sed si creatae, an una vel d multae; si multae, an simul creatae ab initio mundi, an non simul ab initio mundi, sed cotidie novae creentur; si autem cotidie novae e creantur, f tunc an de nilo an de aliquo; si vero de aliqua, an ex traduce sicut corpus, an de allo. Deinde an sit mortalis vel s immortalis; sed si immortalis, tunc an omnes vires suas quas exercet dum est in corpore retinet etiam post mortem corporis, an non omnes; si autem non omnes, tunc b scindendum est quas retinet vel quas amittat i exuta a corpore, et j hic finitur liber.

* Liber . . . collectus] Tractatus de anima

V] Liber de anima a dominico gundisalino ab arabico in latinum translatus continens decem capitula P om. M.

b Incipit . . . anima om. CMP.

c constant P.

d om. CP. e om. M.

i add. aliquid PV. z om. CP.

k utrumque C jubicumque M.

l om. C.

m conniciunt C corrupt P.

n om. MV. o add. ipse CP.

p add. per M. q om. M.

r nec se nec Deum MV.

s est similis Deo CP.

t sit inferior corpore CP.

u simil. sui creatoris CP.

* de anima . . . invenit] per philosophos de anima dictum invenit rationabilerit C.

1 latimus M. u arcarias CP.

2 hebraicas P. v recunditum V.

3 add. iam M. w duxit CP.

4 tam studiose pro anima C quamvis studio-se pro anima laborent P.

5 ea CP.

6 naturali C.

7 an CP.

8 an C] aut P.

9 nova cotidie CP.

10 creantur C.

11 an CP.

b tunc scindendum] consciendum V.

i retinet C.

j et . . . liber em. M.

* Cum omnes . . . l. 11, gerit. The same as the first paragraph of the prologue to the translation of Avice Liter VINaturalium by Johannes Hispalensis. Quoted by A. Jourdain, Recherches Critiques, Paris, Joubert, 1843; specimen L, pp. 449–450. Both passages are given in parallel columns by Loewenthal, op. cit. p. 20. The prologue is found, amongst others, in MSS. Paris, B.N. Lat. 8602, f. 79r and Bruges 510. f. 1r. Cf. also Paris, B.N. Lat. 6443.
CAPITULUM PRIMUM\(^k\)

AN SIT ANIMA

Merito quae rerit de anima an sit. Fuerunt enim plerique hominum \(^1\) qui solis sensibus dedit nihil praeter haec sensibilia esse crederent. Unde in tantam dementiam delapsi \(^m\) sunt ut etiam \(^n\) Deum non esse dicerent; aut sicut illi qui in Iob dicunt: \textit{Quid \(^6\) est Deus, ut serviamus ei?} \(^o\) aut sicut \(^p\) illud \(^q\) David: \textit{Dixit \(^7\) insipiens in corde suo: Non \(^r\) est Deus.} Quapropter rationes \(^s\) quibus philosophi animam esse deprehenderunt \(^t\) apponere necessarium duxi. Dixerunt enim: \textit{Nos \(^8\) videmus quaedam corpora moveri voluntate et sentire; hoc autem habent \(^u\) vel ex hoc quod corpora sunt vel non. Si autem hoc \(^v\) habent ex eo quod corpora sunt, tunc omnino corpora conveniunt in hoc, quoniam quibuscumque convenit aliqua forma et proprietas addicta \(^w\) ipsi \(^x\) formae. Unde si sentire et moveri voluntate \(^y\) habent ex hoc quod corpora sunt, tunc sentire et moveri voluntate \(^z\) comitantur ubique corporeitatem. Sed non comitantur ubique quoniam non omne corpus sentit vel movetur voluntate, \(^a\) ut lapides. Ergo sentire et moveri voluntate \(^b\) non habent animalia ex hoc corpora sunt.}

Item si ipsa corpora haberent sentire et moveri voluntate ex seipsis, tunc ipsa corpora essent causa sui motus et sensus. Sed si ipsa essent causa sibi \(^b\) voluntarii motus et sensus, tunc numquam \(^g\) quiescerent \(^e\) a voluntario \(^d\) motu et sensu dum essent corpora. Quamdiu enim est causa, secundum quod est causa, numquam cessat effectus; sed quandoque quiescunt corpora; igitur\(^10\) non habent sentire \(^e\) et moveri voluntate ex seipsis. Aliquid ergo alicui inedit eis quod est causa voluntarii motus et sensus.

Item nullum corpus\(^11\) agit alicui \(^f\) ex hoc \(^k\) quod est corpus, alicuique omne corpus ageret illud.\(^h\) Sed nos videmus multas actiones corporis; nullam igitur earum agit corpus ex hoc quod est corpus; sed omnis actio eget agente. Quia\(^12\) enim omnis actio accidentis est, nec est res per se existens, ideo necessario eget agente per quem sit essentia eius et esse. Igitur actiones corporis causam efficientem habent praeter corpus.

\(^1\) Capitulum ... anima] Prima quaestio de anima an sit V] quaestio prima an sit anima C om. M.
\(^2\) homines CP.
\(^3\) lapsi C.
\(^4\) et CP.
\(^5\) illi MPV.
\(^6\) sicut illud om. M.
\(^7\) om. CP.
\(^8\) non est Deus] et cetera C.
\(^9\) philosophorum rationes quibus C.
\(^10\) deprehendant C.
\(^11\) vel habent MV.
\(^12\) Cf. Job XXI, 15.
\(^13\) Ps. XIII, 1; cf. LII, 1.
\(^14\) Nos ... sentire, cf. Avic. I.1, f. 1r, 2A: Videmus quaedam ... moventur voluntarie.
\(^15\) Numquam ... motu. Cf. Macrobius, \textit{Com. in S. S.} 15, 9: Numquam ... a motu cessant.
\(^16\) igitur ... sensus. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 1r, v hoc ... quaed] habent ex hoc quod V.
\(^17\) adiecta (Cor. s.m.) C] addita P.
\(^18\) ipsae V.
\(^19\) om. C] volupitate P.
\(^20\) om. GM] volupitate P.
\(^21\) voluntarie C.
\(^22\) sui CP.
\(^23\) quiescent M.
\(^24\) suo motu voluntario C.
\(^25\) moveri et sentire CP.
\(^26\) alicui C.
\(^27\) co P.
\(^28\) om. M.

2A: Sed non habent ... huius corporeitatem.

\(^11\) Nullum corpus ... agentes. Cf. \textit{Fons Vitae} III, 43–44; p. 176, ll. 6–7, 11–12.

\(^12\) Quia enim ... I. 27, praeter corpus. Cf. \textit{op. cit.} p. 176, ll. 25 sqq.: Postquam actio ... praeter corpus.
J. T. Muckle

Item corpora\textsuperscript{13} composita sunt et continuata ex partibus.\textsuperscript{1} Coniunctio vero et continuatio non fit nisi per motum\textsuperscript{1} partium compositi et per attractionem aliarum ab aliis et per retentionem uniuscuiusque illarum in loco. Non est autem partium per\textsuperscript{k} se coniungi quorum natura est potius ire in diversas partes. Necesse est igtur ut sit ibi essentia praeter corpus quae partes corporis coniungat et reineat.

Item omne\textsuperscript{14} quod\textsuperscript{1} movetur vel movetur ab alio vel a seipso. Si\textsuperscript{15} autem a seipso, tunc idem est motum et movens; sed movere est in receptibili in potentia facere motum esse in actu, sicut calefacere est facere ut in calefactibili in potentia sit calor in actu, et sic in similibus. Uno autem et eodem motu movet et movetur quicquid movet se, sed motus quo movet in actu est, et movetur ad hoc ut motus quem habet\textsuperscript{m} in potentia sit in actu. Si\textsuperscript{16} ergo aliquid a se movetur, tunc simul est in eodem unus et idem motus in potentia et actu, quod est impossible; nihil enim simul est in potentia et actu\textsuperscript{a} secundum idem. Nihil ergo movetur ex seipso, sed omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Ergo aliquid aliud est per quod corpora sentiunt et voluntarie moventur.

Item videmus corpora animari et sensificari; omne\textsuperscript{17} autem quod animatur ante possibile est animari quam animetur, arioquin impossibile esset\textsuperscript{0} illud animari. Nullum autem possibile de potentia venit ad actum nisi per aliud quod sit in actu; quod enim in actu non est, sibi vel alii dare esse non potest; omne ergo quod animatur ab alio animatur. Dicatur autem illud, si placet, anima vel quomodolibet aliter; non enim inquirimus quomodo vocetur, sed an sit illud quod sic vocatur. Sed quoniam aliqua\textsuperscript{18} vis relationis est in hoc quod dicitur anima,\textemdash anima enim animati anima, et omne animatum anima animatum est,\textemdash tunc rationabilis\textsuperscript{p} videtur ut id quo corpora animantur anima vocetur. Hoc\textsuperscript{19} enim nomen anima non est ei inditum a sua essentia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora\textsuperscript{q} et refertur ad\textsuperscript{r} illa\textsuperscript{s} Anima ergo est quae corpora animat et sensificat et voluntario motu movet.\textsuperscript{t}

\textbf{QUOMODO \& ANIMA MOVET CORPUS}

Nunc autem inquiramus quomodo anima moveat corpus. Omne\textsuperscript{20} enim,\textsuperscript{v} quod movet aliud, aut quiescit dum movet, aut movetur dum movet. Si\textsuperscript{21} autem anima\textsuperscript{w} movetur dum movet, tunc aliquo sex\textsuperscript{x} motum movetur coepit esse... illud esse... and III. 4, p. 83, ll. 10–11.

\textsuperscript{1} paravit V.
\textsuperscript{1} motum partium comp. mutuum partium compositionem C.
\textsuperscript{k} coniungi per se CP.
\textsuperscript{l} om. M.
\textsuperscript{m} habent M.
\textsuperscript{n} add. quod est impossibile C.
\textsuperscript{o} est C.
\textsuperscript{13} Corpora composita... I. 6, reineat. Cf. \textit{op. cit.} p. 177, ll. 4–14: Corpus est compositum... absoluere et reineare.
\textsuperscript{14} omne quod... a seipso. Cf. Aristotel, de anima I. 3, 406a, ll. 3–5.
\textsuperscript{16} si ergo... et actu. Cf. ibid: el τὸ ἀναρ-\textit{κτρον}... τὸ ἀναρ	extsuperscript{17} omne autem... I. 21, sit in actu. Cf. Fons Vitae III. 10, p. 100, II. 20–21: Quicquid
\textsuperscript{p} rationabilis P.
\textsuperscript{q} corpus C.
\textsuperscript{r} ab M.
\textsuperscript{s} alia Cf. alid P.
\textsuperscript{t} add. Capitulum Secundum P.
\textsuperscript{u} Quomodo... corpus om. VM.
\textsuperscript{v} om. M.
\textsuperscript{w} om. C.
\textsuperscript{x} sex all ms.

\textsuperscript{18} aliqua vis... dicetur anima. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 2r, 2: appellatur hac res... relationes.
\textsuperscript{19} Hoc enim nomen... ad illa. Cf. \textit{op. cit.} f. Iv, 2M: Hoc enim nomen... ad illa.
\textsuperscript{20} omne enim... dum movet. Cf. de Diff. Anima et Spir. p. 133: quod movet... et non movetur.
\textsuperscript{21} Si autem... secundum locum. Cf. Avic. I. 2, f. 2v, 2: Hic motus... secundum aliud.

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quia aut movetur secundum substantiam aut secundum qualitatem aut secundum locum. Sed secundum substantiam fit motus duobus modis quia aut secundum generationem aut secundum corruptionem. Sed anima dum movet non movetur secundum generationem. Moveri enim generationem nihil aliud est quam generari; generari vero est substantiam ingredi. Si ergo anima dum movet secundum generationem, tunc quotiens movet, totiens corrumpitur, et sic desinit esse anima, et totiens generatur quia totiens substantiam ingreditur et fit substantia alia ab ea quae prius erat. Et ita ad singulos motus quibus movet corpus ipsa fit alia et alia substantia; et sic fit cotidie infinitae substantiae, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima movetur secundum generationem dum corpus movet. Sed neque movetur secundum corruptionem a simili per contrariam.


Motus ergo animalis non esset voluntarius, quod est inconveniens.

Item motus violentus aut est ad unam partem, ut motus caeli, aut est ad plura, ut hominis vel asini. Si ergo moveretur anima motu violento sed ad unam partem, sequeretur praedictum inconveniens eo quod ipsa

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movet ad plura sed haec tantum quae ex elementis constant. Si vero moveretur ad plura, cum ipsa movet suum corpus ad plura, tunc vel ad eadem plura movebitur ipsa vel ad alia. Si autem ad eadem, tunc anima et corpus simul moverentur ad easdem actiones corporales comedendi scilicet et bibendi et similia, quod est inconvenientis. Si vero moveretur anima ad alia plura, tunc vel ad similia vel ad dissimilia. Si autem ad similia, tunc idem inconvenientis sequeretur quod si ad eadem. Si vero ad diversa, erit tunc contrarietas inter motus quibus movetur et quibus movet, et impedientur aliis propter alios. Et sic cum ipsa movetur ad alia quam corpus suum moveatur, impediret movere corpus suum, quod nequaquam fieri potest. Sed neque motus quo ipsa movetur est animalis. Animalis enim motus est ille qui ab anima fit, sicut naturalis quia a natura. Si ergo anima moveretur motu animali, tunc una anima moveretur ad alia anima, et similiter de illa alia quaeretur si moveretur ad alia anima, et sic in infinitum.


Quaeritur etiam si ideo movet quia movetur, scilicet ut non possit movere nisi ipsa movetur, quemadmodum in artificialibus apparat ut in molendino cuius mola non movetur nisi quia rota movetur per quam mola movetur, an non, scilicet ut ad movendum corpus non sit necesse semper ipsam moveri, sed quandoque movet corpus ipsa mota, quandoque quiescit. Si enim non moveret corpus nisi quia ipsa moveretur, tunc impossibile esset

\[\text{omnis qualitas...color et figura.}\]

\[Fons Vitis IV, 7, p. 229, ii. 12-15: qualitas, id est, color et figura.\]
ipsam movere corpus nisi simul et ipsam moveretur. Sed probatum est ipsam non moveri aliquo sex motuum, et constat ipsam movere corpus. Movet ergo et non movetur. Et ita ad hoc ut moveat, non est necesse ipsam moveri, sed quia aliquando gaudet et aliquando tristatur et de ignorantia ad scientias per studium cotidie permutatur, utique secundum alterationem saltem moveri videtur. Movetur enim affectibus eo quod nolle et velle eiusdem rei habeat in diversis temporibus. Videtur ergo moveri motu electionis, cum hoc potius eligit quam illud, et sic videtur alterari dum movet. Sed si hoc esset, nunquam in eadem voluntate permanens propter eundem finem et ad idem propositum suum corpus aliquo tempore moveret, quod esse falsum quisquis in se facile deprehendit. Sed etsi sic moveatur, non est tamen necesse eam moveri ad hoc ut moveat. Anima igitur quiescens movet.

Quiquid autem a re quiescente movetur, uno quinque modorum movetur, quoniam movetur anima aut per desiderium eius quod appetit aut per odium eius quod respuit aut per terrem eius quod refugit aut per vim naturalem sursum vel deorsum tendit, ut lapis deorsum, ignis sursum, vel sicut ferrum movetur ab adamante, aut quia res movens rei motae causa principalis existit, sicut scientia movet artificem, ipsa tamen non moveretur. Hoc ergo quinto modo anima movet animalia, quia est causa motus animalium per desiderium et per voluntatem et per opus atque mutationem; ipsa tamen non movetur aliquo modo motionis corporum.

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CAPITULLUM æ SECUNDUM

QUID V SIT ANIMA?

Nunc restat inquirere quid sit anima, et merito; magna enim quaestio fuit apud philosophos quid esset. Quidam enim dixerunt quod anima est substantia incorporea mobilis 28 ex se ipsa; aliis quod ipsa est complexio 29 corporeis; aliis quod anima est sanguis; Pythagoras dixit quod anima est numerus se ipsum movens, et multa alia in hunc modum. Quibus omnibus contemptis quasi frivolis et iam destructis, quid philosophorum principes, Plato scilicet et Aristoteles, dixerint x animam esse videamus.

Plato 30 animam sic definit y dicens: anima est substantia incorporea corpus movens. Quod 31 autem anima 3 sicut substantia sic probatur; quicquid recipit contraria, cum sit unum et idem numero, substantia est. Sed anima, manens una et cadem numero, recipit contraria quae sunt virtutes et vitia,b gaudium et tristitia, scientia et ignorantia. Ergo anima substantia est.

Item quicquid est, aut est substantia aut accidens. Sed anima non est accidens. Nihil enim quod adveniens constituit et recedens destruit accidens est; sed 4 anima adveniens constituit animal et recedens destruit; ergo anima non est accidens; est igitur substantia.

Quod autem anima 5 non sit corpus philosophi sic probant dicentes: ponamus aliquem hominem subito creatum in aire et perfectum, sed velato visu suo ne videat exteriora sua, et moveatur in aire, sic ut membra eius separata non contingent se nec aer tangat eum ita ut ipse sentire possit; qui si quidem non affirmat tunc vel exteriora membrorum suorum vel interiora, nec se animatum esse vel sensibilem esse vel aliqoud huiusmodi; nec tamen dubitabit affirmare se esse, cuius tamen non affirmat longitudinem nec latitudinem nec spissitudinem. Si autem in illa hora et in illo statu possit imaginare manum vel aliqoud aliorum membrorum, 1 non tamen imaginaret illud esse partem sui nec necessarium suae essentiae. Verum est autem quia id quod affirmatur alius est ab eo quod non affirmatur, et concessum alius est ab eo quod non conceditur, et quia essentia quam affirmat esse est propria illi eo quod illa est ipsemet, et est praeter corpus eius et praeter membra eius quae non affirmat esse, profecto datur p intelligi apte quod anima habeatur alius esse quam sit esse corporis et quod homo non eget corpore ad hoc ut sciat animam suam et percipiapt 4 eam.

Item id 20 de quo nulla est dubitatio hoc est quod in homine est aliqoud per

a Cap. Sec. om. CMV] Cap. Tertium P.

v om. M.

w complexi M.

x dixerunt CP. y definitiv CP.

m movens corpus M. o om. CP.

b add. et CP. e destruat MV.

da sed ... destruit] anima est huiusmodi C.

4 om. P.

5 add. esse CM.

6 om. M.

7 add. secundum C] scilicet P.

28 mobilis ex seipsa. Avic. I. 2, f. 2v, 1A.

29 complexio corporis . . . seipsam movens. ibid.


31 Quod autem . . . I. 32, percipiapt eam.

32 animatum se MV. k om. C.

1 om. MV.

m quod CP.

n add. non conceditur et C] non conc. etiam P.

7 om. C.

p aperte datur intelligi MV.

q recipiat M.

Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 2v, 2X: Dicemus igitur . . . percipiapt eam. See also f. 27r, 2G.

35 Id de quo . . . I. 15, p. 38, per se proprium. Cf. Avic. V. 2, f. 22v, 2D; id de quo nulla . . . f. 23r, 1A, habere situm proprium.

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quod ipse apprehendit intelligibilia. Id ergo quod est subiectum intelligibilium vel est corpus vel aliquid habens esse per corpus, vel non. Si autem subiectum intelligibilium est corpus vel aliquid habens esse per corpus, tunc intellecta forma subsistit per se vel in aliquo eius divisibili vel in aliquo eius non divisibili. Illud autem corporis quod non dividitur punctus est; punctus enim est finis qui non separat a linea in situ aliqua tali separatione per quam punctus sit aliquid in quo aliud subsistat. Si ergo punctus per se separatus esset ut recipieret aliquam rerum et cognosceretur habere esse, tunc punctus esset habens duas partes, unam versus linearum et qua separatus esset et aliam ab ea diversam et oppositam ei. Cum autem punctus esset separatus per se a linea, profecto linea a qua separaretur habet alium finem versus punctum, et iste alius punctus esset finis lineae et non iste; sed de hoc et de illo puncto idem potest dici, et ex hoc provenirent puncta ordinari ad faciendum lineam, quod impossibile est; ex coniunctione enim punctorum nihil efficit potest nec potest habere punctus situm per se proprium. Ergo subiectum intelligibilium non potest esse aliquid corporis indivisibile.

Sed neque corpus neque aliquid corporis divisibile potest esse subiectum intelligibilium. Si enim forma intellecta fuerit in aliquo quo dividitur in partes, tunc accidit ei ut ipsa dividatur in partes quae vel crunt similes vel dissimiles. Si autem fuerint similes, tunc quomodo componetur ex eis aliquid quod non est illae? Nullum enim totum ex hoc quod est totum est pars; nec utla quaelibet partium est suum totum, cum altera continetur in toto, quae est praeter intentionem eius. Quapropter si fuerint similes, tunc intellecta forma vel erit aliqua figura vel aliquis numerus, et forma intellecta erit imaginabilis non intelligibilis, quod constat esse falsum. Non est autem omnis forma intellecta figura vel numerus; quapropter non possunt esse similis; sed nec possunt esse dissimiles. Forma enim intellecta partes dissimiles habere non potest nisi partes definitionis quae sunt genus et differentia. Si autem genus et differentiae essent in subiecto corporali, provenirent multa inconveniencia, quorum unus est quia omnis pars corporis recipit etiam divisionem in infinitum in potenti. Sequeretur ergo tunc genus et differentias infinitas esse in potentia, quod est impossibile. Probatum est enim generae et differentiae unius rei non esse infinita in potentia.

Item non omne intellectum potest dividi in intelligibilia simpliciora. Inter ea enim quae sunt, sunt intelligibilia quae sunt principia compositionis aliorum intelligibilium quae non habent genus nec differentias nec sunt divisibilia in quantitate nec in intellectu. Partes igitur intellectae formae non possunt esse similis, quorum unaquaque continetur in toto quod non habeat esse nisi ex earum conjunctione; sed nec dissimiles. Forma igitur intellecta non potest dividii; quapropter non potest consistere

5 ver non om. C.
10 autem esse per om. C.
15 forma intellecta CM.
20 aliquid CP. aliun M.
30 add. separat in duas partes vel per se esset C.
50 eo MPV.
70 perseverent P.
90 ordinarii V.
110 punctus potest habere CMP.
130 dividatur C.
150 Ergo subiectum . . . indivisibile. Ibid.
170 Si enim . . . est ille. Ibid.
190 Nullum . . . eius. Ibid.
210 tunc . . . imaginabilis. Ibid.
230 paratum V and sic often.
250 paras V.
270 in intellect. intelligibilia M.
290 item P.
310 intellig. aliorum CP.
330 dissimilia C.
350 qua C.
370 om. M.
390 Sed . . . dissimiles om. here and put after dividii.
410 Item non omne . . . 1. 5. p. 39. existens per corpus. Cf. Avic. V. 2, f. 23r, 2A: Item non omne . . . non corporalis.
in aliquo quod dividitur, sed neque in aliquo quod est indivisibile; quare non potest esse in corpore nec in aliquo quod habeat esse per corpus. Ipsa tamen eget receptibilis; ergo subjectum intelligibilium nec est corpus nec aliquid corporis, divisibile vel indivisibile; sed forma intellecta non consistit nisi in anima; ergo anima non est corpus nec aliquid existens per corpus.

Item virtus intellectiva abstrahit intelligibilium a quantitate et loco et situ et ceteris omnibus. Sed haec abstractio vel est respectu rei quae abstrahirat vel respectu rei quae abstrahitur, videlicet esse huius formae intellectae abstractae a situ vel est ita in esse extrinseco vel est ita in esse formantis.7 impossibile est autem ut habeat esse sic in esse extrinseco. Restat ergo ut non sit separatum a situ et ubi nisi cum habet esse in intellectu quia, cum habet esse in intellectu, nec est habens situm nec potest innui nec separatim ostendi nec dividitur nec habet aliquid eorum quae sunt huiusmodi; ergo impossibile est eam esse in corpore. Ergo subjectum intelligibilium non est corpus nec forma existens in corpore; sed anima est subjectum intelligibilium; igitur anima non est corpus nec aliquid existens per corpus.

Item intelligibilis quae sigillatim solet intelligere anima rationalis sunt infinita in potentia. Iam autem probatum est quia id quod praevalet rebus infinitis in potentia nec est corpus nec virtus corporis; anima igitur non est corpus nec virtus corporalis. Virtutes enim corporales debilitari solent in fine actatis juvenilis circa quadriginta annos; virtus vero apprehendens intelligibilis plerumque corroboration circa hanc etatem; unde non est de virtutibus corporalibus.

Item virtutes corporales apprehendentes per instrumenta solent fatigari asiduitate suae actionis. Ea enim quae fortia et difficilia sunt, cum apprehenduntur, plerumque debilitant instrumenta vel etiam destruunt, in tantum ut post quando sensus apprehenderit difficile nequeat apprehendere debile. Qui enim intueris niumum splendorem, profecto nec cum illo nec statim igitur post ilium videt debilem lucem; similiter et in alios. In re autem intelligibili e contrario fit. Assiduitas enim suae actionis et formandi ea quae sunt difficilia acquirit ei virtutem faciunt apprehendendi post illa id quod est debilis illis; quamvis accidat ei plerumque defectus ex quod intellectus iuvatur imaginatione operante instrumento deficiente et tunc non deservit intellectui. Quod si non esset, profecto aut semper ita eveniret aut saepius; quare anima non est virtus corporalis.

Item quod anima non sit corpus sic probatur. Omne corpus habet qualitates perceptibiles aliquo sensu; sed qualitates animae non sunt perceptibiles aliquo sensu; ergo anima non est corpus.

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Item 42 omne corpus subiacet omnibus sensibus vel aliquibus; sed anima nullis subiacet sensibus; ergo anima non est corpus.

Item 44 omne corpus aut est animatum aut inanimatum. Ergo si anima est corpus, aut est inanimata aut animata. Si autem anima est animatum corpus — sed omne animatum corpus aliqua anima est animatum — tum anima est animata ab alia 1 anima; et similiter illa 2 eadem quaestio de illa alia 3 anima, et sic in infinitum. Anima ergo non est 4 animatum corpus; sed nec est corpus inanimatum quia quod non vivit aliiud vivificare non potest; anima autem corpus vivificat; ergo anima nullo modo est corpus sed est substantia. Ergo est anima 5 substantia incorporea. Quod autem sit movens corpus iam superius demonstratum 6 est. Vera est igitur 7 definitio animae secundum Platonem, quod anima 8 est substantia incorporea corpus movens.

**Definitio 8 animae secundum Aristotelem**

Aristoteles autem sic 1 definitivum animam dicens: *Anima 9 est prima perfectio corporis naturalis, instrumentalis, viventis potentialiter.* Perfectio autem alia est 9 prima, alia secunda. Prima 47 perfectio est per quam species fit species 8 in effectu, et figura ensi 7; secunda perfectio est ut aliquid eorum quae consequuntur speciem rei aut ex actionibus eius aut ex passionibus eius, sicut est incidere ensi. Prima perfectio est scientia medicinae 10 in cognitio, secunda perfectio est medicina in operatione. Anima 11 ergo est perfectio prima quia statim cum unitur corpori fit in eo plena 12 potentia vivendi vel 13 sentiendi, et sic per animam perfectur species corporis animati quod ante animam erat in sola potentia. Quicquid autem in sola potentia est, adhuc imperfectum est; tunc autem perfectur cum de potentia ad effectum perducitur, et quia sola anima corpus vivit, ideo anima est perfectio corporis, quia id, ad quod aptum est potentia, non perfectur nisi per animam; et prima quia nulla praecedunt quae animant, 14 et quae sequuntur 15 ad hoc non valent. Corpus 48 autem aliud naturale est ut arbor, aliud artificiale ut scannum quod animatum esse non potest. Ut ergo removeat artificiale, apposuit naturale. Sed naturale aliud est 16 simplex, aliud compositum. Simplex autem aliud est quadlibet elementorum quatuor, aliud nec elementum nec elementatum ut quadlibet caeleste corpus. Sed nullum elementorum est animatum nec aliquod 17 caelestem corporum secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter videatur Platoni. Nullum ergo simplex corpus est animatum; sed nec omne compositum naturale ut lapis. Ideo apposuit instrumentalis, id est habentis instrumenta quibus iuvatur ad vitam. Instrumentorum 40 autem alia sunt necessaria ad

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1 anim. aut inan M.  
2 corpus anim. M.  
3 ali qua M.  
4 eadem CP.  
5 om. MV.  
6 est non V.  
7 C. anima est M.  
8 monstra MV.  
9 om. C.  
10 Def. Arist. om. MV) opinio Aristotelis de anima C in margin.  
11 se M.  
12 definit sic M.  
13 om. V.  
14 om. MV.  
15 x om. CP.  
16 zensis M.  
17 altera CP.  
18 potentia plena M.  
19 et CP.  
20 om. C.  
21 consequuntur C] consequentur P.  
22 om. MV.  
23 ali quid P.  
26 Corpus ... quatuor. Cf. de Diff. Animae et Spir. p. 135: modi autem ... aqua, terra.  

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receptendum nutrimentum, alia ad superflua eiciendum. Necessaria autem ad receptandum nutrimentum in vegetabilibus sunt truncus, radix et rami et alia huvismodi; in sensibilibus autem guttur 1 et venae et alia huvismodi. Necessaria vero ad superflua expellendum in utriseque sunt i pori, sed in sensibilibus etiam alia. Multipliciora enim sunt instrumenta sensibilium quam vegetabilium propter multipliciores actiones eorum.

Ultima autem differentia idem videtur significare qua k dicitur viventis potentialiter.1 Quicquid enim est aut est potentialiter aut effectu; quicquid autem potentialiter est imperfectum est donec de potentia transeat ad effectum per perfectionem. Perfectio autem rei est receptio suae speciei. Dicens 40 ergo viventis potentialiter tantum illud ostendit corpus per animam m perfici, quod ante animam habuit a potentiam vivificari, quod pene idem sonat instrumentale, scilicet cui e possibile p est uti 40 actibus vitae.

Postquam 51 autem ea, in quibus videmus esse animam, sunt corpora, et non perfectur esse corum secundum quod sunt animalia nisi per existentiam animae in illis, tunc anima pars est constitutionis illorum.5 Partes autem constitutionis rei duae sunt. Una est id quo res est id quod est in actu, quae est ei forma vel quasi forma; altera vero est id quo res est id quod est in potentia, quae est ei materia vel quasi materia. Cum igitur anima sit p pars constitutionis rei, profecto non est pars materialis cui ad constituendum aliquid forma adveniat; sed quia omne 52 esse ex forma est, ipsa utique est quasi forma, non quae in subiecto subsistat, s sed quae adveniens corpori animal perfecti. Nam 48 corpus proprium, in quo existit unaqueaque animarum, sic lactet tam vegetabilis quam sensibilis quam etiam rationalis, non s est id quod est ex complexione propria sed ex anima. Anima erit quam facit illud esse illius complexiones, nec permanet in complexione a propria in actu nisi quandiu fuerit anima in illo.5 Anima enim sine dubio est causa per quam vegetabile et animal sunt illius complexiones; ipsa enim anima est principium generationis et vegetationis. Unde impossibile est w ut proprium subiectum animae sit id quod est in actu nisi per animam. Non enim verum est ut proprium subiectum animae prius constituatur ab alio,4 cui postea adveniat anima quasi non habens partem in eius constitutione vel definitione,7 sicut accidentia quae consequuntur esse rei consecutione necessaria, non constitutia illud in actu. Immo ipsis anima constituit ipsum s proprium subiectum et dat ei esse in actu. Cum vero anima separatur ab eo, succedit 8 necessario cum separatione eius alia forma quae est sicut opposita formae complexionali. Haec enim forma et haec materia, quam b habebat dum aderat anima, non remanet post animam in suo specie quoniam destruitur eius species et eius substantia quae erat subiectum animae. Illud ergo corpus et naturale non

1 add. ut C.
2 om. MV.
3 quae MP.
4 Quicquid . . . potentialiter om. M.
5 ipsam M.
6 pot. hab. M.
7 cum C.
8 posee C.
9 corum CP.
10 pars sit CMP.

41 Postquam . . . l. 19, quasi materia. Cf. Avic. I. 1, f. 1r, 2B: postquam haec . . . sicut subiectum.
42 omne esse ex forma est. Boethius, de Trinitate, 2, 21. Pl. 64, 1250B.
erit iam sicut erat, sed habebit aliam formam et alia accidentia, cuius aliqua per eum aliqua partes et dissolvitur substantia propter mutationem earum. Unde non remanet essentia materiae post separationem animae, et quod erat subiectum animae fit subiectum aterius rei. Ergo animaesse in corpore non idem est quod accidens esse in subiecto. Anima ergo non est accidens; sed nec corpus; est igitur substantia.

Cum autem quatuor sint quorum unumquodque substantia dicitur, scilicet materia et forma materiae et corpus et spiritus, quo istorum modorum anima substantia dicatur videndum est. Non enim est substantia quae sit materia quoniam tunc apta esset recipere omnem formam, itaque et formam asini, quod est impossibile. Nec est substantia quae sit forma materiae quoniam forma materiae non habet esse post separationem sui a materia; anima vero habet esse post separationem sui a corpore, sicut postea probabitur. Anima etiam non est substantia quae sit corpus. Restat igitur ut sit substantia quae est spiritus rationalis. De quo si constiterit quod sit compositus ex materia et forma, tunc non erunt nisi tres substantiae, scilicet materia et forma et compositum ex utroque, ut substantiae talis recte fiat divisio. Substantia, alia est simplex, alia composita; simplex, alia materia, alia forma; sed composita, alia est corpus, alia est spiritus. Cui enim adventit forma corporeitatis et fit substantia corporea, idem procul dubio adventit forma spiritualitatis et rationalitatis et fit substantia rationalis spiritualis. Sed de hoc in sequentibus plenius disseremus.
CAPITULUM TERTIUM

AN*: ANIMA SIT CREATA VEL INCREATA

De anima quieritur* an sit creatae an b increata hoc modo. Omne quod est aut coepit esse aut non coepit esse; sed anima est; ergo anima* coepit esse aut non coepit esse. Si autem non coepit esse, tunc cum ipsa sit substantia, est utique substantia quae non coepit esse; sed substantia quae non coepit esse aeterna est; ergo anima, si non coepit esse, est aeterna substantia. Ergo est d coaeterna Deo. Igitur Deus et quod non est Deus sunt coaeterna, quod omnino videtur falsum. Si enim omne* quod est f aut creator aut creatura aut proprietas creatoris est, tunc, cum anima non sit creator nec proprietas creatoris, profecto creatura est; igitur anima creatae e est. Item omne quod crescit imperfectum est; nihil enim crescit nisi ad hoc ut perficiatur. Sed anima crescit quia in sapientia et justitia proficit; igitur imperfecta est.

Item omne imperfectum a perfecto descendit; sed anima est imperfecta; igitur a perfecto descendit. Omnim autem quod ab alio descendit illud i aliud sibi initium est unde coepit; i anima k igitur coepit esse. Sed nihil quod coepit esse increatum est; anima igitur increata non est; est igitur creatae, quia, omne quod est, creatum l vel increatum est. m

* om. all mss.
*An . . . increata om. M] an anima sit creatae vel non C in margin utrum anima sit creatae V.
*b vel M.
*om. CM.
*d coaeeterna Deo M.
* om. M.
*creatura C.
*b omne CP.
*i C.
*i quod C.
*i incrept C.
*k an. ig. coepit sm. C.
*l add. est CP.
*m om. CP.
CAPITULUM QUARTUM

AN SIT CREAT A UNA VEL MULTAE

Fuerunt enim qui dicerent animam unam tantum: esse quae secundum diversa vires unius suae substantiae in plantis exercet vegetacionem, in animalibus sensibilitatem, in hominibus intellectum et rationem; quoadmodum unaquaeque rationalis anima dum est in suo corpore secundum vires quas habet varias ipsae, cum sit una simplex substantia, in ossibus, capillis, et ungubus exercet solam vegetacionem, in aliis vero partibus corporis praeter hoc etiam sensum et motum, in cerebro vero insuper intellectum et rationem. Et quoadmodum unus et idem radius solis simul diversa agit in diversis, quoniam lutum stringit et ceram dissolvit, sic unam tantum animam esse dixerunt, quae simul de universitate rerum alia tantum animat, alia sensificat, alia rationabilia reddit, prout unumquodque corpus virium suarum receptibilis invent. Et tamen cum in omnibus corporibus una sit multas dici inventur propere diversitatem corporum et virium quibus tam diversa operatur.

Sed hunc errorem philosophi sic destruunt dicentes: cum nos videamus vegetabilia habere animam quae nutrit et generat nec habere animam quae sentiat vel cognoscat, profecto haec anima aliud est ab illa.

Item videamus animalia habere animam quae sentiat nec habere animam quae intelligat, tunc haec anima aliud est ab illa. Tres igitur principali sunt animae, prima vegetabilis qualis est in plantis, secunda sensibilis qualis est in brutis animalibus, tertia rationalis qualis est in hominibus; de quibus tamen omnibus vegetabilis anima praedictatu ut genus de suis speciebus. Anima enim vegetabilis est intellectus generalis cuius subjectum similiter est commune universale, videlicet corpus vegetabile, augmentabile, absolutum genus non specificatum, et in hoc omnes animae conveniunt; omnis enim anima nutrit, augmentat et generat. Anima ergo vegetabili, secundum intellectum communem, sic est in vegetabili sicut in animali quia esse eius est sicus esse rei universalis in rebus; sed postea vegetabile et animal differentia specifica differentia constitutiva, non accidente tantum. Anima vero vegetabilis secundum quod est specialiter faciens vegetacionem in solis vegetabilibus est et non in sensibilibus; sed secundum quod est in animali non facit nisi corpus animale quia est animativa ex qua pendet virtus animationis quae est differentia ipsius ad id cum quo convenit in hoc quod est virtus nutriendi et augmentandi quoniam praeter hoc quod est nutritiva et augmentativa est etiam animalis et habet in sua natura ut sen-

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* om. all mss.
* An . . . multae om. CM] anima an una an multae P.
* Quaerunt V.
* vires diversas V.
* exercetur corrected to exercet V] exercent M.
* varias vires quas habet CMP.
* add. et CP.
* crebro V.
* om. C.
* add. in corporis C.

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54 An . . . multae. Avic. V. 1, f. 26v, 2.

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56 praeter hoc . . . l. 13, p. 45, est tantum vegetabilis. Cf. Avic. II. 1, f. 6v, 1C: praeter hoc . . . vegetabilis tantum.
sificet et moveat, cum habuerit instrumenta, et ipsa est conservans illam compositionem et compositionem sicut cum relata fuerit ad habentia conjunctionem erit cognes. Non enim de natura elementorum et contrariorum corporum est coniungit per se quorum natura est ire in partes diversas quae non coniungit nisi anima propria; verbi gratia, in palma est anima palmifica et in uva, anima uvifica et omnino anima quae est forma ipsius materiae. Anima vero, cum sit palmifica supra hoc quod est anima nutriendi et augmentandi, habet etiam esse animam palmificam. Unde palma non eget anima vegetabilis et alia anima ad hoc ut fiat palma; si enim hoc esset, profecto non haberet actiones nisi tantum vegetabiles; sed eius anima vegetabilis habet etiam in sua vegetabilitate quod est palmifica. Similiter anima vegetabilis quae est in animali post creationem animalis habet actiones praeter actiones quas agit sola secundum quod est tantum vegetabilis. Hae igitur animae in virtute vegetandi tanquam in genere convenient sed specifiis differentiis differunt.

Quamvis autem omnis anima sit substantia et haec tres simul sint in unoquoque honom quo quis in homine est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis et rationalis, non tamen tres substantiae sunt in homine; humana enim anima, cum sit una simplex substantia, habet virem animae vegetabilis et vires animae sensibilis et vires animae rationalis; similiter et anima sensibilis habet vires animae vegetabilis et quamvis haec vires diversae sint inter se ita ut una carum non praedicet de altera, quippe cum unaquaque earum sit species per se, tamen nihil prohibet eae simul haberi ab anima rationali; quemadmodum, quia invenimus humorem in aer non separatum a calore, non tamen idcirco necesse est ut humorem et calorem qui sunt in aer non habeat aliqua una forma vel aliqua una materia; sic et de virtibus animalrum.

Quod autem corpus mundanum aliud est receptibile vitae, aliud non, et receptibile vitae aliud est receptibile animae vegetabilis tantum, aliud animae sensibilis tantum, aliud animae rationalis tantum, ration haec est; quoniam receptibile vitae facit temperantia, non receptibile vero vitae facit contrarietas. Unde ultimitas contrarietatis prohibuit corpora elementaria recipere vitam. Natura enim cuiusque illorum habet contrariam, et ob hoc fuerunt remotissima a vita; corpora vero coelestia, quia non habent contrarium, ideo fuerunt apta nobiliori modo vitae corporalis. Quapropter unumquodque corpus, quanto fuerit minoris contrarietatis et magis accesserit ad temperantiam, quae non habet contrariam, tanto magis incipiet assimilari coelestibus corporibus. In compositis vero complexatio frangit remota a vita.  

1 sensificat C.  
2 om. CP.  
3 ipsam P.  
4 compl. et compositionem CP.  
5 relicta C.  
6 qui C.  
7 vivifica M.  
8 et P.  
9 anima palmifica CP.  
10 autem V.  
11 nutritivae CP.  
12 om. CP.  
13 aevum V.  
14 simplex una CP.  
15 sint diversae CP.  
16 et MJ om. VP.  
17 unaquaque M.  
18 tantum M.  
19 nil V.  
20 om. C.  
21 ea V.  
22 om. MPV.  
23 temperantia V.  
24 contraria P.  
25 complexio C.  
26 l. 26, una materia. Cf. op. cit. V. 7, f. 27v, 2: Virtus una materia.  
27 Natura l. 38, corporibus. Cf. op. cit. III. 5, f. 21r, 1: Deinde demonstratores remota a vita.  
28 In compositis l. 14, p. 46, tenebrae sunt contrariae. Cf. loc. cit.: In compositis est contraria.
et debilitat virtutem contrarietatis et operatur in eis formam complexionis; complexio vero medium est inter contraria. Medium vero non habet contraria et ideo aptatur plus ad recipiendum vitam; unde complexio, quae remotor fuerit ab extremis contrariis et magis accesserit ad medium complexionatum, aptior fiet ad recipiendum augmentum perfectionis vitae. Cum vero temperatissimum fuerit ita ut contraria aequalia sint in eo et agant aequaliter, coaptatur perfectioni vitae rationalis quae est similis vitae coelestis. Haec autem aptitudo est in spiritu humano. Spiritus vero humanus omnino est quiddam quod generatur ex elementis et effigiatur vultus ad similitudinem coelestium corporum. Unde sapientes iudicant de eo dicentes: quod sit substantia lucida et ideo spiritus visibilis vocatur radius et lux, et ob hoc anima gratulatur cum videt lucem et tristat in tenebris. Ipsa enim lux comparata est vehiculum et confortat propertiam eam vehiculum eius quod est spiritus cui tenebrae sunt contrariae. Ex his manifestum est quod cum nec vita nec ulla perfectionem sive bonitatem retenta sit apud primum principium in prima genitura, sicut Aristotles dixit, tamen non omne corpus est receptibilis vitae quia careat aptitudine recipiendi eam. Quae autem sunt receptibilitia vitae quanto maioris fuerint temperantiae, tanto fient receptibilitia vitae nobilioris, et inde est quod quaedam non recipiunt nisi animam vegetabilem tantum, quaedam vero amplius quia animalem. Quemadmodum si corpus unum ponatur ad solem cuius situs talis esse potest ut non recipiat a sole nisi calorem tantum; si vero talis fuerit eius situs ut recipiat ab eo calorem et illuminationem, tum simul calefact et illuminabitur et lux cadens in illud erit principium calefaciendi illud; sol enim non calefacit nisi radio. Deinde si maior fuerit eius aptitudo ut etiam possit accendi, accendetur et fiet flamma, quae flamma erit etiam causa calefaciendi et illuminandi simul ita ut quamvis sola esset, tamen perfercretur calefacto et illuminatio, et praeter hoc calefacto poterat inventorì per se sola, vel calefactio et illuminatio sola per se, quorum posterius non esset principium a quo emanaret prius. Cum autem omnia simul concurrunt, tum id quod fuerat posterius fit principium etiam prioris et emanat ab eo idquod erat prior.

Sic ergo dispositionem virium animalium facile intelligere poteris, si per corpus caleficii intelligas illud tantum vegetari, et per illuminari illud ab anima sensificari, per accendi vero animam rationalem sibi infundi. Fortior enim est actio animae rationalis quam animalis et animalis fortior quam vegetabilis. Anima enim vegetabilis movet partes corporis sine mutatione totius de loco ad locum; animalis vero movet totum corpus de loco ad

praecipit actus praeceptus. Did Gundissalinus interpretat praeceptum per Aristotelem, nemo tamen poterit per notae Aristotelis, et non dicit Aristotelis.

Quemadmodum . . . I. 33, intelligere poterit. Cf. Avic. V. 7, f. 27v, 2E: Dicemus . . . virtutum animalium.
locum totaliter et anima animalis coniungitur formis corporum convenientibus sibi in substituta cominus vel eminus, et abstrahit eas a formis rerum corporalibus. Anima 62 vero vegetabilis coniungitur essentiae corporum quia convenit cum eis in spissitudine, et hoc proprie et continue tantum. Unde 63 anima sensibilis agit in vegetabilem et vegetabilis in naturam, sed rationalis agit in sensibilibus sicut intelligenter 64 h agit in rationalem. Oportet 64 enim ut inferior sit quasi j materia superiori 65 k eo quod superius agit in inferior; et ideo sapientes noluerunt 1 appellare aliquam substantiarum formam simpliciter, nisi intelligiamentem m primam quae vocatur ab eis intelligiamentia agens.

Non solum autem istas, sed etiam  n humanas animas multas esse philosophi probant o dicentes: Si 66 anima humana una est in omnibus corporibus, sed est v multae propter relationem 4 quam 5 habet ad illa, 6 turc aut est 7 sapiens in omnibus illis aut 8 insipiens in omnibus illis, et non latet unum quicquid est in anima alterius. Unum enim, quod ad multa refertur, possibile est differre secundum diversos respectus; non est autem verum illud posse 8 differre in eis per illa quae habent esse 9 in essentiis illius. Cum enim unus fuerit multorum x filiorum pater, et ipse fuerit juvenis, non est 3 juvenis nisi secundum omnes illos; juventutem enim habet in seipso et 3 continentur in unaquaque relatione. Similiter prudentia et stultitia et alia 6bis similia non sunt nisi in ipsa anima, et continentur cum ea 3 in unaquaque relatione. Unde si una esset anima in sapiente et stulto, tunc una anima simul esset sapiens et insipiens, quod est impossibile. Cum igitur alia sit sapiens et alia insipiens, tunc non est una anima in omnibus corporibus, sed sunt multae differentes numero non specie. Omnes 66 enim animae humanae unum sunt in specie et definitione; multas igitur species animarum 6 esse et uniusquisque speciei singularia d multa manifestum est, ex quibus omnibus soae tantum anima rationalis et vegetabilis, secundum quod tantum est vegetabilis, e specialissimae species sunt. Ex 67 differentia enim constitutiva non provenit ulla anima vegetabilium, sed ex differentiis quas habet unumquodque vegetabile per se tantum et non aliud; non est enim nisi 8 principium tantum proprium actionis vegetabilis. Sed animae vegetabilis animalis differentia, divisiva et 3 constitutiva singularum i specierum quae sunt sub ipsa, est virtus animae animalis adiuncta illi, quae aptat illi corpus, et est differentia ad modum differentiarum quas habent simplicia, non quas 1 habent composita.

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*aem V.*
*iigitur CP.*
*haec V.*
*intelectiva C.*
*tamen V.*
*quasi (sicut suprascript) M.*
*superioris CP, s. m. M.*
*voluerunt MPV.*
*intelectiva C.*
*et M.*
*add. esse C.*
*etiam V.*
*relations CP.*
*quas CP.*
*alia C] ab illa M.*

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62 anima ... tantum. *Cf. Fons Vitae III.*
64 V. 3, f. 24v, 1: Nos scimus ... una est.
65 omnes ... definitione. *Cf. Avic. V. 3, f. 23v ad finem.*
66 Ex differentia ... I. 34, composita. *Cf.*
67 Avic. II. 1, f. 6v, 1A: Ex differentia ... composita.
CAPITULUM QUINTUM

AN 1 FUERINT ANIMAE CREATAE AB INITIO MUNDI

Merito quaeritur, cum multae sint animae, an simul creatae = fuerint ab a initio mundi, an cotidie novae crearent. Fuerunt enim qui dicerent omnes humanas animas simul a principio mundi p fuisset creatas, et in comparibus q stellis positas, tamdiu ibi permanere r unaquamque quo adusque corpus sibi coaptabile generetur cui ipsa statuto tempore s nutu creatoris infundatur. Rationes autem, quamvis debiles, quibus philosophi sententiam hanc destruer e conati sunt, apponere non recussam.

Dixerunt enim: licet 68 ponamus animas v humanas prius extitisse et non incepisse cum corporibus, eas tamen ante corpora multas fuisset impossible est. Multitudo enim rerum vel est ex essentia et forma, vel ex comparatione ad materiam et originem multiplicatam locis circumscribentibus unaquamque materiam v secundum aliquid, vel ex temporibus propriis uniuscuiusque illarum quae accidunt illis accidentibus, vel ex causis dividentibus illam. Inter animas autem ante corpora non fuit alteritas in essentia vel forma. Forma enim earum una est, quoniam omnes humanae animae unum sunt in specie et definitione; ergo non est inter x illas alteritas nisi secundum receptibile suae essentiae, cui debitur essentia eius proprie quod est corpus. Ergo si animae fuerunt ante corpora, profecto una non fuit alia numero ab alia, quia non fuit alteritas multitudine inter illas; itaque non fuerunt multae ante corpora.

Item, si 69 possibile esset unaquamque r animam creari ante corpus in quo perficitur et operatur, profecto otiosum s esset eius esse; nihil autem otiosum vel superfuum est a in natura; ergo non fuerunt creatae ante corpora. Sed nec fuit creat a una numero. Cum 70 enim generatur duo corpora, infunduntur cis duae b animae, quae duae animae vel sunt partes i illius unius animae, et sic aliquid quod non habet molem vel magnitudinem est divisibile in potentia, quod impossible d est; vel illa anima una numero est in duobus corporibus, quod iam superius improbatum est. Igitur ante corpora animae e non fuerunt una nec multae. Quod autem non est unum vel f multa, non est; quicquid 71 enim est, unum e est vel multa; nullo modo i igitur fuerunt ante corpora. Quapropter consequitur ut cotidie crearent novae animae;

k Capit. Quint.] Caput P] om. CMV.
1 An omnes animae fuerint simul creatae ab initio aut non C (in margin)] om. V] de creatione (in margin)] M.
2 fuerint creatae CP.
3 a principio CMJ in principio P.
4 crehentur V.
5 om. M.
6 corporibus M.
7 unaqm. perm. CP.
8 corpore C.
9 con. sunt dist. CP.
10 hum. animas CP.
11 licet . . . I. 19, ab alia. Cf. Avic. V. 3, f. 24r, 1B: Si autem posuerimus . . . 2A, ab alia.
12 Si possibile . . . in natura. Avic. V. 4, 24v, 2: Si possibile . . . in natura.
13 om. CP.
14 in forma CP.
15 alt. inter illas CMP.
16 animam creari unaquamque CP.
17 otiosus M.
18 om. C.
19 om. M.
20 illius unius animae partes CP.
21 est impossible CP.
22 nec animae C] nec non P.
23 nec CP.
24 est unum vel C] vel est unum P.
25 igitur modo CP.
26 Cum enim . . . in duobus corporibus. Cf. op. cit. 24r, 2B:Cum enim fuerit . . . in duobus corporibus.
cum enim creatur corpus quod sit dignum fieri instrumentum et regnum eius, tunc causae intelligibiles quae solent dare unamquamque animam creant eam. Ergo ut anima creetur sine corpore ita ut ipsa creetur et non corpus, hoc est impossibile.

Licet autem cotidie creentur novae animae, non tamen creantur in tempore. Tempus enim secundum Aristotelem est mensura spatii continentis prius et posterius, et secundum alios tempus est mora cuius pars iam praeterit parsque futura est. Nihil ergo fit in tempore nisi ex intellectu habendi prius et posterius. In tempore enim non creatur nisi cuius aliquid fit prius et deinde aliud eius posterius, quasi in sucedentibus sibi instantibus; non enim omnes partes simul fieri possunt, sed unaqueaque occupat spatium suum ordine secundum prius et posterius. Anima autem simplex est cares omni mole et quantitate. Quod autem quantitate caret non habet partes quorum unam necesse sit prius creari et deinde aliam; in instanti igitur creatur anima. Instans vero non est tempus; non enim habet prius et posterius; ergo creatio animae non fit in tempore, sed creatur simplex in simplici anima in instanti. Quod enim quantitate caret, quantitatem quae tempus est occupare non potest, nec potest extendi creatio eius per prius et posterius, in quo nihil est prius vel posterius. Unde anima non est opus naturae quae non operatur nisi in tempore.

Probat autem philosopho animas non a Deo sed ab angelis creari hoc modo: si factor primus est factor animae per se, tunc anima semper fuit apud eum; sed anima non semper fuit apud Deum quoniam cotidie creatur novae; igitur anima non est facta a primo factore, nec primus factor est factor eius per se. Igitur necesse est ut aliquid sit medium inter deum et animam, quod sit factor animae. Illam autem propositionem qua dicitur quod, si anima facta est a primo factore, semper fuit apud eum, sic probant dicentes: cum aliquis fit agens qui fuit non agens, necesse est hoc fieri propter novitatem aliiuis rei quae contingit, scilicet vel conditionis vel naturae vel voluntatis vel intentionis vel potentiae vel aliiuis alterius dispositionis, quoniam si dispositiones agentis permanent ita ut erant, ita quidem ut agentis non fieret aliquid novum in se vel extra se, usque tunc, profectioni non esset potius actionem esse quam non esse. Immo non esse duraret semper; quia enim non esse duravit usque huc, eo quod non fuit elector qui daret esse, profectione sum iam est esse, necesse est, ut eius causa sit, electorem esse. Si enim agens non fieret novus elector, nec esset elector sicut nec erat ante, procul dubio non esse duraret necessario sicut erat ante. Sed qui creat animam eligat melius esse eam quam non esse. Aliquid ergo

\textsuperscript{1} add. animae C. causae] animae P.
\textsuperscript{1} om. CP.
\textsuperscript{2} om. CMP.
\textsuperscript{1} pars M.
\textsuperscript{1} sit CP.
\textsuperscript{1} aliquid CP.
\textsuperscript{1} om. M.
\textsuperscript{1} una M.
\textsuperscript{1} est tempus CP.
\textsuperscript{q} quem M.
\textsuperscript{q} esset CP.
\textsuperscript{q} iam M.
\textsuperscript{q} eum CP.
\textsuperscript{v} qui M.
\textsuperscript{v} creatore C.
\textsuperscript{v} non fuit agens CMP.
\textsuperscript{v} propter nov. fieri CP.
\textsuperscript{v} conditionis V.
\textsuperscript{v} naturae vel vcl.] necessitatis C] nat. vel necessitatis P.
\textsuperscript{b} elector C.
\textsuperscript{b} elector quam est C.
\textsuperscript{d} non CMP.
\textsuperscript{d} nec sicut CP.
\textsuperscript{d} etiam C.
\textsuperscript{d} sem melius esse CP.

\textsuperscript{73} Cum enim . . . est impossibile. Cf. Avic. V, 4, 24, 24v, 2.
\textsuperscript{74} Si factor primus . . . factor animae. Adapted from \textit{De Vita Ius} III, 2, p. 78, ll. 5–12: si inter factorem . . . inter illa.
sibi novi accidit, quia tunc primum hoc facere eligit quod prius similiter elegisse putuerit; Deo autem nihil novi advenit; tunc enim variabilis esset, quod est impossible. Igitur ab ipso non creatur anima quoniam, si ab ipso crearetur, secundum praedictam ratiocinationem aliquid novi sibi accidisse videretur, quod est impossible. Unde verum est illud quod, si primus factor cam creasset per se, semper fuisset apud eum, quia si Deus eam creasset, non noviter, sed ab aeterno eam creasset et ita semper apud eum fuisset.

Item alia probation: factoris primi facere est facere aliquid ex nihil; sed postea probabitur animam fieri ex materia; igitur non est factura primita.

Item creari vel fieri est exire de potentia ad effectum. Nihil autem exit de potentia ad effectum nisi per alium quod est in effectu; primus vero factor nec est in potentia nec in effectu; igitur per illum non exit anima de potentia ad effectum. Ergo non creatur ab illo.

Item creare vel facere est trahere de potentia ad effectum; sed trahere de potentia ad effectum est movere; igitur quaecumque res creat animam movet eam. Sed quicquid creando movet eam, necesse est ut sit mobile vel immobile. Si autem fuerit immobile in se, tunc non poterit moveri; si autem non poterit moveri, tunc nec a se poterit moveri nec ab alio. Quod autem se non potest movere, multo minus et alieud; igitur quod movet animam non est immobile in se; igitur est mobile. Sed Deus est immobile; igitur non movet eam; et si non movet eam, utique nec eam creavit.

Item ad recipiendum aliquid ab aliquo, nihil est dignius eo quod illud recipit nullo mediante. Si igitur anima recipit esse a primo factore nullo mediante, tunc nihil est dignius ea ad recipiendum illud ab illo; sed substantia intelligentiae dignior est ad hoc; ergo anima non recipit esse a primo factore nullo mediante.

Item quicquid movet animam non potest esse infinitum quoniam quicquid movet alium aut movet per se aut per accidens. Si autem id quod infinitum est movet alium per se, necesse est ut motus, qui ab eo fit, sit infinitus; sed motus animae finitus est; igitur non fit ab infinito. Si autem movet illud per accidens, tunc essentia eius non est infinita, quod sic probatur: nulli quod infinitum est advenit accidentis; id enim quod infinitum est non mutatur; sed omne cui accidens advenit mutatur; igitur infinito non accidit accidentis.
J. T. MUCKLE

Igitur quod movet animam nullo mediante non potest esse infinitum; est igitur finitum.

Item quod movet animam nullo mediante est finitum; sed primus factor non est finitus; igitur factor primus non movet animam nullo mediante.

Item si motor animae est infinitus, et motus animae est infinitus; sed motus animae non potest esse infinitus quoniam substantia eius finita est; igitur motor animae nullo mediante non potest esse infinitus; sed factor primus est infinitus; igitur factor primus non potest esse motor animae nullo mediante.

Hoc autem quod philosophi probant, animas non a Deo sed ab angelis creari, sane quidem potest intelligi, scilicet non Dei ministerio sed angelorum. Et tamen cum dicitur Deus creare animas, intelligendum est auctoritate non ministerio, sicut cum dicitur de Christo: hic est qui baptizat, cum sacerdos baptizet. Sed Christus auctoritate non ministerio; sacerdos vero ministerio tantum non auctoritate; sic et angeli creant animas ministerio tantum non auctoritate. Unde nec creatores animarum dicuntur quia in creando non auctoritate, sed ministerio funguntur. Qui enim in agendo aliquid non auctoritate sed ministerio utitur, in ministrando utique superiori obsequitur. Et ideo anima creatura angeli non dicitur, sed Dei, cuius auctoritate creatur, sicut et magnalia quae aliquorum ministri operandur non ipsis sed dominis suis quorum nutu faciunt imputantur. Sicut ergo corpus humanum non recipit actionem aliquam animae rationalis nisi mediante spiritu, sic et anima rationalis non recipit actionem factoris primi nisi mediante intelligentia, scilicet angelica creatura. Multiplex erim simplici, nec spissum subtili potest coniungi, nisi mediante aliquo quod habeat convenientiam cum utroque extremorum.

*s factor primus M.
*h om. C.
1 haec V.
1 om. CP quid M.
2 sed M.
1 min. sed corrupt. M.
= Item CP.

80 quod movet ... l. 9, nullo mediante.
81 Sicut ergo ... angelica creatura. Cf. op. cit. III. 2, p. 75, l. 24 to p. 76, l. 5: Si non esset

*a creat CP.
*b baptizat CP.
§ si M.
4 autem P] om. C.
* om. MV.
1 om. CP.
1 om. MPV.
= alio C.

spiritus ... uno ictu oculi.
88 Spissum ... extremorum. Cf. op. cit. III. 51, p. 194, ll. 1–3: quod si spissum ... nisi per medium.
CAPITULUM SEXTUM

(SI ANIMA CREATUR DE NIIHLO VEL DE ALIQUO)

(Merito de anima quaeritur si de nihilo vel de aliquo creatur.) Fuerunt enim qui dicerent animam esse ex traduce sicut et corpus; ut quemadmodum caro filii ex carne patris et matris generatur, ita anima filii ex animabus parentum decidatur. Quibus cum opponebatur quod, cum aliquid de substantia alterius sumitur, aut totum de toto aut pars de parte aut pars de toto sumitur, illud unde sumitur minus remanet, sic animae parentum minores remanent post decisionem animae filii ab illis, respondebant hoc non sequi. Cum enim una candela ab alia accenditur, tota flamma eius ab alia sine diminutione eius sumitur, sic et in animabus. Sed quia sola quantitas augetur vel minuitur, profectione cum anima nullius quantitatis sit, eius sentia nec augeri potest nec minui, quamvis una anima fluat ab alia. Sic enim fluit una anima ab alia sine illius diminutione, sicut calor ignis non minuitur, cum ex se generat calorem in aere. Nam calor qui est in aere non est ipsemet qui est in igne, eo quod, remoto igne, remanet calor in aere, et quia subjecta eorum sunt duo diversa, unde calor qui fit in aere diversus est a calore qui est in igne in potentia. Similiter propter lumen solis quod diffunditur super terram non minuitur lumen solis, quod est in essentia eius, quamvis hoc fluat ab illo, nec lumen quod est super terram est idem ipsum, sed diversum a lumine quod est in essentia eius. Omne autem quod fluit ab aliquo eiusdem genus est cum co quo fluat, et est simile ei a quo fluat, nec fluat ab aliquo nisi quod est illi simile, et idea a substantia simplici non fluat nisi substantia simplex. Iam tamen omnes tenent animam non esse traducere.

\* Cap. Sex. om. all ms.
\* Si ... aliquo an anima creatur ex nihilo vel non C (in margin) utrum anima creata sit a nihilo P om. M.
\* quacritur de anima M.
\* dixerunt C.
\* s ex V.
\* istud unum consumitur C.
\* add. et C.
\* om. CP.
\* eis CMP.


\* om. CP.
\* perfecto P.
\* om. CP.
\* ab alia fluat CP.
\* dim. illius CMP.
\* gen. ex se CP.
\* subjectum V.
\* fit V.
\* solis C.
\* alio CP.
\* est eiusdem CP. ipso CP.
CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM

Sed nec de nihilò creato esse videtur. Quamvis enim anima sit simplex, videtur tamen constare ex materia et forma. Cui enim advenit forma corporeitatis ut fiat corporea substantia, idem prorsus advenit forma spiritualitatis ut fiat incorporea substantia. Unde corporea et incorporea substantia in substantia quidem nullatenus differunt, sed potius substantialiter conveniunt. Immo in substantia unum sunt cum nomen et ratio substantiae aequae omnibus conveniunt. Omnis autem diversitas ex forma est, non ex materia; materia enim in omnibus eadem est, sed partes eius formas advenientes distribuunt, ac per hoc in materia non est differentia, sed in forma; unde corporea et incorporea substantia constare videtur ex materia et forma.

Materia autem tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo accipitur simpliciter et intelligibiliter tantum, nuda ob omni forma, prout apta est recipere omnem formam corporalem et incorporealem. Secundo modo accipitur composita corporeitate, prout sic formata materia est tantum corporum, vel composita spiritualitate, prout sic formata est tantum materia omnium substantiarum intelligibilium. Tertio modo materia dicitur corpus elementum vel elementatum, prout sic tantam materiam est omnium generorum. Quapropter cum substantiâe sensibiles et intelligibiles ron ex eadem materia esse dicuntur, quantum ad secundum et tertium modum hoc intelligitur. Quantum vero ad primum modum dicendi, materia, tam corpora quam incorporea, ex eadem materia constare perhibetur, quoniam in resolvendo omnia ne in infinitum eatur, ad unam materiam primam universalem et ad unam formam primam universalem pervenitur. Et sic omnia constant ex eadem materia et diversis; omnia quidem ex eadem materia universalis prima, sed corporea et incorporea ex diversis secundariisiam formatis. Secundum hocigitur materia alia simplex, alia composita; simplex quae est universalis omnium; composita, quae est specialis incorporeorum vel corporeorum. Et notandum quia post primam universalem id quod est materia posterioriorm, forma est priorum et quod est manifestius, forma

a Cap. Sept. om. all ms.
Sed nec] ai vero C.
Cum C] qui P. om. M.
spiritualitati M.
in omnibus CP.
et non C.
est eadem CP.
tamen M.
add. scilicet M.
add. cum C.
add. omnium C.
est materia C. Sic est tantum materia omnium P.
et intell. om. M.

Quamvis... et forma. Cf. op. cit. IV, 2, p. 213, ll. 14–15: Substantiae... et forma.
Unde corporea... omnibus conveniatur. Perhaps op. cit. IV, 10, p. 233, ll. 8–11.
Omnis autem... est eadem. Perhaps op. cit. IV, 1, p. 212, l. 7; IV, 9, p. 231, ll. 13–30; p. 233, ll. 1–2.
Materia autem... I. 18, omnium generatorum. Cf. op. cit. IV, 8, p. 229, ll. 2–6:

secundum et om. C.
thoc intell.] et primum intelligendum est C.
materiai CPV.
hteribentur MV] proibetur P.
om. C.
im. CP.
om. CMP, prima universalis M] prima universaliter P.
simplex... comp. om. M.
a] quae... corporeorum] corporea spiritualis quae est corporaeorum vel incorporeorum C] spiritualis quae est corporaeorum vel incorporeorum P.
quod est... Q. 5, p. 54, infra emam. Cf. op. cit. IV, 9, p. 230, ll. 7–13: quod manifestum... infra emam.
est occultis, quia materia quo propinquior est sensui est simillim formae, et ideo fit manifestior propter evidentiam formae et occulcionem a materiae, quamvis sit materia formae sensibilis. Sed quo z remotior fuerit a sensu, erit similius materiae propter occulcionem, scilicet materiae, quamvis sit forma materiae primae simplici vel aliqui aliarum materiarum quae sunt infra eam, ut quantitas, cum sit forma substantialia, materia e coloris et figurae. Nam cum species forma sit generis et l omne genus post primum species sit, profecto omne genus post primum materia u est posteriorum et forma priorum.

Unde a secundum Platonem forma similiter tribus modis accipitur: uno γ in potentia tantum et nondum ν coniuncta materiae; alio cum est in actu iam coniuncta materiae, per quam materia est in actu, sicut est unitas et substantialitas; tertio modo formae elementorum, scilicet quattuor primae qualitates. Est α etiam alius modus praeter hos quo forma dicitur, cum scilicet est in voluntate divina, sicut est illud: formae rerum fuerunt in mente divina ante quam prodirient in corpore, sed appellatio ν tantum γ dicitur. Ibi enim forma est non a secundum veritatem, quoniam a non sustinetur in alioquo, et quia eius essentia est praeter essentiam formae existentis in materia. Unde oportet ut accipiatur per se et innuatur b appellatio e formae. Quoniam forma intelligibilis quae est in essentia divinae voluntatis, impossibile est ut sit d talis ante fluxum suum ab essentia voluntatis, et e ante applicationem ad ad materiam, qualis est post defluxum f et coniunctionem sui cum materia. Sed g quia divina voluntas est prima causa agens, idcirco forma omnium est in eius essentia, ad modum quo forma omnis causati est in sua causa. Omne enim causatum g est in sua causa, et exemplum h in suo exemplari, secundum formam quam habet, scilicet in causa rei i est, ut res sit huius modi vel huius i formae. Huic consonat divina auctoritas k quae dicit: Omne quod factum est l in ipso vita erat. Nam quia omne exemplatum prout m in exemplari est, ab exemplari nullo modo diversum est, in Deo autem nihil est nisi quod ipsa est, ipsa autem vera vita est; n sed omne quod factum est eius exemplatum est; tunc omne quod factum est in ipso vita est. Sic ergo est o materia universalis, scilicet prima, quae est materia omnium creatorum, sic est et forma s universalis omnium creatorum, scilicet unitas et substantialitas. Et sicut materia o est specialis omnium corporeorum s substantialia corporea, sic est etiam o materia specialis omnium spiritualium t sub-

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53 Unde . . . . primae qualitates. Cf. op. cit. IV, 20, p. 256, ii. 3-8; Unde ne . . . . qualitates.
54 Sed quia divina . . . . in sua causa. Cf. op. . . . . om. C.
54 fluxum CP.
54 creatum CP.
54 exemplum C.
55 add. sui P.
55 formae huius CP. α voluntas C.
55 om. CP. α proprium CP.
55 om. M.
56 est materia CMP.
56 corporum CMP.
57 om. P.
57 materia etiam M.
58 specialium CP] corrected to spiritualium V. cit. p. 256, ll. 11-13: Voluntas est . . . . in sua causa.
58 forma . . . . unitas. Cf. op. cit. IV, 13, p.
239, ll. 18-20.
stantia incorporea. Et sicut est forma specialis illorum quantitas, sic istorum forma specialis est spiritualitas vel rationalitas.

Rationes autem quibus probatur anima constare ex materia et forma haec sunt. Substantia simplex aut habet formam sibi propriam aut non; si vero non habet formam sibi propriam, tunc non habet esse; omne enim esse ex forma est. Item si substantia simplex non habet formam sibi propriam, tunc non est species differens ab alia; nulla es: enim differentia specierum nisi per formam; habet igitur formam. Sed forma non dat esse nisi cum est in materia; igitur substantiae simples constant ex materia et forma.

Item omnes substantiae, tam simplices quam compositae, conveniunt in hoc quod omnes substantiae sunt; sed propriis formis sunt diversae substantiae; necesse est igitur ut sit haec substantia communis in qua conveniant et quae det omnibus intellectum substantialitatis aequaliter, quae non est eis forma, sed materia. Quod sic probatur: nulla conveniunt in quo differunt; sed omnia formis differunt; formis igitur non conveniunt sed conveniunt in substantia. Substantia igitur non est eis forma sed materia quae una est omnium substantiarum et qua omnes participant. Nulla autem forma est qua omnes participant nisi unitas; unitas vero non est substantia; igitur substantia materia est cui adventiit formae corporis et spiritualitatis et fiunt substantiae corporea et incorporea.

Item quaeque sunt diversa, diversa sunt per formam; sed quaeque diversa sunt per formam, conveniunt in materia; igitur corpora et incorporea conveniunt in materia.

Item nulla res est agens nisi per formam; sed actiones substantiarum simplicium diversae sunt; unde et formae earum diversae. Conveniunt ergo omnes in materia eo quod omnes sunt substantiae simplices, sed different formis propriis; conveniunt ergo omnes in substantialiute sed differentia perfectio eo quod una in sapientia vel iustitia perfectior est ali. Item substantiae simplices aut sunt materiae tantum aut formae tantum aut nec materia nec forma aut materia et forma simul. Si substantiae spiritualia sunt tantum essent, profecto in nullo different sed omnino unum essent quia materia rerum una est non diversa in se, nec aliquid agerent quoniam actus formae est non materiae quod intelligenti satis manifestum est. Si enim ex hoc, quod materia sunt, aliquid agerent, tunc quicquid ex materia est illud ageret.

u spiritualis P.
1 quae M.
5 specialitas C.
2 participent M.
6 et ut P.
7 add. om. M.
8 probant phylusophy animam V.
9 add. id est quae sunt corporeitas et spiritualitas CP.
10 ergo omnes in materia CP.
11 om. M.
12 add. simplicium M.
13 om. specialis C]
14 spiritualitatis CP.
15 enim CMP.
16 sit V.
17 aut V.
18 tantum materiae CP.
19 om. V.
20 op. cit. IV, 1, p. 212, ll. 2-8: Signum huius in se formam.
21 Conveniunt ergo omnes . . . perfectione. Cfr. loc. cit. 15-17: Communitas . . . perfectione.
Item si substantiae spirituales materia tantum essent, tunc non haberent esse; materia non habet esse nisi per formam.

Item substantiae spirituales non possunt esse formae tantum; formae enim non habent esse nisi in materia; unde animae essent formae tantum, non haberent esse. Nec sunt una forma tantum quia tunc non essent diversae; sed nec sunt diversae seipsis quia tunc in nullo convenirent; sed constat eas convenire et diversae esse; non sunt ergo una forma tantum. Quod autem compositae sunt ex materia et forma evidenter indicat earum differentia a corporeis et earum a seipsis; non enim se differunt nisi formas constituentes haberent.

Item omne quod est intelligibile dividitur in formam et formatum ut est spiritualitas et spirituale, et rationalitas et rationale. Intellectus vero, cuius est coniuncta dividere et divisa coniungere, non comprehendit primo nisi rem constantem ex materia et forma quae sunt finis rerum et deinde abstractit. Cum enim intellectus percipit rem, comprehendit eam; sed non comprehendit eam nisi quia res finita est. Res autem finita non est nisi per suam formam; unde res, quae non habet formam qua fiat unum et differat ab alio, incomprehensibilis est quia infinita est ac per hoc essentia acterna infinita est quia non habet formam.

Similiter et materia primordialis infinita est quia ex se nullam habet omne vero creatum finitum est; finitum autem esse non potest nisi sit habens formam; ergo omnis substantia intelligibilis est habens formam et materiam.

Item in anima est multiplicitas et diversitas, cui aliud est esse substantiam, aliud esse unam, aliud esse animam, aliud esse intelligentem. Unumquodque enim horum in alius subjectis per se inventi potest sine alio. Haec autem multiplicitas vel est diversarum materiarum tantum vel diversarum formarum tantum vel materiarum et formarum simul vel unius materiae et diversarum formarum vel unius formae et diversarum materiarum. Unam autem tantam materia primam esse et non multas iam manifestum est; multas etiam formas sine materia subsistere impossibile est; restat igitur ut haec multiplicitas sit multarum formarum in una materia.

Item necesse est ut anima sit una tantum res simplex carens omni com-

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104 unde si animae . . . convenirent. Ibid. p. 213, l. 2–5: Si haec substantiae . . . quamquam.
positione vel non; non est autem simplex carens omni compositione; igitur vel est duae materiae vel duae formae vel materia et forma simul. Ex duabus autem materiis nihil potest esse sine forma; omne \textsuperscript{107} enim esse ex forma est neque ex duabus formis sine materia. Necesse est enim ut aliqua \textsuperscript{7} sit materia in qua coniungatur; est igitur anima materia et forma simul.

Item nullam habet proprietatem materia per se nec forma per se, sed compositum ex utraque. Aliquid materia ex se non esset informis, et forma haberet formam, quod est impossibile. Omnis enim proprietas forma est; multae autem sunt proprietates animae; igitur \textsuperscript{108} anima nec est materia tantum nec forma tantum sed composita ex utraque.

Item omne esse vel \textsuperscript{8} est sensibile vel intelligibile; sed omne esse ex forma est; igitur quicquid est sensibile vel intelligibile ex forma est; forma autem non habet esse nisi in materia.

Item factura a factore penitus diversa est; sed \textsuperscript{109} factor est unus tantum simpliciter; nulla igitur factura est per se una \textsuperscript{8} tantum simpliciter; anima igitur vel intelligentia \textsuperscript{b} nec est una tantum materia nec una tantum forma, sed composita ex utraque. Si quis autem dicit \textsuperscript{9} quod materia est una tantum per se et forma una \textsuperscript{d} tantum per se, non est verum. Neque enim materia neque forma habet esse per se unum vel multa nisi cum sibi ad invicem coniunguntur. \textsuperscript{e} Materia enim non habet esse per se nisi per formam, nec forma habet esse nisi in materia.

Item \textsuperscript{110} si universitas creaturarum ab extremo infimo usque ad extremum supremae continua in sine interruptione, tunc necesse est ut sicut corporeae substantiae compositae sint ex materia et forma ita et spiritualia; \textsuperscript{1} alioquin corporea et incorporea substantia non esset sub codem genere \textsuperscript{8} coaequae species eo \textsuperscript{h} quod simplex prior est \textsuperscript{i} quam composita,\textsuperscript{j}

Item \textsuperscript{111} universitas substantiarum vel resolvisur ad unam radicem vel ad \textsuperscript{k} plures. Si autem \textsuperscript{l} ad unam radicem resolvisur, tunc necesse est ut illa una radix vel sit materia tantum, vel forma tantum, vel nec materia nec forma. Sed materia tantum esse non potest quia res non haberet esse cum formae non essent, nec forma tantum quia forma non existit per se. Si autem nec forma nec materia, tunc vel \textsuperscript{m} factor primus vel alidum (\textit{esse}).\textsuperscript{n} Sed factor primus esse non potest; omne enim quod ex ipso est nec creatum nec factum est nec est alidum quam ipse est.\textsuperscript{o} Aliud autem quam ipse est \textsuperscript{p} nihil est nisi vel materia vel forma vel compositum ex utraque.

Si autem resolvisur ad plures, tunc vel \textsuperscript{q} ad duas vel ad plures. Si vero fuerint duae, tunc vel duae materiae \textsuperscript{r} vel duae formae,\textsuperscript{s} vel altera materia et

\textsuperscript{7} sit aliqua CP.
\textsuperscript{8} est vel CP.
\textsuperscript{9} tantum una CP.
\textsuperscript{10} intellectiva C.
\textsuperscript{b} om. V.
\textsuperscript{d} tantum una CP.
\textsuperscript{e} coniungitur \textsuperscript{VJ} consignantur P.
\textsuperscript{f} specialis C.
\textsuperscript{g} om. V.
\textsuperscript{h} et M.
\textsuperscript{107} omne enim \ldots forma est. Boethius, de \textit{Trinitate} 2, 21. PL 64, 1250B.
\textsuperscript{108} igitur anima \ldots ex utraque. \textit{Cf.} Fons Vitae IV, 1, p. 212, ll. 11–17: non est possible \ldots perfectione.
\textsuperscript{109} sed factor \ldots ex utraque. \textit{Cf. op. cit.} III, 2, p. 76, ll. 15–18: Factor primus \ldots
\textsuperscript{110} Item \textit{si} \ldots quam composita. \textit{Cf. op. cit.} IV, 6, p. 226, ll. 2–7: et sì totum \ldots\ et forma.
\textsuperscript{111} Item universitas \ldots l. 9, p. 58, nec forma. \textit{Cf. op. cit.} IV, 6, p. 224, l. 15 to p. 225, l. 21: omnia resolventur \ldots nec forma.
altera forma, vel nec duae materiae e nec duae formae; sed non est possibile u ut sint duae materiae vel duae formae, vel nec duae materiae nec duae formae, propter praedicta inconvenientia; restat igitur ut altera carum sit materia et altera forma. Si autem fuerint plures quam duae, tunc illa multiplicitas vel resolutur v ad duo vel non. Si autem multiplicitas resolvitur ad duo, tunc duo sunt radix, quorum unum est materia et alterum w forma. Si autem multitudo non resolvitur ad duo et natura multitudinis opposita x est duobus, tunc necesse est ut aliquid aliud, praeter factorem primum, sit y nec materia nec forma, quod impossibile z est.

Item duo necessario sequuntur post unum; sed primus factor in se vere unus est; duo 112 igitur necessario sequuntur post eum, quae a sunt materia et forma ex quibus omnia constituantur et ad quae omnia resolvuntur.

Quamvis ergo humanae animae cotidie novae creari dicantur, non tamen de nihilu,b sed de materia prima creari videntur. Si enim omne esse ex forma est, profecto rationalis anima non habet esse nisi per formam; sed forma non habet esse nisi in materia; forma igitur qua anima rationalis est non est nisi in materia; ac per hoc anima s videtur constare ex materia et forma.

Unde etiam constabit illud divinum: 113 Quis vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul; quoniam qui nunc creat novas animas d quantum ad formas tunc etiam creavit animas quantum ad materiam, ut vere dicatur crasse omnia simul. Simul enim omnia creavit cum materiam e omnium semel creavit. Si autem humanae animae sive angelici spiritus de nihilo creantur, tunc non creavit omnia simul nisi sola corporea. Sed divina auctoritas irrefragabilis est; ut ergo omnia simul creasse dicatur necesse est ut unum materiam omnium, tam corporeorum quam spiritualium, semel creasse f concecutur. Si enim substantiae simplices ex prima materia non sunt, profecto quorum nec materia nec forma tunc aliquid x erat, cum alius simul creata non sunt; non ergo qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul, quod falsum est. Summa autem praedictarum rationum quibus probantur substantiae simplices constare ex materia et forma haec est: creator 114 vere unus est; sed creatum a creatore omnino diversum h est; igitur necesse 115 est ut creatum sit duo.

Item substantiae corporeae i et incorporae nec sunt omnino diversae nec omnino convenientes.

Item 116 omne quod intelligitur dividitur in formam i et formatum.

Item 117 omnia reducuntur ad duas radices per resolventem. Item nulla resolvuntur nisi in ea ex quibus componuntur; sed omnia resolvuntur in duo.

Quamvis 118 autem substantiae simplices ex materia et forma constare k

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112 duo . . . post eum. Cf. op. cit. p. 222, l. 27: duo sunt post unum.
113 Eccl. 16, 1.
116 om. CP.
117 om. MV.
118 materia MV.
119 om. C.
119 erat aliquid CP.
120 add. diversum V.
121 corpore et in corpore M.
122 forma V.
123 constare dicatur om. CP.
124 Item . . . formatum. Cf. op. cit. IV, 6, p. 223, l. 12 omne intelligibile . . . formatum.
125 Item omne . . . per resolventem. Cf. op. cit. p. 225, l. 8 and l. 17.
126 Quamvis . . . 1, 5, p. 58, absolute dicitur. Cf. op. cit. IV, 4, p. 218, II. 20-24: postquam non est . . . superius est eo.
dicantur, non tamen simplices esse negantur. Compositio enim ex materia et forma tantum non tollit simplicitatem quae tantum ex alterius comparatione dicitur. Hoc enim quod simplicitas de rebus creatis et compositis cum magis et minus dicitur evidenter indicatur quia nullae earum simplex absolute dicitur; nullius enim incorporeae creaturae substantia vere simplex est cui hoc non potest esse quod nosse. Non est enim vera simplicitas ubi est composito; sed omnino compositio est ubi est hoc et aliud. Omnis autem creatura est hoc et aliud; nihil est enim quod de ea vere dixeris quin de ea aliquid aliud vere affirmare non possis, cum non sit ei idem esse, vivere et intelligere. Si enim idem esset ei esse et intelligere, profecto sicut una est in omnibus essentia non secundum magis et minus, ita et una esset intelligentia non secundum magis et minus. Si autem una esset intelligentia, una esset cognitio. Sed si una esset cognitio, una esset et dilectio; tantum enim quinque diligens quantum diligendum esse cognoscit; non autem aequae diligentiae ne nec aequae cognoscunt, quia stella 119 a stella differt in claritate. Non sunt ergo aequales in intelligenti, quae tamen aequalia sunt in essentia. Non ergo est eis idem esse et intelligere, sed alium hoc et alium illud. Ubicumque autem est hoc et illud procul dubio compositio est. Non sunt ergo simplices substantiae immunes ab omni compositione; ac per hoc non dicuntur simplices esse quod omni compositione careant, sed quia respectu inferiorem de compositione minus habent, quoniam adhaerentes aeternitati et affixa desiderio uni et eidem creatoris voluntati incommutabili, nulli permutationi subiacent, affectio nomen non variant, in eodem statu semper permanet. Multo minus ergo humanae animae simplices sunt, in quarn essentia tam multiplex virtus est animandi, sensificandi et ad tam diversa corpus movendi et multiplici de causa affectionem commutandi. Quia eaem gaudet, dolet, sperat et metuit, numquam pacata subsistit, et intelligenti eius semper variatur, dum incognito studio addicitur et cognitum per oblivionem subtrahitur; unde non est ei idem esse et intelligere. Sic ergo nulla substantia incorporea absolute simplex est quae hoc et aliud est, quamvis una com- paratione alterius simplicior dicatur quae tamen in se considerata multiplex et composita judicatur.

In solo autem Deo est vera et absoluta simplicitas ubi non est hoc et aliud, qui id ipsum est quod habet ac per hoc non sic habet formam ut alius illi sit scientia quam scit et aliud essentia qua est, sed utrumque unum, quamvis non utrumque dicendum est quod verissime simplex et unum est. Cum enim de Deo aliquid vere dixeris, nihil aliud restat quod de eo vere

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1 autem V.
2 om. V.
3 vel V.
4 quod CP.
5 om. CP.
6 nosce V.
7 enim est C] est om. P.
8 om. CP.
9 om. CP.
10 in omnis una est CP.
11 om. C.
12 diliget C.
13 om. M.
14 inde M.

119 I Cor. XV. 41.
120 In solo ... habet. Cf. Boethius, de Trini-
dicere a possis. Quaecumque enim de Deo secundum substantiam dicuntur multivoca b sunt. Unde cum dicis Deum iustum, hoc dicis esse quod est; cum vero bonum c vel fortet vel sapientem cum dicis, non aliud eum esse quam prius dicis, sed hoc idem aliis modis d repetis; non enim est ipse alius et alius. Solus ergo Deus absolute simplex est, et nulla creatura absolute simplex sed alterius comparatione dicitur.

a om. CP. dic. poss. vere M. 
b sunt mult C. multi vocati sunt M. 
c fort. vel bonum CP. 
d nominibus CMP.
CAPITULUM OCTAVUM

AN ANIMA SIT MORTALIS VEL IMMORTALIS

Merito quasitur de anima an ipsa sit immortalis. Fuerunt enim multi qui dicerent animam non remanere post corpus, dicentes animam spiritum esse qui sicut carne regitur ita et cum carne moritur; unde eti ne negabant resurrectionem corporum. Quod autem in morte corporis ipsa non moritur a philosophis sic probatur: quicquid destruitur ad destructionem alterius pendet ex eo aliquo modo; sed quicquid pendet ex aliquo, nescie est ut vel sit eo posterius vel sit eo prius essentia non tempore, vel habeat simul esse cum eo. Si autem anima sic pendet ex corpore sicut ex eo cum quo habet simul esse et hoc fuerit ei essentiale, tunc essentia uniusciusque illorum d relativa est ad alterum et sic nec corpus nec anima est substantia; sed utrumque est substantia; quare non est hoc eis essentielle. Si autem hoc fuerit eis accidentale, tunc destruo uno illorum destruere relatio quae accidit alteri quod non destruitur ad destructionem alterius, quamvis sic pendet haec ex.

Si autem anima sic pendet ex corpore veluti eo posterius, tunc corpus causa i est esse animae; causae autem quatuor sunt; corpus ergo vel erit causa efficiens animae et dans ei esse vel erit causa receptibilis eius ad modum compositionis sicut elementa recipiunt corpora vel ad modum simplicitatis ut aes imaginis k vel erit causa formalis vel causa perfectiva l sive finalis. Impossibile est autem ut corpus sit causa animae efficiens. Corpus enim ex hoc m quod est corpus non agit aliquod. Non enim agit nisi per virtutem. Si enim ageret per seipsum et non per virtutes suas, tunc omne corpus ageret illam actionem. Deinde omnes virtutes corporea aut sunt accidentia aut formae materiales. Impossibile est autem ut accidentia vel formae existentes in materiis dent esse substantiae existenti per se non in materia. Impossibile est etiam corpus esse causam recipiendam quoniam anima non est impressa in corpore ullo modo ut forma in materia. Ergo corpus non est formata forma animae rationalis nec ad modum compositionis nec ad modum simplicitatis ita ut aliquo pars corporis componatur vel complexionetur aliqua compositione vel complectione a aliqua in qua imprimitur p anima. Impossibile est etiam corpus esse finalem causam animae vel perfectivam. Melius est autem hoc e converso sentire. Igitur anima non pendet ex corpore ut causatum a sua causa essentiali, quamvis complexio et corpus causae sint u animae accidentales; cum enim creatur corpus aptum recipere animam et fit aptitudo instrumentorum, comitatur tunc creari a causis separatis illud quod est anima.

Sed quia quia creato uno creatur et aliud, non tamen idcirco oportet ut uno...
destruendo destruatur et aliud. Non enim hoc \( ^{v} \) contingit nisi cum esse unius fuerit propter \( ^{w} \) esse alterius aut in altero. Saepe enim contingunt aliaeque \( ^{x} \) propter \( ^{y} \) alia quibus destructis remanent illa quia esse illorum non habet esse ex illis, et praeципue, cum id \( ^{z} \) quod dat ei esse fuerit aliud ab illo ex quo utraque \( ^{a} \) habent simul esse. Attribuens igitur esse animae non est corpus nec virtus corporis, sed est sine dubio essentia existens nuda a materia et a mensura; et \( ^{b} \) quandoquidem anima habet esse ab illa et non habet ex corpore nisi \( ^{i} \) debuit horae qua debet esse tantum, tunc non pendent esse \( ^{d} \) eius ex corpore nec est corpus causa eius nisi accidentalis. Ergo non debet dici quod sic pendent \( ^{e} \) anima ex corpore ut corpus debet esse prius anima prioritate causalitatis.\(^{f} \)

Si autem anima pendent ex corpore sicut id quod est prius, sed si \( ^{s} \) haec prioritas fuerit temporalis, tunc impossibile est ut esse animae \( ^{h} \) pendent ex corpore postquam prius est eo in tempore. Si vero prioritas eius fuerit in esse non in tempore, quemadmodum prioritas est ut, cum essentia prioris \( ^{i} \) fuerit, comitetur etiam esse id quod \( ^{j} \) est posterius, et tunc hoc prius non habet esse cum ponitur \( ^{k} \) destrui id quod est posterius, non ut, quia posterius posuimus \( ^{l} \) destructum, omnino oporteat destrui \( ^{m} \) id quod est prius, sed ob hoc quod \( ^{n} \) posterius non potest destrui nisi quia prius accidit priori aliquid in natura sua quod destruxit illud et tunc destruuit posterius. Unde ex positione destructionis posteriornis non provenit destructio prioris, sed positio destructionis ipsius \( ^{o} \) prioris ponit posterius destrui postquam priori accidit destrui in se. Et quandoquidem ita est, oportebit tunc ut causa destructiva prius contingat in substantiam animae propter quam destruatur corpus et ut corpus nullo modo destruatur propter causam quae sit ipsius propria; sed corpus destruatur ex causis quae sunt eius propriae ex permutatione suae complexionis \( ^{p} \) et compositionis; igitur impossibile est ut anima pendent ex corpore sicut prius natura cuius \( ^{q} \) causa postea \( ^{r} \) destruat corpus aliquo modo. Ergo non est inter illa hic modus pendendi; sed nec aliquis aliorum; restat igitur ut nullius corum esse pendent ex altero; esse enim animae pendent ex aliis \( ^{s} \) principiis quae non permutantur \( ^{t} \) neque destruuntur. Igitur anima non moritur in morte corporis.

Dicitus insuper quod nulla causa destruit animam aliquo \( ^{u} \) modo, cuius probatio haec est. Quicquid solet destrui ex aliqua causa quae sit in eo, in illo est potentia destruendi in quo ante destructionem est effectus permanendi. Aptitudo autem eius ad destructionem non est ex suo effectu permanendi. Intentio etenim potentiae diversa est ab intentione effectus, et habitudo huius potentiae diversa est ab habitudine huius effectus, quoniam habitudo huius potentiae est ad destruendum, et habitudo huius effectus est ad permanendum; igitur ad duas res diversas inveniuntur in re una hae duae intentiones.\(^{35} \)

Dicitus igitur quod quamvis in omnibus compositis et simplicibus existenti-

\( ^{v} \) ex hoc M.  
\( ^{w} \) per CP.  
\( ^{x} \) alia CMP] corrected to aliaeque V.  
\( ^{y} \) per P.  
\( ^{z} \) illud C.  
\( ^{a} \) utraque habet M.  
\( ^{b} \) quae M.  
\( ^{c} \) tunc C] nec P.  
\( ^{d} \) eius esse CMP.  
\( ^{e} \) pendent CP.  
\( ^{i} \) fuerit prioris CP.  
\( ^{j} \) quo CP.  
\( ^{k} \) componitur M.  
\( ^{l} \) possumus M.  
\( ^{m} \) om. CP.  
\( ^{n} \) quo CP.  
\( ^{o} \) prioris ipsius CP.  
\( ^{p} \) compos. et comp. CP.  
\( ^{q} \) cum C.  
\( ^{r} \) dest. postea CP.  
\( ^{s} \) princip. aliis CMP.  
\( ^{t} \) permutatur M.  
\( ^{u} \) aliis C.
bus in compositis possunt simul coniungi effectus permanendi et potentia destruendi, in rebus tamen simplicibus separatis per se impossibile est haec duo coniungi, et absolute dicimus quod impossibile est has duas intentiones simul esse in aliquo * unius essentiae.

Quicquid enim permanet et habet posse * destrui, permanendi habet posse; sed permanentia eius non est omnino necessaria, et quia necessaria non est, est utique possibilis; possibilitas autem quae recipit duo extrema est natura potentiae; est igitur in substantia eius potentia permanendi et effectus permanendi. Iam autem ostensum est quod effectus permanentinae illius sine dubio non est potentia permanentinae illius. Effectus igitur permanentinae illius est alicuius quod accidit rei cui inest potentia permanendi. Ipsa igitur potentia non est alicuam essentiam animae in effectu, immo rei cuius essentiae accidit permanere in effectu, verumtamen est veritas essentiae ipsius. Sequitur ergo ex hoc ut eius alicuius sit composita ex aliquo per quod essentia eius sit in effectu, quod est forma in unaquaque re, et ex alicuius cui advenit iste effectus, in natura cuius * est potentia quae est materia eius. Ergo si anima est simplex absolute, profecto non dividitur in materiam et formam, sed si est composita.

Dimittamus nunc compositum et loquamur de substantia quae est eius * materia, dicentes quod ipsa materia vel dividitur sic, scilicet in formam et materiam, quod est impossibile, vel nullo modo destruitur; similiter et anima. Non enim loquimur hic * de re composita ex materia et aliis. * Manifestum est igitur quod in omni eo quod est simplex, non compositum vel est materia compositi, non conveniunt effectus permanendi et potentia destruendi respectu suae essentiae. Si enim fuerit in eo potentia destruendi, non poterit esse in eo effectus permanendi, et e contrario. Manifestum est igitur quod in substantia animae non est potentia corrupendi sed generatorum corruptibilium; corruppitur enim quod compositum et coniunctum est. Potentia vero corruptendi non est in composito secundum quod est unum, sed in materia quae in potentia receptibilis est utrorumque contrariorum. Ergo in destructo composito non est potentia permanendi vel destruendi, nec coniunguntur in eo. Materia autem vel est permanens non per potentiam quae * praeparat eam ad permanendum, sicut quidam d putaverunt, vel est permanens per potentiam qua permanet quae non est potentia destruendi.

Potentia enim destructionis aliud est quod contingit in ea; potentia vero destructionis simplicium quae sunt in materia est in substantia materiae, non in substantia eorum. Demonstratio autem quae necessarium facit hoc est quod omne generatum est corruptibile secundum quod finitur potentia permanendi, et ob hoc necesse est corrupti quod est compositum ex materia et forma in cuius materia est potentia permanendi ipsam formam, et potentia corruptendi simul. Ostensum est igitur humanam animam nullo modo corrupti; et igitur immortalis, et hoc est quod monstrare voluimus.

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* om. C.
* om. CP.
* om. C.
* om. CP.
* om. M.
a lia re CP.
b composita CP.
c qua praeparat MV.
d quiddam V.
CAPITULUM NONUM

DE VIRIBUS ANIMAE

Postquam autem anima rationalis convincitur esse immortalis, considerandae sunt utique omnes vires eius quas exercet dum est in corpore ut ex hoc aperte pateat quis retineat \* exulta a corpore et quas deserat. Primo \* autem 123 sciendum est quia vis ex hoc \* quod est vis essentialiter et principaliter est vis ad aliqumd. Nec potest esse principium alterius rei, nisi illius tantum quia ex hoc quod est vis ad illud, principium est illius. Si autem fuerit principium alterius rei, non tamen ex hoc quod est principium essentialiter illius primi; possibile est enim ut una vis \* sit principium multarum actionum secundario quae oriuntur ex ea, quarum ipsa non est principium principaliter. Sicut visus, 2 cum principaliter \* sit vis apprehendendi colorem, est tamen secundario vis apprehendendi numerum, figuram, \* et situm et motum. Vires 124 ergo ex hoc quod sunt vires non sunt nisi principia actionum propriarum principaliter. Nam omnis vis, ex hoc quod est vis, non est nisi quia ex ea provenit actio quam principaliter habet. Omnis enim vis actionem habet propriam in qua non convenit cum aliis, quamvis unius virtutis aliquando diversae sint actiones secundum diversa receptibilia. Diversitas 125 enim \* actionum provenit ex diversitate virium. Unde vis irascibilis \* non \* patitur ex deliciis, nec concupiscibilis ex nocentientis, nec visus ex aliquo illorum. Non est autem tanta diversitas inter vires inter earum \* actiones. Cum enim vires differant genere vel specie, actiones \* tamen quaedam differunt genere ut apprehendere et movere, quaedam fortitudine et debilitate ut opinari et asserere, quaedam velocietate et tarditate ut subsidis et hebes in discendo, quaedam privatione et habitu, ut movere et quiescere, dubitatio et sententia; \* quaedam differunt materia, ut sentire album et sentire nigrum, vel gustare dulce et gustare amarum. Quapropter unaquaque actio non habet vim \* sibi propriam \* ex qua provenit.

Actionum 127 enim quae \* differunt fortitudine et debilitate principium una vis est, cuius actio aliquando est fortior, aliquando debilior. Si enim debilia propter debilitatem haberent aliam vim quam fortia, oporet \* tunc ut tantus esset numerus virium, quantus est numerus graduam diminuitions et augmenti qui paene infiniti sunt. Unum autem virtuti accidit facere suam actionem fortiori vel debiliorem, quandoque secundum quod fuerit opera-

\* Capt. nonum, om. all mss.
\* De viribus animae] anima exuta a corpore quas retineat vires et quas non, quod ut appareat de viribus animae est tractandum \* (r.m.) \* om. M.
\* retinet MPV.
\* primum CP.
\* eo M.
\* om. M.
\* add. est M.

123 Primo autem . . . L. 9, principaliter. Cf. op. cit. I. 4, f. 4v, 2C: Dicemus igitur . . . earum principaliter.
124 Vires ergo . . . L. 17, ex nocentientis. Cf. op. cit. V. 7, f. 27r, 1B: omnis virtus . . . ex nocentientis.
125 Diversitas . . . virium. Cf. Avic. V. 7,
tio, quandoque secundum aptitudinem instrumenti, quandoque secundum prohibentiam. * extrinsecus nec sit vel ne non sit, vel ut * augeretur vel minuat ur actio. Sed principium actionem quae differunt genere, ut apprehendere et movere, vel apprehendere colorem vel apprehendere saporem, dubitari solet an sit una vis, et an omnes vires apprehendentes sint una vis. Anima enim habet apprehensiones per se ipsam quae sunt intelligibles et alias apprehensiones per instrumenta quae diversae sunt secundum diversitatem instrumentorum. Si autem intelligibles et sensibles actiones fuerint quasi ex duas viribus, tunc iterum quae timui an omnes sensibles quae intus imaginantur et quae extrinsecus apprehenduntur sint * ex una vi. Si autem quae intus fuerint fuerint ex una vi vel ex multis viribus, quae timui tunc an exteriores sint ex una vi quae operatur actiones diversas in b instrumentis diversis; non enim prohibetur una vis apprehendere res diversas genere aut * specie, sicut intellectus et imaginatio. Sensata 128 etenim * communia, quae sunt magnitudine, numerus, motus et quies et figura, quandoque sentiuntur uno sensum, quandoque 1 aliquibus eorum, quamvis hoc fiat mediante alio sensato. Deinde an vis movendi ipsa sit vis apprehendendi et an vis concupiscendi ipsa sit vis irascendi quia cum praesentatur * aliquid quod detectat, patitur uno modo, et cum praesentatur quod molestat, patitur alio modo? Una 129 enim et eadem vis operatur * contraria et una vis movet volupatibus diversis, immo 1 una vis operatur actiones diversas in diversis materiis. Quamvis ergo omnis actio proveniat ex aliqua vi, non tamen tot sunt vires quot 1 earum actiones.

Verissime 129 autem scimus quod omnium virium una * quandoque impedit alteram, et altera imperat alteri et retrahitur altera propter alteram a propria actione; quod non fieret, nisi unum vinculum haberent in quo coniungeretur omnem, quod eis dominaretur, et quod propter alias impediretur regere alias. Nisi enim quaelibet vis haberet aliquid 1 in quo coniungeretur alii, hoc est, si instrumentum non esset commune nec subjectum commune nec aliquid aliud esset commune in quo coniungeretur, 1 una non retrabere aliam a sua actione. Quomodo enim hoc esset cum nos videamus quod sensus aliquando augmentat cupiditatem et virtus concupiscibilis non patiatur ex sensato secundum quod est sensatum? Si autem patitur 1 non ex hoc quod est sensatum, tunc ipsa passio non est ex concupiscencia illius sensati. Oportet ergo sine dubio ut concupiscibilis sit quae sentit. Impossibile es autem duas vires esse unam. Manifestum est igitur quia aliquid unum 1 est habens duas vires. Unde verum est dicere, quia sensimus, concupivimus, et quia vidimus hoc et hoc, irati sumus. Illud autem unum, in quo coniunguntur haec vires, est id per quod cognoscit unusquisque quae sit sua sententia ita ut possit vere dicere,

128 Sensata etenim * . . . 1. 19, patitur uno modo. * Ibid. 2B: Sensata . . . patitur alio modo.
129 Una . . . materiis. * Ibid.
quia sensi, concupivi. Hoc autem unum impossibile es: esse corpus. Corpus enim ex hoc quod est corpus non potest esse id in quo coniunguntur hae vires, aliquin omne corpus haberet has vires, sed ex alio propter quod fit auspum ad hoc quod primo est coniungens et est perfectio corporis secundum quod est coniungens; ergo illud aliquis alius est a corpore; secundo quia manifestum est aliquas isterar virium nec esse corporeas nec subsistere in corpore, ut irascibile "et concupiscibile et intellectus et alias 'suismodi. Est igitur non corpus quoniam in eo quod est non corpus possunt coniungi hae vires, quorum quaedam emanant ad instrumenta et quaedam sunt propriae ipsius." Quae autem exercentur instrumento coniunguntur in principio quod coniungit eas instrumentum; quod principium procedit ab anima in instrumento. Manifestum est ergo quia unum est in quo omnes hae vires coniunguntur et cui omnes reddunt ca quae apprehendant, et illud non est corpus. Restat ergo ut illud sit anima, quae quamvis sit una essentiale et, ab ea tamen fluunt multa in membra diversa. Cuius cum infinitae sint vires, tamen dum est in corpore, tres principalis vires habet: primam vegetandi quals est in plantis, secundam sensificandi quals est in bruis animalibus, tertiam ratiocinandi qualis est in hominibus.

Vegetare autem est movere partes vegetati a centro ad extrema. Sed anima secundum quod est vegetabilis habet tres vires, scilicet virtutem nutritivam, augmentativam et generativam. Vis autem nutritiva est vis convertens corpus quod est nutrimentum a corporeitate in quo erat in similitudinem corporis in quo est, et unit e pro restauratione eius quod resolutum est de illo. Nutrimentum vero est corpus quod solet assimilari naturae corporis cuius dicitur esse nutrimentum et restaurat ei quantum resolutum est de illo vel plus vel minus. Augmentativa vero est vis augens corpus in quo est per corpus quod assimilat illi augmento proportionali omnibus suis dimensionibus quae sunt longitudo, latitudo, spissitudo, ut perducat rem ad suam perfectionem. Generativa vero vis est accipiens de corpore in quo est partem illi similis in potentia et operatur in ea, per attractionem aliorum corporum quae illi assimilat, generationem et complexionem et convertit eam in similitudinem ipsius in effectu.

Anima ergo per virtutem vegetandi tria operatur quia nutrit, augmentat et generat, sed ministrantibus sibi in hoc quatuor virtutibus naturalibus quae sunt attractiva, retentiva, digestiva, expulsiva, cum suis quatuor qualitatis, duabus activis, caliditate scilicet et frigiditate, et duabus passivis, humiditate et siccitae. Nam primo calor movet materias, deinde frigiditas

\[ 66 \]
facit eas quiescere in suis perfectionibus creaturarum et consummat m eam, 
deinde sequitur humiditas quae est receptibilis figurae; postea sequitur 
sicitas quae conservat figuram et iuvat ad retinendum eam.

Notandum 135 autem quod ex omnibus viribus animae vegetabilis sola vir-
tus nutritiva n est quae operatur omni tempore vitae singularis. Quae dum 
permanserit exercens suas o actiones, profecto vegetabile p et animal q erunt 
viva. Si r vero destructa fuerit, non remanent s viva.

Augmentativa 137 vero a principio operatur quousque res perficiatur, et 
deinde cessat eius operatio s commendantur nutritivae. Generativa 138 vero in 
principio operatur et statim eius operatio perfectur commendantur regimini u 
virtutum nutritivae et augmentativae. Quae postea iterum excitatur ut 
creetur v res sui generis, cuius duae sunt actiones: una est creare corpus et 
figurare et lineamentare, w altera est attribuere partibus eius in operatione 
secunda formas rerum, scilicet virtutes et dimensiones et x numeros et 
figuras y et asperitatem et lenitatem et alia his adhaerentia; in quo s serviunt 
ei virtus e nutritiva et augmentativa, illa nutriendo, ista dilatando et elon-
gando secundum b quod res meretur. Virtus ergo nutritiva servit augmenta-
tivae et ambae servient generativae.

Sed virtus nutritiva appetit ut per eam substantia cuiuslibet singularis con-
servertur, et augmentativa appetit ut per eam substantia singularis perficiatur.

Generativa vero appetit ut per eam permaneat species. Nutritiva enim rest-
auratur quod resolvitur de singulari, et generativa restauratur quod resolvitur de 
specie. Augmentativa vero apponit quod rei deest de perfectione. Hae sunt 
vires animae vegetabilis.

 Multi autem videtur has actiones non esse animae sed naturae, sicut 
divinis e qui dicunt d arbusta vivere non per animam sed per viriditatem. 
Sed actiones naturae et animae in hoc differunt quod actiones naturae semper 
eodem modo, actiones vero animae diversis modis fiunt. Unde 139 motus na-

turae semper ad unam partem tantum, motus vero animales ad diversa. Unde 

si motus arboris motus naturae esset, non simul moveretur s unum et idem 
corpus oppositus motibus ut t in radicibus s deorsum ad centrum, et in ramis 
sursum a centro. Unde fortior est operatio animae quam naturae quia anima 
agit in naturam sed non e converso ut b appareat in plantis in quibus gravia 
feruntur sursum contra naturam.

DE i ANIMA SENSIBILIS SECUNDUM QUOD EST SENSIBILIS

Secundum 140 autem quod anima est i sensibilis duo operatur, scilicet sensum 
et motum voluntarium. Unde secundum hoc duas k vires habet motivam

= consumit P] consumat MV.
= nutritiva virtus CMP.
= actiones suas V.
= vegabile V.
= animalis M.
= si vero fuerint dest. V] si vero dest. sunt C.
= remanent P.
= add. et deinde C.
= virtutum regimini CP.
= creatur C] creatur P.
= liniamentare MV.  

De omn. V.

135 Notandum autem ... l. 7, remanent viva. Cf. ibid. 1A: ergo virtus ... crunt viva.
136 Augmentativa ... nutritivae. Ibid. 2A: Augmentativa ... nutritivae.
137 Generativa ... l. 23, de specie. Cf. ibid.  
2B: Sed generativa ... de specie.

= figuram V.
= virtutes M.
= divinus VP.
= dicit P.
= movetur M.
= quod CP.
= radices CP.
= quod M.
= De ... sensibilis om. PV.
= om. M.
= vires duas habet C] duas habet vires P.

2A: Si autem ... tantum.
140 Secundum autem ... l. 6, p. 69, vis in essentia. Cf. op. cit. I, 5, f. 4v, 2B: Anima autem ... una in essentia.

[ 67 ]
scilicet et apprehensivam. Sed motiva est duobus modis quia aut est movens eo quod imperat motui, aut est movens eo quod efficit motum.

Sed vis motiva secundum quod est imperans motui est vis appetitiva vel desiderativa, quae, cum imaginatur aliquid quod appetitur vel respiitur, imperat aliis virtutis motivae ut moveat. Quae habet duas partes; unam quae dicitur vis concupiscibilis quae est vis imperans moveri ut appropinquetur ad id quod putatur necessarium vel utile appetitu deflectamenti; aliam quae vocatur irascibilis quae est vis imperans moveri ut fugiatur ab eo quod putatur nocivum vel corrupens appetitu vincendi.

Vis autem motiva secundum quod efficit motum est vis infusa nervi et musculis. Quae aliquando contrahit cordas et ligamenta coniuncta membris versus principium, in quo servit irascibili cum fugit quod molestat. Aliquando vero relaxat et extendit in longum convertens cordas et ligamenta et contrario contra principium, in quo servit concupiscibili cum appetitur quod delectat.

Vis autem apprehensiva duplex est. Alia est enim vis quae apprehendit a foris; alia est quae apprehendit ab intus. Sed apprehendens a foris dividit in quinque vel in octo scilicet visum, auditum, odoratum, gustum et tactum.

Visus autem est vis sita in nervo concavo ad apprehendendum formam eius quod formatur in humore cristallino ex similitudinibus corporum coloratorum venientibus per corpora radiosa in effectu ad superficies corporum tesorum.

Auditus est vis sita in nervo expanso in superficie nervi optici ad apprehendendum formam eius quod sibi advenit ex commotione aeris, qui constringitur inter percutiens et percussum resistens ei constrictione violenta, ex qua provenit sonus, et pervenit eius commotio ad aerem collectum quietum in concavitate nervi optici movens illum ad instar sui motus, et commotiones illius motus tangunt nervum.

Odoratus est vis sita in duabus carunculis anterioris partis cerebri, similibus mamillarum capitibus, ad apprehendendum id quod offerit ei aer attractus ex odore qui est in vapore permixto cum aere, aut ex odore impresso in illo ex permutaione quae sit ex corpore odorifer.

Gustus est vis sita in nervo expanso super corpus linguae ad apprehendendum saiores resolutus de corporibus contingentibus ipsam cum permiscendur humoris unctuoso linguae permixtione permutanti.

Tactus est vis sita in nervis cutis totius corporis et eis carnisibus ad apprehendendum id quod tangit illum, et afficit contrarietatem permutante complexionem vel permutante affectionem compositionis. Videtur autem quibusdam haec vis non esse species specialissima sed genus quatuor virium aut etiam plurium diffusarum simul in toto corpore. Quam una discernit
contrarietatem quae est inter calidum et frigidum; alia discernit contrarietatem quae est inter humidum et siccum; tertia discernit contrarietatem quae est inter asperum et lene, et propter has superius dixit vel octo. Sed quia collectio harum virium tactibilium est in uno instrumento, ideo computantur una esse vis in essentia. Notandum autem quia sicut ad tactum haec octo vel decem pertinet, similitur ad unumquodque aliorum pertinente totidem.

Ad gustum enim pertinet octo sapore quam qui sunt dulcedo et amaritudo, et p aceto et p stipticitas, ponticitas et acuitas, unctuesitas et insipiditas. Insipidum autem videtur quod non habet saporem et est sicut id quod gustatur de aqua vel de albugine (sic) ovi. Ceteri vero multiplicati sunt per hoc quod sunt medi in, et praeter hoc quod afficiunt gustum sunt etiam quidam eorum qui afficiunt tactum quia ex natura saporiva et affectione tactiva componitur unum quod quod non discernitur sensu et fit illud unum quasi sapor purus discretus. Saporibus autem qui sunt medi in extremos vel adiungitur solutio et calefacio et haec compositio vocatur acuitas, vel adiungitur sapor et solutio sine calore et fit acerdo, vel cum sapore adiungitur et siccarea et spissare et fit ponticitas; similitur autem et in aliis.

Ad odoratum quod pertinet octo, de quibus apud nos non habentur nomina nisi duo, scilicet fetor et odor. Cetero vero designantur cum adiectione nominem saporum ut odor dulcis et odor acidus, quasi odores qui solent coniungi cum saporibus non comparentur nisi illis nec cognoscantur sine illis.

Ad auditum quoque pertinet octo sed carent nominibus; designantur tamen nominibus transumptis ut sonus, alius acutus, alius gravis, alius debilis, alius fortis, alius durus, alius mollis, alius asper, alius lenis. Sed haec divisio soni est secundum accidentia; primum enim sensibile est sonus sed ea quae accidunt ei sunt haec.

Ad visum etiam pertinet octo quorundum principales sunt duo, scilicet albedo et nigredo, sed album paulatim fit nigrum (tribus) viis; una est primum in subappendium et haec est progressio pura. Cum enim fuerit progressio pura, prius pervenit ad subappendium et deinde ad pallidum et tam diu sic quousque fiat nigrum, quia hoc modo procedendo non cessat paulatim intendi nigredo sola quousque fiat pura nigredo. Alia autem via est prius ad subrubeum, deinde ad rubeum, postea ad nigredinem: tertia vero via est qua primum itur ad viriditatem, deinde ad indicum, postea ad nigredinem,
et in istis modis non potest esse diversitas nisi secundum diversitatem eius ex quo componuntur colores medi.

Notandum autem quod inter omnes sensus quibus animal est animal, tactus est principalior; sicut enim omne quod habet terrenam animalam habet virtutem nutritivam et potest non habere aliquam aliarum sed non convertitur. Sic omne quod habet animam sensibilem habet sensum tangendi et potest non habere aliquem aliorum sed non convertitur. Qualis est ergo virtus nutritiva comparatione aliarum virium ad animam terrenam sive vegetabilem, talis est tactus comparatione aliarum virium ad animam sensibilem quod ideo fit quia prima compositio animalis fit ex qualitatis tactibilis.

Gustus autem quamvis inter gustata indicet id a per quod vita permanet, tamen destructo gustu potest remanere animal. Alii autem sensus, licet cooperentur ad inquendum nutrimentum conveniens et ad fugiendum quod est nocens, non tamen iuvat ad sciendum si aer est adureka vel congelans, et quod fames est desiderium siccit et calidit et sitis est desiderium frigidit et humidi. Nutrimentum enim huiusmodi fit ex qualitatibus quas apprehendit tactus. Tactus igitur est primus sensuum qui est necessarius omni terreno animali. Unde cum ceterorum sensuum instrumenta sint membra aliqua, instrumentum tactus est tota cutis circumdans corpus. Quia enim sensus iste est conservans corpus ab accidentibus quae nocent, profecto si consisterent in aliqua membrorum, tunc cum adderet ei alicub noxium, oporteret ut totum corpus penetretur sentiens per tectum. Quia vero aliis sensus apprehendunt res non contingentes et de procul, sufficit ut eorum instrumentum sit unum membro cui, cum sacrambi sibi coniunctum fecerit nocentum, caveat sibi anima ab eo et separat corpus a parte illa. Si autem instrumentum tangendi esset aliquid unum ex membris, tunc non percipieret anima de corrupentibus nisi quantum contingenter illumin membro tantum. Praeter hoc etiam tactus potest esse sine alius sensibus. Alii vero sensus non possunt fieri sine tactu quod manifeste appareat in gustu et auditu. Hi autem sensus non ab omnibus animalibus habentur aequaliter; a quibusdam enim habentur fortius et a quibusdam debiliter et a quibusdam habentur omnia et a quibusdam non omnia. Sensibilium ergo alia superant alia qualitate et numero horum quinque sensuum, alia qualitate et non numero, alia numero et non qualitate, alia nec numero nec qualitate.

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1 om. C.
2 om. CP.
1 principalis CP.
3 ergo est CP.
4 om. M.
5 add. terrenam, talis est tactus comparatione aliarum virium ad animam C.
6 indicet CP.
7 om. CP.
8 permanere CP.
9 etiam M.
10 cooperantur MPV.

146 Notandum ... ex qualitatis tactilibus. Cf. op. cit. II. 3, f. 7v, 2A: Primum sensuum ... ex qualitatis tactilibus.
146 Gustus autem ... quas apprehendit tactibus. Ibid.

16 instrumentum ... l. 29, illud membrum tantum. Cf. op. cit. II. 3, f. 8r, 2D: Ex proprietatis ... contingenter illud.

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DE INTERIORIBUS VIRTUTIBUS ANIMALIUM

Virtus vero apprehendens ab intus duplex est, quoniam alia apprehendit formas sensibilium, alia intentiones sensibilium; interest autem inter apprehendere formam et apprehendere intentionem. Forma enim est id quod apprehendit sensus interior et exterior simul, sed sensus exterior prius, et deinde reddit eam interiori. Formam igitur apprehendit ovis exteriore sensu cum videt figuram lupi et affectionem et colorem. Intentionem vero apprehendit cum iudicat ut illum expavescat et ab eo fugiat, quamvis hoc non apprehenderit sensus exterior aliquo modo. Idcirco quod de lupo primo apprehendit sensus exterior et postea interior vocatur hic proprie forma. Quod vero apprehendunt vires interiores absque sensu vocatur hoc loco intentio.

Virium ergo apprehendentium ab intus prima est phantasia quae est sensitiva communis, et haec vis est sita in principio prima concavitatis cerebri recipiens per seipsum omnes formas quae imprimitur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei.

Post hanc est vis imaginativa sive formativa quae est sita in extremo anterioris concavitatis cerebri retinens quod recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanent in ea post remotionem illorum sensibilium.

Post hanc autem sequitur vis quae vocatur imaginatio comparatione animae sensibilis, sed cogitatio comparatione animae humanae, quae est sita in principio mediae concavitatis cerebri ubi est nervus qui secundum quod vult, solet coniungere et dividere inter se aliquo de his quae retinet forma.

Post hanc est virtus aestimativa, quae est sita in summo mediae concavitatis cerebri, apprehendens intentiones non sensatas quae sunt in singulis sensibilibus, sicut vis quae est in ovo diiudicans quod ab hoc lupo est fugiendum et quod huius agni est miserendum. Videtur autem haec vis operari in imaginatis compositionem et divisionem.

Ad ultimum autem est vis memorialis sive reminiscibilis, quae est sita in posteriore concavitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit aestimatio de intentionibus non sensatis singularum sensibilium. Tali est autem comparatio virtutis memoriales ad virtutem aestimationis qualis est comparatio virtutis imaginativa ad sensum; et talis est comparatio virtutis imaginativa ad intentiones qualis est comparatio virtutis aestimativa ad formas sensatas.

Quod autem has quinque vires anima habeat intrinsecus ratio deprehendit.

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148 Virtus . . . hoc loco intentio. Cf. op. cit. I. 5, f. 5r, 1C: sed virium apprehendentium . . . nomine intentionis.
149 Virium . . . l. 18, illorum sensibilium.
Et primum de sensu communi qui est phantasia. Nam sensus communis est virtus cui redduntur omnia sensata; quae virtus si non esset quae apprehenderet coloratum et tactum, non possemus discernere inter illa nec dicere quia hoc non est illud. Sed haec distinctio non fit ab intellectu quamvis operat ut intellectus inventiat ea simul quosque discernat ea inter se; secundum enim quod sensata sunt et secundum quod redduntur a sensatis non apprehendit ea intellectus sed abstracta; nos autem discernimus inter illa. Oportet igitur ut coniuncta sint apud discernentem vel in essentia eius vel extra; imposibile est autem hoc fieri in intellectu; resta: ergo ut hoc fiat in alia virtute. Si enim non coniungentur in imaginatione animalium quae carent intellectu, cum inclinarentur proprio desiderio ad dulcedinem, scilicet quod res quae est huiusmodi formae est dulcis, cumviderent eam non appeterent eam ad comedendum. Praeter hoc etiam, si non esset apud nos virtus apprehendens quod hic homo albus est iste minus eo quod audivi mus eum canentem, non probaretur nobis eius iocularitas ex sua albedine et e converso.

Item si non esset in animalibus virtus in qua coniungentur formae sensatorum, difficile esse esset ei vivere, scilicet si olfactus non ostenderet saporem et si sonus non ostenderet saporem et si forma baculi non rememoraret formam doloris ita ut fugiatur ab eo. Oportet igitur sine dubio ut formae istae habeant unum aliquid in quo coniungantur intrinsecus. Ostendit etiam nobis esse huius virtutis consideratio rerum quae ostendunt se habere instrumentum praeter sensus exteriores, sicut videmus, quod ei, qui in circuitt volvitur, videtur quicquid est in circuitt moveri, quod vel est accidentis quod accidit visibilibus vel est accidentis quod accident instrumentum quo perficitur visus; sed hoc in visibilibus non est quia nova circumvolvuntur; igitur in alio est. Vertigo etenim non fit nisi causa motus vaporis qui est in cerebro et in spirito qui est ibi est accidit spiritui circumvolvi; ergo virtutis quae ebi est accidit circumvolvi.

Item imagines quae videntur in somnis aut sunt ex descriptione formae in thesauru retinente formas aut ex alia virtute. Si autem fient ex descriptione formae in thesauru, tunc quicquid ibi custoditur esset praesens animae, non pars eius tantum, ut quasi illa sola pars tantum sic visa vel audit in somnis; sed hoc non est. Si autem ex alia virtute, tunc ex virtute quae est sensus exterior vel sensus interior; sed sensus exterior non prodest in somnis quia aliquando qui imaginat colores privatus est oculis; restat ergo ut hoc fiat in sensu interiore. Impossibile est autem hoc fieri nisi in principio sensuum

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151 Nam ... l. 29, accidit circumvolvi. Cf. op. cit. IV, 1, f. 17r, 2A: Nam sensus communis ... f. 17v, 1A: quod iam expeditivum.

152 Item imagines ... l. 8, p. 73, sive formativa. Cf. ibid. 1A: imagines quae sunt ... vocatur formalis.
interiorum; quae cum imperat ci virtus aestimativa et vult propalare quod est in thesauru, ostendit, licet fiat hoc etiam in vigilantе in quо, cum firmitе fuerint stabilitа, sensаtа erunt quasi praeсentiа. Et haec virtus est illa quae vocatur phantаsіa sive sensus communis quia 1 est communis omnium sensuum a qua derivatur aliae et cui omnes reddunt sensum, et ipsа est vere quae senti. Sed quia inutile est aliqua = recipere nisi contingat illud retinere, ideo sequitur alia virtus quae retinet id quod haec apprehendit, et haec 0 virtus vocatur imaginativa sive 0 formativa.

Quae 183 et 0 sensus communis videntur a esse quasi una virtus eo quod unum habent 7 subiectum, scilicet primam concavitatem cerebri; sed tamen 8 in forma differunt quia aliquis est id 9 quod recipit, aliud id 0 quod retinet; quod apparat in aqua quae siquidem potentiam habet recipiens insculp- tiones 9 et limatione 0 sed non habet potentiam retinendi eas. Sic 9 et istae duas vires diversae sunt quia formam rei sensibilis retinet haec virtus quae vocatur formativa 9 vel imaginativa, sed non discernit illam ullo modo nisi hoc z tantum quia retinet eam. Sensus vero communis, sive phantаsіа, et sensus exterores recipiens et discernit aliquo modo et diuidunt. Dictum enim quia 9 hoc mobile nigrum est et hoc rubicundum acidum est; per hanc autem virtutem nihil discernitur de omni eо quod est in ca nisi hoc tantum quia hoc et illud continetur in illa.b

Sed quia certissime scimus in natura nostra esse ut componamus et dividamus sensibilis inter se ad instar formarum quas vidimus 9 extra, quamvis non videamus eas 4 esse vel non esse, idcirco oportet ut in nobis sit virtus quae 10 hoc operetur 1 et haec est virtus quae cum intellectus sibi imperat vocatur cogitatio, sed cum virtus animalis sibi 8 imperat, vocatur imaginatio.h

Deinde aliquando 1 diiudicamus de sensibilibus per intentiones quas non sentimus vel quia in natura sua non sunt sensibles aliquo modo vel quia sunt 1 sensibles sed nos 2 non sentimus eas in hora iudicii. Sed quae non sunt sensibles ex natura sua sunt sicut inimicitiae et malitia et quae a se diffugiant sicut hoc quod ovis apprehendit de lupo, et concordia quam habet cum socia 1 sua. Quae vero sunt sensibles sunt sicut cum videmus aliquid = ceruleum, iudicamus esse mel et dulce; hoc enim non reddit nobis sensus in ipsa hora cum ipsum sit de genere sensatorum, et haec 0 sunt res quas apprehendit anima 0 sensibilis ita quod sensus non doceat eam aliquid de his; tunc virtus qua haec apprehenduntur est alia virtus et vocatur aestimativa. Aestimatio enim operatur in homine iudicia propria ex quibus est illud, cum anima perti-

1 offendi М.  
2 etiam hoc C] et hoc P.  
3 quia est com. om. N.  
4 = aliquod C.  
5 om. C.  
6 vel C.  
7 = est М.  
8 videtur CV.  
9 habet CMP.  
10 om. М.  
11 om. М.  
12 om. MNV.  
13 impressiones CP.  
14 = lineationes CP] linationes М.  
15 = sed CN.  
16 im. vel for. CP.  
17 = quia tant. ret. haec eam C.  
18 = quod CP.  
19 = ea NP.  
20 = vidi М.  
21 = esse C.  
22 = quа N.  
23 = operatur М.  
24 = om. C.  
25 = imaginativa N.  
26 = deind. aliq. CP.  
27 = sens. sunt CP.  
28 = om. CP add. cum habet N.  
29 = sua socia P.  
30 = aliquam C.  
31 = haec MV.  
32 = om. М.  
33 = animam М.  

183 Quae et sensus . . . l. 13, p. 75, quae intelligitur hominis. Cf. ibid. IA: formae autem quae sunt . . . quae intelligitur hominis. (End of chapter.)
naciter negat esse res quae non imaginantur, nec describuntur in ea et omnino non vult credere eas esse. Et haec virtus sine dubio consistit in nobis quae est domina iudicis in animali iudicium non definitum, sicut est iudicium intellectuale, immo iudicium imaginarum conjunctum cum singularitate et forma sensibili; et ex hac virtute emanat quam plures actiones animalium.

Usus autem est ut id quod apprehendit sensus vocetur forma et quod apprehendit aestimatio vocetur intelectio. Sed unaqueaque istorum, scilicet forma et intelectio, habet thesaurum suum. Thesaurus enim eius quod apprehendit aestimatio est virtus imaginativa vel formativa cuius locus est anterior pars cervi. Unde cum contingit in ea infirmitas, corrupitur hic modulus formalis ita ut vel imaginat formas quae non sunt, vel vix retinet quod est in illa. Thesaurus vero apprehendentis intentionem est virtus retentiva sive custoditiva cuius locus est posterior pars cervi; et ideo, cum contingit ibi infirmitas, corrupitur haec virtus, cuius proprium est custodire has intentiones, quae vocatur etiam memoriales. Sed vocatur retentiva ob hoc quia id quod est in ea firmaret haeret, et vocatur memoriales propter velocitatem suae aptitudinis ad recordandum per quod formatur cum rememorat post oblivionem; quod fit cum aestimatio convertitur ad suam virtutem imaginativa et repraesentat sibi unaquamque formarum quae sunt in ea, ita ut quasi modo videat quod ipsae sint formas eius. Cum vero ostensa fuerit forma, apprehendet intentionem quae erat deleta et apparebit ei intelectio, sicut appuruerat prius, et stabilet eam in se virtus memoriale, sicut stabilirat prius, et fit memoria. Aliqua vero de intentione pervenit ad formam, et memoria tunc non habet comparationem ad id quod est in thesauru retiniendis, sed ad id quod est in thesauru imaginandi, et tunc erit eius conversio vel ad intentiones quae sunt in retentiva ita ut intcntio faciat sibi formam appareire necessario; et tunc reedit iterum comparatio ad id quod est in imaginacione vel erit eius conversio ad sensum. Ad intentiones autem fit conversio veluti cum obitus fueris comparationis tuae ad aliam formam quam tu iam scieras, considerabis actionem quae appetebatur per illam, et, cum inveneris eam, scies quem sapor eum quam figuram vel quem color est debeat habere et revocabitur comparatio tui ad formam quae est in imaginacione et restitues obilam comparationem in memoriam.

Thesaurus enim intellectus memoria est quae retinet intentionem. Si autem id hoc modo fuerit impedimentum ita ut non facile intelligatur, erit conversio ad sensum, et, si sensus reddiderit tibi formam rei, revocabitur et
residebit in imaginatione; et redibit comparatio tui ad illam et residebit in memoria. Et haec virtus quae componit { inter formam et formam, et inter formam et intentionem, et { inter intentionem et intentionem est quasi virtus aestimativa; et hoc propter locum, non propter hoc quod iudicat, immo quia { facit pervenire ad iudicium. Unde assignaverunt locum eius in mediate cerebrui ut haberet communitatem cum intentione et cum forma.

Videtur autem quod virtus aestimativa sit virtus cogitativa et imaginativa et memorialis, et quod ipsa est diiudicans. Sed per scipsam est diiudicans, per motus vero suos et actiones suas est imaginativa et memorialis. Sed est imaginativa per id quod operatur in formis, et est memorialis per id quod est eius { ultima actio; sed retentiva est virtus sibi thesauri. Et videtur quod formalis et cogitativa huius sit memoria quae provenit ex intentione ipsa quae intelligitur hominis.

Dicimus 184 ergo quia virtus formalis, quae est imaginatio, ipsa est ultima in { qua resident { formae sensibilium, et facies eius quam habet ad sensibilium est sensus communis. Sensus autem communis quicquid redidunt ei sensus exteriores reddit { virtuti formalis quasi ad reponendum et ipsa reponit. Aliquando autem virtus formalis reponit quaedam quae non sunt apprehensa sensu. Virtus vero cogitativa convertit { ad formas quae sunt in hac virtute formalis ad componendum eas et dividendum quoniam suat subjecta ipsius; et { cum ex eis componatur formam { vel = divisorit, poterit reponere in illa. Illa enim non est thesaurus huius { formae secundum quod forma componatur ad aliquem vel secundum quod est adveniens ab intus vel de foris, sed est thesaurus eius { eo quod ipsa est { ipsa forma abstracta { hoc modo abstractionis.

Si autem haec forma eo modo quod est compositionis vel divisionis adveniet de foris, profecto haec virtus retereret eam, vel etiam si appareret huic virtuti ex alia causa. Cum enim contingenter { ex alia causa, scilicet vel ex imaginacione vel ex cogitatione vel ex aliqua figururum caelestium ut appareat in formali aliqua forma, et intellectus fuerit absens vel cessans ab inspiciendo, possibile est tunc describi aliquid in sensu communi ita ut audiat et videat sonos et colores quae non habent esse extra, nec aliquid de illis est extra. Et saepe iste contingit hoc cum negligenst est virtus intelligibilis, { quia cum anima rationalis occupatur circa alia et non { custodit aestimationem et imaginacionem, profecto confortatur { imaginativa sive formativa in suis propriis actionibus ita ut formae etiam imaginentur sive videantur ei quasi sensatae.

Quod ideo fit quoniam omnes { hae virtutes sunt virtutes { unius animae deservientes { et. Unde cum anima occupatur circa aliquam earum, ipsa retinet eam { ne adiuvet alias nec conservet eas ab errore ipsarum et revocet

184 Dicimus . . . l. 19, p. 76, de qua magis curat. Cf. ibid. 17v, 2A . . . 18r, 1B: Agemus prius . . . de qua magis curat.
eas ad viam rectitudinis. Anima etenim, cum occupata fuerit circa interiora, non solet curare de exterioribus quantum deberet; cum vero occupata fuerit circa exteriora, praetermitte gubernare virtutes interiores. Ipsa enim cum intente considerat sensibilias exteras, ea hora, qua de his tractat, debilitatur eius imaginatio et memoria. Cum vero obedit actionibus virtutis concupiscibilis, debilitantur actiones virtutis & irascibilis, et e converso; et omnino cum obiedierit dispositioni actionum motivarum debilitantur actiones apprehensivae, et e converso.

Cum vero non fuerit & occupata actionibus huius vel illius, sed fuerit tranquilla veluti separatas, tunc fortior et oportet inter virtutes accidit ut operetur et superet. Cum vero occupata fuerit una virtute et ob hoc praetermissit refrenare aliam quae non retrahitur a suis actionibus superficiei nisi per custodiam animae et aecessstiones circa se, tunc confortatur illa virtus et discurrit per actiones suas naturales.

Hoc autem quod contingit animam d aliquando non e occupari actione alicuius virtutis quandoque fit insirmitate vel debilitate quae impedit et retrahit a perfectione, sicut fit in languoribus et terroribus, quandoque in quiete, sicut in dormitioine, et tunc id d de quo curiosissime est nihil aliud est nisi imperare virtutis de qua magis curat.

Deinde virtus imagitativa est virtus quam aliquando retrahit anima a sua propria actione duobus modis; uno h cum occupatur anima sensibus exterioribus et convertit virtutem formalem i ad operandum in suis j exterioribus et movet k eam per id quod reddet ei de illis ita ut non permitat imaginativam l cogitare quia retrahit eam a sua propria actione; et formalis etiam impeditur ne posset coniungi imaginativaque; et hic est unus modus. Aliquando autem anima praevalet super eam in suis actionibus quae coniunguntur ei de cognitione m et cogitatione, et hoc duobus modis. Uno cum dominatur imaginativa et subicit eam sibi et sensum a communem cum ea ad componentem formas alicuas et disiungendum o secundum quod anima concuspicat. Unde tunc non licet p imaginativaque agere quod debet agere naturaliter, sed trahitur a partem illam ad quam trahit eam anima rationalis. Alio q cum revocat eam ab imaginationibus quae non assimilantur rebus extrinsecis et retrahit eam ab his falsificando e eas. Unde non multum licet ei effigiare eas et praesentare.

Cum autem imaginativa t impeditur utroque modo, debilitatur eius actio. Remoto vero utroque impedimento sicut fit in hora dormiendi u vel in languoribus qui debilitant corpus et impedunt animam ne habeat intellectum et cognitionem sicut fit in terrore v cum debilitatur anima et quasi dissolvitur propter w id quod timetur, et tunc retrahitur ab intellectu, vel quia debilis est, vel quia timet ne contingat res corporales, tunc imaginatio

\[ a \text{ em N.} \\
\text{b virtutis . . . actiones om. V.} \\
\text{c fuuerit V.} \\
\text{d aliquando animam V.} \\
\text{e si M.} \\
\text{f de quo quod CP.} \\
\text{g est curiosior C.} \\
\text{h add. modo CP.} \\
\text{i add. et CP.} \\
\text{j add. actionibus P.} \\
\text{k vovet V] monet P.} \\
\text{l imaginationem CP] imaginativa M.} \\
\text{m agnitione C.} \\
\text{n sensu M.} \\
\text{o distinguendum C.} \\
\text{p add. et M.} \\
\text{q retrahit CP] retrahitur P.} \\
\text{r add. modo C.} \\
\text{s simplificando C.} \\
\text{t imaginatur CP.} \\
\text{u dormiendo N.} \\
\text{v timore C.} \\
\text{w per N.} \]

Deinde viruts . . . l. 28, p. 77, disserere praetermittimus. Cf. op. cit. IV. 2, f. 18r, 1B:

Deinde virtus . . . 2D: prophetiae quae declarabantur.
potest niti et converti ad formalem et iniungere sibi operari, et earum adu
nati simul & confortatur ita ut actio formalis fiat manifestior et formae quae
erant in formali praesententur s in sensu communi et videantur quasi habe
ant esse extrinsecus. Operatio etenim apprehensi de eo quod venit ab exeri
oribus et de eo s quod venit ab interioribus est id quod praesentatur in for
mali, nec different nisi comparatione. Sed cum sensatum vere est id quod
apparet in ea, tunc id quod apparat in ea tale b est intus quale est id quod ap
paret foris. Et ob hoc epilepticus, perterritus et dissolutus et soporatus s videt
imaginationes et audit sonos tales quales vere videt d et audit e in tempore
salutis.

Si autem cognitioni et intellectus succurrerint i ei in aliquo istorum et re
vocaverint ad se virtutem imaginativam excitando eam, delebuntur omnes
illae formae et imaginationes. In quibusdam autem hominibus haec virtus
imaginativa sic fortissima creata est et praevalens ut non s dominentur ei
sensus, nec formalis resistat ei. Et anima eorum sic est fortissima ut, quamvis
contempletur intellectum et id quod est supra intellectum, non tamen desinat
condere ad sensum. Istit habent in vigiliis quod ali b in somnis; haec
enim est dispositio dormientis dum apprehendit visiones et certificatur i ei,
scilicet vel ita ut sunt vel per imagines quas habent. Istitis quoque talia acci
dunt in vigiliis; saepe etenim inter utrumque istorum, scilicet dormitionis et
vigiliae, contingit eos in ultimo absentari a sensilibus et i accidit eis quasi
dormitatio; k et multoianti non accidit, et multoianti rem vident sicut i est,
et multoianti apparat eis m eius n imago; propter causam enim qua imaginat
itur in dormiente imago rei quae videtur, multoianti apparat similiudito, et
videtur eis quia id quod apprehendunt sit locutio illius imaginis, quasi verba
audita quae tenent et legunt, et haec est propria prophetia virtutis imaginat
ivae. Sunt autem hic o et v aliae prophetiae et s genera somniorum, quae quia
longum est de eis r disserere praefermissimus.

Restat autem dicere de virtute memoriali, et de eo quod interest inter
ipsam et cogitativa in hora aestimandi. Dicimus 156 ergo quia s aestimatio
excellenter iudex est i in animalibus quae iudicat ad modum adinventae
imaginationis, cum non est u certa sicut cum putat homo mel sordidum quia v
simile est stercori. Aestimatio enim iudicat ita w esse et anima sequitur ipsam
aestimationem x quamvis intellectus improbat. Animalia autem et qui y assi
milantur eis homines in suis actionibus non sequuntur nisi hoc z iudicium
aestimationis, quod non habet discretionem rationalem; s sed est ad modum
adinventionis b prout est in animo eius tantum, quamvis virtutibus hominis s

\[\begin{align*}
&\times coniungere P. \\
&\times add. et CP. \\
&\times praesentem M. \\
&\times hoc CP. \\
&\times est tale CP. \\
&\times add. et C. \\
&\times vidit CP. \\
&\times audivit CP. \\
&\times succurrerint CN succurent P. \\
&\times om. CP. \\
&\times alteri CP. \\
&\times certificatur V. \\
&\times om. C. \\
&\times dormitio CP. \\
&\times sicuti V. \\
&\times om. MV. \\
&156 Dicimus ergo . . . 1. 23, p. 80, sunt

Dicemus ergo . . . 2D: sunt iudicia estima
tionis.
\end{align*}\]
propter consortium rationis accidat aliquid per quod virtutes eius interiores differant a virtutibus animalium. Unde ex utilitatis sonorum d compostorum et colorum et odorum et saporum compostorum e et spei et desiderii, habent quaedam quae non habent cetera animalia. Et eius virtus imaginativa interior eismodi f est quod valet ad scientias, praesertim cum virtus suae memoriae valeat multum s ad scientias eo quod confert nobis experimenta quae retinet memoria et considerationes singularum et alia huiusmodi.

Ad considerandum autem aestionem iudicamus rationes in h quibus non communicat ei intellectus in hora aestimandi, silicet qualiter apprehendat intentiones quae sunt in sensibilibus, statim ut sensus apprehenderit formas, ita ut aliquid de illis intentionibus non sentiatur, i et ita ut plures ex illis nec prosint, nec obsint in ipsa hora. Dicimus ergo quod ipsa aestionatio fit i multis modis ex quibus unus k est cautela proveniens in omne quod est a 1 divina clementia, sicut est cautela infantis qui cum nascitur mox penet ad ubera matris, et sicut cautela infantis qui cum elevatur ad standum et timet cadere, statim nitiur adhaerere ad aliquid, vel ad custodiendum se per aliquid, et cum oculum eius volueris purgare a lippitundine, ipse statim claudit tamquam intelligat quid accidat ex hoc et quid debeat m fieri secundum n hoc, quasi hoc sit natura animae eius, cum o non habeat hoc p per electionem; praeter hoc etiam animalia habent cautaetas naturales. Et ob hoc sunt comparationes inter has q animas et eorum principia quae sunt duces incessantes praeterea comparationes quas contingit aliquando esse, et aliquando non esse, sicut considerare cum intellectu, et quod subito in mentem r venit. Omnia enim illic s veniunt t et per istas cautaetas apprehendit aestionatio intentiones v quae sunt commixtæ cum sensibilibus, ut e eo quod obest et prodest. Unde omnis ovis pavet lupon cum numquam viderit eum. v Et accipites timemt aliaæ aves, et conveniunt cum aliis absque discretione, et hic est unus modus. Alius autem modus est qui fit per experientiam, silicet cum animal w habet dolorem vel delicias, vel pervenit ad illud utilitas sensibiles, vel nocementum sensibile adiunctum cum forma sensibili; x forma enim huius rei et forma eius quod y adiunctum est x illi fiant descripta in formali; et intention b comparationis quae est inter illas et iudicium de illa fiant descripta in memoria, silicet quod memoria per se ipsam naturaliter apprehendat hoc et deinde forma ipsa apparat extra imaginativam, tunc movetur per formam, et cum illa movetur id quod adiunctum fuerat illi de intentionibus utilibis, vel nocivis, d et omnino e procedit memoria ad modum motus inquisitionis, quae est in natura virtutis imaginativae. Sed aestionatio simul sentit hoc totum et videt intentionem per formam eius. Et hic est modus qui f contingit per experientiam. Qui est sicut cum s canis terretur lapidibus sive fustibus vel aliis huiusmodi.

\[\text{[78]}\]

\[\text{Mediaeval Studies}\]

\[\text{5}\]

\[\text{10}\]

\[\text{15}\]

\[\text{20}\]

\[\text{25}\]

\[\text{30}\]

\[\text{35}\]

\[\text{40}\]

\[\text{om. hère et inserted after odorum V.}\]

\[\text{om. N.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. N.}\]

\[\text{om. N.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]

\[\text{om. C.}\]
Aliquando autem adveniunt alia \(^b\) iudicia ab aestimatione ad modum similitudinis. Cum enim res habuerit aliquam formam coniunctam \(^1\) cum intentione aestimationis in aliquo sensibilibus quae coniuncta est semper cum omnibus illis, profecto cum visa fuerit forma, videbitur eius intentio, ali- quando autem animalia differunt in iudice qui eget in suis actionibus ut istae virtutes obedient. Id autem quo magis eget \(^j\) est memoria et sensus. Sed forma opus est propter memoriam et recordationem, memoria autem est etiam \(^k\) in aliis animalibus; sed recordatio, quae est ingenium revocandi quod oblivitum est, non inventur ut puto nisi in solo homine. Cognoscere etenim \(^l\) aliquid ibi fuisse \(^m\) quod deletum \(^a\) est, non est nisi virtutis \(^o\) rationalis. Si autem fuerit alterius praeceptor rationalem utique poterit esse aestimationis, sed quae decoratur rationalitate. Reliqua autem animalia si memorant, memorant tantum; si vero non memorant, memorare tamen nec desiderant, nec cogi- tant inde, \(^p\) quia hoc desiderium et hic appetitus solius hominis est. Recordatio vero est respectus ad aliquid \(^q\) quod habuit esse in anima in praeterito, et imita- tatur discere uno modo et non imitatur alio modo. Recordatio etenim est motus a rebus apprehensis exterioribus vel interioribus ad alias. Discere vero est motus a cognitis ad incognita ad hoc ut sciantur. \(^r\) Recordatio vero est inquisitio ut habeatur in futuro quale habeatur in praeterito. Discere vero non est nisi ut habeatur aliquid \(^s\) in futuro.

Item in recordatione non itur ad id quod inventum est. Cuique quaera sequatur acquisitio intentionis necessario, sed ad modum signorum. Cum enim iam habetur id quod est propinquius intentioni, movetur anima ad intentionem tali dispositione qualis ipsa erat. Si autem dispositio fuerit diversa, quamvis subeat \(^t\) mentem forma propinqua, vel eius intentio, non tamen \(^u\) propter \(^v\) hoc oportebit moveri. Sicut ille cuius mentem subit liber aliquis per quem recordatur magistri qui \(^w\) se docuerit eum. Non enim necesse est ut cum recordaturn libri et intentionis eius recordetur etiam magistri sui omnis homo. Via autem quae ducit ad discere \(^x\) necessario \(^y\) est syllogismus et definitio.

Sunt autem plerique hominum quibus facilius est discere quam recordari; quidam enim \(^z\) naturaliter habet cognoscere necessario mvtus, alii vero fit et converso; quidam enim fortis est in memoriter retinendo, \(^s\) sed debilis \(^b\) in recordando eo quod est sicca compositioque eius retinet quod apprehendit; sed materia, cur \(e\) movetur anima, non est \(d\) obediens actionibus imaginacionis \(e\) et representationibus eius. Alius vero est contrarius isti; qui enim citius recordantur sunt hii qui magis percipiunt nactus; natus enim operatur \(f\) motus \(e\) sensibilibus \(b\) ad alias intentiones; unde qui fuerit perceptibilior nutuum erit ciutis recordans. Alius autem fortis est in discendo, sed debilis est \(i\) in memorando, quasi enim inter discere et memorare contrarietas est. Ad discendum etenim necesse \(j\) est ut materia formae interioris sit multum

\(^b\) illa N. \(^i\) om. C.
\(^1\) gregi CNP.
\(^2\) om. PV.
\(^3\) enim CP.
\(^m\) fecisse C.
\(^a\) deletum M.
\(^o\) virtus CNP.
\(^p\) tantum C.
\(^q\) id CP.
\(^r\) sciantur M.
\(^s\) aliquod C.
\(^t\) prop. forma subeat mentem CP.
\(^u\) om. M.
\(^v\) oportebit propter hoc CMNP.
\(^w\) qui se] quae sic C.
\(^x\) adiscere MP.
\(^y\) om. N.
\(^z\) enim... habet] autem habet naturaliter C.
\(^e\) om. C.
\(^b\) debilis M.
\(^k\) cum movetur] commovetur MV] cum
\(^m\) commovetur N.
\(^d\) om. M.
\(^f\) imaginabilibus M.
\(^o\) operatur MN.
\(^e\) motus CNP om. M.
\(^b\) sensibilib CP.
\(^i\) om. MN.
\(^j\) est necesse C.
facilis ad imprimendum ei, ad quod non iuvat nisi humor; memoriae vero necessaria est materia in qua difficile delectatur quod impressum est in illa, et ad hoc k opus est sicca materia, et idcirco difficile est haberi l illa duo simul.

Illi vero sunt memoriores quorum animae non habent multos motus nec disperguntur cogitationes corum; ille enim cuius anima habet multos motus et multiples m cogitatus a non bene memorat. Unde memoria etiam o sicca materia eget ut anima sit velox studio ad formam et ad p materiam, et ut habens illum non occupetur circa aliam. Unde pueri, quamvis sint humidi, tamen firmento retinent; animae enim corum non occupantur circa quae occupantur animae maiorum, nec moventur ab eo in quo stant ad alium. Juvenes vero q propter calorem suum et propter motus suos agiles, quamvis complexio corum r sit sicca, tamen memoria corum non est sicut memoria puerores. Senibus vero propter s humorem qui praevalet in eis accidit non memorare ea quae vident, sed aliquando ex dolore vel ira vel ceteris huiusmodi accidit cum memoria aliquid simile dispositioni rei qualiter acciderit t; causa vero doloris et irae et tristitiae non u est nis quia forma eorum quae praetererunt impressa est sensibus interioribus; quae cum reddity facit illud vel simile illius. Desiderium quoque et spes faciunt hoc idem; spes autem alius est v quam desiderium quia spes est imaginatio alius rei cum affirmatione vel opinione quia erit; desiderium vero est imaginatio rei et concupiscentia eius, judicans quod delectabit cum affuerit. Timor autem est oppositus spei ad modum contrarietatis; diffidentia vero vel desperatione est eius privatio, et haec omnia sunt judicia aestimationis.

Post haec x autem repetimus adduc y de virtutibus motivis, adicientes quod animal, z cum aliquid desiderat, percipit se s desiderare vel imaginat; si enim non periperet, non intenderet moveri ad quaerendum a illud. Non autem habet b hoc desiderium ex aliqua virtutum apprehendentium; virtutes enim apprehendentes nihil alii faciunt nisi indicare et apprehendere. Cum autem indicant vel apprehendunt sensu vel aestimationem, non ex hoc necesses est illud desiderare. Homines enim conveniunt in apprehendendo quod sentiunt e vel imaginant secundum hoc quod sentiunt illud et imaginant, sed differunt in desiderando illud quod sentiunt vel d imaginant; unus etiam et idem homo discrepat in hoc; imaginat enim cibum et desiderat illum in hora famis sed non desiderat illum in hora satietatis et qui bonorum morum e est quandoque imaginat f turpes concupiscientias s sed non desiderat illas; alius autem desiderat.

Et hae duae dispositiones non sunt h hominis tantum, sed etiam omnium animalium. Desiderium etiam aliquando est debile, aliquando est f forte; cum 188 autem confortatur desiderium, statim obediunt ei virtutes motivae

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187 Animal cum aliquis ... I. 38, omnium animalium. Cf. op. cit. IV. 4, f. 20r, 2A: animal cum vult ... omnium animalium.
188 cum autem ... I. 19, p. 83, quae solet pati ex eis. Cf. ibid. 2A: cum autem firmatur ... 20v, 2B: quae sunt in musculis.
quae non faciunt aliud nisi contrahere musculos et extendere. Non est autem hoc ipsum desiderium; non enim quisquis prohibetur a motu prohibetur a vehementia desiderii, nec tamen habet obedientiam aliarum virtutum quae tantum movere solent quae sunt in musculis. Huius autem virtutis, scilicet desiderii, rami sunt virtus irascibilis et virtus concupiscibilis. Illa autem quae desiderat delectabile et quod putatur utile ad acquirendum est concupiscibilis; quae vero desiderat vincere et id quod putatur nocivum repellere est irascibilis. Aliquando autem inventur in animalibus affectus non ad concupiscientias suas, sed sicut affectus matris circa filium suum et uxoris circa virum suum et sicut affectus eiusmod qui desiderat exire a carcer vel a compedibus. Sed hic affectus, quamvis non sit cupiditas virtutis concupiscibilis, est tamen aliquis affectus concupiscientiae virtutis imaginativa; virtuti enim apprehendenti appropriatur proprium delectamentum in eo quod apprehendit, et in eo quod agitat de eis quae semper renovantur, vel de formis. Cum autem dolet quia amisit illud, cupit illud naturaliter desiderat autem virtus desiderativa movere ad illud instrumenta, sicut desiderat ex concupiscientia et ira ad id quod est pulchrum inter intelligibilis. Ex concupiscientia igitur habetur intensio desiderii ad delectamentum, et ex virtute affectandi desiderium; et ex ira habetur intensio desiderii ad victoriam, et ex virtute affectante desiderium.

Timor enim, dolor et tristitia sunt de accidentibus irascibilis propter communionem quam habent virtutes apprehendentes; cum enim moventur sequentes formationem intelligibilem vel imaginabilem, fit timor. Cum vero non timet, confortetur; et accidit ei dolor unde venit ira, cum non potest repellere illud, vel cum timet adventum eius. Gaudium autem, quod est ex modo separationis, est finis huius virtutis. Sed pecuniam capere et cibos appetere et concupiscere coitum et alia his similia sunt ex virtute bestiali concupiscibilis. Solutiam vero et gaudium sunt de accidentibus virtutis apprehendentis. Virtus autem desiderativa sequitur has virtutes praedictas; enim intenditur eius vis, desiderat.

Hae autem omnes sequuntur virtutes aestimativas, non enim appetunt nisi postquam aestimaverint volitum. Aliquando vero est ibi aestimatio, sed non est ibi desiderium. Et contingit aliquando ex rebus corporalibus ut illos motus sequatur aestimatio ad quae repellenda movetur natura, et ut illae virtutes sint priores aestimatione in actione sua, sicut plerumque aestimatio ducit virtutes ad aestimationem. Aestimatio enim habet dominium inter virtutes apprehendentes in animalibus. Cupiditas vero et ira habent dominium inter virtutes moventes quas sequuntur virtutes desiderativae, et dein de virtutes motivae quae sunt in musculis.

Omnes autem istae actiones et ista accidentia sunt de accidentibus quae accidunt animae, sed dum est in corpore, quia non accidunt ei nisi propter consortium corporis; et ideo trahunt post se complexiones corporum. Accidunt etiam ipsa cum accidunt complexiones in corporibus. Quasdam enim

\footnotesize{1 inquirendum N.  \\
1 nocument CNP.  \\
1 replere V.  \\
2 et CNP.  \\
3 corpribus M.  \\
4 cogitatio CP.  \\
5 incipit CP.  \\
6 motiva CP.  \\
6 instrumentum N j instrumento CP.  \\
7 intentio CP.  \\
8 intentio CP.  \\
9 enim N.  \\
9 cum timet om. M.  \\
9 om. CP.  \\
9 et CNP.  \\
9 add. et ira M.  \\
9 per P.  \\
9 trahit MV.  \\
9 complexionem N.  \\
9 Quasdam N.}
complexiones sequitur aptitudo irascendi et quasdam aptitudo concupiscenti et quasdam aptitudo formidandi et timendi. Unde facies quorundam hominum est facies irascibilis, qui ex hoc quod cito irascitur contestatur d faciei suae. Quidam etiam videtur timidus et formidolosus quia formidat et cito terretur.

Hae igitur omnes dispositiones non sunt nisi ex consortio corporis, sed diversis modis. Quasdam enim principaliter e habet corpus, sed ex hoc f quod est habens animam; et quasdam principaliter habet anima, sed ex hoc f quod est in corpore; quasdam vero b aequiliter. Somnus enim et vigiliae, aegritudo i et sanitas sunt dispositiones corporis quorum principia in ipsa j sunt. Sed non habet ea corpus nisi ex hoc quod est habens animam. Imaginatio vero k et concupiscientia et ira et alia huismodi sunt animae, sed ex hoc quod est habens corpus, et sunt corporis ex hoc quod principaliter sunt animae l ipsius corporis, quamvis sint m animae; sed ex hoc quod est habens corpus non dico ex corpore. Similiter sollicitudo, dolor, tristitia et n memoria — nullum horum est accidens corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, sed sunt o dispositiones rei coniunctae cum corpore, nec sunt nisi p cum est coniunctio cum corpore. Habet ergo ea corpus, sed propter animam, nam habet q anima ea principaliter, quamvis habeat illa r ex hoc quod est habens corpus; sed non dico quod habet s illa ex corpore. Dolorem autem habet propter verbera et propter permutacionem complexionis, sed hoc accidens habet esse in corpore. Solutio vero continuitatis et complexio sunt dispositiones corporis ex hoc quod est corpus et hic dolor etiam t habet esse in sensu sentientis secundum quod est sentiens, sed corporis. Videtur autem u fames et cupiditas esse huissus generis; sed ex imaginatione et timore v et dolore et ira principaliter accidit passio animae. Non enim ira vel dolor, secundum quod est ira vel dolor, est passio aliqua ex passionibus quae dolorem inferunt corpori, w quamvis sequatur eae passio corporalis dolorem inferens corpori, sicu: accensio caloris vel extinctio x eius et cetera huismodi. Haec enim non est ipsa ira vel dolor, sed quiddam y quod consequitur z iram vel a dolorem.

Dicimus etiam melius esse ut anima b habeat aliquid ex hoc quod est in corpore quod postea sequantur e passiones in corpore quae sunt propriae corporis. Imaginatio etiam, ex hoc quod est apprehensio, non est de passionibus quas habet corpus principaliter, quamvis postea ex imaginatione accidat extendi aliquod membrum. Hoc enim non habet ex causa naturali per quam debeat complexio permutari, vel calor augeri, vel vapor generari qui diffunditur in membrum ita ut extendatur, sed quia formae habetur in aetnazione secura est permutatio in complexione et calor et humiditas et spiritus, et nisi esset illa forma, non haberet natura d quid moveret eam.

Dicimus igitur ad summam, quod ex anima solet contingere in materia cor-
porali permutatio complicognis quae acquiritur sine actione et passione corporali, ita quod calor accidat non ex calido et frigiditas non ex frigido. Cum enim * imaginat anima i alicuiq et firmatur in eo, statim materia s corporalis recipit formam habentem comparationem ad illam, vel qualitatem; et forma quae est in anima principium est eius quod contingit in materia, sicut forma sanitatis quae est in anima medici principium est sanitatis quae advenit, et sicut forma scannii in anima carpentarii. Sed haec non adducunt ad hoc quod provenit ex illis nisi per instrumenta et b media. Cum autem infirmus credit se convalescere vel sanus agrotatis, multotiens contingit ex hoc ut forma in i tantum confirmetur in anima eius ut eius materia patiatur ex ca et proveniat inde sanitas vel infirmitas, et haec actio efficacior est quam id quod agit medicus i instrumentis suis et mediis. Propter hoc etiam est quod homo potest ambulare super trabem quae est in media via, sed non audet ambulare super eam si fuerit posita pons super aquam profundam eo quod imaginatur in anima eius forma cadendi k nimirum impressa. Cui oedit natura eius et virtus membrorum eius, nec obedient eius contrario, scilicet i ad erigendum et n ad ambulandum. Sic igitur n cum formae imprimuntur in anima et constiterit animae ita esse, saepe o contingit materiam p pati ex eis quae solet pati ex eis. 4 Hae sunt vires animae secundum quod est sensibilis.

Sciendum autem quod nullam virium vegetabilium, nullam sensibiliun retinet anima exuta a corpore. Nihil enim est quod vegetando nutriat vel animando sensificet vel moveat. Has enim actiones non exercet anima nisi dum est in corpore. Unde, sicut ex conjunctione corporis et animae fiunt, sic ex divisione utrisque percutunt, et vires earum non remanent in corpore vel i anima nisi in s sola potentia. Quod philosophi sic probant dicentes: manifestum est omnes vires 199 vegetables et sensibles non habere actionem nisi per corpus, et e esse earum w est v eas sic esse ut operentur; ipsae autem vires non sunt sic ut operentur nisi dum sunt w corporales; igitur esse earum est esse corporales. Ergo non remanent post corpus.

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*a om. N.
*i alicuid anima CP.
*s corp. mat. M.
*om. M.
*i om. N.
*add. in NV.
*k nimir cadendi N.
*i sed CP.
*w et ad] etiam ad C] et P.

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*a ergo N.
*o fere C.
*materia M.
*illis CP.
*r aut M.
*add. in MN.
*om. N.
*om. M.
*add. esse C. = fuerunt C.

199 omnes vires . . . post corpus. Cf. op. cit. IV. 5, f. 20v, 2D: omnes vires . . . post corpus.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM

DE VIRIBUS ANIMAE RATIONALIS

Sciendum autem quod omnes praedictae vires et actiones communes sunt homini cum omnibus animalibus. Sed quae sequuntur propriae sunt hominis, scilicet agere actiones electione deliberationis et adinvenire artes meditando et comprehendere universalis. Homo enim habet agere de rebus singularibus et de rebus universalibus. Universalia autem non sunt nisi conceptiones tantum, quamvis sint de actione. Qui enim tenet communem conceptionem qualiter debeat aedificari domus, ex hac tantum conceptione non provenit ali- quam domum esse in actu singulariter. Actiones enim egent rebus singularibus et proveniunt ex intentionibus singularibus. Homo igitur habet virtutem quae est propria conceptionum universalium et aliam quae propria est ad cogitandum de rebus singularibus, de eo scilicet quod debet fieri et dimitti et quod prodest et obest et quod est honestum et in honestum et quod est bonum et malum; et hoc fit ad modum syllogismi vel considerationis verae vel falsae cuius finis est dare sententiam de re singulari futura ex rebus possibilibus. De necessariis etenim et impossibilitibus non cognit at an habeant esse an non; de praeterito etiam non cognit at an habeat esse quia est praeteritum. Ad huius autem virtutis iudicium sequitur motus virtutum desiderative varum et ex virtute iudicante de universalibus, haec virtus transmit maximas propositiones ad id quod cognit at et concludit de singularibus.

Quapropter animae rationalis duae sunt vires: una est virtus intelligendi et alia est virtus agendi, sive una est virtus contemplativa et alia est virtus activa; et utraque vocatur intellectus aequivoce.

Sed virtus activa sive intellectus activus est principium movens corpus hominis ad singulas actiones quas praecipue sibi eligit secundum quod intendent. Sed hoc facit aliquando per virtutem animalem appetitivam sive desiderativam, aliquando per imaginativam sive aestimativam, aliquando per se ipsam. Per appetitivam siquidem agit quotiens accidunt ei affectiones hominis propriae quibus cito affectur, sive sint actiones sive passiones sicut confusio et verecundia et risus et similia. Per aestimativam vero sive imaginativam agit cum contendit adinvenire scientias rerum faciendarum et non faciendarum et artes. Per se ipsam autem humana anima agit cum contendit generare in se intellectum contemplantium quae seentia sendent ex usu et divulgantur famose apud homines, sicut hoc quod mentiri turpe est et consimiles propositiones tantummodo probabiles.

\* De Viribus Propriis Animae Rationalis
\* De Propriis Viribus Hominis P\* om. M\]
De virtutibus quae propriae sunt hominis N.
\* in actu esse N.
\* alia MNV.
\* est propria CP.
\* add. quod CP.
\* et V.
\* et V.
\* scientiam CP.
\* om. CP.

\* enim CP.
\* habeat MNV.
\* quod CP.
\* add. rebus CP.
\* virtutes C.
\* om. N.
\* om. C.
\* add. per C.
\* om. N.
\* anima humana N.
\* scientiae P.
\* est V.
\* praepositiones M.
Virtus autem contemplativa sive intellectus contemplativus est qui solet informari a forma universali nudata a materia. Et si fuerit v nuda in se, apprehendere formam eius in se facilius erit; si vero non fuerit nuda, fit tamen nuda, quoniam ipse denudabit eam, ita ut de omnibus affectibus eius cum materia nihil remaneat v in ea. Intellectus vero sive intellectus est iudex veri et falsi de universalibus; sed activus est iudex de malo et bonus in singularibus. Ille est iudex de necessario et possibile et impossibili; hic de honesto et inhonesto, licito et illicito. Unusquisque autem horum intellectuum habet dubitationem sive opinionem; habet et sententiam. Cum enim intellectus non quiescit in eo quod comprehendit sed adhuc haesitat ignorans quid potius tenere debeat, ille intellectus vocatur dubitatio sive opinio. Dubitatio enim est privatio comprehensionis s alterius contradictoriarum. Opinio vero est conceptio ad quam acceditur cum formidine alterius partis. Non enim omnis qui putat iam conscript, sicut non omnis qui senit iam intellectit, aut qui imaginar iam putavit, velit conceptum vel consensit. Cum autem in eo quod comprehendit, consentit, et quiescit et iquod utique fit, cum per inventionem medi i termini altera contradictoriarum certissime fit, tunc sententia vocatur. Sententia enim est conceptio certissime definita, sive sententia est certa comprehensio unius contradictoriarum. Certa autem non fit nisi necessaria ratione vel divina revelatione. Principia vero contemplativi sunt ex propositionibus per se notis; sed principia activi sunt ex probabilibus et ex auctoritatibus et ex famosis et experimentibus. Ergo in homine est virtus iudicantis sensibilis et iudicantis imaginativa et iudicantis aestimativa et iudicantis contemplativa et iudicantis activa. Principia vero quae imperant virtutii desiderativae ad movendum membra sunt aestimatio imaginativa, et aestimatio activa et cupiditas et ira. Quapropter intellectus activus eget corpore et virtutibus corporalibus ad omnes actiones suas. Contemplativus vero eget corpore et virtutibus eius, sed non semper, nec omni modo. Sufficit enim ipse sibi per seipsum.

Sciendo autem quia nulla harum virtutum est anima; immo anima est id quod habet has virtutes, habens piscinet apud in 있는데 ad actiones quorum quaedam sunt quae non perficiuntur nisi per instrumenta et per usum eorum; quaedam vero sunt quibus non sunt necessaria instrumenta. Sub-

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stantia.igitur animae humanae d duas habet actiones: unam propter corpus quae vocatur practica, et aliam propter a se et propter principia sua b quae est apprehensio per e intellectum et utraque sunt inter se dissidentes d et impedientes se. Nam cum anima occupatur circa unam, retraititur ab alia quia cum anima intenta fuerit sensibilibus, retraititur ab intelligibilibus, et cum cogitaverit de intellectu, postponet haec omnia e nisi forte fuerint haec praeventia super animam et subegerint eam et traxerint f eam ad partem suam.

Quapropter virtus activa debet imperare ceteris virtutibus corporis sicut oportet secundum judicium virtutis contemplativa ita ut haec non patiatur b ab illis ullo modo; immo ipsae patiantur ab ea, et sint ei omnino subjectae, ne forte contingat in ea affectiones trahentes eam post se prove nientes ex rebus naturalibus quae vocantur perversi mores. Oportet ergo ut ipsa i non sit passibilis ullo modo vel vincibilis, sed imperans, et tunc habet mores optimos. Possibile est autem ut mores comparentur etiam i viribus corporalibus. Cum enim illa fuerit dominans habebit affectionem agentem, et ex intellectu habebit affectionem patientem. Nominamus autem omnem affectionem morem; erit ergo unum propter quod contingent k mores in hoc, et mores in illo; quoniam, si ipsa fuerit victa, habebit affectionem passibilem et similibre affectionem activam non extraneam, quae erunt duas actiones et duo mores. At l nos quidem erit unus sed habebit duas comparationes. Anima ergo m rationalis cum sit n una substantia habet comparationem ad duo, quorum unum est supra o eam et alterum r infra eam. Sed habet in se virtutes quibus coaptatur ad utrumque illorum,s nam virtutem activam habet propter id quod debet ei r quod est infra se, et virtutem contemplati vam habet propter s id quod est supra t se videlicet ut patiatur ab eo et perfit ciatur per u illud et recipiat ab illo. Quae duas vires sive duo intellectus sunt animae v rationali quasi duae facies; una quae w respiciat deorsum ad regendum suum inferius quod est corpus quam nullo modo oportet recipere alium affectionem generis debiti naturae x corporis; et aliam qua respiciat sursum ad contemplandum suum superius quod y est Deus, quam oportet semper recipere z aliquid ab illo quod est illic a et affici ab illo. Sed ex eo quod est infra eam scilicet b intellectu activo generantur s mores et scientiae, et ex eo quod est supra eam, scilicet d intellectu contemplativo acquirunter

\[ ^{169} \text{Substantia...l. 8, ad partem suam.} \]
\[ ^{169} \text{Quapropter virtus activa...l. 1, p. 87,} \]

\[ ^{a} \text{om. CP.} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{per N. propter princ. et prop. CP.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{om. CP.} \]
\[ ^{d} \text{propter CP.} \]
\[ ^{e} \text{dividentes V. diss. inter se CP.} \]
\[ ^{f} \text{anima CP.} \]
\[ ^{g} \text{extracert V.} \]
\[ ^{h} \text{om. C.} \]
\[ ^{i} \text{patiantur N.} \]
\[ ^{j} \text{anima M.} \]
\[ ^{k} \text{om. CP.} \]
\[ ^{l} \text{contingit M.} \]
\[ ^{m} \text{igitur CP bis N.} \]
\[ ^{n} \text{fit V.} \]
\[ ^{o} \text{super C.} \]
\[ ^{p} \text{add. est CP.} \]
\[ ^{q} \text{eorum C.} \]
\[ ^{r} \text{om. V.} \]
\[ ^{s} \text{id propter quod P.} \]
\[ ^{t} \text{super CP.} \]
\[ ^{u} \text{om. M.} \]
\[ ^{v} \text{in natura C; anima M.} \]
\[ ^{w} \text{om. C. qua MN.} \]
\[ ^{x} \text{natura C.} \]
\[ ^{y} \text{quod est Deus not in Aviceena.} \]
\[ ^{z} \text{aspicer C; respicer P.} \]
\[ ^{a} \text{illac C.} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{add. in V.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{generantur V.} \]
\[ ^{d} \text{add. in V.} \]

\[ ^{168} \text{Substantia...l. 8, ad partem suam.} \]
\[ ^{169} \text{Quapropter virtus activa...l. 1, p. 87,} \]

\[ ^{v} \text{add. est CP.} \]
\[ ^{q} \text{eorum C.} \]
\[ ^{r} \text{om. V.} \]
\[ ^{s} \text{id propter quod P.} \]
\[ ^{t} \text{super CP.} \]
\[ ^{u} \text{om. M.} \]
\[ ^{v} \text{in natura C; anima M.} \]
\[ ^{w} \text{om. C. qua MN.} \]
\[ ^{x} \text{natura C.} \]
\[ ^{y} \text{quod est Deus not in Aviceena.} \]
\[ ^{z} \text{aspicer C; respicer P.} \]
\[ ^{a} \text{illac C.} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{add. in V.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{generantur V.} \]
\[ ^{d} \text{add. in V.} \]

\[ ^{168} \text{Substantia...l. 8, ad partem suam.} \]
\[ ^{169} \text{Quapropter virtus activa...l. 1, p. 87,} \]

\[ ^{v} \text{add. est CP.} \]
\[ ^{q} \text{eorum C.} \]
\[ ^{r} \text{om. V.} \]
\[ ^{s} \text{id propter quod P.} \]
\[ ^{t} \text{super CP.} \]
\[ ^{u} \text{om. M.} \]
\[ ^{v} \text{in natura C; anima M.} \]
\[ ^{w} \text{om. C. qua MN.} \]
\[ ^{x} \text{natura C.} \]
\[ ^{y} \text{quod est Deus not in Aviceena.} \]
\[ ^{z} \text{aspicer C; respicer P.} \]
\[ ^{a} \text{illac C.} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{add. in V.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{generantur V.} \]
\[ ^{d} \text{add. in V.} \]

\[ ^{168} \text{Substantia...l. 8, ad partem suam.} \]
\[ ^{169} \text{Quapropter virtus activa...l. 1, p. 87,} \]

\[ ^{v} \text{add. est CP.} \]
\[ ^{q} \text{eorum C.} \]
\[ ^{r} \text{om. V.} \]
\[ ^{s} \text{id propter quod P.} \]
\[ ^{t} \text{super CP.} \]
\[ ^{u} \text{om. M.} \]
\[ ^{v} \text{in natura C; anima M.} \]
\[ ^{w} \text{om. C. qua MN.} \]
\[ ^{x} \text{natura C.} \]
\[ ^{y} \text{quod est Deus not in Aviceena.} \]
\[ ^{z} \text{aspicer C; respicer P.} \]
\[ ^{a} \text{illac C.} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{add. in V.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{generantur V.} \]
\[ ^{d} \text{add. in V.} \]
sapientiae. Sed ad acquirenda haec unusquisque horum duorum intellectuum habet aptitudinem et perfectionem. Id enim quod solet aliquid recipere aliquando est receptibile eius in potentia, aliquando in effectu.

Potentia autem tribus modis dicitur secundum prius et posterius. Dicitur enim potentia sola aptitudo a qua nondum exivit aliquid ad effectum, nec habetur aliquid per quod except, sicut est potentia infanlis ad scribendum. Dicitur etiam potentia haec aptitudo, cum iam habetur id per quod possit pervenire ad effectum sine medio, sicut est potentia adulti hominis ad scribendum cum cognoverit incaustum et calamum et simplicia elementa. Dicitur etiam potentia haec aptitudo cum perfecte habentur instrumenta et ex instrumentis accidit perfectio aptitudinis uta possit facere quando liberet et non sit ei necesse addiscere, sed sufficiat ei tantum velle sicut est potentia scriptoris perfecti in arte sua cum non scribit.

Sed potentia prima vocatur pura et materialis, secunda vocatur potentia possibilis sive facilis, tertia perfectio. Intellectus igitur activus sive contemplativus cum est in sola potentia, scilicet cum potentia animae nondum receptum aliquid de eo quod est eius perfectio, vocatur intellectus materialis, dictus autem materialis ad similitudinem aptitudinis materiae primae quae ex se nullam habet formam sed est receptibilis omnium formarum. Cum vero uterque intellectus est in potentia facili, scilicet cum accidit unicusque illorum habere iam principia quibus perficiuntur eorum actiones, sed activa propositiones probabiles et aliae affectiones, contemplativo vero per se nota prima ut: omne totum maius est sua parte, et: quae eadem aequalia inter se sunt aequalia, et alia huissmodi intelligibilia prima ex quibus et eorum quibus pervenit ad intelligibilia secunda, vocatur uterque intellectus in habitu et potest dici intellectus in effectu respectu primit. Potentia enim prima non potest intelligere aliquid in effectu. Haec vero potest aliquid intelligere in effectu, sed cum inquisierit; deinde cum acquiritur unicusque istorum intellectuum perfectio dicitur intellectus in effectu.

Intellectus enim contemplativus tunc est similis potentiae perfectivae, cum incipiunt in anima existere formae intelligibiles adepta post se nota. Et quamvis non convertitur ad eas ut consideret illas in effectu, sunt tamen quasi reposiit apud eam ut cum voluerit consideret eae in effectu, et intelligat eae et intelligat se intelligere eae.

Est enim hic intellectus qui intelligit quotiens vult intelligere sine labore inquirendi. Quamvis autem hic intellectus vocetur intellectus in effectu, potest tamen vocari intellectus in potentia respectu eius qui sequitur post cum. Cum enim intellectus contemplativus est in effectu absoluto, scilicet cum

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* acquirendum M impotentia N.
* dicitur CP.
  * om. V.
* in effectu C.
  * et N.
* cognovero V.
  * incaustrum N.
  * om. C.
* om. C.
* om. CP.
  * prima CP.
  * bis N.
  * in CP.

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Potentia autem . . . I. 11, p. 88, ab extrinsecus. Ibid. 1F: Potentia . . . ab extrinsecus.

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forma intellecta est sibi praesens et considerat eam in effectu et intelligit in effectu et intelligit se intelligere in effectu, quod tunc est in ea, vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio. Quo idero vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio quando intellectus in potentia non exit ad effectum nisi per intellectum qui semper est in effectu. Aliquid igitur est per quod animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exevent de potentia ad effectum. Id autem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum.

Unde cum intellectus qui est in potentia coniungitur cum illo intellectu qui est in actu aliquo modo coniunctionis, imprimitur in eo aliqua species formarum quae est adepta ab extrinsecus.

Ipse enim est qui dat formam intelligibilem, cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros. Sicut enim sine luce exteriore non fit visio, sic sine luce intelligentiae agentis in nos, nullas fit veritatis rei comprehensio; hoc enim est est menti ratio quod est aspectus oculo. Ratio enim est mentis aspectus; huius autem aspectus per ea quae conscienciam est motum dicitur consideratio vel cogitatio. Cognitiones etnem et considerationes motus sunt animae, et ita menti opus est ratione ad videndum et consideratione ad inquirendum, sed sicut ssepe aspectus dirigitur et tamen quia lux deest nihil videtur, quod patet in tenebris, ista cum ratio movetur ad aliquid comprehendendum si lux intelligentiae deest, nihil comprehendit et vocatur ignorantia, si vero adest, comprehendit et vocatur scientia. Sicut ergo fit visio concurrentibus tribus, scilicet visu et viso et luce, sic et scientia. Ad hoc enim ut fiat visio prius necesse est ut visus in oppositum corpus offendat et adminiculo exterioris lucis a viso corpori formam similium ci quae in illo est, sed alterius generis quam sit illa, recipiat. Sic et virtus rationalis cum considerat singula quae sunt in imaginacione mediente luce intelligentiae siunt nuda a materia et ab appendicis materiae et imprimuntur in anima rationali; et ea sibi imprimi hoc est ea intelligi, non quod ipsa mutentur in imaginatione ad intellectum nostrum, nec quod ipsa forma cum in se sit nuda considerata per se faciat similium sibi, sed quia, cum datur animae contemplari huiusmodi formam nudam, mediante luce intelligentiae agentis, ex forma illa contingit in anima quiddam quod secundum aliquid est sui generis, et secundum aliquid non est sui generis, sicut cum lux cadit super colora, ex illa fit in visu comparatio quae non est similis ei ex omni parte. Imaginabilia enim sunt intelligibilia in potentia et intuent intelligibilia in effectu, non ipsa eadem, sed quae extrahuntur ex illis. Immo sicut comparatio, quae appareat ex formis sensibilibus mediente luce, non est ipsae sed formae sed quiddam aliud quod...
habet comparationem ad illas, quod fit, mediante luce, in receptibili recte oppositio, sic anima rationalis cum coniungitur formis aliquo modo coniunctionis ex luce intelligentiae agentis, aptatur ad hoc ut subsistant in ea ipsae formae nudaee ab omni permixtione, decorantes et nobilitantes eam, quam quasi locus est ipsa, mediante intellectu materiali, et tunc anima intelligent ei quod apprehendit in se ipsam formam intellectorum nudorum a materia; hoc autem quod forma est nuda vel ideor est nuda quia intellectus eam denuudat ut de est humanitas, vel quia ipsa forma in se nuda est a materia ut angelica essentia, unde non est ei opus nudare eam.

Anima autem intelligent se ipsam et alia quae non sunt ipsa; hoc autem quod se ipsam intelligent facit eam intelligere se esse intelligentem et intellectum et intellectum. Cum vero intelligent ceteras formas, non ita est; ipsae enim formae per se sunt in corpore semper et in potentia sunt in intellectu, quamvis in aliquibus rebus de potentia exeat ad effectum. Cum igitur intelligent alia a se, tunc intelligent in intellectum et intellectum non sunt unum in nostris animabus. Nam ipsa anima est intelligent, intellectus vero vel dicitur virtus eius quia intelligent, vel dicitur ipsa sua forma intellectorum, quae, quia est in anima, sunt intellecta. Forma enim intellecta, cum subdict in substantia intelligibil, facit intelligent illud cuius haec forma est propria forma. Cum enim forma sicut est ab intellectu qui est actus animae comprehenditur, illa media veritatis rei conceptio quae ad intellectu agente in rem intellectam et ab anima patiente ab ea generatur, dicitur intellectus passive mediis qui inter intellectum quo intelligimus, qui est actus animae, et intellectum scilicet rem quam intelligimus, hoc est, cuius formae similitudinem in mente retinemus. Unde quia hic intellectus non est nisi similitudo formae rei quae in mente concipitur, a philosophis similitudo vocatur.

Primum autem quod percipit de formis humanus intellectus est id quod de eis est essentiale vel accidentale et id propter quod imaginaciones illae conveniunt et differunt. Sed intentiones quibus non differunt ipsae formae fiunt una intentio in essentia intellectus propter similitudinem, sed propter id in quo differunt fiunt multae. Intellectus igitur habet potestatem multiplicandi intentiones quae sunt una et adunandi eas quae sunt multae. Sed adunatio multorum fit duobus modis; uno cum intentiones, quae sunt multae et differentes dimensionibus in imaginationibus, sunt una intentio cum non differunt in definitione; alio cum de intentionibus generum et differentiarum componitur una intentio in definitione.

\textsuperscript{7} composito CP. \textsuperscript{2} coniungetur N. \textsuperscript{4} ut est humanitas not in Avicenna. \textsuperscript{9} inter V. \textsuperscript{10} ipsa MV. \textsuperscript{5} sic nisi. perhaps for passivus or patiens sive. \textsuperscript{11} om. M. \textsuperscript{12} ut angelica ess. not in Avicenna. \textsuperscript{6} denuudare C. \textsuperscript{13} quam rem V. \textsuperscript{14} hic N. \textsuperscript{7} humanis CMNP. \textsuperscript{15} add. C. \textsuperscript{16} om. C. \textsuperscript{17} add. quod C. \textsuperscript{18} differunt C.

\textsuperscript{177} decorantes \ldots materiali. \textit{Loc. cit.} f. 25v, 2B: decorantes \ldots materiali. \textsuperscript{178} tunc anima \ldots l. 14, ad effectum. \textit{Ibid.} Anima intelligit \ldots ad effectum. \textit{Before the preceding by several lines.} \textsuperscript{179} tunc intelligent \ldots nostris animabus. \textit{Loc. cit.} 2C: ergo intellectus \ldots nostris animabus.
Modi autem multiplicandi sunt et converso istorum; isti autem modi sunt de proprietibus humani intellectus quos non habet alia virtus. Aliae enim vires apprehendunt quod est multum multum sicut est, et quod est unum apprehendunt unum sicut est. Cum autem apprehendunt unum quod est commune sed compositum ex aliquibus et ex eorum accidentibus, non tamen possunt separare accidentalia eorum ab essentialibus eorum. Cum vero aliquam formam sensus 

\footnote{\textit{sensui C.}} representat imaginationi et imaginatio intellectui et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem, \footnote{\textit{intentione M.}} si postea representaverit ei aliam formam eiusmod \footnote{\textit{eiusdem \`a speciei quae non est alia nisi numero, intellectus tunc nullo modo excipiet \`b ex ea formam aliam praeter quam pr"ius acceperit, nisi secundum accidentis, quod est illius proprium ex hoc quod est illud accidens, ita ut aliquando accipiat illam nudam, aliquando cum illo accidente, et ob hoc dicitur quod Socrates et Plato sunt una intentio in humanitate, non quod humanitas quae est coniuncta proprietatibus Socratis ipsa eadem sit coniuncta proprietatibus Platonis quasi ambo habebant unus essentiam, sicut fit in amicitia et in aliis relationibus, sed quia humanitas multiplicata est \textit{e} in esse. Humanitas enim non est una in qua conveniunt secundum esse extrinsicum, ita ut ipsa eadem sit humanitas Platonis et Socratis. Quamvis \footnote{\textit{182 enim humanitas sit natura sine \`d dubio in qua conveniunt omnia singularia speciei aequaliter quorum una est definitio, tamen quia accidit ei existere in hoc singulari et in illo, idei multiplicata est; hoc \textit{\`c} autem non habet ex natura sua. Si enim ex natura humana esset unde deberet multiplicari, profecto non predicaretur homo de aliquo uno numero. Si vero humanitas esset ex hoc quod est humanitas Petri, tunc humanitas non esset aliterius. Ergo unum de accidentibus quae accidunt humanitati ex materia est haece species multiplicationis et divisionis. Accidunt etiam ei et \textit{f} alia accidentia praeter haec, scilicet quia cum fuerit in materia acquireret ei aliquid modus quanti et qualis et \textit{e} ubi et situs quae omnia extranea sunt a natura ipsius. Si enim ex hoc quod est humanitas esset huius tantum termini, quanti et qualis et \textit{u} ubi et situs, tunc ex hoc quod est humanitas oporteret \textit{b} unumquemque hominem convenire \textit{c} cum alio in his \textit{i} accidentibus. Si vero ex hoc quod est humanitas esset aliiuisus aliterius termini, quanti et qualis et \textit{u} ubi et situs, oporteret simili ter ut omnes \textit{t} homines convenirent in illo alio \textit{m} termino. Ergo forma humana ex sua essentia non habet haec accidentia quae solent ei accidere sed propter materiam habetur \textit{=} cum illis. Unde prima forma \footnote{\textit{183 humana quae precedent, ipsa tantum prodest ad cognoscendum formam humanam, secunda vero nil prodest. Intentionem enim impressa animae una est, quae non est nisi imaginatio prima et idea imaginatio secunda nil operatur; potuit tamen unaquaque \textit{p} praecedere et operari illud idem in anima, non sicut hic \textit{q} homo singularis vel hic equus. Intellectus \textit{r} au-}
tem, cum apprehendit * aliqua inter quae est prius et posterius, solet cum illis intelligere tempus necessario, nec in tempore sed in momento. Intellectual enim intelligit tempus in conclusione et in terminis, et hoc subito.

Quod autem intellectus non potest formare ea quae sunt in ultimo intelligibilitatis ^ et abstractionis a materia, hoc non habet * ex aliquo quod sit in essentia illarum rerum, nec ex aliquo quod sit in natura intellectus, sed ex hoc quod anima impedita est in corpore et ex corpore et quod in multis eget corpore. Sed corpus elongat eam a dignioribus suis perfectionibus. Hoc enim quod oculus non potest intueri solem non est ex aliquo quod sit ^ in sole, nec ex hoc quod sol non * appareat sed ex infirmitate oculi. Cum autem remota fuerit a nostra anima ^ ipsa aggravatio et impedimentum, tunc intelligentia animae de his omnibus erit melior quam habet anima et quae est purior et delectabilior. Sed quia rerum aliae sunt subtilissimae, aliae, sunt nimi debilis esse, ideo * formatio * intellectus variatur secundum esse rerum. Res enim subtilissimae non valet apprehendere * quia excedunt b eum. Motum vero et tempus et materiam * vix potest intelligere co quod sunt debilis esse; privationes quoque * non apprehendit intellectus absolute sed per hoc quod non * apprehendit habitum eius. Intellectual autem apprehendit privationem ex hoc quod ipse fuit habens privationem.^

Tribus * autem modis intelligibilis * formantur in nobis; quorum unus est cum in anima formatur aliquid in effectu ordinate,^ sed haec ordinatio non est necessaria sed commutabilis, sicut cum ordinaveris in anima intentiones verborum significatum hoc quod omnis homo est animal, invenies intellectum uniuscuiusque horum universalem, qui non formatur nisi in substantia non corporea.

Ad hoc * autem ut i formentur in ea, necesse est ibi ^ prius et posterius. Si vero commutaveris hoc et ordinaveris aliter intentiones formatas, videlicet ut dicas quod animal predicatur de omni homine, non dubitabis hunc ordinem secundum quod est ordo intentionum universali non esse ordinatum, nisi in substantia non corporea. Sed alius est hic ordo quam primus siclicer quantum ad auditum, non quantum ad intellectum; quasi enim * duo ordinis sunt diversi, sed intellectual eorum purus idem est.

Secundus modus est cum intellectus rei iam acquisitus est, sed anima avertitur ab eo nec respicit ad id quod iam interlexit, sed est mutata ab illo intellecto ad aliud. Non enim est in potentia animae nostrae omnium simul subito intelligere.

Tertius est cum aliquid a te quacribus de his quae iam sciisti,^ vel scire potes, sed tu dubitas respondere in ipsa hora; certus tamen quia potes ^ respondere postea quamvis nondum sit ordinata * apud te responsio. Nec

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* add. inter M.
* et hoc om. CP.
* intellectibilitas N.
* habent N.
* fit V.
* om. V.
* ipsa anima CP.
* conformatio V.
* add. sed C.
* expediunt em C.
* naturam P] materia M.
* vero GN.

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* sic all mss. Avic. omits non.
* habitum CP.
* form. intellig. CP.
* ordine C] ordinate with sinuous stroke after a N.
* haec V.
* quod C.
* om. CP.
* non C.
* scivisti N.
* postea respondere potes CP.
* apud te ordinata CP.

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184 formatio intellectus . . . privationem. Cf. ibid. 2A: formatio . . . privationem.
185 Tribus autem modis . . . l. 15, p. 96, inter virtutes humanas. Cf. op. cit. V, 6, f. 26r, 1A: dicemus quod formari . . . f. 26v, 2: in virtutes humanas. End of chapter.
tamen incipis ordinare in animo tuo nisi dum respondes, quod provenit \( p \) ex certitudine sciendi illud, quam habet ante ordinancecum. Differentia autem inter primam et secundam formationem \( q \) haec est, quod prima est sicut id quod de thesauro extrahis et agis aliquid de illo; secunda est sicut id quod habes in thesauro et \( r \) non agis aliquid de illo; tertia vero differt a prima in hoc quod nondum est aliquid ordinatum in cogitatione, sed est sicut inchoatio ordinis cum adicione certitudinis, et differt a secunda per hoc quod respicitur aliquid modo a considerante illud in actu, qui habet se \( s \) ad illud sicut ad id quod est quasi repositus.\( t \)

Si quis autem dixerit quod hoc \( u \) est scientia in potentia \( v \) sed potentia propinqua effectui,\( w \) dicimus falsum esse. Habens enim hoc habet certitudinem in effectu iam acquisitam quam non est necesse acquirere nec per potentiam remotam nec per propinquam. Ipsa enim certitudo certitudo est quia habet hoc apud se et ut cum voluerit scire illud sciet \( x \) et sic certitudo eius \( y \) in effectu est, quod hoc \( z \) iam acquisitum est, quae vocatur in effectu. Acquisitio enim aliquid acquisitio est; hoc \( \sigma \) igitur quod innimus \( \tau \) est acquisitum \( \upsilon \) in effectu. Impossibile est autem certum \( \eta \) fieri, ut id quod rescit sit ci cognitum in effectu et repositus \( \zeta \) apud se. Quomodo enim certificabitur quis de alia qua re nisi quia secundum \( \theta \) hoc quod fit certum est ci cognitum? Id ergo quod innimus duo continet in se, scilicet cognitum in effectu et certitudinem in effectu quia penes se habet hoc repositus. Sed illud simpliciter est cognitum apud eum; hoc vero, quod vult facere cognitum, alter.\( \xi \) Mirum est autem quia hic respondendo ordinat id quod subito venit in eius animam,\( h \) qui dum docet alium incipit ipse discere doctrinam, quae est secundi modi in quo ordinatur ipsa forma secundum ordinem quo ordinatur apud illum qui ab eo recipit. Unus autem istorum modorum est scientia cogitabilis cuius ultima perfectio non completur nisi cum ordo eius componitur. Alius \( i \) vero est scientia simplex,\( j \) in qua non solet generari forma \( k \) una post aliam, sed est una ex \( l \) quae proveniunt \( m \) formae in receptibilia earum. Et haec est scientia efficiens id quod vocamus scientiam cogitabilem et est principium eius et ipsa est virtus animae intellectiva \( n \) absoluta quae est similis intelligentis agentibus. Ordinare enim non habet anima nisi ex hoc quod est anima, quod si non haberet, non \( o \) haberet utique scientiam animalem.

In nostro autem puro intellectu non est multitudo \( p \) aliqua nec ordo formarum. Ipsae enim est principium omnis formae fluentis ab \( q \) co in animam.\( r \) Similiter est dispositivo separatorum pure in hoc quod intelligunt aliqua. Intellectus enim noster est intellectus efficiens formas et creans illas.\( s \) Non est eius \( t \) formare \( u \) vel qui est in forma \( v \) animae; formare vero animae sapi-
entis hominis secundum quod est anima non est nisi formare ordinatim et distincte. Unde ipsa non est simplex omnino.

Omnis autem apprehensio intelligibilis aliqua similitudo est ad formam separatam a materia et ab accidentibus eius materialibus. Sed anima habet hoc ex hoc quod est substantia recipiens impressa ab eo. Intelligentia vero habet hoc ex hoc quod est substantia principium agens et creans. Quod autem proprium est eius ex sua principalitate ad animam est eius intelligibilis in effectu. Quod vero proprium est animae ex eo quod informatur ab ea et recipit ab ea est eius intellectibilitas in effectu.

De dispositione autem formarum quae sunt in anima hoc scendunt est quod imaginata et quacumque adhaerent eis, cum anima avertitur ab eis, sunt reposita in virtutibus conservativis eorum, quae revera non sunt apprehendentes. Si enim hoc esset, tunc essent apprehendentes et conservantes simul, quod non est. Immo sunt thesaurus ad quem, cum convertitur se virtus apprehendens iudicans, scilicet aestimatio vel anima vel intellectus, inveniet ea iam haberi ibi. Si autem non invenerint ea, erit eia necesse redire ad perquendum et reminiscendum. Quod si non fieret, necesse esset nobis dubitare cum anima vacuatur ab aliqua forma, an ipsa forma habeat esse, an non habeat esse nisi in potentia, et dubitaremus quomodo memoria retur vel cum non fuit apud animam in quo fuit et anima cui adhaesit quousque revocata est haec forma. Animalis enim animae discretea sunt virtutes et unicaeque virtuti per se separatim attributa sunt instrumenta, et formis assignatus est thesaurus, quas aliando non contemplatur aestimatio; et intentionibus assignatus est thesaurus, quas aliando non considerat aestimatio. Non est enim aestimatio locus in quo stabiluntur ista, sed est iudicans, et propter hoc dicimus quod aestimatio aliando respicit formas et intentiones repositas in his duabus virtutibus et aliando avertitur ab eis.

Dicemos ergo nunc de humanis animabus an ipsa intelligibilia qua apprehendunt et deinde convertuntur ab eis ad alia non sunt in illis perfecte in effectu; et ideo ipsae non intelligunt ea perfecte in effectu; an habeant thesaurum in quo reponunt. Sed hic thesaurus vel est essentia earum vel corporis earum vel aliquid corporale ipsarum. Iam autem diximus quod nec corpus nec aliquid pendens ex corpore est dignum ut sit subjectum intelligibilium. Non enim dignum est ut formae intellectae sint habentes situm, sed coniunctio earum cum corpore facit eas habere situm. Si autem essent in corpore habentes situm, non essent intelligibiles. Vel dicemos quod ipsae formae intelligibiles sunt res per se existentes, quorum unaquaeque est species et res per se existens. Sed intellectus aliando conspicit illas et aliando avertitur ab illis et postea convertitur ad illas. Et anima est quasi speculum, ipsae vero quasi res extrinsecae quae quandoque apparent in ea quandoque non apparent, et hoc fiat secundum comparationes quae sunt in-

\[^{w}om.\ N.\]
\[^{x}om.\ CP.\]
\[^{y}substantiae\ C.\]
\[^{z}om.\ M.\]
\[^{a}om.\ C.\]
\[^{b}intelligibilitas\ CNP.\]
\[^{c}imaginativa\ VP.\]
\[^{d}advertis\ V\] \[^{e}advertis\ C\] \[^{f}advertis\ M.\]
\[^{g}om.\ N.\]
\[^{h}convertit\ CNP\] \[^{i}consistit\ M.\]
\[^{j}om.\ M.\]
\[^{k}om.\ V.\]

\[^{1}add.\ ad\ C.\]
\[^{2}esse\ habeat\ CP.\]
\[^{3}quantum\ C.\]
\[^{4}moraretur\ CP.\]
\[^{5}fuere\ CP.\]
\[^{6}anima\ N.\]
\[^{7}om.\ CP.\]
\[^{8}add.\ in\ N.\]
\[^{9}om.\ M.\]
\[^{10}om.\ C.\]
\[^{11}om.\ M.\]
\[^{12}add.\ est\ M.\]
ter eas et animam; vel ex principio agente fluant in animam formam una post alien iuxta petitionem animae. Deinde cum anima avertitur ab hoc principio cessat fluxus formarum in animam; quod si ita esset praefecto necesse esset addiscere omnibus horis sicut primitus.

Nos autem dicimus ultimam partem huius divisionis esse veram. Non enim possimus dicere hanc formam esse in anima perfecte in effectu et non intelligi ab ea perfecte in effectu. Sensus enim de hoc quod eam intelligit non est nisi quia forma existit in ea; unde corpus non potest esse thesaurus eius, nec etiam essentia animae potest esse thesaurus eius; animam enim esse thesaurum eius nihil aliud est nisi quia forma intellecta existit in ea.

Non est autem sic apprehensio formae; apprehendere etenim formam non est thesauri sed tantum retinere; alterius ergo virtutis est apprehendere. Formas etenim memoratas et formatas esse in aliquo, non est ipsas apprehendere, sicut formas sensibiles esse in aliquo, non est sentire. Unde corpora in quibus sunt formae sensibilium non sunt apprehendentia. Apprehensionem vero secundum quod est virtutis apprehendetis necesse est sieri ab eo in quo solet imprimi ipsa forma aliquo modo impressionis. In memoriai autem et formali non imprimentur formae nisi secundum quod sunt instrumenta et habent corpus retinens ipsas formas, propinquum generi virtutem apprehendentem quae est aestimatio et imaginatio, ita ut consideret eas cum vult, sicut retinet formam sensatam circa sensum ad hoc ut acquirat eam sensus cum voluerit; hoc autem potest intelligi in memoriai et formali, non in anima; formam enim intellectam esse in anima hoc est quod apprehendi eam. Item adhuc postea declarabimus in sapientia prima quod haec forma non est per sed se existens.

Restat ergo ut ultima pars sit vera et ut discere non sit nisi perquirere perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agenti, quosque fiat ex ea intellectus qui est simplex a quo emanent formae ordinatae in anima, mediate cogitatione. Aptitudo autem quae precedit discere est imperfecta, postquam vero discitur fit integra. Cum enim transit in mentem eius qui discit id quod cohaeret cum intellecto acquisito et convertit se anima ad insipientium, ipsa inspectio est conversio animae ad principium dans intellectum. Cum enim anima coniungitur intelligentiae, emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis quem sequitur emanatio ordinandi. Si vero avertitur a primo fluent ipsae formae in potentia sed potentia proxima; ergo primum discere est sicut curatio oculi, qui factus sanus cum vult aspiciat aliquid unde sumat aliquam formam. Cum vero avertitur ab illo, fit illud sibi in potentia proxima effectui.
Dum autem anima 4 humana generaliter est in corpore, non potest receptere intelligentiam agentem subito. Sed eius dispositio est 5 sicut dicimus. Cum enim dicitur: Plato est 6 sciens intelligibilii, hic sensus est ut cum 7 voluerit, revocet formas ad mentem suam. Cuius etiam sensus est, ut cum voluerit possit 8 coniungi intelligentiae agenti, ita ut ab ea in ipsum formetur ipsum intellectum. Non quod intellectum sit praeens suae menti et formatum in suo intellectu in effectu semper, nec sicut erat priusquam disceret; hic autem modus intelligendi in potentia est virtus quaque acquirit animae intelligere cum voluerit, quia cum voluerit coniugetur intelligentiae a qua emanat in eam forma 9 intellecta. Quae 10 forma est intellectus adeptus 11 verissime et haec virtus est intellectus in effectu secundum quod est perfectio.

Formatio vero imaginabilium 1 est respectio animae ad thesauros sensibilium. Sed primum est inspicere quod est superius; hoc autem est inspicere quod est inferior. Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi 12 intelligentiae agenti et tunc inveniet in ea pulcritudinem 13 intelligibilem et delectionem perennem sicut dicemus suolo.  14

Debes autem scire quod sapientia 15 sive 16 habeatur ex doctrina sive non, non 17 aequaliter habetur. Sunt etenim quidam dispersament qui 18 sunt aptiores ad intelligendum, quorum aptitudo, quae est prior ex aptitudine quam praediximur, est fortior, cum vero homo habet hoc in seipso 19 non aliunde, vocatur haec aptitudo subtilitas, quae aptitudo 20 aliquando in aliquidibus hominibus 21 ita praevalet, quod ad coniungendum se intelligentiae non indiget multis nec exercitio, nec disciplina, quia est in eo aptitudo secunda; immo quia quicquid est per se scit. Qui gradus est altior omnibus gradibus aptitudinis; 22 haec autem dispositio intellectus materialis debet vocari intellectus sanctus, qui est illius generis cuius est intellectus in habitu, sed hic est supremus in quo non omnes homines conveniunt. Non est autem longe ut ab his actionibus comparatis ad intellectum sanctum, potestate earum et virtute emanet aliqvid in 23 imaginativam, quod 24 imaginativa representet 25 etiam secundum exempla visa vel audita verba eo modo quo praediximus.

Per quod autem hoc fit certius, hoc est, quoniam manifestum est quod intelligibili qua studet homo acquirere non acquirit nisi cum habuerit terminum 26 medium in syllogismo. Hic autem medio terminus inventur duobus modis. Aliquando 27 inventur proprio 28 ingenio; ingenium autem est actus rationis cuius propria vi 29 inventitur medium terminus. Subtilitas vero est supra 30 ingenium; aliquando habetur 31 ex doctrina; principium autem doctrinae est ingenium. Resvero terminantur sine dubio apud ingenia, quas adinvenerunt 32 homines ingeniosi, deinde tradiderunt eas discipulis. Possibile est ergo ut homo in 33 seipso habeat ingenium et ex ratione sua sine doctrina faciat

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4 om. M.
5 esse N.
6 add. etiam N.
7 formam V.
8 quod V.
9 om. M.
10 om. C.
11 = om. C.
12 pulcritudine V.
13 in loco suo N] loco suo P.
14 om. CP.
15 om. CM.
16 quae M.
17 semetipso N] passage corrupt in C and M.
18 habito N.
19 om. N.
20 altitudinis N.
21 om. PV.
22 et C.
23 representat N.
24 medium terminum CNP.
25 add. autem CNP.
26 ingenio proprio CP.
27 om. M.
28 ultra C.
29 habentur M.
30 inveniuntur M.
31 ex CP.
syllogismum. Sed differunt homines in hoc quantitate et qualitate. In quantitate, eo quod aliqui hominum habent ingenium adinvenienditi medio terminos plures numero. In qualitate, eo quod alius hominum est velocior ingenii. Et quia haec inaequalitas non potest terminari, sed semper recipit magis et minus, tunc debet finiri in ultimo defectus penes eum qui nullius est ingenii, vel in ultimo augmenti penes eum qui habet ingenium omnium quaestionum, aut plurimum ex his, aut qui habet velocius ingenium. Possibile est ergo ut aliquis aliquis anima co quaestione ab intelligentia agenti vel subito vel paene subito firmiter impressam, non probabiliter sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos. Probata autem, quae sciuntur ex suis causis, non sunt intelligibilia et hic est unus modus prophetiae, qui omnibus virtutibus prophetiae altior est. Unde congrue vocatur virtus sancta, quia est altior gradus inter omnes virtutes humanas.

prior ea. Virtus autem posterior ea est virtus retentiva, quae scilicet retinet quod imaginativa reddit memoriali. Virtus vero prior ea est super omnes virtutes animales; aestimatio \textsuperscript{a} vero servit intellectui activo et \textsuperscript{h} activus deservit contemplativ. Colligatio enim animae cum \textsuperscript{i} corpore ad hoc est ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et mundetur et sanctificetur; huius vero colligationis animae in \textsuperscript{i} corpore rector \textsuperscript{k} est intellectus activus. Intellectus autem materialis cum \textsuperscript{1} aptitudine sua deservit intellectui in effectu; et intellectus in effectu deservit intellectui in habitu, et intellectus in habitu deservit intellectui adepto qui est ultimus finis in quo finitur genus sensibile \textsuperscript{m} et humana species eius. Et in hoc virtus humana conformatur \textsuperscript{n} primis principiis omnis eius quod est.

Ex his autem omnibus viribus animae rationalis, nulla virtus vegetabilis, nulla sensibilis, nullus etiam intellectus activus, nec scientia ulla quae activo intellectui \textsuperscript{o} comparatur in anima exuta a corpore remanere cognoscitur. Scientia enim est \textsuperscript{p} comprehensio formae rei ab anima, intellectu vel imaginacione. Sed cum intellectu comprehenditur dici scientia intelligibilis; cum vero imaginacione dici scientia sensibilis; scientia \textsuperscript{187} enim intelligibilis est unitio \textsuperscript{q} formae intellectae cum intelligente et per hoc fit intellectus, cum intelligens apprehendit formam rei, non \textsuperscript{r} intellectus quidem,\textsuperscript{s} qui est vis animae qua forma rei concepitur, sed intellectus scilicet ipsis media conceptio quae ab intelligente et re intellecta in anima generatur. Scientia vero sensibilis est unitio \textsuperscript{t} formae sensatae cum sentiente et ob hoc dicimus nos scire \textsuperscript{u} nivem esse albam et frigidam et mel dulce. Scientiam enim horum habere dicimur quia formas istorum sensibiles per experientiam sensuum in imaginacione impressas retinemus. Quod ideo fit \textsuperscript{v} quia anima rationalis habet in se vim intelligendi et vim sentiendi. Sed quia ipsa in se, intelligibilis est \textsuperscript{w} non sensibilis; ideo intelligibilia per \textsuperscript{x} se apprehendit sine \textsuperscript{y} medio, sensibilitia vero non apprehendit per se nisi mediente \textsuperscript{z} aliquo. Nihil enim apprehenditur \textsuperscript{r} nisi per suum simile, sed anima rationalis nullo modo est similis \textsuperscript{b} istis sensibilibus.\textsuperscript{c} Igitur anima rationalis non apprehendi: sensibilia per se.

Apprehensio \textsuperscript{188} enim animae non fit nisi conunctione suae formae cum forma intellecta et unitione eius cum ca.\textsuperscript{d} Sed quia substantia animae est subtilis, sensibilitia vero spissa, simplex \textsuperscript{e} autem non potest coniungi spissio sine medio quod habet similitudinem cum extremis, ideo anima non apprehendit sensibilitia per se nisi mediente \textsuperscript{f} spiritu, qui est substantia sentiens consimilis \textsuperscript{g} utrisque extremis. Et est media inter corporcitatem sensibilium \textsuperscript{h} et spiritualitatem \textsuperscript{h} rationalis animae ac per hoc sensibilia \textsuperscript{i} prout sunt sensi-

\textsuperscript{a} aestimativa MN. Exstamatio V.
\textsuperscript{b} om. CP.
\textsuperscript{i} in C. cum om. M.
\textsuperscript{c} cum CNP. \textsuperscript{om. M.}
\textsuperscript{k} rector CP.
\textsuperscript{1} con V.
\textsuperscript{s} sensibilem N.
\textsuperscript{n} confinmatur C.
\textsuperscript{o} intellectu N] intellectum P.
\textsuperscript{p} om. M.
\textsuperscript{q} imitatio C] mutatio P.
\textsuperscript{r} add. autem C.
\textsuperscript{s} om. C] autem P.
\textsuperscript{t} mutatio CP.
\textsuperscript{188} Apprehensio . . . I. 37, rationalis ani-
\textsuperscript{u} om. CP.
\textsuperscript{v} sit N.
\textsuperscript{w} add. et N.
\textsuperscript{x} app. per se CP.
\textsuperscript{y} ante C.
\textsuperscript{z} aliquo med. CP.
\textsuperscript{a} apprehenderunt M.
\textsuperscript{b} sensibilibus CP.
\textsuperscript{c} similis CP.
\textsuperscript{d} ipsa V.
\textsuperscript{e} simpliciter N.
\textsuperscript{f} all miss. spiritu.
\textsuperscript{g} similis C.
\textsuperscript{h} om. C.
\textsuperscript{i} add. sensib. et spirit. C.
bilia corporalia habentia materiam non sunt intelligibilia, sed abstracta a materia et a consequentibus materiam. Intellectus enim non apprehendit nisi cum intelligens apprehendit formam rei. Unde scientia intelligibilis non habetur nisi per intellectum. Igitur scientia intelligibilis est conjunctio formae intelligens cum forma intellecta.

Cognitio enim rei non habetur nisi per unionem duarum formarum cognoscenti et cogniti sine medio; quae unitio non fit nisi secundum similitudinem et propinquitatem. Ac per hoc, anima rationalis, quia divisibilis est a sensibis, ideo non potest eis coniungis nisi mediante aliquo quod sit simile duobus extremis. Medium autem inter animam intelligentem et corpus est anima sensibilis et natura. Sed et anima sensibilis non apprehendit formas sensibles nisi mediantibus instrumentis et aere propter similitudinem quam habent instrumenta et aer ad duo extremas, scilicet substantiam et formas sensibles.

Unde quacumque scientia quae aliquo mediante acquiritur, anima exuta carnis, destruitur. Sed quia intellectus contemplatius animam subiectum suum inseparabiliter comitat, ideo et sapientia quae per illum degustatur ab anima etiam separata a corpore non separat. Sapientia enim est comprehensio veritatis earum rerum quae vere sunt et quae sui immutabilem sortiuntur substantiam. Veritas autem cuiusque rei est id quod ipsa est, et in hoc conveniunt scientia et sapientia quod unaquaeque comprehendit id quod ipsa res est. Unaquaque igitur comprehendit veritatem rei. Alloquin nec vera scientia nec vera sapientia dicetur, si veritas rei non comprehenderetur sed quia veritas rei alia est variabilis, alia incommutabilis. Id enim quod unaquaeque res est aut variabiliter est et non semper manet idem aut incommutabiliter est quia semper idem est; sed quia scientia est de sensibilibus quae motui et permutationi subiacent, ideo scientia est comprehensio veritatis earum quae non vere sunt, quia id quod sunt variabiliter sunt. Vere autem esse dicuntur quacumque praeter motum et materiam vel omnino sunt vel intelliguntur quorum primum Deus est et deinde rationalis substantia intelligibilis et ad ultimum omnium veritas incommutabiliter permanet. Sed quia horum omnium sapientia cognitio est, ideo sapientia est comprehensio veritatis earum rerum quae

1 unio C.
2 per CP.
3 add. quia CN quod P.
4 om. CNP.
5 dissimilis CNP.
6 sensibilibus N.
7 ei NPV.
8 om. CP.
9 add. et N.
10 om. CMN.
11 add. alic. med. after acquiritur CP.
12 corpore C.
16 om. CP.
17 immutabile C.
18 idem N.
19 id . . . comprehendit om. V.
20 rei veritas CP.
21 apprehenderetur C.
22 add. est M.
23 om. CMN.
24 incommutabiliter MNP.
25 est idem CP.
26 nec M.
27 cognitio CP.


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sunt b vere et quae sui immutabilem sortiuntur substantiam. Sicut autem per intellectum scientia sic sapientia per intelligentiam acquiritur, quae i secundum Boethium 190 paucorum i admodum hominum est et solius Dei. Intelligentia, 191 enim est aliorum oculum animae quo se vel Deum et acterna contemplando speculatur.

Sed quia dum intelligendis sensibilibus subilitate scietiae animae rationalis intendit, nec b se nec Deum intelligit, haec enim sensibilis quibus occupatur sub ipsa sunt, ideo ut se et Eum 1 a quo est intelligat, necesse est ut cuncta sensibilia et corum formas, ipsum etiam intellectum et omnem scientiam et rerum memoriam transcendat ut a carnalibus sensibus pura uni soli et simplici cogitationi cui debet esse 2 tantum intenta in 3 considerationem 4 eius a quo est simpliciter esse suspendat; quatenus superiorem faciem sursum 5 elevans ascendent cum Paulo ad tertium coelum, 196 scilicet mundum illum intelligibilem in quo iam 6 non sensus vel intellectus sive scientia valet sed sola intelligentia. Si enim scientia non est nisi de his quaes versus vel intellectus percipit, intellectus autem et sensus proprie non est nisi de compositis, non enim intellectus percipit nisi coniuncta dividendo et divisa coniungendo, profecto cum aliori mentis oculus scilicet intelligentia in solam 7 cognitionem vereae simplicitatis intenditur, necesse est ut inde 8 intellectus et scientia quae diversorum sunt omnino expellantur. Sola est ergo ibi necessaria intelligentia ut sapientia percipiat. 9

Cur enim hic oculus animae qui est intelligentia 10 in contemplationem 11 creatoris intendit, quoniam Deus lux est, ipsa intelligentia tanta claritate divini 12 luminiis perfunditur ut 13 in ipsa intelligentia sic irradia lux inaccessiblem tamquam forma in speculo resultare videatur. Ipsa enim intelligentia creaturae rationalis quasi speculum est acterni luminis de qua Apostolus: 197 Videmus nunc 14 per speculum 15 quae quanto amplius ab omni alia 16 cogitatione detera fuerit, tanto verius in ea divinae lucis imago resultabit. Ex qua intelligentia sic irradia et ex luce irradiante, illa mentis illuminatio divinitatis cognitio, veritatisque 17 perfectae 18 nascitur, quae est vera sapientia. De qua propheta 192 dicit: Domine in 20 lumine tuo videbimus lumen.

Sicut 193 enim hunc solem visibilem non nisi adminiculio saec lucis videmus 21

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191 Intelligentia . . . animae. Cf. Boethius, Consol. V, Pr. 4. PL 63, 849A: Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit. (In the critical edition, CSEL 67, p. 117, ll. 25-26, the text is the same but intelligentia is given as a variant.)

192 Cf. II Cor. XII. 2.

193 1 Cor. XIII, 12.

194 Ps. XXXV, 10.

195 Sicut enim . . . l. 4, p. 100, proxime accedit. Much the same thought is found in Isaac de Stella, Epist. de anima, PL 194, 1888A.
sic ipsum solem iustitiae Patrem 200 luminum non nisi sua claritate prius irradiati per intelligentiam contuemur; nam cum ad contemplandum Deum anima rationalis per intelligentiam ascendit ad ipsum lumen inaccessible proxime accedit. Inter quam et Deum quoniam iam tunc nihil inter est, ex vicinitate aeterni luminis ipsa quoque intelligentia quae in ipsum lumen offendit procul dubio luminosior fit ut se et Deum cognoscat, iuxta illud: 201 Accedite ad Deum et illuminamini. Et in hoc tantum intelligentiae accessu sapientia degustatur. Si 202 enim sapientia a sapore dicta est, sapor autem rei non sentitur nisi cum res ipsa degustatur,1 gustatur autem cum ad horam 1 gustu tangitur, profecto sola intelligentia sapientia k percipitur;1 quia ea sola sed = rara 203 hora et parva mora Deus utcunque sentitur. Unde propheta: 204 Gustate et videte quoniam = suavis est dominus. Et merito per intelligentiam gustari potius quam videri o vel audiri vel odorari Dominus p dicitur quia cum omnibus aliis sensus praetereunt tactum qui communis est omnibus remota a se sentiant, gustus ex omnibus praetere tactum hoc habet proprium ut sentire non possit nisi quod se nullo mediate tetigerit.

Ideo sola intelligentia Deus gustari dicitur quia ex omnibus viribus animae ea sola in praesenti et in futuro nullo s mediate quasi tangitur; hic tamen prorsum gustamus ubi ad horam intelligendo raptum s 205 de Deo aliquid sentimus. Ibi vero satiabimur, ubi eo sine fine perfruemur iuxta illud 206: satisbore cum apparuerit gloria tua. Sola est ergo1 intelligentia qua ex omnibus viribus suis in purgata anima post mortem remanet, s forte in ea s ante mortem iugiter exercet. Nam si in corpore posita intellectum contemplativum non habuit, w profecto, quia in morte intellectum activum descript, cum neutro recessens in tenebris tabescit. Quod autem intellectus activus in morte deserat, Apostolus 207 testatur dicens: prophetia cessabit et scientia evacuabit sed quia sapientia permanet in aeternum, intelligentia utique qua z apprehenditur, semper permanere non dubitat. Et ideo anima fit immortalis per intelligentiam aeternatis. y Cum enim rationalis z anima sed beata a ab hac mortalitate transit, intellectus ab intelligentia, scientia a sapientia, temporalitas ab intellectus absoluta et in illa claritate aeterni luminis Deus et in Deo quicquid non est Deus simpliciter b videtur. Unde Apostolus: 208 Tunc enim cognoscemus sicut et cogniti sumus. Non enim erit o ibi necesse sicut hic ad multa cognoscenda oculus mentis circumflectere, et nunc hoc, nunc illud vicissim attendere, sed cuncta simul generaliter immo specialiter d cognosc-s

200 St. James I, 17.
201 Ps. XXXIII, 6.
204 Ps. XXXIII, 9.
205 Cf. St. Bernard, De diiit. Deo, X. PL 182, 990C.
206 Ps. XVI, 15.
207 II Cor. XIII, 8.
208 I Cor. XIII, 12.
mus quando ipsum librum 209 vitae in quo sunt omnes 210 theasuri sapientiae et scientiae Dei coram nobis apertum in tanta claritate legentes intellectuermus. Si enim nunc in carne quis positus, quamdui per intelligentiam sublevatur, sic in ipso contuitu aeterni luminis indeclinabiliter tenetur ut ad nulla alia cogitanda unquam vel ad modicum permutetur, tunc utique quanto immobilius uni soli intentioni adaheebit, quando quod impediat nil habebitur, quando secundum Apostolum: 211 A claritate in claritatem transierit; a claritate praesentis contemplationis ad claritatem perfectae visionis, a claritate speculi 212 et enigmatis ad claritatem plenam et continuum cognoscendae veritatis. Rationalis ergo anima in tantum vere est in quantum se et Deum intelligit. Sed in tantum a vero esse deficit et quasi moritur, in quantum a contemplatione veritatis avertitur. Et tamen non sic moritur ut esse desinat, sed sic moritur ut sine beata vita semper infeliciter vivat.

Ad beatam ergo vitam, 213 cognitionem scilicet divinitatis, acquiendam, tam hic quam in futuro, quae est vera sapientia, nihil praestantius videtur quam velut clausis carnalis sensibus, extra carnem mundumque effectum quempiam, alienumque a mortalium curis, in secreto cordis sibi soli loqui et Deo, ut altior cunctis visibilibus factus, mentem suam repleat divisus sensibus et coelestibus formis absque ulla commixtione terrena, vere speculum immaculatum effectus imaginis Dei; et ex ipsum lumen semper lumen accipiens instar quoddam futurac beatitudinis iam in semetipsa praferat; et id operis quod postmodum aerlabeliter acturus est iam in praesentia quasi quodam praeflude contemplationis exercet. Ad eum enim qui vere simplex est cognoscendum rationalis anima pervenire non potest nisi omnia sensibilia, se suamque multiplicatatem cognitionationem, desideriorum transcendens, in tantum simplicitatem se extenuaverit ut haec sola intincto in eo permaneat ceterisque omnibus clausus hunc solum intelligentiae simplicis oculum in Creatoris contemplationem defigit. Ad hoc autem quando sufficiat, quando suum ipsius simplicitatem simpliciter sine ulla cogitatione vix unquam considerat? Nunc enim rationalis anima plene se sicut est videre non valet quia de terrena inhabitatione tenebras sustinet, et tamen in tantum se conspicit in quantum has tenebras per lumen intelligentiae vincit. Cum enim ad contemplandum Deum per intelligentiam ascendit, quoniam tunc ad lumen accedit, ex qua parte magis illuminatur, ex ea sibi magis innoscescit; ex ea vero parte se non videt, ex qua per consortium carnis tenebras sustinet

209 Apoc. XIII, 8.
210 Col. II, 3.
211 II Cor. III, 12.
212 Repeated in Liber de Spiritu et Anima, 40. PL 40, 791: Nihil enim ad beatam vim praestantius videtur, quam velut clausis car
nalibus sensibus extra carnem mundumque

* quoniam C. * intellectum C.
* om. M. in carne nunc C.
* sicut N.
* om. CP.
* immutabilis C.
* habebit CMP.
* om. CP.
* cognitionis CP.
* primus C.
* mundumque effectum CMV mundum quia effectum P.] mundique? effectum N.
* mortalibus C.

213 Apoc. XIII, 8. 214 Col. II, 3.
quia corpus 214 quod corrupitur aggravat animam. Unde mens b hominis a mene 216 graeco merito dicitur quod latine luna interpretatur. Luna enim, ut aiunt astrologi, non habet lumen a se sed a sole. Ex ea enim parte illuminatur quae solem respicit, sed ex ea semper tenebrae manet quam e ad terram deprimit.d

Sic e mens humana cum per f superiorem faciem virtutem s scilicet intelligentiae ad contemplandum Deum convertitur, ex ea parte illuminetur et sibi clara videtur quia se vel Deum nulla phantasia intervollante sed b revelata facie contrectur. Cum vero per inferiorem virtutem, scilicet scientiam, ad haec sensibilita i intelligenda et j disponenda se deprimit,k ex ea tenebrescit l et se non videt quia sibi et albis, terrenis et aeternis, simul interdure non valet; cum enim istic intendit, ab illis discedit,m et n quo in his est amplior, in illis est angustior. Et o quo plus habet terrenae sollicitudinis in infinitis, minus habet luminis ex supernis. Et iade rationalis anima cum sit media inter intellectum et intelligentiam tanto per intellectum et scientiam haec inferiora subtilius intelligent, p laudabilia ordinat, quanto per intelligentiam plus cognitionis q superius degustat; quia r quo tanto plus s luminis a superiore percipit, tanto plus ad inferiorem transmittit ut in eo quasi ad lucernae lumen videat quo in nocte huius saeculi gressum operis ponat.

Cum autem inter solem et lunam terra interponitur, luna per eclipsim obscuratur, quia cum mens rationalis ad haec terrena cogitanda et amanda se deprimit, terrena cura interposita, veri solis sibi t radiis abscondit quia contemplationis lucem subtrahit. Cum igitur u terra interponitur, luna eclipsim patitur, quia, cum mens terrena cura premitur, divinae contemplationis luce privatur.

Notandum autem quia v luna multotiens tota w obscuratur, sed numquam tota illuminatur; tota enim luna obscuratur cum humanam mentem terrenae sollicitudinis sic undeque nebula obscurat, quod eam divinae considerationis radius ex nulla parte illustrat.x Sed cum illuminatur, numquam tota illuminatur, quia mens rationalis numquam perfecte se videt, quamdiu temporali mutabilitatii subiacet. Sed eo magis et magis se conspicit quo magis et magis ad lumen verum per contemplationem accedit, quod est 216 lux vera quae y illuminat omnem hominem vetientem in hunc mundum. Non scilicet hunc primum z sensibilem, caliginosum, neque hunc a secundum intellectibilem b formarum multiplicitate e plenum, sed hunc tertium,d intelligibilem simplicem, qui est tertium caelum ad quod raptus Paulus per contemplationem audit arcana verba quae non 217 licet homini loqui, in quo sola simplicia et aeterna simpliciter e videntur quorum tantum cognitio sapientia est. In primo enim

b omnes homines C.
† qua CP.
3 deprimit C.
* add. est M.
§ om. M.
€ virtutis solis CP.
\ scilicet M.
& in sensibilita C. ad hoc sensibilitum M.
et disp. om. C.
k deprimit C.
\ tenebrescit C.
\ discendit N.
\ in N] et M.
\ ex N.
\ add. et N.

214 Wisdom IX, 15.
215 Cassiodorus Dr An. 1. 7. PL 70, 1282B.

\ cogitationis V.
\ et N.
\ om. M.
\ enim C.
\ quod C.
\ obscuratur tota P.
\ illustrat MNV.
\ quae ill.\ illuminans N.
\ om. CP.
\ intelligibilem V.
\ multiplicate CPV.
\ terrenum N.
\ simplicia CP.

216 St. John I, 9.
217 II Cor. XII, 4.
mundo sive caelo cum bestiis terrae par experientiam sensuum  ꞌ reptamus; ad secundum autem cum sapientibus huius saeculi per  ꞌ intellectum sublevamur; ad tertium vero cum Paulo per intelligentiam ꞌ supra nos rapimus, ꞌ ut dicere possimus; ꞌ Nostra 218 conversatio in caelis est. In primo igitur solis sensibus degimus ꞌ in secundo scientiam apprehendimus, in tertio sapientiam degustamus. In primo caelo quasi caeci in tenebris homines palpitant de quibus dicitur: 219 nescierunt neque intellexerunt quomiam in tenebris ambulant. In secundo luna lucet ꞌ quia nox nocti indicat scientiam. In tertio sol refulget quia dies 220 diei eructat verbum.

Postquam autem auxiliante Deo, iam sufficienter assignavimus quod rationalis anima omnes vires suas in corpore manens quantum in se est exercet. Et deinde quod exuta a corpore de vegetabilibus nullam, de sensibilibus vero unam scilicet memoriam, de intelligibilibus ꞌ quoque unum scilicet contemplativum retineat, restabat ut ex omnibus viribus suis quas sit habitura recepto corpore monstraremus. Sed quia de hoc apud philosophos paene nihil ilvenimus, nos quasi ex obiis aliquid apponere non presumimus. ꞌ Tres enim status habet anima; in corpore, deposito corpore, recepto corpore; primus est vivorum, secundus mortuorum, tertius resuscitatorum. In primo itaque ut praedictum ꞌ est omnes vires suas exercere cognoscitur nisi forte alciuus sui instrumenti vitio praepediatur. ꞌ In secundo de vegetabilibus nullam, de sensibilitibus vero unam scilicet memoriam retinet. Si enim dives damnatus apud inferos fratrum suorum memoriam non amisit dicens; 221 habeo quinque fratres, quanto magis beatorum spiritus exuti ꞌ a carne memoriam nostri non deserunt quos dum viverent in Christo dilexerunt, cum iam ꞌ et angelii 222 gaudeant pro conversione ꞌ nostra. De intelligibilibus etiam unum scilicet contemplativum quo uno oculo beata anima videt Deum suum. Recepto vero corpore quod de vegetabilibus nullam sit habitura certi sumus. Sed de sensibilitibus et intelligibilibus viribus quas sit habitura et quas non, nondum plene instructi sumus.

Finitus est liber. ꞌ

Lege ꞌ Tractatum et fuge errores. ꞌ

1 sensivum M.
2 per int. om. C.
3 experientiam V.
4 expetere MN.
5 possumus N.
6 digimus N.
7 luceret C.
8 intellectibus MNV.
9 praesumpsimus CMNP. praesumpsimus P.

219 Ps. LXXXI, 5.
220 Ps. XVIII, 3.
221 St. Luke XVI, 27.
Ralph Niger

An Introduction to His Life and Works

G. B. FLAHIFF, C.S.B.

The figure of Ralph Niger, like that of so many English scholars of the latter half of the twelfth century, is an obscure and elusive one. All who have attempted to sketch his life have had to conclude with the half apologetic acknowledgment that we know indeed but little of him.\(^1\) What writings of his contemporaries have been preserved to us contain extremely few references to him. If additional contemporary works were known to the older bibliographers, they certainly do not seem to have provided them with any additional information about Niger.\(^2\) Ordinarily, one might resign himself to passing over such a writer, as we do so many of that period, with little more than the mention of his name; but in Ralph’s case, the very bulk of the writings he has left behind stands as a constant challenge and arouses our curiosity about their little-known author.\(^3\) Moreover, the already familiar material does afford, on closer examination, more information than has hitherto been gathered from it, while the works themselves of Niger provide other elements toward a more complete biography. The present article pretends in no way to be definitive. Its purpose is chiefly to restate and evaluate the known facts about Niger’s life, to add those which have been derived from a study already begun of his works, and to show at the same time that such a study and even an edition of his works may be justified. It will deal in a first part with Niger’s life, and in a second part with the list of his authentic works.\(^4\)

I

The year of Ralph Niger’s birth cannot be fixed with certainty. Around 1140 would seem to be an approximate date, since he is a student in the schools of Paris in the 1160’s and is referred to as Magister (magister artium) by 1168 at the latest. As to the place, several writers have stated that Niger was born at Bury St. Edmunds

1 R. Anstruther, Radulphi Nigri Chronica, the Chronicles of Ralph Niger (Publ. of Caxton Soc., London, 1851) contains a few introductory remarks on Ralph’s life (pp. vii–viii). R. Pauli has added noting, save the suggestion that Ralph may have been a Cistercian, in his article, ‘Die Chroniken des Radulphus Niger,’ Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (1880), pp. 569–589, especially 569–571 on Ralph’s life; cf. Pauli’s introduction to the extracts of Ralph’s chronicles, which he has edited in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, XXVII, 327–344. The fullest single account we have of Ralph is that by C. L. Kingsford in the Dictionary of National Biography under the name Niger; it is the fullest only because it gathers together most of what various others had previously said.

2 John Bale, Index Britanniae Scriptorum, ed. Poole-Bateson (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Oxford, 1902), pp. 331–332; John Pits, De Illustribus Angliae Scriptoribus (1619), p. 291; C. Oudin, Commentarius de Scriptoribus Ecclesiae Antiquis (Leipzig, 1722), III, 94–95; Thomas Tanner, Bibliotheca Britannica-Hibernica (London, 1748), p. 548. Tanner has used the earlier bibliographers, and seems to be himself the basis of later accounts. Most of the bibliographical works on English writers have at least mentioned Niger and his writings.

3 His Scripture commentaries, preserved in the Library of the Dean and Chapter of Lincoln Cathedral (Mss. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27), fill some 700 folios, recto and verso, the equivalent, that is, of 1400 pages, each page containing 2 columns of 50 lines each. These manuscripts will be referred to as Linc. Ms. 23, etc.

4 The only excuse for writing the article at this stage is the suggestion from others working in the twelfth century that anything added to our present knowledge of Niger would prove useful. I hope to be able to furnish further material, as my work on his writings proceeds.
in Suffolk, but none of them give any authority whatsoever for their affirmation. Some have been prudent enough to explain that 'it has been said' he was a native of that place; others have stated it absolutely. I find no evidence to confirm such a statement, unless it be the presence of Ralph's works in the mediaeval monastic library at Bury. This, after all, is rather weak evidence, and I see no reason why the statement should be maintained. The birthplace of Niger, like the date of his birth, is still unknown. Nor do we know aught of his youth: our first information concerning him comes from his student days. For a long time, John of Salisbury's letter of the year 1166 provided the earliest known reference to Ralph Niger. If the chronology proposed by the editor of a document recently come to light, however, be correct, our first information about him dates from one year earlier, 1165.

The document in question is a letter written by Ralph himself, probably in the year 1182, wherein he seeks to enlist the aid of Conrad of Wittelsbach Cardinal-Bishop of Sabina, in his effort to win ecclesiastical approval for his theological writings. He reminds the Cardinal how he, Ralph, had formerly been instrumental in bringing Conrad, to the latter's great profit, into relation with Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Martin Preiss, who has published the document, shows that this meeting must have taken place in the summer of 1165 at Sens. As will appear presently, Niger was already at this time a student at Paris. His presence at Sens at a given moment is easily explained in view of his associations with the Archbishop of Canterbury and his fellow exiles. Of this latter fact we shall see more. Meanwhile, the document's particular interest consists in revealing to us Ralph's intimacy, even as a young man, not only with the great archbishop of Canterbury, but likewise with Conrad of Wittelsbach, Cardinal, Archbishop of Mainz, and a leading figure in the Empire.

The letter of John of Salisbury, written to Ralph Niger in the following summer, 1166, is fortunately richer in information. It is the answer to one just received from Ralph. After a first allusion to his own recent failure to be reconciled with Henry II (for John has been forced into exile in the wake of Archbishop Becket and is at that moment the guest of his old friend Peter de la Celle, abbot of St. Remi at Rheims), he goes on to comment on the news given him by Niger, especially as to the English bishops' appeal against the excommunication which Becket had pronounced against them on Whitsunday of the year 1166. Finally, John comes to

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6 Bale (Index, p. 331) seems to be the first to state it; he does so cautiously: 'Fuit iste Sudovolcas (ut fertur) Buriensis . . .' Later writers have undoubtedly followed Bale, although they do not give their authority. The author of the article in DBV appears to associate Bury as Niger's birthplace with the fact that manuscripts of his works were formerly preserved there.

7 M. R. James, in speaking of the works of Niger which John Boston found at Bury, adds to Niger's name: 'a native of Bury' ('Two Essays on the Abbey of St. Edmund at Bury', Cambridge Antiquarian Soc. Publications, XXVIII, 1895, p. 39). Tanner had already stated it without qualification (Bibl., p. 548); also Anstruther, after Tanner (p. vii). Hardy, in his Descriptive Catalogue of MSS. relating to History of Great Britain . . ., II (London, 1863), 288, cites Pits, who had very certainly used Bale.


9 Ep. 180 (Migne PL, 199, col. 177-179; also in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, XVI, 533-537; and Robertson, Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, VI, London, 1882, pp. 1-5; references in this article are given to the Migne edition, as the most convenient). The date of the letter may be ascertained from the fact that John is answering a letter received from Ralph, in which the latter informed him of the appeal of the English bishops against the excommunication pronounced by Becket at Vézelay on June 12, 1166. This appeal was decided upon at a meeting of bishops at Northampton on July 6 of the same year (A. Morey, Bartholomeus of Exeter, London, 1937, pp. 23–24). Allowing time for the news to reach Niger and for his letter to reach John, John's letter could hardly be earlier than the end of July.
what seems to have been the main point of the letter he had received. Niger had besought him to use his influence with the archbishop of Canterbury on behalf of Ralph’s good friend, the archdeacon of Poitiers (Richard of Ilchester), one of the victims of the excommunication; he had likewise asked John’s counsel concerning a proposed visit to Richard. John is in a quandary as to what to reply: although he does not completely discourage such intimacy with the excommunicate, he sees it, nevertheless, to be dangerous and he urges Niger to seek the advice of others. Apparently Niger was not satisfied with this non-committal answer. John’s next letter shows that he has heard again from Ralph to the effect that, while he has thus far declined all invitations and inducements to go to Richard, the appeals of the latter become more and more insistent. By now, John’s mind is clearer on the attitude to be taken: he makes the necessary distinctions as to various ways of communicating with excommunicates and goes on to find scriptural support for encouraging Niger to visit their mutual friend, the archdeacon, in the hope of winning him to repentance. These two letters are so closely connected, both in subject-matter and in time, that they may well be considered together in drawing from them information about Niger.

Ralph must have been at that moment of the year 1166 a student in the schools, since John, speaking in the present tense, congratulates him on his studies and on his choice of schools, where virtue and not merely idle argumentation is cultivated. The schools in question can hardly be other than those of Paris, as indeed is generally accepted, although the vague reference to their being in urbe garrula et ventosa has been interpreted otherwise. A considerable number of learned Englishmen were then in or near Paris, as a result of having been driven into exile with Becket. This, however, is certainly not the case for Ralph, as may be inferred from facts which show that he is not in the king’s disfavour at the time of this letter:

9 PL, 199, col. 178C.
10 On Richard of Ilchester, see the article under this name in DNB (Kate Norgate).
11 Ep. 181 (PL, 199, col. 179–181; Materials, VI, 5–8); but this letter is not published in the Recueil, but is referred to in a note on the preceding letter (XVI, 535, n.2).
12 Ep. 181 (col. 179D): ‘Unde et studia tuis congruerunt quibus ad urbe garrula et ventosa, ut pace scholarium dictum sit, non tam inutilium argumentationum locos inquirere quam virtutum.’ Du Boulay, in his Historia Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1665), II, 769, cites this passage when he speaks of Niger as a teacher of rhetoric and dialectics at Paris; but it surely suggests a student rather than a master. It is not impossible, however, that he was already a master in some discipline. The address prefixed to the letter as published proves nothing, since it is not that of the original letter; but in another letter of John’s to Gerard Pucelle, dating from the same year (cf. n. 18 below), reference is made to a ‘Master’ Ralph (Ep. 185, PL, 199, col. 192: ‘ministerio magistri Radulphi’) who is almost certainly Niger, since this latter actually does figure in still another letter of John to the same Gerard with the added name of Niger (Ep. 238, PL, 199, col. 270), and the nature of the rôle played by the ‘Master Ralph’ in the two cases is very similar.
13 The editor of the Recueil has attempted to prove that the reference is to Poitiers (XVI, 535, n.4). Du Boulay had interpreted it as meaning Paris (loc. cit.), and this interpretation seems highly probable, to say the least. The expression, ‘garrulous and windy city,’ rings like the slang of students with whom John himself would be familiar; indeed, just shortly before this time, he had been in Paris, enjoying to the full his renewed contact with the scenes of his own studies (cf. Chartularium Unio. Paris., ed. Denifle-Huetain, I, Paris, 1889, p. 24). Moreover, the allusion to a considerable choice among the schools (‘multiplices locos et sedes’) fits Paris better. Finally, we know that Ralph was certainly a student at Paris at some time, since, in the Prologue to one of his commentaries, he speaks of Gerard Pucelle as his master (Anstruther, Radulphi Nigeri Chronica, p. vii; the passage referred to occurs in Linc. Ms. 26, fol. 1: ‘Hujus vero audacie mee incentores habui venerabillem Johannem Carnotensem episcopum et magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum’). On Gerard, see Hist. litt. de la France, XIV, 301–304, for the little that is known of him; also A. Budinsky, Die Universität Paris und die Fremden an derselben (Berlin, 1872), pp. 82–83. Miss Eleanor Raithbone is preparing a work on English Cathedral Chapters as centres of learning in the twelfth century; it contains much new material on Gerard.
14 Herbert of Bosham has left us a list of the eruditi who followed Becket into exile (Materials, III, 523 ff.).
he is intimate with Richard of Ilchester, clerk to Henry and his favourite ambas-
sador, and he is, moreover, contemplating at the very moment a visit to the king's
court (ad curiam), where he expects to meet the excommunicated archdeacon.15
His subsequent bitterness toward Henry II and its cause, expulsion by the king,
according to the testimony of the anonymous continuator of Niger’s shorter
chronicle,16 must therefore date from a later period of his life. This, in turn, per-
mits us to conclude that he was in Paris in 1166 for the specific purpose of studies,
and not just to escape his monarch’s wrath.

How long had Ralph then been in Paris? It is not sure, but, since he himself
speaks elsewhere of Gerard Pucelle as his master,17 and since Gerard left Paris for
Cologne in 1165,18 Niger must have been in Paris for some time previous to that
date. Moreover, in a letter of the year 1168, John of Salisbury gives Ralph the ex-

cplicit title of Magister; 19 this would certainly imply that Ralph had already spent
several years in the schools. He may very well have come to Paris then about 1160
or shortly afterwards.

This letter of the year 1168 is addressed to Gerard Pucelle but makes reference
to Niger. There is no evidence of any change in the latter’s position at the time. He
is still most intimate with John and Becket’s followers. He may even have been
present when John prepared for the archbishop a letter to Pope Alexander III
interceding for Gerard Pucelle, who is still at Cologne and in disfavour with the
Roman pontiff because of his association with the schismatics of that city.20 John
has asked Niger to write to Gerard and give him fuller details of the progress of
their efforts, but the letter, if Niger ever did write it, has not come down to us.
There is nothing further about Ralph in John’s own letter; hence, it is of no assis-
tance in determining whether his relations with the king’s party had become any
less friendly. That they did eventually, is clear from the well-known passage of
Niger’s shorter chronicle, where he bursts into a furious attack on Henry II’s char-
acter as well as his policies.21 Even in his theological works, he finds occasion to

display his marked hostility to the king, although the tone he assumes is there
somewhat less bitter.22

Our sole source of information on the subject of Niger’s expulsion is the anony-

mous continuation of this shorter Chronicle. The author, before adding his own

15 There can be no doubt that a visit to
Henry III’s court is meant, for on July 13 and
14 of that very year Richard was at Fougeres
with the king, where he witnessed royal acts
issued there (L. DeLisle, Recueil des actes de
16 Ed. Anstruther, p. 169.
17 See above, n. 13.
18 C. C. J. Webb (John of Salisbury, London,
1932, p. 148) gives 1166 as the date; Pauli is
probably more correct in giving 1165 (MGH,
SS, XXVII, 327, n. 1), since Gerard is already
at Cologne when John of Salisbury writes to
him early in 1166, at a date later than Becket’s
legatine appointment (April 24), but earlier,
it would appear, than the excommunications
19 Ep. 238 (PL, 199, col. 270); as has been
seen above, he may have been Magister two
years earlier; cf. n. 12.
20 PL, 199, col. 270A: ‘Misit ergo dominus
Cantuariensis iterato ad Ecclesiam Romanam,
injungens nuntius, me praesente, ut revoca-
tionem vestram a domino papa satagerent

impetrare. Ego ipse ex conscientia magistri
Radulphi Niger composuit litterae. Ego rogavi
ipsum, ut rei hujus seriem ex ordine scriberet
vobis.’ Becket’s letter had the desired effect,
for, on May 20, Alexander III wrote pardon-
ing Gerard, if Becket himself should deem his
repentance sincere (PL, 200, col. 485–486;
Jaffe–Loewenfeld, Regesta, no. 11400). Others
besides Becket were seeking clemency for Ger-
ard; cf. Preis, Die politische Tätigkeit . . .
, p. 102.
21 Ed. Anstruther, pp. 167–169. This passage
has likewise been transcribed in part by Wright,
Bibliographia Britannica Literaria, Anglo-Norman
22 Except in his chronicles, Niger invariably
characterizes Henry II as ‘rex sub quo passus
est beatus Thomas martyr Anglorum’ (e.g.
Moralia Regum, Linc. Ms. 25, fol. 29v, 159v;
Ms. 26, fol. 108, 109, 157; De Re Militari, Linc.
Ms. 75, fol. 25, 28, 29v, etc.). Each of these
references is occasioned, moreover, by the de-
sire to point out some abuse of Henry’s reign.

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brief annals, feels called upon to offer some sort of apology for so 'unseemly' an attack on so great a monarch:

Hucusque protractit hanc chronicam magister Radulphus Niger, qui, accusatus apud praecticturn principem et ex illium pulsus, ob expulsionis injuriam atrociam quam decuit de tanto ac tam serenissimo rege mordaci stilo scriptis.25

The grounds of the accusation against Niger are not stated. Oudin and Tanner use a very general term to characterize it as treason, without, however, giving any authority for their statement.24 Very probably Ralph's continued sympathy for the archbishop's cause led to an accusation against him and to his expulsion some time before Becket's death in 1170.26 There is, nevertheless, a further possibility, namely that he was involved in the rebellion of the sons of Henry II against their father in 1173, or even later, and on that account denied access to England. The latter hypothesis gains strength from an isolated reference in the writings of Gervase of Tilbury, where he states that he had been associated with Ralph Niger at the court of the young King Henry, eldest son of Henry II.26 Whatever may have been the truth concerning the exile, this mention of Niger by Gervase of Tilbury is the next certain bit of information that we have about him.

How early Ralph came to be attached to the young king's court, we do not know. His acquaintance with Gervase there could hardly be earlier than 1177–1178, since Gervase, who had passed many years of his life in Italy, was still there in 1177, having assisted on July 24 of that year at the meeting between Alexander III and Frederick Barbarossa at Venice.27 Ralph's connection with the court may, of course, have begun before that of Gervase. At any rate, since the young king died on July 11, 1183, we can affirm that at some period between 1177 and 1183, Ralph was in the service of Young Henry.28 It is doubtful if the service was a very active one; the prince was more probably Ralph's patron, for, as will be seen in the course of this article, Niger was by this time already busy with his works on the Old Testament.

Of Ralph's later life nothing is known, says the writer in the Dictionary of National Biography. All his biographers have stopped here. Indeed, until quite recently, the letters of John of Salisbury and the passing mention of Gervase of Tilbury were the only known contemporary witnesses to even so much as the existence of our Master Ralph Niger. A short time ago, however, Professor W. Holtzmann, in his collection of papal letters relating to England, published two new documents, found on the flyleaf of one of the Niger manuscripts at Lincoln.29

23 Ed. Anstruther, p. 169; also published in Hardy, Descriptae Catalogue, II, 287–288 note; and in Wright, loc. cit. The continuator does not accuse Niger of falsehood, but blames him for keeping back Henry's many good points and for offering no excuses for his bad deeds, many of which could be palliated.
25 Wright (p. 422), Anstruther (p. vii–viii), Hardy (II, 288), Pauli (MGH, SS, XXVII, 327) and the DNB all see his loyalty to Bocket as the reason for the expulsion; but they seem to assume that he was driven into exile along with the archbishop; Hardy and Pauli state it expressly. Against this view, see above, pp. 106–107.
26 De Otio Imperialibus (MGH, SS, XXVII, 370): 'Unde literatur ille nostris temporis vir magister Radulphus Niger, domini mei regis junioris concuralis, cum Topica Aristotilis et

Elencos verarius glossar, ait:

"Sunt loca, sunt gentes, quibus est matcrae parentes,
Cum moris aut pietas aut longa supervenit etas . . ."

27 Cf. article on Gervase of Tilbury in DNB (W. H. Hunt).
28 Ralph was not present at the death of Henry, for he speaks of having heard from others of his pious death: ' . . . vitam finiens in Martello, castro Limoviae, sub testimonio sanctorum virorum, in sancta devotione' (Anstruther, p. 93). The most complete work on Young Henry is that of C. E. Hodgson, Jung Heinrich (Jena, 1906); it contains nothing, however, on Ralph's presence at the court.
They, in conjunction with Niger’s own works, throw some light on the hitherto unknown portion of his life.

The first of the documents is a letter of Clement III, dated February 7, 1191, commissioning Guy of Noyers, archbishop of Sens, to have examined by men of his ecclesiastical province learned in the Scriptures and in Canon Law the writings of Master Ralph Niger; which writings, it is said, should prove of great profit to the Church. Any necessary corrections are to be made, and Guy is to report back to the Pope in order that he in turn may approve the works as thoroughly orthodox.30 Pope Clement died in the following month, and one of the very early letters of his successor, Celestine III, is a word for word renewal of this same commission to Guy of Noyers.31 The other document is yet more interesting. It consists of two parts: a notice recording how the volumes of Niger’s works had been distributed among various persons for purposes of examination, and a copy of the report made by Guy to Celestine III to the effect that, after long and careful scrutiny by prudent and learned men, the works of Ralph have been found to contain nothing contrary to holy faith or dangerous to Christian teaching.32 The date is missing on Guy’s letter, but it is almost certainly of the year 1192 some time after Easter.33 The details furnished as to the exact distribution made by Guy of the different works and the length of time they were kept permit us to conclude that the notice, along with the first transcript of the letters, was written at Sens.

Guy of Noyers was not the only one, however, who had the responsibility of censoring Niger’s works. The notice, before giving the names of those to whom the archbishop of Sens entrusted certain works, states that the volumes had been first divided between Guy and the archbishop of Rheims 34 [William of Champagne, or of the White Hands, 1176–1202]. Guy therefore distributed only those which fell to his lot. Moreover, since the Pope’s letter to Guy states explicitly that he should have recourse to learned men of his province, it is not improbable that a similar commission, which has not come down to us, was sent to the archbishop of Rheims empowering him too to act as censor. The works for which Archbishop William was responsible would be those theological and canonical works of Niger written before 1191 which are not mentioned in the notice about Guy’s distribution.35

30 This is Holtzmann’s no. 258 (pp. 453–454).
31 Holtzmann, no. 259 (pp. 454–455).
32 The notice prefixed to the letter states that the persons to whom Guy had distributed certain works of Niger kept them from the feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) until the following Easter. Since Pope Celestine’s letter was dated April 24, 1191, it is quite probable that Guy set about his task within a few weeks, so that the feast of St. John the Baptist would be that of the year 1191 and the Easter, referred to, that of 1192, which fell on April 5. (As Guy died in December, 1193, the Easter could not in any case be later than that of 1193, March 28).
33 'Duiisius voluminibus inter dominum Guideronem Senonensem archiepiscopum et dominum Remensem archiepiscopum, idem dominus Senonensis assumptas sibi ipsi secundam partem moralium Regum ad inspicendum et examinandum, priorem uero partem moralium Regum tradidit magistro Petro Anglicico canonic et alis canonici . . . _(Holtzmann, p. 454). I have been unable to identify this Petrus Anglicicus.
34 Guy’s list included five works: 
Moralia Regum (prior pars, as in Linc. Ms. 25).
Moralia Regum (secunda pars, as in Linc. Ms. 26).
Epitome Vœoris Testamenti (which is not contained in part in Linc. Ms. 24, as stated by Holtzmann, p. 454, n. 5, but is identical with the In Paralipomenon as contained in Linc. Ms. 27; this is evident from the Insipit of the latter Ms., fol. 1: ‘Epitomé veteris testamenti liber iste inscribitur grecce Paralipomenon, hebraice Debriamian, latine . . .’). 
Remediarum in Estram (cf. Linc. Ms. 27, where it is incomplete).
Digestum Nunci (cf. Linc. Ms. 23).
It may therefore be inferred that the archbishop of Rheims had some five others: the commentaries or digesta on Leviticus and Deuteronomy (as represented by Linc. Ms. 24) also
The choice of the archbishops of Sens and Rheims as censors points to the conclusion that within their ecclesiastical provinces lay the scene of Niger's life and literary activity during the years since he had left the service of young King Henry. That his works were there so easily available, strengthens this hypothesis. Finally, the role played by William of the White Hands, as friend and host to Becket and his supporters in the different dioceses of central France over which he had ruled, would easily explain Ralph's preference for this region. As bishop of Chartres (1165–1168) and then as archbishop of Sens (1168–1176) while still retaining the see of Chartres, he had been most active in the exiled archbishop's cause and that of his friends. Nor did he show himself less generous after Becket's death and his own transfer to Rheims: his intimacy with several learned men who were natives of the British Isles and friends of Becket's is quite well known. The prologue to Niger's De Re Militari, as yet unpublished, throws further light on these years of his own life. It confirms the hypothesis of his relations with the archbishop of Rheims, but it indicates also that a part, perhaps the greater part, of this time had been spent close to the scene of Ralph's earlier studies a: Paris, which lay, it may be noted, within the limits of William's former ecclesiastical province of Sens.

Maurice of Sully, bishop of Paris from 1163 to 1196, was second only to William of the White Hands in his warm support of Becket and his friends. Less of a patron of letters than was William, he was, nevertheless, more of a scholar, a former master in the schools and a preacher of high repute, who continued, as bishop, his interest in the schools of his episcopal city and in the development of studies there. Niger himself testifies, in the Prologue just mentioned, to his intimacy with the bishop of Paris, in the period prior to the composition of the De Re Militari (1188–1190). His testimony gives considerable probability to the theory that he was actually at Paris in the 1180's. Was he teaching during this period? He does not say so, but such may very well have been the case; writings of the character of his were, for the most part, the work of men who were or had been masters in the schools. It must in any case have been an interesting period in Paris amid teachers and students like Peter the Chanter, Peter of Poitiers, Alexander Neckam, Stephen of Tournai, Stephen Langton, the future pope Innocent III, Gerald of Wales, etc.

the commentaries on the other two books of the Pentateuch, Genesis and Exodus, which works seem now to be lost but which are both mentioned by Niger himself in other commentaries (In Nom., Linc. Ms. 23, fol. 12 for Genesis; and In Lev., Linc. Ms. 24, fol. 25v for Exodus); and finally the De Re Militari et Triflicit Via Pereginationis Terosolymitanae (cf. Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5–52), which Niger himself considers to be a theological and canonical work (ibid., fol. 5v, Prologue).

It is extremely doubtful if the De IV Festivitatibus Beatae Mariae Virginis and the De Interpretationibus Nominum Hebraeorum (=Philippus) were written by this time. As to the commentaries on Josue and Joshu, which appear to be included in the list which Niger gives of his own works in his longer chronicle (ed. Anstruther, p. 97) under the comprehensive title of Septem Digesta super Eptatium, no known manuscripts of them are preserved and I have seen no references to them in Niger's works; cf. below, p. 117.


32 On William, see the interesting and suggestive article of J. R. Williams, 'William of the White Hands and Men of Letters,' Anniversary Essays... by the Students of C. H. Haskins (Boston, 1929), pp. 365–387. Williams gives references to the chief biographies of and studies on the archbishop. The latter's acquaintance with English men of letters is treated on pp. 370–371.

33 Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5–5v; also in Cambridge, Pembroke College Library Ms. 27, fol. 119r–120r. The latter manuscript was formerly at Bury St. Edmunds.

34 The best, if not the only, individual work on Maurice is that of V. Mortet, 'Maurice de Sully évêque de Paris,' Mémoires de la Soc. de l'Hist. de Paris et de l'Ille-de-France, XVI (1889–1890) 105–326; and published apart, Paris, 1890. On his studies, pp. 116–119; teaching and preaching, pp. 123–136; relations as bishop with the schools, pp. 150–161.

35 Professor F. M. Powicke has devoted two chapters to Paris and its studies in this period: Stephen Langton (Oxford, 1928), pp. 23–74.
G. B. FLAIIFF

This important prologue to the first book of the De Re Militari begins with lengthy introductory remarks on the nature of the subject to be treated, on the three mystical journeys to Jerusalem, on contemporary pilgrimages and crusades, on the great need of proper interior and spiritual dispositions in such undertakings; then the writer addresses himself directly to someone whom he calls Reverende Pater, to whom he is offering the work. The rest of the prologue makes it clear that it is the archbishop of Rheims, William of the White Hands. Niger beseeches him to have this and others of his works (hec et alia que super libros Mysii digessit) examined lest they contain any error. After urging upon William how apt he is to assume such a task, he explains that formerly Maurice, bishop of Paris, had been accustomed to correct his works for him. Now, however, Maurice is growing old; besides, he is deficient in knowledge of law (quia tamen canones et leges non didicerit). Ralph has already asked the archbishop of Sens (Guy of Noyers, 1176–1193) and others (alia quaque auditores legum et canonum) to undertake the work of correction, but they have all for one reason or another declined. And so he has recourse 'like a beggar' to William, asking him to have prudent men and men skilled in law examine, emend and improve these his works on Scripture.

It is Niger's allusion to the fact that Maurice 'was accustomed' to attend to the correction of his works (alia prioribus operibus meis favore emendationis prestare consuevit) that has led me to suggest that Ralph was in Paris during the 1180's and on quite intimate terms with the bishop. Probably he is still there when he writes to William in this prologue (1190?), since his reason for not turning on this occasion also to Maurice is only the latter's advancing years and his insufficient knowledge of law.

The prologue provides further information which permits us to link the facts it sets forth with those contained in the later documents, already considered, published by Holtzmann. There appears to have been a sequence of events like the following: Ralph Niger, after composing several commentaries or digests on the first books of the Old Testament and a work entitled De Re Militari, wishes to have the stamp of orthodoxy placed upon them. Maurice of Sully, who has censored earlier writings of Ralph, possibly even some of these same, cannot undertake the task this time. Guy of Noyers and others decline it. The author of the works then seeks help from the archbishop of Rheims, noted as a patron of letters and probably already well known to Ralph. Archbishop William, convinced of the value of the works, or interested at least, praises them to the Pope himself, Clement III, and urges him to have them all examined. Whereupon, the Pope commissions the archbishop of Rheims and the archbishop of Sens to conduct the scrutiny of the books and report to him. Someone at Sens has copied down, fortunately for us, the Pope's letter

41 The general part of the Prologue ends in Linc. Ms. 15 on fol. 5v. The more personal part follows on; it has seemed to me important enough to publish as an appendix to this article.

42 Further on, Niger addresses the one to whom he is writing: 'Sullimatis (sic) illustratus vestri et prorogativa potestatis apostolice auctoritatis et regie dignitatis fulsa presidio . . .'. William had been papal legate as early as 1169. Uncle of the king Philip Augustus, he had been likewise co-regent at the beginning of that king's reign, and he fills the same office a second time when Philip arranges for the governing of his kingdom during his absence on the Third Crusade in 1190. It would not be easy to find another whom Niger's form of address would fit so perfectly. Still further on, reference is made to the addressee's having acquired knowledge in the 'consistory' (de consistorio proprio); William was raised to the dignity of cardinal-priest of Sancta Sabina at the Lateran Council of 1179.

43 This is not the only place where Niger is preoccupied about ecclesiastical approval for his works. In a prologue to Book IV of his longer chronicle (see n. 101 below), in the prologue to De IV Fest. B.M.V. (see n. 60 below) and in that to his commentary on Kings (M. Preiss, Die politische Tätigkeit und Stellung der Cisterzienser . . ., Berlin, 1934, p. 261), he speaks in similar terms. These texts and those published by Holtzmann are important additions to our knowledge of censorship in the latter part of the twelfth century.
and that of his successor, Celestine III, along with the answer of the archbishop of Rheims commending the books, and has added a short notice concerning those who had assisted Guy in his work of censorship. No trace remains to us of the results of the enquiry instituted by William on the books which fell to his lot.44

What did the stamp of ecclesiastical approval on his works avail Ralph Niger? The question has to remain unanswered. At least it may be said, however, that it did not suffice to prevent his falling into all but complete oblivion. Save for the tribute of Gervase of Tilbury who speaks of him as literatus ille nostri temporis vir,45 the contemporaries of his later years make no reference even to the man, much less to his writings or his scholarship; nor do the men of following generations. His theological works were never popular enough to be copied to any great extent, if we are to judge by the known manuscripts. To our knowledge, only two sets existed even in the Middle Ages, neither of them quite complete: one in the Library of the Dean and Chapter at Lincoln,46 the other at St. Edmund’s Abbey, Bury.47 Of these the former remains intact, but of the second set only the De Re Militari is still extant, having found its way in the sixteenth century to Pembroke College at Cambridge.

The remainder of Niger’s life is obscure. There are serious reasons for believing, nevertheless, that he returned during the reign of Richard I to his native England. The Chronicles are evidently Ralph’s latest works. That the longer chronicle, published as Chronicle I, comes after the theological writings is clear from the fact that it includes a list of all these. Moreover, since it does not list among Ralph’s works the shorter chronicle, we may assume that this one was not yet written. Now, if we consider as two the commentaries on Paralipomenon and Eirodas, bound together to-day as Linc. Ms. 27. The eighth was perhaps never returned; it may have contained Niger’s missing commentaries on the first two books of the Pentateuch, Genesis and Exodus. ‘Toren . . .’ (read by Wooley as ‘Terent . . .’) is probably for ‘Torentona,’ i.e. Thornton, an abbey of Austin Canons in northern Lincolnshire.

44 John Bostor, himself a monk at Bury, drew up early in the fifteenth century a catalogue of ecclesiastical writers, indicating, in so far as he could, where their works were to be found in English ecclesiastical libraries. (Understand that R. A. B. Mynors, W. Pantin and R. W. Hunt are soon to publish this catalogue; meanwhile, we have that part of the work which Tanner published omitting the notices on non-English writers: Bibliotheca Brit.-Hib., Preface, pp. xvii-xiii.) Under Ralph Niger’s name, Boston has reproduced the list of works given by Ralph himself in his longer chronicle (ed. Anstruther, p. 97), a copy of which was in the Bury library at the time and is likewise mentioned by Boston. He does not, however, indicate that all the works in the list were to be found at Bury, but only the commentary on Kings, seven books on the Heptateuch and the De Re Militari, along with the longer chronicle (Tanner, Bibl., p. xxxvi; in the original catalogue, Cambridge Univ. Library, Add. Mss. 3470, fol. 124). Hence Bury had not the commentaries on Paralipomenon and Eirodas, the De IV Festinatibus B.M.V., nor the De Interpr. X. et X. Hier. On the Bury library, as known to John Boston, see the article of M. R. James cited in n. 6 above; Niger’s works are mentioned on pp. 39–40.
both chronicles, while not dealing expressly with England alone, are, nevertheless, distinctly English, especially toward the close. The sources used for the twelfth century, which Paulli has been able to identify, are the chronicles of earlier English writers, William of Malmesbury, Roger of Wendover, Geoffrey of Monmouth. A list of the kings of England occurs in the longer chronicle; the shorter one contains a list of the kingdoms and bishoprics of the Anglo-Saxons and one of the archbishops of Canterbury. No other single country receives such special attention. It is this noticeably English touch to his last works that leads to the conclusion that Niger returned to England and composed them there. Henry II being now dead, there would be no particular obstacle to his doing so.

There is, moreover, corroboratory evidence of his presence there: three documents, at least, of an official nature, make mention of a *Magister Radulphus Niger* in England in the years 1194 and 1199. It may be, of course, that there were others of the same name. But, in spite of the frequent use of the name Ralph in England and Normandy at this time, the combination *Ralph Niger* is not common. It is known that the father of Roger Niger (bishop of London 1229–1241) was called Ralph; and the name Ralph Niger occurs more than once in the Pipe Rolls of the last quarter of the twelfth century; but none of these is given the title of *Magister*. It is therefore quite possible, and even probable, that the three known references to a *Magister Radulphus Niger* in English documents, at the very moment when our Ralph seems to have returned to England, apply to none other than himself. It would be a coincidence indeed if a second person of the same name and title happened to be at hand in just those same years.

Two entries in the Plea Rolls of 1194 mention the name. In one, two men are charged with robbing the servant of Master Ralph Niger. In the other, Master Ralph himself is plaintiff against the king in connection with a certain prebend which is said to be in the king’s gift; the case is remanded and has unfortunately left no further trace in what rolls are preserved. The last mention is in one of King John’s early charters, dated August 31, 1199, wherein he confirms to Roger Crispus the grant of a house in London under the same conditions as he had formerly, as Count of Mortain, granted it to Master Ralph Niger.

When and where Niger died is unknown. Paulli has argued that he was still living

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50 Ralph Niger of Stratton’ appears twice between 1175 and 1177: *Pipe Roll 22 Henry II*, *Pb. of Pipe Roll Soc.*, XXV (1904) 96, and *Pipe Roll 23 Henry II*, *P. of P. R. S.*, XXVI (1905) 60; both entries are for Notts and Derbyshire. Three entries for the same counties in the years 1195–1197 bear the name Ralph Niger, who may be the same as the Ralph Niger of Stratton: *Pipe Roll 7 Richard I*, *P. of P. R. S.*, new series, VI (1929) 19; *Pipe Roll 8 Rich. I*, *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s., VII (1930) 268; *Pipe Roll 9 Rich. I*, *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s., VIII (1931) 147. In 1199, a Ralph Niger occurs in a Lincolnshire entry and in one for Herefordshire: *Pipe Roll 1 John*, *P. of P. R. S.*, n.s., X (1933) 149, 218.

51 Three Rolls of the King’s Court . . . (1194–1195), *Publ. of Pipe Roll Soc.*, XIV, 88. Maitland, who edited this volume, found the name illegible in part, but he has supplied the missing letters, apparently from the *Placitum Abbreviatum* (London, 1811), p. 14, where the name ‘Magistri Radulphi Nigri’ is found in full. Probably it could still be read on the roll when this work was edited.

52 *Rotuli Curiae Regis*, I (London, 1835), 87. The session is that of Dec. 4, 1194, and the case is for Lincolnshire. The name of the prebend has not been read by the editor, except for the last three letters: ‘. . . nes;’ this ending is not common in Lincolnshire; sixteenth century lists contain a Skegnes in the archdeaconry of Lincoln (deanery of Candlehoe). If Niger did hold a prebend at Lincoln, this would help to explain the interest taken by the cathedral library in his works.

53 *Rotuli Chartarum* (London, 1837), p. 22. At his accession, Richard had granted the county of Mortain in Normandy to his younger brother John.
when Hubert Walter died in 1205, since he refers to Hubert in the longer chronicle as though he were already dead: *Parum tamen literatus fuit et nimis acer in operibus justicie*.64 With this single exception, there is nothing in either chronicle that relates to a date later than 1199, the very year in which King John disposed of the house which Ralph had held in London. Such a coincidence suggests that Ralph may have died in that year and that the reference to Hubert Walter has been added or its tense altered. However, we shall have to be content, for the present, to place the date of Ralph’s death in the last year of the twelfth century or in the very early years of the thirteenth.

Before passing from the man to his works the question as to whether Ralph was a monk or not should be raised. It was supposed at one time that he was a religious at St. Edmund’s Abbey, Bury, but there are no apparent grounds for such a supposition other than the presence of his works in that house.65 Moreover, unless his attitude toward the Black Monks changed considerably after his return to England, one would hardly expect to find Niger, who had severely criticized their abuses and excesses in his *De Re Militari*,66 entering a house of the older branch of the Benedictine family but a few years later. The theory that he may have been a Cistercian is much more plausible, but I believe this too can be disproven. Pauli favoured this theory, adducing as evidence to support his view the many very precise statements in the Chronicles about the order of Citeaux, the universal interests displayed by the author, his imperfect Latin,67 his devotion to the Blessed Virgin, etc.68 All of these facts are quite true, whether they warrant the conclusion drawn from them or not. Indeed, there are more passages in other works than the Chronicles which voice high praise of the Cistercians. In the *De Re Militari*, for instance, Niger’s condemnation of the excesses of the Black Monks is followed by a most favourable picture of the continent, regular life of the Cistercians.69 This need not, however, indicate any more than a decided preference for the younger order. And that this was Ralph’s position, namely, that he was not himself a Cistercian but was a great admirer of the order, becomes almost certain in light of the Prologue to his work on the four feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, still unpublished. The work is dedicated to the members of an unnamed religious order; references to their outstanding devotion to the Blessed Virgin, to the integrity of their lives, to their flight to the wilderness and to the unprecedented rapidity of their growth, make it evident that Ralph has the Cistercians in mind. But the terms in which the work is offered to them as a gift and the general tone of the whole Prologue seem to ex-

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64 *MGH, SS*, XXVII, 327, n. 5; cf. *art. cit.* in *Nahr.*. . . . *Göttingen* (1880), p. 570. It might be noted that Pauli, like Anstruther, read ‘minus acer’ instead of ‘nimis acer;’ it is certainly the latter reading in the manuscripts (Brit. Mus., *Cotton Ms. Cleopatra C. 70*, fol. 53v; also in Linc. *Ms. 15*, fol. 57v).

65 Pauli considers the supposition to have arisen in the sixteenth century (*art. cit.*, p. 571).

66 Linc. *Ms. 15*, fol. 27–27v: ‘Quippe grandes possessiones, quas pietas consulit religioni, dissipat, et edes nobilissimas in rudera decidere permittunt. De incontinentia eorum et excessibus finis non est, que, quia in propatulo sunt, scripto mandari non indigent. Et hec ut de pluribus et ut in pluribus vera sunt, in eis maxime qui nigrum habent habitud.’

67 There is frequent awkwardness, striving for effect, use of unusual expressions, etc. In justice to Ralph, it should be noted once and for all that all the manuscripts which we have of his works are copies; some of the faults and shortcomings may be put down to scribes.

68 *Art. cit.*, p. 570, 573; cf. *MGH, SS*, XXVII, 327. Pauli goes no further than to say that he must have been a Cistercian or very devoted to the Cistercians: ‘Cisterciensis ordinis seu monachus seu congregationi valde addictus’ (*MGH, loc. cit.*). A more recent writer, who seems to use Pauli as his authority, speaks without any reservation of Ralph as an English Cistercian: Karl Wenck, ‘Die Römischen Päpste zwischen Alexander III und Innocenz III . . . ; *Papstum und Kaiserum* (=Festschrift Kehl), Munich, 1926, p. 417.

69 Linc. *Ms. 15*, fol. 17v: ‘In monachi vero Cisterciensis ordinis omnia claustra sancta conversatione minantur, nisi apud paucos in quorum porta valde consistunt cupiditas pariter et avaricia. Ab omnibus tamen inquinamentis immunes esse crediderim claustrales simplices quorum sola cura est ordinis sanctitas et silentium contemplationis . . . ’
clude the possibility of his having been actually a member of the order. The case is far from rare among the late twelfth century scholars, where a man, without being himself a Cistercian, displays keen interest in their life and institutions, nay more, gives enthusiastic voice to his admiration and affection for the order. As long as proof to the contrary is lacking, it is more reasonable then, to conclude that Ralph Niger was not a monk but remained a secular clerk.

II

The greater part of Ralph's works are scriptural and theological in character, typical of the age in which he lived, when theological studies were based largely on the Scriptures and the commentaries of the Fathers, and not yet marked with the dialectical character which was to predominate in thirteenth century Theology. The nature of Ralph's works was determined by his own education. To be sure, he had been first trained in the liberal arts and, like his friend John of Salisbury and other humanists of the late twelfth century, he came to bewail the decline of these studies, as the more utilitarian disciplines of law and medicine encroached upon them. But the liberal arts were to him only a means to an end. His true interests were more theological than humanistic; it is the inroads of law and medicine on the study of the Scriptures that cause him the greatest concern. Ralph acknowledges Gerard Pucelle as his master; all too little is known of Gerard, beyond that he was learned in law, both civil and canon, and in the Scriptures. His interests are mutualand fuerit, vestro committitur arbitrio ut insufficientia mea sapientia vestra que ex Deo est corrigitur et suppleatur.'

J. de Ghellinck comments on the lofty reputation enjoyed at this time by the Cistercians and on the interest displayed by scholars in Cistercian usages: 'Les Notes marginales du Liber Sententiariam,' Rev. d'hist. ecc., XIV (1913) 533. Miss Beryl Smalley informs me that she has met in the works of Stephen Langton passages not unlike those of Niger, where Langton too, who was certainly not a Cistercian, expresses his praise and admiration for the order. Similar sentiments may be found likewise in Peter the Chanter's works.


See notes 13 and 12 above. A recent work suggests Gerard as author of a gloss on the Decretum of Gratian: S. Kuttner, Repertorium der Kanonisistik, 1140-1234 (Stud. et Test. 71, Rome, 1937), pp. 11, 26, 64 n. 2, 197 n. 3. Miss Eleanor Rathbone will deal with Gerard's legal work in her book on English Cathedral Chapters as centres of learning in the twelfth century; he was certainly in utroque jure peritus.
reflected in those of his pupil. Niger tells us that he has studied not only the expositions of the Fathers but also the canones and leges in the schools, while his allusions to Roman civil law show some acquaintance with this subject as well. To Ralph, however, all law is based primarily on the Scriptures; there one must seek it as at its source; hence, his works appear to be predominantly scriptural. In reality, Ralph is, and his works are, a product of that period of the twelfth century when Canon Law and Theology had so much in common, both as to sources and method, that they constantly interpenetrated each other.

It is not the purpose here, however, to go into a detailed study, or even to give a thorough analysis, of Niger's writings; this will be reserved for a future work. It is merely a question of listing Ralph's known authentic works with a brief explanation of their nature. The task of drawing up the list is greatly facilitated by the list which the author himself has left us in his longer chronicle. He has just been speaking of certain writers of the late twelfth century—Joachim of Flora and Geoffrey of Auxerre are mentioned by name—when he goes on:


If we add to these works the shorter chronicle, published as Chronicle II, we have, I believe, the complete list of the authentic works of Ralph Niger, with the exception possibly of a gloss in verse on certain works of Aristotle, of which the only trace is one isolated contemporary reference. We seem to have them, moreover, in the approximate order in which they were written: Ralph might be expected to put them down in chronological order, and this does prove to be the case, where verification is possible, in every instance, save one. We shall consider each work.

The close relationship between these two disciplines in the twelfth century is treated by Fournier-LeBras, Histoire des collections canoniques, II (Paris, 1932), 314–351, up to the time of Gratian, and by J. de Ghellinck, Le Mouvement théologique au XIIe siècle (Paris, 1914), pp. 277–346 throughout the whole century.

The prologue to De Re Militari alludes to the analogia super libros Moysi digesti (Linc. Ms. 75, fol. S5v), the digests were therefore earlier than it. Moreover, the De Re Milit., as will soon be seen, was occasioned by the fall of Jerusalem and the launching of the Third Crusade; it could not then have been begun before the

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individually and then attempt to dispose of other writings which have been falsely assigned to Niger.

(1). *Digesta Septem in Heptaticum.*

There is no reason to doubt that Ralph did write commentaries on the first seven books of the Old Testament, since we have his own word for it and since his word is confirmed in five cases out of the seven by concrete corroboratory evidence. Nevertheless, no trace of manuscript or mention of the commentaries on *Josue* and *Judges* has been found, other than that implied in the title from Ralph's list: *Septem Digesta in Eptaticum.* John Boston of Bury gives this same title, having taken it directly from Ralph's own list, which Boston reproduces. He indicates, moreover, that the commentaries or digests were to be found in the library at Bury. However, when we consult Boston's other list of *Nomina doctorum qui scribunt super Bibliam,* wherein after the name of each book of the Bible are given the names of those who have written on that book, we find Ralph's name occurring in the lists which follow *Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers* and *Deuteronomy,* but missing after *Josue* and *Judges.* From this we may conclude that, although Boston had indicated the Bury library after the comprehensive title of *Digesta super Eptaticum,* that library contained but the first five of the books.

The only extant manuscripts of the digests are those at Lincoln (Library of the Dean and Chapter, Mss. 23, 24). Even there the digests on *Genesis and Exodus* are missing. Proof positive that these did exist, however, is had in the references to passages in them which Niger himself makes in his commentaries on *Numbers* and *Leviticus.*

The date of these writings cannot be fixed exactly. With the exception of *Numbers,* they are earlier than the *Moralia Regum* which was written before the end of Henry II's reign, in fact several years perhaps before the end of the reign. If we are to judge by the quantity of work involved, Niger must have been engaged upon the digests already in the 1170's, or in the very early 1180's, at the latest. Exception has to be made, however, for the commentary on the Book of *Numbers,* which, for some reason, is later than the others, having been written after the *Moralia Regum* and the commentary on *Paralipomenon,* to both of which specific reference is made in the work on *Numbers.* Possibly it is later than the commentary on *Esther* also. In any case, it is prior to the year 1191, since it is mentioned among the writings of Niger, which were examined by Guy of Noyers at the command of the Pope. The middle or later 1180's would seem to be the date of composition.

The question of Ralph's method in commenting on the Scriptures must be left for a more detailed study of his works. In spite of the variety of names he gives to his commentaries on the books of the Old Testament, his method does not vary

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71 Op. cit., p. xlii.
72 See n. 35 above. It has been suggested in n. 46 that these two may have been in the volume which had been loaned to the abbot of Thornton when the entry concerning Niger's writings was made in Hamo's catalogue.
73 See below on the date of the commentary on *Kings.* I hope that internal evidence may help to date these works more exactly.
74 Linc. *Ms.* 25, fol. 50v and 57; cf. n. 44 above.
75 See n. 35 above.
essentially. Nor is there anything original about his method as such: he goes through each book, giving first a section of the scriptural text, followed by commentaries drawn in large part from the Fathers of the Church and other early commentators, and often adding a certain number of personal notes. It is the method common to many older writers and still popular in the twelfth century. The Glossa Ordinaria is the classic example of this type of commentary.\textsuperscript{77} What does add interest to Ralph's work, especially from the historian's point of view, is the number of allusions to historical events, some of them contemporary. This is true, however, of the later books, especially Kings, rather than of the digests on the Pentateuch.

(2). \textit{Moralia Regum}.

The commentary on Kings has always occurred in lists of Niger's writings. It is preserved to-day in two volumes among the Lincoln manuscripts of his works (Library of the Dean and Chapter, Mss. 25, 26). In his Prologue to the second of these volumes (fol. 1), the author explains that the division into two volumes does not mean that he is following the old division of two books of Samuel and two books of Malachim; this old division ought not to be made, because the story of the kings of Juda and Israel runs on throughout and ought to be treated as a single whole. If Ralph has made two volumes of the work, it is for an eminently practical reason: a single volume would be too big and heavy to carry about with any ease. The internal division is not into four books, as eventually becomes the case with Kings, but into twenty-four, the second volume beginning with the thirteenth book. Ralph has likewise multiplied the number of chapter-headings; John of Salisbury and Gerard Pucelle are his authority for this.\textsuperscript{78}

As has been noted above, Henry II was still reigning when the \textit{Moralia Regum} was written, for within a few folios of the end of the second volume reference is made to him as still alive.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, since the \textit{De Re Militari} was offered to the Archbishop of Rheims not later than 1190 so that before that date and yet after the composition of the \textit{Moralia Regum} would come the writing of the commentaries on Paralipomenon, Esdras and Numbers and of the \textit{De Re Militari} itself, the date of composition of the \textit{Moralia} ought surely to be put back to the early 1180's. On the other hand, it cannot have been completed before 1179, since a decision of the

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, \textit{La Renaissance du X\textsuperscript{II}e siècle} (Ottawa, 1933), pp. 245–247, on this kind of "lecture glosée." On the \textit{Glosa Ordinaria}, of which Niger himself makes use, see the article of Miss Beryl Smalley, "La Glossa Ordinaria," \textit{Rech. théol. anc. médi.}, IX (1937) 366–400.

\textsuperscript{78} Linc. Ms. 26, fol. 1: 'Prologus de libri divisione. . . . et Malachim Hebrei dividunt nominibus et titulis et voluminibus. Ecclesia vero propter hystorie continuationem et successionem regum Israel et Juda usque ad Sezechiam (sic) ultimum totam seriem successionis regiminum appellat una nuncupatione libri regum. Unde et ego sub unius nominis et tituli (sic) nuncupatione totius historie seriem deputavi. Verumtamen expositionis ejus volumen dividit licere estimavi quattuor, licet unus sit liber, divisus tamen in partes facilius hau- letur; tali enim divisione licentia non adimitur ei qui voluerit tanquam unius hystoric et uno volumine unam expositionem contexere quominus divisa conjungat vel etiam pluralius dividat, dum tamen hystoric continentiam non scindat. Capitula quoque numerosius supposui quam ea beatus Jeronymus disperserit propri expositionis latitudinem et distinctionum utilitatem. Hujus vero audacie mei incentores habui venerabilem Johanneum Carnotensem episcopum et magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum, qui hoc mihi non minus licere quam expedire persuaserunt.' Ralph, John and Gerard may therefore have had something to do with the older division of the Scriptures into chapters. On this older division, see the article of A. Landgraf, "Die Schriftzitate . . .," \textit{Biblia}, XVIII (1937) 74–84.

\textsuperscript{79} Niger has been referring to the troubles of the English Church under Henry II. After speaking of Becket's death, he goes on: 'Prinpecps, licet postea in pena et confusione multa mala passus fuerit, a vexatione ecclesie, cum hec scribentur (sic), non quievit, quoniam Azael Geth suam expugnaverat . . . (Linc. Ms. 26, fol. 157).
third Lateran Council (March, 1179) is cited toward the end. The sentence in the Prologue to the second volume, which mentions John of Salisbury and Gerard Pucelle, inclines me to suggest the year 1180 as the date of the work’s completion. In the first place, while John is called the venerable bishop of Chartres, Gerard, who became bishop of Coventry in 1183, is simply magistrum meum Gerardum Puellam dictum; which seems therefore to require an earlier date than 1183. Again, if John were already dead (d. Oct. 25, 1180), one might well expect from so good a friend as Ralph, so soon after the loss, some expression like benae memoriae. But it is dangerous to argue from silence; let us take about 1180 as a round date. This would, of course, put the digests on the Pentateuch back into the 1170’s, as proposed above.

(3). Epithome Veteris Testamenti in Paralipomenon.

(4). Remediarus in Esdram.

These two works, the last of Niger’s scriptural commentaries, are preserved in the library at Lincoln Cathedral (Ms. 27), bound together in one volume. From what has gone before, they would seem to have been composed in the middle 1180’s.

(5). De Re Militari et Tribus Viis Jerosolymitanae Peregrinationis.

The title is given thus in Niger’s chronicle, but in both the manuscripts extant (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5–32; Cambridge Pembroke Coll. Libr. Ms. 27, fol. 119–156v), it takes a slightly different form: De Re Militari et Tripli Via Peregrinationis Jerosolimitanae. In spite of the order in which the two parts of the title occur, it is the second which indicates more truly the nature of the work, as is clear from the opening words of the Prologue:

Peregrinatio est tota vita hominis in hac valle lacrimarum in qua manentem civitatem non habemus sed futuram inquirimus; peregrinari enim est ab eo in quo manserit homo proficisci alio ad profectum suum.

Jerusalem has always had the mystical meaning of Heaven, hence the ‘pilgrimage to Jerusalem.’ What has occasioned the writing of the work, however, is the recent fall of the earthy city of Jerusalem in Palestine (occupied by Saladin on Oct. 2, 1187). This event has led many to take up the cross to go to Jerusalem on a new crusade. Niger’s purpose is to warn them that a corporal crusade will profit nothing unless it be accompanied by a spiritual one, that is, unless men give heed to the journey they are also making to the heavenly Jerusalem. This gives him an opportunity to enlarge on warfare, arms, armour, siege-machines, etc. (hence the De Re Militari of the title), all of which are treated symbolically in connection


82 Preiss argues convincingly that the dedication, with its part addressed to Conrad of Wirneckbach, could only have been written in the early summer of 1182 (Die politische Tätigkeit . . . der Cisterziener, Berlin, 1934, p. 265). The work would then have to be prior to this date.

83 Prologue to Ek. I (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5); also in the course of Bk. III (fol. 24).

84 Bk. I, Prologue: ‘Quia vero labor peregrinationis corporalis parum facit nisi eam peregrinatio spiritualis purificat.’

85 This part of the title was undoubtedly taken from Vegetius’ treatise of the same name, a fourth century work which was very common in mediaeval libraries. Some of the headings on arms, instruments of war and campaigns seem to have been suggested by those of Vegetius. Otherwise, there is little resemblance.
with the spiritual warfare we must wage. Ralph even goes so far as to dissuade his readers from going on the crusade to Palestine; at least, he urges the king, to whom he addresses himself in the Prologues to Books II and III, to be in no great hurry. If calamities have befallen Palestine, they are but a visitation from God upon the sins of its inhabitants; hence one should be slow about interfering. Besides, there are enemies enough of Christ to be encountered at home in the guise of heretics, as diverse as they are numerous, without going off to the Holy Land to fight the infidel. Man's true pilgrimage and crusade being a spiritual one, it should be assured before any other is attempted. This general thesis leads Ralph to a consideration of the evils of his own time, with the result that he has left us many passages of contemporary interest. Indeed, the work merits to be published first among those of Niger's works which are still known only in manuscript. An edition will appear in the near future.

(6). De Quatuor Festivitatibus Beatae Mariae Virginis.

The Prologue informs us that, having served the Son of the Virgin in his expositions on Scripture, the author wishes now to honour the Mother. This work must, therefore, be later than the commentaries, and very probably after Niger's return to England. It is offered to the members of some religious house, almost certainly Cistercians, noted for their devotion to Mary, and consists of the proper of the Divine Office for the four major feasts of the Blessed Virgin: her Nativity (Sept. 8), the Annunciation (March 25), the Assumption (Aug. 15) and the Purification (Feb. 2). Niger himself has composed the offices, drawing largely on scriptural sources. Antiphons and responsories are accompanied by musical notation which he claims to be new:

Novum enim cantum antiphonum et responsoriis conquesivi ut et concentus redimeret scripture ruditatem (fol. 33).

The work is extant in one manuscript only: Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 33–43.

(7). De Interpretationibus Hebraeorum Nominum.

In the one manuscript (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 59v–86), this work bears a different title: Philippiacus, which has evidently nothing to do with the nature of the contents. Niger himself gave it this title and he tells us in his Prologue why he has done so: a certain Jew converted to Christianity and named Philip has been his guide in the

86 Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 26v: 'Inde est, serenissime domine, quod prudentiam vestram et patientiam liberrius audaeam commendas quia nec inconsula necessitate peregrinationis vos illigatis.' The prologues referred to are on fol. 12v and 18v. The king in question is certainly Philip Augustus, for Niger was in France when he wrote this work; moreover, his high praise of Philip throughout is in sharp contrast with his severe judgments against Henry II of England.

87 'Exigentibus peccatis hominum . . .' (fol. 5); 'Peccatis enim Palestine exigentibus . . .' (fol. 24); and a whole chapter in Bk. III, De justa pena Palestine (fol. 25v; cf. fol. 24).

88 Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 26v: 'Hec itaque, serenissime regum, de milicia christiana et de tribus viis peregrinationis Jerusalimitanæ et de pestilentiiæ heresum que fines occiduos invasit (sic) vobis scribere curavi ut contagiones here-

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ticorum ab ingressu terrarum vestrarum arceatis et de peregrinacione assumenda non festinatis et modum milicie religiosa agnoscatis.' Several times Niger manifests great concern about the heresies of the late twelfth century (especially on fol. 24 and 25v). On these heresies, consult J. Guiraud, Histoire de l'inquisition. I. Origines . . . (Paris, 1935), ch. 1: L'Hérésie au XIIe siècle (pp. 1–33). Ralph's preoccupation with heresy is another reason for supposing that he was at one time associated with the Archbishop William of Rheims; the latter was particularly active against the sect of publicani or patecins (cf. Williams, art. cit., in Annu. Essays . . . Haskins, p. 371, n. 44).

89 The general character of some of these is not unlike that of certain passages in Walter Map's De Nugis Curialium.

90 See above p. 114.
use of Hebrew dictionaries for the interpretation of many names; hence Ralph
calls the work *Philippicus* to acknowledge his great debt to Philip.91

Much of the matter is based on a similar work of St. Jerome,92 as Niger further
explains in the Prologue. He feels obliged in fact to justify his seeming presumption
in attempting to add to or alter what St. Jerome has already done. Like the latter’s
work, this of Niger proceeds through the books of the Old and New Testament list-
ing in alphabetical order for each book all the proper names with their interpre-
tation. It is not a slavish following of St. Jerome, however; the order of books varies
somewhat and even that of names at times. More often than not Ralph’s interpre-
tation agrees with that of the great Doctor, but there are frequent cases where he
differs; he is usually careful to indicate, nevertheless, what St. Jerome’s interpre-
tation is.93 Finally, many of Niger’s lists are fuller, while he gives lists for *Ruth,*
(*Judith,* *Machabees,* *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras,* which are altogether lacking in St.
Jerome’s work.

The very nature of the work and the observations of the writer raise the interesting
problem of Ralph’s knowledge of Hebrew. That he should undertake this
particular work at all is evidence that he had some interest in Hebrew. Moreover,
his remarks in the Prologue on Hebrew words and writing prove some acquaint-
ance with the language. Nevertheless, his other works bear but scant witness to a
knowledge of Hebrew, while he himself in another part of this very work admits
that even with the aid of dictionaries and the help of Jewish interpreters he sees the
meaning of many names *non omnino clare . . . sed tanguam per speculum in enigmâ.*94
Elsewhere, after mentioning how some words are written with a simple aspiration,
others with double and still others with none at all, he adds: *Unde et variatur inter-
pretatio; serum ignorantibus Hebreum determinatio talium magis est laboriosa quam fru-
tuosa.*95

If we may accept his own testimony for it, Ralph has been painstaking, never-
theless, in seeking out the meaning of the Hebrew names. He has declined to take

91 Linc. Ms. 75, fol. 59v: ‘Unde et hoc opus
non nomine meo sed Philippi interpretes mei
Philippicum intituavi quoniam maxime fidem
ejus in eo secutus sum, eo quod de Judeo factus
Christianus in lectionem Machuere et Aruch
magister et interpretes meus fuit.’ This is one
more case to add to the already known num-
ber of ecclesiastical writers who thus made use
of a Jewish interpreter; see Miss Smalley’s arti-
cle, ‘Andrew of St. Victor, Abbot of Wigmore:
a Twelfth Century Hebraist,’ *Roch. théol. anc.
méd.,* X (1938) 362.
92 Published in Migne *PL,* 23, col. 815–904.
Niger’s work must not be confused with an-
other treatise on the interpretation of Hebrew
names, which occurs frequently in manuscripts
of the Vulgate, and which used to be printed
with the works of Bede (e.g. *Opera Venerabilis
Beda,* Basle, 1563, cols. 498–647), but which is
actually of a considerably later date; Pro-
fessor F. M. Powicke says there is good au-
thority for attributing it to Stephen Langton
(*The Mediaeval Books of Merton College,* Oxford,
1931, p. 131, n. 347 note). It too is based on
St. Jerome’s work; in fact, it seems to be little
more than a rearrangement of it; instead of
giving the names for each book of the Scrip-
tures in succession, as does St. Jerome, this
work groups all the Hebrew names beginning
in *A*, then those in *B*, etc., making but one
alphabetical list. It appears to add little that
is new. Niger’s treatise, on the other hand, while
following the order of St. Jerome, dis-
plays much more originality in the way of add-
tions and differences, especially in the first
books of the Old Testament upon which Niger
himself had written commentaries.
93 The following, chosen at random from fol.
60v, are typical: *Câbathe:* adunatus vel azedo.
J. molares dentes vel pacienda’ (cf. St. Jerome’s
*Jer. horribilis* (cf. *PL,* 23, col. 823). Some-
times disagreement with St. Jerome is on a
more fundamental point; thus, Niger prefaces
the following observation to the names in *P:
Apud Hebreos, ut dicit Jeronimus, *P* littera
non est. Moderni Hebreei dicunt habere *Ps* et
*Psa* pro nostro *P*; ponit autem *F* forte ubique
pro *P.* Ego vero tempora nostra sequor quia *P*
habere (sic) semper in principio, *Psa* autem in
fine; *Ps* autem pro *Psa* etiam plerunque ponit
principio’ (fol. 61v; cf. *PL,* 23, col. 889).
In his commentary on *Numbers,* Ralph invokes
the testimony of St. Jerome along with that of
Jewish usage to show that our letter *S* has to
stand for three different Hebrew letters (Linc.
94 Fol. 80, in a minor prologue to the names
that occur in *Paralipomenon* and *Esdras.*
95 Fol. 60v, at word *Chaber.*

[121]
the word of his interpreter Philip, unless the dictionaries Machbereth and Aruch 96 support it, and unless these in turn are in accord with the interpretation of Jews of Ralph’s own time. Finally he has refused to trust even the combined weight of all three of these, unless their interpretation is confirmed by the Old Testament itself or at least by Gamaliel.97 It is undoubtedly as a result of these efforts that Ralph acquired his smattering of Hebrew.

This work closes the list of Niger’s scriptural writings; there remain his two chronicles and the gloss he is said to have composed on Aristotle.

(8). Chronicle I.

Anstruther gives the name of Chronicle I to the longer of Niger’s two chronicles, extending from the creation to the end of the twelfth century. For his edition 98 he used one manuscript only: British Museum Cott. Ms. Cleopatra C. 10. Pauli has described this particular manuscript,99 and in the parts of it which he has re-published in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica 100 he has included certain marginal notes that Anstruther omitted. Pauli, like Anstruther, seems, however, to have been ignorant of the Lincoln manuscript of the same chronicle (Ms. 15, fol. 44–58). The latter incorporates the marginal notes just mentioned and contains as well a few interesting variants which will have to be taken into account in a re-edition. Pauli has carefully analyzed the contents of the chronicle and its sources up to the point where it becomes almost contemporary.101 There still remains the task of determining more exactly, if possible, Niger’s sources for the twelfth century. Meanwhile it must suffice to refer to Pauli’s article and to the notice in T. Duffus Hardy’s Descriptive Catalogue, vol. II, pp. 496–497.

(9). Chronicle II.

Less interesting for its own sake, apart from the attack it contains on Henry II, this chronicle acquires a certain importance from its association in all the manuscripts with the Chronicle of Ralph, abbot of the Cistercian house of Coggeshale, a valuable source for the reigns of Richard I and John.

96 These are well known mediaeval dictionaries, Machbereth for biblical language, Aruch for the Talmudic. Menahem Ben Saruk composed a dictionary, Machbereth, in Spain in the tenth century. The first Aruch, by the Gaon Zemach, is of the late ninth century; but the best known one is that of Nathan of Rome, incorporating much of the earlier one and dating from the end of the eleventh century. About the middle of the twelfth century, Solomon Ibn Parchon, disciple of the Spanish scholar Abra-
ham Ibn Ezra but himself writing at Salerno, composed a Machbereth ha-Aruch (name borrowed from the two). Niger may have had this latter, since he always uses the same two names in conjunction whenever he refers to the use of a dictionary. Facts about the dictionaries are drawn from M. Waxman, A History of Jewish Literature (New York, 1930), I, 172, 254, 279–

97 ‘Neque enim verso meo interpreti credere volui nisi Machuere vel Aruch asti-
pularentur interpretationi. Sed neque his fidem adhidebam nisi Judei consentirent. Sed neque his tribus assentiebam nisi de veteri testa-
mento vel saltum de Gamalielo suo talis in-
terpretationis significationem ostenderent’ (fol. 59v).

98 PP. 1–104 (edition cited above in n. 1).


100 SS, XXVII, 331–341.

101 Art. cit., pp. 573–581; also pp. 581–584 for the twelfth century part. Pauli recognized that from the year 1110, Niger is much less dependent on other sources. The Lincoln manuscript actually contains a prologue at this point, which is missing in the British Museum manuscript used by Pauli, and which states the very fact which he observed:

PROLOGUS: Priore de historiis et cron-
icis aliorum excepismus et plerique se-
quentium. Verum ea que prope tem-
pora nostra acciderunt vel etiam diebus mei accidunt laciuse expendi secundum ea que prius audivi aut vidi et a veridi-
cis latoribus accipi. Ego tamen et de prioribus et de sequentibus non eru-
besco corrigi meis in quibus deliqui; et ideo hoc chronica sicut et alia scripta mea omnia ad emendandum prudenti-
orum virorum committo judicio (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 55v).
Anstruther published this chronicle as *Chronicle II*, using one manuscript almost exclusively: British Museum *Cotton Ms. Vespasian D. 10* with some notes from another: *Royal Ms. 13. A. 12*. Pauli re-edited extracts from the same two manuscripts. Elsewhere he has described the manuscripts fully, analyzed the contents of the chronicle, and given a list of other known manuscripts: London, Heralds’ College Ms. II; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale Ms. Lat. 15076; Dublin, Trinity College Ms. E. 4. 24. He omits the manuscript of Cambridge, Corpus Christi College Ms. 343 (fol. lv–18v for Niger’s chronicle).

The success of this chronicle in comparison with Niger’s other works, as evidenced by the number of manuscripts, is undoubtedly due to its having been used by Ralph of Coggeshall as his starting point. The relationship of the two Ralphs and of the annals and additions, which separate the parts that belong admittedly to these two, still awaits a more thorough examination.

Ralph Niger continued his part to about the year 1180; the death and burial of Louis VII of France are mentioned. He seems to have been writing, however, some twenty years after this date, for in his list of the archbishops of Canterbury, he ends with *Hubertus qui regem Johannis inuuxit*.

All the manuscripts, most of which are of the thirteenth century, attribute this chronicle to Ralph Niger. The first continuator states explicitly that what has gone before is the work of Ralph, while the Prologue too is definitely assigned to him. Molinier, without giving any reasons or authority, seems to consider that the attribution to Ralph is by no means sure. In the present state of the question, however, there is no solid reason for denying his authorship.

As in the case of the first chronicle, we refer the reader, for the time being, to Pauli’s article and to T. Duffus Hardy’s notices: *Descriptive Catalogue*, II, 287–289 on Ralph’s part of the chronicle; II, 415 and III, 22, 30 on the continuations.

(10). Gloss on Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi (?)*

According to Gervase of Tilbury, Niger was the author also of a gloss in verse on these two parts of Aristotle’s logic. There is no other reference to it than that of Gervase, not even in Ralph’s own list of his works, and we have only the two lines of the gloss which Gervase cites. The latter was in a position to know what Ralph had written in his earlier years, having been his fellow courtier in the Young King’s service. Moreover, Ralph would certainly have studied the logic of Aristotle and perhaps even taught this very portion of it, the dialectical part, at Paris, as DuBoulay suggests. The gloss may therefore be placed with some degree of probability among the authentic works of Niger. It would date from the early years of his literary activity, before his Scripture commentaries.

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102 Pp. 105–169; Ralph’s chronicle ends at p. 169, but Anstruther goes on to publish the first additions also.

103 *MGH*, SS, XXVII, 341–344.


106 Pauli (*Art. cit.*) says that the list ends with Baldwin (1184–1190); Anstruther too ends the list in his edition with Baldwin. Yet, the manuscript which they both used (*Vespasian D. 10*, fol. 34) bears the mention of Hubert Walter. I am dependent, for the moment, on photographs; there is evidence of the words ‘Hubertus qui Johannis inuuxit’ having been scratched somewhat; perhaps it is clear in the manuscript itself that they have been deleted. Nevertheless, they were certainly written by the person who copied the manuscript, for they are in the same hand and on a normal line, not interlined or added in the margin. And, since the manuscript is a copy, I do not see on what grounds Pauli and Anstruther have concluded that the words were not in the original.


108 The passage is cited above in n. 25; cf. editor’s note in *MGH*, SS, XXVII, 370, n. 6.

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Works falsely attributed to Ralph Niger.

The confusion between our Ralph and Ralph of Flaxi, monk at St. Germer in the
diocese of Beauvais, has long since been noted. The confusion of persons led to a
 corresponding confusion of works. As a result, Ralph of Flaxa’s commentary on
Leviticus has often been ascribed to Ralph Niger. Tanner made this error; the
manuscripts in the Royal collection (now at the British Museum), which he lists
as Niger’s Digestum in Leviticum are all copies of Ralph of Flaxa’s much better
known work on this same book of the Old Testament. Conversely, Niger’s histor-
tical works have sometimes gone under the name of Ralph of Flaxa.

No explanation has been offered of this confusion. It is not impossible, however,
that Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was the unwitting cause thereof when he wrote of
Ralph of Flaxa: Radulfs ille niger monachus Flaicensis in territorio Belonensis fecit opus
super Leviticum. The juxtaposition of the words Radulfs and niger could easily lead
to the confusion of this member of the Black Monks at St. Germer with our Ralph
Niger, since both wrote treatises on Leviticus.

Tanner likewise ascribed to Niger a work entitled Pantheologicon. Bale was un-
doubtedly his source for this statement. The editors of Bale’s Index have, however,
called attention to this false ascription: the Pantheologicon is in reality the work of
Peter, canon and prior of the Augustinian house of Holy Trinity, London. The
latter dedicated the second and third parts of his treatise to Ralph, archdeacon of
Colchester, and the presence of this name at the head of the volume seems to ex-
plain the false attribution to the other Ralph, Ralph Niger. I believe it explains
another error about Niger, namely, that which makes him to have been arch-
deacon of Gloucester. This error has its root apparently in a misreading of the
archdeacon of Colchester’s title; Tanner has put Radulfs archidiaconus Glocestriae,
instead of Colcestrie as occurs in Bale. Once the work was wrongly ascribed to
Niger because of the name Ralph at the beginning, the further error, that Niger
was archdeacon of Gloucester, would follow naturally.

Finally, Ralph has been sometimes credited with historical works other than his
two chronicles. Bale, Pits and Tanner mention some three: De Regibus Angliae a
Guillelmo Primo, De Rebus Gestis Regis Johannis, and Initia Regis Henrici Tertii.
The attribution to Niger is so lacking in solid foundation, however, that later bibliog-
raphers do not include them at all; even Bale and Tanner seem to have had their
doubts about the authenticity of the works. They are nothing but excerpts from
other chronicles which have, for some unknown reason, had Niger’s name attac-
tched to them. It is hardly necessary to discuss them here. Anstruther treats the
matter in the introduction to his edition of Niger’s chronicles (p. ix), as does also
the article in the Dictionary of National Biography. Hardy too touches on it in his
Descriptive Catalogue, III, 78.

110 Hist. litt. de la France, XII, 484; also article on Niger in DNB.
111 Bibl. Brit.-Hib., p. 548; cf. article in DNB.
112 Hist. litt. de la France, XII, 484; cf. art. in DNB.
113 Chronica Alberci Monachi Trium Pontum, publ. in MGH, SS, XXIII, 844.
114 Loc. cit. Pits too attributed it to him (De Illustribus Angl. Script., p. 291).
115 Ed. Poole and Bateson, p. 331, n. 11. On Peter’s Pantheologus, see R. W. Hunt’s article,
‘English Learning in the Late XIIth Century,’ Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc. (1956), 53–54; the pro-
logue to the first part of the work is published as an appendix to the same article, pp. 38–42.
116 This is Ralph of Haute Rive, who died at
the siege of Acre in 1191 (R. W. Hunt, art. cit., P. 33).
117 Both the author of the article in DNB and Pauü (art. cit.) questioned this fact, but
without offering any solid objection other than the non-appearance of Niger’s name in the list
of archdeacons of Gloucester found in Le Neve’s Fasti.
118 The editors have noted this misreading
by Tanner: Index, p. 331, n. 12. Pits too had
read Gloucester (loc. cit.).
119 Bale, Index, pp. 331–332 Tanner, Bibl.,
G. B. FLAHIFF

Many points about Ralph Niger’s life still remain obscure. The further study of his works should add to our knowledge of the man. Certainly, it will make us more familiar with him, and this promises to be intriguing, for he reveals himself already as one with a strong personality and many peculiarities. This article has attempted little more than to show what can be stated with certainty, what is probable, and what is demonstrably false, among those things which have been previously said about him. If it has added anything new of particular interest, it is, first of all, in showing the scope of Niger’s personal interests as manifested in his works; and secondly in bringing forth evidence for Ralph’s prolonged residence in Paris or nearby and his close association with the theologians and patrons of letters of the rank of the Bishop of Paris, Maurice of Sully, and the Archbishop of Rheims, William of the White Hands. He must have been in contact with many of the chief scholars and teachers at Paris during years which represent an important formative period in the realm of theological studies. All of which leads to the conclusion that Ralph’s works may throw valuable light on the developments of those years, the 1170’s and 1180’s, at Paris.

Appendix

Prologue to Book I of De Re Militari (cf. n. 41 above). (Linc. Ms. 15, fol. 5v, col. 1, line 18 to col. 2, line 5).

Hec vobis, reverende pater, de verbo Domini munus modicum in exenias porrigo quatinus Dei amore et sacre scripture intuitu et presentium gratia et hec et alia que super libros Moysi digessi a prudentioribus viris faciatis examinari priusquam a me vel ab alio in publicum educantur. Neque enim de me certus sum quod viam pollutam deserti hujus inpolluto pede transierim, ut in tanto sacre scripture pelago sine ullo periculo errors enataverim. Hoc itaque munus magnificentie vestre congruum et officio vestro debitum omni desiderio et necessario a vobis efflagito. Sullimitas (sic) enim illustratus vestri e: prerogativa potestatis apostolice auctoritatis et regie dignitatis fulsa presidio et potest et debet ydoneos viros ad hujus emendationis scrutinium eligere et quasi munus puplicum (sic) indicere. Quod enim apex apostolicus hodie pro debito sui officii facere non sufficient, quoniam egregios viros qui ad hoc facerent mortalitatis erratum ei subduxerit, vos qui singulariter in partem apostolice sollicitudinis accitus fueritis defectum ejus, maxime cum possitis, supplice tenenni. Venerabilis quoque M. episcopus Parisiensis, qui aliis prioribus operibus mei favorem emendationis prestare consuesit, jam consensit ut amodo tali studio intendere non possit. Sed et si etas et voluntas pariter ei suffragarentur, quia tamen canones et leges non didicerit, ad emendandum expositiones juris non facit. Ego enim estimaverim omne jus tam divinum quam humanum in terris lege mosaiça continer. Quecumque 120 enim de canonibus inmitientia justicet et fidei in scolis didici, de fontibus legis mosaiça scaturit[e] adverteri; et ideo secundum jurat et sensum meum et stilum expositi pro posse meo adaptavi. Inde es quod dominum Senonense archiepiscopum quia canones et leges audiet ad scrutinium invitavi, et non tunc exaudivit me. Alios quoque auditores legum et canonum rogavi, qui aut metu laboris aut alia diffidentia pauperis auctoris inventa inviseri noluerunt. Necessarie igitur tamquam pauper ad emendationem eorum quibus sufficere me non presumo a vobis auxiliunm postulo, quoniam de consistorio proprio didiceritis qui pr aliis noverit leges et canones. Etinam soli juris periti faciunt ad examen digestorum legis Moysi, quoniam juris ignari in examinando jure parum idonei sunt. Quicquid igitur falsum invenirent seu contra fidem secure condampment, me tamen simul emendato. Si

120 The reading looks more like Quicumque in the manuscript.
vero minus composite dictum invenerint quod ipsi elegantius scribere norint; \textsuperscript{121} nolo enim \textsuperscript{122} quod incompositum meum abradant cui tamen veri aut fidei substantia astipuletur.

\textsuperscript{121} The conclusion of this conditional sentence is lacking; the following emendation is suggested; \ldots norint, [nolo quod condamment:] nolo enim quod \ldots .

\textsuperscript{122} Corrected from Cambridge, Pembroke College \textit{Ms. 27}, fol. 120: Lincoln \textit{Ms.} reads: \textit{tamen}.
Origin and Significance of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy

GERHART B. LADNER

The Byzantine iconoclastic controversy, the great struggle against religious images in the Eastern Roman empire which began between 724 and 726 with measures of the emperor Leo III against the images and ended finally with the institution of the Feast of Orthodoxy in 843, was one of the greatest political and cultural crises of Byzantium, the greatest one between the monophysite trouble and the Latin invasion of Constantinople in 1204. The question arises very naturally how this controversy about the religious images could assume such an outstanding importance and lead to such serious convulsions; for iconoclasm was then not only a secondary trouble as in the 16th century Reformation, but the matter of a great conflict. This question has not yet found a satisfactory answer. The reason is that it has been discussed either by historians in its supposed historical relations such as the rise of Islam, equally hostile to images, or by art historians who were only interested in the consequences for Byzantine art. With the exception of a few ingenious remarks of W. Solowjew in his book on Russia and the universal Church, the first attempt at a more synthetical investigation has been made by the Russian A. Grabar in his excellent book on the emperor in Byzantine art. I wish to emphasize that my effort to approach the solution of the problem of the political role of Byzantine iconoclasm in the first part of this article is largely based upon the results of Grabar who has not yet drawn the final consequences of his findings.

The emperors who initiated and chiefly encouraged iconoclasm were Leo III (717–741) and his son Constantine V (741–775), and then, after the iconophile intermezzo of Irene’s reign (780–802) and the temporary rehabilitation of the holy images by the second council of Nicaea in 787, again Leo V (813–820), Michael II (820–829) and Theophylus (829–842). These emperors were in military and administrative matters the most able and successful rulers of Byzantium in the 300 years of transition between the death of the great Justinian and the coming of Basil I, the true father of the Middle Byzantine empire. These iconoclastic emperors initiated and chiefly encouraged iconoclasm because they were convinced that the images were the cause of the weakness of the empire and the loss of its position in the world. They were also influenced by the teachings of the Church Fathers, who had long been opposed to images. They believed that the images were idolatrous and that they distracted the faithful from the worship of God. The emperors also feared that the images were a source of corruption and that they encouraged the worship of images as gods.

1 This article is on the whole identical with a public lecture, delivered at the Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto and at Notre Dame University, Indiana, in February 1939. Some new points and documentary evidence have however been added. For more complete bibliographical reference cf. the excellent survey given by L. Bréhier, in: Histoire de l’Église, published by A. Fliche and V. Martin, V (Paris 1938) 431 ff.; an older study by L. Bréhier: La querelle des images (Paris 1904). The topics dealt with in the second part of the article, namely the doctrine of the sacred images as developed by their defenders in the Byzantine empire, its influence upon the matter and form of the images themselves and the relation of the Byzantine iconophile and iconoclastic views to the mediaeval theory of art in the west, have been treated by me at some length in two earlier studies: “Der Bilderstreit und die Kunstlehren der Byzantinischen und byzantinischen Theologie,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Ser. III, Vol. I (1931) 1 ff., and: “Die byzantinische Malerei im 11. Jahrhundert,” Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien, New Series, Vol. V (1951) 33 ff.

2 For the date cf. note 45.

3 Cf. notes 42 and 43.

peorors stopped the early fierce assaults of the most dangerous enemies, Islam in the east, and the still pagan Bulgarians in the north, and they achieved the reforms of the army and of the political, juridical and financial administration, which made this possible. Like a few others of the greater Byzantine emperors Leo III as well as later Leo V and Michael II came from the eastern parts of the empire and were soldiers without a higher education.5

It is unfortunate for the historian that most of the iconoclastic sources have been lost or destroyed after the victory of orthodoxy — in so far as they are not recorded by the acts of the subsequent orthodox councils and the orthodox authors. The voluntary destruction of iconoclastic sources is the principal reason for our being so inadequately and often unreliably informed about Byzantine iconoclasm. But I think one should not go too far in criticizing the iconophile reports, partial as they were bound to be. The concrete statements which are made by these sources, concerning the reasons for the first iconoclastic measures of Leo III, infer that he took them under the influence of a few bishops of Asia Minor, who had again been inspired by Islamic and Jewish hostility against the supposedly idolatrous use of images.

The oldest and indeed contemporary source is a passage in the letter of the patriarch Germanus of Constantinople to Thomas of Claudiopolis, one of the iconoclastic Asiatic bishops, written about 724, shortly before the start of the iconoclastic activity of Leo III and preserved in the acts of the second council of Nicaea of 787. After having blamed the removal by Thomas of the images of Christ and the Saints from his episcopal town, calling it an inconsiderate innovation, Germanus continues in this way: “For the rest,” he says, “we” (that is to say the Christians), “ought to achieve the overthrow of the words and deeds gathered together by the infidels in order to injure the Church of Christ, and we should demonstrate her venerable and divine imperturbability. One thing therefore is to be understood first of all, namely, that not only just now but often the Jews too reproached us for such things,” (namely, for idolatry in form of the use of images), “and that they, though being true worshippers of idols, but attempt to abuse our pure and divine faith and are eager to prevent us from our devotion for things made by human hands” (namely the images; cf. the prohibition of χαρποντήρα in Levit. XXVI, 1, cf. also Exod. XX, 4 and Deut. V, 8). Further on in the same letter,6

5 It is probable that Leo III, who is generally called the Isaurian and founder of the so-called Isaurian dynasty, was not born in Isauria (Southern Asia Minor), but in Syria near the borders of Cilicia; (cf. the sources as quoted by L. Bréhier op. cit. 433 f., note 1; also K. Schenk, in: Byz. Zeitschrift V (1896) 296 f.; H. v. Schubert, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Frühmittelalter (Tübingen 1921) 330, and A. A. Vasiliev, Histoire de l’empire byzantin I (Paris 1932) 311 f.). Constantine V was more educated and more “fashionable” a man than his father Leo III. On the one hand he wrote a theological treatise on the images; on the other his passion for horses was so great that it caused his disreputable nicknames Καβαλλίων and Κοστρόφυς. This and the accusation of “effeminacy,” that is to say sodomy, raised against Constantine in spite of his being three times married (cf. the sources in Martin and Fliche op. cit. 39 f.), should be borne in mind when we study the representations from the hippodrome (see below) and the portraits not only of Constantine himself, but also of his favourite chariot driver (cf. Vita S. Steph. Jun., Migne, P. Gr. C 1172 B), which were substituted for Christian art, and also when we attempt to understand his aversion against monasticism (cf. p. 139 ff.). Thus Byzantine iconoclastic proçane art, meant to replace religious-monastic art, may have comprised even a distorted revival of Greek agonal-athletic art.—Leo V was an Armenian; Michael II and his son Theophilius were Phrygians.

6 Mansi, Consilia XIII 109 B. This passage has been used by E. Caspar, Geschichte des Paphnitius II (Tübingen 1933) 648, who acknowledges the connection between Jewish-Islamic and Byzantine iconoclasm, as does also Chr. Dawson, The Making of Europe (London 1936) 172. See also E. J. Martin, A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy (London, New York, Toronto, without year) 31.

7 This seems to allude above all to the Jewish relapses into idolatry described in the Old Testament; cf. the continuation of Germanus’ letter, Mansi op. cit.
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Germanus says that also the Saracens seem to hit upon something similar, but that they can be easily refuted, because they venerate a real idol, the Kaabah, the black stone of Mecca, and because they cultivate all kinds of superstitions. Toward the end of his letter9 Germanus refers to the infidels in general, but probably having in mind chiefly the Jews and Mohammedans, when he points out that there would be danger for the belief in the Church’s infallibility if the images were now rejected: for enemies of the cross could boast that idolatry had been practiced for centuries by the Christians.

The patriarch Germanus does not expressly state in this letter that Thomas of Claudiopolis’ iconoclasm was stimulated by the Jewish and Islamic example, but the fact that he mentions that factor in so close a connection with Thomas’ heretical views and actions, makes it nevertheless probable that such was his opinion.

The next important source is a report about the origins of iconoclasm, which was publicly read by the presbyter John, representative of the Anatolian bishops, during the second council of Nicaea, that is to say about fifty years after the events, and which is again preserved in the acts of this council.10 It was stated that a Jewish magician from Tiberias, of the name of Τεσσαρακωτάρχης,11 induced the caliph Yazid II, who reigned from 720 to 724, to order the destruction of all images, prophesying a long reign to him if he would do so, Yazid agreed.12 Thus even the Christian churches were deprived of their decoration throughout Yazid’s empire,13 upon the instigation of the Jew Τεσσαρακωτάρχης; and this happened, as the acts of Nicaea say, before the evil had entered this country, that is to say the Byzantine empire.14 When the pseudo-bishop of Nacolia—Constantine of Nacolia—and his followers had heard of these events, the Nican report goes on, they imitated the Jews and Arabs in their crimes against the churches.

Now Constantine of Nacolia was doubtless one of the initiators of the iconoclastic movement in the Byzantine empire, along with Leo III himself, with Thomas of Claudiopolis15 and probably also Theodosius, archbishop of Ephesus.16 Our some authors without reason (Schenk, in: Byz. Zeitschr. V [1896] 276; Hefele-Leclercq, Histoire des conciles I 2 [Paris 1910] 617, 627, note 3, 630, note 1; L. Bréhier, Article Besant, in: Dictionnaire de l’histoire et de la géographie ecclesiastique VIII [1935] 1171). Dionysius of Tell-Mahré says nothing about Jewish influence upon Yazid, but reports other idol-syncretisms of the caliph: he ordered all white dogs, white doves, white cocks and blue-eyed (fair-haired?) men to be killed; this latter order was however not carried into effect.

11 Mansi, op. cit. 197 D-E. — The centre of the Umayyad caliphate was Syria.


13 There were two different episcopal towns Claudiopolis in Asia Minor. Claudiopolis in Bithynia, see of an archbishop, metropolis of the province of Ionia, and Claudiopolis in the province of Isauria (cf. Gme, Gesetz Episcopian 438, 442). Thomas of Claudiopolis is called bishop, not archbishop by the sources.

14 The archbishop Theodosius of Ephesus, son of the emperor Tiberius III was certainly an iconoclast under Constantine V; he presided over the iconoclastic council of 754. Pope Gregory II, in his first letter to Leo III (Jaffé, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, ed. Wat.

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knowledge about Constantine and Thomas is chiefly derived from three letters of the patriarch Germanus: the one directed to the bishop of Claudiopolis has been quoted before, the other two were written to Constantine and to his metropolitan John of Synnada. The three letters have been very competently discussed by G. Ostrogorsky, who has proved that Constantine of Nacobia and Thomas of Claudiopolis had been in Constantinople shortly before Leo III opened the iconoclastic campaign. Constantine had failed to convince Germanus of his ideas, but it is very likely that he and Thomas and their friends had won the emperor instead, although the sources do not say this and we are unable to see whether Leo had already developed similar intentions on his own account. The most important fact for us is at any rate that the acts of the council of Nicaea established a causal connection, "imitation," see above), between Byzantine and Jewish-Islamic iconoclasm, through the medium of Constantine of Nacolia; he is made responsible for the origin of the heresy also by Tarasius who was patriarch of Constantinople at the time of the second council of Nicaea; Tarasius ascertained this clearly on the occasion of the public reading of Germanus' letter in the Nicene council.

17 They are likewise included in the acts of the second council of Nicaea. Mansi, Conc. XIII 100 ff.
18 G. Ostrogorsky, "Les débuts de la querelle des images," Mélanges Diehl I (Paris 1930) 238; he points out rightly that Germanus in writing to Thomas of Claudiopolis after the latter's visit to Constantinople would not have praised the orthodoxy of the Christian emperors regarding the images, if Leo had already declared himself as their enemy.

19 Cf. Germanus' letter to John of Synnada and the somewhat later one to Constantine himself, loc. cit. — Constantine of Nacolia had deceived the patriarch by making him believe that he had changed his mind after Germanus' admonitions. Cf. for the details Ostrogorsky, op. cit., also Hefele-Lecleercq, op. cit. 627 ff.; L. Bréhier, in: Fiche and Martin, Hist. de l'Église V 447; the chapters written by Ch. Diehl, in his Manuel d'art byzantin I (Paris 1925) 360 ff.; in: Cambridge Medieval History IV (Cambridge 1927) 1 ff., and in: Histoire générale, published by G. Glotz: Histoire du moyen âge III (Paris 1936) 259 ff.; I shall in general quote this latest of Diehl's comprehensive publications on the subject. On the contrary, it is sufficient to cite the Histoire des conciles by Hefele-Lecleercq, leaving aside Lecleercq's more recent article Images (suite et querelle), in: Cabrol-Lecleercq, Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de littérature, because the author repeats here almost literally what he had said in his notes to Hefele's work, so far as iconoclasm is concerned.

20 It is uncertain to what extent the iconoclastic bishops had followers among their flocks. A true Iconoclastic party appears only later, especially in the time of Constantine V (741-775); it was then composed chiefly of soldiers of the army, which was devoted to the emperors, and of higher circles among the dignitaries of the court and in the administration and secular clergy.
21 This connection would be much more obvious if it could be ascertained that the Jew Τεσσαρακοντάκηρος = "40 cubits", mentioned in the acts of Nicaea, was identical with a man called "the son of 40 cubits," who had been a patrician in the service of Leo III according to the Arabic source Khitab al 'Uyun, dating from the second half of the 11th century (cf. the translation by E. W. Brooks, in Journal of Hellenic Studies XIX [1899] 26). J. Sturr, in his article "As Iconodulic Legend and its Historical Basis," Speculum VIII (1933) 500 ff., takes the identity for granted. But the matter is dubious since the Arabic source is late and confused and partly dependent upon Byzantine sources like Theophanes (cf. also note 22). The name Τεσσαρακοντάκηρος (or in a shorter form Σεσσαράκηρος) is not quite as rare as Sturr thinks, since, according to Theophanes, not only the adviser of Yazid II (Theophanes, Chronogr. A.M. 6215), but also a personality in the reign of the Empress Irene was called so (ibid., A.M. 6291, Migne, P. Gr. CVIII 954 B). The identification, attempted by Sturr, of Τεσσαρακοντάκηρος with the Mohammedan Bener (Basir), the iconoclast adviser of Leo III (see below), seems, if not quite impossible, even more uncertain than the identity of "40 cubits" and the "son of 40 cubits." Sturr, for the rest, considers the Nicene report on Τεσσαρακοντάκηρος as partly legendary, especially in so far as his Jewish origin and, generally speaking, in so far as the alleged involvement of Jews in iconoclasm is concerned. However this be, there remains at least the fact that the council of Nicaea connected Byzantine iconoclasm with the iconoclastic activity of Yazid II.

21 Mansi, Conc. XIII 105 B and 107 A; cf. Ostrogorsky, op. cit. 236.
The patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople who wrote his *Antirrheticus* against the arch-iconoclast of the emperors, Constantine V (died 775), as late as the first quarter of the 9th century, is in general well informed. Therefore it is important that in his third *Antirrheticus* he too says that the edict of the caliph Yazid II against the images caused the iconoclastic evil in the empire.  

It is true that the possibility cannot be excluded completely that the causal relation between Jewish-Islamic and Byzantine hostility against the images existed more in the views of the iconophile writers than in reality. For the acts of Nicea and the iconophile authors in general emphasize at least as much as the actual historical connection, which we have dealt with till now, the spiritual affinity between iconoclasm on the one hand and Judaism and Mohammedanism, as well as Manichæism on the other.  

It will therefore depend ultimately upon our critical examination of the intrinsic character of Byzantine iconoclasm, how we shall interpret these statements of the sources.

The trustworthiness of the last mentioned Nicene report is however increased by a detail: Yazid II upon the advice of *Τεσσαρακοντάρχιος*, is said to have destroyed also those images that were εν ταῖς ἁγοραῖς πτόλῳ κατὰ κόσμον ... καὶ ἐπερέταιοι ...  

This destruction of the profane images in public places as well as that of the religious ones in churches, originated in Jewish and Islamic views which, in their stricter form, excluded artistic representations of human beings or even all animated beings in general, and not only religious representations.

32 Migne, P. Gr. C 529C. Cf. also Stephanus Diaconos, *Vita S. Stephani Junioris* (written about 808), Migne, P. Gr. C 1116B, where St. Stephen, martyr under Constantine V, is said to have made the Greeks, the Jews, the Syrians and the heretics responsible for the origin of iconoclasm. The *Oratio ... de ... imaginibus ... adversus ... Constantinum Cabalum* (Migne, P. Gr. XCV 309 ff.) and the *Epistola ad Theophilum imperatorem de ... imaginibus* (loc. cit. 345 ff.), once erroneously attributed to St. John Damascene, were written about 780 and the middle of the 9th century respectively (cf. *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* VIII [1924] 707). The *Oratio* relates (loc. cit. 336 ff.) that the imperial dignity and a long reign were foretold to Leo III by Jewish magicians, but under condition that he would destroy all images after his succession; and so he did in the 10th year of his reign, still under Jewish influence. The *Epistola* (loc. cit. 356 f.) tells the same story but connects it with the iconoclastic persecution of Yazid II, asserting that after the death of the caliph the same Jews who had advised him went to Isauria, (mistakenly believed to be the native country of Leo III), and imported the same prophecy to the youthful Leo. A similar story is told in the *Epistola* (loc. cit. 365 ff.) concerning the Emperor Leo V and the causes for his iconoclasm; yet in this case the seditors are said to have been a witch and a magician called Sabbatus, who are not specified with regard to their religion. All these stories are obviously legendary and formed after the model of the reports of the Nicene council and of Theophanes and Nicephorus about Yazid II and his Jewish iconoclastic advisers.—N. Jorga, *Histoire de la vie byzantine* II (Bucharest 1934) 32, who still believed that the *Epistola ad Theophilum imperatorem* (died 842) was a work of St. John Damascene (cied 754), seems to consider it as a reliable source and therefore calls Leo III *un esprit suprêtement*, on p. 32 of the Volume, erroneously referring to him also the parts dealing with Leo V. Strangely enough, on p. 34, Jorga contradicts himself in characterizing both Leo III and Leo V as *absolutely débuts de superstitions*. Jorga's study: *"Les origines de l'iconoclasme," Bulletin de l'Académie Roumaine 1929*, was not at my disposal.—Starr, *Speculum* VIII 500 ff., who quotes some further Byzantine variations of the story, likewise refers to the *Oratio* and to the *Epistola* as to works of John Damascene.

33 Cf. for instance *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, op. cit. XIII 157 D. — So far as the Manichees are concerned, we have no evidence for their historical connection with the iconoclasts. For a very slight spiritual relationship between iconoclasm and Manicheism cf. note 44 and p. 148—For the Paulicians cf. p. 133 and note 34.

34 Mansi, op. cit. 197 D-E. It is added that *Τεσσαρακοντάρχιος* suggested this in order to dissipate his animosity toward Christianity. That is almost certainly an arbitrary interpretation.

35 Nevertheless there was a large cycle of religious Jewish art as early as the third century a.D. (Dura). Islam before about 700 objected only to idolatry, not to all the representations of human beings (cf. L. Böhlener, in: *Fliche and Martin, Hist. de l'église* V 446). For the changing phases in the Jewish attitude to the images cf. J. B. Frey, "La question des images chez les juifs à la lumière des récentes découvertes," *Biblæa XV* (1934) 265 ff., espe-
On the contrary, Byzantine iconoclasm emphasized a certain species of non-religious art — the imperial imagery — substituting it, as we shall see, for the sacred images of Christian tradition.

Beside the evidence for the relation between the Saracen and Byzantine iconoclasts which we have met, we have the testimony of Theophanes, in his Chronographia (written ca. 810–814), about a man called Beser (or Basir). He says, had found a companion and a helper in his madness in Beser, who had been born as a Christian in Syria, but had apostasized to Mohammedanism. It is possible that he was forced to do so, according to Theophanes, he had later on escaped into the Roman empire from serfdom under the Arabs. Leo III became friendly with him because of his physical strength and because he held the same heretical views as he; Leo or his son Constantine made him a patrician. In mentioning the death of the patrician Beser in the war of Constantine V against the usurper Artavasdis, Theophanes calls Beser Σαρακενάρχον. It is not very likely that Beser gave the idea of iconoclasm to Leo III, but he may very well have encouraged and influenced Leo’s attitude.

We gather from Germanus’ letters to John of Synnada and to Thomas of Claudiopolis that Constantine of Nacolia and probably also Thomas of Claudiopolis justified their iconoclastic views by the prohibition of idolatry found in the Old Testament. The same is true for Leo III himself, as can be seen from the first of the two letters by which Pope Gregory II replied to lost letters of the emperor. Now, iconoclastic tendencies had arisen in the Church for the same general reason more than once in previous centuries. They were aroused in this particular moment by Islamic iconoclasm, which had been preceded by Jewish hostility against the images. As we have seen, the acts of Nicaea assert that Constantine of Nacolia imitated the Jewish and Mohammedan iconoclastic attacks of his time. Even if this be exaggerated, we can at least assume that Constantine and his companions knew about these events. But the principal problem for us remains: how and why did Byzantine iconoclasm in the 8th century become a movement of so great importance? And this leads to the other question: why did the emperors accept and enforce it? The influence of a few bishops of Asia Minor and their followers upon Leo III and even the example of Islam and contemporary Judaism, which revived an old trend against imagery, are in themselves not a sufficient explanation.
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for this phenomenon. For one is bound to ask: why did Leo follow the Jews, the Mohammedans and the Bishops of Asia Minor?  

Some modern historians have rejected the discussed source evidence altogether, for the reason that it is not likely that the same emperor Leo III who fought with tenacity and success against Islam from his accession to the throne and who forced the Jews to accept baptism from 722 would have been inclined to adopt any of their religious views.  

Other authors have, perhaps with more right, held probable that Leo followed nevertheless a policy which would make Christianity more acceptable, not only to Mohammedans and Jews, but possibly also to certain heretical groups, of Manichee character and allegedly hostile to images, above all the Paulicians of Asia Minor, a sect kindred to Manicheism; Leo’s own origin from Northern Syria, open to influences from regions in which all kinds of trends hostile to imagery or at least to the representation of human form were current has been discussed in this connection; furthermore, it has been supposed that Leo may have been impressed by the military virtue of the Mohammedans and also of the Paulicians, whom he may have known in his native Syria or when he was a general in Asia Minor. The Paulicians, like the Manichees, were opposed to exterior signs of the faith in general, including the images, but it is a controversial point, whether in the time of Leo III or even later, they were breakers of images in the strict sense like the Byzantine iconoclasts. Certain 19th century writers finally, stressing the military and juridical reforms of Leo III, have tried to characterize the iconoclastic emperors as rationalists: according to such anachronistic views these 8th and 9th century rulers would have objected to the images and to the monks, who were their principal upholders, propagators and painters, for reasons which would show them akin to the rationalistic sovereigns of the 18th century enlightenment or even to the Prussian political reformers of Napoleonic times.

The alleged facts, namely the desire of the emperors to reconcile so far as possible Mohammedans, Jews and sectarians with the Christian Byzantine empire, their inner reforms and their hostility against the monks, may be illustrative as historical or psychological background of the iconoclastic position, but they still do not sufficiently explain why the emperors selected the images for the object of their attacks. It is difficult to see how such reasons alone should have implied necessarily the particular iconoclastic measures which were taken.

All the more we must not forget that the iconoclasts gave reasons for their actions — according to the testimony of the iconophiles themselves — and that

31 Ostrogorsky, op. cit. does not attempt to explain the influence of the iconoclastic bishops of Asia Minor upon Leo III.


33 These possibilities are discussed for instance in Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. III 2, 619, but also by v. Schubert, op. cit. 330, by Dawson, op. cit. 171 f. and others. — Leo III and above all Constantine V, in pursuing their iconoclastic policy, relied largely upon the army, recruited chiefly in Asia Minor. Yet, in spite of modern hypotheses to this effect, there is no evidence that the soldiers were iconoclasts, because they came from Asia Minor. All, after they had but to obey the orders given by the emperors.


35 These views are dealt with in detail in Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. and Vasiliev, Hist. de l’empire byz. I 334 ff.; they are not completely futile in so far as they draw our attention to an important point: namely to the fact that, at least from Constantine V, iconoclasm was clearly and closely connected with hostility to monasticism. We shall have to return to this subject which is treated by Leclercq himself, op. cit. and emphasized in the quoted works of Diehl and Vasiliev.

36 This strange comparison is repeatedly used by Schenk, op. cit.
their principal reason was their aversion to what they called idolatry. This brings us back again to the account given by the iconophile sources, of the connection between the earliest iconoclasts and Mohammedanism and Judaism. I think we need not object to the reality of this connection if we understand it in the right way. Of course there could be no question of the iconoclastic emperors or bishops sympathizing with the Islamic or the Mosaic religion; they felt certainly as Christian, even more Christian than the iconophiles. But it happens that people perceive or believe to perceive some truth in their enemy's position: so Constantine of Nacolia and his associates may have appreciated the seemingly anti-idolatrous attitudes of Jews and Saracens. The emperors again, in their efforts to strengthen their position in the empire, were bound to behold that the Mohammedan caliph as well as the Jewish kings of the Old Testament claimed to have a power more directly derived from God than that which the Christian emperor could claim; for there was no Jewish or Mohammedan Church comparable with the Church of the Christians, which is the result of the Incarnation. Now the Incarnation is also the great fact which allowed the Fathers of the Church after some hesitation to recognize a Christian art and made them consider as no longer valid the Old Testament prohibition against making "the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath nor of those things that are in the waters under the earth" —a prohibition that by the way was not strictly followed either in pre-Christian or in post-Christian Jewish history and was indeed obviously directed first of all against idolatry and only secondarily against art, which was closely connected with the then pagan religions all round Israel.

The supernatural mystery of the Incarnation, surpassing Creation, opened up the possibility of Christian imagery through the fact that God himself has assumed human nature and could be reproduced in his humanity. The reality of the Incarnation and a relative divinity of imagery are therefore, as we shall see later, dependent upon one another, according to the iconophiles.

The existence of the Church as the unity of the incarnated Christ with the Christians and the existence of a religious art representing the incarnated Christ and his Saints to the Christians are two interrelated facts, both resisted or neglected by Judaism and Mohammedanism, which did not believe in the Incarnation. Jewish-Islamic iconoclasm therefore could appeal to the emperors for the reason that it involved an ascendency over a very important part of religious life of man, which had been, by the Incarnation, gifted with a spiritual liberty, contradicting on principle any unlimited power of government. The Byzantine emperors certainly did believe in the Incarnation, but they did not accept the following two consequences: the absolute supremacy of the Church in spiritual matters and the terrestrial representation of the celestial world in Christian imagery. Many historians have stated that the iconoclastic controversy developed from a rather ritual question to a fundamental contest between Church and State, that is to say the emperor. But the truth is that iconoclasm was from its beginning an attack upon the visible representation of the civitas Dei on this earth. Not only because the images had such an important place in the Byzantine Church, theologically and liturgically, that an attack against them was ipso facto an attack against the Church but also and still more because, as we shall see, the emperors showed unmistakably that even in maintaining the belief in the supreme, supernatural government of Christ, they did not wish to permit on this

37 See above, p. 132.—The other reasons, like the impossibility of the ἐπιγραφή (cf. p. 145), contain an explicit or implicit reproach of idolatry.
38 Exod. XX 4, Levit. XXVI 1 and Deut. V 8.
39 Cf. also note 25.
earth any other but their own image or more exactly the imagery of their own imperial natural world. They wished even more ardently than their predecessors and than most of the occidental emperors to be the Christian, the sacred emperors — Βασιλεὺς καὶ Ιωρεύς εὐμ., “I am King and Priest,” wrote Leo III to Pope Gregory II, following the old caesaropapist theory—but they understood this in such a way that only their sacred empire was to be the material form of Christendom in the terrestrial world; the Church would be only the liturgical function of the empire. Accordingly the supernatural should remain abstract, Christ and his heavenly world should not and could not be expressed visibly in images.

It is certainly significant that the most violent iconoclast Constantine V held views on the two natures of Christ that led him close to monophysitism; although there is no evidence for a historical derivation of iconoclasm from monophysitism. The monophysite heresy, according to which the human nature of Christ is absorbed in the divine nature, is kindred to iconoclasm in that it makes Christ so inaccessible to humanity and to the human world that he threatens to become an abstractum. Wladimir Solowjew, in his book on Russia and the universal Church, has shown long ago that Byzantine caesaropapism had quite generally an interest in upholding the heresies which attacked the perfect unity or the entirety of the divine and the human nature in Christ (Arianism, Nestorianism, monophysitism, monotheletism); for the dissolution of this unity or the diminution of the entirety of each nature, in narrowing the extension of Christ’s government in the human world widened the extension of the emperor’s rulership. And Solowjew has even pointed out, in a more general way than is being done in this article, that the same antagonism against a perfect realization of the Incarnation in the terrestrial world was also the reason for the iconoclastic struggle against Christ’s image and against images of holy persons in general.

But was Byzantine iconoclasm not in spite of all merely a sincere reaction against a real danger of idolatry, arising from the fact that the Greek Church did not only make but also worship the images? The question of the veneration of images and of the form which this veneration might take played an enormous role in the iconoclastic controversy, and yet it was not the essential point, for the struggle, almost from the beginning, was directed not only against worship, but also against any use of religious images. Besides the theology of the worshippers of images dis- 40 Quoted in the second letter of Pope Gregory II to Leo III: Jaffé-Wattenbach, Reg. Pont. Rom., 2182; last edition: in: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Ser. III, Vol. III, p. 85, line 382. — Cf. for those letters note 16.


42 French edition: La Russie et l’Église universelle (Paris 1922), introduction, p. XXV.

43 I became acquainted with Solowjew’s book after having written most of this article.

44 The iconophiles reproached the iconoclasts also for Manichaeism (cf. pp. 131 and 148); yet the relationship is a very slight one, for the Manichæans were much more radical in rejecting the corporeal world.

45 This remains true although Ostrogorsky, who, in: Milanges Diehl 238 ff., denies the existence of an imperial edict before 730, is probably right in asserting that Leo III had between 724 and 726 tried by peaceful means to convert his subjects to his opinion regarding the images, before enforcing the first iconoclastic measures; cf. also Diehl, op. cit. III 265.— Theophanes, Chronographia, A. M. 6217 (ed. De Boor I 404 or Migne, P. Gr. CVIII 816A), as well as Nicephorus, Brevarium historici de rebus gestis post Mauricii imperium (ed. De Boor, Nicethori... opuscula historiae 58, or Migne, P. Gr. C 964B) use the words καθαρῶς, καθῆκας, as they refer to the first plans and acts of Leo III against the images, and those words signify “take down,” or “destroy.” Germanus, in his letter to Thomas of Claudopoli, writes likewise about the έκκλησίας καθαρὰς, ordered by Thomas (cf. Mansi, Conc. XII 108E). The Vita S. Stephani Junioris says that Leo announced his intentions with the words: Εξαλωμένη τεχνογιάς υπαρξάσθη τῆς τῶν έκκλησιῶν εκκαθαρίσεως, οί δὲ τεις προκούν (Migne, P. Gr. C 1084C); yet since the making of images is called an idolatrous art in this passage, one should not press the
tinked between the λατρεία, that is to say the true adoration or cult of God, which is de fide, on the one hand, and the τιμητική προσκύνησις of the images on the other hand, which is similar to the veneration of the Saints, the relics, the book of the gospels, the cross, and which did not exclude literal prostration, kissing and offering of incense and lights; the veneration of the images was also called a veneration by relative love, because directed only relatively to the image and really to its prototype. It is no doubt very probable that people didn’t always make this distinction and it may be that the iconoclasts felt in part sincerely repulsed by excesses of image-worship. Yet if we do not forget how much Byzantine iconoclasm was an undertaking of the emperors themselves we shall understand without any possible doubt that we must not consider the Byzantine iconoclasts merely as puritans — although the Protestant iconoclasts of the 16th century judged them in this way according to their own views. The first great inconsistency of the Byzantine iconoclasts was that they do not really follow the Old Testament commandment to which they refer, namely not to represent in images and not to adore anything in heaven or earth, but that they felt concerned only with religious art — an inconsistency which was repeated by the Protestants so far as making not as venerating profane images was concerned. There is of course a certain general relationship between Byzantine-oriental and northern Protestant iconoclasm, a relationship which has always been noticed by Protestants. In both cases we find a refusal to venerate God under visible forms — a religious attitude recurring periodically since prehistoric times, especially in the east and north — and, as a consequence of denying or, at least, limiting the sacramental order of the world, also the view that the State is the highest visible form of life on the earth. The special characteristic of the imperial Byzantine iconoclasm, which distinguishes it from the iconoclasts of the Reformation, was however the simultaneous increase of a profane imperial art which was meant to replace religious art in the churches and in the public buildings and places. It is one of the great merits of the book of Grabar already mentioned to have gathered all the available material concerning profane imperial art in the iconoclastic period, which is not very numerous be-
fact that the author (writing about 80 years after the events), mentions only the prohibition of image worship on this occasion. Moreover, he himself reports a little later the destruction of a famous Constantinopolitan image of Christ, placed over a door of the imperial palace which was called η ἡμέρα Χαλκῆ (cf. loc. cit. 1085 C; it is difficult to be sure whether the image was a statue of bronze and caused the door to be called Χαλκῆ or whether this name originated from the material of the door, while the image was a mosaic or painting; cf. Dictionnaire d’arch. chrét. et lit. VII [1927] 2449 ff., 2456; Article Jesus Christ [Portraits] V 440, 442). This first reported destruction of a sacred image upon order of Leo III happened as early as 725 or 727. — An ancient Latin translation of the Vita S. Stephani Junioris relates that Leo, before proceeding to any demolition of images, had them moved higher up on the walls of the churches, in order to prevent worship. After having been rejected almost unanimously by the more recent authors, this report has been admitted as possible by L. Bréhier, op. cit. 450. But even if Leo had acted merely against image worship in the very first beginning of iconoclasm, his and his son’s later policy proves that their aversion to images was a much deeper and more comprehensive one.

44 Acta Conc. Nic. II, Mansi, op. cit. XII 1086B: ... σχεταὶ πόδων προσκύνησις ... St. Theodore of Stucion, in the 9th century phase of the contest, states not only a relative veneration, but also a relative identity between the image and its prototype; cf. Antwihericus I 11 (Migne, P. Gr. CXIX 341B-C); ... κατὰ τὸ πόρον τή; (loc. cit. 344B): ... ἐν τῷ ἔναντι τῆς θεότητας ... σχετικά δὲ μεταδίνεια.
cause of the destruction of most of the iconoclastic monuments, and to have pointed out its important development at this very time.

It cannot be my intention to trace back the profane, yet sacred cult and the juridical significance of the images of the Byzantine emperors to its old Roman and oriental origins; there are excellent works on this topic; I mention only besides the book of Grabar that of Louis Bréhier and Battifol and the more recent studies by H. Kruse and by Alföldi. The Church herself, particularly in the east, had granted a certain degree of veneration — different however from the cult or adoration (Λαρπεία) of God and the veneration of the Saints — to the Christian emperor, and his images. The proskynesis, the prostration before the emperor, as well as the attribution of the circular nimbus to the emperor and the empress in Byzantine works of art testify to this fact.

Now, the stressing of the imperial portrait and of scenes in which the emperor, his court or his profane world in general appear is the one main feature of imperial art in the iconoclastic period; the other one is the reintroduction of representations of animals, plants, and ornaments which are destined to replace the Christian scenes; this meant a turning back into a powerful stream of Hellenized and Romanized oriental or of orientalized Helleno-Roman art, which had largely influenced the ornamental part of Early Christian art although it had not lacked human representations and symbols of Christian character.

Emphasizing of the imperial art in the proper sense can be found in the first place in the coins, these symbols of the State’s power par excellence. In the iconoclastic period there are a considerable number of coins which show on both sides the emperor’s portrait (the coins of Constantine V are almost extensively of this kind), whereas, before the iconoclastic emperors, the reverse showed usually the cross (sometimes flanked by figures of emperors) or, under Justinian II (685–695 and 705–711), even the image of Christ. The emperor is represented either in the form of a bust or enthroned or standing and bearing the Labarum, the Constantinian banner of the Christian empire, sometimes being blessed by the hand of God, which is stretched from the heavens. The imperial seals of Leo III showed originally his portrait on the obverse and the Mother of God on the reverse; obviously as an iconoclastic measure two new types were introduced: one has Leo’s son Constantine V on the reverse (on the obverse still Leo himself), the other has on the obverse the cross, on the reverse the inscription: alone. Furthermore the iconophile sources contain allusions to the fact that the iconoclastic emperors spared and even multiplied their own portraits not only on the coins but also in statues and other works of art, for instance, in large representations of their victories, probably frescos or mosaics, whilst they destroyed the images of Christ and the Saints. And it seems that the second iconoclastic emperor, Constantine V, even enforced a more intense worship of the imperial icons, while scouring any veneration of the religious ones.

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50 Les survivances du culte impérial romain (Paris 1920).
51 Studien zur offiziellen Geltung des Kaiserbildes in römischen Reich (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums XIX 3. Paderborn 1934).
54 Grabar, op. cit. 163 ff; Wroth, op. cit. pl. XXXVI ff. Images of Christ and the Blessed Virgin are very frequent upon the coins of the post-iconoclastic period, cf. Wroth, op. cit. pl. L ff.
56 Cf. Lihačev, loc. cit. 469 ff. — For the veneration of the cross by the iconoclasts cf. p. 138 and note 61.
57 Grabar, op. cit. 168; 167. Cf. Nicephorus,
We also know that Constantine V during whose reign the violent persecution of image worship and worshippers reached its paroxysm ordered that the representation of the six oecumenic councils in the Milion of Constantinople be destroyed and replaced by illustrations of horse and chariot races in the hippodrome. The great public performances in the circuses and in the hippodromes at which the emperors sometimes assisted not only as spectators but also as participators, were in the Byzantine empire as well as in ancient Rome (and in places and times less remote from us) an official matter of great importance, glorifying not only bodily strength, skill and elegance, but also the empire’s glory and power. The emperor’s victories in wars as also in the chase and in games, won personally or by his soldiers and his jockeys, hunters and players, were equally considered as an expression of the emperor’s success and triumph. Therefore the replacing of the images of the councils and of the religious images in general by the images from the hippodrome and the general predilection of the iconoclastic emperors for such scenes, which is testified by the sources, means that the emperor, in those cases, substituted the cult of the empire for that of the Church. Even the emphasizing of the veneration and artistic representation of the cross in the iconoclastic period seems to be due in part to the fact that the cross had become since Constantine the Great the palladium of the empire; besides it corresponded better, as a symbol, to the abstract character of iconoclasm.

Let us now, still following Grabar’s study, take a glance at the iconoclastic revival of non-figurative art which now returned to the churches. The already mentioned *Life of St. Stephen the younger,* martyr of the iconoclastic persecution under Constantine V, written in the intermission before the second persecution under Leo V and Theophilus, tells us that Constantine V removed all the holy images of the life of Christ from the church of Mary Ἐν Βακχαπρας in Constantinople and substituted images of trees, birds, beasts surrounded by wreaths of ivy with cranes, crows and peacocks; he made the church a storehouse of fruits and a cage for birds, says the orthodox writer quoting Psalm LXXVIII.

Where images of Christ, of the blessed Virgin, of the Saints had been before, animals and plants alternated with representations of horse races, the chase, theatre scenes and chariot races. The most detailed description of iconoclastic decoration — though not in religious but in profane buildings — is given by the continuator of Theophanes, who describes the palace of Theophilus, the iconoclastic emperor of the 9th century. Here again there were mosaics and paintings of animals and trees, but also paintings of trophies, and mosaics representing statues which plucked fruits, also all kinds of mechanical automaton, golden lions and birds which could move and roar or sing, on the whole a fairy tale like the Arabian Nights.
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Actually nothing has survived from this profane iconoclastic art if we make exception for a few geometrical ornamental decorations in the cavern churches of Cappadocia. But we may gain an idea of Byzantine art of this period through approximately contemporary Islamic works like the mosaics in the Umayyad mosque of Damascus, and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Oriental and Hellenistic elements seem to have been equally strong in Byzantine iconoclastic art. The refinement of the profane art of this period was to be a benefit for religious Byzantine art after the victory of orthodoxy and is an indirect preparation for the artistic bloom of the late 9th and 10th centuries in the Byzantine empire of the Macedonian dynasty, a period which is inadequately called Byzantine Renaissance.

On the basis of the study of imperial iconoclastic art in Byzantium the conclusion — which Grabar has not drawn — seems to me inevitable, namely that there is a mutual causal relation between this profane imperial art and the origin of iconoclasm. The religious art of the Byzantine iconophiles had imbued the daily life of the people in a most effective and overwhelming way with religion. We shall soon see, how according to the iconophiles the religious images were to such an extent a true representation of Christ and his Saints that they were in some way identical with it and consequently able to bring those prototypes down to the earth. But it was just this intense and visible terrestrial representation of the Kingdom of God through the Church and their images which the iconoclastic emperors wanted to replace by a more abstract conception of Christendom which left more room for the idea and the reality of the empire.

In fairness to the iconoclastic emperors the fact may be recalled once more that the most prominent among them (Leo III, Constantine V and Leo V) were above all great soldiers who had to defend the empire in a dangerous period. On the other hand the vita contemplativa in a wider sense prevailed in Byzantine Christendom of that time; and it is much less important that there were superstitious excesses in worshipping the images, the relics and the Saints, than that monasticism and image worship, which was favoured very much by the monks, were the most vital and popular forms of religion. As modern authors have supposed, the place of monasticism and image worship among the people may have led the iconoclastic emperors and their advisers, and also part of the higher clergy, to the opinion that a ritualism suspect of idolatry, and a religious quietism were endangering not only the spiritual welfare, but at the same time also the military strength of the empire; in forming this opinion their attention may have been drawn to the religious practice of conquering Islam, consisting essentially of prayer and the Holy War. Yet the superiority of the vita contemplativa was always part of the Christian doctrine and is actually a teaching of Christ Himself (Luke X, 41–42); we may therefore reduce the argument to the fact that there existed some evils which would furnish reasons for the iconoclastic movement and the attacks against monasticism, when it was decided to disregard the tradition and the reasons in favour of the images and the monks.

46 Cf. De Jerphanion, Les églises rupestres de Cappadoce (Paris 1925 ff.).
47 Cf. for instance D. T. Rice, Byzantine Art (Oxford 1936) 76 (bibliography).
48 Cf. also the recent article of C. R. Morey, “The Byzantine Renaissance,” Speculum XIV (1939) 139 ff.
50 See the review of those opinions in Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 619 ff.; Leclercq joins them in a more cautious form whereas N. Jorga, Histoire de la vie byzantine II 32 ff., falls into exaggerations. See also W. Elliger, “Zur bilderdienlichen Bewegung des 8. Jahrhunderts,” in: Forschungen zur Kirchengeschichte und zur christlichen Kunst für Johannes Ficker 43. — Cf. also p. 141 f. on the economic side of the problem. 51 The latest scholarly historian of the Byzantine empire, A. A. Vasiliev, follows the
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It is needless to emphasize that the iconoclastic emperors believed that they possessed responsibility, authority and competence in religious questions. Constantine V himself wrote a theological treatise against the images. Leo III, in his Elogia (an abridged and modernized edition of the Code of Justinian), stressed and strengthened the Christian element in the practice of law. It was a general political theory of the earlier middle ages that Christian rule had a quasi-ecclesiastical character, that the Christian ruler and above all the Christian Emperor was rex and sacerdos, Βασιλεύς καὶ λεγώ, vicarius Dei on this earth, a theory which, chiefly because of the Constantinopolitan patriarch's antagonism to the Pope, led to more permanent political consequences in the Byzantine empire than in the western world; therefore the term caesaropapism is rightly applied to Byzantium in the first place. Now, in the iconoclastic controversy, the government of the Byzantine emperors passed beyond the earlier stages of caesaropapism and approached the stern regions of omnipotence of the State. More recent experiences may help us to understand how in such periods every expression of human life can come within the grasp of a supreme will, and all the more when these expressions are so important in the life of a people as the images were for the great majority of the eastern Christians. Secondary, but typical points which I shall enumerate briefly, confirm, I think, the thesis that iconoclasm was but an outgrowth and indeed the climax of the caesaropapistic theory and practice of the State, as represented by some of the most successful Byzantine emperors.

1) The resistance of the orthodox party to the assaults of the iconoclastic emperors was in part paralyzed by the latter's victorious fight against other enemies of Christendom, namely Islam and the Bulgarians.

views expressed by Diehl and others, as he states: . . . "le développement excessif du monachisme et l'accroissement rapide du nombre des monastères allait à l'encontre des intérêts étudiés de l'état byzantin" (Histoire de l'empire byzantin I 341). Vasiliev goes on to say that the monasteries attracted many gifted young men who would otherwise have fulfilled their functions in life as peasants, soldiers or public officers. But it is more than dubious whether one is justified in arguing in this way, even if there were some individuals who had chosen the religious life in order to escape public duties; and even if I. D. Andreiev is right in estimating the number of monks in the Byzantine empire of the iconoclastic period at 100,000. (I was unable to use the book of Andreiev on the patriarchs Germanus and Tarasius of Constantinople [Sergiev Posad 1907], written in Russian, but it is quoted by Vasiliev, loc. cit. 340). Apart from the superiority of the vita contemplativa, there is the undeniable contribution of monasticism to mediaeval culture in the broadest sense. To the view that the possession of large estates by the monasteries was a disadvantage to the Byzantine state, Ostrogorsky (in: Byz. Zeitschrift XXX [1929-30] 400) has rightly objected that it is not probable that any scarcity of land existed at that time in the Byzantine empire.

II. Fragments contained in the Antiphonarii I and II of the patriarch Nicephorus; cf. Ostrogorsky, Studien zur Geschichte des byz. Bildertreits 7 ff.

Ed. Zachariae v. Lingenthal, in: Collectio librorum iuris Romani ineditorum (1852); cf. for the Elogia L. Bréhier, loc. cit. 438 (also bibliography) and Diehl, loc. cit. 259.

72 For vicarius Dei as title of the emperor in the west cf. my book Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit (Veröffentlichungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung II [Baden bei Wien 1936], note 411 (with bibliography). Since Innocent III vicarius Dei is an official title of the Pope.

74 A similar solution was given by K. Schwarzlose, Der Bilderstreit 50, yet he has failed to explain sufficiently why the images were attacked by caesaropapism.

75 This can be observed in the historical work of the patriarch Nicephorus, in the aforementioned Breviarium, ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 52 ff. or Migne, P. Gr. C 597 ff.; in spite of being an almost fierce enemy of Constantine V, belittling his victories in the polemic work against him (Antiphonarius III, Migne, P. Gr. C 508 f.), Nicephorus reports Constantine's and his father's exploits in an objective way in the Breviarium. The 10th century writer Genesius says that after the death of the initiator of the second iconoclasm, Leo V, Nicephorus made a statement to the effect that the empire had lost an impious ruler, but a great defender of public interest (Diehl, op. cit. 296; cf. Genesius, Regum Lib. I, Migne, P. Gr. CIX 1009 C).— Even the acts of the second council of Nicaea (Mansi, op. cit. XIII 355) praised the iconoclastic emperors for their military and political achievements.

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2) The iconoclastic party could count upon the ambition or the weakness of a certain number of high dignitaries, some of whom were nevertheless later ill-treated or even sentenced to death. Such were the cases of the two patriarchs who had been set up at the will of the emperors after the deposition of the valiant nonogenarian patriarch Germanus by Leo III. The first of them, Anastasius, after having joined with many of the orthodox the revolt of the usurper Artaudus against Constantine V, was ignominiously paraded around the hippodrome, mounted on an ass and exposed to the mockery of the crowd. In the reign of Constantine V, the second of these patriarchs, Constantine, who had agreed to swear publicly that he was not a worshipper of images, was nevertheless a few years later charged with high treason, first deposed and exiled, finally tortured and beheaded.

3) The instincts of the populace were excited by public propaganda which did not shrink from calumnious proceedings. So Constantine V forced the iconophile monks of Constantinople to appear in the hippodrome, each holding a woman by the hand, that he might expose them to ridicule. And when Leo III, in the beginnings of iconoclasm, declared that the volcanic eruption, which happened in 726 between the Greek islands of Thera (Santorin) and Therasia, was a consequence of idolatry, justifying in this way his measures against the images, then we may assume that this was in part a speculation based upon the superstition of his subjects, even if Leo himself participated in it to some extent.

4) The confiscation and secularization of the property of the iconophiles, particularly the monasteries, appears to have been a very important factor in the iconoclastic struggle; some historians have seen in the fiscal measures and generally speaking in the economic aspect one of the principal features of iconoclasm. The Russian byzantinist C. N. Ouspenski has even gone so far as to say that the iconoclastic movement was in reality an attempt of the emperors to despoil the monasteries of their large estates for the sake of the small land owners and directly or indirectly of the State. According to Ouspenski the iconophiles overemphasized the theological questions involved, in order to set up a smoke-screen for the real economic issue. This hypothesis is based upon the Νόμος γεωργίων, a Code of agricultural law, often attributed to Leo III, but recently admitted to be of an uncertain date, and perhaps written already in the 7th century. But even if the Νόμος had been issued by Leo III, it is doubtful whether the small free landowners

79 Cf. for his succession after Germanus Theophanes, Chronographia A. M. 6221, ed. De Boor I 408 or Migne P. Gr. CVIII 824; Vita S. Stephani Junioris, Migne, P. Gr. C 1083.
77 Cf. A. Lombard, Constantin V (Paris 1902) 22 ff.
78 Diehl, op. cit. 270, where the sources are quoted.
79 Nicephorus, Brevisarium, ed. De Boor, loc. cit. 73 or Migne, loc. cit. 984 C.
82 Cf. Ostrogorsky, in: Mélanges Diehl 240. The question discussed there, whether the eruption happened shortly before or after the beginnings of Leo's iconoclastic activity, is unimportant for us.
84 Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 617 f., note 2 (to p. 616); 618 f., note 3; Diehl, op. cit. 263, 273; Vasiliev, op. cit. I 351. — The confiscation of the papal patrimonies in Calabria and Sicily and the contemporary increase of taxes in these regions still belonging to the Byzantine empire have no causal relation to the origin of iconoclasm; the measures were on the contrary decreed by Leo III as a consequence of the resistance of the Popes Gregory II and III and of Italy in general against iconoclasm. See the edict of Leo III in: Fr. Dölger, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches I (München-Berlin 1924) Nr. 300.
85 I was unable to make use of C. N. Ouspenski's Sketches on Byzantine History (Moscow 1917), written in Russian; the book is however quoted and its results are to some extent accepted by Vasiliev, op. cit. — Cf. the important objections raised by G. Ostrogorsky in his study: "Die vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit der Isaurier," Byz. Zeitschrift XXX (1929-30) 399.
83 Cf. Vasiliev, op. cit. 324 ff.
and the agricultural communities mentioned in it were created by Leo's initiative; they are more likely of an older origin. And it is still more questionable whether there existed any relationship between these economic developments and the iconoclastic hostility toward monasticism. There remains only the fact that the wealth of many of the iconoclastic monasteries was in all probability an additional motive for the iconoclastic persecution. For the rest the whole problem of the relation between the empire and the Church was involved in the origins of iconoclasm, as has been explained above.

5) At the apex of the persecution under Constantine V the omnipotence of the State did not stop at the war against the images and their defenders, but banned also other exterior signs of religious fervor, as relics, and even the veneration of the Saints and the prayers to them; furthermore certain churches were secularized and above all attacks were launched against the celibacy of the monks who were finally forbidden to wear their habit and were obliged in some places to choose between marriage and death. The forcible transfer finally of large groups of inhabitants of Armenia and Northern Syria to the Balkans and to Constantinople itself, was undertaken by Constantine V for various reasons. There is however a certain probability that a considerable number of these Asiatic immigrants, who included monophysites and Paulicians and had lived in the vicinity of the Mohammedans, inclined toward iconoclasm; we have seen that the first iconoclastic bishops came from Asia Minor and that Leo III himself was a native of Northern Syria.

Every kind of violence on the one side, martyrdom on the other side was the last consequence of the war against the sacred images. And this is true, although to a less extent, even for the revival of iconoclasm in the 9th century, and particularly during the reign of Leo V.

The images and their worship were indeed too deeply rooted in the soul of the Christians and particularly of the Eastern Christian peoples to be overthrown permanently. It is not my intention to describe the diverse external vicissitudes of the iconoclast disturbances. As the persecution of the images had been implicit and explicitly a persecution of the Church, the victory of the iconophiles meant also a great victory for the Byzantine Church. It has been said with good reason that with the end of iconoclasm Byzantine caesaropapism was replaced by a dyarchy of emperor and patriarch. Patriarchs like Photius in the second half of the 9th and Michael Cerularius in the middle of the 11th century would not have been possible without the victory over iconoclasm.

A further consequence of the iconophile victory is that the elaborate doctrine of images as developed on the basis of the older Greek tradition during the controversy was to predominate forever in Byzantium. The very character of this doctrine was bound to fix it permanently and at the same time to influence profoundly the content and formal aspect of the images themselves. The second phase of iconoclasm is at least as important for the development of the doctrine as the first; St.
Theodore of Studion (died 826) surpasses in some regards even St. John Damascene (died 754), when defending the images with theological arguments.  
I have already mentioned the connection of the images with the dogma of the Incarnation in the theory of the Byzantine iconophiles, a connection which is of general importance for the Christian world in so far as it makes the possibility of Christian art dependent upon the Incarnation. But the Byzantine iconophiles went further than that on two essential points. For them this connection became eventually a necessary one, the Incarnation implied necessarily the making and worshiping of images; and further, the relation between the image and its prototype, that is to say for instance with Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, was a relation of identity, a relative identity of course which was not a crude material one, but was, as we shall see, defined in a very significant way. Both ideas, the necessity of images and the identity with the prototypes, had their basis in the large role which pseudo-Dionysian, neo-Platonic and Platonic elements played in Byzantine theology. If more magical elements were present in the background of the Byzantine theological doctrine, we must grant nevertheless that the distinction between the different ways of veneration of an image of Christ and of Christ himself were very strictly distinguished by the iconophile theologians. In spite of eventual excesses of iconolatry the reproaches of the iconoclasts in this regard seem to me unjustified, so far as the doctrine is concerned.

The iconophiles can claim for their principle of identity the authority of St. Basil, whose words: "the honour of the veneration of the image is transferred to its prototype," are quoted over and again. It is true that St. Basil had said this speaking about the internal relations in the Holy Trinity, but nevertheless the claim is right because this sentence of his demonstrates his conception of the relation between image and prototype. St. John of Damascus, the great theologian of the iconophiles in the first phase of the controversy, quotes beside St. Basil chiefly Pseudo-Dionysius as his authority; he interprets Dionysius' conception of the hierarchical structure of the universe as a hierarchical series of prototypes and images: Christ as image of the Father, the προορισμοί or ideas as prototypes in God of the things, men as images of God, the Old Testament events as prototypes of the

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81 I am trying to characterize the orthodox doctrine of the images as a unit, though distinguishing occasionally between the phases of its development, especially between the views of St. John Damascene as representative of the first and of St. Theodore of Studion as the representative of the second phase. The patriarch St. Nicephorus, the third great theologian and historian in the iconoclastic controversy agrees with the two others, yet is not quite as original a thinker. — A somewhat fuller account of the doctrine of the iconophiles has been given in my article in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ser. III, Vol. I, p. 1 ff.

82 Cf. *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, * Conc. XIII 229 E ff.: *Διαμηνυόμεναι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λάγου ἐκ παρθένων γέννησαν καὶ τὸ τοῦ μέγα καὶ σωτήριον μονογένος, ὅτε αὐτὸς σαβατ ἐπισκέπτετο ἡμῖν ἐξάραμα, μόρφωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς τῶν εἴδων πλάγης. Άπαν (namely the iconoclasts) ... τὰς ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐκείνων εἰκόνα τῶν ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ἐκείνων τῶν διαμαόνων ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ... Cf. also the negative statement of the iconoclastic council of 754 in *Acta Conc. Nic. II*, Mansi, op. cit. 337C: Εἴτε τοῖς ἐκείνοις τοῦ Θεοῦ λάγους ὁμοίαι καὶ ὑπάττασαν διὰ τὸ σαρκόν χαὶ ἑκτείνεθαι δὲ εἰκόνας χρωμάτων καὶ ἑκάτον ἠθηροσύμφων αἰεριζόμενα ... ἀνάθεμα (it should be noted that the iconophiles themselves rejected the circumscription in an image of the divine σωτά, but admitted that of the ὑπάτας, see below). Cf. also St. John Damascene, *De imaginiis oratio I*, Migne, P.Gr. XCIV 1245A: Πάλαι μὲν ὁ Θεός ὁ ἀδόκιμος τοῦ καὶ ἀκαταμάκρος σῶμας οἰκονόμος. Νῦν δὲ σαβατ ὁδηγός ὁ Θεός καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συναρματευθέως εἰκονίζω Θεόν τοῦ ἀδόκιμον.

83 See p. 145.

84 See above p. 135f.

85 St. Basilius Magnus, *Libre de Spiritu Sancto* 18, 45, Migne, P. Gr. XXXII 149C: ... τῆς ἑκάτου των τῶν πρωτοτύπων διαμαόνων. Quoted for instance in John of Damascus, *De imaginiis oratio I*, Migne, P. Gr. XCIV 1261D.

86 Cf. also Hefele-Leclercq, op. cit. 1215 ff. (appendice III), who gives further bibliographical reference on the question.
New Testament, and last but not least the holy icons as images of Christ and the Saints.  

Now let us ask John Damascene and Theodore of Studion in what the identity between an artistic image of Christ and its prototype, that is to say Christ himself, consists. (The image of Christ was the principal problem, the solution of which was the standard valid also for the images of the Mother of God and the Saints). They answer that it cannot be an identity either according to the image's matter, which may for instance be wood and colour, or according to the prototype's essence (οὐσία), which is divine, nor even according to the humane nature of Christ, which is different from the nature of the image. But — and this is the most important formulation among other ones — it is an identity according to the hypostasis, to the person of Christ. It is true that this formulation does not say how this hypostatic identity between Christ and His image is possible, but nevertheless the definition was of the utmost importance. For although it was denied by the iconophile theologians that the identity be a real identity with the divinity, the very introduction of the trinitarian term of the hypostasis saved something of dignity for the image: the hypostasis, the person of Christ, comprises his divine as well as his human nature. And indeed we find Theodore of Studion writing: Ότι καὶ εἰς εἰκόνα εἶναι τὴν θεότητα εἴπτων τις οὐκ ἐν ἀμαρτία τοῦ δέοντος. In a still more important sentence he refers to the fact that man himself is created after the image and likeness of God; therefore there is something divine in the art of making images. And since images can be copied, Christ and His image of God can be again reproduced in images.

97 Cf. John Damasc., De imag. oratio I 10 and III 19, Migne, P. Gr. CXIV 1240D and 1240C.
102 Theodore of Studion, Antirrh. III, 3, 1, loc. cit. 420D: Continuation of the second last quotation in note 99: ... ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως θεότητα.
103 Cf. I.c. 9, 1, c. 424D: ... μαὶ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἡ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα προκύπτει ... κατὰ τὸ μοναδικόν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἑιμικόνως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὸ ἐκεῖνον τῶν φωνῶν. Cf. also Theodore's important and terse letter De cultu sociarum imaginum to his uncle Plato, Abb. of Sakkudion, where the identity according to the divine nature (οὐσία) within the Holy Trinity is again very clearly distinguished from the personal (ὑποστάτη) identity between Christ and his image: Migne P. Gr. CXIX 501A: Ὡθεί γὰρ τῆς τῆς εἰκόνος οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑαυτῆς γεγραμμένος προκύπτειν.
104 Cf. I.c. 501B: Ἀλλὰ δὲ φωνὴ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐκείνη μικρῆ, Ἰη σύ οὐ οὕτως Θεοτόκου, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ πατρί ... ἦν δὲ τὸ ἀνάπτυξον γεγραμμένον ἑαυτῶν οὐκ οὕτως θεοτόκη, ὡς ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν. Αὐτὰ μὲ γάρ φωνεῖ διαγραφής καὶ ἕνα τῇ Χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔγορε οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνη γεγραμμένη. Cf. loc. cit. 504A: ... ἢ ἐλθῇ τῶν Χριστιανῶν πληθυσμῶν, ἢ μάν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς θεότητος ἐφοσοῦ νυκτέρισμα προκύπτει, οὕτω καὶ ἐκείνη τῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μίαν καὶ τῆς τῆς ἑαυτῆς κρατείνων ἔφοσον κατὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ.—Less outspoken yet Joh. Damasc., De imag. oratio I 4, loc. cit. 1236C: ... ἢ σάρξ λόγον γέγονεν, οὐκ ἀπόλεγεν τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦτο, ἀπόλεγεν δὲ μαλλὰ τῶν Λόγου εἰς ὑπόστασαν. Ἰδίως διὰ ἑαυτῆς ἴδε τῶν δόμων, οὐκ ἰδεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῆς ἑιμικόσιος συνειλήθη σαρκὶ τε καὶ αἰματι.: other formulations used by Theodore of Studion to define the identity between the holy images and their prototypes: according to relationship (το πρὸς το ὁ σκέψις), to the identity of names (τὸ ἴδιον) or to the identity of substance (τὸ ἴδιον) or to the identity of substance (τὸ ἴδιον), cf. the quotations in my article, cited in note 91.
105 Antirrh. I 12, loc. cit. 344B. Cf. also note 100 and the last quotation in note 101, from St. John Damascene.
106 Antirrh. I 2, loc. cit. 420A. For the development of the concept of an analogy between the creative acts of God and of the human artist, cf. E. Panofsky, “Idea” (Studien der Bibliothek Waburg) and my short remarks on p. 10 of my article quoted in note 91. For
The iconoclasts were of course strictly opposed to this solution of the problem. Their chief argument was — as we learn from the iconophile sources — the impossibility of the περιγραφή, of the circumscription of the divinity; God cannot be circumscribed in a picture or in any other work of art.104 Whoseover tries to do that, is bound to fall into idolatry and into one of the great heresies: Nestorianism is chiefly mentioned, but also monophysitism and others.105

It is this iconoclastic argument of the impossibility of the περιγραφή of our Lord in the images, which led the holy abbot Theodore of Studion to the strict formulation of the contrary of this impossibility, namely to the necessity of the images and of their veneration. It is necessary to repeat and to emphasize that the ultimate basis of this argument is the fact of the Incarnation. As perfect man, Christ not only can but must be represented and worshipped in images: let this be denied, says Theodore, and Christ’s olosomyla, the economy of the salvation, is virtually destroyed.106 Regarding the particular derivatio of Theodore’s doctrine one can say that it is based on the hierarchical order of the images of St. John of Damascus, but it transcends the latter’s system by making a still more definite use of neo-Platonic, perhaps also of late peripatetic ideas. The higher step — the prototype — is bound to produce the lower — the image. The image is a necessary outgrowth of the prototype, to be compared with the shadow of a natural body, with the impression of a seal.107 The prototype includes its image potentially (δυνάμει).108 This latter term may perhaps be of Aristotelian origin, nevertheless the whole system recalls very strongly the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. The uppermost grade in the neo-Platonic world of ideas, the Hen, being replaced by the Logos, the personal Christ, and the lower ideas being replaced in part by personal Angels

instance to St. Bonaventure, who follows St. Augustine, there is an aspect of Christ, the Word and Son of God, according to His dispositionem aeternum, secundum quam (Filius Dei) dictur mundus archetypus et ars plena omnium rationum viventium (Comment. in IV Libros Sententiarum I 27, 2, 4, ed. Quaracchi I (1882) 490a); cf. Augustinus, De Trinitate VI 10, 11, Migne, Patr. Lat. XLII 931; cf. likewise Johannes Scotus Eriugena, De divisione naturae II 24, Migne, P.L. CXXII 579B (a text kindly indicated by Dr. Lawrence Lynch). For the concept of the ars aeterna cf. also E. Gilson and Ph. Bühler, Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues (Paderborn 1937) 455.

104 Cf. Theodore of Studion, Antirrh. III 1 and 2 passim, loc. cit. 392 ff.; also Nicephorus, Antirrh. I passim, Migne, P. Gr. C 205 ff., Antirrh. II 9 ff. loc. cit. 349 ff. — Another argument of the iconoclasts, reported by Theodore of Studion, Antirrh. III 3, 11, loc. cit. 425A, and 4, 2, loc. cit. 428D: if identical adoration could be offered to Christ and to his image a φώς (namely Christ) and a θέως (namely the image “set up” by the artist) must needs exist simultaneously which is impossible. — The antithesis φως — θέως was used in a different sense in antiquity and became later on very important for very popular canon law: ius naturale — ius positum; cf. St. Kuttner, “Les origines du terme ‘droit positif’, Revue historique du droit français et étranger, Ser. IV, Vol. XV (1936) 728ff.

105 See p. 148 note 127.

106 Cf. Theodore of Studion’s important letter to the Abbot Plato of Sakkudion, De cuius saecularis imaginum, Migne, P. Gr. CXCIX 505A: “... ἡς (namely the worship of Christ’s image) ἀναγραφής ἀνήργησεν δυνάμις καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ὀλοσομύλα. Cf. also his Problematar ad Iconomach. 12, Lc. 484B: ... ἁρὰ ὁδὸς ὁτὲ ἀπαγόρευεν Χριστὸν ἐγγραφαῖς, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἧς ὁ τόσον ὄμοιος τὴν σάμα Χριστοῦ ἀπαγόρευς.”

107 Cf. Theodore of Studion, Antirrh. III 4, 2, Lc. 429A: Εἰ ταῦτα σῶμα ἄμερος παρῆκα τῇ οὐκ αἰεὶ εἰς καὶ εἰς τὸν σωμάτων ἀνθρώπου σῶμα, ἄλλος εἰς τὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ σώμα πραγμάτων, οὕτω τούτω εἰς τὸν Χριστοῦ ἀμαρτωλόν ἐκπεπλήρωσεν, ἀποκάλυπτε τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπεγορημένων, ἄλλος τούτω ἐκεῖνο βιβαζόμενο ἐν μὲν Χριστῷ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα δυνάτων, ἐν τῇ τῇ ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτῷ δραμάνων ὑπὸ πρωτότοκον. Ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ἄμερος ἄμερος δεῖδεται, ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν ἄττια, τότε καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ δύναμι, ἀλλ’ ἄλλος ἐκκαθαρίζεται εἰς ἁμώμων ὁλὴ ἐποπραγμα-

108 Cf. Theodore of Studion’s important note 107.
and Saints (Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita!) the painted or carved images of these holy persons could take the place of the corporeal bodies of the neo-Platonic system.

A more practical fact confirms this interpretation of the iconophile doctrine. I am speaking of the ἀγαθοποιήσας, the images which were supposed to have originated without intermediary of human hands; a belief very characteristic of Byzantine religious art, passed from there to the occident and still surviving in Christian countries of the east and south. The origin of these ἀγαθοποιήσας is sometimes imagined as a kind of supernatural emanation or impression. Famous and sacred examples of images of Christ were and are derived from the legendary impression of His Face on a veil. This legend appears first in the 6th century, in connection with an image allegedly sent to king Abgar of Edessa in Northern Syria by Christ. The legend of the impression of the Holy Face on the veil of St. Veronica is probably of later date.

It can be understood easily that the idea of a certain identity between the images and their divine or holy prototypes was to influence largely the matter and form of Byzantine art.

The most obvious consequence is the conscious conservation of types which had been found for definite representations and were believed sacred by their relation to the prototypes. So the Byzantine Christ as powerful Pantokrator is repeated over and again. Several types of the Blessed Virgin with the Divine Child develop: for instance the Hodegetria, one of the most majestic types of the Madonna in art; or the Glykophila, the Virgin as sweet and loving mother. It is not as if the charge of monotony formerly raised against Byzantine art were justified; there was enough possibility of external and intrinsic variations and of diverse combinations of elements. But if we take Byzantine iconography as a whole, it can safely be stated that its conservatism was much greater than that of occidental iconography.

The second consequence of the principle of identity of the Byzantine images with their prototype is the survival of a certain degree of naturalism in Byzantine art, again more than in occidental art. The very conception of hypostatic or personal identity, which, as we have seen, is sometimes defined in the iconophile sources as an identity according to the similitude or likeness, had at least a share in the maintenance of a certain naturalism. This becomes very clear in a chapter of Theodore of Studion, in which he discusses the question of what would be the effect of a possible lack of skill in the artist upon the identity between the worship received by the image and that destined for the prototype. He solves the problem by stating that the identity does not exist in so far as there is a discrepancy, but only in so far as there is a similitude.

On the other hand the images were assimilated to their holy or even in some way divine character. This was of course the most important and also the most difficult task of the Byzantine artists. They reached the hieratic form by selecting and transforming certain character current in late antique art, especially majestic severity and a slightly melancholic beauty. This transfiguration created perfect figures of tremendous religious earnestness and of saintly loveliness; it included a certain abstraction from nature, a certain schematization; yet it never led to

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109 Cf. for instance E. v. Dobschütz, Christusbilder (Berlin 1899) 28 and 37 ff.
111 Dobschütz, op. cit. 197 ff.; Dict. d’arch. chrét. et de liturg., loc. cit. 2458 ff.
112 Antirrh. III 3,5, loc. cit. XCIIX 421C.
such a sovereign and finally still more creative contempt of naturalism as in early mediaeval occidental art. It may be mentioned on this occasion that, as a lasting consequence of iconoclasm, sculpture in the round disappeared completely from Byzantine art, while reliefs were admitted. There was no official prohibition of statues; the old association of statuaric art with pagan idolatry as well as the oriental artistic trend which transformed plastic forms into pictorial patterns led to this result.

A last result of the principle of relative identity concerned the choice and distribution of the scenes from the life of Christ and the Blessed Virgin to be represented in the Byzantine church buildings. The very belief in the mysterious presence of the represented scenes, such as for instance the resurrection of Christ or the nativity of the Virgin, made the Byzantines consider the images not only as an illustration and as a suggestion of the holy stories, not only as means of edification and of teaching; the images, for the Byzantines, did not only represent, but they were in some way present as the history of the redemption. Therefore gradually a holy canon of images developed which corresponded to the principal liturgical feasts and regulated also the places of the images in the church.

After these considerations I think we can understand all the better the outstanding importance which the images had for the Byzantine Church, an importance which they never had in the occident, where the more sober view that the images are litteratura laicorum always prevailed. Neither the theory of identity nor that of the necessity of the images is to be found in the west; on the other hand the west never knew the extreme Byzantine form of caesaropapism and consequently only mild reflections of Byzantine iconoclasm.

Let us now turn for a moment to the controversy about the images between Charlemagne and his theologians like Alcuin and Theodulf of Orleans on the one side and Pope Hadrian I on the other. It was a direct result of Hadrian’s agreement with the first re-establishment of the images in Byzantium by the second council of Nicaea in 787. The Frankish point of view is expressed in the Libri Carolini, that of the Pope in a long letter on the images, preserved in the Codex Carolinus. It must be emphasized that neither of these two documents penetrates to the heart of either the iconophile or the iconoclastic doctrines. Both sources recognize without any doubt that images are allowed in the Church. Yet while Hadrian agrees with the relative worship and follows the older arguments of the Greek fathers like St. Basil and Pseudo-Dionysius, the Franks scorn worship, claiming as their chief authority the teaching of Gregory the Great. And there is a still more significant difference. For the Franks the religious images are only reminders and paradigmas. Their value is small, if compared with the Holy Writ, says Rabanus Maurus, who wrote in the second period of the controversy between the Pope and the

114 Occidental naturalism which developed in the second half of the middle ages from occidental anti-naturalism, is something fundamentally different from the late antique and Byzantine naturalism.
115 Cf. also L. Bréhier, La querelle des images; Vasiliev, op. cit. I 381.
116 Cf. G. Millet, Recherches sur l'iconographie de l'évangile... (1919), Chapters 2 and 3.
118 The doctrine of images in the west has been treated in a more detailed way on p. 12 ff. of my article, cited in note 91. — The expression laicorum litteratura occurs from the 12th century on (Honorus Augustodunensis, Siccardus of Cremona, Durandus, etc.), but the idea received its first famous formulation through Gregory the Great. For instance Reg. XI 10, M.G. Epist. II 270: ... nam quod legentibus scriptura hoc idiotibus praestat pictura cernendibus. Cf. also L. Gougaud, “Muta Praedicatio,” Rev. Bened. XLII (1930) 168 ff.
117 M. G., Concilia II, Suppl.
118 M. G., Epist. V 5 ff.
119 Cf. Libri Carolini III 16; 23, M. G. Concilia II Suppl. 138; 155.
120 Carmen 38, M. G., Poetae II 196:
Nam scriptura sua norma est perfecta salutis Ilsa (i.e. pictura) oculis tantum paucam solamina praestat.
Franks, which corresponds more or less to the second period of Byzantine iconoclasm during the reign of Leo V and Theophilus. For the Popes the worth of the images is their immediate visibility. Hadrian I, in his letter to Charlemagne, defended the images with these words: ... quia visione sacrarum imaginum ad speciosam formam domini et salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi secundum cernem sanctaetque genitricis et sanctorum pertinet.\textsuperscript{121} And Pope Nicholas I, in the next century, praises the very visible quality of images, saying that they show the object of their love to the Christians\textit{ ad tremendum terribiliter}.\textsuperscript{122}

A more didactic and symbolical conception of imagery in the north and west of Europe and a more direct in Rome and Italy are expressed in the works of art themselves. German frescos and miniatures of the Ottonian period for instance suggest a deeper meaning beyond the image in the expressive gestures and eyes of their figures; whereas in 11th century Roman works like the famous frescos in the lower church of St. Clement the artist intended to concentrate all that he wanted to express in the dramatic reproduction of the events in the picture.

I cannot, on this occasion, enter further into the difference between northern and southern occidental art in the middle ages.\textsuperscript{123} Summing up the contrast between the conception of art in the Christian occident, considered as one complex, and in the Christian orient, one may say that in the 8th and 9th centuries there is no concept of Christian imagery in the west which can be compared with the deep speculations of a John Damascene and of a Theodore of Studion. And yet the doctrine of identity included a profound spiritualism and at the same time an extreme sensualism, which were in some way kindred to the intellectual presuppositions of the iconoclasts themselves.\textsuperscript{124} It is not quite accidental that the iconoclasts, who were blamed for inclining not only to Judaism, Mohammedanism and Manichaeism,\textsuperscript{125} but also to monophysitism,\textsuperscript{126} charged the iconophiles themselves with monophysitism and above all with Nestorianism.

The respective arguments are not very clearly developed by the sources.\textsuperscript{127} Let us therefore try to state the case for the iconoclasts: The iconophiles, according to them, are like the monophysites who blend and confuse the two natures in Christ; for they believe that He was so much God even as Man that Christ, the God-Man, would needs be circumscribed in an image of Christ. But the iconophiles are also like the Nestorians; for whosoever tries to circumscribe Christ in an

\textsuperscript{121} M.G., Epist. V 19.

\textsuperscript{122} M.G., Epist. VI 437.

\textsuperscript{123} For the influence of the doctrines upon the works of art themselves, in the east as well as in the west (on both sides of the Alps), see my study on Italian painting in the 11th century cited in note 1.

\textsuperscript{124} This has also been felt by G. K. Chesterton, cf. his \textit{St. Thomas Aquinas} (London 1933) 94 f. — Ostrogorsky, \textit{Studien zur Geschichte des Byz. Bildstreits}, believes that the iconoclasts and the iconophiles had different notions of what an image is, and sees the very reason for the iconoclastic conflict in this fact. Cf. against this thesis H. Barion, in: \textit{Römische Quartalschrift} XXXVII (1930) 80 ff., and my article in \textit{Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte}, loc. cit. 6, note 20.

\textsuperscript{125} See note 23.

\textsuperscript{126} Cf. \textit{Acta Conc. Nic. II}, Mansi, \textit{Concilia} XIII 157 D, and Theodore of Studion, \textit{Antirrh. III} 1, 25, loc. cit. 401A, where the iconoclasts are compared to diverse mono-

\textsuperscript{127} The iconophiles compared to the monophysites by the iconoclasts: cf. the acts of the iconoclastic council of 754, in \textit{Acta Conc. Nic. II}, Mansi, loc. cit. XIII 244D; also loc. cit. 252A-B; 260A. — The iconophiles compared to the Nestorians by the iconoclasts: cf. ibidem 241E; also loc. cit. 256A-B; 259E f.; also Theodore of Studion, \textit{Antirrh. III} 1, 22, and \textit{Problematas ad Iconomach.} 13, loc. cit. 400C and 484B-C. — The iconoclastic view regarding the similitude between iconophiles and Nestorians could have been turned against the iconoclasts themselves, like the argument regarding monophysitism. But the iconophiles have apparently enumerated Nestorius among the forerunners of the iconoclastic heresy only for the reason that he was one of the principal heretics: in \textit{Acta Conc. Nic. II}, loc. cit. 400A and 416C, the three iconoclastic patriarchs of Constantinople are compared to Arius, Nestorius and to the monophysite Dioscurus.
image, actually divides him into two persons, since only a human person can be represented in a work of art; the iconophiles have therefore only the image of a man whom they call God, that is to say they produce an idol. Both of these arguments are exaggerated and unjust; the iconophiles could reply to them in referring to their belief in the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, which according to them was duplicated in the image in an identical way. But nevertheless the iconoclast charges may be explained to some extent by the fact that the image worshippers insisted that Christ in his humanity and divinity is really, although not materially, identical with his image.

The Church in the west stuck much more closely to the truth that there can be on this earth no identity with God, neither in images nor in man, who himself is made to the image and likeness of God, nor in any creature. That means an immense variety of terrestrial beings. But it also means a permanent change and over and again new creative efforts in art, whereas, as we have seen, the chief types of Byzantine art remained largely fixed by the principle of identity.

It must also be stated that the victory of the Byzantine Church over iconoclasm and extreme caesaropapism did not lead to a renewal as deep as the great occidental Church Reform of the era of Gregory VII with its lasting consequences for all spheres of life, not least in the field of Christian art. The victory of orthodoxy in Byzantium was closely followed by the broadening of a traditionalistic and nationalistic antagonism toward the west, and the see of St. Peter especially, which led to the schism of Photius in the 9th and to the permanent one of Michael Cerularius in the 11th century. The patriarchs of Constantinople who claimed universality for the east were even interested in preserving a moderate form of caesaropapism as a bulwark against the universality of Rome, and so the Byzantine Church did not share in the transformation of western Christendom in the era of the controversy of investitures. As a result the stubborn and yet in some regards venerable traditionalism of the Byzantine as well as of the other oriental Churches and later the Russian Church kept the religious images, as being gifted with relative divinity, essentially unchanged and unaltered in their religious and in their artistic character, until in post-mediaeval times the influence of the fundamental changes in western Christianity broke the spell of the great old form of Byzantine religious art.

128 Cf. also Elliger, op. cit. 50 ff. But Elliger overlooks completely the fact that the iconoclasts were even nearer to monophysitism than the iconophiles (cf. 135). Moreover he does not clearly show the intrinsic connexion of iconoclasm as well as of monophysitism and other heresies with caesaropapism, pointed out so well by Solowjew (see p. 135 and note 42).

129 See above.

130 It is characteristic that St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica 2, 25 3, will grant to the image of Christ even the adoratio laetiae ... proprier rem causae imago est, but does not at all mention the possibility of any identity between Christ and his image.

131 In the west the Augustinian conception, continued by John Scotus Erigena and St. Bonaventure, which understood the creating Word of God as "Ars aeterna," is characteristic for the thoughts on art in general. Cf. also note 103.

132 Cf. A. Michel, Humbert und Kerullarios I (Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschicthe, published by the Görres-Gesellschaft, XXI [1924]).

133 Cf. p. 142 on: the dyarchy of emperor and patriarch from the end of the iconoclastic controversy. Cf. also Solowjew, op. cit., introduction p. XXXIII.

134 Cf. my Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit, Chapter on Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida's contests with Berengar of Tours on the one hand and with the patriarch Cerularius on the other.

135 While reading the proofs, there came to my attention the study of J. Starr, The Jews in the Byzantine Empire 641–1204 (Texte und Forschungen zur Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Philologie XXX [1939]). On p. 75 f. Starr, without proof, denies any influence of the Jews on the iconoclastic movement. He considers the sources in question to be legendary; cf. note 20a of this article. On p. 90 f. of his study Starr maintains the erroneous attribution of the Oration ... de ... imaginibus ... adversus ... Constantinum Cabalimum to St. John Damascene; cf. note 22.
The Canzone d'Amore of Cavalcanti
According to the Commentary of Dino del Garbo

TEXT AND COMMENTARY

OTTO BIRD

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N.B. The first half, only, of this study (up to and including Historical Analysis, Stanza II) is published in this number of Mediaeval Studies. The second half will be published in our next issue. (Ed.)

Introduction

Poetry, in spite of what poets may say to the contrary, can never completely avoid the influence of philosophy. For if poetry deals with words, it deals, not only with the beauty of sound, but also with the ideas those sounds signify. Therefore in its ideal structure it cannot but feel the influence of philosophy, which is the province of ideas in their purity; for ideas, as it were, seek their natural place as their source as well as their end. Yet it cannot be denied that some poetry is more philosophic than others. In the Middle Ages Dante of course comes immediately to mind, and "Dante and his Circle" have come to have something of the same position in Mediaeval Literature that the "Metaphysical Poets" have in English. But after Dante, Guido Cavalcanti undoubtedly is the most representative of the philosophic tendency of this school — perhaps in this it is significant that Cavalcanti was Dante's primo amico. Of all his work, however, one poem in particular entitles Guido to this position of philosophic poet, that poem being the Donna mi prega, or Canzone d'Amore. And although it must never be forgotten that Guido, as a poet, is primarily concerned with the beauty of his poem, nevertheless philosophy will enable us to better appreciate that beauty by acquainting us with the ideas he uses so freely as belonging to the heritage of his time. It is not a question of finding in the philosophers the immediate "sources" of Guido's poem; it is rather that of locating the various ideas Guido makes use of in those places where we can most readily recapture their significance. And here the value of a mediaeval commentator is obvious, since he has already done part of the job of locating these ideas and thereby given us something further to concentrate upon.

This poem is, according to tradition, the answer Cavalcanti gave to a certain
request made to him by Guido Orlandi in the name of a certain lady.\textsuperscript{1} Thus Orlandi’s poem in which he makes this request runs as follows:

\textit{Onde si move ed onde nasce Amore?}
\textit{qual e’ l’u proprio loco ov’è dimora?}
\textit{e sustanzia, accidente, o memora?}
\textit{cagion d’occhi, o voler di core?}

\textit{Da che procede suo stat’ o furore?}
\textit{come foco si sente che divora?}
\textit{di che si nutre? domand’io ancora;}
\textit{come, quando ed a cui si fa segnore?}

\textit{Che cosa e, dico, Amore? ae figura?}
\textit{a per se forma o e’ somiglia altrui?}
\textit{e vita, questo Amore, o e morte?}

\textit{Chi ’l serve, de saver di sua natura:}
\textit{io ne dimando voi, Guido, di lui:}
\textit{odo che molto usate in sua corte.}

And in the \textit{Donna mi prega} Guido manages in one way and another to consider each of the questions Orlandi asks; in fact the eight questions which Guido sets for himself in the first stanza of his poem comprehend these listed by Orlandi. In answering them, however, Guido made use of the philosophic and scientific knowledge of his time to such an extent that his poem has been said to be more of a scientific treatise than a poem. But be that as it may, the philosophic interest of his poem is evident from the fact that so many men who are most generally known for their work in philosophy have commented upon it. Thus Egidio Colonna, or Giles of Rome, is attributed with a commentary on this poem, and both Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola also turned their hand to it.\textsuperscript{2}

Amongst the commentaries, however, the one by Dino del Garbo is probably the earliest;\textsuperscript{3} in fact it is practically contemporary with the poem, since Dino died in 1327, just twenty-seven years after the death of Guido. Consequently, Dino has the advantage of enjoying the same intellectual atmosphere that Guido was in when writing the poem. Furthermore, as a physician, Dino was trained in the same science that Guido is noted for — that of natural science. Thus Boccaccio tells us (\textit{Decameron}, VI, 9) that Cavalcanti was “un de migliori laici che avesse il mondo, et ottimo filosofo naturale,” whereas Villani writes that Dino was “grandissimo Dottore in Fisica, et in più scienzie naturali et Filosofiche, il quale al suo tempo fu il migliore, e più Sovrano Medico, che fosse in Italia.”\textsuperscript{4} Therefore, at least in the historical contingencies, Dino enjoys inestimable advantages as a commentator, and for that reason should be of profit to us as a guide to the understanding of this most difficult of Guido’s poems.

\textsuperscript{1} “Guido Orlandi in nome di una donna a Guido Cavalcanti, e la Canzone ‘Donna mi prega’ ne e la risposta” in MS. Riccardiano 2846, as quoted by Pietro Ercole, \textit{Rime di G. Cavalcanti}, Livorno, Vigo, 1885, p. 85.


\textsuperscript{3} It is almost certain that the commentary attributed to Egidio Colonna (died 1316) does not belong to him and is of a later date. Cf. Fran. Pasqualigo, \textit{La canzone di Guido Cavalcanti ‘Donna mi prega’}, Venezia, Olschki, 1891, pp. 6-8.

Dino himself, as has been said, was a medicus, and what we know of his life is little more than a chronicle of the times and places in which he held the Chair of Medicine. He was born in Florence and sometime around 1295 went to Bologna to study Medicine in the university there. But as he himself tells us in the proem of one of his works, he stayed there for only one year because of the war which broke out when Azzo d’Este attacked the city and which continued from 1296 to 1299. The war ended, Dino returned to resume his medical studies and after four years took his doctorate, i.e. circa 1304. He then lectured in Bologna for two years and after that went to Siena. He could only have stayed there, however, about two years, for he must have been back in Bologna by 1308 inasmuch as he tells us that the sixth year of his lecturing at Bologna was 1311; consequently, since he lectured there for two years, 1304–1306, before going to Siena, he must have returned in 1308, so as to make 1311 the sixth year of his lectureship at Bologna. From Bologna he went to the University of Padua, probably about 1313, where he could not have stayed later than 1319, for at that time he was back in Florence. But he probably stayed there only a short time before returning to the University of Siena, where he remained until 1325, when he went back to Florence, where he died on the 30th of September, 1327.

With the exception of his commentary on the Donna mi prega all of his works are medical writings. Thus he has commentaries on parts of the Canon of Avicenna, one on the De generatione embrionis of Hippocrates and one on the surgery of Galen, an epistle De coena et frandio, a book of Quaestiones medicinae and another De virtutibus medicamentorum.

Concerning Dino’s commentary on Cavalcanti, in which we are here more particularly interested, it is found in the original Latin, so far as is now known, in only one manuscript. For although mention is made of a 1498 Venetian edition by various writers of the eighteenth century and later, there is no record of anyone having actually seen this edition. Besides this manuscript, there is only the Italian translation published by Cicciapori from the Magliabechian MS. vii, 1076, which he compared with the translation in the Laurentian MS. xx, Pluteo 41, in his edition lecturae MCCCXI.”

Ibid. “Deinde vero vocatus ad Studium reperandum a Communi Paduae, ibi legens hoc opus reincepi et processe . . . et tunc quidem propter nulam statum Civitatis Paduae Florentiam redi, et reassumus hoc opus Florentiae . . . terminavi . . . et completum est hoc opus a me anno Christi 1319 die 25 mensis Novembris.”

Secundis liber canonis Avicennae, op. cit., p. 249: “Et finita est . . . anno Christi 1325, die 27 mensis Octobris, quam ego Dinus de Florentia minimus inter Medicos Doctores incipi cum viguit Studium in Civitate Senarum, et quam Florentiam redi propter illius studii diminutionem et annullationem.”

Villani, loc. cit.: “Nel detto tempo (1327) a di 30, di Settembre mori in Firenze Maestro Dino del Garbo.”

For editions of these cf. L. Thordike, A Catalogue of Incipits of Medieval Scientific Writings in Latin, Cambridge, Mediaeval Academy, 1937 under Dino del Garbo in the index.

tion of the poems of Cavalcanti. The Latin version, then, I am presenting now from the Chigian MS. L.V. 176, which is described by Arnone as follows:

E un volume pergamenaceo in-4 del secolo xv, dal titolo: *Vita di Dante*, di carte numerate 79 e non numerate e bianche 5. Ha lettere iniziali colorate, ed è adorno di eleganti miniature. Nella 3ª carta non numerata e scritto modernamente a lapis: "Lassato per legato a Papa Alessandro VII dal Conte Federigo Ubaldino, che l'acquistò da Parigi, ove l'aveva portato seco Iacobob Corbinelli fiorentino, autore delle Postille moderne, e come fuoruscito era andato in Francia a ricevere dall' Regina Caterina de'Medici." Dopo la Vita di Dante si trova (c. 29) la canzone *Donna mi prega*, a cui tien dietro il commento in latino di Dino del Garbo. Le note marginali, sparse nel commento, sembrano di mano di Celso Cittadini.

This text is presented here along with the text of the poem accompanying it, which has been corrected according to the explicit and implicit changes which Dino makes upon it in the course of his interpretation of the poem; in other words, the text of the poem here included is as near as it is possible to the text that Dino had before him while he was making his commentary. The differences from the poem of the Chigian MS. are, on the whole, quite minor, usually being only changes in spelling, although there are a few places where Dino reads a different word altogether. But in each case these variants have been noted at the foot of the page, where the reading of the manuscript text is noted. I have also accompanied the poem with an English translation, which, insofar as it is possible, is the one Dino would make if he were speaking English. The difficulty, of course, comes in making the meaning of the poem clear in a very literal translation, for besides the use of so many technical philosophical terms, which demand a lengthy explanation to make their meaning clear, Guido’s Italian is so very elliptical that it demands expansion in English to make any sense out of it. In my translation I have attempted a compromise in the hope of keeping as close to the Italian text as possible while at the same time allowing some sort of meaning in English. Thus, I have retained the philosophical terms, leaving to the analysis of the commentary their full explication, while I have put in brackets the words which at the very minimum will expand the ellipses. However, it should not be forgotten that this translation is based on Dino’s interpretation of the poem, which might be open to discussion at practically every stage, yet only where it seems evidently far-fetched have I noticed it at the foot of the page.

Concerning the text of the commentary, it has been transcribed as it is in the manuscript, except, of course, for the expanding of the genitive *e to ae* and the insertion of *he* in such words as *apprehensio*. I have, however, repunctuated and divided the work into sections. The only other changes are the few cases of obvious misreading, which are noticed at the foot of the page. Finally, as to the sources quoted, I have noted only those explicitly mentioned by Dino, and I have left to the analysis any other texts that would be helpful.

In the analysis of the commentary I have begun by paraphrasing small sections of Dino’s commentary (in small type), and then analyzed the philosophic doctrine it is dealing with. However, I do not mean to imply that the texts I bring forward to facilitate the understanding of Dino’s thought are “sources” for Dino in the sense that he actually used such and such books for his commentary. In most cases

13 In *Rime di Guido Cavalcanti* ecc. per opera di Antonio Cicciaparici, Firenze, Carli, 1813, pp. 76-115, “Volgarizzamento inedito del comando latino di Maestro Dino del Garbo sulla canzone *Donna mi prega* ecc. Fatto per Ser Jacopo Mangiatroja notaio e cittadino fiorentino.” This Italian version has been compared with the Latin text by J. E. Shaw in *Italica* XII (1935), pp. 102-105.

the doctrine in question was so general in XIII-XIVth century scholasticism that he could have got it from innumerable places. But since Aristotle is at the source of most of these psychological and physiological doctrines, I have tried to locate the basis for Dino’s interpretation in Aristotle. However, since we are dealing here with a XIVth century version of Aristotle, it is not always possible to find this Aristotelian doctrine in the text of Aristotle himself and, consequently, it is necessary to turn to his mediaeval commentators. But in this case the problem is less one of hoping to find exactly the book that Dino got such a doctrine out of, than that of finding texts which will explicate his meaning while at the same time maintain the general consistency of his thought. Consequently, in citing these texts to accomplish the analysis of Dino’s commentary, I do not at all mean to imply that Dino actually used them, but only that they are examples of scholastic thought which enable us further to understand the work of both Dino and Cavalcanti. Thus it amounts to an essay on the use of scholastic philosophy in the poetry of that time.

Finally in conclusion I attempt to review in general Dino’s interpretation of the poem, and, while pointing out its inadequacies, show in what way it can aid us in understanding what is after all a very obscure poem. For although Dino’s interpretation is not the only one that can be given of this poem, it does make manifest the problems which must be faced by one who would come to any sort of understanding of the Canzone d’Amore of Cavalcanti.

When Mr. Ezra Pound raised the problem of the interpretation of Guido’s poem in his edition of Cavalcanti,15 Professor Gilson suggested that a more detailed study of Dino’s commentary upon it would be profitable. Owing to Mr. Pound’s gracious gesture in communicating his copy of the MS of the commentary to the Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, I was able to take advantage of this opportunity of examining the problem and I wish hereby to express my gratitude to both of these gentlemen who have, each in his own way, aided me in the preparation of this study.

O. B.

The Canzone d’Amore of Guido Cavalcanti

Text

Chemincia la cancone di Guido de messer
Cavalcante de Cavalcanti di Firence:

I
Donna mi priega che io deggia dire
d’uno accidente, che sovent’e fero,
et e si altero, ch’e chiamato amore;
si chillo nega, possa il ver sentire.

5
Et al presente conoscente chero,
perch’io non spero ch’uom de basso core
ad tal ragione porti conoscenza;
che senza natural dimostramento
non o talento di voler provare

10
la dove a posa et chi lo fa creare,
et quale e sua vertu et sua potenca,
l’essenza, poi ciascuno b suo movimento,
el piacimento che ’l fa dire amare,
et s’uomo per vedere il puo mostrare.

II

15
In quella parte dove sta memoria
prende suo stato, si formato come
dyaphano da lume d’una obscuritate.
Lo d quale da marte viene et fa dimora.
Egli’e creato et a sensato nome,

20
d’alma costume et di cor volontate.
Vien da veduta forma che s’intende,
che prende nel possibile intellecto,
come’n subjecto, f loco et dimoranza.
En quella parte mai g non a possanza,

25
perche da qualitate l non discende;
risplende in se perpetuale effecto,
non a dilecto ma consideranza;
si che non puo k largire l simiglianza.

III

30
Non e vertude ma da quella viene
ch’e perfectione, che si a pon e tale

a dove) ove.
b ciascuno) ciascun.
c obscuritate) obscuritate.
d lo) la.
e volontate) volontate.
f subjecto) subgetto.
mjouran) dimoranza.
a mai) gia.

h possanza) possanza.
i qualitate) qualitate.
j consideranza) consideranza.
k puo) puote.
l largir) largir.
m simiglianza) simiglianza.
a che si) chessi.
e pon) pone.
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

non rationale ma che sente, dico.
Fuor di salute giudicar mantiene,
che p la'ntentione per ragion q vale;
discerne r male, in cui e vinto, amico.

35  Di sua potenza segue spesso morte,
se forte la vertu fosse impedita
la quale aiuta alla t contraria via;
non perche opposto natural sia,
ma quanto che da buon perfecto u torse.

40  Per sorte non puo dire huom caggia vita,
che stabilita non a signoria.
A v simil puo valere w quando huomo oblia.

IV

L'esser'c quando 'l x volere e tanto
ch'oltra misura di natura torna;

45x poi non s'adorna di riposo mai.
move cangiando colore, a riso in pianto,
et la figura con la paura storna;
poco sogiorna. Ancor di lui vedrai
che 'n gente de valore il piu si trova.

50  La nuova qualita muove sospiri;
et vuol ch'huom miri non fermato loco——
destando si ella, la qual manda fuoco;
ymaginar non puote che il pruova.b
Et non si nuova perchve allui sitir;
et non si b giri per trovarvi gioco,
ze certamente gran saver ne poco.

V

Di simil tragge complexion e lo d sguardo
che fa parere lo piacer. Certo
non puo coverto stare e quando e si i giunto——
non gia selvaggi s la belta suo dardo——
che tal volere per temere e sperto,
consegue h merto spirito ch'e punto.
Et non si puo conoscier i per lo viso,
compreso j bianco in tale objecto k cade;
et chi bene aude, forma non si vede,
perche li mena che da lui procede,
fuore di colore esser diviso,

p che) chel.
q ragion) ragione.
r discerne) discerne.
a in marg.: forte impedita.
î alla) fa.
ì perfecto) proposto.
ì a) ad.
ì valore) valer.
ì('lo) lo.
ì in marg.: Per che il riposo la una certa
degnita sed dicit degli. Dogni reposo mi pareva
indigna.
ì colore) color.

[ 156 ]
OTTO BIRD
absciso mezo m obscuro, luce raude.
Fuor d'ogni fraude che dice degna in fede,
che solo di costui nascie merzede. o

RITORNELLA
Tu puoi sicuramente gir, cancone,
ove ti piace, ch'io t'ò si adornata
ch'assai laudata sara tua ragione
dalle persone ch'anno intendimento,

di star con l'altre tu non ai talento.

Translation

A lady asks me that I would tell
of an accident which is often fierce
and is so great that it is called love;
so that if anyone denies it, let him hear the truth.
And for the present I seek men of understanding,
for I do not hope that one of base heart
could bring understanding to such reasons;
for without natural demonstration
I have no desire to try to prove
where it is posited and who makes it created,
and what its virtue is and its power,
its essence and its every movement,
the pleasingness which makes it called loving,
and whether one can show it by sight.

In that part where memory is
it (love) takes its state so formed as
a diaphan by light from an obscurity.
It 1 comes from Mars and makes its rest.
It is created and has a sensible name,
a habit of the soul and will from the heart.
It comes from a seen form which is understood,
which takes its place and rest
in the possible intellect as in a subject.
In that part (the intellect) it never has any power,
because (the intellect) 2 does not descend from quality;
it shines in its own perpetual effect,
and has no delight but consideration,
so that it cannot grant a likeness (to love as a passion).

1 post absciso leg. in.
m mezo) meco.

1 It Dino takes to refer to love, the subject
understood of prende, although it may refer to
obscuriare.

a che) om.
o merzede) mercede.

2 It should be noted Dino supplies a subject
here—intello—which governs the remaining
lines of the stanza.
(Love) is not a virtue but comes from that
which is a perfection, which is posited as such,
not rational but which senses, I say.
It maintains an unsound judgment,
for the intention is rendered valid by reason;
he, in whom reason is conquered, discerns badly what he loves.

Death often follows from its power,
if, perchance, its virtue is impeded
which helps the contrary way;
not because it is a natural opposite (does love cause death),
but inasmuch as it twists (man) from his perfect good.

One cannot say that man loses life through chance,
since stability has no sovereignty (in chance).
When man forgets (love), he can become well again.3

(Love's) essence is when its desire is so great
that it goes beyond the measure of nature;
then it is no more adorned with repose.

It moves, changing color, (from) laughing to weeping,
and distorts the face with fear;
it rests little. Moreover you will see
that it is found most among people of worth.

Its new quality moves sighs;
and wills that man contemplate a non-fixed place —
if it is awakened, it makes fire;
he, who has experience of it, cannot imagine (anything else).
And let no one move (towards love) because he is attracted to it;

Let no one go (to it) to find joy,
nor certainly either great wisdom or little.

The look which makes pleasure appear
takes its complexion from the like. Certainly 4
(love) cannot stay hidden when it has happened —
yet beauty has not a savage 5 dart —
such a desire (as love) is experienced in fear,
which follows by merit of the spirit which is stung.
And it cannot be known by visual
comprehension, which is concerned with such an object as white;

he who understands well, does not see (love's) form,
because it produces there what proceeds from it (viz. its effects),
being divided from all color,
and cut off in an obscure medium, it takes away light.

3 Here Dino takes a simile to refer to the condition of the man before he was afflicted with this passion—"like what he was."
4 Certainly seems to go better with the preceding sentence, so as to read: "which makes pleasure appear certain."
5 Dino understands by savage, "dull and weak," i.e. innocuous.
OTTO BIRD

It is beyond all fraud because worthy in faith,
for only from that is mercy born.

70

RITORNELLA

You can go securely, canzone,
wherever it pleases you, for I have so adorned you
that your reason will be much praised
by persons who have understanding;

75

with others you have no desire to stay.
The Commentary of Dino del Garbo on
cavalcanthi’s Canzone d’Amore

Rome
Chigiano L. V. 176.
F. 29ra

I

Inscriptum super cantilena Guidonis de Cavalcañibus a magistro
Dino del Garbo egregio medicinae doctori editum.

Ista cantilena quae tractat de amoris passione dividitur in tres partes. In
prima ostenditur quot et quae sunt ea quae dicuntur de ipsa. Secundo, de il-
lis quae proponit determinat. Tertio, in ponendo finem dictionis ostenditur
sufficientiam corum quae dixit. Ibi, secunda, In quella parte dove sta memoria;
tertia, ibi, Tu puoi sicuramente. In prima parte, quae est primus versus, tria
ponuntur. Primo, ostenditur intentio generalis. Secundo, qualis debet esse
auditor a huic sermonis. Tertio, in speciali ostenditur quot et quae intendit

Volens igitur auctor determinare de passione amoris, praemittit causam
moventem ipsum ad tractandum de amore. Causa autem movens ad hoc est
mulier vel domina quae ipsum rogavit. Causa quae istud attribuitur mulieri
vel dominae fuit duplex; una est quia hiuiusmodi passio, quae est amor, de
quo loquitur ut plurimum circa mulierem versatur, et licet aliquando erga
masculum versetur, sed quia raro, cum sit talis amor bestialis et ideo praefer
naturam, ideo solum hic proponit circa mulierem. Secunda causa fuit quia
forte hic auctor vexabatur tunc passione ista circa aliquam mulierem, et ideo
ut ei applauderet, proponit hanc causam circa mulierem. Sed adverto quod
licet causa propter quem motus fuit ad tentandum hoc circa amorem fuerist
mulier vel domina quam forte dilexerat, tamen non dixit quod haec domina
sibi praecipieret, sed dixit quod rogavit eum, ut ostenderet ea quae tractat
hic non dicit in quantum passionatus tali passione amores. Nam qui hoc
modo passionatus est cogit tur ad exequendum ea quae vult res quam amat;
unde et hoc modo illud quod ei dicit domina quam amat est e praeeptum
sicut dictum domini servo. Sed illa, quae dicit, referet in scientifico modo et
veridisco tracto ex praecptis scientiae naturalis et moralis. In talibus autem
qua sic dicuntur ab aliquo, ille qui dicit optinet locum magistri, cum sit
sciens; cum vero recipit ea quae dicitur, optinet locum discipuli cum sit igno-
norans et addiscens. Et ideo sicut magister optinet locum principatus, ita in
hac materia voluit se ostendere quantum in hoc optinere locum principantis
et magistri, et ideo sicut subdivit verbum ad dominum non debet esse cum
praeeptio sed cum rogamine. Subditus enim non debet praecipere domino
sed rogar. Sic iste propter hanc causam vertens se ad istam intentionem non
dixit: Donna mi comanda, sed dixit: Donna mi priea. Et nota quod significanter
dixit donna ut ostenderet quod ista petio est iusta cui debet satisfacere, cum
esse potens in satisfaciendo. In hoc enim vero ostenditur quod petio est
iusta ratione illius qui petit; nam tunc est petiio iusta cui satisfieri debet ra-

* auditor) auctor; but, as is evident from p. 161, l.32, the correct reading is auditor.
tione illius qui petit quando petens cognoscit illud quod (29rb) petit, et quando qui petit ex persona digna. Hinc autem hoc nomen *donna* attribuitur mulieri cum iam habeat cognitionem perfectam, quoniam mulieri quae est in aetate puellil in qua cognitio non est perfecta non attribuitur hoc nomen *donna*. Iterum etiam attribuitur mulieri dignae; nam illud nomen attribuitur mulieri honestae; mulier enim meretriciaria non dicitur *donna*. Et maxime attribuitur hoc nomen mulieri quae est proles alcuüius familiae quae non est omnino viliter nata; unde dignitatem habet ex honestate et ex prole generationis suae.

Deinde subdit, *d uno accidente etc.*, ubi de hac passione de qua tractare intendit dict quattuor: primo, quod erat accidentis: secundo, quod erat accidentis ferox; tertio, quod erat accidentis alium, id est, magnum; quarto, quod vocatur amor. Dicitur autem haec passio accidentis primo, quia non est substantia per se stans, sed est alteri adhaerens sicut subjecto ut appetitus animae, simili modo sicut animae passiones quae sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia. Secundo, dicitur accidentis quia potest advenire et etiam recedere sicut accidentia aliqua. Tertio, dicitur accidentis quia adventit ab extrinsecus. Et licet secundum aliquid possit quis habere dispositionem intrinsecum per quam faciliter incurrat in hanc passionem, ut postea declarabitur, tamen accidentis ipsum principaliter est res extrinsec. Dicitur autem haec passio accidentis ferox ratione intemperantiae quae est in hac passione, ut declarabitur postea. Sed dicitur accidentis magnum ratione effectuum quos inducit in corpus; convertit enim plus et alterat quasi aliae passiones, ut declarabitur in processu cantilenae.

De causa autem quae haec passio vocatur amor ponere non curamus quoniam de nominibus nulla debet esse cura, cum rei essentiam cognoscamus. Nam secundum Philosophum, nomina rebus ad placitum imponuntur. Deinde subdit, *si chi lo nega etc.*, quasi dicat sic: oportet nos loqui de isto accidente ut quicumque negat ipsum esse, quia ignorant quiditatem et essentiam eius, possit veritatem cognoscere de ipso, et credat ipsum esse aliquid.

Deinde subdit: *et al presente conocente chero etc.*, id est, in praesenti materia quero quod homo qui audiet ista sit cognoscens, id est, intelligens, id est, subtilis intellectus.

Deinde subdit: *parchio non spero etc.*, id est, non spero quod bestialis et depress intellectus talem sermonem quem dicam possit intelligere.

Deinde subdit: *che senza natural dimostramento etc.*, id est, sine naturali demonstratione quasi velit dicere quod ea quae dicet extralet ex principiis scientiae naturalis, et non solum extralet ex principiis scientiae naturalis, imo ex principiis scientiae moralis et astrologiae; et ideo auditor huius sermonis debet esse intelligens.

Deinde subdit: *la dove posa, etc.* Quas res proponit dicere de amore: prima, ostenditur in qua parte habet esse amor sicut in subjecto; secunda, quid est creans, id est, generans ipsum in illo subjecto; tertia, quae sit virtus eius, puta ostenditur utrum sit virtus vel procedens ex virtute; quarta, quid potest inducere (29va) amor in corpus, et hoc non est aliud nisi ostendere effectus eius; quinta, suam essentiam, scilicet, quid sit amor; sexta, motus amoris, id est, alterationes diversas quas amor facit; septima, unde causatur complacencia ex qua fit amor, et ex qua homo movetur ad loquendum de amore; octava, utrum amor possit ostendi visibiliter an non. Primam ergo rem tangit cum

1 Cf. p. 163.
2 Cf. p. 169.
3 Cf. p. 167.
4 *Arist., De interpret.,* I, i, 16a20.

II

In quella parte et cetera. Hic prosequitur de his quae proposuit dicere de amore, et in ista instantia vel versus determinat de duobus primis, scilicet, de subgetto amoris et de ipso principio vel causa generante amorem. Primo ergo, ostendit in qua parte habet esse amor. Secundo, quid sit creans vel generans. Secundo ibi. Lo qual da marte viene. Hic igitur vult dicere quod amor habet esse in parte memorialis quoniam impressio speciei rei, ex qua creatur amor, conservatur in memoria et retinetur in ea sicut lumen, procedens ab aliquo corpore luminoso quod lumen infundit, habet recipi et retinere in corpore dyaphane, quod illuminatur quod tamen prius erat obscurum et erat de se privatum lumine. Declaratum est enim in scientia naturali quod lux est actus corporis dyaphani. Et ideo dyaphanum est illud quod de se lucem non habet, est tamen aptum recipere et retinere lucem quae infunditur in corpore luminoso sicut appareat de aere, qui est corpus dyaphanum quod de se lucem non habet; unde ratione huius dicitur corpus obscurum, est tamen aptum recipere lucem a corpore luminoso sicut est corpus solare aut aliius corpus lucens. Similiter declaratum est in scientia naturali quod sicut lumen recipitur in aere, et species rerum coloratarum cum lumine intentionaliter, et non recipitur res ipsa materialis. Lapis enim non est in anima sed species lapidis, ut dicit Philosophus. Et propterea in memoria illius qui amat non retinetur et conservatur res materialis quae amatur, sed species rei intentionaliter, et sicut dyaphanum existens prius obscurum perfectur quando lumine informatur, ita et virtus memorialis b perfectur quando informatur specie quae retinetur et conservatur in ea. Et ideo iste optime dixit quod ita informatur memoria ex specie rei ex qua causatur amor, sicut dyaphanum luce quod de se erat obscurum et imperfectum. Sed debes hic intelligere, ne error quod quando iste dicit quod amor habet esse in parte memorialis quod illud dictum quantum ad speciem rei ex cuius apprehensione causatur amor; species autem illa figitur et conservatur in memoria, sed passio ipsa quae est amor non habet esse proprie in memoria, sed habet esse in appetitu sensitivo sicut in subgetto in quo habent esse passiones animae omnem, sicut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, amor et similia accidentia, sicut declaratum est in scientia moralis et naturalis, et iste ideum ponit etiam.

Deinde cum dicit, Lo quale da marte viene etc. vult auctor ostendere quod amor est res generata vel creata, et ideo dicit, Egli'e creato et a sensato nome, id est, habet nomen sensibile, id est, denotans aliquam rem sensibilem, cum istud nomen amor denotet et significet aliquam passionem nobis sensibilem, quemadmodum quaelibet alia passio sensuali habet proprium nomen, ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia.

Similiter etiam vult hic ostendere quae est res generans vel creans istam passionem, et quia ad generationem alcuibus passionis in anima concurrunt duas res. Una est dispositio naturalis alcuibus corporis; videmus enim quod

b memorialis) materialis.

Arist., De ani., II, viii, 418b10.
Arist., De ani., III, viii, 432a1.

\[162\]

\[ \text{cf. Arist., De ani., II, iii, 414b2–6.} \]
secundum diversas dispositiones naturales corporum homines sunt apti incurrere diversas passiones; quidam vero faciliter incurrunt in iram, quidam in tristitiam, quidam in laetitiam, et sic similiter ex dispositione corporis naturalis quidam sunt apti ut faciliter hanc passionem incurrant amoris (29vb). Alia res concurrat ad causandum aliquam passionem quae est res extrinseca quae suam ymaginem vel speciem causat in virtute sensitiva ad quam cognitionem vel apprehensionem consequitur appetitus talis vel talis, in quo appetitus istae passiones fundantur. Ideo auctor ut complete ostenderet quae est res generans istam passionem, primo ostendit quae est dispositionis naturalis corporis quae reddit hominem aptum ut faciliter istam passionem incurrat. Secundo ostendit quae est res extrinseca ex cuius apprehensione consequitur in appetitu passio amoris. Secunda ibi; *vien da veduta forma*, vel posset incipere ibi, *D'alma costume.*

In prima parte quia dispositionis naturalis per quam aliquis inclinatur ad incurrondam faciliter in aliquam passionem ex principiis proprie nativitatis hominis contrahitur, et inter ista principia nativitatis alciuis praeceptua et principalia sunt corpora celestia, nam ut dicit Phylosophus in *Physicis*, homo hominem generat et sol. Et in *De generatione animalium* dicit quod in spiritu genitivo est natura existens propositio naturalis ordinatio astrorum. Ideo merito iste auctor vult ostendere a quo corpore caelesti concurrente in generatione alciuis, datur haec dispositionis naturalis, per quam aliquis faciliter inclinatur ad incurrondam hanc passionem quae dicitur amor. Hoc autem ostendit in verbo illo quo praemisit cum dixit, *Lo quale da marite viene et fa dimora.* Nam ista passio dicitur procedere a marite isto modo, quoniam astrologi ponunt quod quando in nativitate alciusius mars fuerit in domo veneris, ut in tauro vel in libra, et fuerit significator nativitatis eius, significabit natum fore luxuriosum fornicateo et omnibus veneribus abusivis sceleratum; unde quidam sapiens qui dicitur Aly in *Commento quadripartiti* dicit quod quando in nativitate alciusius venus participat cum marite, dat in amoramentum, fornicateionem, luxuriam et talia similia, quae omnia pertinunt ad ad passionem amoris de quo loquitur auctore in hac cantilena.

Deinde subdit, *d'alma costume* etc., id est, amor de quo dicitur est quod est res creata et generata est mos animae, id est, quaedam passio quae ad necositatem moribus animae, et appellat hic mores animae accidentia quae sunt dictae passiones.

Deinde subdit, *Et di cor voluntate,* id est, passio consequitur voluntatem in appetitu sensitivum qui est in corde. Et ex isto verbo apparat quod iste ponit quod amor, prout est passio animae quemadmodum ira et tristitia sunt etiam quaedam passiones, habet esse in appetitu sensitivo; in virtute autem memoriali habet esse, ut dixi supra, non prout est passio sed ratione speciei rei quae apprehenditur, ad cujus apprehensionem consequitur appetitus talis in quo causatur haec passio. Dixit autem hic auctor quod consequitur appetitum sensitivum qui est in corde. Nam iste loquitur imitans Aristotelis philosophum qui posuit quod appetitus et omnis virtus sensitiva habet esse in corde, sed medici posuerunt quod habet esse in cerebro, quae autem

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9 *voluntate* *Ad. quae in marg.*
opinionum sit vera non est presentis intentionis discutere. Et nota quod istum appetitum vocavit voluntatem, quae videtur intellectui attinere, ut ostenderet quod licet amor fiat in aliquo ex dispositione naturali per quam quis inclinatur ad incurrendum faciliter hanc passionem, tamen fit etiam ex proposito et per electionem quod pertinet ad voluntatem quae est libera et liber arbitrii, cum se habeat indifferenter ad opposita et est simile hic, sicut etiam est in aliis passionibus ut, verbi gratia, de ira; nam (30ra) aliquis licet sit dispositus ex natura ad faciliter incurrendum in iram, tamen per voluntatem potest se retrahere ab ea, et potest etiam in eam incurrere, et simili modo etiam de amore. Et ideo ad denotandum hoc, dixit quod non solum erat mos animae, id est, passio sed etiam erat consequens voluntatem.

Deinde cum dicit, *Vieua da veduta forma* etc., auctor, quia amor, ut dictum est, passio est quaedam animae, et passio causatur in anima ex apprehensione aliquidus rei quam consequitur appetitus, vult ostendere quae est res ex cuius apprehensione consequitur talis appetitus ut in ipso causetur haec passio quae est amor. Et vult dicere quod passio quae est amor causatur ex apprehensione aliquidus formae visibilis quae quidem comprehenditur, ut postea dicit, sub ratione complacentiae; quae complacentia causatur, aut quia videtur sibi forma illius rei pulchra, vel ex gestibus illius formae qui sibi placent quicunque gestus sint illi. Et ideo talis apprehensionis fit ab intellectu ad quem pervenit species illius formae visibilis. Hic enim est ordo in apprehensione humana, sicut declaratum est in scientia naturali, quia primo species rei pervenit ad sensus exteroires, ut ad visum, vel auditum, vel tactum, vel gustum, vel olfatum, deinde ab illis pervenit ad virtutes sensitivas interiores sicut pervenit ad fantasia primordio, deinde pervenit ad cogitativam, et ultimo ad membrorum; ab ipsis autem virtutibus procedit postea ista species ad virtutem nobiliorem, quae virtus in homine est adhucquies inter virtutes adprehensivas, et ulla est virtus possibilis, quae dicitur possibilis ad differentiam intellectus agentis qui etiam est in nobis, sed quia intellectus agens non est de virtutibus apprehensivis de quibus loquimur hic. Sed intellectus possibilis est illi qui recipit species rei, et recipiendo speciem rei cognoscit rem. Ideo dicit quod pervenit ista forma primo apprehensa a visu usque ad intellectum possebilem, et non amplius procedit ad aliam virtutem, sed cognoscit quia non est alia versus apprehensiva quae sit in nobis alior et nobilior quam sit ista; et hoc est quod vult dicere istic auctor cum subdit, *che prende nel possibile intellecto*, *come in subiecto loco* etc. id est, qui est sicut subiectum et locum specierum rerum apprehensurarum, et istud concordat cun verbo Phylosophi posito in tertio *De anima*, qui dicit quod *anima est locus specierum* sed non tota, *sed pars eius intellectio*, et subdit, *et dimoranza*, id est, et species istius rei moratur quia, scilicet, non procedit ad aliam virtutem neque ad alium locum.

Sed hic oportet duo notare; primum est quod licet auctor dicat quod ista passio quae est amor causatur ex apprehensione formae quae primo videtur per visum, non intelligit hic solum sensus visus, imo intelligit omnem alium sensum exteriorem. Nam res quae amatur ab aliquo ut, verbi gratia, est mulier, non solum placet ex qua complacentia procedit amor, ut postea dicit, ratione eius quod amans comprehendet quod est pulchra ratione coloris, et figurae eius et quantitatis et finium. Imo etiam aliquaendo placet ratione eius quod comprehenditur per sensus alios, verbi gratia, ratione

14 Cf. p. 162.
15 Cf. p. 172.
16 Arist., *De ani.* III, iv, 429a27.
17 Cf. p. 172.
loquelae cius, et aliorum gestuum qui comprehenduntur per alios sensus. Sed tamen quia ut in pluribus haec complacentia ex qua causatur in appetitu passio amoris primo venit ex forma quae comprehenditur per visum, hinc est quod auctor solum expressit de sensu visus. Secundo, oportet notare quod illud quod hic auctor dicit de intellectu possibilo non ob(30rb) aliud dicit nisi ut ostendat quod apprehensio quae cadit in amatore, secundum quod hic est sermo de amore apud homines, convenit non est pure sensitiva, imo etiam intercident apprehensio intellectiva, et propterea in animalibus brutis cadit talis modus amoris et amicitiae de quo non est haec presens intentio.

Deinde cum dicit, *En quella parte mai non a posanza* etc., removet auctor quasi errorem vel dubium quod ex dictis posset surgere. Quia enim dixerat quod ista forma visibilis, ex cuius apprehensione causatur amor, pervenit usque ad intellectum possibilem, potuisset aliquis credere quod per haec verba quod ipse voluisset quod passio amoris haberet esse in intellectu possibili; quod non est verum. Et ideo istum errorem vel dubium removet sic dicens, *En quella parte* etc., hoc est dicere quod, licet sit dictum quod causans amorem sit species aliquis formae visibilis quae postea apprehenditur ab intellectu possibili, tamen passio amoris non habet esse in intellectu possibili; quia intellectus possibilis non est virtus particularis corporae, quia intellectus possibilis non est forma quae proveniat ex qualitatis elementorum per admissionem eorum sicut proveniunt aliae formae corporae qua dicuntur formae elementales quia descendunt ab elementis et qualitatis eorum. Et hoc est quod iste vult dicere, quando dicit, *perche da qualitate non discede*. Imo intellectus est quaedam forma a particularitate et corruptibilitate, quae corruptibilitas procedit a qualitatis elementalis, et ideo in tali forma quae est intellectus possibilis primo et proprii recipitur, ad quod est universale, et incorruptibile. Et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, *Risplende in se perpetuale effectum*, id est, operatio quae est sicut effectus animae respectu alicuius quod est perpetuum et incorruptibile, sicut et iste intellectus est incorruptibilis; et propterea, quia intellectus non est virtus corporae particularis sicut sunt virtutes sensitivae, dum amor, de quo loquimur hic, sit quaedam passio corporalis et particularis, talis passio non habet esse in intellectu, cum in eo etiam non sint aliae passiones corporales ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, et similia. Operatio intellectus est pura consideratio et apprehensio spiritualis; et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, *Non a dilecto*, id est, non habet delectationes corporales quae delectationes quae aliquando sunt in passione amoris, et propter hoc intendit quod in se nullam aliab habet passionem qualis est ira, tristitia, et similia. Dixi autem quod nullam habet delectationem corporalem, quia delectationem spiritualem quae delectatio sequitur ad suam propriam operationem, quando est perfecta, bene habet. Unde Aristoteles decimo *Ethycorum* dixit quod *philosophya affert numerables delectiones puritate et sinceritate*. Talem ergo delectationem bene habet intellectus, sed delectationem quae est de ipsis passionibus animae sensualibus inter quas passiones connumeratur ira, tristitia, gaudium, amor, et similia non habet, sed operatio intellectus est pura consideratio et apprehensio spiritualis; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *ma consideranza*, id est, quod operatio intellectus est considerare et cognoscere.

Deinde subdit; *si che non tuo largire simiglianza*, id est, et propterea non potest illuc, id est, ad intellectum (30va) pervenire similis passio, sicut est amor vel aliae passiones corporae, et ideo Philosophus dixit primo *De anima*, qui 

19 Arist., *De ani.*, I. iv, 408b13.
dixit animam gaudere vel tristari simile est ac si aliquis dixerit eam texere vel haedificare, quasi dicat sicut illud ultimum non dicimus; ita etiam non debimus dicere quod proprie anima tristetur vel gaudeat, et refert suum sermonem ad animam loquendo de ipsa pro parte eius intellectiva.

III

Non e vertute etc. In isto versu vel stantia prosequitur de aliis duobus quae praeponit, videlicet, de virtute amoris et de potentia amoris. Et dviditur in duas partes. Nam primo determinat de virtute amoris; secundo determinat de eius potentia; secunda pars incipit ibi, Di sua potencia segue spesso morte. In prima parte vult dicere quod amor non est virtus sed est procedens ex operatione alicuius virtutis, gratia cuius est notandum quod in anima sunt tria. Nam in ipsa sunt virtutes quae sunt potentiae naturales eius, quae potentiae sunt multae, quarum omnium radix est anima, sicut sunt intellectus, voluntas, fantasia, extimativa, memoria, et virtus sensitiva communis et particularis, et appetitus sensitivus, et est etiam virtus vegetativa quae nutrit corpus. Sunt etiam in ipsa virtutes quae dicuntur intellectuales, ut sunt sapientia, intellectus, et scientia, arts, et prudentia. Et quaedam sunt virtutes morales, ut sunt temperantia, liberalitas, fortitudo, magnanimitas, et similia. Sunt etiam in ipsa passions circa quas passions consistunt virtutes morales quae animam in talibus passiones rectificat, ut sunt ira, tristitia, timor, audacia, amor et similia. Modo amor non est virtus quae sit de potentis naturalibus animae, neque est virtus quae est habitus intellectualis vel moralis, sed amor est passio quaedam appetitus quemadmodum ira vel tristitia non sunt virtutes sed sunt passions appetitus. Licet tamen amor non sit virtus, procedit a virtute, et hoc est quod iste subdit, Ma da quella viemme. Dicitur autem amor procedere a virtute, non prout virtus est habitus intellectualis, quia dictum est prius quod amor habet esse in intellectu possibili, neque etiam procedit a virtute quae est habitus moralis, quia talis virtus est in appetitu ut regulatur a ratione. In tali autem appetitu in quo est amor, de quo loquitur hic, non est ratio regulata, ut ipse statim dicet, et ideo dicitur procedere a virtute, prout virtus summitur pro aliqua potentia animae, quoniam procedit ex operatione virtutis sensitivae quae est in nobis. Nam amor est passio quaedam appetitus qui appetitus consequitur formam rei apprehensae per sensum primo exteriorum, et deinde per virtutes sensitivas interiores, ut dictum est supra. Unde in amore concurrat duplex passio sensitiva, scilicet, cognoscitiva et appetitiva, quia omnis appetitus qui est in nobis insequitur cognitionem, et licet in amore concurrat operatio potentiae cognoscitivae sensitivae, tamen amor non habet esse proprie, ut in subiecto, in potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva, sed habet esse in appetitiva sicut omnis alia passio, et hoc ideo est quia in cognitione sola est motus rerum ad animam, sed in appetitu est motus animae ad res. Cognoscimus enim res, prout sunt in nobis, sed appetimus eas, prout sunt in seipsis, et ideo Philosophus dicebat septimo Methaphysicae, quod bonum et malum, quae sunt objecta appetitus, sunt in rebus, sed rerum et falsum, quae sunt objecta intellectus, sunt in anima, et quia secundum passiones trahimur passimur (30vb) ad cognitionem rei agentis in ipsam. Ideo licet in passionibus concurrat operatio potentiae sensitivae cognoscitivae ex qua consequitur talis appe-

\[^{d}\text{passio)}\text{potentia.}\]
\[^{20}\text{Cf. p. 164.}\]
\[^{21}\text{Arist., Metaphys., VI. iii, 1027b26.}\]
titus in nobis, amor tamen, qui est passio, non habet esse, ut in subiecto, in potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva, sed habet esse in appetitu, quando appetitus trahitur ad cognitiones rerum quas appetit. Et quia hic appetitus, in quo habet esse haec passio, est appetitus sensitivus et non est appetitus intellectivus, quia in intellectu non habet esse haec passio, ut dixi prius, et licet, ut dixi prius, in amore de quo loquimur hic concurrat aliqua apprehensio intellectus, tamen passio amoris non habet esse in intellectu, et ideo appetitus, in quo habet esse amor, non est intellectivus sed sensitivus. Similiter autem quia hic appetitus sensitivus non est regulatus a ratione, imo est efferens et divertens a ratione, ideo amor procedit a virtute quae non est rationabilis sed sensibilis, et hoc est quod vult dicere iste auctor cum subdit, che perfectione che si pon tale, non rationale ma che sente dico.

Deinde cum dicit, fiur di salute guidicar mantiene etc., vult auctor probare quod appetitus in quo habet esse amor est appetitus qui non est regulatus a ratione, quia hic appetitus non insequitur iudicium rationis rectum et salvum. Nam hic appetitus consequitur iudicium in quo iudicatur aliquid amicum et diligendum, quod tamen non est ita, et ideo dicit auctor, Fiur di salute, id est, haec passio ponit iudicium hominis extra salutem, id est, extra salutem quia iudicium quod est in amore non est iudicium sanum, imo est corruptum. Iudicat enim habens amorem quod iudicandum non est, et illud quod dictum est declarat cum subdit, che la'ntentione per region vale, quasi dicat quod intentio iudicandi tunc valet, id est, tunc est recta, quando est cum ratione, scilicet, bona. Nunc autem ille in quo est amor discernit male aliquid esse amicum, id est, amabile quod tamen secundum rectam rationem non est amabile, et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum subdit, discerne male, in cui e vinto amico.

Deinde cum dicit, Di sua potentia segue spesso morte, vult auctor ostendere quae sit potentia amoris, id est, quid potest amor inducere in corpus, et intelligit hic potentiam quae est respectu effectus intensionis quem amor potest in corpus inducere. Nam adeo potest haec passio corpus alterare quod multotiens inducit mortem quae est ultimum terribilium, sic etiam aliquando accidit mors in vehementibus aliis passionibus animae, et hoc est quod primo proponit hic auctor cum dicit, Di sua potenza etc. Secundum quem autem modum amor inducit mortem declarat auctor cum dicit et subdit, Se forte la vertu fosse impedita, quasi dicat quod amor tunc interficit quando est adeo vehemens quod propter ipsum impedimentur opera virtutis vegetativa vel virtutis vitalis quae conservat vitam et operationes eius in corpore humano. Videmus ad sensum corpora illorum, in quibus est amor adeo vehemens et non consecutur neque adimplent eorum desiderium, arcieri et desiccari et tandem consumi et mori, et istud videmus non solum in amore accidere, imo etiam hoc accidit in omni vehementi cogitatione et solicitude animae. Impediuntur enim in talibus animae operationes virtutis vitalis quae dictur iuvare contrarium viam, id est, quae conservat vitam quae est contraria mortis, et hoc est quod iste vult dicere cum dicit, Se forte, id est, fortasse, La vertu fosse impedita; la quale a vita alla contraria via.

Subdit autem postea auctor iste, Non perche opposta natural sia.(31ra) In quo verbo vult ostendere secundum quem modum haec passio impedit opera virtutis vitalis propter quod impedimentum inducit mortem, et vult dicere quod amor non impedit opera virtutis vitalis neque inducit mortem quia proprie amor sit aliquid contrarium naturale ipsi vitae quemadmodum in-

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ducunt mortem aliae aegritudines, verbi gratia, sicut est malaegri naturalis complexionis. Ista enim inducit mortem quia est contraria bonae complexioni in qua stat vita. Amor autem non est res quae sit proprie contrarium naturale ipsa vitae, sed amor inducit mortem in quantum in ipso amore homo torquetur, id est, remotetur a bono suo perfecto, et a bona sua, et a perfecta sua naturali dispositione, et hoc est quod vult dicere auctor cum dicit, Non perche opposito natural sia; ma quanto che da buon perfecto torte. Nam in amore quando est valde vehemens aliquis remotetur a bona sua dispositione naturali, et tendit versus melanconicam sicut ponunt medicinae auctores, et hoc est propter vehementem cogitationem quae est in ipso, et sollicitudinem circa rem quam amat. Nam ex hoc accidit quod virtus distrahit tota quasi ab operibus nutrimenti eo quod ipse actus unius virtutis intenditur valde, ac tur aliarum virtutum valde remittitur. Et quia in amore intenditur valde actus animatae virtutis, ideo diminuitur et debilitatur valde operatio nutrimenti propter quod corpus decidit et remotetur a sua bona dispositione naturali, et tendit in dispositionem malam et aegram propter quod ultimo corpus consumit tur et mortitur. Sic ergo amor interficit non quia sit aliquid contrarium directe naturale sed quia in ipso distrahit virtus naturalis ab operationibus propius nu(31rb)trimenti. Subdit autem postea, per sorte non pio dire huom ch'aggiua vita, quasi velit dicere, neque a sorte, id est, neque a casu accidit quod amor inducat mortem sicut aliquid dicere; quia casus non est res stabilis et firma, cum sit causa sui effectus non ut in pluribus sed in paucioribus, et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, che stabilita non a sig- noria. Modo videmus ad sensum quod amor hoc multotiens facit, scilicet, quod quando aliquid vehementer perseverat in ipso, et videmus etiam quod quando quis obliviscitur eius, ex oblivione sola redit ille homo ad dispositionem suam naturalem, et propter sua medici ponunt quod maxima cura istius passionis, scilicet, amoris est ut homo distrahit a cogitatione illius quod amat, et obliviscatur eius. Et propter ea ex hoc amor interficit multotien, hoc est signum quod amor non interficit a casu et quomodocumque, imo interficit per se. Sed ex hoc quod ex sola sui oblivione quis ab hac passione curatur, et redit ad dispositionem naturalem absque alia alteratione et curatione facta per medicinas exteiores, est signum quod amor interficit non quia sit aliquid contrarium naturale, sed interficit per alium modum, qui dictus est, et hoc est quod vult dicere ultimo a simil pio valere quando huomo oblia, id est, obblivi- citur, hoc est dicere, eius sola salet ad curationem et notionem impedimenti et mortis sicut ipsis primo valet ad inducendum mortem. Nam hoc non faciunt ut contrarium naturale aliquid sed faciunt modo dicto.

IV

(31rc), L'esseretc. In isto versu vel stantia prosequitur auctor de alius duobus quae propositus dicere de amore, scilicet, de essentia amoris, et de motibus quos amor inducit in corpus. Primo ergo, dicit in quo consistat quiditas et essentia amoris. Secundo, ostendit qui sint motus eius, id est, quas altera- tiones inducit diversas in corpus; secunda pars incipit ibi, Move cangiando co- tore. In prima ergo parte cum dicit, l'esser, intendit dicere quasi dicat quod

essentia amoris in hoc consistat quod est passio quaedam in qua appetitus est cum vehementi desiderio circa rem quam amat, ut, scilicet, coniungatur rei amatae, et hoc est quod vult dicere ista cum dicit, Quando't volere e tanto ch'oltra misura di natura torna, quasi velit dicere quod in amore est tantum desiderium in appetitu ad hoc ut coniungatur rei amatae quod est ultra mensuram, id est, terminum naturalem; nam istud desiderium in amore adeo est magnum quod quasi videtur esse infinitum, unde non habet terminum, sicut naturalia sunt mensurata et terminata. Causa autem quare in amore est tantum desiderium in appetitu ut coniungatur rei amatae est quia res amata est sicut finis illius qui amat, et sicut propria perfectio appetitus in quo est passio amoris; nunc autem quaelibet res appetit coniungi suo fini in infinitum. Unde et Philo-, phus etiam primo Pollyticæ 28 dixit quod quaelibet ars et cognitio appetit suum (31rd) finem in infinitum intelligere. Tamen hic, quod non proprie dicitur appetitus infinitus quia non habet terminum ultra quem possit augeri appetitus respectu finis proprii, et propterea referens se ad illum intellectum, dixit hic auctor quod amor est quaedam passio consistens in appetitu in quo est desiderium ut coniungatur rei amatae tantum quod est ultra mensuram termini naturalis, quoniam in eo est quasi infinitum desiderium, et cum isto appetitu in quo est haec passio est etiam sollicitudo cogitationis continuativa circa rem amatat; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum subdit, poi non s'adorna di reposo mai, et istud dictum de diffinitione essentiae amoris concordat cum eo quod auctor [medicinae] dicit de amore diffinendo ipsum. Dicit enim amor est sollicitudo melanconica, similis melanconiae in qua homo iam sibi inducit incitationem cogitationis super pulchritudinem quaramundam formarum et figurarum quae insunt ei; deinde adiuvavit ipsum ad illud desiderium eius, et non consequitur. 27 Et Aly Abbas dixit, quod amor est sollicitudo animae in illud quod amatur et cogitationis in ipsum perseverantia. 28

Sed notandum gratia perfectioris intellectus eorum quae hic dicuntur de amore, quod amor accipitur duplex: uno modo communiter et largo secundum quod est quaedam passio per quam inclinatur et movetur appetitus in aliquam rem quae videtur sibi bona propter complacentiam eius ratione cuiuscumque (31va) actus illius rei, et isto modo non accipitur hic. Nam isto modo amor est circa multa de quo amore non est presens intcntio, et de omnibus amicis adinvicem est hoc modo amor quia amici amant se adinvicem, et tamen non amant se amore de quo est haec presens intentio. Et potest etiam esse amor in uno respectu alterius, et tamen non erit amicitia inter eos; omnis enim qui est amicus alii cum amatur ab illo, sed non omnis qui amat aliquem amatur ab illo, et ideo licet omnis amicitia sit cum amore, non tamen omnis amor est cum amicitia. Sed alio modo accipitur amor specialiter proprius pro passione quamam quae iam adeo est in appetitu vehementer impressa ut difficulter removeatur ab ipso, quae passio est propriis circa actus venereos in quibus actibus est furiositas et intemperantia, cum in illos actus homo inclinetur ex appetitu naturali. Et hoc modo intelligitur hic de ista passione quae dicitur amor, quae passio propter vehementem eius impressionem desiderium eius, et non consequitur."

28 Arist., Pol., I, iii, 1257b25.
28 Cf. Haly filius Abbas, Liber totius medicinae . . . , Theorie IX, cap. viii (Lugduni, 1523, p. 104vb): "Amor autem est anime sollicitudo in id quod amatur et cogitationis in id ipsum perseverantia."
iam alterat corpus alteratione non naturali, unde iam quod in ipsum dicatur aegrotare eroticos,\textsuperscript{1} quod et auctores medicinae qui de aegritudinibus et de eorum curis determinant, tractant de hac passione, et modum etiam cura-
tionis suae, et vocatur talis passio eres \textit{et} ab auctoribus medicinae.

Deinde cum dicit, \textit{move cangiando colore}, loquitur auctor de motibus ipsius amoris, id est, de diversis alterationibus quas haec passio induct in corpus, et vult dicere quod in hac passione corpus alteratur diversis et contrariis altera-
tionibus, quod quia non accidit in alii passionibus animae ut in ira, in tristitia, in timore, et in similibus. Nam in amare corpus alteratur nunc ad is-
tum colorem, nunc ad illum qui est oppositus; similiter etiam alterat nunc ad risum, nunc ad planctum; et hoc est quod vult dicere, post cum dicit, \textit{Muove cangiando color, riso in pianto.} Similiter etiam in amore corpus nunc alteratur ad gaudium et spem, nunc ad timorem et desperationem; et hoc est quod vult dicere, cum dicit, \textit{Et la figura con paura storna}, hoc est dicere, aliquando ponit figuram hominis simillem figuraae hominis gaudentis. Causa autem istarum diversarum alterationum quas amor induct in corpus est propter diversita-
tem ymaginationum quae representatthur sibi de re quam amat. Nunc autem representa-
tatur sibi aliquid de ipsa propter quod gaudet, laetatur et sperat, nunc vero representa-
tatur sibi aliquid propter quod timet, tristatur et desperat, et securundum hoc accidit quod in ipsa diversimode movetur color naturalis et spiritus, quia nunc movetur ad intra, nunc ad extra, nunc partim ad intra, nunc partim ad extra, securundum quod diversimode movetur in diversis pas-
asionibus animae, ex cuius motu diverso accidit diversificatio coloris corporis
ita ut nunc sit unius coloris, nunc alterius, et nunc assimiletur figura eius
figurae timentis, nunc gaudentis, nunc ridentis, nunc plorantis. Et ideo sub-
dit auctor, \textit{Poco sogiorna}, id est, parum quiescit in cogitationibus suis talis
homo, quando est in cogitatione alciuuis rei subito pervenit ad ipsum species
rei quam desiderat et absconditur a cogitationibus illius rei primae, et secur-
dum diversitatem ymaginationum quas habet dare quam(31vb) desiderat
movetur subito et de uno modo passionis in aliqu, et parum in una passione
quiescit, et istud declarabit in verbo illo quod subdit, \textit{La nuova qualita.}

Deinde cum dicit, \textit{Ancora di lui vedrai etc.,} intermiscet auctor in quibus man-
eriebus hominum quantum ad mores civiles frequentius accidit haec passio, et
vult dicere quod haec passio amoris ut plurimum reperitur in hominibus
nobilibus; et appellant hic nobiles homines illos qui sunt magni et potentess, vel
ex progenie eorum, vel ex divitiis multis, vel ex virtute cum in hominibus
enim istics frequentius reperitur haec passio amoris, et causa huius est multi-
plex. Una causa est et ista videtur esse potissima inter alios, quia homines alii
populares sunt plus dediti cogitationibus quae versantur circa opera civilia
quaee necessaria sunt in vita; nam quidam dant se uni artificio, quidam vero
alteri, et ideo distrahnunt multum a tali cogitatione et solicitudine quae est
in hac passione; homines vero nobiles et potentess, quia circa tali opera
artium non vacant, plus sunt apti incurrere tales cogitationes quae circa haec
passionem versantur. Secunda causa est quia licet in amore quando est mul-

\textsuperscript{1} eroticos potiot. But I know of no such word, and Rev. J. T. Muckle has kindly offered the emendation with the following explanation: "my con-
tecture is that potiot is a corruption of the Gk. \textit{kopronos} transilterated into Latin. The \textit{c} has been lost under the influence of the final \textit{e} in aegrotare; the \textit{p} is a wrong transliteration of the Gk. \textit{pe}; \textit{v} is the same as \textit{es}; \textit{c} may easily be an abbreviation for \textit{oc} in Grecil, the final \textit{c} being mistaken for a \textit{t}. This would make the Gk. \textit{kopronos written in} abbr. \textit{kopros.} " The word \textit{kopronos} is used to denote an erotic pathological condition—a form of heroos; cf. J. L. Loues, "The Loveress Malady of Heroes," in Modern Philology, XI, (1913-1914), pp. 518, 520.

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tum impressus appetitus non sit liber, imo est servus et ducitur secundum appetum huius passionis. Tamen in principio quando incipit haec passio in impetui adhuc appetitus est quasi liber ita ut possit amare et possit desistere ab amore, et ideo initium huius passionis incipit multotiens ex proposito. Nunc autem omnis homo citius proponit rem appeterere quam facile potest acquirere; quod enim acquiri non potest aut cum difficultate magna acquiritur homo non sic appetit. Nunc autem homines nobiles et potentess faciliss possunt acquirere rem amatam et ei coniungi quam homines populares et viles. Nam habent divitias et virtutes per quas citius hoc acquirunt quam illi qui ea non habent. Tertia causa est quia tunc magis perficitur et imprimitur in amante quando cognoscit quod redamatur a re amata. Nunc autem facilius movetur animus rei amatae ad readmandum aliquem nobilium quam aliquem vilem, quoniam in nobili sunt gestus et mores priores placibilibres ex quibus movetur quis ad amandam aliquem quam sint in aliis, et proptererea optime dixit iste quo haec passio plus inventitur in istis quam in aliis.

Deinde cum dicit, La nuova qualita muove sospiri etc., declarat auctor illud quod prius dixit in verbo illo, Poco soggiorna. Vult enim ostendere quae est causa quae homo in quo est haec passio parum quiescit in aliqua passione, puta vel in gaudio, vel in tristitia, vel in timore; et parum etiam quiescit in aliqua cogitatione diversa a cogitatione rei quae amatur, et cum hoc etiam ostendit causam cuiusdam accidentis quod saepe accidit in hac passione, quod accidentis est suspirium, nam amantes multotiens suspirant. Et vult dicere quod quando in amante renovatur in apprehensione sua species rei amatae quae conservatur in memoria, tunc ista species, renovata in apprehensione, movet ipsum ad suspiria sicut videmus ad sensum, quod quando amans aliquid agit vel cogitat, et subito ad eum perveniat cogitatio rei amatae, tunc suspiria emittit, et proptererea quia in tali subita renovazione apprehensionis generatur quaedam angustia circa cor propter diversum motum subitum quic accidit in calore et spiritu eius, qui quidem(32ra) motus diversus est causa suspiriorum; et istud vult dicere cum dicit, La nuova qualita muove sospiri. Et haec est causa quia talis homo non potest firmiter circa reas alias cogitare, nec etiam aliquid aliud potest firmiter ymaginari, quia cum homo qui est in perfecto amore est in cogitazione alterius rei, subito quasi venit sibi in apprehensione species rei quam diligit; et hoc accidit quia species rei quam amat in memoria eius, licet sit in potentia, quando de ea non cogitat, tamen est in potentia multum propinquae actui. Unde ex modica alteratione accidit quod talis species fiat in actu et tunc circa ipsum cogitat, et ideo disrupitur et absconditur species prima et apprehensione prima; et hoc est quod vult dicere iste cum dicit, et vuol ch’uom mire non fermato loco, id est, et facit haec passio ut homo non firmiter possit cogitare in aliquo. Destando si ella, id est, excitata species rei quae amatur quae erat conservata in memoria. La qual manda fuoco, id est, quae species facit inflammationem, id est, motum inflammativum spiritu et calido naturali; tamen ex motu isto provenit motus, ad virtutem cogitativam, propter quod cogitatur necessario homo cogitare circa ipsam; et ideo subdit ymaginari non ypuote huom che nel pruova, aliter, che il pruova, et melius. Et ideo homo qui habet experienciam talis passionis non potest aliquid firmiter ymaginari quod sit aliud ab ymagine rei quae amatur; et quia non potest firmiter aliquid aliud ymaginari, ideo nec potest circa alium rem cogitare cum virtus ymaginativa deserviat cogitativae repre-

b rei) re.
sentando sibi ymaginationem rei circa quam virtus cogitativa cogitat et iudicat.

Deinde cum dicit, *et non si muova perche allui si tiri*, intermiscet auctor quod-dam verbum in quo vult quasi tibi consulere circa hanc passionem amoris, et vult dicere quod aliquis non moveatur ad adhaerendum isti passioni quae est amor, quoniam amor, cum est bene impressus et est in suo fervore animus amantis, in totum est factus servilis, ita quod quasi nulla libertas ei remanet. Et ideo dicit quod nullus adhaereat ei quia credat in tali passione solatium vel gaudium invenire, quoniam, ut dictum est prius, in tali aliquando accidit multa angustia et multa tristitia et multus timor; et hoc intendit cum subdit, *et non sigiri pettrowari gioco*. Neque etiam aliquis adhaereat ei quia credat in ipso invenire sapientiam multam vel paucam, quia in ipso nulla est sapientia, neque discretio, imo potius, quasi ulio, ille qui amat, cum bene est in fervore ipsius, devenit in fatuitatem et inspientiam, et ideo dictum est supra auctoritate auctoris quo haec passio est solicitudo melanconica similis melancholiae; et hoc intendit cum subdit, *ne certamente gran sauer ne poco*, et in hoc vult etiam auctor dicere quod nulla astutia atque prudentia valet quando animus est vehementer passionatus hac passione quoniam in totum quasi libertatem perdit, et fit servilis in cogitationibus in quibus cogitur de re amata. Et ideo optime consult iste quod nullus debet moveri ad hoc ut isti passioni adhaerat, ut in ipsa nulla sit utilitas neque solatii neque sapientiae et virtutis, gratia enim istorum duorum maxime moventur homines ad aliquid operandum, et ideo merito isti duobus eos ostendit privari passione amoris.

V

(32rb) *Di simil tragge* etc. In isto versu vel stantia tractat auctor de aliis ulti-mis que proponit dicere de amore. Et primo ostendit unde causatur complacentia ex qua aliquis movetur ad amandum. Secundo ostendit utrum amor sit res apprehensa per visum an non; secunda ibi, *Et non si puo cognoscer per lo viso*. Prima pars dividitur in duo, quia prima facit quod dictum est, secundo, intermiscet quandam aliam proprietatem de qua non dixerat quae consequitur hanc passionem; secunda ibi, *Certo non puo coert ostare*.

In prima parte vult dicere quod species rei visibilis, ex cuius comprehensi-ione in appetitu alcuimus causatur amor, comprehenditur sub similis et convenientis et proportionalis, et talis comprehensio sic facta sub ratione similis et convenientis est quae facit rem quae comprehenditur esse placibilem alcuium, et ex hoc in appetitu illius causatur amor illius rei; nichil enim displicet alcuium, nisi in quantum comprehenditur sub ratione dissimilitudinis et dis-convenientiae. Ex hoc enim movetur quis ad odium alcuium rei, sicut propter simulidentinem et convenientiam movetur ad amorem illius. Causatur ergo complacentia propter quam movetur alcuus ad amandum rem aliquam quia res ista comprehenditur sub ratione similis et convenientis; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, *Di simil tragge complexion lo sguaro, che fa parere lo piacerne*. Et signanter dicit auctor che fa parere, quia illud licet videatur illi qui amat esse placibile et propter hoc amandum, tamen secundum rei veritatem et secundum iudicium regulatum a ratione non est ita, sicut multotiens alcuium videtur aliquid esse bonum, non tamen simpliciter in rei veritate est bonum. Deinde cum dicit *certo non puo coertto stare* etc., intermiscet quandam aliam proprietatem quae est in hac passione et reddit etiam causam eius. Et vult dicere quod amans qui habet amorem in suo fervore non potest celare pas-

<sup>25</sup> Cf. p. 170.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. note 24.
 OTTO BIRD

sionem suam, quoniam talis homo non potest desistere quin loquatur de ipso, et quin etiam loquatur de re quam amat, et quin etiam faciat gestus et mores hominis amantis; et hoc intendit primo cum dicit, *Certo non puo coverti stare, quando e si giunto, id est, quando et ita vehementer impressus. Quae autem sit causa quare iste, in quo est haec passio, ipsam non potest bene celare, auctor subdit, cum dicit, *non gia selvaggi la belta suo dardo, quasi dicat la belta, id est, res, quae videtur aliqui pulchra propter quam pulchritudinem quae sic sibi apparat esse movetur ad amandum ipsam, non habet dardum silvestrem, id est, pigrum et debilem. Appellat autem iste auctor dardum talis rei quae hanc passionem facit stimulum eius in movendo animum amantis. Nam res amata inprimis hanc passionem adeo stimulat animum, ut propter stimulum eius cogatur ad loquendum et ad faciendum gestus propter quos non bene talis suam passionem celare potest, imo adeo aliquando stimulat animum quod in loquendo et in monstrando suam passionem nichil timet; et dato quod aliquando incurrat magnum pericum, secundum quod ad sensum multotiens videmus, quod talis homo, loquendo de amore talis dominicae vel talis, interficitur ab alis, et tamen talis in quo adeo animus stimulatur nichil de tali periculo et timore considerat ut sibi praevente. Et hoc est quod vult dicere iste auctor cum subdit, *che tal volore per temere e sperto, id est, talis appetitus est probatus in experientia per timorem quia, scilicet, ut dictum est, non considerat timorem periculii qui sibi(32va) potest iminere, imo celando passionem suam. Et causam istius, auctor subdit cum dicit *consegue morto spirito ch'e punto, id est, et merito hoc consequitur, scilicet, quod amans non potest celare passionem suam, et quod etiam non curat de timore periculii quod sibi supervenire potest, quoniam spiritus qui est organus animae preventus, id est, commotus a specie rei amata ymaginata et apprehensa, necessario est causa ut homo moveat linguam, et loquatur, et gestus etiam faciat in quibus manifestet passionem quae causatur ex ipso ex qua amat, quoniam declaratum est in scientia naturali quod motus causatur in nosis ex alteratione facta in spiritu a speciebus ymaginatis et fortiter apprehensis.

Deinde cum dicit, *Et non si tuo cognoscer per lo vise, loquitur auctor de ultimo verbo quo proponit dicere de amore; vult enim ostendere utrum amor possit per visum cognosci et comprehendi. Et haec pars dividitur in duo, quia primo manifestat hoc, secundo intermiscet quamdam aliam proprietatem de qua nondum dicit, quae consequitur hanc passionem; secunda ibi, *Fuor d’ogni fraude. In prima parte vult dicere quod amor non est res quae possit cognoscere per visum quemadmodum cognoscitur color albus, vel alius color; nam circa tale objectum cadit potentia visiva, scilicet, circa colorum. Nunc autem amor est circa accidentis alius quam sit color; et ideo non est res apprehensa per visum. Et hoc vult dicere cum dicit, *Et non si tuo cognoscer per lo vise, compreso bianco in tale obietto cade, et istud verbum probat quod amor non possit comprehendi per visum, prout amor est passio in amante. Sed cum subdit, et *chi bene aude forma non si vede, vult ostendere et probare quod amor non possit comprehendi per visum ratione rei amatae, quia per visum non potest cognosci quod illa est res amata; nam forte alicii videretur, quod amor solum esset res quae haberet pulchritudinem coloris et figurae et talium quae comprehenduntur per visum. Modo auctor vult ostendere hoc non esse verum, et ideo dicit, *Et chi bene aude, id est, et quicquum bene intelligit, et cognoscit forma, scilicet, talis qualis est amor, non videtur, scilicet, ratione rei amatae; quoniam vult totum amor procedat a re quae est extra colorem, scilicet, pulchrum, et quae est divisa et absissa ab omni pulchritu-
dine, et est res obscura secundum medium, id est, est turpis secundum aliquid partem sui et aliando ex toto est auferre omnem lucem, id est, extra omnem pulchritudinem. Videmus ad sensum multotiens quod aliqua res amatur ab aliquo in qua secundum rei veritatem, nulla est decorosisitas, neque pulchritudo, licet ita videatur illi qui diligat, propter quod per visum non potest discerni amor, respectu rei circa quam versatur amor, ita ut dicamus quod circa illam rem versetur amor quae habet pulchritudinem quoniam multotiens versatur circa rem contrariam rei pulchrae; et hoc est quod vult dicere cum dicit, per che li mena che da lui procede, et fuori di colore esser diviso, absceso mezo obscuro, luce raude.

Deinde cum dicit, Fuor d'ogni fraude dice etc., intermiscet quandam (32vb) aliam proprietatem quae est in hac passione de qua non dixerat, et vult quod, quando amor est perfecte in aliquo, est extra omnem fraudem ad rem amatam quia est cum perfecta fidelitate absque fraude in omnibus quibus credit et potest complacere rei amatae; quoniam quando ille qui diligat habet appetitum defraudendi rem amatam, tunc non est amor in ipso perfectus. Et propterea nos videmus quod illi in quibus est amor valde incensus, dato quod coniungantur rei amatae, tamen si crederent displicere rei amatae, non attentarent coniungi rei amatae, neque attentarent violentiam aliquid sibi ingerere; et hoc intendit primo cum dicit, fuor dogni fraude che dice degna in fede.

Deinde postea cum subdit, Che sola di costui nascie merzede, vult auctor redere causam predictorum, scilicet, quare est quod amans omnem fidelitatem gerit circa rem amatam, et nullam habet fraudem circa ipsam, quoniam ex ipsa passione sola inter alias passiones animae oritur misericordia, scilicet, respectu rei amatae, quoniam amans qui est vehementer afflicitus ista passione semper est in appetitu et in affectione ut res amata misericordiam habeat erga ipsum. Secundum enim quod apparat per Aristotelem secundo Rectoriae, misericordia est tristari et compatii de malo alterius, quoniam illud malum habet ille indigne. Nunc autem dictum est prius quod in hac passione amoris est multa tristitia et multa angustia quae angustia et tristitia oriuntur ex hoc quod amans non coniungituri rei amatae; et ideo amans appetit ut res amata misereatur ei ut, scilicet, compatiatui ei de tristitia et angustia quam habet ex ipsa, et quod res amata cogitet quod illud habet indigne. Nam ex hoc accidit quod res amata facilius inclinatur et movetur ad hoc ut obediat appetitu amantis; et hoc est quod vult dicere iste cum dicit, che solo da costui nascie merzede. Quia igitur amans semper appetit ut res amata misereatur ei, hinc est quod nullam fraudem vult gerere circa rem amatam, sed habet fidelitatem totam circa ipsam. Timet enim ne misericordiam haberet a re amata, et optime dixit auctor, Che solo da costui nascie merzede.

RITORNELLA

Tu poi etc. In isto versu vel stantia, quae potius dicitur ritornellus, auctor in ponendo finem dictis ostendit sufficientiam corum quae dixit, et quia manifestum est quod dicit, exponere non curemus.

Historical Analysis of the Commentary

I

P. 160, ll. 3–10:

Division of the poem: This poem, which considers the passion of love, is divided into three parts. In the first part the poet states what he is going to say about love; he raises the problems about his subject which he is going to attempt to answer. In this part, which is the first stanza, Guido does three things: First he shows his general intention. Secondly, he states what kind of person the reader of this poem should be; in other words, he states what kind of audience he is addressing, beginning with et la presente (1.5). Thirdly, he states in particular what he intends to say about love; he posits the problems he is going to consider, beginning with che senza naturale (1.8). Having thus stated what he is going to do, Guido in the second part of the poem, from the second through the fifth stanza, undertakes to accomplish these things. Finally by way of conclusion in the ritornella Guido shows the sufficiency of what he has said.

P. 160, ll. 11–13:

Since our author is going to write about love, he sets forth first the reason why he is writing about this subject. He is writing about love because a woman or lady has asked him about it.

Having divided the poem into its parts, Dino can now begin his analysis. Thus, beginning here with the introductory stanza, he considers Guido’s general intention in writing this poem, which is contained in the first four lines of the poem. Here Dino finds that Guido is laying down the causes which have led him to write about love. And in good scholastic fashion he lays down all four causes. For as Aristotle shows in his Metaphysics V. ii, 1013 b 16–26 and Physics II. iii, 194 b 16 sq., there are four main ways by which a thing is dependent upon another for its being. The first is as a thing is dependent upon its matter: for instance, as a bronze statue is dependent upon its bronze for being what it is, natural bodies upon the elements, earth, air, fire and water, a syllogism upon its terms, or the whole upon its parts. This dependence is that of material causality. But among those things on which a thing depends for being what it is there must be, besides the matter, something to actualize that matter, and this is the form. Thus, in the case of the whole and its parts, it is the order of the whole that determines the parts; it is the army that makes men to be soldiers or the city that makes men citizens; or in works of art it is the form, for instance, that is put upon the bronze that makes it a bronze statue; or in natural things it is rational animality, for instance, that makes man to be man. And this dependence is that of formal causality, the intrinsic active principle of the thing whereby it is what it is, whereas the material cause is the intrinsic passive principle out of which the thing is made. But besides these intrinsic causes there are also external dependencies. There is the dependence of a thing upon that by whose operation it has come into being, as a son depends on his father or the statue on the sculptor for its existence. Such a dependence is that of efficient causality. And finally there is the dependence of a thing upon its end, that for the sake of which it exists, as beatitude in the case of man. Such is final causality.
Consequently, in these lines of his commentary Dino is determining the efficient cause of Guido’s writing about love. In this case it is some woman or lady, for as Guido says in the very first line, *Donna mi priega*. Thus, it is due to a lady asking him about love that Guido has written this poem.

For the distinction Dino makes between “lady” (*domina*) and “woman” (*mulier*), *vide infra*, p. 177 sq.

P. 160, ll. 13–19:

There are two reasons why Guido should say that a woman or lady has led him to write about love. In the first place this love of which he writes usually has a woman for its object, although at times it may concern another man. Such love, however, is rare since it is a bestial love and against nature; consequently, Guido considers here only that love for woman. Secondly, he may attribute his writing this poem to a lady because he is in love with some lady, and consequently, in order to praise her he says he has written this poem because of her.

Such a love as is considered in this poem is bestial and contrary to nature when it is between men because, as St. Thomas says, (*Sum. Theol.*, II–II. 154,1,c.) it frustrates the end of the venereal act, which is the begetting of children. Consequently, being contrary to the nature of man, such a love is much rarer than that which man has for woman. Therefore, Guido in writing about excessive concupiscent love posits it as concerning a woman, although it might be that his analysis would apply also to love between men.

But Guido may also attribute his writing to a lady because, being in love with her, he would in this way praise her. For it would be praise for her in that the whole poem would then be written for her sake at her own instigation, and thus what beauties the poem has would be due to her.

P. 160, ll. 19–35:

But although it may be the woman he is in love with who has caused him to write this poem, nevertheless he does not say that she *commanded* him to write. Instead, he says she *asked* him. By this he would show that what he says here is not said as if in the passion of love. For he who is empassioned with love thinks he must do whatever his beloved wishes, so that whatever she says is to him as the command of a master to a servant. But whatever Guido says in this poem is said in a scientific and veridical manner from the precepts of natural and moral philosophy. And he who speaks this way with knowledge assumes the place of master, while the one receiving what is said, being in ignorance and desiring to learn, assumes the place of student. Therefore, just as the master has a higher place than the student, so in this matter Guido would show that he is the master and the lady the student. Consequently, the lady addressing him *asks* rather than *commands* him to speak of love, for one can only fittingly address a master with requests and not commands. Thus, Guido, since he is going to speak like a master on this question of love, writes *Donna mi priega* and not *Donna mi commanda*.

Here by an acute analysis of the significance of *priega* Dino shows how Guido has determined the formal cause of the poem. For since he writes that the lady *asks* him rather than *commands* him to speak about love, he shows that he is going to have the place of a master in this poem rather than that of a lover, subject to every whim of his lady. Therefore, the form of the poem is the scientific expression of a master, albeit in verse, rather than the lyrical expression of a lover, and thus at the very start Guido forestalls those who will criticize his poem for not being what it was never meant to be, namely a passionate account of love.
Since then Guido is speaking as a master in this poem, he will treat his subject in a scientific and veridical manner from the principles of natural and moral science. As science is the knowledge of things through their causes, he will attempt to give a causal analysis of love, and since science aims at the truth, he will attempt to ascertain the truth about love. Hence he speaks in a veridical manner rather than a rhetorical one, for instance, which he might use were he trying to persuade his lady of his love. Furthermore, since love is a passion of the soul (vide infra, p. 186 sq.), he will use the principles of natural and moral science for his analysis. He will use natural science or physics because love properly concerns only those beings which have their own principle of change, and such beings are the object of natural science. For as St. Thomas says (in Phys. I. lect. 1, n. 4, t. 2, p. 4), "Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum principium est natura; natura autem est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est; de his igitur, quae habent in se principium motus, est scientia naturalis." But of all the natural sciences Guido will principally use psychology, for since love properly happens only to living creatures, he will make most use of that science which considers animated natures, and this is psychology; (cf. St. Thomas, loc.cit.). Finally since love most properly concerns man alone, among the creatures in this earthly realm, Guido will make use of moral science or ethics, which considers human operation as ordered to an end, as St. Thomas says In ethic., I. lect. 1, n. 2–3. Consequently, for his analysis Guido will primarily use the De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, for these two works are the principal authorities for these sciences he is going to use in his analysis of the nature of love. But for a general discussion of the classification of the sciences in the Middle Ages, cf. J. Mariétan, Problème de la classification des sciences d’Aristote à St. Thomas, Paris, Alcan, 1901.

P. 160, l. 35–p. 161, l. 9:

Furthermore, it is significant that Guido says that a lady (Donna) asked him. For by this he would show that hers is a just petition which he must satisfy insofar as he is able. But a petition is just when the one making it knows what he asks and is a worthy person. This word donna, however, satisfies both of these conditions. For this word is said of a woman only when she has a complete knowledge; it is not, for instance, used of a girl who has not yet rounded out her years of experience. In the second place this word is used only of women of worth, for it is said of women of character (honestae); and never, for instance, of a harlot. In fact for the most part this word is used of women of noble birth who have worth from their character and birth.

Here, then, Dino shows by analysing the significance of donna that the final cause of this poem is that of satisfying a worthy person, since donna implies that the petition that is made of him is a just one which he must satisfy insofar as he is able. For since he addresses her as donna, Guido shows that a person of knowledge and worth is asking him about love, so that it is incumbent upon him to answer her. For, as Dino says, this word is used only of women who have worth or dignity because of their character (honestas) and birth, for as Cicero says (Att. 7,11,1), “Ubi est autem dignitas, nisi ubi honestas.” But in the De Officiis, I, iv, 14, Cicero describes more fully what this is: “Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit quid sit ordo, quid sit quod debeat, in factis dicitque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae despectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit: quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat.
cavetque ne quid indecore effeminata faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis, ne quid lubidinose aut faciat aut cogitetur. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id quod quarerimus honestum." Thus, honestas is seen to be spiritual beauty, which, I take it, we refer to most frequently today as "character." At any rate it is from this and the fact of noble birth that a woman acquires the dignity whereby she may merit the name of donna. And here it is well to recall that this position of the Donna is a common element in the poetry of the dolce stil novo and goes directly back to the Provençal troubadours; cf. R. Renier, Il tipo estetico della donna dei Medioevo, Ancona, 1885.

P. 161, ll. 10–13:

Then, beginning in line 2, d’uno accidente, etc., Guido says four things concerning this passion which he intends to consider. First he says it is an accident, secondly that it is a fierce accident, thirdly that it is a high or great accident, and finally that it is called love.

Here, then, Guido begins his determination of the material cause of the poem; he determines what the subject matter of his poem is.

P. 161, ll. 13–20:

He calls this passion an accident first because it is nœs a substance subsisting by itself but adheres in another as in a subject, namely as an appetite of the soul such as the other passions of the soul, as anger, sadness, fear and the like. Secondly, it is called an accident because it can come and go like other accidents. And thirdly it is an accident because it is extrinsic to the nature of the thing. But although there may be some who have an intrinsic disposition whereby they readily incur this passion, as is afterwards declared, nevertheless as an accident it is principally extrinsic.

Dino gives three reasons in order to explain how love is an accident. In the first place love is an accident because it is not a substance. A substance, as Dino says, is that which subsists by itself (per se stans); it does not exist as in another. For as Aristotle says, (Cat., v, 2a34–2b6) everything else but first substance is either affirmed of first substance or present in such as its subject. This is evident from particular examples. We predicate "animal" of "man," so we predicate also "animal" of any particular man. Were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could not be affirmed of the species (the second substance). Color again is in body, and so also in this or that body. For were there no bodies existing wherein it could also exist, it could not be in body at all. Therefore, all things whatsoever, save what we call primary substances, are predicates of primary substances or present in such as their subjects. They underlie all other things (Cat. v, 2b15) and as such are the ultimate subjects. And that which adheres in another as in a subject, namely in the substance, is an accident, (cf. Phys. I. iii, 186a34). Consequently, since love inheres in another and does not stand by itself as a subject, love is an accident. Love is never found as existing by itself, but is always found in some person who happens (accidit) to be in love. It is something which happens to a person just as the other passions of the soul, anger, sadness, fear and the like. But for love as a passion of the soul, vide infra, p. 186–187.

But, in the second place, as an accident, love is like certain others in that it can come and go. For an accident, as Aristotle says (Top. I, v, 102b6–9), may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the selfsame thing, as the sitting-posture may belong or not belong to the same thing, or likewise whiteness, for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white and at another
not white. However, in this ability to come and go love is characterized as a separable, as opposed to an inseparable accident, such as masculinity, which is inseparable from him who has it.

Thirdly, love is an accident in that it is something that is extrinsic to the nature of the thing having it. Although it is true that some may have an intrinsic disposition whereby they incur this passion more easily than others (vide infra p. 189) nevertheless it remains that love is principally a thing coming from the outside. It is principaliter an extrinsic thing inasmuch as it has its beginning (principium) in an extrinsic form, but vide infra, p. 193. But in this love is distinguished as an extrinsic accident from those which follow from the very nature of the thing in which they inhere, such as the proper properties of a thing, which although they do not indicate the essence of a thing, they still belong to that thing alone, (Top., i, v, 102a18), such as risibility in man.

Thus, Dino in commenting upon Guido's saying love is an accident has shown (1) that it is an accident as opposed to a substance, (2) that it is a separable accident and (3) that it is an extrinsic accident.

P. 161, ll. 20–22:

Guido says this passion is a fierce accident because of the intemperance there is in this passion.

Vide infra p. IV

P. 161, ll. 22–24:

And he calls love a great accident by reason of the effects it produces in the body, for it causes greater changes than other passions, as is declared in the course of the poem.

Vide infra, p. IV. But it should be noted here that Dino is translating altero by great. Cf. p. 11: "altum, id est, magnum.," for he takes it as referring to the effects of love such as are described in the fourth stanza.

P. 161, ll. 25–27:

Finally Guido says this accident is called love. But no reason can be given why this passion should be called by this name rather than any other. There is no necessary relation between the essence of a thing and its name, for as Aristotle says, names are imposed on things by convention.

No reason can be given why this passion should be called love rather than something else because there is no necessary relation between the essence of a thing and its name, such that knowledge of the essence would yield knowledge of the name. For as Aristotle says in his De Interpretatione, I, ii, 16a27–30, a word signifies something by convention. Thus no sound is a word by nature but it becomes one by becoming significant, that is by being taken by man to stand for and to refer to something else. Some sounds may signify something naturally, such as a groan or a laugh, but such sounds are not words or names. Cf. St. Thomas, In Perih. 1, lect. 2, n. 8, v. 1, p. 13. Consequently, since the word love signifies this passion of which we speak by the agreement of man, there is nothing in the nature of this sound by which it should signify what it does. Therefore, no reason can be given for this signification except the agreement of man that such a sound shall stand for such a passion, and what is thus established by convention can only be known by discovering that convention.
Then in line 4 Guido adds what amounts to this: we must speak of this accident in order that whoever should deny it, through ignorance of its nature, may now be able to know the truth about it and come to believe that it is something.

Although with the discussion of accident all four of the causes have been given, Dino takes this line in the sense of a further final cause. Thus, besides satisfying the request of a worthy person, he will also answer those who have denied love (si chi lo nega, etc.). For if any deny love, through ignorance of its nature, he can learn the truth about it from this poem and come to know what it is.

Therefore summing up all the causes of this poem, we can say that because a lady has asked him, Guido, speaking as a master from the principles of natural and moral philosophy, is making this poem on the passion of love in order to satisfy a lady’s request as well as to persuade those, who deny it, of its nature.

P. 161, ll. 31–40:

In lines 5–9 Guido states what kind of audience he is addressing in this poem. Thus he says that in this matter he wants a knowing man (al presente conoscente chero), that is, an intelligent man, one with a refined and trained intellect (subtilis intellectus). For there is no hope that those of unrefined and untrained intellects, those di basso core, could understand what is in this poem. For such would be without knowledge of natural demonstration (senza natural dimostramento) on which this poem is based inasmuch as what is said here is drawn from the principles of natural science, as well as from those of moral science and astrology. Consequently, if the poem is going to demand some acquaintance with psychology, ethics and astrology, it is necessary that the reader be conoscente.

Here we see the demand, which runs through the whole of the dolce stil nuovo, for il cor gentile. Love and the service of love in poetry is only for those of nobility of heart and intellect, and not for those of basso core, who are unable to understand it. Cf. the canzone of Guido Guinizelli, Al cor gentil, repara sempre Amore, in L. di Benedetto, Rimatori del Dolce Stil Novo, Torino, 1925, pp. 3–6.

But in this poem Dino claims Guido has even more reason than usual to ask for a man who is conoscente. For as we have already seen (cf. p. 177), Guido is going to use natural and moral science for his analysis of love. But here Dino also adds the science of Astrology, which is used to account for those who are so disposed to readily incur this passion of love, but for this vide infra, p. 189 sq.

P. 161, l. 41–p. 162, l. 4:

Finally, in lines 10–14, Guido begins stating in particular what he is going to show about love. He is going to try to prove (1) la dove posa, i.e. where love has its being as in a subject; (2) chi lo fa creare, what, namely, creates or generates it in that subject; (3) et quale e sua virtu, whether it is a virtue in the sense of a power or faculty of the soul or an intellectual or moral virtue; or whether it is not a virtue but proceeds from one; (4) et sua potentia, what, namely, it is capable of producing in the body — i.e.. its effects; (5) l’essentia, what love is, namely, its quiddity or nature; (6) poi ciascuno suo movimento, that is the motions of love, namely, the alterations which love causes; (7) et il piacimento che’l fa dire amare, what causes the pleasingness (complacencia) which is the cause of love such that man speaks of it; and finally (8) et s’uomo per vedere il puo mostrare, whether love can show itself visibly or not.

Such is the list of problems as Guido wrote them and as Dino del Garbo interprets them, and as such it is principally the same as the list of questions that Guido Orlandi addressed to Cavalcanti, as we have already seen in the Introduction
There was no need for Dino to go into greater detail here as to what the problems are. As Guido answers them, Dino comments sufficiently on the answers to fully explicate the problems, and we shall follow his lead here in putting off a detailed consideration of them until their solution arises. However, Dino might have considered why these and no other questions were asked. Likewise, he might have attempted to determine why they are asked in this order, whether, namely, there is not some principle of order behind them. Furthermore, he does not ascertain whether these questions are mutually exclusive; it appears at first glance, for instance, that question 4 and 6 are pretty much the same, for to determine love’s effects would be to account for the alterations love causes. All of these would appear to be proper questions for a commentator to consider. However, it may be that Dino felt there was no need to consider in particular the nature of these questions inasmuch as they are the conventional questions which the poets asked about love rather than the proper questions a scientist would ask in investigating the nature of a passion of the sensitive soul. A sign that this is so is evident in Guido’s managing to answer those questions which Guido Ordandi had addressed to him, who was addressing him not as a scientist but as a poet.


**II**

P. 162, ll. 5–9:

Division of the stanza: here, Guido begins to consider those things which he has proposed to say about love. In this stanza he answers the first two questions he has asked, namely (1) *la dove posa*, i.e. the subject in which love is, and (2) *chi lo fa creare*, i.e. the principle or cause generating love, which he begins in line 18, with *La qual da marte viene*.

P. 162, ll. 9–14:

In answer to the first question, then, Guido means to say that love has its being (*esse*) in the memory because the impressed species of the thing, which causes love, is conserved and retained there, in the memory, just as light, proceeding from a luminous body, is received and retained in the diaphanous (*diaphanum*), which was obscure because deprived of the light which illuminates it.

But here it is evident that Dino is not beginning his commentary upon the very first line of this stanza. For Guido says that love takes its state in that part where the memory is (“in quella parte dove sta memoria prende suo stato”), and such would appear to be the answer to the question as to where love is located. However, inasmuch as Guido immediately makes an analogy which shows how love is in the memory, this answer is not without its qualifications; it is not the complete answer. Therefore, Dino in commenting upon this passage first considers the analogy before undertaking to say why and how love is in the memory. Since love is in the memory, and since these conditions are implied in the analogy, Dino begins by expanding and interpreting this analogy. The analogy Guido makes, then, shows from the activity of light on the diaphanous how love is in the memory; thus, he says that love takes its state in that part where the memory is, so formed as the diaphanous of light from an obscurity, (“*si formato come diyaphano da lume d’una obscuritate*”), which is the analogy Dino has here expanded. As stated strictly, Dino’s expansion of it would read that the impressed species of the thing causing love is to the memory as the light from a luminous body is to the diaphanous.

However, before we go on to see what sense this makes, it should be noted that Dino is reading these three lines of Guido so as to take *stato* as the antecedent of *si*
formato. Thus he understands Guido to be saying that love’s state in the memory is formed as a diaphanous is formed by light; love is acting upon the memory whereas the diaphanous is acted upon by the light according to Guido’s statement. Consequently, our analogy is that love is to the memory as light is to the diaphanous, where the difficulty of expression lies in Guido’s expressing the one side of the analogy as active and the other as passive, with the result that the subject of si formato appears to be love, whereas, according to Dino, it actually is stato.

P. 162, ll. 14–20:

It is declared in natural science that light is the act of a diaphanous body. Therefore, the diaphanous (diaphanum) is that which of itself does not have light and yet which is apt to receive and retain the light which comes to it from a luminous body; as is apparent from the case of air, which is a diaphanous body that does not of itself have light. Consequently, it is called an obscure body and yet is one that is apt to receive light from a luminous body, such as the sun.

From this it appears that we are to seek an understanding of our analogy in a certain doctrine of light, wherein the diaphanum supplies a certain function. And this doctrine is the one elaborated by Aristotle in his De Anima (II, vii) to account for the sense of sight, which, in turn, was promulgated and developed by the mediæval commentators. Therefore, let us turn to Aristotle and his mediæval commentators to see what the position of the diaphanum is in this doctrine, for in locating its place and function we shall have occasion to determine the meaning of the other terms which are necessary for the explication of our analogy.

In order to account for the sense of sight, we have to consider, according to Aristotle, three different terms. For besides the power of sight and its proper object, we must also consider the medium of sight. Now, the object of sight is color, as Aristotle says (De Anima, II, vii, 418a29), but this object is not apprehended by the sight except through some medium. That a medium is necessary is evident from the fact that if one should place a colored object upon the eye, one cannot see it, (ibid., 419a13–15). But this medium through which the visible object is rendered present to the power of sight is the diaphanum or transparency. Thus, it is the action of color upon the diaphanum which, in turn, acts upon the eye which results in the object being seen (ibid., 419a18–21).

What, then, is the nature of this diaphanum? As its name shows, it is a transparency, and, thus, such things as air and water are diaphanous. However, they are not the diaphanous itself; for if air according to its nature was the diaphanous, then water could not be, since it does not have the nature of air. Therefore, the diaphanum must be some one nature which is common to air and water and all other transparent things, (ibid., 418b4–9). Furthermore, this diaphanum is something, as Dino says, which of itself does not have light and yet which is apt to receive and retain the light from a luminous body. For that it does not of itself have light is evident from the fact that diaphanous things are sometimes in darkness, as in the case of air at night, and consequently, it can be called an obscure body, as Dino says. Yet, as apt to receive light, it is in potency in its darkness, and it is actualized when it is illuminated by some luminous body, such as fire or the sun, (418b10–13). And then it is light, for as Aristotle says, light is the act of the diaphanum qua diaphanum (418b9). Thus, in daytime the air as diaphanous is actualized as diaphanous, not as air, and there is light, and in this light the visible object is rendered present to the sense of sight. For color, as the visible object, is that which moves the diaphanum in act, which movement as communicated to the eye causes the act of seeing. Whence nothing is visible without the actualized dia-
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phanum, for nothing is visible without light, but, as actualized, the diaphanum is light.

P. 162, ll. 20–23:

Light is received in the air intentionally, just as the species of colored things is received by us in seeing, and not the material thing itself. For, as Aristotle says, the species of the stone, and not the stone itself, is in the soul.

Having seen that there must be a medium for sight, as well as something of what it is, we now turn to the question of why there must be a diaphanum. In so doing, we shall be considering the operation of the diaphanum and, thus, be drawing closer to the basis on which our analogy is founded. We have seen that a medium is necessary in the case of sight from the fact that if one should place a colored object upon the eye, one cannot see that object. The reason for this is that sight is not an act performed according to material principles, such as the sense of touch is. But sight is a formal and spiritual act whereby the form only of the thing is grasped, and not the form in its matter. Consequently, a medium is necessary between the object and the eye where that object may attain the proper spirituality to be grasped by the eye; cf. St. Albert, *In II de anima*, Tr. III, cap. xiv, vol. 5, p. 259b: “si quis ponat quod coloratum est super oculum, non videbit ipsum: et hujus causa est, quia coloratum secundum tactum non agit in aliquid nisi actione physica, quae est per principia materialia ipsius: color autem non fit in visu per actionem physicam, sed per actionem formalem et spiritualem . . . et ideo indiget corpore in quo prius efficiatur spiritualis antequam in oculo generetur: et haec est necessitas quare oportet medium esse in sensu visus.” Rendered thus spiritual, by being abstracted from its matter, the thing, now as a form only, is called the species or intentio of the thing, which when impressed upon the sense of sight produces the vision of the thing seen. It is the form or species of the thing and not the thing itself that is in the eye; for as Aristotle says, it is not the stone, but the species of the stone which is in the soul (*op. cit.* III, viii, 432a1). For in looking at a stone, my eye does not become petrified. Furthermore, if one should argue that it is not the stone anyway, but the color of the stone that is the object of sight, still it would not be true that the color is in the eye in the same way it is in the stone; for in that case the eye would become colored as its object is, which is not so. Therefore, it is necessary to conclude that the object as it exists in its own right as a thing enjoys a different sort of existence than that which it has purely as an object known. As a thing, it has the existence proper to a thing as such, namely esse materiae, a form in matter. As a species or intention, the thing has the existence proper to it, not as a thing, but as an object of knowledge, namely esse intentionale or spirituale, inasmuch as it is in this state abstracted from its matter; cf. St. Albert, *op.cit.*, Tr. III, cap. vi, p. 241a: “Adhuc autem manifestum est formam sensibilem secundum esse materiale esse in re sensata extra animam, et rem, et ibi rem afficit sua qualitate: secundum autem hoc esse non est in medium nec etiam in anima: quia si color esset in aeris sicut in colorato, oporteret quod videremus acerem esse coloratum et oculum esse coloratum colore quem recipit: et hujus contrarium videmus: ergo secundum aliquid esse est in abstractione quam in materia propria . . . esse autem intentionale et spirituale.” It is this latter sort of being that the object enjoys in the medium and in the soul. It is no longer the thing it was in its material conditions, but has become an object of knowledge and as such is presenting itself (‘tending towards,’ as intentio) to be known. The thing has become spiritualized by being abstracted from its matter in order to meet the conditions of the knowing
power, which can grasp only the form of the thing. But just as the thing as species has an existence other than it has in its natural existence (in esse materiale), so light has an existence in the diaphanum other than it has in the luminating body. In both instances the species and the light are existing intentionaliter. (Op. cit., Tr. III, cap. xii, (p. 255b): “lumen est intentio, spirituale esse habens in perspicuo (dia-
phano).” This special point is of importance to us historically in that it enables us to know that Dino was not using the commentary of St. Thomas on the De Anima. For on this point Thomas says, In De Anima, II, lect. xiv, n. 420 (Pirotta edit.): “Alii vero dixerunt quod . . . lumen deluens a luce habet esse intentionale, sicut species colorum in aere . . . autem est falsum.” Although this does not tell us whether Dino was following some commentator, and if so, what one, yet it does enable us to dismiss St. Thomas as a source, at least on this particular point.) The light is in the diaphanum, as we have seen, as in a subject, and this subject is not, as it were, its proper matter; for, if it were, the diaphanum would always have light and color, which it does not. It is there, then, in a purely formal way, it is there intentionally; and, by being there, it actualizes the diaphanum so that it can become the medium in which the visible object is rendered visible to the eye.

P. 162, ll. 23–29:

Similarly in the memory of the lover is conserved the species of the intentional thing, and not the material thing, which is loved. Likewise, the diaphanum, which was previously obscure, is perfected by being informed with the species, which it retains and conserves. Therefore it is excellently said by Guido that the memory is informed by the species of the thing causing love just as the diaphanum which was previously obscure and imperfect, is informed by light.

Thus, we have now discovered the likeness on which Dino has established his analogy. For, it will be recalled, that he stated this analogy as reading that the impressed species of the thing causing love is to the memory as the light from a luminous body is to the diaphanum. The likeness then, which validates this analogy is the intentional being which both the species and the light have. For the material thing which causes love is not in the memory, any more than the physical luminous body is in the diaphanum. In both cases they are there intentionally, as we have seen above. It remains, however, to see how the memory is perfected by the species of the object causing love; for, as Dino says, the memorial power is perfected when it is informed by the species, just as the diaphanum, which was before obscure, is perfected when it is informed with light. If this is so, then we shall have another likeness on which to establish our metaphor, and it will be made doubly secure.

The likeness here is evident in the very words with which Dino states this analogy, for both the memory and the diaphanum are perfected by being informed. Perfected here means the same as actualized, for, as St. Albert tells us, the Latins rendered the Greek endelechias either by perfectio or actus (op. cit. Tr. I, cap. iv, vol. 5, p. 123a). Thus, Dino says that both the memory and the diaphanum are actualized in the same way, namely by being informed: that is, by acquiring a form which will realize the perfection which up until now they had only in potency. In the case of the diaphanum, as we have already seen, it is the light from a luminous body which brings it out of obscurity into the light to which it has been in potency; thus the diaphanum is perfected by being informed by a luminous body, and becoming actualized as light, after having been in obscurity. Likewise, the memory, when it has nothing to remember, can be said, analogously with the diaphanum, to be in obscurity; it is in potency to its act of remembering. It will be actually remembering,
in other words, it will be perfected, only when it has something to remember, which happens when it has the form of a thing which has been apprehended. For the memory is the treasure house of the intentiones of apprehended things, which it keeps custody over by firmly retaining them even after the original apprehension has been forgotten (Avicenna, De anima, P. IV, cap. 1, f. 17vb). Thus, like the diaphanum, the memory is perfected by being informed; it is informed with the form of the apprehended thing, which it firmly retains to itself. And in each case it is a form which has intentional existence, for the form existing in the memory is a species such as we have considered above in speaking of sight. It is true that it is a species which has undergone considerable development since becoming the species apprehended by an external sense, but here it is sufficient to point out that, like that of sight, the species in the memory is a form with intentional existence; concerning the changes the species undergoes in going from the eye to the memory, we shall have more to say in considering the cause of love (cf. p. 194).

Consequently, as interpreted by Dino, Guido has a double reason for saying love is in the memory like light in the diaphanum. First, love is in the memory as the apprehended species of that which causes love and, consequently, is there intentionally just as light is in the diaphanum. Secondly, this species, as a form, perfects the memory by giving it something to remember, just as the intentio of a luminous body perfects the diaphanum by making it light; in each case, before being informed, the memory and the diaphanum were obscure — the diaphanum literally so, the memory analogously. Therefore, to refer back to the words of the poem, we see that Dino has accounted for the analogy and at the same time determined the sense of its language. Thus, he understands stato as the antecedent of si formato in order to establish the metaphor, so that it reads: "In quella parte dove sta memoria (Amore) prende suo stato (ch'è) si formato come diaphano da lume d'una obscuritade." Reading it thus, Dino explains the metaphor as we have analyzed above, in the course of it showing that (1) stato will refer to both the species causing love and light as having an intentional existence, (2) formato can apply to both memory and the diaphanum as being perfected by being informed, and (3) obscuritade, likewise, can apply to both memory and the diaphanum as signifying, analogously, their state before being informed by their respectively proper forms. Thus Dino has certainly done a thorough enough job in accounting for the sense of these lines. The only thing he leaves open to argument is his initial reading of stato as the antecedent of si formato, and the very success of his interpretation after taking it in that way is a strong argument for the validity of that reading.

P. 162, ll. 29–36:

But here it must be understood, lest one fall into error, that when Guido says that love has its being in the memorial part, he is referring to the species of the thing, which, when apprehended, causes love, for that species is fixed and conserved in the memory. But love as a passion does not properly have its being in the memory, but is in the sensitive appetite as in a subject, in which all the passions of the soul have their being, such as anger, sadness, fear, love and similar accidents, as is declared in natural and moral science.

Thus, before proceeding to consider what Guido has to say about the cause of love, Dino qualifies the sense in which we are to understand that love is the in memory. For love can be said to be in the memory only when we take love as referring to the species of the thing, which, when apprehended, causes love, which is fixed and retained in the memory; and it is in this sense that love has been taken in
the preceding analysis. For properly love is a passion and has its being, not in the memory, but in the sensitive appetite as in a subject.

By passion, as is evident from the word itself, is meant a suffering, an enduring or undergoing (passio from patior). But it is not the soul alone that undergoes the suffering, for as Aristotle says (De Anima, I, i, 403a17–19), all the passions of the soul seem to be associated with the body — anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage and joy, as well as loving and hating; for when these appear, the body suffers something. Therefore a passion is something that happens to the soul as it is joined to the body. But in II, iii, 414b2–6 Aristotle specifies what part of the soul the passions are to be attributed to, for he says that where there is sensation there is also appetite, for appetite consists of desire, anger and will. But where there is sensation there is joy and sadness, the delightful and grievous; and where these are there is desire, which is the appetite for the delectable. Consequently, passion is to be located in the sensitive part of the soul. Furthermore, it is in the appetite part of the sensitive soul. But the appetite, as Aristotle tells us, is the motive power of the soul (De anima, III. x, 433a31); in this it is distinguished from the apprehensive or apperceptive powers of the soul, sense and intellect, according to which the apprehended thing becomes in the apprehending power according to the mode of that power, as we have seen in the case of sight (cf. p. 183). But the operation of the appetite is that of being moved by the appetible object according as it is intellect or imagined (ibid., 433b10–11). Consequently, according as there are different kinds of apprehension, that of intellect and that of imagination or sense, there will be different appetites. Thus we are brought back to the first passage from Aristotle where he says that appetite consists of desire, anger and will. But will is that which moves a man when he acts according to reason (ibid., 433a24–25); consequently, the will is the rational appetite, but for a fuller discussion vide infra, p. 192. Thus we are left with desire and anger as comprising the sensitive appetite, and it is on these that the mediaeval commentators distinguished respectively the concupiscible and irascible parts of the sensitive appetite. But perhaps because Aristotle had said that movement is characterized by either avoiding or pursuing something (ibid., III. ix, 432b29), some were led to say that the concupiscible is that part of the appetite which moves towards a thing apprehended as a good, whereas the irascible is that part of the appetite which moves away from, fleeing that which is apprehended as bad. Thus St. Albert, following Avicenna (cf. De anima, IV. c. iv, 20r2) writes: “Motum autem animalem dico, qui fit per praecedentem apprehensionem boni vel mali: quam apprehensionem boni vel mali in animali sequitur appetitus, vel motus ad aliquid, vel motus ab illo, sive fuga . . . Nota ergo, quod sicut dicit Avicenna, virtutis appetitivae duae sunt partes, vis concupiscibilis, et vis irascibilis. Concupiscibilis est vis imperans moveri ut appropinquetur ad ea quae putantur ut utilia, appetitu delectandi. Vis vero irascibilis est, quae imperat ad repellendum a se quod putatur nocivum vel corrumpens, appetitu vincendi.” — In de anima, II. xx, t. 5, p. 523b. St. Thomas, however (and St. Albert after him in a later work — cf. Sum. de creat. II, 66, R., t. 35, p. 558) argues that this is an improper distinction, for contraries belong to the same power, as both white and black fall under the power of sight; therefore since the good and bad are contraries, they must belong to one power (In de anima, III. lect. xiv, n. 806). Consequently, he distinguishes the two according to different respects of the good apprehended. Thus the concupiscible part is ordered to the appetible good as delectable to senses, whereas the irascible is ordered to the appetible good as perfecting the delectable things so as to be able to use them at will; so it is, as it were, the propugnatrix concupiscibilis, whence its object has been called the arduous, (ibid. n. 804–805). Thus
the irascible part rises up against those things which militate against the concupiscible accomplishing its end (cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I. 81, 2, c). To take love as an example, desire for a certain woman is a passion of the concupiscible appetite, but if in attaining that desire, someone should interfere and try to hinder that attainment, the irascible appetite would rise up against him and in anger it would fight against that person so as to achieve what it has desired, in other words, the irascible would come forward to fight for and defend the concupiscible. But this is sufficient for our present purpose of locating the passions, although we shall have to return later to consider the concupiscible and irascible parts more in detail.

But it remains to be seen whether the passions belong to the sensitive or the rational appetite. However, since we have already seen (p. 186) that the passions happen to the soul as joined to the body, the passions can only properly be located in the sensitive appetite, for the intellect, and consequently the rational appetite, is in itself unmixed with body (cf. p. 199). Therefore, the passions are properly the operations of the sensitive appetite, and hence are those things which a man suffers in his body when he is moved by the appetible object. Thus St. Thomas says, *In Ethic. Nis.*, II, lect. v, n. 292: "passiones proprie dicantur operationes appetitus sensitivi, quae sunt secundum transmutationem organi corporalis, et quibus homo quodammodo ducitur."

Hence since love is in the memory not as a passion of the soul but as the *species* of the thing which causes love, we are considering love at this stage as it exists in the apprehensive powers of the soul and not as it exists in the sensitive appetite. Consequently we are engaged in considering love in the line of its conceptual development, which receives its fullest explication in lines 21–28 of Guido's poem (cf. p. 194). Therefore, we are in a position now to see why Guido should have said that love is in the memory. Dino, however, does not explicitly answer this question, but he has given all the materials for an answer in showing how love is in the memory as the *species* of the thing which causes love. It only remains to see whether the memory holds a particular and conspicuous place in the line of development from the *species* of a desirable object to the motion of the sensitive appetite towards that object. But that it does is evident from what St. Albert says in his commentary on the *De memoria et reminiscencia*, Tr. I, cap. i, t. 9, p. 99a: "Hoc autem est quod dicitur (Aristotelis, 450a14), quod memoria sit primi sensitivi . . . nos tenemus quod primum sensitivum esse, quod est fons et origo sensualitatis, et cui contingit sentire secundum se semper et in omni sensibili . . . Patent, quod primi sensitivi est sicut a quo est primus motus ejus, sicut phantasia dicitur motus a sensu secundum actum factus. Sic igitur dicitur memoria esse primi sensitivi sicut id in quo quiescunt motus primi sensitivi, et a quo fit reflexio in rem primo per sensum acceptam." Thus memory is related to the *primum sensitivum*, i.e. the common sense (for which cf. p. 195), as to the source of its act, and it is in the memory that the motion of the sensible perception, which begins as a whole in the common sense, comes to rest. Thus in sensible apprehension common sense and memory are the two termini (for this progression in human apprehension cf. p. 193 sq.). But the common sense is the fountain and origin of *sensualitas*, i.e. of sensual movement, the passions of the sensitive appetite (cf. St. Albert, *Sum. Theol.* P. II. Tr. XV, q. 92, m. 1, tome 33, p. 193–194). Consequently, memory is the completion of the act begun in the common sense, which is the source of sensual movement. Thus, Guido can say love is in the memory inasmuch as memory presents the completed *species* of the object perceived to the appetite, which as it moves towards that object, gives rise to the passion of love (cf. p. 186).

But in this case memory is no longer concerned exclusively with the reproduction
of the past, but it has an active part in the production of a present perception. Thus we may have here a trace of the Augustinian analysis of the memory. For St. Augustine in analysing sensible perception required of the memory much the same sort of work that Kant did in the reproduction of the manifold by imagination. Thus in the case of hearing a sound, memory is necessary in order to unite the impressions that make up the sound, for every sound has a beginning, middle and end, and, if the memory did not preserve the beginning until we had reached the end, we would never have the perception of that sound (De musica, VI, c. 8, n. 21; t. 32, col. 1174; and cf. Et. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin, Paris, Vrin, 1929, pp. 83–85). Consequently, if love comes from a seen form, as Guido says, then the memory is necessary, inasmuch as memory unites the impressions that make up any one perception. Hence Guido can say love is in that part where memory is, since it is in the memory that the visible apprehension is completed, which causes love to arise in the appetite.

Furthermore Guido would have another reason for saying at the beginning that love is in the memory, for just as love is properly in the sensitive soul and yet participates in the rational soul (cf. p. 196–197), so the memory, as Aristotle says, belongs properly to the sensitive soul, although accidentally to the rational soul (De mem. et remin. i, 450a14); for we can remember things we have known as well as those we have sensed, and yet since this is accomplished only through the reproduction of the sensible species upon which our knowledge depends (cf. p. 196), the memory properly belongs to the sensitive soul. Consequently, as located in the memory, love will have the same character as the memory, namely that of belonging properly to the sensitive soul and yet participating in the rational one, and it is the work of this second stanza to determine the position of love in these two respects. Thus he is able by this to state generally what he is going to determine in particular above love, namely, that it is in that part which participates in both sense and intellect.

P. 162, ll. 37–42:

Then when Guido says (1.18), lo quale da marte viene, etc. he would show that love is a generated or created thing, and therefore he says (1.19) egli'è creato e a sensato nome, that is, it has a sensible name, denoting some sensible thing, since this name love signifies some sensible passion in us, just as other sensual passions have their proper name, such as anger, sadness, fear and the like.

Here then we begin the second part of this stanza, where Guido undertakes to answer the question chi lo fa creare. But before he can begin to seek the cause of love he must show it is a thing that has been caused. Consequently, Guido immediately adds that egli'è creato e a sensato nome. But if it is something created or generated, for Guido obviously does not literally mean that love is produced totally ex nihilo, then there must be some cause which brings it into being; and it is this cause which is to be under consideration in this part. Furthermore, by saying it has a sensato nome we are to understand that it is some sensible thing — sensato being taken here as functioning as a transferred adjective referring to that which the nome signifies. Consequently, by this we are to understand that love is something that is sensed, and thus we have moved a step further towards the statement of love as a passion of the sensitive soul, which Guido achieves temporally in saying d'alma costume, etc. (l. 20, but cf. p. 190 for explication). For as we have seen from analysing the preceding lines, love as it is in the memory may be either intellectual or sensible (cf. supra). Therefore in this line Guido has further specified the nature of love by saying it is sensible, although he has not yet said whether it is
an act or passion of the sensitive soul. But for a full account of the progression in this stanza, *vide infra*, p. 193.

But the principal purpose of this line with regard to this second part is to point out that love is a generated thing and, more particularly, a sensible generated thing, so that now one can properly inquire into the cause of its generation; for before one can ask *why* a thing is, one must first know *that* it is. But as to why this line should be considered before the line about love coming from Mars, which is the line prior to this, *vide infra*, p. 193.

P. 162, l. 43–p. 163, l. 13:

However, it must be known that there are two things which occur in the generation of a passion. One is the natural disposition of the body, for we see that according to different natural dispositions of their bodies men are apt to incur different passions. Some for instance incur anger very easily or sadness or joy, and thus similarly some men because of the natural disposition of their body are apt to incur this passion of love very easily. The other cause of a generation of a passion is the extrinsic thing whose *i* *age or species* causes in the sensitive power that knowledge or apprehension from which the appetite gets its desire, and it is in the appetite that these passions are founded. Therefore in order to show completely what the cause of this passion is, Guido first states the natural disposition which renders a man apt to readily incur this passion in saying *lo quale da marte viene* and secondly shows what the extrinsic thing is whose apprehension causes the passion of love to follow in the appetite, in *viem da veduta forma* or else perhaps in *d'alma costume*.

But before we inquire into the cause of this passion, Dino points out that there are two things which concur in the generation of a passion, one intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic. Thus besides the extrinsic thing, which gives rise to love after it has been apprehended by the appetite (cf. p. 194), we find that some people are by nature more apt to have this passion than others. Consequently there must be some intrinsic cause which so disposes one, and this is the natural disposition of the body to which Dino refers. For by a disposition we are to understand, as Aristotle says, a certain arrangement of parts (*Metaphys.* V. xix, 1022b1); thus by a certain arrangement of bodily elements some men are by nature disposed towards shame or fear (*Categor.* viii, 9b15–20). But the bodily elements are fire, air, earth and water which result from the various combinations of the elemental qualities, the hot and cold, the dry and moist (but for this cf. p. 199). And it is the proportion these qualities have in the body which determines the complexion of the body, which constitutes the natural disposition of the body (cf. p. III). Consequently, due to the bodily complexion some men have a natural aptitude for the passion of love. Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, P. IV, cap. iv, f. 20va: "Dicemus nunc quod actiones iste (concupiscibilis & irascibilis) et quod accidentia ista sunt ex accidentibus quae accident animae, sed dum est in corpore: quae non accident ei nisi propter consortium corporis; et ideo trahunt secum complexiones corporum. Accidant etiam ipsa cum accident complexiones in corporibus; quasdam enim complexiones sequitur aptitudo irascendi: et quasdam aptitudo concupiscendi, et quasdam pavor et timor." We shall have to consider the complexion of the body further on (cf. p. III), but here it is sufficient merely to note that the disposition of the body does have some influence upon love; for all Guido is doing here, as Dino says, is to note the cause of such natural dispositions, which he does by saying *lo quale da marte viene*.

P. 163, ll. 14–31:

The natural disposition by which one is apt to readily incur a certain passion is
determined by the principles proper to one's nativity. But of these the principal ones are the celestial bodies; for as Aristotle says in the Physica (II. ii. 194b14), man and the sun generate man, and again in the De generatione animalium (II. iii. 737a1), he says that there is in the generative spirit a nature existing in proportion to the natural ordination of the stars. Thus Guido in saying lo quale da marte viene et fa dimora would show what celestial body rules over the nativity of one who has a natural disposition to readily incur the passion of love. For this passion is said to proceed from Mars because, as the astrologers say, anyone born when Mars is in the house of Venus or in Taurus or Libra will be an exceedingly lustful fornicator and vicious in all venereal abuses. Thus Ali ben Ridhwan says in his Commentary on the Quadripartitum of Ptolemy that one born when Venus is in conjunction with Mars is given to love-making, fornication, voluptuousness and the like, all of which pertain to the passion of love about which Guido is speaking in this poem.

Although Dino here refers us to the authority of Ali ben Ridwan, at the crucial point Ptolemy has more to say than Ali does about the lustfulness of those born under Mars and Venus. Cf. Ptolemy, Quadripartitum cum commento Holy Heben Rodan, Venetiis, apud Scotum, 1519 (Paris, B.N. Res. V. 190), Tract. 3, libri 4, cap. 13: in qualitatis anime nati, f. 72r: "Quod si haec eadem stella (Mars) in predicti (Venus) conjunctione conversabitur natus multus ac superflus erit in coitu . . . suos et alienos decipiens, appetitus festivis, fastidiosus, coniugatarum et virginum corruptor, versutus acutus, inordinatus deceptor." Ali however is reserved and adds nothing; in fact he says here, "Totum hoc dictum similiter est manifestum per glosas preteritas in verbis que dixit de saturno: et inde accipere poteris totam significacionem martis secundum suam naturam." Then, further on (Tract. 4, cap. 4, f. 83r) Ali writes: "Et postquam ita est convenit quod mars et satirus habeant in luxuria significacionem: et est manifestum quod si hi duo planete: participationem habuerint cum luminaribus bono aspectu erit coniugium secun- dum legem: et si non fuerit bono aspectu: significat quod erit iibi fornicatio et similia. Quapropter venus cum marte qualitatem amoris efficit absolute. Et propter hoc faciunt venus et mars res que sunt inamoramentum . . . propter quod significat figura que fit de venere et marte: omnem rem que est inamoramentum."

P. 163, ll. 32-35:

Then Guido adds d'alma costume (1.20), that is, the love about which we are speaking here, besides being a created or generated thing, is a custom of the soul (mos animae), i.e., a certain passion of the soul. For by customs (mores) here he means those accidents of the soul which are called passions.

Here then we have finally reached Guido's statement of love as a passion. In the first of this stanza love is presented as a species in the memory and hence, as we have seen, capable of being either intellectual or sensitive. But in line 19 love is stated to have a sensible name and consequently to belong to the sensitive soul. Here, however, we find that love is a passion of the soul and hence belongs to the appeti- tive rather than the apprehensive part of the sensitive soul. For Guido says that it is a "custom of the soul," and although it may seem forced to take this as meaning love is a passion, Dino justifies this reading by translating costume as mos, wherein the ambiguity of the word makes more evident the sense in which this can be taken as referring to a passion. For the Latin mos can signify either a moral virtue or a custom or habitual action; but our word habit, if taken in technical as well as gen- eral usage, has this same ambiguity, for technically as habitus it can signify a moral virtue; so it would be better here to translate Guido's costume as habitus; and the Greek also has this in ἀφθος and ἐθος. Taking costume then in the sense of moral virtue,
which as Aristotle says (Eth. Nic., II, i, 1103a24–25) we have a natural aptitude for, as realized through habitual acting, we will be able to see how this means that love is a passion. For as St. Thomas says in commenting upon this passage of Aristotle (In Ethic. Nic. II. lect. i. n. 249), moral virtue pertains to the appetite. Consequently, if *costume* in Guido's line be understood as *mos*, we here have Guido saying that love pertains to the appetite and hence is a passion, for as we have seen (p. 186) the motion of the sensitive appetite is a passion. But that *mos* was current, though improperly, in the sense of an act of the appetite is witnessed by St. Albert, VI Ethic. Tr. IV. cap. iii, t. 7. p. 460a: "Dicitur enim mos ex inclinatione naturali appetitus actus; et hic mos ad naturam refertur et non proprie mos vocatur." However, if *costume* be understood here in the sense of *mos* as referring to the appetite, then as *mos* we should expect some reference to its subjection to reason, for as properly signifying a moral virtue, *mos* refers to the appetite as it is apt to obey reason. Nor are our expectations disappointed for Guido immediately adds, *et di cor voluntate*, to which we shall now have to turn to see how love is subject to reason, cf. p. 192.

P. 163, l. 36–p. 164, l. 1:

Then Guido adds, *et di cor voluntate*, that is, love is a passion following upon the will in the sensitive appetite, which is in the heart. From this it appears that here Guido posits that love, inasmuch as it is a passion of the soul such as anger and sadness, has its being in the sensitive appetite; for it has its being in the memory, as has been said, not as a passion but as the species of that thing which, when apprehended, causes the passion of love to arise in the appetite. But here he says that it follows upon the sensitive appetite which is in the heart, and in this follows Aristotle, who posited that the appetite and every sensitive power has its being in the heart. Doctors, however, hold that it has being in the brain. But it is not our present concern to determine which opinion is true.

Having shown that love as a passion does not properly have its being in the memory, Dino in this line understands Guido to say that love is properly in the heart. Thus Dino is here interpreting the significance of *cor*. But love is properly to be located in the heart because the heart is the seat of the passions. In fact the passions can be defined as certain motions of the heart; thus Aristotle says (De Anima, I. i, 403a30) that anger is a surging of blood or heat about the heart. But the heart is the seat of the passions because it is the principle of movement inasmuch as the movement of the body is realized through the activity of the animal spirits which are generated by the heart; but for this doctrine vide infra, p. IV sq. Nevertheless, here it suffices to point out that Aristotle did hold that the heart is the seat of the passions; cf. De part. animal. III, iv, 666a11. Some others, however, maintained that the brain is the seat of the passions and of movement, and, although not intending to discuss the truth of the matter, Dino adds this evidently to put in a word for his profession, since it was the medici who held this opinion. Cf. Galen, De placitis Hippoc. et Plat. VIII. and for a discussion concerning the truth of these opinions, cf. St. Albert, I De mot. animal. Tr. II, cap. 1–2, t. 9, pp. 269–273.

P. 164, ll. 1–11:

Guido significantly refers to the will here (et *di cor voluntate*), which seems to reach to the intellect, in order to show that although love may arise from a certain natural disposition by which one is apt to readily incur this passion, nevertheless it also arises from purpose (*ex proposito*) and choice, which pertains to the will which is free and has freedom of judgment, since it faces opposites indifferently. In this love is similar to other passions, as anger, for instance. For although one should be dis-
posed by nature to readily incur the passion of anger, he still is able through his will to refrain from it or else to give in to it. In order then to denote this, Guido says that love is not only a custom of the soul but is also a passion that is consequent upon the will.

Now that we have come to the place of the will in the development of the passion of love we can resume our consideration of love as a custom of the soul, a mos animae (cf. p. 190). For as costume implied, as will be recalled, that love referred to the appetite, we have still to determine whether love does not also obey the reason inasmuch as mos, in virtue of which we have been able to give this interpretation to costume, properly denotes moral virtue. But if we are free to love or not to love, as we evidently are, love must somehow pertain to the reason, for our freedom is rooted in our reason. But since the consent that we give to our loving or refusing to love is an act of the will, it is to the will that we must first look to find what relation it has to reason. Now Aristotle tells us (Ethic. Nic. III. ii, 1111b20–30) that will is closely akin to choice, although not the same. For will is concerned with ends while choice is concerned with means to that end. Thus, for example, we will to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy, or again we will to be happy, for it would not be fitting to say that we choose to be happy, since in general choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control. But happiness is the per se bonum, which is the proper object of the will (ibid. 1113a22–24) and is always willed as the end. But since all things that offer themselves may not be real goods but only apparent ones, being particular goods that are apprehended, deliberation and choice are necessary for determining which particular goods will be suitable means for realizing the end which is the per se bonum, the general good. And it is here that the reason and intellect are involved (ibid., 1112a16), in which lies the basis of the freedom of the will. For the reason must deliberate which particular goods are to be followed to attain the desired end. But in this act of deliberation and choice it is not determined to any certain one, for the intellect lacks any material organ and so is not determined to one by its matter, as the eye is, for instance, to colored surfaces (cf. p. 182); it is somehow all things, and consequently any of all the things offered to it, as apprehended as a good, can be chosen and willed. But this apprehension of a good and the consequent choice or refusal of this good is the work of the will, for, as has been said, the good is the object of the will, whereas the intellect is properly ordered to the true. But since the apprehension which the will follows is that of the intellect, the will is called as we have seen (p. 186), the rational appetite. And it is in virtue of belonging to the rational soul that the sensitive appetite is subject to the will. For as Aristotle says, the inferior are subject to the superior powers; thus the superior moves the inferior spheres among the celestial bodies (De Anima, III. xi, 434a15). Consequently, since reason is superior to the sensitive appetite in men, in virtue of being freer from matter, the motions of that appetite are subject to the deliberation of reason before the will gives its consent to that motion. Thus, although by nature my appetite might move towards Helen, because she is beautiful, before actually loving her I would deliberate whether or not such a love were a real good, and thus it sometimes happens that in the height of passion deliberation will intervene and halt the whole course of our action. But that the passions may sometimes overrule the judgment of reason is also a fact, but for a discussion of this see the analysis of lines 32–34 of Guido’s poem (p. III).

But now sufficient has been said to show the significance of costume in this line. For as understood as mos, we have seen how love can be called a custom of the soul. For though strictly it is improper, nevertheless since love like a moral virtue per-
tains to the sensitive appetite and yet is subject to the will, there is some reason for calling love by such a name. And this enables us to account for the progression of the stanza up to this point. For we have now accounted for both the possibilities that existed in saying that love is in the memory, which allowed love as species of the thing causing love to be in both the sensitive and rational souls (cf. p. 188). But, as we have seen, love is in the sensitive soul in virtue of being properly a passion of the sensitive appetite, and yet it also reaches the intellect inasmuch as it is subject to the will. But having thus gotten back to the intellect again, Guido now proceeds in the following lines of this second stanza to analyze the nature of love as it is in the intellect and thus to achieve a rounded whole out of the stanza. But before proceeding to this part, where Guido considers the external cause of love, it is necessary to review this progression more particularly in order to attempt an answer to the difficulties encountered above (p. 189) as to why Dino should have considered line 19 before line 18. This line, as will be remembered, served the principal purpose of pointing out that love is a generated and sensible thing and so determined the field of enquiry so that Guido could proceed to consider the causes of that generation. But then directly in the next line Guido further specifies his subject matter by saying it is a passion of the soul which is in the heart and subject to the will. But it was necessary for him to specify that it is in the heart lest one think he was going to enquire into the cause of love as it exists in the memory, as was said only four lines back. Furthermore, by specifying it as subject to the will, Guido qualifies the sense in which the natural disposition of the body is a cause of love, as stated in line 18. Consequently, lines 19–20 specify the subject quite particularly so that Guido has made sure of that of which he is going to seek the cause. As an internal cause, however, the natural disposition of the body concerns the disposition of the matter which receives the form of the passion love, and is thus somewhat outside the development of the succeeding lines. Consequently, it may have been for some such feeling that Guido stated that love comes from Mars, in order to get this fact out of the way for the future development and yet to include it in order to complete his account of the causes of love, even though lines 19–20 are naturally prior as determining the field of enquiry of this second part of the stanza. And thus to answer Dino’s doubt (cf. p. 189) as to whether Guido begins his account of the external cause in the line beginning d’alma costume (20) or viaen da veduta forma (21), I should say for the reason just given that the latter is the proper division. Of course, all this difficulty would be avoided if line 18 were taken with the preceding lines, for our whole difficulty here arises from taking this line about love coming from Mars as belonging to this second part. Dino, however, does not take it in this way, for reasons we have already considered, although we shall have to return to this problem later.

P. 164, ll. 12–21:

When Guido says, viaen da veduta forma, etc. (21), he would show what that thing is which, on being apprehended moves the appetite, thereby giving rise to the passion of love. For this passion is caused by the apprehension of some visible form which is comprehended as pleasing (sub ratione complacentiae), as shall be said later. But this pleasingness is itself the result of either the form seeming beautiful or its motions being pleasing. But this apprehension is brought about by the intellect after the species of the visible form has come to it.

Having stated that love is a generated thing specified as a sensible passion located in the heart and yet subject to the will, Dino can now turn to consider what the external cause of this is, which Guido states in saying viaen da veduta forma, che s’intende.
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But not any visible form will give rise to love and consequently Dino says that love arises from a form that is apprehended as pleasing, which is discussed in detail further on (p. V). But such an apprehension is brought about after the species of the visible form has come to it. Consequently, the first step in exegesis is to explain how the visible form reaches the intellect, which Dino accomplishes by showing the order in human apprehension.

P. 164, ll. 21–28:

This is the order in human apprehension as it is declared in natural science. First, the species of the thing comes to the exterior senses, as sight, hearing, touch, taste or smell; from these it goes to the interior powers of the soul, first to the fantasy, then to the cogitative power, and finally to the memorial power; thence it transcends the sensitive order and comes to the possible intellect which is the highest of the apprehensive powers.

Such is the order as Dino states it, but in that it differs from the order usually given by the scholastic philosophers it offers some difficulties of explication. The distinction between the external and internal powers of the sensitive soul is common enough. It distinguishes those powers which directly apprehend their objects as existing outside the soul from those which apprehend their objects as existing within the soul. Thus St. Albert in III De anima, Tr. I. cap. i, t. 5, p. 316a: "Est earum (potentiae sensitivae) quaedam sunt apprehensivae de foris existentibus suis agentibus, quaedam autem sunt apprehensivae, ita quod sua agentia proxima sunt et intus." But the external powers are those commonly called the five senses, and their mode of apprehension has been sufficiently considered above in the case of sight. The enumeration of the internal powers as given by Dino, however, differs considerably from that usually given. Inasmuch as he says the first of these is called phantasia, we might suppose he is following Avicenna, since Avicenna says the first of the internal powers is the phantasia or sensus communis (De anima, P. I. cap. v, f. 5rb). But the rest of Dino's list does not at all tally with Avicenna's. For whereas Dino enumerates only the cogitative and memorial power after the fantasy, Avicenna gives the imagination, the cogitative, estimative and memorial powers. Consequently, Dino is either omitting several of the powers or using some of his terms to comprehend more than one power. On the testimony of Avicenna himself we can take the latter as the case. Cf. Canon, I. Fen. I. Doc. 6, cap. 5, t. 1, p. 75: "Et virtus quidem comprehensiva occulte est sicut genus quinque virtutem: una est virtus, quae vocatur sensus communis et phantasia; et apud medicos quidem sunt una virtus, sed apud certificantes, qui sunt ex philosophis, duae sunt virtutes... Et secunda quidem est virtus, quam medici vocant cogitativam... et est estimativa... Quidam autem hominum sunt qui prae sumunt et hanc virtutem imaginativam vocant, sed tamen non curamus: quia de nominibus nom disputamus. Sed intentiones et differentias intelligere debemus. Et medico quidem non est curandum, ut hanc virtutem sciat... Tertio vero ver illarum quas nominant medici, est quinta aut quarta, quum certificaverimus, quae est virtus conservativa et memorialis." Thus the doctors take some powers to comprehend what the philosophers distinguish as two separate powers; they name common sense and fantasy as one power and also designate as cogitativa the estimative and imaginative (in man the cogitative) powers, while they agree with the philosophers in calling the last of the interior powers the memory. Therefore, Dino in naming only three interior powers of the soul is only following his profession and by these three comprehends the five powers which the philosophers designate. But it is now necessary to see how these powers operate in carrying the sensible object to the intellect, and in con-
sidering these powers it is better to follow what Avicenna says of them in the De anima rather than in the Canon, since, as a philosopher, he goes into much greater detail to consider their nature and mutual relations.

From the external senses the forms or species apprehended come to the first of the interior powers of the soul, the common sense. This power is located in the first concavity of the brain, and its work is to receive the impressions of the five senses. Once these impressions have been received by the common sense, they are conserved by the imagination, which is located at the extremity of the anterior concavity of the brain, and whose work it is to keep these impressions of the five senses even after the sensible things causing the sensations have been removed. These images conserved in the imagination are compounded and divided by the vis imaginativa, which in man is called the cogitativa, and which is located in the middle concavity of the brain. But whereas all these powers operate according to the species which the external senses abstract, the next power, the estimative, apprehends those sensible qualities which the external senses cannot even perceive. Thus, the sheep which sees a wolf knows immediately it must flee by reason of its estimative power, for it apprehends that, if it does not, its life will be endangered. This faculty is located at the top of the middle concavity of the brain. Finally, there is the memorial power, located in the posterior concavity of the brain, which conserves the intentions which the estimative power perceives; thus, the memory is in the same relation to the estimative power as the imagination is to the common sense (Avicenna, De anima, P. I. cap. v, f. 5rb).

Now inasmuch as these diverse powers have diverse functions to perform, they apprehend according to diverse modes of apprehension. But since, as we have seen in the case of sight, to apprehend is to abstract the form of a thing from its matter, these powers are diverse according to the diverse grades of abstraction at which they apprehend. And these grades are determined according to the completeness with which the form is abstracted from matter and its conditions or appendices (loc. cit., P. II, cap. ii, f. 6vb). Thus, for example, sight needs these accidents of matter when apprehending its form, since it does not make a complete abstraction of the form from its matter, but needs certain matter present in order to make its apprehension possible. Imagination, on the other hand, makes a more complete abstraction and, consequently, has no need for the matter in order to accomplish its apprehension; thus, although the matter of the form it apprehends is absent or even destroyed, it can still hold the form stable, whereas if the matter were not present to sight, it could no longer apprehend its form. But although the imagination makes its form clear of matter, it does not make it completely clear of material accidents, for the forms which are in the imagination are still sensible with a certain quality and quantity as well as place and, thus, individual. The estimative power, however, transcends this order of abstraction in that it apprehends immaterial intentions which are not in their matter, although it happens to them to be in matter inasmuch as figure and color and place and the like are things which it is impossible to have except in corporeal matter. Thus goodness and badness, the fitting and unfitting are things which in themselves are not material, although it happens to them to be in some body. Consequently, estimation is a purer abstraction and closer to simplicity than the two preceding. But it is not completely clear of matter, for it apprehends particular things according to their proper matter and according to the comparison of one thing to another and, consequently, apprehends its form still with some of the accidents of matter. The only power in which forms are completely free of matter and its accidents is the intellect, for it apprehends forms which have been made clear of matter and its accidents in every
way; it apprehends one nature free of quantity, quality, place and position. In this it differs from the apprehension of sense, imagination, or estimation. It accomplishes the most complete abstraction of form from matter of any of the powers of the soul (Avicenna, loc. cit. and f. 7ra).

P. 164, ll. 28–41:

This intellect is called possible to differentiate it from the agent intellect, which is also in us, but is not an apprehensive power, which is all we are concerned with here. The possible intellect is that which receives the species of the thing, and in receiving that species, knows the thing. Therefore, Guido says that the form, which is first apprehended by sight, comes to the possible intellect and does not proceed any further to any other power because there is no other apprehensive power in us which is higher or more noble than this one. Thus he says, che prende nel possibile intelleco, come in subjecto loco, etc. (22–23); that is, it takes its place as in a subject in the possible intellect, which is the subject and place of the apprehended species of things, which is in agreement with Aristotle (III De Anima, iv, 429a27), who says that the soul is the place of species, though not as a whole, but only in its intellectual part. Then Guido says, et dimoranza, that is, the species of this thing comes to rest there because it does not proceed to any other power or place.

As we have just seen above (p. 195), it is in virtue of accomplishing the most complete abstraction that Dino refers to the intellect as a more noble power than any of the others of the soul, in fact, the highest of them. But having come to the intellect in following the order of apprehension, we now take leave of Avicenna, for Dino in considering the intellect posits the agent intellect as existing within us, thereby giving evidence he is not here following Avicenna, who posits it as existing outside us in an Intelligence (cf. De Anima, P. V., cap. v, f. 25rv and also Metaphys. IX, cap. iv, f. 105r). Consequently, let us now turn back to Aristotle, keeping in mind, however, Dino’s interpretation that both the possible and agent intellect are within us, that is, not separated from the soul of man. But as to what is Aristotle’s own opinion on this question of the intellect, cf. G. Rodier, Aristote, Traité de l’âme, Paris, E. Leroux, 1900, t. II, p. 459–467.

Concerning the intellect, Aristotle says in the De Anima, III, v. 430a10–15, that in every being there is an element which plays the role of matter and an element which plays the role of form; the one is in potency to all, the other produces in act all of its kind. Consequently, there must be in the soul also an intellect apt to become all and an intellect capable of producing all. But these are respectively the possible and agent intellect, for it is possible for the one to become all things, since it is in potency to all, but it is none of these until actualized by the other. The agent intellect accomplishes this work, as we have seen (p. 195), by abstracting and thus freeing the species, apprehended by sense, from all matter and the conditions of matter. Thus Aristotle goes on to say (430a16) that the agent intellect is in respect to the intelligibles in potency, which it renders into act, like light is in respect to the colors in potency, which it renders into act. For as we have seen above (p. 182), light actualizes color insofar as it renders the diaphanous in act and thereby allows the color to meet the condition of the seeing power and so become actually seen; likewise, the agent intellect actualizes the intelligible in potency by infusing it with its light whereby it, as a sensible species, is made to meet the conditions of the intellect by being freed of all its material conditions and so becomes actually known. Thus the agent intellect accomplishes its work by making the object, which has been apprehended by the senses, universal, which is the condition for things to be known, for as Aristotle says knowledge is of the universal. Consequently, by abstracting the universal from the sensible species the agent intellect actualizes the possible intel-

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lect and in this act is as art in respect to its matter (432a12). For just as it is the work of art to induce a form into matter, so it is the work of the agent intellect to induce the universal, which it has abstracted from the sensible species, into the possible intellect. Thus the possible intellect is as the recipient of that which the agent intellect has to give, and therefore, Dino says that it is the last of the apprehensive powers inasmuch as the apprehension, in this case knowledge, is realized when the agent intellect has deposited the universal in the possible intellect, or in other words, when it has actualized it.

Thus we have followed the species of the thing from its beginning in sense up to its final rest in the intellect. But the species at this stage is no longer the same as it was when first apprehended by sight. It has been successively further deprived of its matter by going, as we have seen, through the internal powers of the soul until in the possible intellect it is rendered completely abstract by the agent intellect; as such the object has met the conditions of human knowledge and is known. Thus, in being known by the intellect, the object is apprehended by all the apprehensive powers of the soul: the external senses give the first experience of the object, which is correlated by the common sense and impressed on the imagination, after which the cogitative power combines and organizes it with the other images it has; the estimation, then judges it good or bad, fitting or unfitting and the like, which judgment is conserved in the memory. Finally the intelligible species is abstracted and deposited in the possible intellect, where the object attains its end as such in being known.

Therefore Guido says that this form, which causes love, goes from the apprehension of sight to the possible intellect, where it takes its rest, since there is no further power for it to proceed to. As an object of apprehension, it has reached its end there in being known and there it stays as in the subject and place of the apprehended species of things, for as Aristotle says (De anima, III, iv, 429a27), the soul in its intellective part is the place of species.

P. 164, l. 42—p. 165, l. 9:

But two things should be noted here. In the first place, although Guido states that love is caused by the apprehension of a form which is first seen by sight, we are not to understand by this that he means only the sense of sight to the exclusion of all the other external senses. For the thing which is loved, such as a woman, pleases the lover not only because he comprehends what is beautiful in her color, figure and quantity, which are all apprehended through sight; she may also please through other motions, which are comprehended by other senses, such as her speech and other motions. But because this pleasingness, which causes the passion of love in the appetite, in most cases comes from a form which is comprehended by sight, our author in this place states love as arising only from the sense of sight. Secondly, it should be noted that what Guido says here about the possible intellect shows that the apprehension which the lover has is not purely sensitive; for inasmuch as it comes to the possible intellect it partakes of the intellect. Consequently Guido is speaking in this poem only of the love that man has, and it is not his intention to treat of love and friendship among the brute animals, which are without intellect and therefore do not have this kind of love.

But in thus stating that love arises from sight, Guido has not only the authority of poets, who presumably have also been lovers, but also that of the philosophers. For Aristotle notes in the Ethics (IX. v, 1167a5—7) that the pleasure of sight is the beginning of love, since no one loves who is not delighted with the form seen. For as St. Thomas says in his commentary on this text (In Ethic. IX. lect. v, n. 1824) one begins to love a woman because he is delighted with her beauty. But we shall have
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to go into a further discussion of this when we consider how this pleasingness is the cause of love (cf. p. V).

Secondly, Dino notes that what is said here about the possible intellect shows that the apprehension which the lover has is not purely sensitive; for inasmuch as it comes to the possible intellect it partakes of the intellect. Consequently, Guido is speaking in this poem only of the love that man has, and it is not his intention to treat of love and friendship among the brute animals, which are without intellect and, therefore, do not have this kind of love.

But having seen what Dino’s interpretation of these lines is, it will be well to consider briefly how well his interpretation fits the text. Guido’s words are, as will be recalled, that love comes from a seen form which is understood so that it takes its place and rest in the possible intellect, as in a subject (“viene da veduta forma che s’intende, che prende nel possibile intellecto, comen subgetto, loco et dimoranza”). It comes from a seen form, as we have seen, because the pleasingness from which love arises usually is comprehended by sight; the other senses may comprehend some pleasingness, but sight is foremost. Likewise, it comes from sight, just as all our concepts arise from a form perceived by sense. But this is a form che s’intende, which can be taken literally as “which intends itself.” For as a form apprehended, its whole existence is intentionale; it is continually tending toward the knowing power of the subject. As such, in this case it goes through, as we have seen above, all the apprehensive powers of the sensitive soul, being further abstracted from its matter by each successive power, until it is deposited in the memory. From here it is completely abstracted from all sensible matter and rendered an intelligible species by the agent intellect and deposited in the possible intellect (“nel possibile intellecto”). Here it takes its place as in a subject (“comen subgetto loco”) and here it remains, since there is no further power or place for it to go (“et dimoranza”). The thing from which this form was abstracted is now known, and the form itself, now a concept, is that through which the thing tends towards the intellect and through which the intellect tends towards the thing. Cf. E. Gilson, “Review of G. Cavalcanti Rime,” in Criterion, XII (1932–33), p. 109: “The origin of our concepts is a form perceived by our senses (veduta forma), abstracted from the sensible image by an act of understanding (che s’intende) and impressed by the active intellect in the possible intellect (nel possibile intelletto), where it stays as in its receiving and conserving subject (chome in subgetto locho e dimoranza).” Consequently, since the form from which love arises reaches the intellect, love is not wholly confined to the sensitive soul; there is something intellectual about it. This agrees with what was said in the preceding lines about love being subject to the will, for the will, as we have seen, is known as the rational appetite. Therefore, the love of which Guido speaks in this poem is properly human, for brute animals, having neither intellect nor will, cannot participate in it.

P. 165, ll. 10–24:

But beginning with, en quella parte mai non a posanza, etc. (1.24), Guido removes any quasi error or doubt that may have arisen from what has just been said. For since it has just been said that the cause of love is the species of some visible form which comes to the possible intellect, one might think that by these words Guido meant to say that the passion of love has its being in the possible intellect. But this is not true, and thus to remove any such doubt Guido says that love as a passion does not have its being in the possible intellect, for the possible intellect is not a particular corporeal power inasmuch as it is not a form which comes from the mixing together of the elements and their qualities. And Guido says this in, perche da qualitate non discende.

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Here then Dino begins to consider what sort of existence love has in the intellect, for in this way he can show why it is that love as a passion has no power or place in the intellect, as Guido says in line 24. But here we are to understand that it is love as a passion which has no place in the intellect, for as we have seen (p. 186), a passion is that which a man suffers in his body from the motion of the sensible appetite towards its object. Consequently, since the intellect is unmixed with body, love as it exists in the intellect will not have the character of a passion. Thus love is to be differently considered according as it is in the sensitive appetite, where it exists as a passion of the body, and in the intellect, where, as lacking any sensitive affection, it is not a passion; cf. St. Thomas, *In de anima*, I. lect. x, n. 162: “Et ideo haec, amor, odium, gaudium et huiusmodi possunt intelligi, et prout sunt in appetitu sensitiva et sic habent motum corporalem conjunctum: et prout sunt in intellectu et voluntate tantum absque omni affectione sensitiva, et sic non possunt dici motus, quia non habent motum corporalem conjunctum.” And at present we are concerned with love as it exists in the intellect, where it has no being as a passion, since the intellect is not a corporeal power, nor mixed with body.

That the possible intellect (as well as the agent intellect, cf. *De anima*, III. v, 430a17) is not mixed with body in any way is clear from what Aristotle says in the *De anima*, III iv, 429a18–26: For since the intellect knows all things, it must be unmixed with matter; that is, it must not be determined to any one thing, but be possible in respect to all. In this, as St. Thomas points out in commenting upon this passage (*In de ani*. III. lect. vii, n. 681) the intellect is distinguished from the senses which are determined to one thing; thus sight is determined to visible things, hearing to audible, etc., whereas the intellect wholly lacks any such determination. For if it were determined to one thing, it would be unable to know other things, just as the sight, if it were determined to any one color, would be unable to see other colors; thus just as the sense of sight is unmixed with color, since it is apt to see colors, so the intellect is unmixed with sensible and corporeal things, since it is apt to know all sensible and corporeal things. Therefore, as Aristotle goes on to say, it is unreasonable that the intellect should be mixed with body either as having the qualities, such as hot or cold, or some organ, such as a sensitive power; that is the intellect is not mixed with either a simple or a composite body. But since a composite body is one that is composed out of the simple, it is sufficient to state that the intellect is not mixed with the simple bodies in order to show the intellect is in no way mixed with body, and this is what Guido accomplishes in saying *da qualitate non discende* (1.25). For the simple or first bodies are the elements, which, as Aristotle says (*De generatione*, II. i, 329a24–26), come from prime matter as accompanied with contrariety. But this contrariety of prime matter is due to the first or elemental qualities, which are those to which all others can be reduced and yet which themselves cannot be further reduced, namely the hot and dry, moist and cold (*ibid.*, 329b25–29). And from these the elements are constituted according to the various combinations of the qualities; thus fire is the hot and dry, air the hot and moist, water the cold and moist, and earth the cold and dry (*ibid.*, II, iii, 330b–6). Therefore, by saying that the possible intellect does not “descend from quality,” Guido means that it is not in any way mixed with body; for if it does not come from the first qualities, it is not constituted of the elements, which are the simplest parts of all bodies. Consequently, since the intellect is not mixed with body, love cannot exist in the intellect as a passion, for as a passion it must be mixed with body, and hence love as a passion has no being in the intellect, since it is not a corporeal power.
P. 165, il. 24–34:

The intellect is a certain form removed from particularity and corruptibility, since corruptibility proceeds from the elemental qualities. Therefore the possible intellect first and properly receives what is universal and incorruptible. And this is what Guido would say in *resplende in se perpetuale effecto* (l. 26), that is, the operation of the intellect is as the effect of the soul in respect of something that is perpetual and incorruptible. Consequently, since the intellect is not a particular corporeal power such as the sensitive powers, love cannot exist as a passion in the intellect, since it is a certain particular corporeal passion.

If the intellect is not at all mixed with matter, as we have just seen, then it is free of all corruptibility and particularity, since these are due to the presence of matter. It is free of corruptibility since it is free of the elemental qualities, which are the source of corruptibility. For as Aristotle says, generation and corruption are from contraries (*Phys.* VIII. vii, 261a34); but as we have seen above (p. 134), the contraries of prime matter, i.e. the first contraries, are the elemental qualities. Therefore the changing of these qualities have as a result generation and corruption (*De gen. et corrup.* II, i, 329a6). But since the corruption of one thing is always the generation of another (*ibid.* I, iii, 318a24–25), we find for instance that the corruption of fire is the generation of air, for fire, being hot and dry, becomes air, the hot and moist, when the dry is dominated by the moist (*ibid.* II, iv, 331a26–30). Thus by this change of the elemental qualities the elements are transformed, but since the elements are the simplest bodies of which all complex bodies are composed, their generation and corruption will cause the same in any complex body. Consequently, since the intellect is not constituted by the elements, it will be free from all corruption. Furthermore, it is not mixed with matter, being unmixed with the elements and their qualities, and therefore will be beyond any particularity, for as Aristotle says, it is matter that individualizes things (*Metaphys.* V, vi, 1016b35; cf. also XII, viii, 1074a33); thus Socrates and Plato for instance are diverse individuals on account of their matter, for both have the same specific form of man. Therefore the intellect, being removed from particularity and corruptibility, is first and properly concerned with that which is universal and incorruptible, which is signified by Guido in saying *resplende in se perpetuale effecto*. For as Dino says, its operation is as the effect of the soul in respect to what is incorruptible. But its operation is dependent on its being in act, which is brought about, as we have seen by the agent intellect according as it separates the potentially intelligible from matter and its conditions by shining upon it, just as light in shining upon colors makes them illuminated; cf. St. Albert, III *De anima*, Tr. II, cap. xviii, t. 5, p. 364b: “et sic ille intellectus (agens) potentia intelligibilium facit actum intelligibilium per hoc quod separat ea a materia, et a conditionibus materiarum, resplendendo super ea, sicut lumen resplendo super colores facit eos resulare in lucido.” (italics mine). Since, however, the intelligibles in this state are completely separated from matter, they are removed from any of the consequences of matter and hence are perpetual and incorruptible. Therefore, considered in itself (*Guido’s in se*), i.e. without reference to the material means on which our intellect depends, the effect of the intellect, as in act, is to have the intelligibles completely separated from their matter and shining in the light of its intelligibility. Cf. St. Albert, III *De somno et vig.* Tr. I, cap. vi, t. 9, p. 184b: “Avicenna et Algazel per omnia concordantes dicunt animam intellectualem non esse in corpore, sed potius illustrare in ipsum suam splendorem. Dicunt enim quod intellectus in homine de natura intellectus est agentis, et est proprius etus effectus.” (italics mine).
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Thus we see again why love as a passion cannot be located in the intellect, for that which belongs to a corporeal and hence corruptible power could not be in the intellect, which is incorporeal and incorruptible.

P. 165, ll. 34–47:

The operation of the intellect is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, which is what Guido says in *non a dilecto*; i.e. it has no corporeal delectations such as are in the passion of love and hence has no passion such as anger, sadness and the like. However, although the intellect has no corporeal delectation, it does have a spiritual delectation which follows from its proper operation when perfect. Whence Aristotle says in the *Ethics* that philosophy affords many delectations of purity and stability. But this delectation is not such as that of love, which is corporeal, as a passion of the sensitive soul. For the operation of the intellect is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, which Guido says in *ma consideranza*, i.e. its operation is to consider and know.

Here Dino shows that the operation of the intellect is not such as would satisfy the passion of love. For its operation is pure consideration and spiritual apprehension, but as pure and spiritual, it cannot be concerned with anything so material as a passion of the sensitive appetite. Therefore love as a passion will not properly be located in the intellect. But by consideration and spiritual apprehension Dino signifies the first two operations of the intellect (cf. St. Thomas, *In de Anima*, I, lect. x, n. 164), which Aristotle considers in the *De anima*, III, cap. vi. The first operation of the intellect is the apprehension of simple or indivisible things; thus the apprehension of Socrates as man is the apprehension of the simple concept man. But when I apprehend that Socrates is a white man, I accomplish the second operation of the intellect, which is the compounding and dividing of concepts so as to express a judgment; thus in apprehending that Socrates is a white man, I put together the concepts of man and whiteness so as to make the judgment, “Socrates is a white man.” But since I am dealing with concepts in these operations, which have been gotten, as we have seen, by abstraction from the materials of sense, I will have no corporeal delectation from such an operation; whence Guido says of the intellect, *non a dilecto ma consideranza*. However, as Dino points out, *dilecto* here is to be taken only in the sense of corporeal delectation, inasmuch as there is a certain spiritual delectation connected with the intellect. For as Aristotle points out, there are two kinds of delectation, one of the body and the other of the soul (*Eth. Nic.* III, x, 1117b29). Consequently although the intellect has no corporeal delectation, being completely unmixed with body, it does have a spiritual one, which follows from its own proper operation when perfect, just as any power, corporeal or not, has its proper delectation when operating perfectly (*ibid.* X, iv, 1174b20). Thus Aristotle says that philosophy affords many delectations of purity and stability (*Ibid.* 1177a25). But this is not the delectation such as would occur in love, which is corporeal as a passion of the sensitive soul. Therefore, when Guido says that the intellect has no delight but consideration, he means that it has no corporeal delight, but its operation is considering and knowing, whose delight is not corporeal, but spiritual; whence love as a passion will have no place therein.

P. 165, l. 48–p. 166, l. 4:

Consequently, in *si che non puo largire simiglianza* (28), Guido says that no such passion as love or any other corporeal passion can come to the intellect. For as Aristotle says in the *De anima* (I, iv, 408b13), to say that the soul is happy or sad is similar to saying it weaves or builds. 

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Now for the reasons given (p. 199 sq.) Guido states his conclusion that the intellect cannot grant a likeness to love as a sensitive passion, for since it is incorporeal and incorruptible it can in no way have a likeness of that which is corporeal and corruptible, as the passion of love is. Yet if love were to exist in the intellect, it would have to be there as a certain likeness, for the intellect knows a thing through the likeness it has of that thing. For as Aristotle says, the intellect in act is the same as the thing in act (De anima, III, vii, 431a1), wherefore there must be a likeness in the intellect to the thing known; and this likeness is the intelligible species by which the intellect knows the thing; cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I. 85, 2: “id quod intelligitur primo, est res, cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo.” But as we have seen above (p. 196–197), the intelligible species is completely abstracted from matter and its conditions; it is universal and hence incorporeal and incorruptible. Consequently if love were to be in the intellect, it would be there as somehow abstracted from all its matter, as a universal or concept, so that it would no longer properly have the character of a passion of the sensitive soul, which is material in virtue of being connected with the sensitive appetite which is a corporeal power. Therefore Guido says that the intellect can make no likeness of love as a passion, for it would have to abstract it from the very conditions which make it a passion. As in the intellect then, love will not have the character of a passion, but will be only that form from which love can arise once the appetite has grasped it; but we shall have to consider how this happens when we come to the fifth stanza.

In resume, then, love as a passion has no existence in the possible intellect, because it, the possible intellect, does not descend from quality, that is, it is unmixed with any corporeal form, which comes from a mixing of the qualities of the elements. Here it is well to note that Dino understands amore to be the subject of non a posanza, whereas he takes intellecto to be the subject of the causal clause and of all that follows in this stanza. Qualitate is taken, as we have seen, to signify the first qualities which constitute the elements, of which, in turn, every corporeal form is composed. The intellect is said not to descend, (non descendere) from quality in the sense of not coming from what is first as simplest in the composition of corporeal forms. Therefore, since love has its existence from some corporeal thing, inasmuch as it is a sensitive passion, it does not have any existence in a completely incorporeal power such as the intellect is. In fact, the form from which love arises, as it exists in the intellect, generates no corporeal and corruptible things such as love is; it is universal as an intelligible basking in the light of intelligibility and, hence, being completely removed from matter and its conditions, it is purely spiritual and incorruptible. But it has been rendered thus by the intellect, and, therefore, Guido says that the intellect shines in its own perpetual effect (risplende in se perpetuale effetto). Since, however, this form is in the intellect as an object of knowledge, it does not generate any corporeal delight, but it generates knowledge. What delight it does generate is purely spiritual as the delight which the intellect has in functioning perfectly, which is in knowing; whence Guido says that it has no delight but consideration (non a dillecto ma consideranza). Cf. Gilson, Cavalcanti, Rime, op. cit., p. 109: “Considered as a form that is simply understood in the intellect, love has no real power (e in quella parte mai non a posanza); in other words, being then a purely rational quality, it does not generate delight, but knowledge (non a dilletto ma consideranza); quite different is the sensible emotion generated by the contemplation of a beautiful form, it delights and, sometimes, it kills.” This being so, the intellect can grant no likeness to love as a sensitive passion; it can hold no likeness of a corporeal and corruptible thing. Whence Guido says, non puo largire simiglianza. Con-
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sequently, since love exists in the intellect only as the form of that from which love arises, which is being known but not desired, it is not there as a passion; but is there as incorporeal and incorruptible whereas love derives its power, and exercises it, from being a corporeal and corruptible thing. Therefore, love does not find its proper existence in the intellect.

We have, then, in the second stanza the answer to the first two questions which Guido posited, namely where love is and who created it ("la dove posa et chi lo fa creare"). We have seen in what sense love is in the memory in the first part of the stanza, and in the second part we have learned that Mars and a seen form are the causes of love. These are not, however, either unqualified or complete answers to these questions, and already in the course of this one stanza we have found that love is not only in the memory but is also somehow in the heart as well as in the possible intellect. Furthermore, concerning the second question, we have found that not only can the causality of Mars be frustrated by the will, in the case of love, but the causality of the seen form is not merely sensitive: it reaches the intellect, so that there is something intellectual as well as sensual to love. In one sense, then, an answer has been given in this stanza to these two questions, but in another sense, the complete answer cannot be given until we have finished the poem. Therefore, in the course of the poem we shall not only be answering new questions as they arise, but we shall also be completing our answers to the questions that have gone before.

(To be continued)
The Franciscan Ordo Missae in the Thirteenth Century

V. L. KENNEDY, C.S.B.

The General Chapter of the Friars Minor held at Narbonne in 1260 under the presidency of St. Bonaventure, then Minister General, decreed that the text of the breviaries and missals should be corrected according to the exemplar verius.¹ We may assume then that by the year 1260, there was in circulation a missal which was recognized as the official mass book of the Friars Minor; and, in fact, the libraries of Europe have preserved a comparatively large number of copies of this Franciscan missal, some of which may be dated as early as this period.² The subsequent good fortune and high destiny of this missal are well known. Rudolph of Rivo, (+1403), a devotee of the ancient Roman rite, complains that in his day all the service books at Rome are "new and Franciscan" as a result of the decree of Nicholas III (1277–1280) who imposed the missal and the breviary of the Friars Minor on the clergy of Rome.³ Popularized by the sons of St. Francis, this missal was widely used throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages and served as the base for the definitive Roman missal imposed on the Latin church by Pius V in 1570.⁴

The history of the origin and development of this mass book up to 1260 still presents some puzzling problems to the historian and not a few details require clarification. Although we know that St. Francis himself gave a definite Roman trend to the liturgical services of his Order;⁵ we are far from certain of the identity of the person or persons who adapted the service books of Rome to the needs of the Franciscans. We intend to confine ourselves here to the question of the missal; the history of the breviary has been reasonably well done⁶ and we shall not touch on it here except incidentally and in so far as it is inseparable from the history of the missal. The problem will be dealt with under the following heads: (a) The Liturgy-

⁵ Rule of 1223, c. 3. Opuscula S. P. Francisci (Quaracchi, 1904), p. 66. — Et clerici faciant divinum officium secundum ordinem Sanctae Romanae ecclesiae, excepto psalterio, ex quo habere poterunt breviaria.

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cal Work of Haymo of Faversham. (b) The Ordinationes divini Officii and the Indutus planeta. (c) The Ordo missae and the Indutus planeta.

(a) The Liturgical Work of Haymo of Faversham

Salimbene, the thirteenth century chronicler of the Franciscan Order, tells us that John of Parma, Minister General from 1247 to 1257, sent a letter to all the houses of the Order in which he gave instructions that the ecclesiastical office should be celebrated in a uniform way by all. Fortunately, a copy of this letter, which begins: Quia sicut indubitante, has been preserved for us by Luke Wadding in his Annals. In the course of this letter, in which he demands uniformity not only in the Office but also in the celebration of Mass, John of Parma makes two statements which are of interest to us here:

a) . . . districte duxi praesentibus inungendum quod praeter id solum quod ordinarium missalis et breviarium a fratre Aymone sanctae recordationis praecedecessore meo pio correctum studio et per Sedem Apostolicam confirmatum et approbatum postea nihilominus per generale capitulum noscitur continuere, ut nihil omnino . . . in choro cantari vel legi . . .

b) In missarum celebratione uniformitate deoceatis a cunctis fratribus quantum fieri poterit observari; ut videlicet hostiam a sinistra sacerdotis et calicem ad dexteram, juxta ritum Romanum ecclesiae, ex traverso altaris componant. Corporalia et pallam quae per se divisam debent calici superponi, disponent, necon hostiam frangant, et sumant sicut in rubricis missalis quod habemus a curia continentur . . .

Apparently then, about the year 1250 John of Parma the Minister General believed that the missal in use in his Order was essentially that of the Roman curia and that this missal had undergone some modification or correction at the hands of his predecessor Haymo of Faversham who had held the highest office in the Order from 1240 to his death in 1244.

We find some confirmation for these statements in the Franciscan missal itself. The mass book of the Friars Minor always bears the title: Ordo missalis Fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem curiae romanae. In the oldest copies of this missal, the feast of St. Clare canonized in 1255 is missing or has been added après coup on the other hand all copies contain the feasts of: St. Francis of Assisi canonized in 1225; St. Anthony of Padua canonized in 1232; St. Dominic canonized in 1234; and St. Elizabeth of Hungary, canonized in 1235. We may assume that the work of adapting the curial missal to the needs of the Friars was done between 1235 and 1255; there is then no internal evidence against Haymo’s composition of the Ordo missalis Fratrum Minorum.


9 We assume that the phrase pio correctum studio modifies both ordinarium missalis et breviarium; such an interpretation is grammatically sound.

10 e.g. Paris, Bibl. Maz. ms. 426; Leroquais, op. cit. p. 127.

11 At the present stage of our research, we hesitate to attribute the composition of the Franciscan missal unreservedly to Haymo. We suspect that there was an early imperfect attempt at adaptation, similar to the place of the Breviary of St. Clare in the history of the breviary. At least one manuscript that we know of, contains a missal which appears to be earlier than the regular Franciscan type; it contains a considerable number of rubrics apparently taken from the Ordinarius in use at the curia in the time of Innocent III, and lacks some of the features always found in the regular missal. We hope to return to this question at a later date when it will be possible to secure the necessary photostats from various belligerent countries. It may be possible to reconstruct the actual missal of the curia by the help of these documents.

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It is quite impossible to say just how much work was involved in this composition; so far, at least, no copy of the curial missal of the first half of the thirteenth century has been discovered. Two hypotheses are possible: (a) there existed a missal secundum consuetudinem curiae romanae essentially the same as what we now know as the Franciscan missal; the masses for the new saints were added and the copyist simply inserted the words Fratrum minorum in the title. (b) An entirely new mass book was composed from the service books in use at the curia, so as to give priests of the Order a convenient, serviceable missal. In support of the first hypothesis, we have the statement of John of Parma "missalis quod habemus a curia," and the fact that there is little in the new missal that would not be found in a Roman mass book of the time; the order of the material is essentially the same as found in the old Lateran Missal; the Ordo missae shows but few changes from that described by Cardinal Lotario (Innocent III) in his De sacro altaris mysterio. Further, we know that Innocent III reformed the liturgy to meet the needs of the curia and this reform probably involved the composition of a missal for the curia. On the other hand, in support of the second hypothesis, the objection may be raised: if the missal of the Friars is nothing but that of the curia, why then did Nicholas III impose the Franciscan missal on the churches of Rome rather than the curial mass book? We do not, of course, know the answer; his choice may have been due to the fact that a larger number of Franciscan missals were available. In any case, our ignorance of the exact content of the curial missal, makes it impossible to determine exactly the difference between the two mass books; we may assume from the statement of John of Parma and from the title of the book itself, that the Franciscan missal was basically and essentially the same as that of the Roman curia.

Haymo of Faversham is credited with another liturgical composition. The author of the Chronicle of the Twenty-four Ministers General, writing about 1369, states:

Hic (Haymo) etiam in capitolo generali deffinitorum quod tenuit Bononiae fecit illam rubricam de agendis in missa quae incipit Indutus planeta sacerdos et fecit divinum officium diligentius corrigi et rubricas alias suppleri de voluntate domini Innocentii Papae IV privilegiiis declarata.

This is simply a development of a similar notice for Haymo which was written about 1304 in the Catalogue of the Ministers General. 

Hic (Haymo) fecit divinum officium corrigi et rubricas suppleri de voluntate et beneplacito domini Innocentii Papae IV privilegiiis declarata.

This statement that Haymo was the author of the rubric Indutus planeta is repeated by subsequent writers and is generally accepted as true by modern Franciscan

12 Cf. previous note.
14 P.L. 207, 802–914.
16 Chronica xxto Generalium Ordinis Minorum in Analecta Franciscana vol. 3 (Quaracchi, 1897), p. 247.
18 e.g. Chronica Fr. Mariani in Archivio Franc. Hist. ii (1909) 305; Speculum Minorum (Rothomag, 1509), Tract, iii, fol. 222v, in margin; Speculum Minorum seu Firmamentum Trium Ordinum (Venetiis, 1513), fol. 32. (Breve memoriale Ordinis Fr. Min.); Wadding, Annales ad an. 1242.
It is curious, however, that the chronicler of 1304 does not seem to know about this phase of Haymo’s liturgical activity. No doubt it is possible that a writer in 1369 could be in possession of facts which were unknown to an earlier chronicler but his testimony should not be accepted at face value without some supporting evidence.

The rubric *Indutus planeta* referred to here is a little book of directions for a priest saying Mass according to the Roman rite; its real title as found in early manuscripts is: *Ordo agentorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa juxta consuetudinem ecclesiae romanæ.* It has been published in a number of early Franciscan printed collections and again in modern times by a rather well-known liturgical scholar who edited it as a sixteenth century document and one that was probably not Roman. There is no indication in any thirteenth or fourteenth century manuscript, so far as we now know, of the author. John of Parma in his letter *Quis sicut indubitantor*, when giving directions to his subjects on the celebration of Mass does not refer to it; neither does the Chapter of Narbonne (1263). On the other hand, the *Indutus planeta* is found in at least one Franciscan missal of the second half of the thirteenth century; apparently its use was prescribed by the General Chapter held at Paris in 1266. Nicholas Glassberger in his *Chronica* gives us the following information:

Anno Domini 1266 fuit capitulum generale Parisiis . . . item moneantur fratres ut uniformiter se habeant in officio missae secundum ordinationem et rubricam illam quae incipit: *Indutus planeta saceros.*

This statement of Glassberger’s is supported by a rubric found in an early fifteenth century Franciscan breviary (Paris B.N. Lat. 760):

f. 266: Item diffinivit generale capitulum Parisiis celebratum quod moneantur fratres ut uniformiter se habeant in officio missae secundum ordinationem et rubricam illam quae incipit: *Indutus saceros.*

It is to be noted that the Chapter of Paris did not make any mention of the author. However, before we come to any conclusion, we must study the *Indutus planeta* in relation to other liturgical documents of the period.

(b) *The Indutus planeta and the Ordinationes divini officii*

An other Franciscan liturgical document of the thirteenth century is the *Ordinationes divini officii* or as it is sometimes called the *Caerimoniale Vetusissimum.* This is a

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20 *e.g.* *Speculum Minorum* (Romhagari, 1509), Tract. iii, fol. 222v ff. *Monumenta Ordinis Minorum* (Salamanca, 1511), Part. ii, fol. 226 ff.

21 J. Wickham Legg, *Tracts on the Mass* (Henry Bradshaw Society vol. 27) (London, 1904), pp. 178–188. This edition is based on the text found in early sixteenth century Roman missals, cf. *Introduction* p. xxix. In his notes to the *Indutus planeta*, p. 251, Legg says: ‘this direction . . . renders it likely that we are not dealing with Roman rubrics.’


23 *Analecta Franciscana* II, p. 78. On this Chapter of Paris, cf. F. Ehrl, *Die ältesten Redaktionen der Generalconstitutionen d. Franziskanerordens* in *Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchengeschichte* vol. 6 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1892), pp. 38–40. The *Diffinitiones* of this chapter were published by A. G. Little, "Definitiones capitulorum generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum 1260–1282," *Archivum Franc. Hist.* vii (1914) 678, from a late thirteenth century manuscript; unfortunately the notice about the *Indutus planeta* is here omitted; but as Little points out (p. 676) "fatendum est in nostro MS. omissiones . . . esse graviores . . ."


series of regulations for the celebration of the Divine Office and the conventual Mass. Franciscan scholars following the editor of this document, Fr. Hieronymus Golubovich, are agreed (a) that John of Parma is the author of the *Ordinaciones*, (b) that Haymo of Faversham is the author of the *Indutus planeta*. Now if one takes the trouble to read through the text of the *Indutus planeta*, he will find therein two references to the *Ordinaciones*:

(a) Quales autem et quot ministri et qualiter se debeant habere in missa ordinata vel sollemni, praesente vel non praesente episcopo, in ordinationibus divini officii declarabitur.
(b) De benedictione vero incensi et incensatione et aliis quae pertinent ad sollemnitatem habebitur in ordinationibus.

Apparently then, if John of Parma, Minister General from 1247 to 1257, is the author of the *Ordinaciones*, Haymo of Faversham, Minister General 1240–1244 cannot be the author of the *Indutus planeta*, or if Haymo is the author of the *Indutus planeta*, then John cannot be the author of the *Ordinaciones*. Since the *Indutus planeta* quotes the *Ordinaciones*, the latter should be the prior document, or both might be the work of one man. However this does not necessarily mean that Haymo is not the author of the *Indutus planeta*, for the argument submitted by Father Golubovich that John of Parma is the author of the *Ordinaciones* is unsound on more than one count.

In his introduction to the text, he presents the following arguments in favor of the authorship of John of Parma: (a) The *Ordinaciones* are first mentioned in the General Chapter of Pisa (1263) but no early writer gives any indication of the authorship if we except Fr. Marianus (+1523) who assigns the treatise to Haymo of Faversham. (b) However, from the implicit testimony of the London manuscript of the *Ordinaciones*, it is quite clear that the author is John of Parma: Article 29 of the text found in this manuscript mentions John’s letter *Indubitantes*; Articles 24 and 29 show that the *Ordinaciones* must be subsequent to the chapter of Metz (1251). (c) Articles 37 and 49 of the same text were revised by an apostolic letter dated June 1, 1256; and since there is no mention of the feast of St. Clare (canonised 1255), these statutes must have been issued before 1255. The author is John of Parma who promulgated the *Ordinaciones*, in all probability, at the chapter of Genoa (1254). In describing the manuscripts employed for the edition of the

26 The only Franciscan writer, so far as we have been able to discover, who disagrees with these conclusions is P. Eusèbe Clop who claims both the *Ordinaciones* and the *Indutus planeta* for Haymo: "S. François et la liturgie de la chapelle papale," *Archivum Franc. Hist.* xix (1926) 35–36.

27 The text will be found in an Appendix to this article

28 The use of the future tense (*declarabitur, habebitur*) in the two references to the *Ordinaciones* might indicate that author of the *Indutus planeta* had in mind the composition of the *Ordinaciones*; on the other hand the *Indutus planeta* is the normal place for these rubrics and the composer would normally place them therein, unless they had already appeared in another document (the *Ordinaciones*), in which case, a reference would save considerable labor. Further, if the *Indutus planeta* preceded the *Ordinaciones* why does the latter not refer to the former for the rubrics on the celebration of Mass? In any case, any argument, based on the use of the future tense in these references, will have to take into account all the evidence given in this article for the priority in time of the *Ordinaciones*.

29 *Archivum Franc. Hist.* iii (1910) 58–60. A few of these dates are apparently faulty. It has since been shown that the Chapter of Metz took place in 1254. Cf. P. Michael Bihl, O.F.M. "De capitulo generale O.M. Metensi anno 1254 adscripto," *Archivum Franc. Hist.* iv (1911) 425–435. What was then the date of the Chapter of Genoa at which John of Parma is supposed to have promulgated these statutes? If we are not mistaken, the next General Chapter after that of Metz (1254) is the Chapter of Rome in 1257 at which John of Parma was succeeded by St. Bonaventure. P. F. Delorme suggests that the *Ordinaciones* were promulgated by the Chapter of Rome (1257), cf. "Diffinitiones capituli generalis Narbonensis," *Archivum Franc. Hist.* iii (1910) 501.
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text, Fr. Golubovich informs us that he used as base the fifteenth century London
manuscript (British Museum 21,115) since it alone preserves the complete text,
I.e. it contains some twenty-two paragraphs which are missing almost completely
in other manuscripts and printed editions. These other manuscripts are: Oxford,
Bodleian misc. 75, xiii century (O); Vatican, Reg. 429 xiv century (V); Rome,
"pennes Cappuccinos," xiv century (C); Rome, Collog. S. Antonii, no date (R);
Bologna, Archigymnasion 16,b,V.24, xv century (B). The printed editions ap-
appeared in 1509, 1511 and 1512; they are designated by the letters S, M and F
respectively. According to our editor, all these manuscripts and editions are defec-
tive or interpolated; only the fifteenth century London manuscript has the true
text. It is conceivable that such may be a true statement of the case; the chances
are however that exactly the opposite is true, namely, that the original text will
be found in the thirteenth and fourteenth century manuscripts and that the late
London manuscript is interpolated.

If we examine the critical apparatus of his edition, we find that where the text is
common to all the manuscripts, the London included, the variants are confined to
a word, a phrase, the addition of a feast or a list of feasts; that is to say, they are
the natural and normal variants to be expected in a liturgical text. When we come
to the twenty-two additional articles (20–25; 28–29; 34–37; 48–51; 70–75) we find
the following information in the notes:

a) OCSVMAFR non habent #20–25 inclusive.
b) OMFSCVAR non habent prorsus #28–29.
c) Solum quidam codd, a nobis collati vel unam vel alteram ex istis #34–37
    habent.
d) OMFCVSAR non habent #48–51.
e) #70–75 desunt in OCVMSVAR.

We submit that it is quite clear from Fr. Golubovich's edition that the London
manuscript is a badly interpolated text of the Ordinationes and that the original
text can be very easily determined from the early manuscripts. Further, the whole
argument for the authorship of John of Parma is unsound since it is based essen-
tially on interpolated articles (24, 29, 37, 49) of this late fifteenth century manu-
script. Let us hope that some Franciscan scholar will give us a truly critical text
of these statutes; then, we may be able to determine from internal evidence the
date of composition, if not the name of the author.

In the Ordinationes there are some twenty-five articles which deal with the celeb-
ration of Mass and the attendance of the Friars at Mass; the duties of the priest,
deacon, subdeacon and acolytes for a solemn Mass are given briefly and regulations
are laid down for the conduct of those assisting in the choir and for the order to be
observed in approaching the Holy Table. Apparently it is the conventual service
both of the Office and the Mass with which the Ordinationes are primarily concerned.
On the other hand, the Indutus planeta deals with a priest saying a private Mass or
the conventual Mass in a small monastery where the number of assistants is

21 Ibid., p. 61.
22 Cf. Ibid. notes for page 65, or page 73, or page 77.
23 Ibid. p. 67, n. (j).
24 Ibid. p. 68, n. (b).
25 Ibid. p. 69, n. (m).
26 Ibid. p. 72, n. (a).
27 Ibid. p. 75, n. (f).
28 Fortunately in the edition of Fr. Golu-

bovich, the interpolated articles are printed in
larger type; but even if we eliminate these,
there still remain many readings which belong
to the London manuscript rather than to the
original text.
29 In the edition of Fr. Golubovich (AFF
iii, 64–81) the following paragraphs deal with
the duties of the ministers: 83–108; the conduct
of the choir: 31–59; 49; 57–64, etc.; order for
communion: 110.
limited; as we pointed out above, the *Indutus planeta* refers back to the *Ordinationes* for the rules for incensing and for the duties of the ministers in a *missa ordinata et sollemnis*. We suggest that the *Ordinationes* are a first attempt to supplement the meagre rubrics of the missal, and since even this collection was quite insufficient for the celebration of a private Mass, a complete set of rubrics for this latter purpose was composed: the *Indutus planeta*.

Both these documents appear to be later than the letter *Quia sicut indubitator* of John of Parma, since he does not refer to either of them. On the other hand, the General Chapter of Pisa (1263) decrees: *Ordinationes generales de officii chori quae incipiant*: *Ad omnes horas canonicas*, etc., uniformiter et generaliter ab omnibus observentur; and, as was seen above, the General Chapter of Paris (1266) imposed the use of the *Indutus planeta*. There is no contemporary evidence on the authorship of either one or the other; the statement found in the Chronicle of the Twenty-four Ministers General (c.1369) is too late to be given credence; the same is true of Fr. Marianus' (+1523) assertion that Haymo is the author of both these documents. Until such time as further evidence is available, we see no reason why these documents should be dated earlier than the generalate of St. Bonaventure (1257–1274).

(c) The Ordo Missae and the Indutus planeta

In the Franciscan missals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the *Ordo missae* comes, as it does now in the Roman missal, between the Masses for Holy Saturday and Easter Sunday. It is invariably preceded by a collection of rubrics: *Inc. Adventus Domini celebratur*. Here are given the rules for Advent, the Quarter Tenses, the *Gloria in excelsis*, the number of collects, the *Alleluia* and the *Gredo*. In the *Ordo missae* we find a uniform text up to the Canon; for the Canon, some missals give more detailed rubrics than others. Moreover, in some missals the *Indutus planeta* is inserted before the *Ordo missae*; in one case, at least, the *Indutus planeta* has been incorporated into the *Ordo missae*. The expansion of the rubrics for the Canon and the insertion of the *Indutus planeta* are further indications that the original *Ordo missae* was too concise and did not give the celebrant sufficient directions for saying Mass.

The Franciscan *Ordo missae* is as follows:

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40 We frequently meet such phrases as the following: *si diaconus ministrat; si non affuerit subdiaconus; cum ministro vel ministrius*. Cf. text in Appendix to this article.


43 e.g. Vatican Ottob. Lat. 574 (sec. xiv in.). The *Indutus planeta* is found in many Roman missals as late as the sixteenth century. Cf. J. Wickham Legg, *Tracts on the Mass* (London, 1904), p. xxix.


45 The edition of the *Ordo missae* is based on the following manuscripts:


(c) Rome, Vatican, Ottob. Lat. 574, xiv century comm. fol. 143 ff. Ebner, *op. cit.* 235–236. This is a Roman missal. (O)


For the text of the Canon, we use in addition to the above:

(a) Paris, B.N. Lat. 826, xiv century comm. fol. 136–151. Leroquais, *op. cit.* pp. 201–203. This is a Roman missal. (P)


Purely orthographical variants are not noted. The spelling of the text is changed, when necessary to conform to modern liturgical Latin.

Postea inclinatus dicit hanc orationem: *Oramus te Domine ut per merita sanctorum tuorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt et omnium sanctorum tuorum indulgere digneris omnium peccatorum.* R. Amen.


Quando sacerdos offert hostiam super altare dicit hanc orationem: *Suscipe sancte pater* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando mittit aquam in calicem dicit:
*Deus qui hominum substantia* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando offert calicem super altare dicit:
*Offerimus tibi Domine calicem* (etc. Same as now.)

Deinde dicit:
*In spiritu humiliatis et in animo contrito* (etc. Same as now.)

Sequitur oratio super hostiam et calicem cum signo crucis:
*Venit sanctificator omnipotens Deus et benedic* (etc. Same as now.)

Cum ponit incensum in thuribulo dicit:
*Per intercessionem beati Michaelis archangeli* (etc. Same as now.)

Cum incensat oblata dicit:
*Incensum istud a te benedictum ascendit ad te Domine* (etc. Same as now.)

Quando reddit thuribulum diacono dicit:
*Ascendat in nobis Dominus ignem* (etc. Same as now.)

Tunc inclinat se sacerdos an* ante altare et dicit hanc orationem:
*Suscipe sancta Trinitas hanc olationem* (etc. Same as now.)

Erigens se deosculatur altare et vertit se ad populum dicens:
*Orate pro me fratres ut meum ac vestrum sacrificium* (etc. Same as now.)

Circumstantes vero respondeant:
*Suscipiat Dominus sacrificium* (etc. Same as now.)

Sequens praephatio dicitur quotidie a vigilia nativitatis usque ad epiphaniam et in purificationis Beatae Mariae:

*Per omnia saecula saeculorum.* R. Amen. (etc.)

(Here follow the text, generally with notes, of the prefaces for: Nativity, Epiphany,
Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus Dominus Deus sabbath (etc. Same as now.)
Hic inclinet se ante altare et cum omni humilitate dicit:

_Type I_ 81

Teigitur clementissime Pater per Jesum Christum filiun tuum dominum nostrum supplices rogamus ac petimus uti accepta habeas et benedicas haec dona haec munera haec sancta sacrificia illibata in primis quae tibi offerimus pro ecclesia tua sancta catholica quam pacificare custodire adunare et regere digneris toto orbe terrarum una cum famulo tuo papa nostro N. et antiquo nostro N. et omnibus orthodoxis atque catholicae et apostolicae fidei cultoribus.

Commemoratio pro vivis. 83
Memento domine famulum tuearum N. et omnium circumstantium . . . aeterno Deo vivo et vero.
Infra actionem. 54
Communicantes et memoriam . . . auxilio.
Per Christum Dominum nostrum.
Infra actionem. 55
Hanc igitur oblacionem . . . grege numerari.
Per Christum Dominum nostrum. R. Amen.

Quam oblacionem tu Deus in omnibus quae-summus benedictam ratam rationabilem acceptabilemque facere digneris ut nobis corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi filii tu domini nostri Jesu Christi.

_Type II_ 52

Teigitur . . . petimus Hic erigit se et osculatur altare et erectis manibus dicit uti accepta . . . benedicens Hic ter signetur tam super hostiam quam super calicem Haec dona, haec munera . . . cultoribus.

Commemoratio pro vivis.
Memento . . . deo vivo et vero.

Infra actionem.
Communicantes et memoriam . . . auxilio.
Per e.d.n.
Alia infra actionem.
Hanc igitur oblacionem . . . grege numerari.
Per e.d.n. R. Amen.
Hic communiter signetur tertio (sic) tam super hostiam quam super calicem.
Quam oblacionem tu Deus . . . ut nobis Hic separatim semel signetur super hostiam et postea super calicem corpus et sanguis fiat . . . Christi.

Hic accipiens hostiam reverenter levet eam junctis manibus dicendo: Qui pridie etc. et teneat eam usque Simili modo.
 Qui pridie quam pateretur . . . ex hoc omnes: Hoc est enim corpus meum. 56
Hic deponat hostiam et levet calicem dicens:
Simili modo posteaquam coenatum est accipiens et hunc praecarium calicem in sanctas et venerabiles manus suas item tibi gratias agens benedixit dedit discipulis suis dicens:

81 Type I is found in M, N. In O the Canon has been torn out.
82 Type II is found in V, G, P, and in margin of N.
83 Comemoratio pro vivis] [Hic fit com. p. v.] N.
[ 212 ]
Accipite et bibite ex eo omnes. Hic est enim calix sanguinis mei novi et aeterni testamenti qui pro nobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.

Haec quotiescumque feceritis in mei memorialem facietis.

Unde et memores Domine nos tui servi... de tuis donis ac datis hostiam puram sanctam hostiam immaculatam panem sanctum vitae aeternae et calicem salutis perpetuae.

Supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu... immaculatam hostiam.

Hic inclinat se dicens: 58

Supplices te rogamus omnipotens Deus... majestatis tuae ut quoquot ex hac altaris participatone sacrosanctum filii tui corpus et sanguinem supserimus omni benedictione coelesti et gratia répleamur. Per eundem C. D. N. Amen.

Commemoratio pro defunctis.

Memento etiam Domine famularumque tuarum N. qui nos... indulgeas deprecamur. Per eundem C. D. N. Amen.

Hic percutiát pectus suum aliquantulum altius dicens. 60

Nobis quoque peccatoribus... largitor admitte. Per C. D. N.

Per quem hæc omnia Domine semper bona creas sanctificas vivificas benedicis et praestas nobis. Per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso est tibi Deus patri omnipotenti in unitate Spiritus Sancti omnis honor et gloria. 61


Pater noster qui es... Sed libera nos a malo. R. Amen.

58 Hic reponat calicem (Hic elevet altius et deponat) G.
53 Hic... dicens] om. N.
60 dicens (dicit) N.
62 Hic cum] N is defective here.
Hic reponat calicem et cooperiat.  
Oremus, Præcepsit . . . dicere.  
Pater noster . . . a malo. R. Amen.  
Sequens Pater noster cum suo cantu dicitur in minoribus festis et in diebus feriaribus. Per omnia . . . a malo. Amen.  
Libera nos quaesumus Domine . . . securi.  
Hic accipiat patenam et signet se cum ipsa et submittens eandem hostiam ponat hostiam in patenam et discooperiat calicem et cum reverentia frangat hostiam per medium super calicem et medium quae est in dextera manu ponat in patena et de illa quae est in sinistra accipiat particulam et quae remanet in sinistra adjungatur particularae quae est in patena.

Per eundem . . . Spiritus Sancti.

Pax Domini . . . vobiscum. R. Et . . . tuo.  
Hic mittat particular in sanguine dicens Fiat commixtio . . . aeterna. Amen.  
Hic dicitur Agnus Dei tribus vicibus.

Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti . . . saeculorum. Amen.

Alia oratio. Perseptio corporis . . .

Hic remota nulla super calicem et erigat aliquantulum et cum dextera manu recipiat corpus domini et teneat super patenam dicens cum reverentia et humilitate Panem coelestem . . . invocabo.

Panem coelestem accipiam et nomen Domini invocabo.

63 Hic. cooperiat] om. N.  
64 Patena] (dicendo) add. G. N. continues directly with the next rubric.  
65 Hic . . . Vicibus] (Et antequam det pacem ministro dicit) add. G.  
66 Domine] (Ad pacem osculando altare dicit inclinatus hanc oracionem) praem. N. (Hic inclinatus dicit h. o. Ad pacem o. a.) praem. P.  
67 Hic . . . dicen] om. N.  
68 Panem] (Hic dicit tribus vicibus) praem. N.
Oratio. Domine non sum dignus . . . anima mea.


Quid retribuam Domine . . . mihi. Calicem salutaris accipiam . . . invocabo. Laudans . . . et salus ero.

Oratio. Quod ore sumpsumus Domine . . . remedium sempiternum.

Hic sumat sanguinem Christi et dicat Sanguis Domini . . . aeternam. Amen.
Postquam communicaverit dicat hanc orationem Quod ore sumpsumus . . . sempiternum.

The original form of the Franciscan Ordo missae is probably the simpler of the two (Type I). In one of the earliest extant manuscripts of a Franciscan missal, the rubrics for the canon as given above in Type II are written in the margin, while the text of the canon itself contains the rubrics of Type I:


Teigitur elementissime Patre . . . rogamus ac petimus uti accepta habeas et benedicas haec doa, haec munera . . . cultoribus.

Hic percuiat pectus suum; aliquantulum altius dictat
Nobis quoque peccatoribus famulis tuis . . .
Per c.d.n.

Per quem haec omnia Domine semper bona creas sanctificas benedicis et praestia nobis. Per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso est tibi Deo patri omnipotenti in unitate Spiritus Sancti

69 cantato (dicto) G.

70 et dicat Trium puerorum om. P.

71 Finita . . . orationem] om. P. This repetition of the rubric for the Placeat is characteristic of the Franciscan missals in which the Type II Canon is found. A similar reduplication will be observed in the rubrics for the communion of the Host. Both these cases are indications of patchwork, i.e. of the correction or amplification of an earlier text by a not too clever scribe.

72 Quoted from A. Ebner, Iter Italicum, pp. 314–316.
It would appear that some scribe attempted to correct this missal by means of a “later edition” of the Ordo missae. One is tempted to suggest that this particular missal shows the effect of the decree of the Chapter of Narbonne (1260), viz. that the missals be corrected secundum exemplar verius. However that may be, it is clear from the Naples manuscript that the original Franciscan Ordo missae is that given above as Type I.72

When we examine the relationship between this document and the Indutus planeta, we see that the composer of the Indutus planeta made use of the Franciscan Ordo missae Type II, expanding and developing the rubrics which he found therein:

**Indutus planeta**

Cum vero venit ad Pater noster elevat manus et extendit sicut prius usque ad da propitius pacem ubi accipiens patenam signans se simpliciter cum ipsa submitten eam hostiae et discooperiens calcem facit fractionem super calcicem frangendo hostiam per medium et ponens illam partem quae est in sinistra manu in patenam et illa vero quae est in dextera frangit per medium et particular quam remanet in sinistra manu conjungit parti quae est in patena. Altera vero quae remanet in dextera erectus sacerdos tenet super calcicem et parum elevato calice dicit Per omnia saecula saeculorum et iterum disposito calice tertio signat super sanguinem cum particula quae tenet in dextera dicens Pax domini sit semper; quo dicto mittit particular ipsum in sanguine dicens Fiat commixtio.74

**Ordo missae Type II**

Pater noster... a male. Amen.
Libera nos quasumus... securi.
Hic accipiat patenam et signet se cum ipsa et submitten eandem hostiae ponat hostiam in patenam et cum reverentia frangat hostiam per medium super calcicem et medium quae est in dextera manu ponit in patena et de illa quae est in sinistra accipiat particularum et quae remanet in sinistra adjungatur particularae quae est in patena.
Hic mittat particularum in sanguinem dicens: Fiat commixtio... aeternam. R. Amen.

If after comparing these texts, any doubt remains that the Ordo missae is the earlier text, such doubts will be quickly dispelled by examining the rubrics in these two documents for the consecration of the Host:

**Indutus planeta**

Cum vero perventur est ad Qui pridie quam pateretur ductis plane digitis super pallam altaris accipit hostiam dicens 73

**Ordo missae Type II**

Hic accipiens hostiam reverenter levet eam junctis manibus dicendo Qui pridie et tenet ipsum usque Simili modo.

71 We suspect from certain variants to be found in the Naples manuscript particularly in the early part of the Ordo missae, that this early Franciscan missal may contain the original text of the Roman curial Ordo missae before any Franciscan reform of the text took place. We hope to return to this problem at a later date. Another question that requires special treatment is the difference between the Franciscan Ordo missae and that found in the missal of the papal chapel composed in the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century. The rubrics for the canon are almost identical with those of the Type II published here. This report, cf. M. Andrieu, “Le missel de la chapelle papale à la fin du xiè siècle” Miscellanea Fr. Erle, vol. 2 (Rome, 1924), pp. 348–376. The text of the Ordo missae has been published by J. Brinktrine, “Ordo et Canon Missae,” Ephe- merides Liturgicae II (1937) 198–209.

74 The text will be found in the Appendix to this article.
accepit panem et parum elevans signat eam dicens benedixit et dicto Hoc est enim corpus meum et adorato corpore Domini levat illud reverenter ita quod a circumstantibus possit videri; postquam deponit in loco suo.

Qui pridie quam pateretur . . . Hoc est enim corpus meum.

Hic deponat hostiam et levet calicem dicendo Simili modo etc.

Here the Indutus planeta has introduced an entirely new element, the elevation of the Host, which does not appear in the Franciscan Ordo missae, either Type I or Type II. We may safely assume that the Indutus planeta is the later document.

Our study of these documents, which deal in one way or other with the Franciscan Ordinary of the Mass in the thirteenth century, permits us to place them, tentatively, in chronological order and to suggest approximate dates for each.

(a) The Franciscan Missal with Ordo missae Type I. This was composed between 1235 and 1255; it is possibly the work of Haymo of Faversham, Minister General 1240–1244.

(b) The letter Quia sicut indulblanter of John of Parma, Minister General 1247–1257, which prescribed uniformity in the celebration of Mass.

(c) The Franciscan Missal with Ordo missae Type II. We suggest that this "second edition" was the exemplar verius referred to by the General Chapter of Narbonne (1260).

(d) The Ordinationes diei et officii. These statutes governing the conventual office and the Mass are anterior to 1263, when they are first mentioned at the Chapter of Pisa.

(e) The Indutus planeta. This ordo for a priest saying a private Mass or the conventual Mass in a small monastery is the latest of these documents; it is anterior to the Chapter of Paris (1266) which seems to have prescribed its use.

**APPENDIX**

Incipit ordo agendorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa juxta consuetudinem ecclesiae romanarum.

This edition of the text is based on the following manuscripts:


(c) Vatican Ottob. 15, xiv century comm., fol. 290 (355) — 293v (358v). This manuscript contains a collection of Franciscan documents, including both the Ordinationes and the Indutus planeta; a detailed description of it will be found in: Fr. Ehre, Die ältesten Redaktionen der Generalkonstitutionen der Franziskanerordens, Archiv für Literatur- u. Kirchengeschichte vol. 6 (1892), pp. 74–75. (O)

(d) Paris, B.N. Lat. 828, xiv century (1342–1352), fol. 106v–118. A Roman missal. The Indutus planeta is very defective here; parts from it are used to supply rubrics for the Ordo missae. (C)

(e) The edition of J. Wickham Legg,
Indutus sacerdos planeta stet ante gradum altaris et junctis manibus mediocriter elevatis dicat antiphonam Intibo ad altare Dei etc. R. Ad Deum qui et Ps. Judica me Patri et Sicut erat. Deinde repetatur antiphonam Intibo, R. Ad Deum qui. V. Adjutorium nostrum. R. Qui facit. Deinde facit confessionem absolutes inclinatus mediocriter et stat 80 taliter inclinatus donec responsum fuerit Missae raturi tui etc. et tunc erigens se facit absolutionem. Qua faceta dicit capitula: V. Deus tu conversus R. Et plebs V. Ostende nobis R. Et salutare V. Domine exaudi R. Et clamor V. Dominus vobiscum R. Et cum spiritu tuo. Oremus. Ausper a nobis etc. et dicitur haec oratio aliquantulum alae sunt ascendit sacerdos ad altare 81 —per Christum Dominum nostrum. R. Amen. Postea inclinatus coram medio altaris junctis manibus dicit sub silentio hanc orationem: Oramus te Domine 82 —per merita sanctorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt etc. et si non fuerint ibi reliquiae dicat ut per merita omnium sanctorum indulgere etc. Qua completa erigit se et manus super altare deponens osculatur illud.

‡ De junctione manuum.

Et nota quod jungendae sunt manus quotiens se sacerdos inclinat ante altare; et in collectis, secretis et postcommunionibus quando venitur ad Per Dominum ultimum si plures dicantur; et postquam inceperit Gloria in excelsis Deus et Credo; et quando vadit ad sedem et quando revertitur ad altare; et in fine praefationis; et ante quam levet hostiam cum dicit fiat dilectissimi etc.; et ante Pater noster cum dicit et praestas nobis; et quando accipit hostiam a patena ut frangat super calicem; et quotiens vadit a libro usque ad medium altaris et quando revertitur ad librum dicit Dominus vobiscum; et si vadit ab altari ad piscinam vel revertitur et quando a sacristia vadit indutus ad altare et quando completa missa revertitur 83 ad sa-

cristiam.

‡ De inclinationibus.


Tracts on the Mass (London, 1904), pp. 181–188. This edition is based on a Roman missal printed at Lyons in 1507; variants are given from missals dated 1508 and 1515. The edition is based on texts that are late and corrupt; we use it here to supply a few doubtful variants which are indicated in our notes by the date of the missal.

We do not pretend to give a definitive edition of the Indutus planeta; our intention is rather to give a reliable text based on a limited number of early manuscripts. The treatise is also found in: Mende, ms. 1, fol. 168r–170v (xiv century); Assisi, ms. 338 fol. 7–11 (xiv century); Col. S. Isidore, ms. 1, 39, fol. 1–7v (xv century), etc.

79 Title om. P. missa] add. (privata et conventualis) V. (privata et ferialis) 1507.
80 stat (stet) OC.
81 altare] finis add. OP.
82 Domine per merita... indulgere om. O.
83 revertitur (vadit) V.
84 vivi] et Percepcion etc. add. V.
85 fiunt (fiunt) O.
86 factus est] in Credo add. O.
medium altaris. Vertens se ad populum tantum cum dicit *Orate pro me fratres* parum se inclinat.

§ De osculo altaris.

Item nota quod primo osculatur sacerdos altare dicta oratione *Oramus te Domine.* Secundo ante collectam primam ubi dicitur *Dominus vobiscum.* Tertio post evangelium cum dicitur *Dominus vobiscum.* Quarto antequam dicitur *Orate pro me fratres.* Quinto post *Te igitur ante uti accepta.* Sexto post Supplices cum dicit ex hac altaris participatione. Septimo finita oratione *Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti.* Octavo ante postcommunionem cum dicit *Dominus vobiscum.* Nono 

§ De modo osculandi.

Et nota quod omnia oscula supradicta fiunt demissis manibus super altare. Ante collocationem autem calicis et post perceptionem fiunt in medio altaris; post collocationem vero calicis et ante perceptionem a sinistris calicis prope hostiam. Et nota quod numquam osculandus est liber nisi ad evangelium.

§ De elevacione manuum et extensione.

Circa elevationem manuum sacerdotis et extensionem notandum est quod semper elevat manus sacerdos mediocriter ita quod elevatio non excedat humeros nec nimis deprimatur; sitque distensio in latum semper moderata et aequalis in missa et quando stat versus altare et quando se vertit ad populum, praeterquam in oratione Unde et memores ubi specialis fit mentio passionis ubi aliquidum fiat prolixior distensio brachiorum usque ad proximas sequentes signationes. In omni vero junctione manuum similis elevatio praecedat aequalis scilicet et moderata.

§ De prosecutione missae.

Postquam osculatus fuerit sacerdos altare, completa oratione illa *Oramus te Domine,* vadit ad dextrum cornu altaris et ibidem stans sine aliquo versus praecedente incipit legere Introitum cum ministro vel ministri; similiet et Kyrieleison. Deinde vadit ad medium altaris et ibi incipit *Gloria in excelsis Deo* si est dicendum; quo finito vel non inchoato si non est dicendum, osculatur medium altaris et vertens se ad populum dicit *Dominus vobiscum.* Quo dicto vertit se ad librum qui est in dextra cornu altaris dicens *Oremus* et ibidem terminat orationem et si plures dicantur ultima similiter ibidem terminatur. Quando vero dicendum est *Flectamus genua* sacerdos stans ad dextrum cornu altaris et non conversus ad populum incipit absolute *Oremus sine Dominus vobiscum* et facto modico intervallo postquam dixerit *Flectamus genua,* dicit *Levate.* Deinde absolute prosequitur collectam; si diaconus ministrat, ipse dicit *Flectamus genua et Levate.* Finita collecta legitur lectio una vel plures, singulis lectionibus singulis praemissis collectis, in quibus omnibus idem modus observatur praeterquam in ultima oratione quae praeedit epistolam in qua semper vertens se ad populum ut praedictum est dicit *Dominus vobiscum.* Deinde legitur epistola semper ante gradum contra medium altaris in missa conventualis; in privatis autem semper ab ipso sacerdote super dextrum cornu altaris. Dum vero legitur epistola a subdiacono, sacerdos extendit corporale quot subpontit calici super altare ita quod longitudo corporalis in longitudine altaris extenditur nec explicatur propter pulvereus usque ad obla-

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83 Nono cum dicit . . Decimo om. 1507.
85 elevatione (junctione) V.
86 manuum et extensione om. P.
87 latum (laterae) V.
88 mentio (commemoratio) P.
89 ubi (in quo) P. Legg's text is quite corrupt at this point.
92 fuerit (sit) V.
93 osculatur (osculatus) V.
94 ibidem terminat (ibi determinat) V.
96 ibidem terminatur (ibi determinatur) V.
97 dixerit (dicit) V.
98 absolute om. V.
99 plures singulis . . . collectis om. O.
tionem calicis; hoc faciat 100 diaconus si ministrat. Corporale vero quod subponitur calici habet quatuor plicas in longitudinem et tres in latitudinem. Quo peracto in missa conventuali vadi sacerdos ad sedem; lecta vero epistola et graduali, et aliis quae ante evangelium legenda sunt cum ministro vel ministris in sede perfectis, subdiaconus parat calicem in loco suo collocando hostiam super patenam et vinum tantum calici 101 infundendo et sic paratum ponit super altare. In missa vero privata si non affuerit subdiaconus parat sacerdos calicem antequam incepta fuerit 102 missa vel post evangelium secundum quod opportunum sibi visum fuerit. Sacerdos vero antequam legat evangelium, super medium altaris inclinatus, dicit Sit Dominus in corde 103 vel Munda cor meum et signans se signo crucis legit evangelium super sinistrum cornu altaris. Finito evangelio osculatur librum et reversus ad medium altaris dicit Credo si est dicendum; snaitem osculatur altare et vertens se ad populum dicit Dominus vobiscum; reversusque ex parte dextra altaris dicit in medio Oremus et legit offertorium.

Quales autem et quot ministri et qualiter se debeat habere in missa ordinata, 104 vel sollemni, praesente vel non praesente episcopo, in Ordinationibus divini officii declarabitur.

‡ De oblatione calicis et hostiae.

Si missa simplex conventualis vel privata fuerit, sacerdos accipit patenam cum hostia duabus manibus mediocriter elevatis et dicit Suscipe sancte pater etc. Interim vero minister ad dextram sacerdos assistens offert ampullam cum aqua quam beneficis sacerdos infundit calici dicens Deus qui humanae substantiae etc. Et nota quod tam in privatis missis quam in conventualibus et ordinatis tempus et ordo infundendi aquam in calicem idem penitus observatur. 105 Deinde accipiens calicem cum 106 duabus manibus mediocriter elevatis offert cum dicens Offerimus tibi Domine calicem etc. Hostia vero 107 collocatur ad sinistrum, calix autem 108 ad dextram. Deinde cooperetur calix corporali simplici plicato quod superponitur 109 calici cum hac oratone In spiritu humilitatis etc. Postea fit signum crucis super hostiam et calicem cum oratone Veni sanctificator etc. ita quod primo ducatur 110 manus super hostiam secundo super utrumque, et sic semper fit quando communiter utrumque signatur; et parum inclinatus super altare vadi ad abluendum manus suas. 111

‡ De beneficitione vero incensi et incensatione et aliis quae pertinent ad solemnitatem habebitur in Ordinationibus.

Deinde deo ad medium altaris inclinatus dicit Suscipe sancta Trinitas; qua finita erigens se osculatur altare et vertens se ad populum dicit Orate 112 pro me fratres; circumstantes vero respondent 113 Suscepiat Dominus etc. Deinde regirans 114 se ex parte dextra 115 dicit secretam vel secretas stans contra medium altaris; quibus completis, elevatis et extensis manibus secundum formam superius taxatam, dicit Per omnia saecula saeculorum. 116 Deinde vero praefatione dicit Sanctus cum ministris mediocriter inclinatus super altare et signat se signo crucis cum dicit Benedictus qui venit.

Deinde inclinatus coram altari junctis manibus dicit Te igitur clementissime

100 faciat (facit) OP.
101 calici om. O.
102 fuerit (sit) V.
103 Prayers are given in full in P.
104 ordinata (conventualis) O.
105 observatur (observetur) V.
106 cum om. O.
107 vero (autem) P.
108 autem (vero) OP.
109 superponitur (supponitur) P.
110 ducatur (ducit) P.
111 suases P inserts here the prayers for incensing.
112 Orate] pro me om. OP.
113 respondent (respondeant) O.
114 regirans (vertens) P.
115 dextra] ad librum add. P.
116 saeculumum P inserts here the text of the various prefaces.
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Pater; erigens se osculatur altae cum dicit uti accepta habes, faciens tres cruces dicendo haec dona, haec munera, haec sancta sacrificia. Deinde elevatis et extensis manibus sicut superius dictum est prosequitur canonem usque Quam oblationem tu Deus. Postea facit tres cruces continue super hostiam et calicem communiter dicens benedictam, adscriptam, ratam et elevatis iterum manibus dum dicit rationabiliem acceptabilemque, facit iterum duas cruces dicens corpus et sanguis, primam super hostiam, secundam super calicem.

Cum vero pervertens est ad Qui pridie quam pateretur ductis plane digitis super pallam altaris accipit hostiam dicens acceptum panem et parum elevans signat eam dicens benedixit et dicto Hoc est corpus meum et adorato Corpore Domini cum mediocri inclinatione levat illud reverenter ita quod a circumstantibus possit videri; postea deponit in loco suo. Deinde cooptum calicem accipit cum duabus manibus et parum elevans dicit accipiens et hunc praeclarum calicem; deponit iterum super altae dicens item tibi gratias agens; deinde signat dicens benedixit et iterum elevans dicit accipite et bibite usque in mei memoriam facietis. Deinde deposito calice dicit Unde et memoras, extensis brachii aliquantulum in modum crucis ut praecedidit est.

§ Nota quod ab hoc loco usque ad purificationem manuum sacerdotis jungendus est index cum pollice praeterquam in signationibus et cum tangitur Corpus Domini; ante vero hunc locum et post dictam purificationem, cum levat manus et extendit, separat parum pollex a digitis ceteris sibi invicem copulatius; abhinc autem usque ad proximum Per omnia fiat signationes sicut in missali signantur et inclinationes sicut supradictum est; hoc addito quod cum in fine hujus orationis Nobis quoque pecatoribus dicitur per Christum Dominum nostrum sine responsione Amen, dicit sacerdos per quem haec omnia quia istud pendet de fine praecedentis.

Dicto autem et praestas nobis discoperit calicem et accipiens Corpus Domini signat ter cum ipsa super calicem a labio in labium dicens per ipsum et cum ipsa et in ipso; elevatis autem digitis cum Corpore Christi signat bis inter se et calicem a labio calicis incipiens et dicens quod sequitur et tibi Deo patri etc. Quo finito tenet Corpus Domini super calicem et parum elevato calice cum ambabus manibus dicit Per omnia saecula saeculorum. Dicendo autem Oremus, praeceptis salutarius moniti etc. reponit calicum et hostiam in locis suis et corporale calici superponit. Cum vero venerit a Pater noster elevat manus et extendit sicut prius usque ad da propitia pacem ubi accipiens patenum signans se simpliciter cum ipsa submittens eam hostiae et discopieris calicem facit fractionem super calicem frangendo hostiam per medium et ponens illum partem quae est in sinistra manu in patenam et illum vero quae est in dextra frangit per medium et particular quam remanet in sinistra manu post fractionem conjungit parti quae est in patena. Alteram vero quae remanet in dextra erectus sacerdos tenet super calicem et parum elevato calice dicit Per omnia saecula saeculorum et iterum deposito calice ter signat super sanguinem cum particula quam tenet in dextra dicens Pax Domini sit semper; quod dicto mittit particular ipsum in sanguine dicens Fiat commixtio. Deinde cooperto calicem dicit Agrus Dei tet parum inclinatus manibus dimissis super altae. Postea
inclinatus ante altare dicit Domine Jesu Christe qui dixisti apostolis; qua finita ergit se et deoscutulatur altare dans pacem ministro dicens Pax tecum. R. Et cum spiritu tuo. Iterum inclinans se ante altare dicit Domine Jesu Christe fili Dei vivi et Percepsit corporis tui. Quibus dicitis erigens se 128 removet corporalem desuper calicem et reverenter accipiens patenam elevat aliquantulum et cum manu dextra accipit Corpus Domini et tenet super patenam dicens Panem coelestem etc. Deinde dicit ter Domine non sum dignus etc. Quo dicto signat se cum corpore quod tenet in manu et reverenter sumit dicens Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christe etc. Hoc supradicto modo solebat fieri in curia a tempore vero bonae memoriae Gregorii IX.

—signat 131 se cum patena in qua jacet Corpus Domini et ab eadem patena non cum manu sed lingua sumit et discooperiis calicem si quae reliquiae Corporis Domini remanent in patena cum digito vel pollice reponit eas in calicem. Liceat tamen quibus magis placuerit sumere Corpus Domini manu de patena secundum 129 priorum Romanarum curiae consuetudinem 130 et tunc signat se cum Corporae Domini quod elevatum de patena tenet in manu.

Depositam patenam cum reverentia accipit calicem dicens Quid retribuam Domino etc. Calicem salutaris etc. Laudans invocabo etc. Quibus dicitis signis se cum calice dicit orationem Sanguis Domini nostri etc. Et extunc percepit sanguinem. Perceptione vero facta vadit ad cornu altaris dextrum et purificationem calicis accipiens dicit Quod ore sumpsimus et Corpus tuum etc. Quibus dicitis purificationem digitorum factam super calicem in calicem dimittens declinat 132 ad abluendum manus; qua ablutione facta assumpt quod remanserit in calice et inclinans cum super patenam et licita corporali lectaque communione in dextro cornu iterum sumit si quid remanęt in calicem. Quo finito revertitur ad medium altaris et complet missam sicut praedictum est. 133 Qua completa beneficat populum dicens In uniate Sancti Spiritus benedicant vos Pater et Filius. Amen.

128 erigens se] The text of V differs widely from that of O and P for the communion. We give in the first column that of OP; in the second that of V. Legg's text agrees here substantially with V; so too does the rubric for the communion in C. Both texts attempt to give the two different practices of receiving Communion, cum manu or cum lingua and both are agreed that the former is the prior consuetudo of the Roman church.

129 secundum ... consuetudinem] (sed prior est curiae romanae consuetudo) 1508, 1515.
130 consuetudinem] et tunc ... In manu om. 1507, 1508, 1515.
131 signat ... calicem] OP insert rather awkwardly the rubric for communion cum lingua.
132 declinat (declinet) P.
133 praedictum est] O ends here.
Albertus Magnus on Aristotle's Second Definition of the Soul

WILLIAM GORMAN

I

In the Summa Theologica, Book II, Tractate XII, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3 (which is contained in the Jamme edition Vol. 18, p. 349a–350a), Albertus Magnus considers Aristotle's second definition of the soul rather briefly, with no objections cited, with only a few explications of the terms of that definition and of his understanding of its relation to the previous definition. But the passage is notable for a firm explicit statement (not to be found in corresponding Summa de Creaturis) as to how these definitions and their stated relation to one another affect what we are to understand of the rational soul. Further, the intervention, between the writing of the De Creaturis and the writing of the Summa Theologica, of certain works of St. Thomas on the soul, particularly his commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, makes relevant to our discussion the citation of St. Thomas' understanding of the meaning of and relation between these two definitions.

In this discussion, I intend to state first the content of this brief passage; then, to compare it verbally, where it calls for comparison, on three points, with the text of Aristotle; to address my statement of my understanding of Albert's text to the three points of difference between it and Aristotle's text; and then to conclude.

In this passage, Albert states as Aristotle's other definition this: "anima est principium et causa huiusmodi vitae, physici scilicet corporis organis." He states further that Aristotle says in Book II De Anima that this is a definition as principle of a demonstration propter quid and the cause through which the previous two definitions (that as entelechiae and that as species and ratio) are demonstratively concluded.

He states further that Aristotle says that these two previous definitions are imperfect not only because they merely say quid est the soul and not propter quid talis est substantia et species; but also because by them one cannot know the causes of the accidents per se and the operations which per se convene to the soul. (Commenting on this second imperfection, he refers us to the first book of the De Anima where he says Aristotle says generally of such like definitions that they are dialectical and vain.)

Next, Aristotle's illustrative geometrical example is lengthily explained; and then on the established pattern, the syllogism in which one definition of the soul is concluded from the other is set up:

Omne quod est principium et causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus, est actus et ratio et species ipsius.

Anima est per se principium et causa operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore secundum totum et secundum partes.

Ergo, Anima est actus et ratio et species.

In closing, Albert remarks on the inapplicability of the middle and major terms of the above to the rational soul:

Anima rationalis secundum quasdam partes suas nec principium nec causa est corpori operum vitae et accidentium per se, sicut secundum intellectum agentem
et aedemptum. Ergo secundum illas nec est actus nec ratio, nec species alicuius corporis, sed separata et separabilius ab ipso.

He closes: “Et his est intellectus definitionum Aristotelis.”

II-A

Since the first three paragraphs witness Albert saying five times: “Aristoteles dicit,” it is relevant to consult the De Anima. The immediate passage in question is chapter II of Book II (413a10-414a29). In that chapter, we cannot find the new definition as Albert states it here any one of the three times he states it. After having said that animate things differ from inanimate “in vivendo” and saying that “multipliciter autem ipso vivere dicto . . . dicimus ipsum vivere, ut intellectus et sensus, motus, et status secundum locum,” and after showing forth these different senses of living, Aristotle states (413b11) (in the Moerbeke translation):

Anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et his determinata est, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, motus.

Later in the chapter at 414a12, Aristotle says:

“Anima autem hoc quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo.”

In comparison, then, two points appear:

1) Aristotle in neither of his statements of the ‘new’ definition makes any mention of the body or kind of body;

whereas Albert, in each of his statements does:

a) causa huismodi vitae, sicut physici corpori organici
b) causa operum vitae et per se accidentium in tali corpore
c) causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus.

2) Aristotle, in both statements, makes an enumeration of the operations, faculties or modes of living which he declares the soul to be principle of (and of these intellectio is one);

whereas Albert makes no mention at all of the works of life in the first, and in his second and third refers to them generally as ‘operum vitae et per se vitae’—without attaching any enumeration.

II-B

To make a second comparison of the text of Albert with that of chapter II of the De Anima:

Albert states that Aristotle says this definition is as principle of a propter quid demonstration and is cause through which others, which merely state quid est, are demonstratively concluded. Now Aristotle nowhere in chapter II says explicitly that the new definition is a principle of a propter quid demonstration of the old. At the beginning of the chapter, he does state that we must seek again about soul “for it is necessary that the definitive ratio show not only quid sit, sed et causam inesse.” (“Because not only must the discourse expressing the definition announce what is in fact, but it must also contain the cause and bring it to light.”)

Aristotle goes on to give an example from geometry of two definitions, one of which is as principle stating the cause of the thing, the other has ratio conclusionis."

1 In this connection it might be said that in this introduction to chapter II, a strong presumption is created that the definitions of soul would be similarly related as principle and

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But it is important to note that Aristotle did not explicitly state that such was his view; it is important because St. Thomas did not think that such was Aristotle's view:

After explicating the geometrical example, St. Thomas comments in Book II, 1.3 of his commentary on De Anima (Pirotta ed. #252):

"It must be attended to that this example which is here induced, is like that which he intends in connection with the soul, in one point (quantum ad aliquid); namely as to this, that a definition of soul is to be demonstrated; but not as to this: that it will be demonstrated by a demonstration dicente propter quid."

In #253: St. Thomas states the syllogism Aristotle intends to set up thus:

That which is first principle of living is actus et forma of living bodies
But soul is first principle of living in those things which live.
Hence, the soul is actus et forma of living bodies.

He then adds:

"Now it is manifest that this demonstration is ex posteriori. For from this, that the soul is form of living body, is it the principle of the works of life, and not conversely."

In effect, then, St. Thomas does not think that Albert states Aristotle says, for the reason that if Aristotle meant that, he would be mistaken.

II-C

It seems pertinent to compare the text of Albert with that of Aristotle on one more point:

In Albert's third sentence, which begins Aristoteles iterum dicit it is said that the first two definitions, as actus and as ratio et species, are imperfect "because through them one cannot know the causes of the accidents per se and of the operations which convene per se to the soul." This again, and even more clearly, is interpretation of Aristotle, not citation. Aristotle does speak of definitions, which do not make known the properties or facilitate conjecture about them, as dialectical and vain. But this, as Albert notes in his next sentences, was in Book I, chapter I (403a) not in Book II, chapter II. Aristotle does not explicitly say anywhere that he considers the definition of soul as act or form an instance of those definitions which are dialectical and vain, because they do not make per se accidentia known. Albert, it would seem, merely infers that because Aristotle begins again in chapter II to discuss the soul and because he was dissatisfied with previous definition, that previous definition was dialectical and vain. (Also, Aristotle does not say anywhere that properties are superiorly demonstrable from the new definition . . . Indeed, if we take Aristotle's statements of the new definition, the properties, the proper operations, are present in the definition as differentia.)

I have noted these differences between the text of Albert and that of Aristotle (to the material of which Albert is clearly referring), not because St. Albert, despite his 'Aristoteles dicit,' is to be construed here or judged here as pretending to faithful...
commentary or literal rendition of the sense of Aristotle; but rather because, regardless of what Aristotle said or meant to say, I think that an explanation of what Albert means here and an explanation of the textual differences from Aristotle will coincide. I think, that is, that there is a reason for what Albert says here and also a reason for the differences from Aristotle’s text; and that the reason for both is the same. The presence of the differences then provides key-clues to the grasp of Albert’s understanding of the soul. And so I propose to direct my exposition of the sense of what Albert says to these three questions:

1) Why might Albert be predisposed to feel that Aristotle said, though he did not explicitly say, that the two definitions are related in a propter quid demonstration since, as we have seen, though perhaps the text of Aristotle suggests that, it does not suggest it so inevitably as to make St. Thomas construe him as saying it?

2) Why, in his statements of the new definition does Albert make mention of the body and give no enumeration of the works of life, as that enumeration is contained in Aristotle?

3) Why does Albert feel that Aristotle’s general remark in Book I about dialectical and vain definitions is applicable to the first of his own definitions of the soul set up in chapter II of Book II?

III-A

To the first, then: It seems to me eminently intelligible that Albert should have no hesitation about construing the relations between the terms ‘soul,’ ‘principle’ and ‘act’ or ‘form’ as a relation in which ‘principle’ is the middle term of a propter quid demonstration. For this is what one would expect him to do as a good philosopher consistent with himself in the measure that this is possible. That is, what Albert, with Avicenna, said for Aristotle about Aristotle’s first definition and first chapter is clearly consonant with what Albert, without Avicenna directly so far as I know, has Aristotle saying here. For if soul is said to be actus, not because it is so in itself but only as a consequence of a certain relation it bears to the body, from which relation it is designated actus, actus being in the body as if the fundamen of that relation, then there can be a middle between soul and actus, namely that term which states the relation more definitely in its cause. And this is just exactly according to Albert what is done by the term ‘principle of life of this kind, namely of physical organic body’ or ‘principle and cause of works of life and per se accidents in such a body.’ To call the soul the act of the body when it is not so in itself, without stating what it is so, is insufficient. Albert, in discussing the first definition of the soul, had to repair this insufficiency. And he now construes Aristotle as going on in chapter II to similarly repair the insufficiency — and he construes Aristotle as saying in chapter II just what Albert had said for him in discussion of the definition in chapter I: namely that to the extent that and because the soul is cause (efficient) or works of and in the body, it is called actus.

It is pertinent, for the corroboration of all this, to recall sentences from Albert’s discussion of the previous definition. I take them only from the discussion in the Summa Theologiae. In the Solutio of q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, (Vol. 18 Jamme ed. p. 347b), Albert says:

“This definition of Aristotle says what the soul is, according as it is form and species and substance of animate body in which with regard to the whole and the parts it does the operations of life. It is not given of the soul as it is in itself.” And later in the same article (Vol. 18, 348a), the same point is made:

“The soul has a double definition, one according as it does the works of life in the body and in its organs, and in this way it is defined by Aristotle as entelechy of
physical organic body having life in potency . . . the other is given of the soul as it is in itself and as it is separable from the body."

Further, in answer to objection 1, which is from Gregory and expresses the fear that if the soul is entelechy it will be dependent on body for being and without body will be nothing, Albert says (348a):

"Gregory would be saying well, if the soul considered in itself were entelechy secundum essentiam. But this is not true, for it is not entelechy except through the animation which it makes (animationem quam facit) in the body through the works of life (per opera vitae). In itself it is an incorporeal spirit, always living, as Plato says."

It is seen then from these quotations that already in the discussion of the first definition, Albert, by disengaging the idea of soul from the idea of act or form, has in effect stated the propter quid syllogism which at the end of discussion of the second definition he attributes to Aristotle. It is according as, to the extent that it does, because it does, the works of life in the body and in its organs, that the soul is called actus. To call soul actus designates a relation between it and the body; to say it is the principle of works of life in the body is to state the reason why there is that relation. Because the soul and the body are conjoined in this as-if causal relation (a relation, which is seen in the corresponding Summa De Creaturis passage, of as-if efficient causality), the actus of the soul which is in the body (because the act of anything seems to be in the agent) is as if the effect of that causal activity on the part of the soul. The demonstration consequently, is truly propter quid.

III-B

The second question about differences was: Why has Albert placed in the new definition the body, and omitted from its statement, the enumeration of the works of life, as Aristotle gave it, namely; vegetation, sensing, local motion and intellect? The answer to this seems clear. He does so, in order that he might conclude, as he does at the end of his passage, that the rational soul, according to certain of its parts, is not actus nec ratio nec species alicius corpore, because it is not according to them principle or cause of works of life in body. If it is only insofar as it is causally responsible for acts in the body (operum vitae in tali corpore; principium et causa operum vitae et accidentum in physico organico corpore secundum totum et secundum partes) that the soul is denominated actus, then to the extent that it is principle of operations (those of the agent and acquired intellect) which are not in the body, it is not called actus nor ratio nor species, but is separate and separable.

Clearly, then, to his purpose it was important that in a definition from which the definition of soul as actus (as he understands the latter) is to be concluded, he should say works of life in such a body secundum totum et secundum partes. He could not have the statement of the new definition say merely works of life and enumerate them, with intellect included as one, for by that manner of understanding Aristotle, St. Thomas, some years before, had proved that the intellective soul was form and act of the body, a conclusion which St. Albert had already in discussion of the first definition disproved. St. Thomas' understanding of and use of the material in Book II, chapter II, of Aristotle's De Anima is indicated in his Summa Theologica, P. I., q. 76, a, l, c:

"Whether the Intellectual Principle is United to Body as its Form?

We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is attributed: for instance that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowl-
edge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; so a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, feeling, and local movement; and likewise the primary principle whereby we understand. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. *This is the demonstration used by Aristotle in II de anima.*

Consequently, since Albert did not believe that such a conclusion was the truth of the matter, the transformation of the middle term, consisting of putting body in it and leaving intellection out, was essential to his use of it.

Again, returning to the discussion of the first definition in his *Summa Theologica*, it is clear that Albert, following Avicenna, has already committed himself to decisions which determine the statement and use he has made here of the new definition. To cite again, the statement (q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, Vol. 18, p. 347b) about double definition:

"One is according as it does the works of life in the body and its organs . . . and in this way it is defined by Aristotle as entelechy . . . the other, which is given of the soul in itself and as it is separable from the body, especially according to the part which is the act of no body, that is, the intellective, according to which part it does the works of life in itself (secundum quam partem opera vitae operatur in seipsa)."

The contrast here is clear between works of life in body and in itself, in the one case permitting definition of soul as act, in the other a definition of the soul as it is in itself.

Objection 10 in the same article states that the definition of the soul as entelechy is badly given; for Aristotle says that it applies universally, and yet intellect, which is of the soul, is not act of any body.

To this Albert replies (Vol. 18, 348b–349a):

"The definition is well given and applies to every soul which is act of body and has nothing except what is act of the body. But the intellect is the act of no body: and for this reason the definition does not convene to it."

(And this is the point where Albert goes on to show that since part is not act, the whole rational soul cannot be.)

This text states then, that that soul is *actus* which has "nothing except what is act of the body." And we understand from this the presence, in the new definition as Albert states it in syllogism, of "in toto et in partibus": "Omne quod est principium et causa per se operum vitae et accidentium in physico organico corpore in toto et in partibus est actus et ratio species ipsius."

It is clear, then, that the decisions made which yield this second difference from the text of Aristotle are controlled by decisions already made about with what reservations the soul can be said to be act. The use of body in the definition was crucial to Albert's consistency with himself.

III-C

Inquiring regarding the remaining difference, the pattern is seen to be the same. Albert, with no direct textual authority from Aristotle, has interpreted him as saying that the definition of the soul as form is a dialectical and vain definition "be-
cause it does not make us know the causes of the accidents _per se_ and the operations which _per se_ convene to the soul."

Though, as I have said, it would be difficult to imagine what this would mean in Aristotle since his new definition, far from making the essential operations known, contains them as _differentia_, it is clear what Albert can mean.

By those operations which "convene _per se_ to the soul" he means those which are not acts of the body, those operations of the intellective part which the soul does in itself (_operatur in seipsa_—in statement about double definition). Those operations which convene _per se_ to the soul are contrasted with those which are acts of the body or done in the body. Now since it was said in the reply to Objection 10, previously quoted, that the definition of the soul as act applies to every soul which is the act of body and _nihil habet nisi quod est actus corporis_, but not to a soul which has a power, the operation of which is not the act of a body but an act in the soul itself, it is clear that from a definition of the soul as act one could never make known those operations which convene _per se_ to the soul, any more than one could make known from a definition of man as essentially a transitive agent his immanent operations. And so, such a definition is dialectical and vain.

Again, then, it is the decisions made in discussion of the first definition which induce Albert to apply a disparaging remark of Aristotle's about a certain kind of definition to Aristotle's own first definition of the soul.

IV

From this examination of Albert's discussion in his _Summa Theologica_, of the second definition of Aristotle it seems possible to conclude several things:

1. That Albert's discussion of the second definition is eminently intelligible in the light of his discussion of the first definition of Aristotle.

2. That Albert's whole use of the material of chapter II of Book II of the _De Anima_ is controlled by the attempt, which succeeds, to make _his_ Aristotle of chapter II consistent with _his_ Aristotle of chapter I.

3. That, therefore, if Albert's positions in discussion of chapter I were Avicennian because in agreement with Avicenna in meaning and clearly borrowed language, then his positions in discussion of the second definition can be called Avicennian by logical derivation. For though there seems no direct borrowing here from Avicenna, positions of marked Avicennian influence rationally control what is said here. Albert, that is, remains Avicennian because he remains consistent with himself.

4. Further, that on the interpretation of Aristotle's chapter II and on the truth of the matters concerned there, Albert is in unequivocal disagreement with St. Thomas. No interpretation of passages is needed to establish this disagreement. Indeed seldom do two men so clearly disagree. One thinks chapter II is correctly cited and used to prove that the intellective soul is the form of the body; the other that it is not. One thinks that because the soul is act and form it is principle; the other that because the soul is principle it is act and form. Either they are using these words, act and principle, to mean the same thing or they are not. If they are, they certainly do not agree and one of them is right, the other wrong, and only one of them a Thomist. If they are using the words to mean different things, it is possible, though improbable, that they could be in agreement on the truth of the

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2 For the bifurcation taken from Avicenna between soul in itself and soul as act control his: (1) statement of the second definition; (2) his interpretation of relation between the two definitions; (3) his use of Book I.
matters concerned; but even then, one would hardly call one who used essential words like act and principle so entirely differently, a Thomist.

At any rate, it is clear that if St. Albert knew of St. Thomas' commentary on chapter II of *De Anima* and of his use of chapter II material in Question 76, he was not impressed. In a discussion of chapter II material, he is more concerned to preserve the integrity of his original Avicennian positions than he is to confront himself with Thomas' interpretation and use of that material.
An English Pilgrim-Diary of the Year 990

“For every wight which that to Rome went, halt nat o path nor alwey o manere.”


FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

I

The pilgrim-diary associated with Sigeric, archbishop of Canterbury (990–94), commends itself at once to the student of medieval history, geography and literature; for this little document with its catalog of twenty-three Roman churches and its list of seventy-nine *submansiones* or stopping places between Rome and the Channel is extraordinarily detailed for the period and is rich in information. Viewed as a literary work, better perhaps as a sketch or a skeleton of a literary work, it is, as W. J. Moore recently and rightly observed, “the only complete itinerary of an Anglo-Saxon pilgrim to Rome which we possess.” It is, accordingly, well worth such study as one may care to devote to it. In the following pages I have attempted to identify the sites in the itinerary portion in the text and, where possible, to account for the often curiously distorted forms of many of the *submansiones*.

II

989. Hér was Síric tó arcebiscope gehádod . . . siþan férde tó Róme æfter his pallium.

Híc consecratus est Síricus ad archiepiscopatum Cantíc . . . hic Siricus (partly erased) ivit ad Romam pro palio.

This entry for 989 (more rightly 990) in the bilingual annals (Old English and Latin) in British Museum Ms. Cotton Domitian A.VIII (fol. 58v), contains a simple statement of a not particularly remarkable event. It tells us that Sigeric

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1 I wish at the outset to thank my friend Mr. Charles Niver for calling my attention in the first instance to this text as edited by Hook and by Miller and subsequently for many useful references. Mr. Niver is at present exploring the implications of certain portions of Archbishop Sigeric’s route with special reference to the art of the time.

2 W. J. Moore, *The Saxon Pilgrims to Rome and the Schola Saxonam* (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1937), p. 86. The next document of this kind known to me is Siuwulf’s travel-diary to the Holy Land of A.D. 1102–3, edited with a translation by Wm. R. Brownlow in the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Soc., *Publ. 21*, London, 1892; this is, of course, post-Conquest.

3 In this section I have for the convenience of the reader ventured to repeat a page or two (text and footnotes) from my article “The Rome of Two Northern Pilgrims: Archbishop Sigeric of Canterbury and Abbot Nikolas of Munkathverá,” *Harvard Theological Review* XXXIII (1940) 267–89.

4 Thorpe’s and Plummer’s *F*-text, now being edited by Mrs. Marie Hoffmann of Strassburg i. El. and myself. For a careful study of the language (late West Saxon with numerous Kenticisms) of the OE portions of the text see C.-H. Fernquist, *Studies in Modern Språkvetenskap XIII* (Uppsala, 1937), 41–103, summary pp. 52–3 §4. It may be noted here that, while the present annal does not occur in other versions of the Old-English Chronicle, a very similar entry under what is surely the correct date 990 does occur in the Easter Table (a Canterbury document) in Brit. Mus. Ms. Cotton Caligula A. XV, fol. 132v: “990; Hér Síric bispoc fór tó Róme,” ed. Felix Liebermann, *Ungedruckte anglonormannische Geschichtsquellen* (Strassburg i. El., 1879), p. 3. The present annal, in reflecting a specialized interest in Canterbury affairs, is characteristic of *F*, beyond all question a Canterbury book; see Charles Plummer, *Two Saxon Chronicles Parallel II* (Oxford, 1899), xxxii §28.

5 On numerous English pilgrimages to Rome in the seventh and eighth centuries see Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–89, 126–7 (chronological table);
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(also known as Siric), archbishop of Canterbury, went to Rome, — probably in the summer of 990 — to receive the pallium from the pope, then John XV (989–96). Such an entry would not detain us long if some unknown member of the archbishop’s retinue had not made this typical journey particularly memorable by jotting down a set of notes which amounts to a sketch, if not a full picture, of the archbishop’s sojourn in Rome and of his return-itinerary from Rome to the Channel. Composed in Latin and preserved in Brit. Mus. Ms. Cotton Tiberius B.V., fol. 22v–23r, these notes constitute in effect an Anglo-Latin pilgrim-diary of the late tenth century. That the unknown author was an Englishman is likely, for he speaks at the outset of “our archbishop” (archiepiscopi nostri). Nothing more is known about this diarist.

The text of the diary has been printed twice in full and a third time in part by as many different persons; none indicates obligations to his predecessor. The editions, none quite accurate, are:

1. Hook. First edition (I, 434 fn.: “never been printed”). Hook gives the complete text but does not identify either churches or places.

2. Stubbs. Stubbs gives the complete text; he does not identify the churches though he identifies correctly many of the places, some very difficult, in the itineraries.

3. Miller (p. 156: “noch nirgends erwähnt”). Miller omits the list of churches altogether but identifies many places correctly; on pp. 30–1 he gives a description of the Ms. and an analysis of its contents. This partial edition suffers especially from Miller’s lack of familiarity with the specifically Old-English letters employed here and there; see, for example, Martinus (stop 73).

As Miller (p. 31) observed, the expression “archiepiscopi nostri” at the beginning of the text suggests that the diary was written during Sigeric’s lifetime and hence not later than 994, the year of the archbishop’s death. The general accuracy of the data makes it indeed probable that the work was composed or compiled in the course of the journey itself, that is in the year 990. Script and internal evidence point to the early part of the eleventh century, probably before 1016, as the date for the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries see Jung, pp. 15–31; and for the twelfth century P. B. Schaeffer, Englishmen in Italy in the Twelfth Century, Rome (unpubl. Harvard diss., 1922).

6 For a biographical notice see Wm. Hunt in The Dictionary of National Biography under “Sigeric or Siric”; also Hook, pp. 431–9, and for scattered notes on Sigeric’s association with Ælfric, abbot and great English writer, see C. L. White, Ælfric: a New Study of his Life and Writings (Yale Studies in English II, Boston, 1898). Index under “Sigeric.”

7 The period of Otto III and Crescentius II; for a brief statement on this period see Léon Homo, Rome médiévale 470–1420 (Paris, 1934), pp. 85–6, also Hook, p. 433. For Italy in the second half of the tenth century see EI XIX, map facing p. 808 (art. “Italia”)

8 See Stubbs, p. 391, n. 1 bottom; Plummer, op. cit., II, 173 under the year 989. Miller, p. 31, thinks that the journey could scarcely have been made before the spring of 991, so Hook, p. 433, but cp. p. 434, footnote line 3 for the 990 date; also White, op. cit., p. 52.


10 Some use has been made of this important little document by students of medieval travel-routes, e.g. E. Ochtmann, “Die Alpenpässe im Mittelalter,” Jahrb. f. schweiz. Geschichte III (1878), esp. p. 250; Aloys Schulte, Geschichte d. mittelalterl. Handels u. Verkehrs zwischen Westdeutschland u. Italien mit Anschluss von Venedig I (Leipzig, 1900), 67; and J. E. Tyler, The Alpine Passes—the Middle Ages (1926–1929) (Oxford, 1930), pp. 8–9, 15. These writers, and sporadically a few others, in the main follow Stubbs’s identifications of the stopping places (submanifestes) in the itinerary part of the diary. There has, however, been only one thorough-going study of the itinerary, in this case limited to the stretch between Rome and Luca, namely that by Julius Jung, “Das Itinerar des Erzbischofs Sigeric von Canterbury und die Strasse von Rom über Siena nach Luca,” Mitteilungen d. Instituts f. österreichische Geschichtsforschung XXV (1904), 1–90; see cit. cit. pp. 15–6 for a pointed comment on the comparative neglect of this document.

11 See Heinrich Henel, Studien zum ae. Complus (in Max Förster’s “Beiträge zur engl. Philologie,” Vol. XXVI, Leipzig, 1934), p. 34 and note 64. I may add that the hand of the
of the present text, which is accordingly at least one transcript and very likely more than one, removed from the prototext (Urtext). That the present copy reflects, partially at least, the work of a scribe or scribes who were quite unfamiliar with the names of many of the submansiones, will be seen in the following section.

III

We may now turn to the text itself or rather to that part of it that includes the submansiones. The text is printed as closely as possible according to the Ms., while all corrections and even the expansion of the commonest abbreviations are confined to the commentary on the individual names (§IV below). To facilitate cross-reference the submansiones are, however, numbered parenthetically with Arabic numerals in order, an order which, as will be seen, is also the order in which they were reached.


That the names of the submansiones have not been well transmitted, will be clear in the discussion of all too many of the items in §IV below. In anticipation, a few general comments may be made: e's and o's of the prototext have been ignorantly confused, as in Arne for Arno (23) and Tremel for Trolme (42); similarly a is miswritten for o in Suteria for Sutero (4) and blanca for blanc (23). In several instances a series of minims has proved ambiguous: so iner for nier (13), Sefui for Sefiu (61)

diary the same as that of the immediately preceding list of tenth-century popes and the marginal list of English bishops. This list of bishops is printed by Pauli and Liebermann in Neues Archiv. d. Gesellschaft f. ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde V (1880), 659–40 and, with some additional discussion, by Louis Duchesne in Le Liber Pontificius II (Paris, 1892), xv. Ælfric's De Temporibus, discussed by Henel, immediately follows the diary on fol. 23r. Stubbs's statement (p. 391, n. 1) that "the Ms. is contemporary with Ælfric's pontificate" can no longer be viewed as right.

12 For the beginning portion, containing the list of the churches visited in Rome, see the editions cited p. 232 above and, more accurately, in my art. cit. Harvard Theological Review.

A brief note on the word submansio f., not recorded in DuCange or J. H. Baxter and Chas. Johnson, Medieval Latin Word-List (Oxford, 1934). Lat. mansio "overnight stopping-place" is, of course, familiar from Classical times; the present compound might thus be expected to mean "sub-station" or "minor stopping-place" and the like, but it is obviously used by Ælfric's diarist without distinction for major and minor stopping-places on the route.
and *amant* for *amant* (67). The Insular s and r have been confused: r read for s in *furcarī* (5) and s for r in *modesanne* (23). In addition to these there is good reason to suspect other errors of various sorts, discussed under the individual names. The names of some of the stops have apparently been very much distorted, for example, *Pilemangener* (35).

Some scribe seems to have had difficulty with the roman numerals used in connection with the stops: unlike the scribe who, I assume, first supplied them. A confusion of minims has quite possibly taken place between (2) and (3), leading to the ultimate alteration of an earlier sequence "*.vii. .iii.*" to "*.viii. .iii.**"; *.lxv. is miswritten *.lx., while an earlier *.lxxviii. or more probably *.lxxix (since "*q*" is usually though not always written *.ix.) is presumably miswritten *.lxx.; that a stop has dropped out between (78) and (80) seems, in view of the very short distance involved, a less likely alternative.

The treatment of the Ms. abbreviation *scē* and, more commonly, *scī* is in the case of many stops in Italy noteworthy. *Scē* and *scī* are, of course, to be expanded respectively to *Sancte* and *Sancta* (as if for a Latin gen. or dat. sing. fem. *-ae*). *Sancte* without the hooked ε is used only before the name of four male saints: *Petēr* (10), *Quiropric* (12), *Martin* (17) and *Gemiane* (19); elsewhere *Sanctī* with the hooked ε is employed indifferently before the names of male and female saints. *Scē* (Lat. *sancta*) before *Cristina* (8) and — very oddly — *scēae* (Lat. *sanctae*) before *Domnine* (36) are exceptional. Now, except perhaps in the case of *Sancta Cristina* (8) the diarist most likely wrote in all cases *scē* (for OE *sancte*, a by-form of *sant* "saint"); this abbreviation a later scribe, perhaps Continental and unfamiliar with OE *sancte*, would seem to have misunderstood the standing for Lat. *sancte*, i.e., *sanctae* and "corrected" the *scē* of his Vorlage to *scī*. This gratuitous alteration seems to have been left in most cases by his successor except in the case of *scēae domnine* (36) as though *Domnine* were the female saint Domnina instead of the St. Domninus here actually meant. A penchant of some intermediate scribe to hook his ε's appears also in the historically unjustifiable *Else* (17) for *Else* or *Elsa* and perhaps also in *blec-* (64). That a Continental scribe may have been concerned in the transmission of the text is further suggested by the confusion of Insular s and r noted above.

To place the blame or to establish at all exactly the succession of errors great and small in our text is, with a unique Ms., scarcely possible, but it is clear, I think, that we have to do with a textual tradition involving one or more persons between the prototext and our surviving copy. That the roman numerals were not in the prototext seems also quite possible in view of the curious separation by roman numerals of the suburb *Antifern* (56) from the town of *Urba* (55) and the possible false division of syllables between *pail* (10) and *Abricula* (11), unlikely to have occurred had the roman numerals ever been rightly in place.

The return journey of the English pilgrims may be supposed to have begun on the third day after their arrival in Rome.13 The city of Rome (1) is mentioned as the point of departure and immediately thereafter "Iohannis viiiii" (2); the significance of this somewhat uncertain item is discussed below. From here on the route followed was a well trod one, often along Roman roads (cp. the references to the *Antonine Itinerary*), running through Italy (3-48), over the Great St. Bernard Pass (between 48 and 49), through part of French Switzerland (49-56) and across north-eastern France (57-78) to a point (79) presumably near Wissant on the French coast.

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FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

IV

In the commentary which now follows, the *submansiones* or stops are discussed in the order of their appearance in the diary, that is, in the order reached. After each name is given, if known, a modern identification (including province, canton or department), also references to special studies and to some large-scale map; for only on such a map are many of the localities—often quite small and today insignificant—to be found. For general convenience reference is, where possible, made to Andree’s *Allgemeiner Handatlas* and to some recent guide-book. Ordinarily I have not found it particularly relevant or helpful to cite corresponding entries from other itineraries since illustrative material of this kind can readily be assembled from the writings of others. To emphasize the continuity of Roman routes I have, however, wherever possible referred to the *Antonine Itinerary (IA)* and also make occasional use of the pilgrim-diary of the Icelander Nikolás, abbot of the Benedictine foundation at Munkálfarð (Eyjafjarðar sýsla), whose forms at times help to explain those of the present text. Other discussion, especially of the nature of the distortion of a name, is given where this justifies an otherwise unpromising-seeming identification. Note the key of abbreviations (§VI below).

*Urbs Roma* (1), the city of Rome. Lat. *Roma* is used though OE had a thoroughly naturalized *Róm* f. Rome, scarcely to be viewed as a *submansio*, is evidently only noted as the point of departure for the return-journey.

*Iohannis viiiii.* (2), “of John IX.” If the Ms. is right (Miller misreads the roman numeral as “viiii”), this item might naturally be supposed to refer somehow to Pope John IX (898–900). But Jung p. 31 (and n. 4) draws the obvious conclusion that this item (2) must refer to something in the Vatican and identifies it as the tomb of John IX (with epitaph quoted by Mann p. 102), located in the outer porch of the old St. Peter’s. Mann (101–2) assumes some regular halting place—unlikely—associated with John IX but hazards no definite suggestion. This monument seems, however, scarcely to be worthy of such prominence in the itinerary, and I should like to venture an alternate identification. I begin with the suggestion that Ms. *viii. may be an error for *viit*, arising from an erroneous joining of the minims of *vii*. of an earlier text with the immediately following *iiii* which preceded Bacane (3); see also p. 234 above. If this suggestion is right, the supposedly original *vii.* would then refer to Pope John VII (705–7), who caused to be built in the old St. Peter’s an oratory (capella) to the Blessed Virgin, close to the present Porta Santa. This oratory, demolished in 1609, was reputedly most beautiful and was especially famed for its mosaics: see Eugen Müntz, *Revue archéologique*, new ser. XXXIV (Sept. 1877), 145–62; art. “Jean VII” by Henri Leclercq in the *Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* VII, ii (Paris, 1927), esp. col. 2200 ff.; and E. W. Anthony, *A History of Mosaics* (Boston, 1935), pp. 137–9. This oratory may have been known to Sigeric and the members of his retinue even before their trip to Rome, if not otherwise, easily through the notice in Bede’s *Chronicon*, i.e. in chap. 66 of Bede’s *De Ratione temporum* (Patrolog. Lat. XC, Paris, 1850, col. 596 under A.D. 708): “Iohannes ... fecit oratorium sanctae Dei generetic operi pulcherrimo intra ecclesiam beatì Petri apostoli.” Accordingly, the present entry “Iohannis viiiii” may stand for “(capella) Iohannis viii” “(oratory) of Pope John VII” where the English visitors

14 For the modern student many of the identifications of Stubbs and Miller, though often right, are frequently unsatisfying because of lack of documentation and precise justification. Both these scholars must have done considerable close investigation in order to have hit upon, as they have, the correct identification of various difficult names; but many of the localities at issue are small and obscure and the identifications of Stubbs and Miller cannot be accepted on sight without qualifying cognomens and references to large-scale maps and special studies where such are available.

15 E.g. Oechlmann, cited in n. 10 above.

16 For literature see *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit., p. 277.
may have said their past prayers and made their last offerings before starting back to the Channel (ad mare). Mention of this famous chapel would, incidentally, quite fit in with the diarist’s obvious interest in sightseeing.

From (1) to (8) the route follows the Cassian Way, IA 286, 1–5.

**Baccane (3)**, Baccano (prov. Viterbo), a village on the edge of a now dried-up lake basin. GCT 143, Baed. RCI 431. Rom. *Baccanae* f. pl., also *Baccana* neut. pl.: IA 286, 4 on the route to Bolsena (8) and in Roman times an important road-junction (Nissen I, 260; II, i, 356). If the Ms. -e is not an error for -o (see p. 233 above), we have here a survival of the Rom. form -ae (-e). PW 4. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1896), col. 2720; Jung 31–2; Matthias 62. The modern form Baccano may have been influenced by other Baccano-names (from Lat. adj. *bacchanal*), though the Rom. *Baccanae* can scarcely have anything to do with Bacchus or the like; see Pieri 333 “baccano.”

**Suteria (4)**, Sutri, prov. Viterbo. GCT 143, Andree 127 C2 and inset K7, Baed. RCI 130. Rom. *Sutrium*: IA 286,3. The Ms. form is irregular: for -er- for vocalic r cp. *Aberats* (75); -a is surely a scribal error for o (see p. 233 above). The form *Sutiera* may, however, reflect merely a popular association with, and partial adaptation to, OE *sūtere* m. “shoemaker.” On the modern Sutri as a petrified locative see Serra 152. PW 7. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1931), col. 995–6; EI XXXIII, 31; Jung 32–3; Matthias 189; Tomassetti V, 626–44.


**Sancte Valentine (6)**, epithet for Viterbo, prov. Viterbo. GCT 143, Andree 127 C2. The former Borgo S. Valentino *in silice* (*Urbs Sancti Valentini* “on the flint paving blocks (of the Cassian Way),” with its church of S. Valentino destroyed ca. 1137, was once a suburb of Viterbo. Stubbs no doubt had this in mind with his tentative identification “probably Viterbo.” Matthias 220–1. See esp. Cesare Pinzi, *Storia della città di Viterbo I* (Rome, 1887), 51–2, 127; Signorelli Index, p. 477 under “Valentino (S)” and “Valentino (S) Borgo”; also Jung 34–6. Miller’s proposed Valentano (on the other side of the lake of Bolsena) cannot be right.

**Sancte Flaviane (7)**, Borgo (or Vico) San Flaviano, epithet for Montefiascone (med. Lat. *Mons Flaccorum*), prov. Viterbo (Signorelli 76–7, 121 n. 13; Jung 36–7, GCT 137, Andree 127 C2, Baed. RCI 123). Borgo S. Flaviano was once a suburb of Montefiascone on the Cassian Way; there is still a twelfth-century church in Montefiascone dedicated to St. Flavian, built on the site of an older basilica (Baed. RCI 123; EI XXXIII, 739–40; Matthias 144, 232).

**Sancta Cristina**, epithet for Bolsena, prov. Viterbo. (GCT 137, Andree 127 B2, Baed. RCI 117), where St. Christina was martyred and where there is an eleventh-century church dedicated to her (EI VI, 354; Jung 37–8; Aarbøger 74). IA 286, 1: *Vulsinis*. So Werlauff 43 §§7; Stubbs; Oehlmann IV, 303 n. 8; Kålund 17, 10: *til Kristinoborgar*; Matthias 68–9 under “Lago di Bolsena.”

The route soon leaves the Cassian Way (which goes on to Chiusi; IA 285, 6: *Chlusio*), bending slightly W around the end of the lake of Bolsena into the valley of the Paglia.

specifically to the Quintaluna which here joins the Paglia in a sharp 200 m drop (El I, 375; Jung 39-43.)

Sancte Petir in Pail (10), “St. Peter’s on the Paglia,” an unidentified religious establishment farther down the Paglia (late Lat. *Palia: Repetti IV, 22; Jung 43-6, esp. 43 n. 4). Ms. Petir represents OE *Peter, gen. sing. *Petres as in Petres castel (49). The Ms. form (Pail) of the river-name is noteworthy. Taking into account the initial A- of Abricula (11), which may have become detached from the end of *Palia or *Pailia of the prototext by false division, it is tempting to think that the river-name was originally written Palia. Pail is, to be sure, a conceivable anglicization of the Lat. or Ital. name (cp. late OE *Paile for Apulia), but in the case of a small and relatively insignificant river adaptation to a foreign language is unlikely. Miller suggests that the site of this St. Peter’s was near Radicofani, prov. Siena (GCT 129, Andree 127 B2), though Radicofani lies some 4 or 5 km back from the Paglia.

The route now appears to pass from the valley of the Paglia into that of the Orcia.

Abricula (11), Bricola in the Val d’Orcia (Repetti I, 361, VI, 33-4; Jung 46-7) on the Roman post-road on the right bank of the Orcia and almost due N of Radicofani. Unidentified by Stubbs and Miller. Bricola is documented from the eleventh century (burgum Bricole) and was in the Middle Ages a well-known hospice, dependant on S. Pietro in Campo di Val d’Orcia; it is now appropriately known as Spedalotto di S. Pellegrino (GCT 121, cp. Repetti V, 441-2). The Ms. reading is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Pieri 272 suggests that the name Bricola is based on Lat. *apricus, adj., “exposed (e.g. to the warmth of the sun)” Bricola would then mean “the sunny little spot,” comparable to the numerous English Sunnyside’s and the Norwegian Solbakke, nature names of similar meaning. If Pieri’s etymology is right, as it probably is, then Ms. Abricula with the initial A- may be an older form than any hitherto recorded. Nevertheless, as suggested under (10) above, the A- may merely have come by false division from a preceding *Palia or *Pailia. Conceivably the prototext showed the preservation of both a’s: Palia Abricula, with reduction by haplography.

Then NNW to

Sancte Quiric (12), S. Quirico d’Orcia, in Sigeric’s day known as S. Quirico in Osenna, prov. Siena (GCT 121, Andree 127 Bl, Baed. RCI 55, Repetti V, 112 ff., VI,223-4; Jung 49-7). The pieve, dedicated to St. Quiricus, dates from the beginning of the eighth century (Repetti V, 112; El XXX, 750). The saint’s name appears here in anglicized form. A by-form of this name, Sanctus Clericus, appearing in various later itineraries, seems to have arisen by popular etymology: e.g. til Klerka borgar (Kålund 17, 4); see also Jung 47 n.4 and 5 and Matthias 166 (“Quirico”).

Then NW to

Turre iner (13), Torrenieri Montalcino in Val d’Asso (prov. Siena). 5, 5 km from (12) above (GCT 121, Baed. RCI 54, Jung 49-50, Repetti V, 542). Ms. -iner for -ier shows scribal confusion of a series of minimis (see pp. 233-4 above). The first element is surely Lat. *turris f. “tower” “turreted citadel,” Ital. torre f., with the VLat. Loss of -s after an unaccented final vowel; see Gröbler II, 21-2 and Pieri 361 *turris.” Repetti cites a late Lat. Turris Nerii; the second element is perhaps the Lat. name Nerius (Gröbler I, 272).

Arbia (14), R. Arbia, tributary of the Ombrone (Rom. Umbro). The name of the Arbia is not recorded early though there is no reason to doubt that this river-name is old: Repetti I, 105-4. As in Else (17) and Arne (23) the mention of the river presumably indicates a crossing. Miller and Jung (p. 51) reasonably suggest
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Ponte d'Arbia (GCT 121, Baed. RCI 56), near the confluence of the Arbia and the Sorra.

Between here and Lucca (26) come several doubtful names. At times the route is not quite certain, but the general course is W and the obvious highway is that leading to Siena. The route presumably follows the W bank of the Arbia.

Secine (15). A crux. Stubbs and Jung (pp. 51–7) identify this with Siena (GCT 120, Andree 127 Bl), Rom. Saena Iulia; but if Siena is meant, then the Ms. form is much disturbed. Miller suggests a location near Monteroni di Val-d'Arbia (GCT 120, Repetti III, 509 ff, Andree 127 Bl); but it should be noted that Miller had already committed himself to the impossible interpretation of Else (17) as "possibly" Siena!

Burse nova (16). Stubbs's Borgo Nuovo refers, I suppose, to Borgonuovo d'Isola near Staggia in Val-d'Elsa, prov. Siena (GCT 113), where stood the old pieve of S. Stefano (Repetti I, 354), and this may well be right. Jung 57 n. 4: "Wo?") I do not understand Miller's "cp. Borgo Vecchio" (with its church of S. Lorenzo) at Colle di Malamerenda in Val-d'Arbia (GCT 120, S of Siena; Repetti III, 28–9). The Ms. spelling with -s can scarcely be right and by common confusion of o and e (see p. 233 above) must stand for Burgo novo (Ital. burgo m. "fortified place" "castle"); the u of Ms. burse may reflect popular adaptation to the cognate OE burh f. The name is of the familiar type "Castrum novum" (Gröbler II, 14–5), "Neuburg, "Châteauneuf," "Newcastle," not lacking in Italian representatives (Pieri 288–9).

Else (17). R. Elsa, small tributary of the Arno. Repetti II, 53. The E- (vs. E-) does not seem to be historically justified; cp. Pieri 35 for an Etruscan etymology *Hulza* and p. 234 above. The place of crossing or meeting the river is uncertain. The s is, as in Modesanum (33), Insular in form. For similar indications of river-crossings cp. Arbìa (14) and Arne (23). Miller misread the name "As(y)e" and suggests Siena or a place in the vicinity; cp. (15) above.

Sancte Martin in Fosse (18), "St. Martin's in Foci," presumably a religious house and W of the Elsa (17). Miller misread the closely written -ti- of Martin as an a and placed his See Maran near Monteriggione (GCT 113, Andree 127 Bl). Stubbs identifies this St. Martin's with S. Martino (a church?) in the district of Fosci, Fosci, now Foci, in the Val-d'Elsa (Repetti II, 330–1; Jung 59–60; GCT 113) and SE of S. Gimignano, very likely the next stop (19). On the Lat. personal name Fuscius in the district-name see Pieri 86; it is surely not Langobardic as Repetti suggests. Ms. fosse, like the mod. Ital. Foci, may well have arisen by popular etymology, in the present instance by a fancied association with Lat. fossa; modern Foci shows popular association with Lat. fawes, used toponymically for a gap.

Sancte Gemiane (19), very likely, as Stubbs would have it, S. Gimignano in Val-d'Elsa, prov. Siena (GCT 113; Andree 127 Bl; Baed. RCI 23; Repetti V, 35–6; Jung 60–1, EI XXX, 653–4). If this is right, MS. Gemiane stands by the haplography of a series of mimins for *Geminiane* (cp. pp. 233–4 above), that is St. Gemminian, bishop of Modena and eponymous of S. Gimignano. Miller misread Germane, i.e. (St.) Germanus, and suggests a site near Poggibonsi in Val-d'Elsa (GCT 113, Andree 127 Bl).

Sancte Maria Glen (20). Stubbs and Jung identify this with the pieve of S. Maria Chianni di Gambassi in Val-d'Elsa (GCT 113, Andree 127 Al, Repetti I, 695; Jung 61–3). According to Repetti this pieve is documented from 1061, the present building dating from the thirteenth century. If Stubbs and Jung are right, as they well may be, we must suppose that Ms. Glen is misspelled for Clan or perhaps for Clani; see Repetti I, 692 ("Chiani") and on the Etruscan origin of this name Pieri 28–9. Miller suggests a site near Certaldo on the Agliena (GCT 113, Andree 127 Bl), perhaps having in mind S. Maria a (A)sciano, due N of (19) on the E bank of the Elsa; but (A)sciano (Lat. Axiosana-, Pieri 122) cannot formally correspond to Ms. Glen.

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Sancto Petro Currant (21). Stubbins identifies as “S. Pietro, Corazzano” and by this would seem to refer to S. Pietro at Balconevisi (Repetti I, 254), a branch of the pieve of S. Giovanni at Corazzano in Val-d’Evoia (GCT 112; Repetti I, 796, IV, 690 under “Quarazzana”; Jung 5, 63–4). Corazzano looks back to an earlier Quyar(r)atiana < Quadratiana, in turn derived from the Lat. personal name Quadratus (Pieri 177). Stubbins’s identification may be right; but, if so, the Ms. Currant must reflect a considerable distortion of a form standing between the older Quyar(r)atiana and the modern Corazzano, perhaps by some popular adaptation to Ital. corrente f. “current” “stream.” Miller suggests that we have to do with a S. Pietro on the Pietroso (GCT 112–3), near Castelfiorentino (GCT 113, Andree 127 A1); the river-name Pietroso “the stony one” cannot, of course, be directly connected with the name of (21).

Sancty Dionisii (22). “St. Dionysius’s.” Hook and Stubbins misread as Dionysii. Stubbins, Miller and Jung (64–8) propose San Miniato between the Elsa and the Evoia in the lower Val-d’Arno, prov. Pisa (GCT 105, Andree 127 Al, Baed. RCI 21, Repetti V, 79–80). Stubbins adds “San Genesio,” that is Borgo San Genesio, earlier Vico Wallari, of San Miniato (Repetti I, 352–3). St. Genesius, Roman martyr, is, to be sure, prominent at San Miniato, but St. Genesius is not St. Dionysius, and I can find no connection between St. Dionysius and San Miniato or the Borgo San Genesio. If Stubbins’s suggestion is right, a substitution of names has evidently taken place. A crux.

Arno bianco (23), R. Arno bianco, med. Lat. Arnus albus. Like Arbia (14) and Ælæse (17) this river-name presumably indicates a crossing which Stubbins and Miller rightly suggest must have been near Fucecchio on the Arno, prov. Firenze (GCT 106, Andree 126 E4). The Arno bianco “was probably a branch...which was separated from the main course of the river [Arno] at the west slope of the hill of Fucecchio” (Repetti I, 147, II, 358 col. 1; Jung 68–9) and was perhaps near the once famous hospice of Altopascio in Val-di-Nievola (Repetti I, 76, Aarboèger 73). The present reference to the Arno bianco seems to be the earliest. The adj. bianca may refer either the clarity of the water or to its milky color (cp. Pieri 273 under “bianco”) vs. nigra (24) below. On the difficult etymology of the name Arno see G. Battista, Studi etruschi I (1927), 332–5. The Ms. spelling is almost surely an error for Arno bianco (see p. 233 above) though it may be noted that Serra (p. 6) records a form Arnce (for Arno?).

Aqua nigra (24), “dark or turgid stream.” This “water,” if a watercourse is here meant as in Aqua pendente (9), presumably refers to some small tributary of the Arno near Fucecchio, perhaps the Nievole, running from the now canalized and well drained marshes of Fucecchio and Bientina (med. Lat. palus Blentina, see Pieri 23), N of Fucecchio (GCT 105; Repetti I, 139 col. 1, VI, 172; Jung 69, esp. note 2). Or perhaps the so-called Arno nero is meant (Repetti II, 356 col. 1). For French place-names based on Lat. aqua nigra see Gröhrler II, 211, for Swiss names see Jaccard 305, and on nigra in Italian names Pieri 289. Stubbins does not identify this site, but Miller evidently had something of this sort in mind in his explanation “near Galleno,” a village about half-way between Fucecchio and Forci (25).

Ms. aqua nigra is very likely to be associated, if not identified with Arnblackr of Nikolás’s itinerary (Kâlund 16, 27–8: þorp, er Arnblackr heitir), a village (þorp) somehow identified with the Arno nero mentioned above (surely not with Arno bianco as Aarboèger 73). Forci (25). Both Stubbins and Miller (with a query) suggest Porcari, prov. Lucca (GCT 105), about 9 km E of Lucca (26) and, I think, rightly. Porcari is an old settlement (Repetti IV, 581–3, VI, 200; Jung 77–8). Confusion of P- and F- is not startling palaeographically, while -cri may easily have arisen in the case of a strange word from a misinterpretation of gi to abbreviate -cari. The name Porcari seems to look back to a Lat. name-type porcaria (with reference to swine raising); see Gröhrler II, 199; Pieri 266.


Camp maior (27), Camaiore in Versilia, prov. Lucca. GCT 104, Andree 126 E4, Baed. NI 532, EI VIII, 494. References to Camaiore begin after the middle of the eighth century (Repetti I, 398–9, VI, 39; Jung 80). The name corresponds to Lat. campus maior; the second element appears here in a CLat vs. VLat or Ital. form maiore or maggiore; on campus in place-names see Gröhler II, 130–2; Pieri 305–6.

The route now more or less parallels the coast to the mouth of the Magra (Rom. Macra; cp. IA 289, 2).

Luna (28), near Luni (prov. La Spezia), about 3 km NE of the mouth of the Magra on the Aurelian Way in the Val-di-Magra. GCT 96, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 276, EI XXI, 661–2 (extensive bibliography). This once famous Etruscan city, now the site of Roman ruins (including a colosseum), was in Sigeric’s day still an episcopal see, destroyed by the Saracens in 1016. The name lives on in the designation of the surrounding region: La Lunigiana. On modern Lunì (formally a petrified locative) vs. Roman Luna see Serra 155 fn (top); see further Repetti II, esp. 948–9; Matthias 131, and for ancient times PW 26. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1927), col. 1604 ff.; Nissen II, i, 283.

The route now turns up the Magra, along the so-called Via Romea or “Pilgrim Way,” leading over the Cisa Pass (Strada della Cisa) in the Ligurian Apennines to Borgo San Donnino (36).

Sancte Stephane (29), (Borgo) San Stefano di Magra (now merely a railway station), prov. La Spezia. GCT 95, Andree 125 D3. So identified by Stubbs and Miller. Documented since the ninth century (Repetti V, 136, VI, 224). Kålund 16, 15: Stephanus-borg surely refers to the same site (see Verlauff 41 and note 73).

Aquila (30), almost certainly Ajulla in the Val-di-Magra (prov. Massa) near the confluence of the Magra and the Aulella, with its abbey of St. Caprasius, founded ca. 884 (GCT 96, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 457, EI V, 361). Hook misread Aquilla. The etymology of Ajulla is difficult and disputed. The present instance would appear to be among the earliest (cited as such by Bassi 35). The mod. form Aulla seems to have become established by ca. 1700 but the earlier forms Aulla, Auvlla count heavily against any association with Lat. aula “court” “palace” (vs. Repetti I, 168 col. 1) or with VL acucula, Ital. aguglia “needle” (used toponymically). Pieri 314 under “lacus” argues cogently for a derivation of Aulla from l)agulla < lacun(u)la “little pool” and, if he is right, we may have here not only a confirmation of his etymology but also a thoroughly archaic form. MS. Agulla would in this case reflect a misreading of an Agulla of the prototext. See further Repetti I, 168–9; Emanuelle Gerini, Memorie storiche . . . Lunigiana II (Massa, 1831), 3–4; Silvestro Bassi, Il Castello e l’abbazia dell’Aulla (Aulla, 1927), pp. 33–5.

Puntremel (31), Pontremoli at the confluence of the Verde and the Magra, prov. Massa: clavis et iama of the Cisa route (Schütte 45). GCT 84, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 457. Repetti (IV, esp. 543–4) knows of no certain reference to Pontremoli before the eleventh century; EI XXVII, 906–7 notes the present instance as the earliest. There is some disposition to identify Pontremoli with a Rom. Apua (Schütte 22 but cp. Giuliani, art. cit. infra, esp. pp. 227–28). The first element of the name is Lat. pons m., Ital. ponte “bridge”: cp. Gröhler II, 147–8 and Punt Erlein (57) below. The second element is less certain but may well be derived from VLat tremulus m. “poplar” “aspen” (CLat. populus m.; see ML 8880); cp. the African site tremulì “at the poplar trees” (?) of IA 24, 1. The present name may thus mean “bridge by which poplars grow” or the like. Matthias 165. It may be
noted that there is a bridge Ponte Tremoli in Viterbo. The poplar enters into the composition of many European place-names; for Ital. examples see Pieri 254 ("tremula"), Olivieri 550 under "Tremolada"; for French examples see Longnon Index under "tremble," Gröhler II, 165 and Dauzat 119; and for French Switzerland Jaccard 470–1. For traditional but unlikely etymologies of Pontremoli (e.g. "shaky bridge") see Repetti IV, 543 col. 2 and Manfredo Giuliani, "Luni e la leggenda di Apua," Archivio storico per le province parmensi XXXIII (1933), 225, and on the Ligurian tribe of the Apuani settled in the Upper Magra (no city Apual) see PW 3.Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1895), col. 288.

Sancta Benedicte (32), "St. Benedict's." The site of this Benedictine foundation must be sought up in the Ligurian Apennines between Pontremoli (31) and Berceo (33) and is quite likely on Montelungo in the Val-di-Magra (GCT 84), a spur of La Cisa, where before A.D. 1000 there was a Benedictine establishment, dependent on the abbey of St. Columban of Bobbio, whence the name of the chapel, later parish, of S. Benedetto a Montelungo (Repetti III, 412–3, VI, 15). This is no doubt what Stubbs had in mind by his "S. Benedetto, Val di Magra." Miller's suggestion of Berceo is surely wrong; see (33) below.

Between (32) and (33) the travellers, proceeding up the Val-di-Magra along the Via Romea (Pilgrim Route), must have crossed—though without special mention—the crest of the Apennines, presumably through the pass of La Cisa (1041 m) (Andree 125 D3, EI X, 447–8), near Berceo and known in the Middle Ages as Mons Bardonis, Ital. Monte Bardone or Francesca (Repetti I, 739–40, IV, 545 col. 1; Schütte 26 n. 1, 28 n. 1 and 2; Matthias 51–2 under "Apennin"). Nikolás's Munsbard (Kålund 16, 6–7 bis and Aarboejer 70 and n.1) refers to the same, as does Munt Bardon in Wace's Brut 2872 (ed. Ivor Arnold, Soc. anciens textes français, Paris, 1938) and Bardun of Lawman's Brut 5264. There is, it may be noted, a Montbardon in the dep. Hautes-Alpes, France (DT Hautes-Alpes 96).

Sancta Modesanne (33), miswritten for Moderanne, epithet for Berceo, prov. Parma (GCT 85, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 456–7, EI VI, 689). Hook and Stubbs misread Moderanne; on the Ms. confusion of Insular s and r see p. 234 above. This mention of St. Moderan (Moderannus), bishop of Rennes (Brittany, France) is, as Stubbs saw, evidently by way of an allusion to Berceo, with which the saint was intimately associated (Schütte 25 and n. 2). Miller's identification of (33) with Fornovo di Taro (GCT 73, Andree 126 E3) cannot be right. For this same saint in French place-names see Longnon 433 §1929.

Between Berceo (33) and Borgo S. Donnino (36)—in an air-line about 40 km due N—come two stops whose identification is difficult. About midway is Fornovo di Taro (prov. Parma) at the confluence of the Taro and the Ceno, where the road from Berceo forks, one branch going to Borgo S. Donnino, the other to Parma (cp. Schütte 39 and map). We may reasonably assume that the Englishmen followed the familiar route Berceo—Fornovo—Borgo S. Donnino.

Philemangenor (34). This curious and doubtless distorted name must be imagined as lying on the route described just above. Fornovo di Taro (Lat. Forum novum, also Forum Novanorum; GCT 73), an important route-junction, would be the obvious stop (see Schütte 22 and n. 2; A. Solari, Athenaeum XVI, Pavia 1928–9, 350–5; EI XV, 719–20); nevertheless, any formal identification of Fornovo with Ms. Philemangenor is impossible without resort to paleographic acrobatics. Formally somewhat more likely and geographically almost as likely is the village of Felegara (GCT 73) about 4 km N of Fornovo and on the road Fornovo—Medesano; cp. (35) below. If Felegara is a really old settlement, this may be our stop.

Metane (35), quite possibly Medesano on the left bank of the Taro, prov. Parma (GCT 73, Schütte map); if this is right, the Ms. form is of course distorted. Mede-
sano lies on the obvious route, where the road Fornovo-S. Donnino forks, one branch going on to Borgo S. Donnino (36), the other to Noceto. Miller’s suggestion "near Parma" is quite indefinite, while Stubbs’s “Costa Mexana, on the R. Verde” is far off the route that the Englishmen are clearly following. Modena (Rom. Mutina) is likewise geographically out of the question.

Sanctae Domnine (36), Borgo S. Donnino, since 1927 a part of Fidenza, prov. Parma (EI XV, 227-8). GCT 73, Andree 126 E3, Baed. NI 445. S. Donnino takes its name from St. Domninus, martyr of Parma; on the apparent confusion of gender in Ms. sciae see p. 234 above. Fidenza, into which S. Donnino is now incorporated, is the Rom. Fidentia Iulia (IA 288, 1). Matthias 70; for this saint in French place-names see Longnon 415 §1697.

We are now on a stretch of the Aemelian Way between Parma (Rom. Parma) and Piacenza (Rom. Placentia): IA route 287, 9-288, 3.

Floricum (37), quite probably, as Stubbs queries and Miller suggests, Fiorenzuola d’Arda, prov. Piacenza. GCT 72, Andree 125 D3, Baed. NI 445, Nissen II, i, 270; PW 12. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1909), col. 2754 (“Florentia,” 2). Hook and Stubbs misread Floricium. The Lat. diminutive Florentiola (Fiorenzuola) cannot well lie behind Ms. Floricun, which is probably a distortion of Florentia, perhaps written Floracteria in the prototext. Florentia is the original name of this settlement, the diminutive Florentiola having been created later in an effort to distinguish this Florentia from the far more important Florence in the Val-d’Arno. See further EI XV, 429, Pieri 346 “Florentia,” Matthias 91.

Placentia (38), Piacenza. Rom. Colonia Placentia. The name is here in its Lat. form. GCT 60, Andree 125 D2, Baed. NI 442, IA 288, 3; EI XXVII, 92-6; Matthias 158-9, 233.

Between Piacenza and Vercelli (43) the Roman road, running via Pavia (Rom. Ticinum) and Lomello (Rom. Laumellum) (cp. IA 347, 1-3), seems to have been followed by the pilgrims for only a short distance.

Sancte Andrea (39), “St. Andrew’s.” Stubbs’s “Case di S. Andrea, on the river Lambro,” evidently meaning Corte di Sant’Andrea, prov. Pavia (GCT 60), at the confluence of the Lambro brook (Rom. Lambrus) and the Po (Rom. Padus), is probably right. So Oehlmann III, 250 and Schulte I, 67.


Pamphica (41), Stubbs and Miller query Pavia (a name replacing in the ninth century Rom. Ticinum), on the Ticino about 3 km above its junction with the Po. GCT 59, Andree 125 D2, Baed. NI 132-5, EI XXVI, 542-9. Pavia would be the natural stopping place at this stage of the journey, though this identification (accepted by Oehlmann III, 250 and Schulte I, 67) offers formal difficulties. If Ms. Pamphica does stand for Pavia — and Pavia appears in many medieval itineraries as the station between Piacenza and Vercelli (see Oehlmann IV, 296-7) —, the Ms. form shows considerable distortion. We may begin by noting the eighth- and ninth-century forms Papeia, Pavia: see Egidio Gorra, “Il Nome di Pavia,” Bollettino della società paesana di storia patria IV (1904), 536 n. i, 560-1, 566-7; and Oliveri 416-7 under “Pavia.” If forms such as Papeia lie behind the Ms. Pamphica, one might assume that Ms. -ica represents a misreading of -eia and the -m- the expansion of an accidental mark or stroke mistaken for an m-abbreviation. Could Pamphiea as a genuine by-form of Papeia or Pavia have stood in the prototext? Such a possibility finds some slight support in the entry Pompeja super Pudam, a station in the itinerary (A.D. 1211-12) of the Frisian Abbot Emo, which Oehlmann (IV, 297 col. I) and Schulte (I, 67) equate with Pavia; if this latter identification is correct, Emo’s qualifying “on the Po” is obviously not quite right. A puzzle.

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Tremel (42), Tromello on the Terdoppio, prov. Pavia, GCT 58, Andree 125 C2. On Ms. 'Tremel' for 'Tremel' see p. 233 above. On this name of uncertain etymology see Olivieri 555 under ‘Tromello.’

Vercel (43), Vercelli at the confluence of the Sesia and the Canterana, prov. Vercelli. GCT 57, Andree 125 C2, Baed. NI 221, EI XXXV, 147–8; Mathias 209, 237. Rom. Vercellae fem. plur., an important Roman route-junction; Gröhler I, 226–7, Nissen II, i, 176. On the modern form Vercelli (petrified locative) see Serra 152 n. 1 (top). The name appears here in anglicized form, comparable to Verceil (probably from loc. pl. Vecellis) in the Old-English Chronicle, F-text sub ann. 1049; cp. OFr Verzels (Wace's Brut, l. 2868), later Vercoux.

At Vercelli we come back to the Roman road of IA routes 350, 7—351—352, 1 (Vevey; Switzerland).

Sancte Agath (44), Santhià, prov. Vercelli. Hook misreads as Agatha, Stubbs scc for sc. Lat. Sancta Agatha. GCT 43, Andree 125 C2, Baed. NI 221. Tradition identifies Santhià with the Rom. Vicus viae longae; more recent scholarship prefers identification with the free town of Quadra (El XXX, 781).

Ivere (45), Ivrea on the Dora Baltea (Rom. Dura maior), prov. Aosta. Eporódia of IA 351, 1 (Nissen II, i, 169–72; PW 11. Halbb., Stuttgart 1997, col. 249–50), later Ivreia (Oehlmann III, 234). The name is Celtic: Gröhler I, 40, 152. GCT 42, Andree 125 B2, Baed. NI 209, EI XX, 73–5. Note that the Ms. form preserves the original initial E- and the -er- (older -er-). For medieval German adaptations see Matthias 120 and further Constantino Vigro, “Il Nome di Ivrea,” Biblioteca della società storica subalpina IV (Pinerolo, 1900), ix-xii; Scheffel 182; and for derived gentile names Serra 47.

With Ivrea the travellers leave the Lombard plain and proceed up the right side of the Val-d'Aosta (Scheffel 182) into the Pennine Alps.

Publei (46). The Ms. form would suggest the name-type *Publius of Kaspers 146 §322: Publy (Jura, France), Publay (Haute-Savoie, France); yet neither this nor the Ms. form seems to correspond formally to the identifications hazarded thus far. Stubbs identifies it with “Poley, near Aosta,” a place which I have not been able to find on any map or in any list of place-names; it is perhaps an error or misprint for Pollein mentioned below. Miller suggests “Plou near Verrès,” apparently confusing “Plout” (GCT 29), 3 km up the river from Verrès with “Plou” (GCT 29) which is more than halfway up the valley between Verrès (now Castel Verrès: GCT 29) and Aosta (GCT 28). Oehlmann III, 235, 250 and Scheffel 183 equate the modern Pollein with Publia of medieval itineraries and this identification is accepted by Schulte I, 67. Pollein (prov. Aosta) is, then, perhaps right.


The route leaves the Val-d'Aosta and turns NW toward the Great St. Bernard pass (Rom. Alpis poenina, Nissen I, 159–60) to the last stop on what is now Italian territory.

The travellers now proceed over the Great St. Bernard pass (2491 m), though this is not specifically mentioned (see map in EI II, 638 and text in same p. 639, col. 2, for this route). The pass was until about the thirteenth century commonly referred to in Latin as Mons Iovis, an obvious sanctuary name, in Old French as Mon(t)gieu and the like (the small level area at the top of the pass is still called “plan de Joux”), in Old English Mungtigof and the like (see E. Sievers-A. S. Cook, An Old English Grammar, 3d ed., §§192, 2 and 196, 3), and in Old Icelandic Mundjo-jja (see R. Meissner, Zs. f. deutsches Altertum XLVII, 1903–4, 194–6). The medieval name is derived from a temple to Jupiter on this site, in turn perhaps interpretatio romana for the shrine of a Celtic divinity; the modern designation “Great St. Bernard pass” is late and is derived from the Augustine hospice founded ca. 980 by St. Bernard of Menthon (Haute-Savoie, France). In addition to Oehlmann, Schulte and Tyler cited in note 10 above, see additionally on the pass in the Middle Ages EI II, 644 col. 1 and XXX, 620–1 (art. “San Bernardo, Colle del”), W. A. B. Coolidge, “The Saracens in the Alps,” The Alpine Journal IX (1879), 276 n. 1, Joh. Hoops ed., Reallexikon d. german. Altertumskunde, art. “Alpenpässe” §6 (Vol. I, p. 69, col. 1), and for this and other sanctuary names in France Longnon 110–15.


The course continues on IA route 351 down the narrow Val d’Entremont.

*Ursiores* (50), Orsières (Germ. Urseren) on the Drance, cant. Wallis. TAS 529, Andree 83 D4, Baed. Swi. 368. Among early forms of this name may be noted *Ursaria* 972; the name presumably means “region frequented by bears” (Lat. ursus). Jaccard 321, 241 (Louise), 362 (Praz du Sex); Studer 258 under “Ursern”; for this and other animal names in place-names see Gröbler II, 202 and Dauzat 22.

The travellers presumably passed through Martigny-Ville (med. Lat. *Martiniacum*, Germ. Martinach; Gröbler I, 187, 266, Jaccard 263–4), Gallo-Roman *Octodurum*: IA 351, 5 (Gröbler I, 104), near the confluence of the Drance and the (Swiss) Rhône (TAS 526, Andree 83 C4, Baed. Swi. 342) and descend the valley of the Rhône (OHG, MHG *Rötien*).


*Burbulei* (52). Unidentified. Stubbs queries and Miller suggests *Ver(s)-Vey* (probably from Lat. *versus viam* “near the highway”), cant. Wallis, though there can be no formal connection. Schulte I, 67 leaves the site unidentified. Vervey is a hamlet ca. 3,5 km down the valley beyond Aigle (Jaccard 505) and 1,5 km in from the Rhône. TAS 475. The Ms. form suggests a name-type *Burbiliaeum* of Kaspers 218 §539: Bourbilly (Côte-d’Or, France) and Borbigo (part of the town of Mira, prov. Venezia, Italy). The site here referred to must be somewhere in the lower valley of the (Swiss) Rhône or on or near the shore of Lake Geneva between [244]
Villeneuve (older name *Compendiacum: Jaccard 102 under “Compengiez”) and Vevey (53, below).

*Vivae* (53), evidently Vevey (Germ. Vivis) on the Veveyse, cant. Waadt; so Stubbs and Miller. Rom. *Viviscum*: IA 352, 1. TAS 464; Andree 83 C3; Baed. Swi. 313; Studer 266; Jaccard 506–7; Mottaz II, 751–2; Gröhrler I, 182. Ms. *Vivae* cannot be quite right, though it is not altogether easy to retrace the steps of the error or even to determine its precise nature. The final -e may represent a misread -i of an original *Vivei* (cp. *Bruvæi*-76 below) or the -e may be right and the a stand for an s of the diarist’s *Vivisc* (cp. Rom. *Viviscum*, Germ. Vivis): the latter interpretation is perhaps the more likely.

*Losanna* (54), Lausanne on the now canalized Flon and just in from Lake Geneva, cant. Waadt. TAS 438 and 438b, Andree 83 C3, Baed. Swi. 308–9. *Lacu Lasonio* of IA 348, 2 seems to refer to Lake Geneva: see Dauzat 204. The place-name has commonly been presumed to look back to a Celtic personal name *Lauus or Lousos* (so Gröhrler I, 172; Studer 149–50; Jaccard 225–6; Mottaz II, 44–51), but more recently a strong case has been made out for a derivation from a sb. *lousa* (*lauza*) “slab of stone,” perhaps with reference to a particular monolith (Pierre-Ouvin) near the chateau of Vidy: the compound *lous-onna* might then designate the guardian divinity of the rock (P. Aebischer, “Le nom de Lausanne,” *Zs. f. schweizer. Geschichte* XI, 1931, 265 ff., esp. pp. 284–7, 295).

At Lausanne the route leaves the lake and, corresponding to IA 348, 2–3, turns NNW for some 25 km: see Grenier i, 166–7 (map) for the route Lausanne-Besançon.

*Urba* (55), Orbe (Germ. Orbach) on the Orbe, cant. Waadt. TAS 292, Andree 83 C3, Baed. Swi. 270. IA 348, 3: *Urba*. On this Ligurian name see Serra 126 n.1; Studer 185; Jaccard 317; Mottaz II, 348–50. Gröhrler I, 349–50. There was a former suburb of Orbe, known as *in Tabernis* “at the taverns,” and this seems to be preserved in

*Antifer* (56), perhaps Tavel, old suburb of Orbe (55). Stubbs “probably Yverdun,” Miller “cp. Iverdun,” but there can be no formal connection between Antifer and the modern and older forms of Yverdun (Gallo-Rom. *Eburudunum*: Studer 185 under “Orbe”; Jaccard 531–2; Dauzat 73; Gröhrler I, 101, II, 184; Aebischer, *Revue Celtique* XLIV, 1927, 322–3). Apart from formal objections, there is less of matter of direction: the travellers are proceeding from Orbe to Pontarlier (57) in France, and Yverdun (Germ. Ifferten) on the lake of Neuchâtel (Andree 83 C3), though only 9–10 km. NE of Orbe, is at right angles to their route. The key to the correct identification of Ms. *Antifer* is almost surely to be found in the phrase: *in fine Tabernis sine Urbe*, quoted by Mottaz II, 349 col. 2; see also Jaccard 453–4: “Tavel” 3, p. 454 top; also Schulte I, 67 and n. 2. Ms.-*tifer* thus most likely stands for the diarist’s *Tafern* or the like (Lat. *taberna* “inn” “tavern”: see Gröhrler II, 49–50) while the *An-* presumably corresponds to some preposition or conjunction, perhaps *Lat. in* or *ad*. Out of *in* or *ad tafern* of the prototext some scribe seems then to have fashioned an independent locality and duly provided it with a roman numeral (see p. 234 above).

The route now presumably goes up the valley of the Orbe through the Col de Jouinge (Schulte I, 43; Grenier i, 166) and then down the valley of the Doubs into France.

*Punt erlin* (57), evidently Pontarlier on the Doubs, dep. Jura, France. Now a French customs frontier. CF XXV-21, Andree 83 B3 and 92 F3, Muirhead NEF 288. The name looks back to Rom. (*Pons* Ariorica (IA 348, 4) or perhaps more rightly Ariorica (PW 3. Hallebn., Stuttgart 1895, col. 835: “Ariorica,” 3; Gröhrler II, 147). On Lat. *pons* “bridge” “bridge-head” in place-names see *Puntremel* (31). If the identification with Pontarlier is correct, one must assume that the second element
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is distorted, with an initial e- for a- and with an historically false final -n (perhaps a misreading for an Insular r). However, neither Ms. -n nor the modern -ier are historically justifiable; has the modern name at some stage been adapted to place-names in -ier < Gmc. -ītr? Cp. Longnon 215-6 §879-91. See further Grenier i, 137.

Nos (58), Nods, dep. Doubs. So and probably rightly Stubbs and Miller. CF XXIV, XXV-20. Schulte I, 67 would identify Ms. Nos with Lodis (CF XXIV-20, Andree 92 F2), but Nods, on the main route from Pontarlier to Besançon is more likely right; see Grenier i, 167 (map). I know of no discussion of the etymology of this French name but suspect that it may be identical with Swiss Nods (Jaccard 380), a plural formation based on OFr no “trough” (in a geographic sense) with an orthographic d (see ML 5859 §3: *naucum). Another possibility, though formally less likely, is Fr. noue f. “swampy ground” (ML 5853: *nau∂, *nau∂), represented in the Swiss La Noz and Combe des Noz (Jaccard 311); for French examples see Longnon 603-4 §2773. The location of Nods, dep. Doubs, suits either etymology.

Bysiceon (59), no doubt Besançon on the Doubs, dep. Doubs. CF XXIV-20, Andree 92 F2, Muirhead NEF 281-4. Rom. Vesontio (Caesar), IA 348, 5: Visontione. Something is wrong with the Ms. spelling; one might imagine that the diarist wrote Bysunceon or the like. Gröhler I, 56; Serra 141, §52; Dauzat 125; Grenier i, 434 (map).

A Roman road leads to Seveux (61).

Cussei (60), Cussey-sur-l’Ognon near the Bois de Cussey, dep. Doubs. CF XXIV-19, Andree 92 E2. The site of a Roman bridge (Grenier i, 434, map). The name, perhaps better spelled *Cussei, looks back to Rom. Cussiacus (Longnon Atlas 177), in turn probably based on the personal name Cusius or Cuius (Gröhler I, 244-5; Kaspers 68 §106).

Sefui (61), Seveux-sur-Saône, dep. Haute-Saône. So Stubbs (with the most unlikely alternative “Savoyeux”) and Miller. CF XXIII-18, Andree 92 E2, Muirhead NEF 182-3, Gröhler I, 100. Gallo-Roman Sebodiamum (PW 3, Halbb., Stuttgart 1921, col. 1076-7). Like Cussey (60) this is the site of a Roman bridge (Grenier i, 434, map). The Ms. spelling -ui is obviously miswritten for -iu (see p. 233 above); the -f- stands according to OE orthographic practice for -v-.

The route now presumably proceeds up the Salon, a tributary of the Saône, in the general direction of

Grenant (62), Grenant on the Saolon, tributary of the Salon, dep. Haute-Marne. CF XXIII-18, DT Haute-Marne 83: earliest reference is Grenant 1120. This not uncommon name-type (Longnon 52 §111) is based on a Gaulish *grano-nants “sandy valley” (Dauzat 72 note; on the element nant- see Gröhler I, 137).

The route now crosses the Langres plateau and turns down the Marne valley.

Oisma (63), Hûmes on the Marne and 6 km beyond Langres (Rom. Lingones); that this name is repeated at the end of the itinerary (i.e. after 80) seems not to have been noted. CF XXII-17, Andree 92 E2. The place-name is based on the Gaulish tribal name Os(s)isni “the bold ones”: Gröhler I, 83; Serra 105 (petrified locative pl.); Longnon 101-2 §399; DT Haute-Marne 88-9: Usma villa 921(?); Longnon Atlas 193. Miller’s suggestion that (63) is Ormancey, 9 km W of Hûmes, is most unlikely (CF XXII-17, DT Haute-Marne 127-8: Ormencion 1188).

Beyond Hûmes (63) the Englishmen leave the Marne and proceed some distance down the Aube before bending back N toward the Marne which they rejoin at Châlons (69).

Blac vile (64). Stubbs and Miller (who misreads Bloescule) identify this with [246]
Blessonville (dep. Haute-Marne, CF XXII–16), 7 km NE of Château-villain, though this offers formal difficulties, besides being somewhat N of the route to the Aube. For Blessonville see DT Haute-Marne 18: Blacqueville or the like, though no such name is to be found in the immediate vicinity (for such a name in dep. Seine-et-Loire see Longnon 296 §1236); the element blacqueville might formally correspond to Ligurian *blaca “thicket” (Gröbler II, 126). Nevertheless, the identification with Blessonville may be right, in which case Ms. blac- must be understood as distorted from a blocun- of the prototext: Ms. a coming from an e via a wrongly hooked e (see p. 234 above) and with the loss of u (for un) by haplography before the u- of uile: *Blecú uile.

Bar (65), Bar-sur-Aube, dep. Aube. CF XXI–15, 16; Andree 89 D4; Muirhead NEF 171. The name is based on a Gallo-Rom. barrum “obstruction” “barrier.” Gröbler II, 110–12; DT Aube 10–11: Barrum super Albam 1061.


Fontaine (68), quite probably, as Miller suggests, Fontaine-sur-Coole, dep. Marne, some 20 km S of Châlons-sur-Marne (69). CF XXI–13; DT Marne: no reference before 1200. It may be noted that the Coole flows into the Marne just above Châlons (69), the next submansio. The name, based on late Lat. fontana “spring” “fountain,” is a common name-type: Dauzat 24, Gröbler II, 225–6.


In the main the route now follows the highway Rheims—St. Quentin, NW across the Aisne (Grenier i, 445 map and 447 map).

Corbenei (71), Corbeny, dep. Aisne. CF XX, XIX–11; Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 111. DT Aisne 76: Cobrenacum 982, a formation on the personal name Corbus (Kaspars 239–40 §386, Skok 77 §93, Gröbler I, 206). From 906 Corbeny was the site of a priory dedicated to St. Marculf (Saint-Marcouf).

Mund Lodiun (?), less likely -sin (72) (as read by Hook, Stubbs and Miller), Laon, dep. Aisne. Miller further misreads Loderuim. CF XIX–10, Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 112–3. The earliest recorded name of this site is Gregory of Tours’s Gallo-Rom. Lugduum, probably meaning “the little fortification”; in the seventh century it is Laudunum. Longnon 32 §53; Gröbler I, 99; Grenier i, 447; DT Aisne 149–51: Laudunum mons 920. Mund (Lat. mons, mont-) refers to the solitary high hill above
the Ardon on which Laon is situated (Gröhler II, 71 ff.). The Ms. form of the second element, whether -un or -uin (cp. Samaran-79 below) cannot be right; one wants -un and that is quite likely what the diarist wrote (for scribal confusion of minims see pp. 233–34 above).

The travellers now set out on a longish stretch of over 100 km between Laon (72) and Arras (75). The next name (73) is especially difficult.

Martinwæð (73). Miller misreads Martinpoeder. A crux. Stubbs makes three suggestions, of which the first two are conditioned on the location of (74) which is all but certainly Doigny near Pérone: (1) St. Martin on the Amignon (? for Omignon, CF XVIII–9); (2) Mont-Saint-Martin, dep. Aisne, 2 km S of Gouy near Le Câtelet on the road St. Quentin–Éstrées (CF XVIII–9; DT Aisne 186: Mons sancti Martini 1123), a foundation apparently established in the twelfth century; (3) somewhat as an afterthought Stubbs mentions Martinpuich, dep. Pas-de-Calais (CF XVII–8; DT Pas-de-Calais 247–8: Martinput 1202; Martini putus of Gröhler II, 235–6). On historical, geographical and formal grounds none of these are at all likely identifications. To return to Martinwæð. That the first element almost certainly refers to St. Martin is of little help since the number of place-names in this general region which include the name of this saint are, as elsewhere in France (see e.g. La Grande Encyclopédie XIX, 216–22), countless. The second element (-wæð) likewise offers difficulties. Formally weð may be viewed as the late OE neut. sb. meaning “ford,” a loan from ON vàð n. “ford”; but weð is apparently only recorded once in OE (OEChron. D-text, sub ann. 1073, where the corresponding E-text has the normal OE equivalent (ge)wead n. “ford”). If, however, Ms. weð is genuine and does mean “ford” here, one might think of it as rendering a Lat. vadum “ford” and that the whole name corresponded to a Lat. (Sancti) Martini vadum “St. Martin’s ford,” of which the second element might later appear in northern France as -wæz (see Longnon 173–4, Gröhler II, 219–20) or -gué (cp. ML 9120). But I can find no Martingue or Martinwez or the like in the region; DT Somme has, to be sure, not yet been issued. One would expect Martinwæð to be near La Fère (dep. Aisne) or St. Quentin (dep. Aisne) or Ham (dep. Somme). A crux.

Duin (74), almost certainly Doigny on the Cologne (Rom. Grusio f.), 3 km E of Pérone, dep. Somme (CF XVIII–9, Andree 89 C3, Muirhead NEF 97). So Miller; Stubbs suggests hesitantly Douen (alternate older spelling of Doigny). Stubbs’s second suggestion of Thun-l’Évêque on the Escaut, 7 km NE of Cambrai (CF XVIII–8) is formally quite unlikely. The early forms of Doigny are very varied, e.g. Domincum, Donius 977; later, among others, is Doin, close to the Ms. Duin. Doigny was early the site of an important fortification and of a priory (at least as early as 1117 and probably earlier). For early forms and history see Paul de Cagny, Histoire de l’arrondissement de Pérone et de plusieurs localités circonvoisines I (Pérone, 1869), 221–8. Swiss Duin (Jaccard 141) and Lat. Duiña (Duennae) vicus (Dennevy, Saône-et-Loire: Longnon 124 §514, Gröhler II, 248) are etymologically unrelated to Doigny.

Aberats (75), Arras on the Scarpe, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVII–7, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 47. Miller misreads Ad(d)erats and queries Arras. The Gallo-Rom. name Nemetocennum, Nemetacum of IA 379, 2 (a very important route-junction) was later replaced by the Gaulish tribal name Atrebatès whether the later forms. PW 33. Halbß., Stuttgart 1935, col. 2381–2: Nemetacum; Longnon 103 §413; Longnon Atlas 129; Gröhler I, 89; Serra 96, 201 (as a petrified locative plur.); DT Pas-de-Calais 14–5. On Carolingian forms of the type Atradis behind Ms. Aberats see Ettmayer, ZONP II (1927), 183; on -er- with epenthetic e cp. Suteria (4). On the route Arras—Thérouanne see Grenier i, 397–8 and 450 (map).

Brusoei (76), Bruay on the Lawe, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVII–7, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 54. Miller misreads Brusoei (-poëi?). Among the early forms are [ 248 ]
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Bruhaion 975, Bruai ca. 1000 (DT Pas-de-Calais 72–3); Kapers 42 §49 notes that the etymological type is uncertain, perhaps *Brugacum. The Ms. form with -wai (written with the OE wynn-rune) may reflect a folk-etymological association with OE wæg m. “way” “route.”

Teran burh (77), Thérouanne on the Lys, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVI–6, Andree 89 B2, Muirhead NEF 46. Rom. civitas Morinorum, later replaced by the Gallo-Rom. Tarouanne, Tervanne (PW 8. Halbb., Stuttgart 1932, col. 2451–2), whence the modern name. IA. 379, 1; Longnon 104 §417; Gröhler I, 152–3; DT Pas-de-Calais 366–7; Grenier i, 314 and n. 1 (perhaps a theophorous name). The old town was destroyed by Charles V in 1553; the present village, built at the end of the sixteenth century, is on the site of a suburb of the old town (Ancienne Ville). The Ms. form of the first element (teran) is almost surely miswritten for terwan or teruan; cp. Law- man’s Brut (ca. 1175–85), v. 27943: Teruae.

Gisne (78), Guitens, about 7 km S of Calais, dep. Pas-de-Calais. CF XVI–5, Andree 89 A2, Muirhead NEF 17 (middle). DT Pas-de-Calais 178–9: Gisna 807.

From Guitens to the Channel (the diarist’s ad mare) there were in the Middle Ages two obvious routes, one to Calais, another via Sombres to the now sand-filled harbor of Wissant (DT Pas-de-Calais iii), and it is probably over the latter route that the English travellers passed.

Sumeran (?) (so read by Hook, Stubbs and Miller), less likely Suijeran (79). The Ms. form is not absolutely certain and offers a palaeographical problem identical with that of Mund Loðum (-uin?) (72 above). If Stubbs’s suggestion of the hamlet of Sombres, 2 km NE of Wissant (GF XV–5, Andree 89 A2), dep. Pas-de-Calais, is right, we have here a very early form; DT Pas-de-Calais 361: Sombres 1171, differs most significantly from the Ms. form in the lack of final -n. That an -n-suffix may, however, have been original is suggested by the 1337 plur. form Sombrenes (in a terrier of Samer); no other name in the vicinity offers fewer formal difficulties.

The diarist ends his report abruptly without so much as a hint of a happy homecoming corresponding to the notice of the arrival in Rome (Aduentus . . . ad Romam) with which the text begins. All we have after Sumeran (?) is the curious repetition of the name Oisma as noted under (63) above. The modern reader may, however, think of the words chanted by Wagner’s pilgrims (Tannhauser III, i) as they pass into the Wartburg valley:

Beglückt darf nun dich, o Heimat, ich schauen
und grüßen froh deine liebliche Auen!
Nun lass ich ruhn den Wanderstab!

V

The significance of this pilgrim-diary for the student of the Middle Ages in general and of pre-Conquest England in particular is, on account of its more than concise style, potential rather than obvious; for in contrast to certain other medieval itineraries and guidebooks to medieval Rome it is a skeleton to which flesh and blood must be added if we are to live over Archbishop Sigeric’s trip with some sense of actuality. A few of the activities of the English party while in Rome are, to be sure, properly described, but in the main the diary is a rather bare list of names, properly speaking two lists: (1) a catalog of the Roman churches visited; (2) an itinerary of the home-journey from Rome to the Channel. The first problem is, then, to identify as precisely as possible the churches of Rome and the sub-


18 Harvard Theological Review, art. cit.
M unus or stopping places of the itinerary. The present paper has attempted to solve as far as is possible for the moment this second element in the first problem presented by the diary. But here a considerable number of localities still defy sure identification or identification at all;19 it is to be hoped that these puzzles will yield to the combined efforts of the palaeographer (to suggest possible sources of distortion), the place-name student (with special knowledge of the regions traversed and special collectanæa) and the historian. Once the first and particular problem of identification is out of the way, there arises the more general and really more significant question of why — when not due to the chance of nightfall, bad weather, broken bridges and the like —, why certain of the smaller places appear as sub-mansio.nes. Had some of these a contemporary reputation for hospitality or special religious associations? The historian will be able to furnish satisfying answers to many of these questions and thus give us a broader insight into the conditions of what is probably not an untypical overland journey from Rome to Canterbury.

And finally, the present document deserves full recognition as a literary work. Not written in the grand manner, to be sure, it is, nevertheless, the earliest travel-diary from the pen of an Englishman and the only known document of its kind from Anglo-Saxon England: if short in words, it is long in meaning. With time and specialized study of the nature suggested above this little diary may yield to the student of England's past a harvest considerably richer than its short and often poorly transmitted text might appear to offer.

VI. Abbreviations


CF Carte de la France dressée par le service vicinal par ordre du Ministre de l'Intérieur à l'échelle du 100,000 ème, Paris: Hachette, 1879–94.


DT Dictionnaire topographique de la France, Paris, 1861 ff. After this general abbreviation follows the name of the department.


Jaccard Henri Jaccard, Essai de toponymie: origine des noms de lieux habités et de lieux

19 Consider, for example, the uncertainties, (24), (32), (34), (35), (37), (41), (46), (52), (64), (73), (80) in §IV above.
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Kaspers Willy Kaspers, Etymologische Untersuchungen über die mit -ACUM, -ANUM, -ASCUM und -USCUM gebildeten nordfranzösischen Ortsnamen, Halle, 1918.

Longnon Auguste Longnon, Les Noms de lieux de la France; leur origine, leur signification, leurs transformations, Paris, 1920.


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Matthias Walther Matthias, Die geographische Nomenclatur Italiens im altdeutschen Schriftum, Leipzig, 1912.

Müller Konrad Müller, Mappaemundi, die ältesten Weltkarten. 3. Heft: Die kleineren Weltkarten, Stuttgart, 1895, pp. 156–57 for text.


Mottaz Eugène Mottaz, Dictionnaire historique, géographique et statistique du canton de Vaud (Waladt), 2 vols., Lausanne, 1921.


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Fieri Silvio Pieri, Toponomastica della Valle dell’Arno, Rome, 1919; this is a separately printed supplement to the Rendiconti of the R. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 5th ser., Vol. XXVII, Rome, 1918.


Schütte Ludwig Schütte, Der Alpeninnenpass des Monte Bardone und die deutschen Kaiser (Historische Studien, Vol. XXVII), Berlin: Ebering, 1901.

Serra Giandomenico Serra, Contributo toponomastico alla teoria della continuità nel medioevo della comunità rurali romane e preromane dell’Italia Superiore (Biblioteca Dacoromanica conduus de Sextil Puščariu, No. IV), Kolosvár, (Klausenburg, Cluj), Hungary, 1931.


Studer Julius Studer, Schweizer Ortsnamen, Zürich, 1896.

TAS Topographischer Atlas der Schweiz, Bern, 1870 ff.
Tomassetti  G. Tomassetti, "Della Campagna Romana nel Medio Evo," continued through several early volumes of Archivio della società Romana di storia patria; references to vol. and page.
Werlauff  E. C. Werlauff ed., Symbolae ad Geographiam Medii Ævi ex Monumentis islandicis, Copenhagen, 1821.
ZONF  Zeitschrift für Ortsnamenforschung, Munich 1925 f.
A Technical Construction in Old English

Translation Loans in -lic

L. K. SHOOK, C.S.B.

A detailed study of the OE grammatical terms appearing in Ælfric’s Latin Grammar sheds much light on the flexibility and self-sufficiency of English during the period of the Benedictine reform of the late tenth century. In these years, as scholars have so adequately indicated, the English vocabulary was increased by numerous Latin loanwords of a technical nature. Many of these loanwords were neither direct borrowings nor hybrids, but were new formations sometimes known as semantic and translation loans, and these are of special interest to the student of...

1 Julius Zupitza ed., Ælfrics Grammatik und Glossar. Erste Abteilung: Text und Varianten (Sammlung englischer Denkmäler, I), Berlin 1880. I have already made a complete analysis of the grammatical terms of Ælfric’s Grammar and hope to publish it shortly under the title: Ælfric’s Latin Grammar: A Study in Old-English Grammatical Terminology.


3 As, for example, OE alb “alb”, aëns “parr” from Lat. albus, aëns, parr/pärtum.

4 That is, words formed on a foreign base with a native affix, e.g. OE declinian, declinning from Lat. declinare, declinatio.

5 A semantic loan is a native word to which a new meaning has been added under the influence of a foreign word, e.g. OE hād “rank,” “person” “sex” comes to mean “grammatical person” under the influence of Lat. persona. Similarly OE hād “shape” “figure” is given the technical meanings “shape of a letter” “grammatical figure” “figure of speech” under the influence of Lat. figura.

6 A translation loan is a new formation made up of native elements translating a foreign word, e.g. OE forsetnes for Lat. praepositio, OE gestrîndelic for Lat. genitivus. Sometimes, as in the case of forsetnnes, the new term is constructed according to the pattern of the foreign original. Sometimes, as in gestrîndelic, the new formation departs radically from the structural pattern of the original, and here the investigator is apparently confronted with a native speech-habit.


The distinction between semantic loans and translation loans is said by some to be invalid. Kroe sch, for example, calls all such terms “semantic borrowings.” However, the fact remains that the difference, though meticulous perhaps, is real. In the case of a semantic loan, only a meaning has been borrowed, in the case of a translation loan, not only has the meaning been borrowed but also the very concept of the word as a distinct lexical unit. [ 253 ]
the English language because they sometimes preserve native speech-habits and afford, accordingly, an insight into the nature of the language.

Adjectives and adverbs in -lic, -liche make up a relatively large group of the translation loans found in the writings of Ælfric. Structurally speaking, such adjectival and adverbial formations are of two kinds: 1. simplex + -lic(e), e.g. dædlic “active,” niðlic “temporal,” werlic “masculine”; 2. present participle + -lic(e), e.g. gestryndlic “genitive,” bræuiendlicc “passive.” In the first case, the new term conforms to a pattern (viz. simplex + lic) found not only in earlier OE, but in the related Gmc languages as well. In the second case, the construction (present participle + lic) apparently also evolves from a native speech habit since it follows no foreign pattern. Moreover, judging from the translation loans in Ælfric’s Grammar, this present participle + lic construction has a technical force approaching or rendering that of Latin adjectives in -ivus.

Latin Adjectives in -ivus (-tivus)

The number of Latin adjectives with the -ivus suffix is large, but few of them are of frequent occurrence and almost none seem to be of popular origin. In the main they are technical terms used in the fields of agriculture, architecture, military science, music, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, law, religion, philosophy, rhetoric, and grammar. Proportionately, grammatical terms constitute here a most significant group, covering the manifold subdivisions of the parts of speech and of the other chief grammatical categories. Although sometimes used substantively, these words are adjectival in form and can always, at least by implication, be regarded as modifying one or more of the following substantives: vox, vocabulum, nomen, declinatio, casus, gradus, verbum, modus, pronomen, particula, aderbiwm, conjunctio, praepositio, littera, syllaba, species.

No less than forty-eight Latin grammatical terms in -ivus appear in Ælfric’s Grammar. These are: ablative, abnegatives, accusatives, actives, adjectives, adversatives, appellatives, comparatives, completives (or expletives), confirmatives (or adformatives), congregatives, conjunctivus, copulatives, datives, defectives, denominations, deortatives, demonstratives, desideratives, diminutives, derivatives, disjectives, disjunctives, dubitative, expletives (or completives), frequentatives, genitics, imperatives, inclinations, indicatives, infinitives, infinitivos, interrogatives, irritatives, meditations, nominatives, optatives, orationis, passivus, relatives, remissives, subjonctives, superlatives, vocatives.

The more common adjectival form in early OE is a simplex, e.g. leòf “dear,” but compounds with -lic, e.g. leòflíc “dearly,” are to be found. Cp. Go. ibnaleiks “equal,” lit. “having an equal body,” OHG wilflíc, ON hønnlig “womanly.” There appears to be no difference in meaning between the simplex and the compound with -lic. See Jakob Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik (Göttingen 1831), III, 122; Fried. Kluge, Nominale Stammbildungslehre der altgermanischen Dialekte (3d ed., Halle 1926), pp. 114–115, #257; Karl Uhler, Die Bedeutungs-gleichheit der altenglischen Adjektiva und Adverbia mit und ohne -lic, Írist, Heidelberg 1926. For a contrary opinion, see Moritz Scheinert, “Die Adjektiva im Beowulffpoe,” (Paul-Braune) Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur XXX (1905), 345 ff.


“...This group of Latin adjectives has been treated at length by Breitmeyer in a dissertation presented to the University of Geneva. See Jules Breitmeyer, Le Suffrage latin -ivus (Geneva 1933). The main linguistic problem is the source of the -iv- before the IE *-oo- suffix. Several explanations have been offered, e.g. Karl Brugmann, Grundris der altl. Grammatik d. idg. Sprachen (Strassburg 1892), II, 128, n. 2; (‘Vervinkelijke Nominal-komposita des griechischen und des lateinischen Wörter auf -ica, -icus, -icus, -ix und Verwandtes.” Indogermanische Forschungen XV (1903), 25 ff.; Hermann Hirt, “Zur Bildung auf -icz” IF XXXI (1912), 5; Antoine Meillet, Études sur le vocabulaire du vieux slave (Paris, 1905), p. 365, but none is entirely satisfactory. The pre-Latin history of the suffix is not pertinent here.

For word-lists see Breitmeyer, op. cit., pp. 168–271.
All show the expanded -tius suffix. With one exception (primitivus) they are formed on the base of the perfect participle (e.g. on adieco-, deriva-, passa-, posses-) + -tius. The base of primitivus is not a perfect participial stem but pri-mi- (IE *pri-) which appears also in Lat. pri-mi-tiae, f. pl., and pri-mi-tus, adv.

The fundamental sense of the suffix is probably "having the character or form of." In the case of the grammatical terms this sense varies between a passive and a quasi-active force. Infinitivus "having the character of being unlimited," derivativus "having the character of having been derived," adiectivus "having the character of having been added" are, for example, passive. Imperativus "having the character of expressing a command," negativus "having the character of expressing negation" are quasi-active. The majority of grammatical terms in -ivus are of this latter quasi-active type. There are a number of instances in Latin where the -ivus suffix is replaced by alternative suffixes without change of meaning; sometimes, for example, by -icius (adiecticius beside adiectivus), or -orius (negatorius beside negativus). Other suffixes, -ibilis, -alis, turn up, though usually with a slight variation in meaning.

OE Renderings of Latin Adjectives in -ivus

The frequency of the -ivus (-tius) suffix in grammatical terminology is reflected in Ælfric's OE grammatical terms. Although he does not in every instance render these technical terms according to the same pattern, it is clear that an OE adjectival formation of present participle + -lic is by far the favorite method and was obviously felt to approach in meaning the Latin adjectives in -ivus.

The following methods of handling grammatical terms in -ivus may be distinguished.

1. Present participle + -lic.
   1. atbrædentlic for ablativus.
   2. ætwegiendlic for demonstrativus.
   3. geægnigendlic for possessivus.
   4. æhylendlic for possessivus.
   5. æscendendlic for interrogativus.
   6. æscrigendlic for disjunctius.
   7. æslacigendlic for remissivus.
   8. ætærigendlic for defectivus.
   9. bebeodendlic for imperativus.
  10. biægigendlic for indicativus.
  11. geægigendlic for vocativus and appellativus.
  12. clipigendlic for vocativus.
  13. edlesendlic for relatius.
  14. forbeodendlic for deortiatus.
  15. foresettendlic for praepositius.
  16. forgigendlic for datione.
  17. gefylidendlic for expletivus and complectivus.

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18. gadrigendic for congregativus.
19. mistihendic for deortatius.
20. nemniendic for nominatius.
21. ofersigendic for superlatius.
22. ofgangendic for dericativus.
23. sméagendic for meditativus.
24. gestríendic for genitivus.
25. swerigendic for iurativus.
26. syndrigendic for discretativus.
27. tyhiendic for ortatius.
28. tógeíscendic for adiectivus.
29. tómiendic for dubitatius.
30. geðóedendic for copulatius.
31. grówiendic for passivus.
32. undertóedendic for subjunctivus, and coniunctivus.
33. ungeendigendic for infinitivus.
34. waniendic for diminutivus.
35. gewilngendic for desideratius.
36. wiðmeten(d)lic for comparativus.
37. wiðsacendic for abnegatius.
38. wréigendic for accusativus.
39. gewysendic for optatius.

2. Present participle.
   1. faestningende for confirmativus.
   2. gelómlécende for frequentativus.
   3. ofcumende\(^\text{11}\) for derivativus.
   4. ofgangende for derivativus.
   5. sěóende for adfirmativus.

3. Substantive or adjective + -lic.
   1. dědílic for activus.
   2. edówítlic for substantivus.
   3. geornfullic for intentivus.
   4. wiðôrnedlic for adversativus.

4. Past participle.
   1. fruncenned\(^\text{12}\) for primitius.

5. Circumlocution.\(^\text{13}\)
   1. geilhte tó ósrum naman for adiectivus.\(^\text{14}\)
   2. forma stepe for positivus.
   3. oðer stepe for comparativus.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{11}\) Ofcumende and ofgangende are variants of ofgangendic.
\(^{12}\) Fruncenned appears on the surface to be an attempt to imitate the past participle at the base of the Latin terms, but in view of the fact that primitius is the one Latin grammatical term with the -ius suffix which is not founded on a past participle, it is probably wiser to regard fruncenned as a figurative rendering of primitius.

\(^{13}\) Circumlocutions are less frequent than one might expect. It is only in the very early part of the Grammar that Latin terms in -ious are rendered by phrases, except of course, for the degrees of comparison where the technical term is clearly the more cumbersome.

\(^{14}\) Elsewhere rendered by tógeíscendic.
\(^{15}\) Also rendered by wiðômeten(d)lic.
4.  ḃridde stæpe for superlativus.\textsuperscript{16}
5.  eal ðæt of naman cynn for denominationus.
6.  Þā gelācniað on ānsealdum for collectivus.

From the foregoing analysis it becomes immediately apparent that the analogy between Ælfric's "present participle + -lice" adjectives and Latin adjectives in -ivus is close. Where Latin shows an occasional substitution of -icius, -orius, -ibilis, -alis for -ivus, OE has an almost equally rare substitution of a present participle, a substantive + -lice, or a periphrasis. But the cases where the present participle + -lice construction is used to render a Latin adjective which is not an -ivus word are even more rare. They are clipigendlice "vowel" for vocalis and ðwendendlice "change-able" for mobilis. It is hardly safe, however, without fuller investigation of all OE words formed on the pattern present participle + -lice, to speak of this pattern as "the usual rendering" of Latin terms in -ivus or to designate it as "the OE technical-adjective pattern," but in view of the consistency with which Ælfric employs it throughout the Grammar it may well be described as "a technical pattern."

\textsuperscript{16} Oferstigendlice.